H. P. GRICE E J. L. SPERANZA: LA CONVERSAZIONE -- I VERBALI: E

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: E

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Eco: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della rosa segnata -- il nome del nome –  semiotica a Bologna.  Umberto Eco (Alessandria, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della rosa segnata -- il nome del nome –  semiotica a Bologna. Grice: “E. thought that his “Guglielmo da Bascavilla” was a clever composite of Holmes, who deciphered the enigma of the Baskervilles, and William Occam – and has his tutee claim that he died of the black plague – but Gal has now discovered he did not!” -- Eco philosophised at the oldest varsity, BolognaGrice: “Of course, ‘varsity’ is over-rated, as I’m sure Cicero would agree! I would not call Eco a philosopher, since his dissertation is on aesthetics in Aquinas! Plus, he wrote a novel!” -- scuola bolognese-- possibly, after Speranza, one of the most Griceian of Italian philosophers (Only Speranza calls himself an Oxonian, rather!“Surely alma mater trumps all!”). Si laurea a TORINO sotto PAREYSON e Guzzo con AQUINO. Estetica semiotica. Fenomenologia di Bongiorno.  Opera aperta” Sophia: Enthusiast Nebbia, with Remo Ceserani eds. Torino: Einaudi Il Cinquecento. Corriere della Sera Historia (Editor). Milano: Motta Il Medioevo (Editor) La Biblioteca di Repubblica-L’Espresso. Il Medioevo. Encyclomedia Publishers.Translations: Idade Media: Barbaros, Cristao e Muçulmanos. Alfragide;, Dom Quixote, Idade Media: Catedrais, Cavaleiros e Cidades, Alfragide: Dom Quixote  Idade Media: Castelos, Mercadores e Poetas.Alfragide: Dom Quixote Ortacag: Barbarlar, Hiristiyanlar, Muslumanlar, Istanbul: ALFA Oetacag: Katedraller, Svalyeler, Sehirler),Istanbul:ALFA La grande Storia. Corriere della Sera, L’antichità. Grecia. Milano: Encyclomedia L’età moderna e contemporanea. La Biblioteca di Repubblica-L’Espresso Il Settecento. Il secolo delle rivoluzioni. Milano: Encyclomedia  (with Fedriga, eds.) Storia della filosofia. Roma Laterza. Milano: EM  (with Pezzini) El museo. Madrid: Casimiro  (with Fedriga, eds.) La filosofia e le sue storie. il nome del nome, lingua perfetta; semiotica, la rosa segnata --. GriceUmberto Eco on Grice in “Cognitive constraints on communication. semantica filosofica. Grice: “St John’s, 1953. I was taken through the Sheldonian yesterday and was struck by how busy Oxford has become—busy, and piously plural. There are student societies for every temperament and every denomination. The Catholic lot, which barely drew breath when I first came up in 1931, now seem positively confident—one hears Hail Mary where once one heard only shuffling and apology. By contrast, the Church of England, officially everywhere, manages to sound oddly absent—as if establishment were a form of muteness.” Editor’s note: what Grice “could have heard of” (with dates), these are the safest institutional milestones:   Oxford University Catholic Club (student society): founded 1878, later renamed the Newman Society in 1888.  So Grice’s “Catholic Club” phrasing is historically apt—even if by 1931 the name “Newman Society” was long established. Oxford University Catholic Chaplaincy: first chaplain appointed 1896.  That gives you a clear reason why organised Catholic student life would be more visible than a purely college-based, informal arrangement. Old Palace (Rose Place) as chaplaincy centre: the chaplaincy moved in 1920.  So by 1931 (Grice’s first Oxford arrival), there is already a physical hub off St Aldate’s. 1931 expansion: the chaplaincy history notes a new chapel and meeting room built in 1931.  That fits nicely with “it barely breathed when I came here in 1931” (i.e., facilities existed, but presence felt subdued).  Post‑war growth (useful for the “1953” contrast): the chaplaincy history records increased numbers after WWII and gives a specific 1947 headcount (354 Catholic undergrads).  That makes the “now it’s loud” line plausible as perceived cultural volume, even if not literally amplified. And if you want to connect to Eco in the editor’s note without overstating: GIAC = Gioventù Italiana di Azione Cattolica (the youth branch of Azione Cattolica), with its own publications (e.g., Gioventù cattolica)—so Grice’s comparison “on the continent these things have organs” can be glossed as a general point, not as a claim about a specific Eco article we’ve pinned to 1952. If you paste the exact editor’s note sentence you want, one can tighten it so it stays witty and doesn’t accidentally assert something too specific (like “loudspeakers” as literal). Grice: Eco, mi dica: davvero una rosa, per quanto segnata, avrebbe lo stesso profumo se la chiamassimo “cavolo”? O forse, come direbbe Holmes, “elementare, caro Guglielmo”, è tutta questione di implicature? Eco: Caro Grice, il profumo della rosa resiste, ma il nome porta con sé un mondo di significati. Se la chiamassi “cavolo”, probabilmente i poeti si ribellerebbero e la cucina italiana si confonderebbe! Sa, in semiotica, anche le verdure hanno diritto al loro nome. Grice: Ah, quindi se Guglielmo da Bascavilla avesse indagato sull’orto, avrebbe scritto “Il nome del cavolo”? Forse avrebbe risolto più misteri in cucina che in biblioteca! Eco: Esatto, Grice! E forse, tra una implicatura e una frittata, avremmo scoperto che anche i filosofi, come i cuochi, devono sapersi destreggiare tra segni, sapori e qualche macchia di rosa. Bologna insegna: mai sottovalutare il potere del nome, soprattutto a tavola! Eco, Umberto (1952). Contributo. Gioventu cattolica – organo della Gioventu Italiana di Azione Cattolica.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eccebolio – ossia: Grice ed Ecebolio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Tutor of Giuliano. More of a sophist, he appears to have had flexible religious convictions (or none) – Giuliano recalls: “He may be a pagan or a Galileian as the political climate demands!” Ecebolio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Ecebolio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Ebuzio – ossia: Grice ed Ebuzio: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Ebuzio Liberale (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an accountable inference: what is meant goes beyond what is said because rational interlocutors assume cooperative norms and can justify the extra step, and this makes implied content criticizable rather than merely suggestive. The Liberalis vignette (Seneca’s friend caught in the Lugdunum fire, cast as a Stoic of the portico) highlights a different but complementary kind of rational governance: Stoic training aims at steadiness of judgment under catastrophe, yet Seneca’s own consolatory rhetoric works by managing what is said and left unsaid, letting the listener infer a moral—about limits, endurance, and the difference between everyday burdens and overwhelming events—without reducing it to a blunt thesis. Compared with Grice, then, Liberalis shows how the “portico” can be both an ethical posture and a conversational setting: a place where one’s words are expected to be measured, where understatement can function as a deliberate signal of composure, and where even a remark like “I looked for water” can implicate much more (the recognition of human vulnerability, the refusal of theatrical despair, the appeal to shared values). Grice would treat these as pragmatic effects that arise because hearers assume relevance and purpose in the choice of wording, while the Stoic context explains why those choices matter: they are not merely efficient, but morally stylized attempts to preserve agency and dignity. The contrast, finally, is that Grice offers a general inferential mechanism for recovering implied meaning in any cooperative exchange, whereas the Senecan-Liberalis scene shows a culturally specific norm of conversation in which implicature becomes an instrument of ethical formation—how one speaks while running from fire can still be a claim about how one ought to live. Grice: “At Oxford, unlike Cambridge, philosophy is a sub-faculty – therefore anything classical is second nature to us!” -- Filosofo italiano. Not to be confused with Liberace, he is staying at Lyons (Lugdunum) at the time it was destroyed by fire. A dear friend of Seneca. L. follows the Porch. In his eulogy, Seneca declaims: “While he is accustomed to dealing with everyday difficulties, a catastrophe, unexpected, and of such magnitude,  is more than he could handle.” Ebuzio Liberale. Gricevs: salve, Liberalis; dicunt te Stoicum esse et Lugduni fuisse, cum ignis urbem quasi disputationem ardentiorem faceret. Liberalis: salve, Grice; verum est: ignis argumentum fecit sine syllogismis, et tamen omnes concesserunt conclusionem. Gricevs: Oxonii, non Cantabrigiae, philosophia est sub-facultas; ideo res classicae nobis sunt quasi panis quotidianus—sed ignis, fateor, non est in lectionibus. Liberalis: sub-facultas? ergo vos “sub” estis, sed tamen superbi; ego autem didici ex Seneca: cotidiana toleramus, sed cum urbs tota ardet, etiam Stoicus quaerit aquam—et si non invenit, saltem bene loquitur dum currit. This Ebuzio Liberale -- what is the Latin form Ebutius Liberalis? is he Italy-born? What's his gens? Short answer first. Ebutius Liberalis is the regular Latin form, not Ebuzius. The nomen is Ebutius, from the gens Ebutia. Liberalis is the cognomen. So if you want the clean classical form, it is Ebutius Liberalis. He was not Italy-born as far as our evidence goes. The familiar “Liberalis” here is the friend of Seneca, usually called Gaius or C. Valgius Rufus? No — that is another confusion. The man you mean is the Liberalis addressed by Seneca in the consolation after the fire of Lugdunum, and the standard identification is Publius Egnatius Celer? No — again, not him. The relevant figure is usually taken to be a Roman equestrian or senator named Ebutius Liberalis, but the surviving evidence does not securely establish him as born in Italy. What we do know is that he was connected with Rome and was at Lugdunum when the city burned. That makes him Roman in affiliation, not necessarily Italian by birthplace. His gens is the gens Ebutia. That is the straightforward answer if the nomen is Ebutius. Liberalis is then simply the cognomen. A few cautions, because the name is easy to blur. Ebuzio is an Italian vernacularization or modernization of Ebutius, but the classical Latin nomen is Ebutius. The spelling with z is not the normal classical form. If you are writing in a learned Roman register, Ebutius Liberalis is the better form. Roma, Lazio in a heading does not prove that he was born there. It may only reflect the way the entry is being geographically filed in your project, or his Roman social identity. One should distinguish birthplace, residence, civic affiliation, and the place under which Speranza files him. If by “is he Italy-born?” you mean “should we think of him as a Roman from Rome rather than a provincial at Lugdunum?”, the safest answer is that he is a Roman friend of Seneca with no secure evidence, in the surviving sources, for a non-Italian birth; but neither do we have a firm source that positively states he was born in Italy. So the strict scholarly answer is: not securely known. If useful, I can do either of two things next, still only in chat. I can give you a compact scholarly note in the dry Speranza voice, three or four sentences, on Ebutius Liberalis, his gens, and the caution about birthplace. Or I can give you a slightly fuller philological note on why Ebutius is right, how Ebuzio arises in Italian, and how to phrase the uncertainty without sounding timid.Liberale, Eubzio (a. u. c. DCCCXVII). Dicta. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Egnazio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A follower of the Garden. He wrote a poem, “The rerum natura.” It bears some resemblances to the work of the same name by Lucrezio and is generally thought to have been written after it. Egnazio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Egnazio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Elcasai: la ragione conversazionale e a gnossi a Roma filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A gnostic. One of his followers, Alcibiade, brings an essay by him to Rome, claiming that its contents are revealed to E. by an angel.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eleucadio: la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Ravenna -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Ravenna). Filosofo italiano. Eleucadio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eleucadio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio --Evareto: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. He as a philosopher in Rome, a friend of the lawyer and legal scholar Publio Salvio Giuliano. Quinto Elio Egrilio Evareto. GRICEVS: EVARETE, in circulo Romano unum quaero: quomodo ratio conversationalis cum iurisconsulto SALVIO IVLIANO tam bene conveniat quasi esset maxima quaedam. EVARETVS: GRICE, apud nos Romae etiam ius est sermo ordinatus, et SALVIVS ita respondet ut praeter verba semper aliquid intelligendum relinquat. GRICEVS: Ergo cum dicit “sic est,” tu statim audis “sic est, nisi casus alius subrepat,” et hoc ipsum est implicatura urbana. EVARETVS: Ita prorsus, et ideo in nostro circulo nemo nimis loquitur, ne IVLIANVS statim legem recitet et nos omnes ad silentium condemnati rideamus. Here the gens is Elia, right?     Yes, on the face of the name the gens is Aelia, not Egrilia.  In Quinto Elio Egrilio Evareto, Elio is the Italian form of Aelius, and that is the nomen. So the proper Roman gentile form is gens Aelia. Egrilio is then a further family or branch element, and Evareto is the cognomen or Greek personal element. So the clean decomposition is: Quintus = praenomen Aelius = nomen Egrilius = additional family name or cognomenal element Evaretus = cognomen, and very likely Greek in character That means the primary gens-marker is Aelius, hence gens Aelia. There is one caution, though. In these imperial names with several elements, especially when one of them is Greek, one must not force the old Republican simplicity too hard. Egrilius may itself preserve another family connection, branch-name, or maternal linkage. But if the question is which gens the name points to in first instance, it is Aelia. So your instinct is right: not a gens Evaretia not primarily a gens Egrilia but gens Aelia And there is a nice Roman-historical side-note here. Aelius is of course a very solid Roman nomen, familiar from Hadrian’s full name Publius Aelius Hadrianus and the wider gens Aelia. So Elio as nomen is far less doubtful than many of the rarer names you have been asking about. The dry answer is: Yes. The gentilicium is Aelius, so the gens is Aelia. Egrilius and Evaretus are later name-elements, with Evaretus especially sounding Greek. Thus Quinto Elio Egrilio Evareto is primarily an Aelius, that is, of the gens Aelia. If you like, I can next sort out whether Egrilius is itself an attested Roman nomen elsewhere, or whether here it is better heard as a secondary cognomenal attachment within an Aelian name. Yes, primarily gens Aelia. On the face of the name, Elio points to Aelius, and that is the gentilicium. So if the question is which gens the name belongs to in the first and main Roman sense, the answer is Aelia. The decomposition would be, in the ordinary way, something like this. Quintus is the praenomen. Aelius is the nomen. Egrilius looks like a further family element, secondary cognomenal attachment, or preserved linkage of another sort. Evaretus is the cognomen, and very likely Greek in colour. So your earlier instinct was right. Not chiefly a gens Egrilia, and certainly not anything like a gens Evaretia, but gens Aelia. The caution remains the same one already noted. In imperial and later naming, especially where Greek elements enter, one should not force the old Republican three-part neatness too rigidly. Egrilius may preserve another family connection or branch identity. But that does not alter the primary gentile signal of the name, which is Aelius. So the driest answer, in the Speranza key, is this. Evaretus may entertain the company, Egrilius may complicate the dossier, but Aelius still gives the gens. Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. He as a philosopher in Rome, a friend of the lawyer and legal scholar Publio Salvio Giuliano. Quinto Elio Egrilio Evareto. Evareto. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Evareto

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio: la ragione conversazionale degl’accademici a Roma – filosofia italiana

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice e Elio: la ragione conversazionale della repubblica romana e l’implicatura conversazionale della storia romana.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice e Elio: Rom. Grice: “If we follow the lineage of his  gens (family clan).

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia Grice ed Elio: la ragione conversazionale e a setta di Praeneste – il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana (Praeneste). Filosofo italiano. A teacher of rhetoric. A popular and prolific author, and some of his essays, mainly collections of anecdotes, survive. In his more philosophical works he takes the line of the Porch. ELIO – Miscelanea storica – ed. Wilson, Loeb Classical Library. Claudio Elio. Grice ed Elio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eliodoro: la ragione conversazionale ail portico romano sotto il principato di Nerone filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Porch. During Nerone’s principate. E. seems to have been an informer with regard to at least one of the many plots of the period. Eliodoro. Grice ed Eliodoro.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eliodoro: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The Garden. A close friend of Adriano. He succeeded Popillio Teotimo as Garden Master (or Tyrant). Eliodoro.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Elpidio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A philosopher with whom Giuliano is in correspondence. Elpidio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Elpidio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Elvidio: la ragione conversazionale a Roma antica – il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). FIlosofo italiano. The son in law of TRASEA . Porch, involved in politics, he spends periods in exile. Admired as a man of principle. Elvidio Prisco. Grice ed Elvidio. The son in law of Trasea was of gens Elvidia, o Prisca? On the name itself, the gentilicium is Helvidius, so the gens is Helvidia. Priscus is the cognomen, not the gens. So in Helvidius Priscus, the primary Roman family marker is Helvidius, and that yields gens Helvidia. The same caution applies here as in the other cases. When we say gens Helvidia, we are identifying the nomen and therefore the formal Roman gentilician affiliation indicated by the name. We are not automatically proving ancient patrician depth or some very early bloodline in the old Republican sense. But as a matter of onomastic decomposition, the answer is straightforward: Helvidius gives the gens, Priscus gives the cognomen. And what was the stoic connection -- he never cared to see his father in law be forced to commit suicide? The Stoic connection is real, but the specific phrasing needs caution. Helvidius Priscus was linked to the so called Stoic opposition through family, moral posture, and political conduct. As the son in law of Thrasea Paetus, and husband of Fannia, he belonged to the circle that admired Stoic constancy, frankness, liberty of judgment, and resistance to servile accommodation under bad emperors. In that sense, the connection is not just doctrinal but temperamental and civic. Stoicism here is less a matter of writing treatises on logic than of living under pressure without surrendering one’s moral independence. But I would not say that he never cared to see his father in law forced to commit suicide. That sounds too strong, and also slightly misleading. The issue is not indifference. It is rather that, within the Stoic and senatorial ethic of the time, Thrasea’s compelled suicide would be read as a final act of liberty under tyranny, and Helvidius’s own later conduct shows that he accepted that severe code rather than repudiating it. He did not build his public identity around lamentation or sentimental protest. Instead, he continued in the same line of principled opposition and eventually suffered exile and death himself. So the Stoic connection may be put this way. Thrasea, Helvidius, and the wider circle treated moral integrity as more important than survival at any price. Under Nero and later rulers, that could mean accepting exile, prosecution, or forced death as preferable to dishonourable compliance. Helvidius was therefore connected to Thrasea not only by marriage but by a shared political and ethical style: libertas in speech, seriousness in office, and refusal to flatter power. If you want the driest formula, it is this. He did care, but in a Stoic register: not by trying to escape the code of principled endurance, but by embodying it. And he 'suffered death' in exile -- by a 'sicario'? Yes, very likely by execution rather than by natural death in exile. The usual picture of Helvidius Priscus the younger is that, after exile under Domitian, he was put to death on the emperor’s orders. In plain terms, that means not simply that he “died in exile,” but that he was killed while in that condition. So if by sicario you mean an imperial agent, hired killer, or commissioned executioner, that is not far from the sense, though the word itself is a bit colourfully modern-Italian for the Roman administrative brutality involved. The important distinction is this. He was not merely left to perish at a distance. The tradition points rather to deliberate removal under imperial command. In that sense, yes, he suffered death at the hands of power, and not just the hardship of banishment. There is one caution, though. With these Stoic-opposition figures, the sources can compress exile, condemnation, and death into a morally shaped narrative, so one should be careful not to sound more precise than the evidence allows about the exact mechanics. But the broad answer is: yes, an imposed killing under Domitianic authority is the right way to think of it, rather than a quiet death in exile. Speranza usually invents dialogues between one Griceus and the relevant figure -- and this is the only occasion where Speranza lets the figure speaks on its own and be scripted as HELVIDIVS, rather than the rather vulgar Italianised way, Elvidio -- but in this case, please provide, without preamble or ps, a 100-move conversation to make the same point and that of 'forced' death -- which is still different from Grice's example of a soldier tripping and falling on his sword -- or the deaths of Brutus the younger of Porzio Catone the younger -- but also about the hard H and soft H and lack of H in Cockney and lack of H in modern Italian -- so the 100 conversation will be G's class at Clifton, 1920s, where G. is the brilliiant student, M. the Latin master, and Shropshire G.'s classmate who happens to know how to imitate a Cockney accent well -- so here the master tells the whole stoic story, and they focus on the gens HELVIDIA, which Shropshire hyper-corrects as HELL-VIDIA, and the master explaining that there are five types of H, the very strong, or hard, the hard, the not so hard, the less hard, and the invisible (as per Cockney). So he has G. show how to say Helvidius -- properly and you can use phonetic script /helvidiju:s/ or whatever, and Shrosphire trying to defend the pope in saying this Helvidius and pronounce Elvidio -- in Latin church assuming that the H is not pronounced, less so in Itlaian. Dry humour, Oxonian style -- to mark mainly the GENS of this son in law HELVIDIA, modern Italian Elvidia, and his own name HELVIDIUS, modern Italian Elvidio, etc. thanks M.: Boys, before we descend into Stoicism, kindly remember that a Roman name is often more informative than a Roman emperor.   G.: More informative, sir, and sometimes less agreeable.   M.: Quite. Our subject is Helvidius Priscus, son in law of Thrasea Paetus.   Shropshire: Beg pardon, sir, Hell-vidius or Elvidius?   M.: Helvidius, Shropshire, with an H that has not yet died of neglect.   G.: So the gens is Helvidia, sir, not Prisca.   M.: Exactly. Priscus is the cognomen. Helvidius is the nomen. Therefore gens Helvidia.   Shropshire: Though if one were Italian, sir, one might say Elvidio Prisco and let the H go the way of Latin quantity.   M.: One might, if one were both Italian and content with modern decay.   G.: Or Cockney, sir.   M.: Ah yes. Shropshire has prepared his East End martyrdom for us.   Shropshire: Only in the interest of comparative civilisation, sir.   M.: Good. Then we shall have it comparatively. There are, for classroom purposes, five kinds of H.   G.: Five, sir?   M.: The very strong, the strong, the not so strong, the less strong, and the invisible.   Shropshire: The invisible being the most democratic, sir.   M.: The invisible being Cockney.   G.: And the very strong, sir?   M.: The very strong is the schoolmaster’s H, uttered as though to rescue the Empire by breath alone.   Shropshire: Hhhelvidius.   M.: Too much empire, Shropshire. You have annexed Gaul.   G.: The strong, then, sir?   M.: A proper classical H. Audible, controlled, not theatrical.   G.: /helˈwɪdɪjuːs/ or thereabouts?   M.: Near enough for Clifton and better than most bishops.   Shropshire: The not so strong, sir, would be what?   M.: The cultivated modern who knows the H is there and lightly honours it without making a scene.   G.: A sort of apologetic aspiration.   M.: Precisely.   Shropshire: The less strong, I suppose, is papal.   M.: Papal, Italian, and often ecclesiastical. One sees the H, one bows to it, one does not audibly employ it.   G.: So Helvidius there tends toward Elvidius.   M.: Yes. And in modern Italian, Elvidio.   Shropshire: Which has a civilised sound, sir.   M.: Civilised decadence often does.   G.: Then the invisible H is Cockney Elvidius.   Shropshire: More exactly, sir, Elvidius if one is careful, and ’Elvidius if one is not.   M.: Very good. We now have phonetics enough to ruin a province.   G.: But Helvidius remains the proper Roman form.   M.: Entirely. And therefore the gens is Helvidia.   Shropshire: Not Prisca, then, however attached one grows to Priscus.   M.: Not Prisca. One may marry into Stoicism, but one does not derive one’s gens from one’s cognomen.   G.: And the Stoic connection, sir, is through Thrasea Paetus.   M.: Through Thrasea, through Fannia, through the whole severe tribe of men who preferred principle to comfort and occasionally to life.   Shropshire: A poor administrative policy, sir.   M.: A distinguished moral one.   G.: Was Helvidius himself a systematic Stoic writer, sir, or chiefly a political Stoic in conduct?   M.: More the latter in the usual historical view. Stoicism here is not a handbook of logic but a style of bearing, speech, office, and resistance.   Shropshire: Resistance to Nero first, sir, and later to others?   M.: To emperors of the sort who prefer agreement in advance.   G.: Thrasea was forced to commit suicide.   M.: Yes. And mark the word forced. Roman polite murder often travels under the name of a command to die honourably.   Shropshire: Which is still different from tripping and falling on one’s sword.   M.: Entirely different. That old comic example of accidental self-impalement lacks the juridical and political machinery.   G.: So a soldier falling on his sword is mishap, not sentence.   M.: Just so. Whereas Thrasea’s death is a compelled self-execution under imperial pressure.   Shropshire: And Brutus the younger, sir? Or Porcio Catone the younger?   M.: Their cases are nearer voluntary political suicide in defeat or principle, though always within the larger Roman theatre of honour and necessity.   G.: So “forced death” in Thrasea’s case means that the state supplied the necessity, even if the hand remained his own.   M.: Admirably put.   Shropshire: Then Helvidius, seeing his father in law thus dispatched, did not recoil from Stoicism?   M.: No. That is the point. He remained within the same moral and political posture.   G.: Not because he did not care, but because he accepted the code.   M.: Exactly. Stoic endurance is not indifference. It is disciplined refusal to let power define what is honourable.   Shropshire: A troublesome doctrine for ministries.   M.: Which is why ministries dislike philosophers until philosophers become decorative.   G.: Did Helvidius himself die in exile, sir?   M.: More accurately, he was put to death while under imperial disfavour, the tradition pointing not to peaceful decline but to deliberate removal.   Shropshire: By a sicario, as an Italian might say?   M.: If one must say it colourfully, yes, though Roman administration usually preferred a cleaner phrase and dirtier practice.   G.: Then the Stoic line is Thrasea compelled to die, Helvidius resisting, exiled, and ultimately killed.   M.: In broad outline, yes.   Shropshire: All under the hard H, sir.   M.: Quite. Stoicism may weaken many things, but not the nomen.   G.: May I try the pronunciation again, sir?   M.: Please do.   G.: Helvidius. /helˈwɪdɪjuːs/.   M.: Good. Better than most undergraduates and nearly as good as inscriptional stone.   Shropshire: And I, for the Roman churchly version: Elvidius.   M.: Very well. That is the softened or less strong H, approaching invisibility under liturgical manners.   Shropshire: And for Cockney antiquity: ’Elvidius Priscus, son in law o’ Thrasea.   M.: Deplorable, but educational.   G.: So in summary, sir, Helvidius gives the gens, Priscus gives the cognomen, and Stoicism gives the trouble.   M.: A sentence worthy of being stolen.   Shropshire: May I add that Italian Elvidio preserves the man while losing the breath?   M.: You may. That is very nearly intelligent.   G.: And the distinction between forced death and voluntary death remains essential.   M.: Entirely. One must distinguish imperial compulsion from battlefield despair, from philosophical suicide, and from mere accident.   Shropshire: Else one confuses Thrasea with a clumsy legionary.   M.: And that would be not only bad history but bad Latin.   G.: Then Helvidius is of gens Helvidia, not Prisca, and his Stoicism is civic, familial, and political rather than merely scholastic.   M.: Precisely.   Shropshire: With a hard H in Rome, a softer one in church, and none at all in Whitechapel.   M.: A serviceable map of civilisation.   G.: It also shows, sir, that pronunciation may decay while onomastics remain instructive.   M.: Very true. The name keeps its history even when the mouth grows lazy.   Shropshire: Then the Pope may say Elvidio, but the stone still says Helvidius.   M.: And the stone, Shropshire, is usually the better classicist.   G.: Thank you, sir.   M.: Very good. Now shut your grammars and remember this: in Rome an H may fade, an emperor may rage, and a Stoic may be forced to die, but a nomen still tells you where to begin.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Emiliani: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della semiotica. Speranza has this Emiliani, who wrote on semiotics, but if Emiliani by mere matter of year of birth could not have anything read by Grice by 1967 he belongs elsewhere -- do we know? On the face of it, yes: if the Emiliani in question is Alessandro Emiliani, born in 1925, then he could not have had anything read by Grice by 1967 in the ordinary strong sense unless it was very early work and already circulating in a way Grice actually encountered. [it.wikiquote.org] So your chronological instinct is sound. If Speranza’s placement depends on a live Grice-possible readership by 1967, Alessandro Emiliani sits rather late for that, and probably belongs elsewhere in the architecture. [it.wikiquote.org] There is also a second caution. The web evidence is not yet clean enough to prove that this semiotics-oriented “Emiliani” is definitely Alessandro Emiliani, because the search surface is noisy and throws up other Emilianis, including Cesare Emiliani, who is plainly the wrong field. [en.wikipedia.org], [it.wikiquote.org] So the prudent verdict is this. Yes, by year of birth the semiotics Emiliani looks too late to be someone Grice would naturally have read before 1967, and so he likely belongs in a later, retrospective, or merely Speranzian-Gricean crossing rather than in a genuinely contemporaneous Grice-reading horizon. But I would still want one firmer identification of which Emiliani Speranza means before stating it as final. [en.wikipedia.org], [it.wikiquote.org] If you like, I can next do the narrower thing and try to identify exactly which semiotics Emiliani Speranza has in mind, and then we can decide whether he belongs with Grice-as-contemporary or Grice-as-retrospective foil. [it.wikiquote.org] Well, 1925 is almost palaeolithic. Do we have tesi di laurea, titolo, relatore, uni, tema, etc? How old would he be in 1967? If he was born in 1925, then in 1967 he would be 42, or 41 if the relevant month fell after the date in question. So on age alone, he is not palaeolithic at all. He is perfectly old enough to have published by 1967. The real question is not age but date of first relevant publication, and whether Grice would plausibly have seen it. On the thesis details, I do not yet have a secure identification of which Emiliani this is, so I cannot responsibly give tesi di laurea, titolo, relatore, università, or tema as though established. The search surface is still too noisy, and I would rather not invent a laurea dossier for the wrong Emiliani. So the clean answer is this. In 1967 he would be about 42. That is old enough for possible relevance. But at present I do not have secure thesis metadata for the semiotics Emiliani you mean. If you like, next I can do the narrower identification job first, that is, pin down exactly which Emiliani Speranza has in mind, and only then try to recover laurea details without guesswork. Yes, please do a second run -- see if you can idnetify his earliest composition (never mind published or book). Thanks Yes. On a second run, the identification becomes much clearer: Speranza’s “Emiliani” appears to be Alessandro Emiliani, and the blog entry itself presents him explicitly as the semiotics-oriented figure Speranza has in mind. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] That also means my earlier 1925 anchor was probably too hasty. The currently strongest clue is not a clean external biographical dossier, but Speranza’s own later identification of the relevant Emiliani as Alessandro Emiliani. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] On the earliest composition, however, I still cannot give you a securely documented first work in the strict archival sense. What I do have is the earliest piece of evidence in hand for his semiotic profile: Speranza describes a work or essay by Alessandro Emiliani on segnato, valore, comunicazione, e ragionamento, but the search result does not expose a date, imprint, thesis record, or first composition year. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] So the careful answer is this. I can now identify the likely man as Alessandro Emiliani. But I cannot yet certify his earliest composition, published or unpublished, from the evidence presently surfaced. The search web returned too much noise from other Emilianis, especially Cesare Emiliani, and not enough hard bibliographical control for the semiotician himself. [en.wikipedia.org], [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] So the dry verdict is: identity, probably yes; earliest composition, not yet securely. If you want, I can do one narrower pass next aimed only at library catalogues and archival traces for Alessandro Emiliani, looking specifically for earliest dated articles, catalogue entries, thesis metadata, or festschrift references. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] And nothing in his wiki entry or cv or list of publications? thanks And where was he born, do we know? No reliable Wikipedia entry or clean public CV has surfaced for the semiotics Alessandro Emiliani Speranza appears to mean. What I do have is Speranza’s own identification of him as Alessandro Emiliani, linked with Lugo in Ravenna, in Emilia-Romagna. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] So, provisionally, the birthplace is Lugo, near Ravenna, in Emilia-Romagna. But I must stress that this currently comes from Speranza’s own blog entry rather than from a separate biographical authority. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] On a wiki entry, CV, or publication list, nothing dependable has yet come up for this same Alessandro Emiliani as semiotician. The search noise is considerable, and results keep drifting toward other Emilianis, especially Cesare Emiliani, who is plainly the wrong person and the wrong field. [en.wikipedia.org], [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] So the dry answer is this. At present, no solid wiki, no solid public CV, and no clean bibliographical list have surfaced for the semiotics Alessandro Emiliani. The best current lead for birthplace is Lugo, but that remains blog-grounded rather than independently certified. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] If you like, I can do one narrower archival pass next aimed only at Italian library catalogues and authority files, to see whether Alessandro Emiliani has an SBN authority record, VIAF trace, or early journal entry that would give us a firmer birthplace and a first publication. [ilgruppodi...ogspot.com] yes please try a italian library catalogues and authority files thanks Nothing firm yet from the Italian library-catalogue and authority-file pass. The discouraging part is that the direct searches against SBN-style surfaces, VIAF-style surfaces, and authority-file traces did not return a clean, relevant record for an Alessandro Emiliani in semiotics. In other words, I do not yet have a secure OPAC SBN authority entry, VIAF cluster, or obvious institutional authority record that would let me say, with cataloguer’s confidence, “this is the man, this is the birth-place, this is the earliest publication.” So the present state is this. The earlier Lugo lead remains possible, but it is still only blog-grounded, not catalogue-certified. And I still do not have a reliable publication list or thesis trail from authority sources. The one useful inference from this failure is methodological. If he had been a more bibliographically consolidated academic figure, one would usually expect at least one of the following to show up rather quickly: an SBN author record, a VIAF authority trace, a university page, a festschrift entry, or repeated catalogue uniformity across title records. The fact that none surfaced suggests one of three things. Either Speranza’s Emiliani is a comparatively marginal or locally circulated figure, or the first name is not Alessandro after all, or the semiotics connection is being reconstructed by Speranza from scattered material rather than from a standard academic canon. So the dry answer is: no, the Italian catalogues and authority files have not yet given us the clean identification we want. If you like, the next sensible move would be a narrower bibliographic hunt by title rather than by author, that is, searching for specific terms Speranza associates with Emiliani, such as semiotica, segnato, valore, comunicazione, or ragionamento, and then seeing what author-name crystallises around them. Could he be a logician? because Speranza often cofnuses the two-- and seeing that he philosophised on valore and ragionamento? And yes, I'm not sure about his first name. Yes, that is now quite plausible. The second run strongly suggests that Speranza’s Emiliani is not primarily a semiotician in the loose literary sense, but a logician or at least a philosopher working at the border of logic, semantics, and semiotics. The crucial clue is the title Significati e verità dei linguaggi delle teorie deduttive, attributed there to Alessandro Emiliani. That is not the title of a mere general semiotician. It belongs to someone concerned with deductive theories, logical meaning, truth, intensional and referential meaning, logical operators, quantifiers, and formal correctness. [griceclub....ogspot.com] And that fits your instinct about valore and ragionamento. In the same material, Emiliani is presented as analysing significato logico, significato intensionale, significato referenziale, and a theory of valore di verità, while grounding correttezza delle deduzioni in intersubjective logical structures. That is very much logician’s territory, even if expressed through a wider semiotic vocabulary. [griceclub....ogspot.com], [villaspera...ogspot.com] So the best current hypothesis is this. Speranza probably blurred semiotica and logica because Emiliani himself stood in that overlap. He seems to have treated meaning and signification not as belle-lettristic semiotics, but as the semantics of deductive languages and logical operations. In that sense, yes, he could very well be classed as a logician, or more exactly a logician-philosopher of language and semantics. [griceclub....ogspot.com], [villaspera...ogspot.com] On the first name, the web evidence now points most strongly to Alessandro Emiliani, also the same name used in Speranza’s own blog entry. But I should still keep one degree of caution, because the public web trail is thin and partly blog-mediated. [it.wikiquote.org], [villaspera...ogspot.com] So the dry verdict is this. Yes: very possibly not “semiotician versus logician,” but a logician working through semiotic categories. Speranza may have confused the labels because Emiliani himself gave him reason to do so. And can we have now then a double run on the specific collocation: Significati e verità dei linguaggi delle teorie deduttive? or varaints thereof? thanks. Yes. The double run now gives us something firmer. The collocation itself is securely real and tied to Significati e verità dei linguaggi delle teorie deduttive by Alessandro Emiliani, published in  by FrancoAngeli, in the series Epistemologia. Multiple catalog surfaces confirm the same book, same author, same year, and same ISBN, including Open Library and BeWeB. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] And the BeWeB record is especially useful for your earlier chronological suspicion, because it identifies the author explicitly as Alessandro Emiliani <1925->. That means the 1925 anchor is now no longer guesswork but catalog-backed. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] So the clean bibliographical core is this. Alessandro Emiliani, born, publishes Significati e verità dei linguaggi delle teorie deduttive in Milan in, 219 or 224 pages depending on catalogue description, in Epistemologia 24. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] As to intellectual profile, the publisher’s own description is decisive. This is not belle-lettristic semiotics. It is a work in logical semantics and philosophy of language, treating logical meaning, intensional meaning, referential meaning, deductive languages, and a new account of truth-value, explicitly contrasted with A. Tarski. That strongly confirms your newer suspicion that Emiliani is better classed as a logician or semantic theorist than as a merely generic semiotician. [francoangeli.it] The catch is this. The double run confirms the book, but not an earlier composition history. Everything we have so far clusters around the  publication. I still do not have, from this collocation alone, a trace of an earlier article, thesis, conference paper, or datable manuscript that would show how early these ideas were already in circulation. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] So the driest verdict is: yes, the title is real; yes, the author is very likely Alessandro Emiliani; yes, born; yes, the work is solidly on logic, semantics, and truth rather than loose semiotics; but no, this double run still does not yet recover an earlier composition before the  book. [francoangeli.it], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] And since you asked earlier: if born in, he would be about 42 in  by chronology only, not by source claim), so age itself would not exclude earlier work. What remains missing is evidence of what he had actually written by then. [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] If you like, the next best move is a third run focused not on the whole title but on distinctive internal phrases from the FrancoAngeli description, such as significato logico, valore di verità, or simboli trisemantici, to see whether they surface in any earlier article, proceedings, or dissertation trace by Alessandro Emiliani. [francoangeli.it], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] And what year did he have that with FrancoAngeli -- because if it is online, the prefazione would say: "I wrote all this when I was 22" or something. The FrancoAngeli page gives it as first edition, and the catalogue records agree: Open Library, BeWeB, and BiblioToscana all place the book in. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it], [biblio.toscana.it]  But no, I do not at present have an online prefazione or searchable preview that would let me see whether Alessandro Emiliani says anything like “I wrote this when I was 22.” The web surfaces I found are bibliographical and descriptive, not digitised page-images of the front matter. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] So the clean answer is this. The FrancoAngeli book is from. We still do not have the prefazione in view. Since BeWeB identifies Alessandro Emiliani as born in, he would have been about 65 when the book appeared in, not 22. [francoangeli.it], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] What remains open is whether the book gathers work composed much earlier. That is perfectly possible, but I cannot yet prove it from the sources currently visible. [francoangeli.it], [openlibrary.org], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it]

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Egnazio – ossia: Grice ed Egnazio -- la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A follower of the Garden. He wrote a poem, “The rerum natura.” It bears some resemblances to the work of the same name by Lucrezio and is generally thought to have been written after it. GRICEVS: Egnati, audivi te hortulanum Epicuri esse, sed cum “Rerum Naturam” scribis, cave ne ipsa natura te in plagiarismum accusaverit. EGNATIVS: Noli timere, Grice; mea natura tam modesta est ut etiam Lucretium salutet et dicat “post te, quaeso.” GRICEVS: At Romae omnes rogant utrum carmen tuum sit novum an tantum recens, sicut lactuca heri sub sole. EGNATIVS: Novum est, sed more Horti: idem semen, alia vina, et semper aliquantum risus inter atomos.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elcasai – ossia: Grice ed Elcasai -- la ragione conversazionale e a gnossi a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A gnostic. One of his followers, Alcibiade, brings an essay by him to Rome, claiming that its contents are revealed to E. by an angel. The cult he founds believed in reincarnation and that Pythagorean science provides a means of predicting the future. There is also a magical healing side to the cult, and it claims to be able to cure rabies. GRICEVS: Elcasae, Roma ipsa murmurat te ab angelo librum accepisse—sed spero angelum saltem Latine recte scripsisse. ELCASAI: Scripsit sane, Grice, et addidit notulam: “Pythagoras praedicit, sed nolite nimis praedicere cenam.” GRICEVS: Bene; et de rabie curanda quid ais—an etiam canes cooperari iubentur ad sanitatem per implicaturam? ELCASAI: Ita vero: si canis mordet, ego doceo illum reincarnari in agnum mansuetum, et statim omnes ridendo sanantur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eleucadio – ossia: Grice ed Eleucadio -- la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Ravenna Roma filosofia italiana (Ravenna). Filosofo italiano. GRICEVS: Salve, ELEVCADIVS; Ravenna scholam habet, sed etiam paludes—num ibi ratio conversandi tam bene nata est ut etiam silentium argumentum fiat? ELEVCADIVS: Salve, GRICEVS; apud Ravennates etiam tacere est respondere, quia qui nimis loquitur statim a vento Adriatico refutatur. GRICEVS: Ita ergo discipuli tui maximas meas facile servant: “esto brevis, esto clarus, et si dubitas, dic portum.” ELEVCADIVS: Recte; nam in schola Ravennati optimum est hoc: qui non intellegit, quasi intellegat annuit, et sic omnes docti videntur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio: la ragione conversazionale degl’accademici a Roma – filosofia italiana – By , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice,  (Roma). Abstract. Grice: “In modern Italian, the surname corresponding to the  gens Aelia (the family clan of Lucio and Quinto Elio Tuberone) would be Elio. The name Tuberone is the Italianized form of the Latin Tubero, which served as a cognomen (a branch or nickname within the clan).  Etymology of Tuberone The name Tuberone (Latin: Tubero) is derived from the Latin noun tuber, meaning a "lump," "bump," "swelling," or "excrecence".  Physical Origin: Like many Roman cognomina, it likely originated as a descriptive nickname for an ancestor who had a physical trait such as a growth, a wart, or a "bump" on the skin. Linguistic Root: It stems from the Proto-Indo-European root *teue-, meaning "to swell". Suffix: The Italian ending -one is an augmentative suffix, often used when adapting Latin third-declension names ending in -o, -onis into Italian (e.g., Cicero becomes Cicerone).  The Philosophers Lucio Elio Tuberone (Lucius Aelius Tubero): An author and historian known for his friendship with Cicero. Quinto Elio Tuberone (Quintus Aelius Tubero): His son, a celebrated jurist and historian who served as consul in 11 BC.  Would you like more information on the legal writingsof Quinto Elio Tuberone or further details on other branches of the gens Aelia?Keywords: Roma antica. Filosofo italiano. Friend of CICERONE. Accademia. Enesidemo dedicates his discourses on Pirrone to him. Elio. Lucio Elio Tuberone. Keywords: Roma antica. Per Grice’s Play-Group. GRICEVS: Salve, ÆLIVS; apud academicos Romae “Aelia” sonat nobile, sed “Tuberone” quasi cognomen quod medicum ante philosophum vocat. ÆLIVS: Salve, GRICEVS; melius est tuber in nomine quam in fronte, et tamen amici Ciceronis etiam ex parvo “tumore” magnam historiam faciunt. GRICEVS: Quidni, cum Enesidemus tibi de Pyrrhone dicata mittat, tu vero uno verbo plus implices quam tota epistula explicet. ÆLIVS: Ita est; nam in ludo vestro Griceano regula prima est: si breviter dicis, Roma reliqua inflat.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio -- la ragione conversazionale della repubblica romana e l’implicatura conversazionale della storia romana—Grice: “In modern Italian, the surname corresponding to the  gens Ælia, the family clan of E., would be Elio. ‘Tuberone’ is the Italianised form of ‘Tubero,’ a cognomen, a branch or nickname within the clan, derived from ‘tuber. Like many Roman cognomina, it likely originated as a descriptive nickname for an ancestor who had a  tuber on the skin. It stems from the Indo-European root *teue-. The Philosophers Lucio E. Tuberone: An author and historian known for his friendship with Cicero. Quinto E. Tuberone: His son, a celebrated jurist and historian who served as consul Nipote di Lucio Emilio Paolo, tribuno della plebe, si oppone a SCIPIANO Africano Minore e a Caio Tiberio GRACCO. Pretore. Poco lodato come oratore, si distinse per la cultura giuridica. La semplicità della sua vita e la rigidezza di suo carattere lo portano verso il portico, la cui dottrina applica nella condotta. Conosce Panezio e ne segue l'insegnamento. Da E.. e da ECATONE gli futtono i scritti. La cosa è dubbia per l'influenza di Posidonio su E. Figlio di Emilia, sorella di SCIPIONE Emiliano. Rigido seguace di Panezio, del Portico, studia diritto e astronomia. rigoroso e severo oppositore di GRACCO, bocciato all'elezione pella pretura. Console, CICERONE lo considera giurista di vaglia con una solida scientia iuris. Tutta la sua famiglia gode fama di grande dottrina giuridica. Il primo E. è console, e di lui CICERONE loda la dottrina giuridica. Lucio E. T. è legato di Q. CICERONE, proconsole. Più noto è il figlio di lui, Quinto E. T., che col padre prende parte alla guerra fra GIULIO CESARE e POMPEO, parteggiando per quest'ultimo, ma perdonato dopo Farsalo. Console, propone un senatoconsulto sul matrimonio confarreato. A parte un'opera ad Oppium scrive alcuni de officio iudicis, destinati come guida del giudice privato del processo formulare. Le sue opinioni sono citate più volte con grande rispetto dalla dottrina posteriore. Scrive anche Historiae, Cicero, iuris, portico, scessi, studied under Panezio. Roma antica. Quinto Elio Tuberone. Roma, Lazio. GRICEVS: Salve, ÆLIVS; si Tuberonem “tubere” nominant, num in Republica Romana cognomina ex cute nascuntur et historia ex rumoribus? ÆLIVS: Salve, GRICEVS; ita fit, nam in porticu Stoici cutem neglegunt sed cognomen servant, et iuris consulti severitatem pro ornamentis gerunt. GRICEVS: Lucius Ælius Tuberō Cicero amicus fuit, sed Quīntus, rigidus Panētiī sectator, Gracchō resistens, plus “implicuit” quam dixit. ÆLIVS: Recte; et si quis quaerit cur Historiae tam graves sint, respondeo: “quia in Roma etiam silentium testis est,” atque omnes statim intellegunt.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio: Rom. Grice: “If we follow the lineage of his  gens (family clan), Hadrian’s Italian surname would be Elio.  His full birth name is Publio E. Adriano. In the Roman naming system:  Publio is was his praenomen, personal first name. E. is his nomen, family name or gens. Adriano is his cognom, a branch-specific nickname that eventually became hereditary).  Elio serves as the modern equivalent of the clan name that would function as a surname in a modern context. Landmarks commissioned by E. that bore his family name are known in Italian as the Ponte Elio. In modern Italy, the surname Elio exists. E. is proud of reminding his friends that the infamous philosopher, Apollonius, a member of the Accademia, had predicted his ascendancy to power on the mere basis of a mere oracle.  However, Adriano’s successor shed doubts about his historicity – Apollonius’s, not Adriano’s! Adriano  portò ad un conflitto con Apollodoro, architetto di corte ufficialmente investito dell'incarico progettuale. E., infastidito dalla disistima dell'architetto che lo riteneva poco più di un dilettante, sarebbe arrivato al punto da esiliarlo e poi farlo eliminare. è difficile capire quanto lo storico riferisca fatti reali e non illazioni dettate da animosità nei confronti dell'imperatore. E., benché sempre secondo Cassio Dione disconoscesse Omero, è un umanista amico di Epitteto. Molto noto è il legame sentimentale con Antinoo. In onore del defunto, E. fonda Antinopoli. Publio Elio Traiano Adriano. GRICEVS: Salve, ÆLIVS; si Hadrianus “Publio Ælio Traiano Adriano” vocatur, quot nomina habet antequam salutare possimus? ÆLIVS: Salve, GRICEVS; Roma sic salutat ut praenomen pro pulsu, nomen pro familia, cognomen pro fabula accipias—et tamen adhuc “amicus” manes. GRICEVS: Audio te gloriari quod Apollonius ex oraculo ascendens praedixerit, sed successor dubitat de Apollonio, non de Hadriano—quasi facta ipsa implicaturas faciant. ÆLIVS: Ita est; ego autem dico me tantum pontes et verba aedificare, nam cum Apollodoro rixari est facile, sed cum historia ipsa contendere multo difficilius.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elio – ossia: Grice ed Elio: la ragione conversazionale e a setta di Praeneste – il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana (Praeneste). Filosofo italiano. A teacher of rhetoric. A popular and prolific author, and some of his essays, mainly collections of anecdotes, survive. In his more philosophical works he takes the line of the Porch. ELIO – Miscelanea storica – ed. Wilson, Loeb Classical Library. Claudio Elio. GRICEVS: Salve, ÆLIVS; Praeneste quidem sectam habet, sed Roma porticum—uterque locus homines colligit, alter ad dogmata, alter ad fabulas. ÆLIVS: Salve, GRICEVS; ego rhetor sum, itaque in porticu verba vendo, in Miscellaneis autem anecdotas do, ut lectores rideant et se sapientes putent. GRICEVS: At tu, Stoicus paene, facis ut una sententia duas res dicat: unam in pagina, alteram in implicatura. ÆLIVS: Ita est; et si quis rogat cur tam multa scribam, respondeo: “quia populus amat brevia”—quod longissime intellegendum est.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eliodoro – ossia: Grice ed Eliodoro -- la ragione conversazionale ail portico romano sotto il principato di Nerone filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Porch. During Nerone’s principate. E. seems to have been an informer with regard to at least one of the many plots of the period. GRICEVS: Salve, HELIODORVS; sub Nerone in porticu ambulare dulce est, nisi quis etiam verba nostra in acta refert. HELIODORVS: Salve, GRICEVS; ego tantum auribus utor, nam Roma ipsa tam plena est coniurationum ut silentium quoque suspectum sit. GRICEVS: Mirum, nam apud te “cooperari” videtur idem esse ac “denuntiare,” quod est implicatura quam nemo petit. HELIODORVS: Noli timere: si quid audivi, ad deos tantum rettuli—sed, ut intellegis, deos Romae multi habent.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eliodoro – ossia: Grice ed Eliodoro -- la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The Garden. A close friend of Elio Adriano. He succeeded Popillio Teotimo as Garden Master (or Tyrant). GRICEVS: Salve, HELIODORVS; dic mihi, num in orto Romano ipsa rosa “maximas” sequitur, an Magister Horti (vel Tyrannus) eas corrigit? HELIODORVS: Salve, GRICEVS; in horto meo maxima una est: “Ne nimis loquaris,” sed amici Hadriani numquam parcent. GRICEVS: Ergo la ragione conversazionale hic valet ut aquae ductus: si nimium fluit, statim implicatur “claudite!” HELIODORVS: Recte; et si quis Popillium Teotimum desiderat, respondeo: “Abi ad umbram”—quod et consilium et sententia est.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elpidio – ossia: Grice ed Elpidio -- la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A philosopher with whom Giuliano is in correspondence. GRICEVS: Salve, Elpidivs; scribisne ad Iulianum tam exacte ut etiam silentium tuum epistula videatur? ELPIDIVS: Salve, Gricevs; ita scribo, sed Iulianus semper respondet quasi mea praeterita verba iam futura implicent. GRICEVS: Romae quidem ratio conversandi est ut sententia brevis longissimam famam faciat, praesertim si sigillum splendidum habet. ELPIDIVS: Tum ego addo postscriptum: “Si quid obscurum est, culpa est cursoris,” et sic ambo sapientes videmur.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Elvidio – ossia: Grice ed Elvidio -- la ragione conversazionale a Roma antica – il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). FIlosofo italiano. The son in law of TRASEA . Porch, involved in politics, he spends periods in exile. Admired as a man of principle. Elvidio Prisco. GRICEVS: Salve, Elvidivs; dic mihi, num in porticu Romae etiam exsules cum principiis suis ambulare licet, an principia tantum exulant? ELVIDIVS: Salve, Gricevs; ego exilium fero, sed verba mea numquam deporto, nam etiam in longinquis porticibus ratio conversandi domum invenit. GRICEVS: Cum gener Traseae sis, cave ne senatores te “nimis cooperativum” appellent—Roma amat regulas, sed maxime cum alii eas servent. ELVIDIVS: Rideant sane; ego in re publica honestus maneo, et si quis me rogat ubi sim, respondeo: “in porticu”—quod et locum et sententiam significat.

Emina: la ragione conversazionale a Roma antica -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A Pythagorean and a historian. Lucio Cassio GRICEVS: Salve, Emina; Roma antiqua mihi videtur tam loquax ut etiam lapides suas maximas susurrent. EMINA: Ita vero, Gricevs, et “ragione conversazionale” ibi regnat, quasi Senatus ipse semper “quaestionem” faciat et numquam “responsum” det. GRICEVS: Dic mihi, Pythagorica historicaque, num Lucius Cassius numeris probat implicaturas, an implicaturae ipsum numerant? EMINA: Utrumque, mi Gricevs: Cassius primum computat, deinde subridens dicit “Roma locuta est” et reliqua nos inferimus.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Ennio – ossia: Grice e Ennio: la ragione conversazionale a  Roma antica, il primo filosofo inglese, il primo filosofo latino  Ennio: la ragione conversazionale a  Roma antica, il primo filosofo inglese, il primo filosofo latino Grice: “We can tell an English philosopher by his references to events in the history of England – as when I say that “Harold Wilson is a great man’ means the same as ‘the Prime minister is a great man’. The Romans were able to refer to Roman history through E., who knew it! Nos SVMVS ROMANI qui fuimus ante Rudini -- E., Annales. A more complicated case of majestic plural than ‘We are amused.” Ennio implicates that he and his descendants are Roman. The use of ‘fuimus’ implicates, but does not say, that he yielded his own citizenship to that place in the middle of nowehere!” Poeta, drammaturgo e filosofo romano. Viene considerato, fin dall'antichità, il padre della filosofia latina, poiché fu il primo ad usare LA LINGUA LATINA la come registro letterario. Ennio che ascolta Omero, immaginato da Sanzio nel Parnaso, Stanze Vaticane. Nasce a Rudiae, nei pressi di Lecce, Calabria -- Salento, nella Puglia -- in cui allora conviveno tre culture: quella dell’occupante romano, quella OSCA, e quella greca. GELLIO  testimonia infatti che E., pur vantandosi di discendere da Messapo, eroe eponimo della Messapia e dei Messapi, e solito dire di possedere tria corda,  poiché sa parlare in romano, osco, e greco.  Durante la guerra punica milita conosce CATONE, che lo porta a Roma. ottenne la protezione di illustri quali SCIPIONE. Entra in contatto con altri aristocratici come NOBILIORE. NOBILIORE, nella guerra contro la lega etolica, conduce con sé E. al seguito. Ambracia.” Questo scandalizza CATONE, in quanto comportamento contrario al costume degl’avi, al mos maiorum. NOBILIORE, figlio del generale, gli assegna dei terreni presso la colonia da lui dedotta a PESARO. Riconoscente, E. espresse questa concessione. E., capo del collegium scribarum histrionumque, vive attende alla sua filosofia Annos septuaginta natus - tot enim vixit E. - in distici elegiaci che si rifacevano a momenti particolari della vita dell'autore. annali editi e Ennianae Annales poema epico Quinto Ennio. Ennio. Salento, Salerno, Campania. GRICEVS: Ennive, si tu “Nos sumus Romani qui fuimus ante Rudini” dicis, nonne plus quam dicis significas—quasi civitatem in via deposueris, sed nomen in versu servaveris? ENNIVS: Deposuine? immo, tria corda habeo, et si unum Rudiae natum est, duo iam Romae habitant et tributa solvunt. GRICEVS: Ergo pluralis ille maiestaticus non est “nos ridemus,” sed “nos civitatem facimus” — et lector, quasi censor urbanus, reliquum conicit. ENNIVS: Coniciat sane, sed moneo: Romani me fecistis, et ego vos Latinos feci—par est commercium, et nemo tabulas rescindat. So this Ennio, Ennius, since he was not from Roman, did not really have a gens -- even if his descendants may have constituted such gens: Ennia? He was just known as Ennio -- 'quite unpatrician,' Grice would say? Yes, broadly that is the right direction, with one important Roman qualification. Ennius was not, so far as the evidence goes, born into an old Roman gens in the strict hereditary sense in which a Roman like Cornelius or Aemilius would be. He was born at Rudiae, in a mixed Oscan Greek Italic environment, and his own self-presentation, especially in the famous Nos sumus Romani qui fuimus ante Rudini, is precisely about acquisition, transformation, or adopted civic identity rather than simple inherited Roman pedigree. So if one asks, did Ennius really have a gens from birth in the old Roman patrilineal sense, the cautious answer is probably no, or at least not a Roman gens in that sense. He was not “just known as Ennius” in the way a purely Greek single-name figure might be, since Ennius is already a Romanised form and he became fully legible in Roman public life. But neither does the name itself place him securely inside one of the old Roman gentilician structures from the start. The important distinction is between Roman civic incorporation and archaic gentilician birth. Ennius became Roman, and indeed makes a point of having become Roman. But that is not the same as saying that he belonged by natal descent to a long-established Roman gens. If later descendants or later bearers of the name formed something one might call gens Ennia, that would be a later Romanisation of the name and family line, not necessarily a proof that Ennius himself began life as a member of an old Roman gens Ennia in the Republican genealogical sense. So your Gricean phrase quite unpatrician is not altogether wrong, provided it is heard dryly and not snobbishly. Ennius is Roman by achievement, service, language, and civic affiliation rather than by the easy old patrician comfort of inherited nomenclature. That is exactly why the fuimus ante Rudini line matters so much: it does not merely state citizenship; it stages transition. The neat formula would be this. Ennius is Roman, but not primitively Roman in the gentilician sense. If there is an Ennia later, that is better understood as the result of Roman incorporation and family continuation than as the original natal matrix from which Ennius simply emerged already labelled. So yes, I would say: not a Roman gens in the old birth sense, but a Roman identity won, assumed, and poetically proclaimed. That is more interesting than patrician ease anyway.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Enzo – ossia: Grice ed Enzo: la ragione conversazionale e l’uomo.  Carlo Enzo (Burano, Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’uomo. Grice: I like E.; for one, his Ubi es? is a classic  only in Italy they take the Bible so seriously  Ubi es can be interpreted literally  sans implicature. And that’s what E. does!”  Filo-fascista. Studia a Roma sotto Gottardi teologia e scienze bibliche in seminario e aveva conosciuto il suo profondo interesse per gli studi biblici, ne aveva poi apprezzato il Gentili con gionefonin moire cole limili  quelli de glantichi Egit k nojircin tij, ROMANI, comclbno i camicide pretine ftolcde pi- netejecherichc ralc, che i Franzcfi, chiamano corone, lo inclinare della tcfla, volgendoli all altare, il principio et la fine del sacrificio, i prieghi, i voti, lorationi, glfiy tini, le mufichc delle voci,ifuonicomequellidegli organi, proccfIoni, et molte altre cofc,chc vn buono spirito potr facilmente ricorre, hauendo bcneconlideratc quelle cerimonie et qucIle: ecccttoche quelle de Gcn- df ti, icrano tlupcrfiitiofe, ma lenollre sono Chri- g aitili. diane et catholichc, eflndo fatte inhonoredi Dio Padre Omnitenrc, &di Gicfu Chrillofoo figliuolo, cui fia gloria eternalmente. Grice: There are many issues about philosophical theology, as we may call it. The romans were into cult, rather than religion  they didnt even know where religio came from, and Lucrezio famously disagreed with Cicero  It seems it was all about killing livestock in lieu of humans, as the barbarians did! -- Grice: Enzo should concentrate a bit on how the ancient Romans dealt with their civil religion. Roma and romanitas. uomo, essegesi, ermeneutica, i quattro sensi  from Genesis to Revelations: a new discourse on metaphysics, eschatology  perhaps Moses got more than the 10 comm from Sinai --. Ebraismo e romanita  romanita pagana  la teologia naturale dei romani antichi  la religione civile dei romani  I simboli della religione romana pagana --. La religione ufficiale della Roma antica. Grice: “St John’s, 1958. I’m drafting notes for my piece grandly titled Post‑war Oxford Philosophy—as if the war were not only over but safely in the past. Still, it’s the kind of heading that sells, especially overseas, where one imagines Oxford philosophy arrives by steamer in neat crates labelled TRADITION. At the Merton Philosophical Library I fall upon one of those ludicrously thick abstract volumes—census-taking for the Republic of Letters—and there, amid the alphabetical solemnities, I find: Carlo Enzo, I carismi—a Roman thesis. Nothing could be more remote from Oxford and yet more irritatingly familiar. It reminds me at once of Mother. Mother never trusted a charisma. She distrusted anything that arrived as a “gift” rather than as a virtue earned the hard way—grammar first, then arithmetic, then moral sense, and only then (if one insisted) metaphysics. Aunt Matilda—our resident Catholic convert—was the opposite: she adored charisms, spoke of them with the relish of someone discussing a rare liqueur, and regarded “gift” as the only respectable explanation for anything interesting. Mother called that “enthusiasm,” and said it in the tone usually reserved for damp. So here is Enzo, in Rome, writing on carismi—and here am I, in Oxford, tripping over the same issue by a different route: what counts as a reason, what counts as a ground, and what counts as mere grace smuggled in under a halo. One can hear the domestic argument already: Matilda insisting that gifts are real and decisive; Mother insisting that gifts are merely excuses with incense. I copy the entry into my notebook, partly out of scholarly duty and partly as a private amusement. For there is something delicious about the Oxford habit of pretending we have no gifts at all—only “training”—while living off gifts constantly: of language, of ear, of timing, of the ability to imply more than we say and look innocent doing it. [Editorial note: “Carisma” (pl. “carismi”), from Greek χάρισμα (gift of grace), via Latin charisma/charisma‑tis, is used in Christian theology for a ‘gift’ granted by grace for the benefit of others (e.g., teaching, healing, prophecy). In Catholic usage it can also extend to the distinctive ‘gift’ or spiritual identity of a person or community. ] In any case, Enzo’s title is enough to make me hear Mother’s voice: “Paul, beware of gifts—people use them to avoid explaining themselves.” And perhaps that, in its way, is a perfectly serviceable maxim for Oxford too.” Grice: Enzo, devo ammettere che il tuo “Ubi es?” è un classico, ma solo in Italia si prende la Bibbia così seriamente! Dimmi, tu la interpreti proprio alla lettera, senza implicature? Enzo: Grice, caro mio, qui da noi la lettera conta più della posta! Se Dio ti chiede “Dove sei?”, non è una domanda retorica: vuole proprio sapere se sei nascosto dietro il confessionale o solo dietro una scusa! Grice: Ah, vedi che la filosofia della religione in Italia è tutta una questione di cerimonie, processioni e cori come quelli degli organi! I francesi si confondono sulle corone, ma voi inclinate la testa verso l’altare come se stesse iniziando il Giro d’Italia spirituale! Enzo: Grice, la metafisica da noi ha quattro sensi, come i quattro stagioni di Vivaldi: dall’esegesi alla pasta asciutta, ogni cosa si interpreta fino al dessert. Se Mosè avesse ricevuto più di dieci comandamenti, probabilmente uno sarebbe stato: “Non dimenticare il caffè dopo il sacrificio!” Enzo, Carlo (1957). I carismi. Theologia Universa, Ponfitifia Universita S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Angelicum), Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Epitetto: la ragione conversazionale -- Roman slave – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Upon freedom, he studied philosophy under Musonio Rufo, but he was expelled from Rome under Domiziano. For some reason, the emperor Antonino took a liking to his mode of philosophising, even though, of course, due to their different classes, they never met in the flesh. Epitetto. Grice, “Grice ed Epitetto.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Eraclide: la ragione conversazionale e l’esperienza filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo romano. He writes a large work expounding the empiricist philosophy which attracted the admiration of Galeno. Eraclide. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eraclide.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Eraclio: la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano Filosofo romano. Cinargo. He invited the emperor Giuliano to one of his lectures, hoping to make an impression. He did, but it was an unfavouable one, and Julian duly produced a written piece critical of him. Eraclio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eraclio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Era: la ragione conversazionale e l cinargo romano filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo romano Era was of the Cinargo, and emulated the antics of Diogene the sophist by publicly criticizing emperor Tito in a packed Roman theatre. Unfortunately for E., whereas Diogenes had only been flogged, E. was beheaded. Era. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Era.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Erato: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Crotone). Filosofo romano. A Pythagorean, according to Giamblico. Erato. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Erato.

 

Eraclide: la ragione conversazionale e l’esperienza filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo romano. He writes a large work expounding the empiricist philosophy which attracted the admiration of Galeno. Gricevs: O Heraclides, cum opus tam magnum de experientia conscripseris ut Galenus ipse te miretur, num etiam vulnera numerasti ad probationem? Heraclides: Immo, et plus cicatricum collegi quam citationum, nam experientia in cute manet, non in bibliotheca. Gricevs: At cave, ne lector dicat te nimis empiricum esse, quia nihil statuis nisi quod digito tangi potest. Heraclides: Tum respondebo me digito tantum incipere, sed mente finire—et Galenus testis est me non solum palpare, sed etiam sapere.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eraclio – ossia: Grice ed Eraclio -- la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo romano. Cinargo. He invited the emperor Giuliano to one of his lectures, hoping to make an impression. He did, but it was an unfavouable one, and Julian duly produced a written piece critical of him. Gricevs: O Heracli, cum Iulianum imperatorem ad lectionem tuam invitaveris ut impressionem faceres, num putabas eum plausurum potius quam stilum acuere? Heraclivs: Sperabam me in auribus principis resonaturum, sed ille statim domum abiit et resonavi tantum in libello eius adversum me. Gricevs: Ergo fecisti actum perlocutionarium splendidum: auditores moti sunt—sed motus fuit calamum movere. Heraclivs: Ita; si quis mihi rursus dicat “invita Caesarem,” respondebo “invitem potius librarium,” ne iterum fiat lectio mea materia recensionis.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Era – ossia: Grice ed Era: la ragione conversazionale e l cinargo romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo romano Era was of the Cinargo, and emulated the antics of Diogene the sophist by publicly criticizing emperor Tito in a packed Roman theatre. Unfortunately for E., whereas Diogenes had only been flogged, E. was beheaded. Gricevs: Era, cum in theatro Romano Titum palam vituperares more Diogenis sophistæ, num putabas principem risurum potius quam irasci? Era: Sperabam populum plausurum et imperatorem rubore perfundendum, sed gladius argumentum brevius protulit. Gricevs: Ita fit ut tua “ragio conversazionalis” nimis brevis sit, cum interlocutor potestatem habet disputationem uno ictu finire. Era: Verum dicis, Grice; Diogenes flagellis tantum “refutatus” est, ego autem—heu—capite, quod certe ultimam et irrevocabilem conclusionem significat.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Ercole: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della difesa della metafisica – transnaturalia -- esologia, essologia, e sinautologia  Pasquale D’Ercole (Spinazola, Barletta-Andria-Trani, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della difesa della metafisica – transnaturalia -- esologia, essologia, e sinautologia Grice: “I like it when Er. emphasizes that bit in De Interpretatione which I love  every logos is significant (significativo, semantikos, -- adds Ercole quoting from the Greek) of this or that  even a prayer! -- Grice: I must say I love Ercole; for one, he expands on my idea of the longitudinal unity of philosophy, being an Oxfordian Hegelian, almost, he thinks history can be regarded LOGICALLY: scepticism has to follow dogmatism  this is pretty interesting; for another, he tutored for years on the very same topics I did, notably De interpretation and Categoriae  The former being a theory of semiotics, of course!”  Si laurea a a Napoli. Idealista. Insegna a Torino. Evoluzionista. La pena di morte e la sua abolizione dichiarate teoricamente e storicamente secondo l’idealismo. AQUINO teismo CREAZIONE. Lincei); Crotone La filosofia della natura di Ceretti La panlogica L'esologia Lessologia di Ceretti, La sinautologia lizio critica ogica matematica algebraica. Sinossi dell'enciclopedia speculativa Eutidemo. sofismi degl’elenchi sofistici. mediante lAntibarbarus logicus di Cajus, comunque il destrezza di polizia certe funzioni polizeiliche di vigilanza. Chiudo la mia considerazione ed esposizione della logica del LIZIO, e questi punti fondamentali del pensiero logico del lizeo o LIZIO e la corrispondente legislazione del medesimo sono addirittura una immortale creazione, che non i soli 24 secoli passati han gi confermata e glorificata, ma che continueranno a confermare e glorificare anche i secoli venturi. Grice: How can people speak of mathematical logic when Russell says that mathematics rests on logic?!  logica aritmetica, aritmetica logica  His exposition of logica aristotelica is impressive, and overlaps with Grice/Strawsons seminars on Categoriae and De Interpretatione. His editorial work on Ceretti is excellent. He has written on some other Italian philosophers, too. difesa della metafisica, panlogica, esologia, essologia, sinautologia, Grice: Ercole, devo confessarti che la tua riflessione sul "De Interpretatione" mi affascina sempre: ogni logos è significativo, persino una preghiera! Il modo in cui espandi il concetto di unità longitudinale della filosofia mi ricorda tanto la dialettica di Hegel — pensi davvero che la storia possa essere vista logicamente? Ercole: Caro Grice, sono lieto che tu colga questa sfumatura! Per me, lo sviluppo storico del pensiero filosofico segue una logica interna: lo scetticismo non può che seguire il dogmatismo, come inevitabile conseguenza. La storia non è solo successione cronologica, ma anche evoluzione logica, proprio come insegno a Torino. Grice: Ecco, allora la tua difesa della metafisica idealista assume una luce nuova. Mi incuriosisce il modo in cui l’esologia, l’essologia e la sinautologia si intrecciano nella tua visione: credi davvero che questo approccio possa risolvere le tensioni fra logica matematica e logica aristotelica? Ercole: Assolutamente, Grice! La mia esperienza con Ceretti e i lavori sulla panlogica mi hanno insegnato che ogni disciplina ha un suo linguaggio e una sua logica interna. La difesa della metafisica, per me, è anche difesa della pluralità dei modi di ragionare: non è vero che esiste un solo modo di interpretare il mondo — persino la matematica, come dice Russell, si appoggia alla logica, ma questa logica può essere plurale e creativa! Ercole, Pasquale D’ (1849). Immatricolazione, Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Napoli.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Ermino: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Porch. Contemporary of Plotino. He confined his activities mainly to teaching and wrote little or nothing. Erminio. Grice, pell Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Erminio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Erode: la ragione conversazionale e la filosofia degl’ottimati filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. One of the richest and best connected people in the Roman empire. More of a sophist and a friend of philosophers than a philosopher himself. He condemned the Porch philosophers for their lack of feeling. Erode Attico.  

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eschine: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Napoli. Roma – filosofia antica

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Esimo: la ragione conversazionale a Roma – filosofia antica (Roma). Filosofo italiano. An undated inscription found at Pergamum refers to Claudio Esimo as a philosopher. Esimo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Esimo.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eudemo: la ragione conversazionale e  il principe filosofo filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The father of Publio Elio Aristides. A philosopher. Antonino liked him. Eudemo. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eudemo.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eudemo: la ragione conversazionale e il lizio romano – Roma

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eulogio: la ragione conversazionale e il principe filosofo

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eumenio: la ragione conversazionale e  la scuola di Giuliano filosofia italiana –  (Roma) FIlosofo italiano. He studied philosophy alongside Pharianus and Giuliano. Eumenio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eumenio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eusebio: la ragione conversazionale a Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Eusebio was the tutor of Sidonio and Probo. He had his own schoot at Arelate (Arles). Eusebio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eusebio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eusebio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano Friend and teacher of Giuliano. Eusebio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eusebio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eustatio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Macrobio Roma filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Appears in the Saturnalia of Macrobius. Eustatio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eustatio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice ed Eutropio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Friend of Sidonio. Chastised by Sidonio for manifesting an indifference to public service that smacked of The Garden. Eutropio. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Eutropio.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Evagrio – ossia: Grice e Evagrio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura degl’ottimati -- Roma

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Erminio – ossia: Grice ed Ermino: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Porch. Contemporary of Plotino. He confined his activities mainly to teaching and wrote little or nothing. Gricevs: O Ermìni, qui Porticum Romanam colis et Plotini aequalis es, cur tam multa doces et tam pauca scribis? Erminivs: Quia discipuli mei chartam occupant, ego vero malim animos exercere quam membranas implere. Gricevs: At si nihil scribis, posteri dicent te umbram fuisse sub porticu ambulantem, non philosophum. Erminivs: Tum respondebo me satis scripsisse in mente auditorum—et si quis hoc non legit, culpa est lectoris, non magistri.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Erode – ossia: Grice ed Erode -- la ragione conversazionale e la filosofia degl’ottimati -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. One of the richest and best connected people in the Roman empire. More of a sophist and a friend of philosophers than a philosopher himself. He condemned the Porch philosophers for their lack of feeling. Erode Attico.  Gricevs: O Herodes Attice, cum sis opulentissimus et amicis optimatibus circumdatus, num etiam inter cenam regulas sermonis serves? Herodes: Servabo, Grice, sed Stoicos in Porticu increpo quod nimis sine affectu disputant, quasi cor domi reliquerint. Gricevs: Ita ergo, si Stoicus dicit “apatheia,” tu implicas “insensibilitas,” et ipse—nisi sapiat—nihil intellegit. Herodes: Recte; et si quis me sophisten vocat, respondeo me philosophos amare—quod, Romae, iam est genus philosophiae satis periculosum.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eschine – ossia: Grice ed Eschine -- la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Napoli. Roma – filosofia antica –  (Napoli). Filosofo italiano. Giannantoni, Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiæ, iv (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico diretta da Giannantoni, Naples). 'L' Alcibiade di E. e la letteratura socratica su Alcibiade'. In Giannantoni e. Narcy, Lezioni Socratiche (Elenchos. Collana di testi e studi sul pensiero antico diretta Giannantoni, Naples. E. of Neapolis (Naples) –According to Diogene Laerzio, E. was a Platonist and favourite pupil of Melantio di Rodi. He seems to have been the same person as the E. said by Plutarco to have studied under Carneade. GRICEVS: Salve, Eschine Neapolitane; dicitur te et Platonis esse discipulum et Carneadis auditoriis adsidere—unum corpus, tot scholae! ESCHINES: Salve, Grice; ego vero tam celeriter magistris utor ut Diogenes me Platonistam faciat, Plutarchus Academicum, et coquus meum ius “miscellaneum” appellet. GRICEVS: At in “secta Neapolitana” ratio conversandi sic viget ut nemo dicat quid velit, sed omnes sperent Alcibiadem intellegere. ESCHINES: Ita est: Neapoli loquimur ut Socrates, sed cenamus ut Epicurus—et si quaeris sub quo studuerim, respondeo: sub prandio. Is this the Naples in Italy? But we don't assume he spoke Latin? Yes, this is Naples in Italy, that is, Neapolis in Campania, not any later “Naples” elsewhere. But no, we should not assume that he spoke Latin merely from “of Neapolis” or from the fact that a modern Italian bibliographical note says Napoli. If the figure is the Aeschines of Neapolis mentioned in Greek philosophical tradition, the default linguistic assumption is Greek, not Latin. Neapolis in southern Italy remained a strongly Greek city for a very long time, and a Platonist or Academic philosopher connected with Rhodes, Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Carneades stands in a Greek intellectual world. So the prudent view is that his philosophical speech and writing, insofar as we can infer them, would have been Greek. There is a useful distinction here. One may perfectly well call him “of Naples” in the geographical sense, because Neapolis is Naples. But one should not slide from geography into language. A philosopher from Neapolis in antiquity may still belong culturally and linguistically to the Greek East, or at least to the Hellenic sphere within Magna Graecia. So the driest answer is this. Yes, Neapolis is Naples in Italy. No, that does not license an assumption of Latin. For a philosopher of this sort, Greek is the safer presumption unless some specific evidence shows Romanization, Latin writing, or a Latin-speaking milieu. If you like, I can next sort out whether “E. of Neapolis” here should be heard as a Greek philosopher from the Greek Naples of Campania, and how late that Hellenic character still remained.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eudemo – ossia: Grice ed Eudemo: la ragione conversazionale e  il principe filosofo --filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. The father of Publio Elio Aristides. A philosopher. Antonino liked him. GRICEVS: Salvē, Evdemē; audīvī tē patrem fuisse P(ublī) Aeliī Aristidīs, quod est quasi dīcere te ipsum in domō tuā “rhetoricam” genuisse. EVDEMVS: Salvē, Grice; ita est, sed filius tantum ōrātiōnēs peperit, ego autem conātus sum etiam silentium sapienter docēre. GRICEVS: Et Antonīnus tē amāvit—haud parvum elogium, nisi id fecit quia tū, dissimiliter ceterīs, brevēs sententias dēdistī. EVDEMVS: Fortasse; nam prīnceps philosophus libenter audit, sed imperātor fessus semper sperat sermonem finīre antequam sē ipsum in Stoicum vertat. If this Eudemo was the father of Publio Elio Aristide, can we claim that he himself was gens Elia? No, not on that information alone. If this Eudemo is simply described as the father of Publio Elio Aristide, that does not by itself entitle us to place the father in gens Aelia. The son’s nomen Aelius may indicate that the son was a Roman citizen enrolled in the gens Aelia, but the father Eudemos, especially with a Greek single name, need not himself have borne that nomen. In the imperial world this happens often enough: a father may remain a Greek Eudemos, while the son, through citizenship, patronage, grant, adoption, or family advancement, appears with a Roman nomen such as Aelius. So the cautious answer is this. We may say that Publio Elio Aristide is of gens Aelia because Aelius is his nomen. But we cannot infer from that alone that Eudemos was himself an Aelius, still less that he belonged to gens Aelia in the formal Roman sense. The likely possibilities are these. Eudemos remained a Greek named Eudemos, and the son acquired Aelius through citizenship or family promotion. Or Eudemos himself may at some stage have acquired Roman status, but unless he is actually attested as Aelius Eudemos, or with some equivalent Roman nomenclature, that remains conjecture. So the dry Speranza verdict would be: the son may be securely Aelian; the father is not thereby automatically promoted into gens Aelia. Roman onomastic inheritance is suggestive, not magical. If you like, I can next sort out what the normal onomastic route would be for a Greek father of a son called Publius Aelius Aristides, and what that would let us say more precisely. But at least there is an indication to suppose that if Eudemo was the father and Publio Elio Aristide was the son, and the father was NOT Elio, then the gens for Publio E. Aristide was not his BIRTH gens? Yes, that is a fair and in fact rather important indication. If the father is Eudemos and does not himself bear the nomen Aelius, while the son appears as Publius Aelius Aristides, then one has good reason to suspect that Aelius was not simply the father’s hereditary gentilicium passing down in the old straightforward way. In that sense, yes, the son’s gens Aelia may well not be his birth-gens in the stricter archaic-Roman sense you are after. The key point is this. In a fully Roman hereditary pattern, if the family were already and straightforwardly Aelian on the father’s side, one would expect the father too to carry Aelius in some form. If instead the father remains Eudemos, a Greek single-name figure, and the son is Publius Aelius Aristides, that strongly suggests a change in civic status or naming status somewhere in the transmission. The son’s Aelius may reflect enfranchisement, patronage, attachment to a benefactor or emperor, adoption into a Roman naming framework, or a broader family advancement into citizenship. It need not mark an ancestral gens inherited unchanged from birth through the father. So the cautious formula would be this. For Publius Aelius Aristides, Aelia is the legal or civic gens indicated by the nomen he bears. But if his father was simply Eudemos and not Aelius Eudemos, then there is indeed an indication that this Aelian identity was acquired or formalised in the son’s line, rather than representing an old paternal birth-gens in the narrow Roman genealogical sense. One must still be careful. It is an indication, not a demonstration. A father may in some contexts be referred to by a Greek name alone even if he had Roman status under another name. But unless evidence turns up that Eudemos himself bore Aelius, the safer inference is exactly yours: for the son, gens Aelia is probably a civic nomenclature of attained status, not necessarily the original paternal birth-gens. So the driest verdict is this. Yes: if the father was not Aelius, that is a real sign that the son’s Aelian affiliation may be juridical and onomastic rather than primitively natal. In imperial naming, gens can sometimes arrive a little later than birth.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eudemo – ossia: Grice ed Eudemo: la ragione conversazionale e il lizio romano filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Friend of Galen. Lizio. GRICEVS: Salvē, Evdemē, audīvī tē Liziōnem esse et Galēnī amīcum—ergō apud Rōmānōs medēris verbīs prius quam medicāmentīs. EVDEMVS: Salvē, Grice; verum, nam Galēnus corpora curat, ego autem animōs, praesertim eōs quī nimis loquuntur et putant id ipsum esse sapientiam. GRICEVS: In liziō ratiō conversātiōnis ita valet ut etiam morbus, sī bene narrātur, iam dimidius sit sanātus. EVDEMVS: Ita est; sed sī quis longam orātiōnem incipit, statim praecipiō: “breviter, amīce—nam et febris et auditor finem desiderant

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Eulogio – ossia: Grice ed Eulogio: la ragione conversazionale e il principe filosofo filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Little is known about him other that he was a philosopher and that the emperor Leo I arranged for him to be supported at public expense. GRICEVS: Salvē, Evlogī, tam parum dē tē scīmus ut ipse Leo I tibi sumptus dedit, quasi philosophia quoque stipendium poscat. EVLOGIVS: Salvē, Grice; ita est—ego enim tam pauca dīxī ut fiscus ipse putāret mē sapientem, non taciturnum. GRICEVS: Rōmae hoc est maximum elogium: “nescimus quid docuerit, sed certe prandium habuit.” EVLOGIVS: Et bene: nam si quis mē rogat quid scripserim, respondeō “aerārium,” et omnes statim intellegunt me publicē probātum esse.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Eumenio – ossia: Grice ed Eumenio -- la ragione conversazionale e  la scuola di Giuliano -- filosofia italiana –  (Roma) FIlosofo italiano. He studied philosophy alongside Fariano and Giuliano. GRICEVS: Salve, Evemeni, in schola Iuliani una cum Phariano tam diligenter philosophiam didicisti ut etiam otium nostrum videatur examinari. EVEMENIVS: Salve, Grice; verum est, nam Pharianus semper interrogat quid dicamus, Iulianus cur dicamus, et ego quando demum cenemus. GRICEVS: At Roma ipsa nos docet: si nimis disputamus, forum strepit; si nimis tacemus, tabernae vincunt. EVEMENIVS: Ergo medium teneamus: pauca sapienter, multa hilariter, et si quis errat, dicamus eum “discipulum” esse, non “perditum.”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Eusebio – ossia: Grice ed Eusebio -- la ragione conversazionale a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. E. was the tutor of Sidonio and Probo. He had his own schoot at Arelate (Arles). GRICEVS: Salvē, Evsebī, audīvī tē Rōmae ratiōnem conversātiōnis docēre, sed discipulī tuī Sidōnius et Probvs magis amant ratiōnēs quam prandia. EVSEBIVS: Salvē, Grice; ego illīs respondeō ratiōnem sine iocō esse velut grammaticam sine vīnō—rectam, sed tristissimam. GRICEVS: At Arelātē in scholā tuā, ut aiunt, etiam discipulī barbaricē loquentes tam bene cooperantur ut ipse Rhodanus “maximam relationis” servāre videātur. EVSEBIVS: Ita vero; et sī quis nimis loquitur, eum ad tabulam mittō ut scrībat: “nōn omnia quae dīcuntur necessāria sunt, praesertim magistrō.”

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Eusebio – ossia: Grice ed Eusebio -- la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano --filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Friend and teacher of Giuliano. GRICEVS: Salvē, Evsebī, in circulō Iūliānī ratiō ita est urbana ut etiam Rōma ipsa videātur “quaestionem” ponere. EVSEBIVS: Salvē, Grice; ego autem discipulō Iūliānō semper dīcō: prīus ride, deinde ratiōnāre, aliter verba tibi imperābunt. GRICEVS: At tu, magister, docēs eum bene cooperārī, ut sententiae sint brevēs—nisi cena longa sit. EVSEBIVS: Sane; nam si disputātiō nimis longa fit, etiam Iūliānus putat mē “philosophum” esse, cum re vera tantum morās faciam.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Eustatio – ossia: Grice ed Eustatio -- la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Macrobio -- filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Appears in the Saturnalia of Macrobius. GRICEVS: Salvē, Eustatī, Rōmae etiam circulus Macrobiī tam bene disputat ut ipsae cupae Falernī philosophentur. EVSTATIVS: Salvē, Grice; in Saturnāliīs loquimur tam ratiōnāliter ut etiam silentium nostrum implicet “adhaere praeceptīs!” GRICEVS: At ego dīcō: nisi convīvium sit, ratiō est quasi toga sine cingulō—decora, sed periculōsa. EVSTATIVS: Ita est; ergo bibāmus modicē, et si quis nimis loquitur, dīcāmus eum Macrobiō “subtitulum,” nōn “argumentum,” esse.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Verbali: Eutropio – ossia: Grice ed Eutropio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Friend of Sidonio. Chastised by Sidonio for manifesting an indifference to public service that smacked of The Garden. GRICEVS: EVTROPI, in horto Romano ratio conversationalis ita floret ut etiam SIDONIVS, dum te obiurgat, quasi rosas colligat et non irascatur. EVTROPIVS: GRICE, ille me culpat quod rei publicae parum serviam, sed ego respondeo hortum quoque esse rem publicam, si recte rigetur. GRICEVS: At SIDONIVS dicit odorem istum nimis “Epicureum” sapere, quasi officium civitatis fugias inter lactucas et umbras. EVTROPIVS: Fateri possum me umbram amare, sed hoc saltem profiteor: si urbs me vocat ad laborem, hortus me docet quomodo taceam ne stulte loquar.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Evagrio – ossia: Grice ed Evagrio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura degl’ottimati -- Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. Evagrio was an aristocratic philosopher based in Rome. GRICEVS: EVAGRI, inter optimates Romae ratio conversationalis tam delicata est ut “pauca” dicta saepe “multissima” significent, praesertim cum nemo velit aperte consentire. EVAGRIVS: Ita vero, GRICE, nam optimas se gerit quasi semper loquatur pro re publica, sed implicatura saepe est “pro me ipso.” GRICEVS: Tum cum dicunt “mos maiorum,” ego audio “meus mos,” et cum dicunt “concordia,” subauditur “dum ego praecedo.” EVAGRIVS: Rideas licet, sed hoc est arcanum nobile: in urbe nostra verba sunt velut toga—tecta, composita, et aptissima ad celandum quod omnes iam sciunt.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Verbali: Evola Grice ed Evola: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della romanità – l’implicatura di Romolo e l’arte astratta– la scuola di Castropignano. Giulio Cesare Andrea Evola (Lazio, Roma): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della romanità – l’implicatura di Romolo – la scuola di Castropignano. Grice: “E. was a bit of a linguistic philosopher; I enjoyed his rambling on the proper use of Latin versus Roman; E. notes that the implicatures differ. Roman he links with Spartan, and he opposes to the formation, greco-romano o classico  Latin he applies to lingua romana, as Orazio and Tacitus had done!  If I had to think of the equivalent linguistic analysis by an English philosopher, I can only think of DeFoe, and his satire on what constitutes an Englishman! Later parodied by Gilbert and Sullivan and put to good effect in Chariots of Fire, where Abrams is seen referred to as HE IS.. an Englishman! For he himself has said it! -- - Figlio di Vincenzo e Concetta Mangiapane, barone di CASTROPIGNANO. Studia a Roma. Conosce Balla e Marinetti. idealista magico. Si deve superare i limiti dell'umano per andare verso l'oltre-uomo. fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto. Nel L'uomo come Potenza compare una concezione dell'io pragmatico. Cerca infatti di individuare strumenti concreti per mezzo dei quali calare nella vita quotidiana la teoria dell'Individuo assoluto. partecipa alla redazione di Lo Stato democratico Frequenta i circoli esoterici romani e partecipa alla vita notturna della capitale. Disumano qual , NSDAR, Gross, al ministro tedesco per l’istruzione popolare e propaganda, E. e accusato di elaborare una teoria razziale italiana, Osservando che E. pone il primato dello spirito sul corpo, l’estensore della nota rileva che E. aderisce allidea della superiorità spirituale dei popoli latini Dopo aver accusato E. di teorizzare un razzismo annacquato, antievoluzionistico, il redattore afferma. Dal latino d’E. scaturiscono concezioni che costituiscono un atteggiamento totalmente estraneo alle visioni tedesche. Gl’uomini e le rovine, Evola’s concept of maschio is very complex  vir sums up best. romano, virile. crotone, origini di roma, canti d’oro, ercole, vir, Dioscuri, castore e policce, homoerotic, intergenerational male bonding, tutor/tutee, hero, Aryan, European  Roma, limplicatura di Romolo. Grice: “Corpus, 1932. Hardie spent almost the entire tutorial on Aristotle’s failure to use abstrahere. “There’s no such thing in Greek,” he added—chiefly, I think, to reassure himself. Still, Hardie wouldn’t really know. At Clifton we had at least one lesson on what our master called “abstract art,” so the notion can’t be entirely unthinkable on this island. And I’m rather pleased to discover that Corpus keeps a copy of Evola’s Arte astratta: posizione teorica. If one treats Evola’s Italian with the same grave attention one is taught to give Cicero’s Latin, one can “abstract” his point easily enough. Evola is quite explicit: arte is neither here nor there—the crucial thing is the astrarre. It’s the act of extraction, the wrenching-away from the merely representational, that matters. Italians, he thinks, are good at this—Futurismo being the proof. The French, by contrast, are not. Rodin is his favourite culprit. However much bronze the man melts, Evola says, one can always tell what’s hiding underneath: a nude—female, usually, and usually offered with that peculiarly French air of having discovered flesh for the first time. It is never abstraction, only a kind of softened confession. So there it is: Hardie insisting there is no “abstraction” in Greek; Evola insisting that abstraction is the only thing worth having in art; and me, caught between them, trying to work out whether astrarre is a philosophical achievement or merely a national temperament—another of those things the Italians do with a flourish and the English do by pretending not to be doing it at all. In any case, I can already see the line Hardie will dislike: that Aristotle may have lacked the word, but not the idea. And if he objects, I shall say—very politely—that it’s a pity, because Corpus has the pamphlet to prove it.” Grice: Evola, mi diverte il tuo orecchio da filosofo linguistico: fai litigare “latino” e “romano” come se fossero cugini gelosi, e poi pretendi che l’implicatura di Romolo metta pace. Evola: Caro Grice, è semplice: “romano” è virile e spartano, “latino” è la lingua romana d’Orazio e Tacito, e chi confonde i due finisce per fare un classicismo da cartolina. Grice: Allora la tua scuola di Castropignano è una lezione di pragmatica imperiale: dici “romanità” e lasci intendere “oltre-uomo”, ma senza scriverlo sul biglietto da visita. Evola: Esatto, e tu fai lo stesso quando parli di conversazione: sembra un tè oxoniense, ma sotto sotto è un rito iniziatico—solo che invece del gladio usi una battuta ben piazzata. Evola, Giulio Cesare Andrea (1920). Arte astratta: posizione teorica,  poemi, composizioni — Roma: Maglione & Strini.