H. P. GRICE E J. L. SPERANZA: LA CONVERSAZIONE -- I VERBALI: NO

 

Catalogue Raisonné of J. L. Speranza’s Publications – H. P. Grice e J. L. Speranza: La Conversazione – I Verbali: NO

 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Noce: l’implicatura conversazionale – la polemica contro il fascismo di Gentile -- la scuola di Pistoia -- filosofia toscana Augusto Del Noce (Pistoia, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale – la polemica contro il fascismo di Gentile -- In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, implicature arises from the rational expectations that speakers and hearers bring to dialogue: meaning is generated through cooperative inference, largely abstracted from historical contingencies, so that linguistic philosophy becomes a way of healing intellectual life after collective trauma by focusing on ordinary language and shared rational norms. N. approaches conversational implication from an almost opposite horizon: for him, conversation, philosophy, and meaning are inseparable from history, politics, and metaphysics, so that what is implied in discourse cannot be detached from the crisis of modernity, the legacy of Gentile’s fascism, or the unresolved tension between immanence and transcendence. Where Grice treats conversational reason as a universal mechanism that allows interlocutors to escape ideological φορτίο by appealing to tacit rules of cooperation, Del Noce reads implicature historically, as the unspoken residue carried by concepts forged within rationalism, Marxism, or fascism, and therefore as something that must be critically uncovered rather than neutrally reconstructed. Grice’s Oxford project aims to suspend historical weight to clarify meaning, whereas Del Noce insists that meaning is always already burdened by history and theology, so that true dialogue requires confronting the implicit philosophical commitments of modern discourse itself; implicature, for Grice, secures mutual understanding, while for Del Noce it exposes the hidden metaphysical wagers that make modern conversation politically and morally fraught. Grice: “Only in Italy, philosophy and history are so connected; it would be as if we at Oxford after the war would be only concerned with understanding Churchill!” Grice: “For us, to do linguistic philosophy was to get away from post-tramautic stress disorder acquired during what Winthrop stupidly called the ‘phoney’ war!” – Grice: “It’s not difficult to understand why Noce’s notes on Gentile were only published posthumously!” -- essential Italian philosopher. «Certo i cattolici hanno un vizio maledetto: pensare alla forza della modernità e ignorare come questa modernità, nei limiti in cui pensa di voler negare la trascendenza religiosa, attraversi oggi la sua massima crisi, riconosciuta anche da certi scrittori laici.»  (Risposte alla scristianità, da Il Sabato). Ttitolare della cattedra di "Storia delle dottrine politiche" all'Università La Sapienza di Roma.  Studioso del razionalismo cartesiano e del pensiero moderno (Hegel, Marx), analizzò le radici filosofiche e teologiche della crisi della modernità, ricostruendo con cura le contraddizioni interne dell'immanentismo.  Argomentò l'incompatibilità tra marxismo, umanesimo, ed altri sistemi di pensiero che propugnavano la liberazione secolare dell'uomo e la dottrina cristiana (affermò: "solo il Redentore può emancipare"). Sostenne tenacemente, per tali motivi, l'impossibilità del dialogo tra cattolici e comunisti e previde il "suicidio della rivoluzione". Studioso del fascismo, sostenne che tale ideologia fosse peraltro in continuità con il comunismo e fosse anch'esso un momento della secolarizzazione della modernità. Sostenne, inoltre, l'esistenza di molti punti di contatto tra il fascismo e il pensiero dei sessantottini. Filosofo della politica, preconizzò la crisi del socialismo reale, mentre esso viveva la sua massima espansione a livello mondiale. saggio su Gentile e il fascismo, Faggi, Serbati, Spir, Vidari, Rensi, Martinetti, Juvalta, Massantini, Catelli, Capograssi. Grice: Caro Noce, devo confessare che parlare di filosofia in Italia è come prendere un caffè a Pistoia: sempre un po’ di storia, un pizzico di polemica e quel retrogusto di modernità in crisi! Noce: Eh, caro Grice, qui da noi la filosofia non si beve mai da sola! Gentile, fascismo, marxismo… tutto finisce nel bicchiere, ma ti avverto: la modernità ha lasciato il fondo amaro, e i cattolici cercano ancora la zuccheriera! Grice: Da noi a Oxford, dopo la guerra, la filosofia serviva per dimenticare il ‘phoney war’ e Churchill… Ma a quanto pare, voi italiani preferite filosofare sul perché la rivoluzione si suicida piuttosto che godervi una pausa! Noce: Grice, la filosofia politica qui è come la pasta: se la scuoti troppo, rischi di far saltare anche il ragù! Meglio discutere con ironia, perché tra secolarizzazione e trascendenza, il vero dialogo sta tutto nel condimento! Noce, Augusto Del (1934). L’anti-cartesianismo. Rivista di Filosofia Neo‑Scolastica

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Noferi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della setta di Firenze – la scuola di Firenze  Palla di Noferi Strozzi (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della setta di Firenze – A comparison between Grice and Palla di Noferi Strozzi helps frame Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning in a historical-social key rather than a narrowly academic one: where Grice systematizes implicature as arising from shared rational expectations governing cooperative conversation, Palla Strozzi exemplifies a lived, pre‑theoretical practice of such reasoned conversational exchange embedded in Florentine civic and cultural life. Grice’s own preference for what he called “Athenian dialectic” implicitly downgrades other philosophical environments as “sects,” yet Palla’s Florence fits remarkably well with Grice’s core insight that meaning flourishes where rational interlocutors share norms, backgrounds, and communal purposes. Palla was not a system‑builder and never held a university post, but his role as patron, mentor, and convener of learned conversation—centered on his library and his cultivated social spaces—shows conversational reason operating through example, taste, and shared cultural competence rather than formal doctrine. In this sense, Florence functions as a “sect” only in Grice’s ironic taxonomy: it is precisely the kind of environment where implicature thrives, because much is meant without being said, relying on common training in classical texts, art, and civic values. Palla’s own Diario, attested as a fifteenth‑century manuscript source, confirms a world in which reflection, political judgment, and cultural meaning are negotiated conversationally rather than scholastically, aligning him with Grice in spirit if not in method: both treat conversation not as ornament, but as the medium in which rational meaning, social norms, and philosophical significance are generated and sustained. Grice would often speak of the ‘Athenian dialectic’ – by which he meant just Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – and none of the ‘minor’ schools other than the Agora –where Socrates preached barefoot, the Academy, or the Lycaeum --. Grice’s implicature seems to be that he would deem those ‘minor’ – pre-socratic and post-socratic or Hellenistic schools – as ‘minor – ‘sects.’ Italians more or less behave similarly. Other than Bologna, everything is more or less a ‘sect’, including whatever happens at Florence! Filosofo fiorentino. Filosofo toscano. Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Important Italian philosopher, especially influential at what Grice called Italy’s Oxford, i. e. Firenze“Palla Strozzi was more a mentor than a philosopher, but I would consider him both a Grecian and Griceian in spirit.” alla Strozzi   Palla e Lorenzo Strozzi. Dettaglio dell'Adorazione dei Magi di Gentile da Fabriano. Grazie alla ricchezza accumulata nelle ultime generazioni dalla sua famiglia, il padre puo far istruire il figlio da filosofi, e grazie all'interesse e all'intelligenza, divenne di fatto uno dei più fini uomini di cultura fiorentini. Ricco e colto, commissiona numerose opere d'arte, tra le quali la Cappella N. nella Basilica di Santa Trinita, opera di Brunelleschi e Ghiberti. La cappella, progetto irrealizzato da N., venne fatta erigere in la sua memoria e ne ospita la sepoltura monumentale. Per questo ambiente commissiona l'Adorazione dei Magi. Grice: “His main claim to philosophical fame is in his character- unlike Alibizi’s and indeed Medici. He loved freedom, and chose to settle in Padova, although his roots were well in Firenze. He built hiw palace in Padova in Prato del Vallo to gather philosophers, since what’s the good of knowing the classics if you cannot converse? He never touched a university! His ‘bibliotheca’ is legendary! “Beautiful painting (by Gentile da Fabriano) of Noferi. Very Italian in an exotic sort of way!” – Grice. Refs.:, " Grice: Caro Noferi, a Oxford diciamo che senza università non c’è filosofia, ma tu sembri aver costruito una biblioteca più famosa dell’Accademia stessa… Firenze sarà anche una “setta”, ma che spirito di gruppo! Noferi: Ebbene, Grice, meglio una setta con belle cappelle e buoni pittori che un’Accademia dove si discute solo a stomaco vuoto! A Firenze preferiamo una conversazione con vino, arte e qualche implicatura nascosta tra le righe. Grice: Ammetto che il tuo spirito fiorentino mi affascina: la biblioteca, le chiacchiere, e persino Brunelleschi che progetta per te! Forse la vera filosofia nasce più facilmente in una loggia che in un’aula. Noferi: Esatto, Grice! Qui a Firenze si dice: “Senza conversazione, anche il pensiero più alto resta chiuso in soffitta… Meglio scendere in salotto, tra amici, capolavori e un buon bicchiere!” Noferi, Palla di N. Strozzi. (1415). Diario. Firenze.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Nola: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’urina – la scuola di Crotone -- filosofia calabrese  Giovanni Andrea de Nola (Crotone, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’urina. A comparison between Grice and Giovanni Andrea de Nola situates Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning within a broader Aristotelian and medical tradition, where meaning emerges through regulated, practice‑bound interpretation rather than abstract stipulation. Grice’s interest in the multiplicity of predication, especially in his discussions of “medical” as an analogically unified term, mirrors de Nola’s medical‑philosophical concern with how signs are interpreted across contexts, most strikingly in his analysis of urine and bodily sediment. For Grice, conversational implicature arises from shared rational expectations that allow interlocutors to move from what is said to what is meant; for de Nola, medical signs function similarly, requiring the physician to infer meaning from observable phenomena by appealing to proportionality, analogy, and practical reason rather than fixed definition. Grice’s critique of reducing unity of meaning to a single “focal” structure, and his insistence on multiple modes of unification in signification, finds a historical counterpart in de Nola’s insistence that sanitas is not a single homogeneous property but instantiated diversely across healthy and diseased bodies. In this sense, de Nola’s medical reasoning exemplifies a pre‑modern anticipation of Gricean insight: meanings, whether conversational or diagnostic, are governed by rational norms shared within a practice, sustained by communal expertise, and made intelligible through inference rather than explicit rule, so that medicine itself appears as a specialized form of reason‑guided conversation between nature, practitioner, and community. Grice: “At Oxford, we are proud of our philosophy, at Bologna, and in Italy in general, they are proud of their physicians, as they call them – students of nature!”. In “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being” and in his unpublications, Grice considers – in the seminar on Categories with his former pupil Srawson – possible predications for ‘medical’ --. In his earlier reflections, Grice is concerned, like Aristotle, with the variety of such predications – ‘medical practice,’ ‘medical herb,’ ‘medical science,’ ‘medical person’. In ‘Multiplicity,’ he goes further. He is interested in refuting Owen, an Anglo-Welsh philosopher, former pupil of Ryle, who had made ‘focal unification’ a bit of the favourite jargon of the day. For Grice, ‘focal’ unification is just ONE type of such ‘unification’ in ‘signification.’ There is, of course, analogical unification, and recursive unification. Grice goes on to propose an exploration in what Aristotle might have had in mind when choosing ‘medical’ as his choice for ‘analogical’ or proportional unification – and comes out with something resembling his excursions into ‘theory-theory’. ‘Medical’ may thus be a bit of the vocabulary of the ‘lay’ or the ‘vulgar,’ for which the ‘learned’ is trying to provide his ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ ‘re-construction’ – Grice restricts the use of ‘construction’ to such routines for which there is no counterpart in the vernacular. Di origini napoletane e zio di Molisi, insegna per lungo tempo a Napoli. Discepolo di Altomare, divenne noto per suo saggio, “Quod sedimentum sanorum, aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei adversus Ferdinandum Cassanum et alios contrarium sentientes.” Cf. Marruncelli, Elementi dell'arte di ragionare in medicina” Crotone, Plato, Nola-Molise, corpus sanum, focal unification, Owen, Pantzig, brennpunktbedeutung, Aristotle, Metafisica, ‘unificazione focale’ – universale: ‘sanitas’ instantiazione: corpus sanum, corpi sani. Grice: Caro Nola, in Inghilterra siamo fieri della nostra filosofia, ma non posso non ammirare la tradizione medica italiana, soprattutto quella calabrese! Dimmi, come riesci a legare la pratica medica alla filosofia della ragione conversazionale? Nola: Grice, la tua domanda è tanto profonda quanto semplice! In Calabria, consideriamo ogni parola e ogni diagnosi come frutto di una conversazione genuina. Anche nell’urina, ci vediamo tracce del dialogo tra corpo e mente: la medicina è sempre una questione di proporzione, analogia e significatione. Grice: Che raffinata prospettiva, de Nola! A Oxford discutiamo spesso di “focal unification” nei predicati medici, ma sono sempre stato affascinato da come tu sappia integrare la logica aristotelica con la pratica quotidiana, persino nell’interpretazione dei segni corporei. Nola: Grice, la tua eleganza dialettica è fonte di ispirazione. Tra Napoli e Crotone abbiamo imparato che “sanitas” si manifesta in molte forme, e ogni corpus sanum è un’istanza unica, proprio come ogni conversazione. La logica e la medicina camminano insieme, perché svelano la verità attraverso la pluralità dei segni! Nola, Giovanni Andrea de (1562). Quod sedimentum sanorum, aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei adversus Ferdinandum Cassanum & alios contrarium sentientes. Venezia: Bevilacqua

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Novara: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Euclide – la scuola di Novara -- filosofia piemontese Giovanni Campano da Novara (Novara, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Euclide. A comparison between Grice and N. brings into focus two very different but unexpectedly convergent ways of thinking about meaning, reason, and inference, one grounded in twentieth‑century analytic philosophy of language and the other embedded in medieval mathematical, astronomical, and exegetical practice. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as inseparable from rational inference: what a speaker means is not exhausted by what is explicitly said but depends on what a rational, cooperative hearer is licensed to infer, given shared norms and purposes. For Campano, working in the thirteenth century with Euclid, astronomy, and astrology, meaning is likewise not exhausted by formal demonstration: the geometrical proof, the astronomical model, or even the mathematical calculation acquires its full sense only within a web of explanatory expectations, interpretive traditions, and worldly applications, ranging from pedagogy to cosmology. Where Grice articulates implicature as a systematic feature of ordinary conversation, Campano practices an implicit theory of implicature in commentary and calculation, treating diagrams, ratios, and demonstrations as communicative acts whose significance depends on what a trained reader can reasonably draw out beyond the written text. Grice’s famous impatience with Euclid as “not philosophical enough” at Oxford paradoxically highlights the shared concern: Euclidean proof presupposes a reader who already grasps what counts as obvious, relevant, or explanatory, just as Gricean conversation presupposes interlocutors sensitive to rational norms. Campano’s blending of geometry with astronomy and astrology pushes this further, suggesting that reasoned meaning may extend across domains, so that inference operates not only within formal proof but also in interpretive judgment about the world. In this sense, Grice theorizes explicitly what Campano enacts implicitly: meaning as something governed by reason, but never fully contained in explicit form, whether the medium is everyday language or mathematical demonstration.  “At Oxford,’ Grice says, “we don’t do Euclid – nor does he do us!” – Euclid is not considered philosophical enough. There is a special faculty for that, an a special chair – the Regius professor of Mathematics --. Grice would often admire a mathematician – ‘provided he is from the other place’. He meant Hardy – and was fascinated by an episode ‘that could never have taken place at Oxford – within the Debating Union --. Hardy is challenged to the ‘alleged obviousness’ of one of Euclide’s theorems, leaves the lecture room, for 24 minutes – returns, and responds to the challenger: “It IS obvious!” – Keywords: astronomy, astrology – what science? Filosofo italiano. Novara, Piemonte. m. Viterbo.  matematico, astronomo e astrologo italiano. Tra i più importanti scienziati e matematic (anche Bacone lo cita come uno dei più grandi matematici a lui contemporanei), Campano è conosciuto anche come Johannes Campanus (che è tuttavia anche il nome di un Johannes Campanus anabattista belga). Elementa geometriae, Campano da N. Tetragonismus idest circuli quadratura. Pubblicato un'edizione degl’Elementa geometriae d’Euclide ed un importante commento all'opera, introducendo un sistema di calcolo degli angoli del pentagono. Il testo e utilizzato per circa due secoli e sarà stampato a Venezia (Preclarissimus liber elementorum Euclidis). L'opera si basa su una traduzione in lingua araba dell'originale testo greco. N. ha inoltre probabilmente presente la traduzione latina eseguita da Bath. Cappellano di papa Urbano IV (in un documento delle Curia pontificia se ne attesta la presenza e se ne parla come di uno dei quattro migliori matematici viventi) e medico personale di papa Bonifacio VIII e viaggia in Arabia e in Spagna. Grice: Caro Novara, a Oxford diciamo spesso che Euclide non è mai stato abbastanza filosofico per noi. Ma dimmi, in Piemonte, si trova la geometria nei teoremi o tra le stelle? Novara: Ah Grice, qui la geometria si intreccia perfino con l’astrologia! Se vuoi sapere dove sta la verità, osserva i pentagoni: sono più misteriosi di una notte piemontese! Grice: Quindi, se ti chiedessi il segreto del calcolo degli angoli, mi risponderesti con una formula o con una profezia? Novara: Dipende, Grice! Qui tra Novara e Viterbo, la matematica si fa anche nelle chiacchiere: ogni angolo ha la sua implicatura, e ogni teorema ha il suo destino. Se non ci credi, chiedi a Bacone! Novara, Giovanni Campano da (1255). Euclidis Elementa. Roma.

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Novaro: la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale ligure -- l’infinito del ponente – Mario Novaro (Diano Maria, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale ligure -- l’infinito del ponente. A comparison between Grice and N. brings out two parallel but differently situated engagements with reason, inference, and the infinite as governing structures of meaning. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning insists that what is meant in conversation depends not on literal content alone but on rational expectations, shared norms, and the hearer’s capacity to infer beyond what is said, even when this invites encounters with the infinite, whether as an unbounded set of stars in ordinary speech or as a potential regress in semantic analysis. Novaro, by contrast, approaches the infinite not as a threat to rational explanation but as an object of disciplined philosophical inquiry, most clearly in his Italian treatise on the concept of infinity and the cosmological problem, where mathematical, metaphysical, and experiential dimensions are held together. Where Grice seeks to tame infinite regress through rational constraints such as anti‑sneak clauses, Novaro treats the infinite as something already partially known, manageable through philosophical training and reflection, a stance shaped by his formation in late nineteenth‑century philosophy and by the Ligurian intellectual milieu in which landscape, echo, and gradual extension matter as much as formal abstraction. In this light, Grice’s implicature emerges as a dynamic, context‑sensitive echoing of reason within conversation, while Novaro’s “Ligurian implicature” can be read as a culturally inflected sensitivity to how meaning accrues through accumulation, resonance, and indirectness. Both see reason as indispensable, but where Grice emphasizes the regulation of meaning in everyday communicative practice, Novaro exemplifies a broader philosophical confidence that even the infinite, whether conceptual or experiential, can be integrated into rational understanding rather than merely curtailed. Grice dwelt with the infinite early on in his career. ‘I kow that there are infinitely many stars,’ Grice claimed, was a piece of nonsense which, contra Austin, was bound to appear in ‘the vernacular’ or ‘the vulgar’. Grice’s tirade is against those defensors of ‘ordinary language’ that couldn’t recognise ‘ordinary’ from their elbow! At a later stage of his development, Grice re-encountered the infinite in terms of the ‘regressus ad infinitum.’ True, he proposes an ‘anti-sneak’ clause to cut that regress short. But, in response to some possible objection to this as ‘ad hoc’ he would comment: ‘And if the ‘analysans’ of ‘… significat …’ DOES appeal to the infinite – what?!” – Things were different for N., who knew that he knew the infinite – at least for the purposes of his ‘laurea’ – recall that ‘laurea’ occurs in Grice’s degree earned at Oxford, that of BACCA-LAUREVS in artibus --.  Grice: “N.  comes from my favourite area in Italy, “La riviera ligure”!” Grice: “Novaro wrote a nice little treatise on the nature of the infinite – a concept which fascinates me!” --Fratello di Novaro, nacque da famiglia economicamente agiata e dopo aver condotto brillantemente gli studi liceali, ottenendo la laurea a Torino. Si stabilì a Oneglia dove fu assessore comunale per il partito socialista. Dopo avere per breve tempo insegnato nel locale liceo, con i fratelli si occupò dell'industria olearia intestata alla madre Paolina Sasso.  Pur dedito all'attività imprenditoriale fece parte attiva della vita letteraria dei primo anni del Novecento e fondò la rivista “La Riviera Ligure,” da lui diretta fino alla sua cessazione. implicatura ligure, ‘la riviera ligure’, Grice echoing Kant, echo, implicature ecoica, Strawson’s ditto-theory of truth, Strawson’s echoic theory of truth, Skinner on echo – ecoico, eco, implicature ecoica, infinito, Lucrezio –Riviera Ligure. Grice: Caro Novaro, dimmi la verità: in Liguria l’infinito si trova più facilmente in una formula matematica o in una distesa di ulivi? Novaro: Ah Grice, qui l’infinito lo misuriamo a gocce d’olio! E se ti sembra poco, prova a contare quanti echi rimandano le nostre colline: è una regressione ad infinitum che anche Kant avrebbe apprezzato. Grice: Quindi, se ti chiedessi che cos’è l’implicatura ligure, mi risponderesti con una poesia o con una bottiglia? Novaro: In Liguria, Grice, la risposta migliore è sempre: “dipende dall’annata!” Ma una cosa è certa: tra filosofia e olio, l’infinito non manca mai! Novaro, Mario (1895). Il concetto di infinito e il problema cosmologico. Rome. Balbi.

 

 

Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Novelli (Padova). Filosofo. Fisico. Camillo Novelli Camillo Novelli (Padova, Veneto). Filosofo. Fisico. Grice’s reason-governed account of meaning treats communication as a rational enterprise in which hearers recover what is meant by assuming the speaker is, by default, cooperating under shared norms; what is “meant” is therefore often larger than what is “said,” because it includes implicatures computed from context, expectations, and practical reasoning. In your Novelli vignette, the Padua voice of the “philosopher–physicist” pushes the same idea through the contrast between equations and their uptake: an equation is maximally explicit, but its role in inquiry still depends on what competent participants take it to be doing (explaining, idealizing, warning against category mistakes such as “relativity” versus “relativism,” or signaling methodological restraint). The Veneto proverb (“between saying and doing there is thinking”) fits Grice neatly: the missing middle term is the inferential work that turns a bare locution into communicative force, just as a formalism becomes meaningful only within a practice that licenses certain inferences and discourages others. The comic “periodic table with implicature next to sodium and potassium” is a good Gricean trope: it suggests that beyond the fixed inventory of elements (or fixed semantics) there is a systematic space of pragmatic consequences—non-written but rule-governed—without which talk (and even scientific talk) would be informationally inert. Finally, the bibliographic anchor to Novelli’s 1888 report on Venetian ceramics is useful as a realism-check: it lets “Novelli” function less as a verified physicist-philosopher and more as a Padua emblem for applied rational craft, where the same Gricean moral holds—precision is not opposed to wit or social inference; rather, precision is one of the norms that makes implicature calculable in the first place. Grice: Caro Novelli, a Oxford ci dicono che la fisica è per chi ama i numeri, ma tu da Padova, come fai a conciliare la filosofia con le equazioni? Novelli: Eh, Grice, in Veneto si dice “tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il pensare!” Una buona formula filosofica può essere più esplosiva di una reazione chimica!  Grice: Allora mi sa che la tua tavola periodica ha anche la voce “implicatura” accanto a Sodio e Potassio… Novelli: Esatto! E guai a chi confonde la relatività col relativismo: qui a Padova ci tieniamo sia alla precisione sia alla battuta pronta, mica solo ai telescopi! Novelli, Camillo (1888). L’arte ceramica all’esposizione di Venezia. Roma: Botta.