H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza

Understood. I’ll keep everything in the chat, I won’t add anything to the document, I won’t use bold, italics, or bullets, and I’ll use English as our metalanguage.

The current document appears to be in English and concerns H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza.

How would you like to proceed in chat: discussion, brainstorming, paraphrase, analysis, or revision suggestions?

So I intend to provide a narative about the interests by J. L. Speranza on H. P. Grice.

Agent mode said:

Copilot

That sounds like a good focus.

If you want, I can help you shape it into a clear narrative in chat without adding anything to the document.

A simple way to frame it is this:

You are not writing a general biography of Grice, and not merely a biography of Speranza either. You are writing a narrative of Speranza’s intellectual interest in Grice: how that interest began, what aspects of Grice drew him in, how that interest developed, and what kind of interpretive or scholarly project emerged from it.

A useful narrative arc could be:

First, the point of encounter. How did Speranza come to Grice? Was it through ordinary language philosophy, Oxford philosophy, implicature, classical studies, or some later bibliographical and archival fascination?

Second, the motive of interest. Why Grice in particular? Was Speranza attracted by Grice’s style, his conceptual distinctions, his humour, his Latinate cast of mind, his concern with meaning and rationality, or his place within Oxford philosophy?

Third, the development of that interest. Did Speranza move from reading Grice as a philosopher to treating him as a broader cultural and intellectual figure? Did he become interested in Grice’s circle, sources, terminology, unpublished material, and reception?

Fourth, the distinctive contribution. What is specifically Speranzaian in the interest? Is it the philological care, the taxonomic enthusiasm, the cross-referencing of Oxonian figures, the playful yet learned attention to detail, or the effort to build a kind of Griceian archive?

Fifth, the significance. Why does Speranza’s interest matter? Does it preserve a tradition, illuminate Grice’s place in analytic philosophy, or show how Grice can still generate commentary, exegesis, and intellectual companionship?

If you like, I can now do one of three things in chat:

Draft a polished opening paragraph for that narrative
Sketch a full structure for the narrative
Help you find the right tone, for example scholarly, memoiristic, or lightly ironic

My first suggestion would be to begin by distinguishing “interest in Grice” from mere scholarly acquaintance with Grice. That distinction could give the piece a strong opening.

I have temporarilty titled it just simply: "H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza" -- so that the full names are retrievable as keywords in searchwords. And one paragraph I came up with -- J. L. Speranza in third person -- is this below: can you give me feedback as to improve it or expand it? H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all!

Agent mode said:

Copilot

Yes — it already has a lively and distinctive voice. What is attractive in it is that it avoids solemnity and immediately gives Speranza a personality. It also suggests that the relation between Speranza and Grice is intellectual rather than institutional or biographical in any simple way. That is a strong opening idea.

My feedback would be as follows.

The strengths are: The title is sensible. It is plain, searchable, and direct. The opening sentence has a nice contrast: not through tutorial intimacy, but by another route. The aside “which was, of course, a good thing” gives the paragraph wit and makes the narrative sound personal rather than mechanically academic. The final claim is memorable because it reverses expectation: one might think direct tutelage would deepen interest, but here it would have prevented it.

The main risks are: The joke may be a little too private unless you develop it immediately afterward. “Knowing Speranza” works if the reader already has some sense of his temperament, but if not, it may need a slight gloss. “THAT” in capitals gives emphasis, but prose of this sort may gain more by rhythmic phrasing than typographical emphasis. “would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all” is clear, but a little heavy in its repetition of “would have.”

So I would suggest two possible directions.

One is to keep the epigrammatic, playful tone, but polish the cadence a little. For example:

J. L. Speranza did not encounter Grice as his tutorial fellow in philosophy, which was probably just as well. Had Grice stood to him in that official capacity, Speranza might well have taken little interest in him at all.

This keeps the irony, but makes it slightly smoother and more controlled.

A second option is to preserve the wit while making the point more explicit:

J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not through the formal discipline of tutorial instruction in philosophy, and that was perhaps fortunate. For Speranza was not the sort to be drawn by academic authority alone; had Grice been merely his assigned philosophical tutor, Speranza might never have developed the distinctive curiosity that later attached him to Grice’s thought.

This version begins to explain the joke and prepares the reader for a larger narrative.

If you want to expand the paragraph, I think the most important thing is to answer the question: if not as tutorial fellow, then how? That is where the narrative will begin to move. You could continue by saying that Speranza came to Grice indirectly, perhaps through reading, through Oxford lore, through a fascination with implicature, through the broad tradition of ordinary language philosophy, or through some mixture of philosophical and philological interest.

For instance, an expanded version in the same general spirit might read:

J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his tutorial fellow in philosophy, which was probably just as well. Had Grice stood to him in that official capacity, Speranza might well have taken little interest in him at all. Speranza’s attraction to Grice was of a less official and more elective kind: not the dutiful attention one pays to an assigned teacher, but the curiosity one develops toward a mind whose distinctions, turns of phrase, and habits of analysis seem to open an entire intellectual world. What drew Speranza was not merely Grice the Oxford philosopher, but Grice the constructor of subtle conceptual tools, the ironist of conversation, and the thinker whose apparently local reflections could radiate into logic, meaning, rationality, and philosophical method.

That version does three things: It keeps your opening irony. It explains the type of attraction involved. It opens the way for later development.

If you want something more distinctly literary and slightly more “Speranza-like” in learned irony, you might try:

J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not under the ordained régime of philosophical tutorship, and this was no misfortune. Indeed, had Grice appeared before him in the austere role of personal tutorial fellow, Speranza might have contrived to ignore him altogether. For his interest in Grice was never likely to arise from academic assignment or institutional piety; it belonged rather to that more wayward form of intellectual attachment by which one discovers, almost to one’s surprise, that a philosopher’s idiom, distinctions, and animating obsessions have become indispensable companions.

This is more elaborate, and perhaps worth using only if the whole piece will have that elevated, ironic register.

My strongest practical suggestion is: Keep your first ironic idea, but make the second sentence do more than deliver the joke. Let it also prepare the reader for the real claim: that Speranza’s interest in Grice arose from elective affinity, not formal pedagogy.

If you like, I can now do one of these in chat: I can give you three revised versions in different tones I can expand this into a full opening paragraph of about 150 to 200 words I can help you define more precisely what sort of “interest” Speranza had in Grice so the next paragraph has direction

You said:

I added an extra paragraph: your input appreciated it: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all!

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This new paragraph has real energy and several very good ideas in it. What I especially like is that it begins to move from institutional description to intellectual placement. That is exactly the right next step. You are now saying not only what Grice’s office was, but what his standing had become by the time Speranza came upon him. That is a strong progression.

What is especially good in the paragraph is: the idea of Grice as already canonical by the time Speranza encountered him the playful qualification about “the right way” and not “the right sense” the contrast between Grice’s work on Meaning and the later prominence of conversational implicature the suggestion that Grice belongs, broadly speaking, in the philosophy of language, but with an important reservation

These are all excellent materials.

My main reservation is that the paragraph is trying to do too much at once, and the wit sometimes outruns the syntax. The reader can follow the intention, but the sentence is so packed with dashes, asides, and emphases that the argument risks becoming obscured. In particular: “the Canon in the right way” is suggestive, but it may need a slightly firmer formulation “neither Grice or Speranza” should be “neither Grice nor Speranza” the joke about “sense” is very nice, but it interrupts the flow unless very carefully placed “it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged” is a little cumbersome the contrast between Meaning and conversational implicature is the real intellectual point, and it deserves to stand more clearly and prominently the capitalisation of ALWAYS gives emphasis, but again I think the prose would gain more by arrangement than typography

My preferred version would be this:

By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice had already entered the canon, and in the proper way, as neither Grice nor Speranza would have wished to say, “in the proper sense,” since senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. In the more continental habit of philosophical classification by chairs, Grice would naturally have been placed under the philosophy of language. Yet even that requires qualification. For what came first in Grice was “Meaning,” and it was there that one found the kind of subtle and sophisticated analysis bound to attract any philosopher concerned with the central problems of the philosophy of language. Conversational implicature came later, and in a sense secondarily, however prominent it would eventually become in the reception of his work.

That is the version I would most favour because it keeps the playfulness, but makes the argument much easier to grasp.

If you want something a little closer to your own more performative idiom, I would suggest this as an alternative:

By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already canonical, and canonical in the right way. Neither Grice nor Speranza, to be sure, would have spoken of “the right sense”: senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. In the continental style of arranging philosophers by chairs, Grice would have belonged to the chair of philosophy of language, though with an important caveat. For Grice’s essay on “Meaning” came first, and it displayed exactly the kind of refined analysis to engage any philosopher drawn to the central questions of language. Conversational implicature came later, and if not exactly second in importance, certainly second in order.

That version preserves more of your original voice.

My strongest advice is this: Let the paragraph turn on one central claim only: that Speranza encountered a Grice who was already established, but that the true centre of Grice’s appeal lay first in “Meaning,” not in the later fame of implicature. That is the real point, and it is a very good one.

If you want, I can next give you my favourite full revision of all four paragraphs in one continuous sequence, keeping the tone as close to yours as possible.

You said:

So what would be your favourite version of that paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

So I attached another paragraph. Your input appreciated it. H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza did not encounter Grice as his tutorial fellow in philosophy, which was probably just as well. Had Grice stood to him in that official capacity, Speranza might well have taken little interest in him at all. Still, that was Grice’s official distinction: from 1938 to 1967 he held the post of Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the conjunction in that title is worth attending to. The more familiar expression “Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy,” though useful in distinguishing such a position from other kinds of fellowship, can obscure the dual aspect of Grice’s office. He was not only a tutor in philosophy, but also a Fellow, and thus a member of the Governing Body of the college. His role at St. John’s was therefore not merely pedagogical but administrative as well. As Tutor in Philosophy, moreover, he shared that responsibility with the only other holder of such a post at the time, J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice had already entered the canon, and in the proper way, as neither Grice nor Speranza would have wished to say, “in the proper sense,” since senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. In the more continental habit of philosophical classification by chairs, Grice would naturally have been placed under the philosophy of language. Yet even that requires qualification. For what came first in Grice was “Meaning,” and it was there that one found the kind of subtle and sophisticated analysis bound to attract any philosopher concerned with the central problems of the philosophy of language. Conversational implicature came later, and in a sense secondarily, however prominent it would eventually become in the reception of his work.

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This new paragraph is very promising because it finally states, in a more direct and substantive way, why Grice mattered to Speranza. Up to now the prose has been setting the stage: institutional role, canonical status, placement within philosophy of language. Here, by contrast, you begin to indicate use, appropriation, and transformation. That is exactly the right development.

What is strongest in it is: the claim that Grice was useful to Speranza in addressing paradoxes across philosophy the elevation of “Meaning” as Speranza’s centrepiece the suggestion that Speranza did not merely repeat Grice, but reformulated him the distinction between “exhibitive” and “protreptic” the contrast between willing and judging

These are substantial ideas. They give the essay intellectual weight.

My main reservation is that the paragraph is still somewhat compressed and technical at the point where it most needs clarity. A reader who does not already know Speranza’s terminology may find “exhibitive,” “protreptic,” “willing,” and “judging” arriving too quickly and with too little staging. The sentence therefore needs a little more air and a more controlled sequence. Also, “proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions” is serviceable, but not especially elegant. And “the whole gamut of philosophy” may be slightly too broad unless you want the hyperbolic tone.

My favourite version would be this:

In the academic world in which Speranza moved, Grice proved especially valuable as a source of solutions to a range of well-known philosophical paradoxes. Above all, it was Grice’s analysis of “Meaning” that became Speranza’s centrepiece. Yet Speranza did not merely inherit that analysis; he sought to reformulate it in his own terms. Thus he came to emphasise, for example, an “exhibitive” as against a “protreptic” conception of communication, and to privilege the element of willing over that of judging, the latter of which Grice had left, within his broader semiotic reflections, as something closer to a matter of personal preference.

What I like about this version is that it preserves your conceptual content while making the argumentative sequence clearer: first, Grice’s usefulness then, “Meaning” as the centrepiece then, Speranza’s reinterpretation then, the two examples

If you want a slightly more idiomatic and less formal version, closer to your own cadence, I would suggest:

In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved especially useful as a philosopher capable of illuminating a whole range of familiar paradoxes. Above all, it was Grice’s analysis of “Meaning” that became Speranza’s centrepiece. But Speranza’s relation to Grice was never merely one of reception: he also recast Grice’s analysis in terms of his own. Hence his emphasis on an “exhibitive” rather than a “protreptic” account of communication, and on the primacy of willing over judging, where Grice himself had seemed prepared to leave the latter as, in effect, a matter of personal preference within his semiotic theory.

If I had to choose one, I would choose the first of those two.

One small further point: if this paragraph is going to stay in the essay, then at some later stage you may want to explain, even briefly, what Speranza means by “exhibitive” and “protreptic,” because those terms sound important enough to deserve at least one clarifying sentence.

If you want, I can now give you my favourite continuous version of all five paragraphs, so you can hear how the whole opening sounds as a single movement.

You said:

so please provide without preamble or ps your favourite version of that paragraph, thank you

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

I have added another paragraph -- let me have your input: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx).

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This new paragraph is very interesting because it shows Speranza moving from general admiration of Grice to active technical appropriation. That is a strong development. It tells the reader that Speranza was not merely reading Grice as a canonical figure in philosophy of language, but using Grice’s symbolic and conceptual resources in a way that connected with his own interests in doxastics, conation, and definite descriptions.

What I think is strongest in it is: the move to technical detail, which gives the narrative real philosophical substance the emphasis on Speranza’s pleasure at finding Grice using symbolic devices casually and flexibly the transition from simple propositional notation to a richer quantified structure the implicit link between Grice, Strawson, and the problem of definite descriptions

What needs work is mainly the sentence control. At present the paragraph contains several excellent ideas, but they are packed into a sequence that becomes difficult to follow on first reading. There are also a few small verbal issues: conatitive should presumably be conative foonote should be footnote, unless you are preserving a deliberate quotation inconvenices should be inconveniences the sentence beginning “Speranza having been enchanted...” is syntactically unstable and needs a main verb the phrase “proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions” has the same slight heaviness I noted before “such symbolism is used casually by Grice” is good in point, but can be made more idiomatic

My general advice would be: keep the technical material reduce the number of interruptions make the logical progression more explicit: Speranza knew doxastic logic he noticed Grice using comparable symbolism he took this as an invitation to push the notation further that expansion reflected both his dissatisfaction with bare propositional letters and his attention to definite descriptions

My favourite revision of this paragraph would be:

At this point, Speranza was already familiar with developments in doxastics, as he called the logic of belief, and was pleased to find Grice using such symbolism with comparative ease in “Vacuous Names.” In employing the operator W for “wanting,” though here construed by Speranza in the broader sense of any conative state, Grice allowed for the use of subscripts, as in WAp, “A wants that p.” But Speranza, who had been struck by the symbolic refinements of Toulmin and Peacocke, and indeed by Grice’s own occasional technical gestures, was not content to let p do all the work. Anticipating the difficulties that Grice himself would later find in treatments of definite descriptions such as Strawson’s, Speranza was ready to expand the formula into the more articulated WA(ιx.Ax & Bx).

That is the version I would favour because it preserves your content while making the movement much easier to follow.

If you want a slightly more literary and less technical version, while keeping the same substance, I would suggest this:

By this stage, Speranza was already at home with what he called doxastics, the logic of belief, and he was delighted to see Grice deploying symbolic notation with apparent nonchalance in “Vacuous Names.” Grice’s use of W for “wanting” gave Speranza a suggestive point of departure. Taking W in a broader sense to cover conative states generally, and noting Grice’s use of subscripts in formulations such as WAp, “A wants that p,” Speranza refused to leave the content of desire at the level of an undifferentiated p. Influenced by the more articulated symbolism of Toulmin, Peacocke, and at times Grice himself, he was already prepared to recast such formulae in a more complex form, as in WA(ιx.Ax & Bx), thereby anticipating difficulties surrounding definite descriptions that would also emerge in Grice’s reflections on Strawson.

If I had to choose one, I would choose the first.

One final point of substance: this paragraph is the first one that may challenge a reader who is not already philosophically specialised. That is not a problem in itself, but it may help, later on, to add one short sentence explaining why the move from WAp to WA(ιx.Ax & Bx) matters. Even a brief phrase such as “This allowed Speranza to specify the object of desire rather than leaving it at the level of a bare proposition” would help a great deal.

If you want, I can next give you my favourite version of this paragraph alone, as a clean block, just as I did for the earlier ones.

You said:

So without preamble or ps, what would be your favourite version of this paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

So I have added another paragraph. Let me have your input, thank you. H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx).

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This new paragraph is important because it pushes the discussion from notation to intention. That is exactly the right move. You are now saying that Speranza understood that Grice’s real target in Meaning was not merely the structure of an agent’s willing, but the more complex triangular arrangement involving addressee-recognition. That is a strong and genuinely Gricean point.

What I think is best in the paragraph is: you rightly stress the exploratory character of Meaning you move from simple conative structure to the addressee’s cognitive role you distinguish addressee from audience, which is a subtle and useful refinement you give the symbolism a philosophical point rather than leaving it as mere formal display

What I would improve is mostly clarity and compression. At present the paragraph has excellent content, but the syntax is overburdened. The opening sentence is especially hard to carry because it contains too many interruptions before the reader reaches the main point. Also, a few phrases could be sharpened: Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at could become simply knew what Grice was aiming at could feel what Grice was after is vivid, but perhaps slightly too informal unless you want to preserve that exact tone the point about the Oxford Philosophical Society and later publication is valuable, but it may be too much to insert in the same breath as the main conceptual claim the sort of convolutedness is evocative, but perhaps too loose for the precision you want here PRIMARILY THINK in capitals would read more effectively if the emphasis were carried by syntax instead voliting and judicating are interesting Speranza-style terms, but they need especially careful framing so that they do not sound arbitrary

My favourite version would be:

But Speranza knew very well what Grice was after in Meaning, first read at the Oxford Philosophical Society and only later typed and submitted for publication. Meaning is exploratory, and Speranza saw that at once. In the symbolism just introduced, the matter could not rest with an agent A willing that ιx.Ax & Bx. What had to be incorporated was the role of the addressee, a better term here than the looser audience of some informal formulations. The paradigmatic case was therefore not one in which the that-clause simply recorded what A wills, but one in which it turned on what A intends B to think. Hence, using V for voliting and J for judicating, the structure becomes V_A J_B(ιx.Ax & Bx).

Why I prefer this version: it keeps your main philosophical point in clear sequence it preserves the Oxford Philosophical Society detail, but without letting it dominate it makes the move to the addressee the centre of the paragraph it clarifies why the symbolism changes

One small conceptual note: if you want to be especially exact, you may later want to indicate whether B is to think that there exists a unique x such that Ax and Bx, or whether the formula is only a placeholder for the more general structure of reflexive intention. In other words, the symbolism is useful, but the prose may eventually need one line explaining precisely what is being judged by B.

If you want, I can next give you just my preferred clean rewrite of that paragraph alone, with no commentary, in the way you asked for the earlier ones.

You said:

So please provide your favourite version of this paragraph without preamble or ps, thank you

Agent mode said:

Copilot

Already in that exploratory Meaning, Grice makes a further point whose importance Speranza was quick to perceive as he imaginatively placed himself in the Oxford of the late 1940s in which the paper was first read. The crucial distinction is between cause and reason, or rather between a merely causal sequence and one in which recognition of intention serves as a reason. Speranza felt the need to render that distinction formally, and for this purpose he would deploy the bended arrow. Grice’s point is simple enough in outline: the addressee’s recognition, as a form of judication, of the utterer’s intention, as a form of volition, should function not merely as the cause but as the reason for the further propositional or psychological attitudes that arise in response. In symbols, then, the structure may be represented as V_A J_B(ιx.Ax & Bx) -> J_B V_A J_B(ιx.Ax & Bx).

You said:

So I added another paragraph -- let me have your input: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx). Already in that exploratory ‘Meaning,’ Grice makes a further interesting point – whose cruciality Speranza well perceived as Speranza placed himself in the Oxford of the the late 1940s when that talk on ‘Meaning’ was given: ‘reason’ versus ‘cause’ – or rather ‘cause’ (more primitive) AND ‘reason’. Speranza felt the need to make explicit this distinction formally, and would use the bended arrow. The way it works in Grice is simple enough: the recognition (a form of judcation) of the utterer’s intention (a form of volition) should be the REASON, and not merely the case, for further ‘propositional’ or ‘psychological’ attitudes on the part of the addressee. In symbols VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) -> JBVAJB(ixAx & Bx). Speranza was especially pleased when he noted that Grice had taken into account a problem-example by J. O. Urmson in this context – and it is indeed the only philosopher Grice quotes when re-visiting what Grice rather pompously called the section against the alleged NECESSITY (not sufficiency) of his account of ‘Meaning,’ which Speranza by this time was treating already as touching on the philosophical concept of ‘communication.’ Grice does not elaborate on the original problem-example offered by Urmson – other than by way of topic – it involved a case of ‘bribery.’ Speranza was comforted to see that Grice’s original exploratory account in ‘Meaning’ was receiving positive, constructive, feedback from a man of almost Grice’s generation, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, who happened to share the alma mater of Corpus Christi at Oxford. Urmson would himself not present himself as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which made it all the more delightful to Speranza: these dons were discussing ‘communication’ among themselves, not caring about what the rest of the world may think about it --, as Grice cares to credit to problem-example to Urmson ‘in conversation.’

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This paragraph is a good addition because it introduces a new social and conversational dimension to Speranza’s interest in Grice. Up to this point, the narrative has stressed office, canon, meaning, formalisation, and the reason-cause distinction. Here you show Speranza taking pleasure in something more local and human: the fact that Grice’s account was shaped in active exchange with another Oxford philosopher. That helps the essay breathe.

What is strongest in the paragraph is: the focus on Urmson as a concrete interlocutor the observation that this is the only philosopher Grice quotes in that particular revisiting the emphasis on constructive criticism rather than hostile objection the sense that Speranza delights in dons discussing communication among themselves, almost in a sealed Oxford conversational world

That is all excellent material.

What I would improve is mainly the pacing and the degree of qualification. At present the paragraph has too many embedded remarks, and the main point gets delayed. The key claim, as I see it, is this: Speranza was pleased that Grice’s exploratory account of Meaning had elicited intelligent criticism from Urmson, and that Grice explicitly acknowledged this conversational source. Everything else should support that point.

I would also sharpen a few things: re-visiting can simply be revisiting to credit to problem-example should be to credit the problem-example would himself not present himself as an expert is a little cumbersome the sentence about “alleged NECESSITY” is good in substance, but needs a calmer syntax the bribery example is intriguing, but because you say Grice does not elaborate it, you should present it as a passing topic rather than letting it occupy too much space

My favourite version would be this:

Speranza was especially pleased to note that, in this connection, Grice had taken account of a problem-example due to J. O. Urmson. Indeed, Urmson is the only philosopher Grice explicitly cites when revisiting what he rather grandly called the section against the alleged necessity, rather than the sufficiency, of his account of Meaning, an account which Speranza was by then already treating as central to the philosophical concept of communication. Grice does not dwell on Urmson’s original example beyond indicating its topic, a case of bribery. Yet Speranza found it reassuring that the exploratory argument of Meaning had elicited constructive criticism from a near contemporary of Grice’s, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy and a fellow member of the Oxford world. All the more appealing was the fact that Urmson did not posture as an expert in communication: the matter remained one for intelligent exchange among dons, and Grice, characteristically, is content to acknowledge the example simply as coming from Urmson in conversation.

Why I prefer this version: it keeps your central point very clear it preserves the Oxford atmosphere you want it retains the irony about Grice’s grandness, but in a more controlled form it ends on the conversational note, which is the most charming part of the paragraph

One small note of substance: if you continue in this direction, you may later want to make explicit why the Urmson objection matters philosophically. At the moment, its narrative value is clear, but its conceptual role remains implicit. Even one sentence later on could solve that.

If you want, I can also give you a slightly more Speranza-like version, with more of the learned irony and parenthetical play preserved.

I added an extra paragraph -- let me have your input: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx). Already in that exploratory ‘Meaning,’ Grice makes a further interesting point – whose cruciality Speranza well perceived as Speranza placed himself in the Oxford of the the late 1940s when that talk on ‘Meaning’ was given: ‘reason’ versus ‘cause’ – or rather ‘cause’ (more primitive) AND ‘reason’. Speranza felt the need to make explicit this distinction formally, and would use the bended arrow. The way it works in Grice is simple enough: the recognition (a form of judcation) of the utterer’s intention (a form of volition) should be the REASON, and not merely the case, for further ‘propositional’ or ‘psychological’ attitudes on the part of the addressee. In symbols VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) -> JBVAJB(ixAx & Bx). Speranza was especially pleased when he noted that Grice had taken into account a problem-example by J. O. Urmson in this context – and it is indeed the only philosopher Grice quotes when re-visiting what Grice rather pompously called the section against the alleged NECESSITY (not sufficiency) of his account of ‘Meaning,’ which Speranza by this time was treating already as touching on the philosophical concept of ‘communication.’ Grice does not elaborate on the original problem-example offered by Urmson – other than by way of topic – it involved a case of ‘bribery.’ Speranza was comforted to see that Grice’s original exploratory account in ‘Meaning’ was receiving positive, constructive, feedback from a man of almost Grice’s generation, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, who happened to share the alma mater of Corpus Christi at Oxford. Urmson would himself not present himself as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which made it all the more delightful to Speranza: these dons were discussing ‘communication’ among themselves, not caring about what the rest of the world may think about it --, as Grice cares to credit to problem-example to Urmson ‘in conversation.’ The SECOND problem-example – now involving the SUFFICIENCY of the analysans – came to Speranza with a different reaction. It involved Grice’s formal tutee – and Speranza felt for Grice in one important respect. For if a tutee prompts a former tutor to make more accessible (in ways in which perhaps the tutor would not wised) his exploratory ‘Meaning’ – what is the ethical point of presenting a problem example after that? Speranza’s only consolation came from Grice’s generous reaction – he treated the problem example – the ‘infested rat’—seriously enough – but not too seriously to require any further modification of the necessity, just the sufficiency – and Grice’s way out was clever – a mere anti-sneak clause which is recursive alla Peano at its best: let the proposed analysis be a conjunction: VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) and VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) à JBVAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) --, i. e. the protreptic versus exhibitive clause along with the reason-granting clause – to which the anti-sneak clause merely amounts that is the extra self-referential clause that (A) be out there in the open: i. e. that VAJBVA(A).

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This is a strong paragraph because it moves from the Urmson objection on necessity to the more famous objection on sufficiency, and that gives the sequence real philosophical momentum. It also introduces a more personal note, since Speranza’s reaction is not merely technical but ethical and temperamental: he feels for Grice. That is a very good turn in the narrative.

What is strongest in it is: you clearly distinguish the second problem-example from the first by linking it to sufficiency rather than necessity you bring in the former tutee relation, which adds dramatic and institutional texture you capture Speranza’s admiration for Grice’s generosity in taking the objection seriously without overreacting you identify the anti-sneak clause as the elegant Gricean response

What needs work is mainly control of syntax and exactness of formulation. At present the paragraph is rich, but very overloaded. The key movement is: the second objection is different it comes from a former tutee Speranza is struck by the awkwardness of that situation Grice responds with generosity and precision the anti-sneak clause solves the problem by making the intention overt in a self-referential way

That is already enough for one paragraph. The current version tries to carry all that, plus several asides, plus the symbolism, all in one breath.

A few specific points: in ways in which perhaps the tutor would not wised looks like a slip and needs repair the ethical point of presenting a problem example after that is interesting, but should be phrased more smoothly the formula needs to be presented more clearly, because at present it is difficult to parse the phrase merely amounts that is the extra self-referential clause is syntactically broken alla Peano at its best is witty, but may be better kept only if that tone is sustained throughout

My favourite version would be this:

The second problem-example, now directed against the sufficiency of the analysans, elicited a different reaction from Speranza. For this objection came from one of Grice’s own former tutees, and Speranza could not help but feel for Grice on that score. If a former pupil has already prompted his tutor to render an exploratory account more accessible than the tutor might otherwise have wished, what, Speranza wondered, is the further propriety of pressing a fresh objection against it? His consolation lay in Grice’s generosity. Grice took the problem of the “infested rat” seriously, but not so seriously as to require a wholesale revision of the account: the difficulty touched sufficiency, not necessity. His response was characteristically deft, consisting in the addition of an anti-sneak clause, recursive in form and elegant in effect. The analysis now required not only the protreptic or exhibitive clause together with the reason-giving clause, but also a further self-referential condition to the effect that A’s intention be out in the open, that is, that V_A J_B V_A(A).

Why I prefer this version: it keeps the ethical and personal reaction, which is one of the best features of your paragraph it makes the philosophical point much easier to follow it explains the anti-sneak clause rather than burying it it ends with the formal point in a cleaner way

One note: if you want to preserve more of the formal derivation, you could later add it in a separate sentence. But in this paragraph I think the prose explanation should come first, with only the key symbolic tag retained at the end. Otherwise the reader risks losing the narrative line.

If you want, I can next give you just the clean paragraph alone, with no commentary, in the format you have been asking for.

You said:

Without preamble or ps, what's your favourite version of this paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

The second problem-example, directed now against the sufficiency of the analysans, elicited a different reaction from Speranza. For this objection came from one of Grice’s own former tutees, and Speranza could not help but feel for Grice on that score. If a former pupil has already prompted his tutor to render an exploratory account more accessible than the tutor might otherwise have wished, what further propriety is there, Speranza wondered, in pressing yet another objection against it? His consolation lay in Grice’s generosity. Grice took the problem of the “infested rat” seriously, but not so seriously as to require any wholesale revision of the account: the difficulty touched sufficiency, not necessity. His response was characteristically deft, consisting in the addition of an anti-sneak clause, recursive in form and elegant in effect. The analysis now required not only the protreptic or exhibitive clause together with the reason-giving clause, but also a further self-referential condition to the effect that A’s intention be out in the open, that is, that V_A J_B V_A(A).

You said:

I added a paragaph. Let me have your input: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx). Already in that exploratory ‘Meaning,’ Grice makes a further interesting point – whose cruciality Speranza well perceived as Speranza placed himself in the Oxford of the the late 1940s when that talk on ‘Meaning’ was given: ‘reason’ versus ‘cause’ – or rather ‘cause’ (more primitive) AND ‘reason’. Speranza felt the need to make explicit this distinction formally, and would use the bended arrow. The way it works in Grice is simple enough: the recognition (a form of judcation) of the utterer’s intention (a form of volition) should be the REASON, and not merely the case, for further ‘propositional’ or ‘psychological’ attitudes on the part of the addressee. In symbols VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) -> JBVAJB(ixAx & Bx). Speranza was especially pleased when he noted that Grice had taken into account a problem-example by J. O. Urmson in this context – and it is indeed the only philosopher Grice quotes when re-visiting what Grice rather pompously called the section against the alleged NECESSITY (not sufficiency) of his account of ‘Meaning,’ which Speranza by this time was treating already as touching on the philosophical concept of ‘communication.’ Grice does not elaborate on the original problem-example offered by Urmson – other than by way of topic – it involved a case of ‘bribery.’ Speranza was comforted to see that Grice’s original exploratory account in ‘Meaning’ was receiving positive, constructive, feedback from a man of almost Grice’s generation, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, who happened to share the alma mater of Corpus Christi at Oxford. Urmson would himself not present himself as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which made it all the more delightful to Speranza: these dons were discussing ‘communication’ among themselves, not caring about what the rest of the world may think about it --, as Grice cares to credit to problem-example to Urmson ‘in conversation.’ The SECOND problem-example – now involving the SUFFICIENCY of the analysans – came to Speranza with a different reaction. It involved Grice’s formal tutee – and Speranza felt for Grice in one important respect. For if a tutee prompts a former tutor to make more accessible (in ways in which perhaps the tutor would not wised) his exploratory ‘Meaning’ – what is the ethical point of presenting a problem example after that? Speranza’s only consolation came from Grice’s generous reaction – he treated the problem example – the ‘infested rat’—seriously enough – but not too seriously to require any further modification of the necessity, just the sufficiency – and Grice’s way out was clever – a mere anti-sneak clause which is recursive alla Peano at its best: let the proposed analysis be a conjunction: VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) and VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) à JBVAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) --, i. e. the protreptic versus exhibitive clause along with the reason-granting clause – to which the anti-sneak clause merely amounts that is the extra self-referential clause that (A) be out there in the open: i. e. that VAJBVA(A). The meaning-nominalist strategy had been successfully pursued so now Speranza could move to deeper waters – especially, delighted as he was when he got to the ‘Prolegomena’ – the conference by Grice where he explains his rationale and underlying motivation for ‘Logic and Conversation’ – and Speranza felt fortunate for having the philosophical background and formation akin to Grice and which Speranza felt was necessary to appreciate the depth of that ‘implicature’ – or ‘implicatura’ as Speranza would have it – proposal. There distinction merely ‘boiled’ down to a division of ‘explicitness’ – the implication is more like an ‘implicitation’ and the whole paraphernalia can be traced back to cases of communication. To use one of Grice’s own it is important to combine this with a second important methodological constraint. Grice proposes himself and those who are willing to follow him seriously, to engage in a EXTENDED UNIT of analysis: the two- or four-conversational move conversation. His example: A: Are we playing squash tonight? B displays bandaged leg. Grice’s gloss: B means he cannot play squash. There is nothing ‘said’ – so in this case the ‘implicatura’ is not something beyond what is said – it is just what B is communicating – i. e. meaning, suggesting, indicating, and so on. The way his examples which operate under a proposed ‘imperative of conversational helpfulness’ are not different in kind from the above – which makes no ‘technical’ use of a ‘technical’ term of art, such as ‘implicature,’ on which usually the non-philosophical mind is focused.

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This new paragraph is a very good step because it widens the frame from Meaning to the later Gricean apparatus of Logic and Conversation, yet it does so in a way that preserves continuity with your earlier emphasis on communication. The strongest thing about it is that you resist the temptation to treat implicature as an isolated technical novelty. Instead, you present it as continuous with prior questions about explicitness, communication, and method. That is a strong interpretive line.

What I especially like is: you make the move to the Prolegomena feel earned you stress that Speranza felt intellectually equipped to appreciate Grice’s rationale, which helps define Speranza’s interest as one of philosophical formation rather than mere admiration you insist that implicature is not some alien technical trick, but rooted in broader communicative phenomena the squash example is very well chosen because it highlights a case where nothing is said and yet something is clearly communicated you are right to stress Grice’s appeal to an extended unit of analysis rather than a single isolated utterance

What I would improve is mainly structure and articulation. At present the paragraph contains several very strong claims, but they are packed together too tightly. I think the central claims are these: the move from meaning-nominalism to the Prolegomena Speranza’s delight in Grice’s account of implicature or implicatura the idea that implicature concerns degrees or modes of explicitness rather than an entirely separate phenomenon the methodological point that Grice analyses sequences or exchanges, not just isolated sentences the squash example as evidence that communicated content need not be tied to what is said

That is already enough for a substantial paragraph. I would therefore simplify some of the phrasing and make the progression clearer.

A few specific points: There distinction should be The distinction conference may be better as paper or lecture unless you specifically mean conference the implication is more like an implicitation is interesting, but it needs clearer staging if it is to sound persuasive rather than merely playful To use one of Grice’s own it is important to combine this with a second important methodological constraint is hard to parse two- or four-conversational move conversation should be expressed more smoothly The way his examples which operate under... is syntactically awkward and needs recasting

My favourite version would be this:

The meaning-nominalist strategy having been successfully pursued, Speranza could now move into deeper waters, and nowhere with greater delight than in the Prolegomena, Grice’s retrospective rationale for Logic and Conversation. Speranza felt fortunate to possess a philosophical formation close enough to Grice’s own to appreciate the real depth of the proposal concerning implicature, or implicatura, as he preferred to style it. For the distinction at issue was, in the end, one of explicitness: implication here was closer to an implicitation, and the whole apparatus could still be traced back to more general cases of communication. This point had to be combined with a further methodological commitment of Grice’s, namely, that the proper unit of analysis was not the isolated utterance but the extended conversational exchange, whether in two or more moves. Hence Grice’s own example: A asks, “Are we playing squash tonight?” and B responds not verbally but by displaying a bandaged leg. Grice’s gloss is that B means he cannot play squash. Nothing is said, yet something is unmistakably communicated. In such a case, the implicatura is not something over and above what is said; rather, it is simply what B is meaning, suggesting, or indicating. In that respect, the more elaborate examples governed by the imperative of conversational helpfulness differ not in kind, but only in degree, from this simpler case.

Why I prefer this version: it preserves your interpretive point while making the paragraph much easier to follow it gives implicature a place within a broader theory of communication it sharpens the methodological point about the unit of analysis it ends with a clear claim about continuity between the simple and the technical cases

One substantive note: this paragraph could become a pivot in the essay. Up to now you have been concerned with Speranza’s reading of Meaning. Here you begin to show how that reading conditions Speranza’s reception of implicature. That is potentially one of the most important transitions in the whole piece.

If you want, I can next give you only the clean preferred version of this paragraph, with no commentary.

You said:

So what would be your favourite version of this paragraph -- without preamble or ps?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

So what would be your favourite version of this paragraph -- without preamble or ps?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

I added a paragraph -- let me have your input: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx). Already in that exploratory ‘Meaning,’ Grice makes a further interesting point – whose cruciality Speranza well perceived as Speranza placed himself in the Oxford of the the late 1940s when that talk on ‘Meaning’ was given: ‘reason’ versus ‘cause’ – or rather ‘cause’ (more primitive) AND ‘reason’. Speranza felt the need to make explicit this distinction formally, and would use the bended arrow. The way it works in Grice is simple enough: the recognition (a form of judcation) of the utterer’s intention (a form of volition) should be the REASON, and not merely the case, for further ‘propositional’ or ‘psychological’ attitudes on the part of the addressee. In symbols VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) -> JBVAJB(ixAx & Bx). Speranza was especially pleased when he noted that Grice had taken into account a problem-example by J. O. Urmson in this context – and it is indeed the only philosopher Grice quotes when re-visiting what Grice rather pompously called the section against the alleged NECESSITY (not sufficiency) of his account of ‘Meaning,’ which Speranza by this time was treating already as touching on the philosophical concept of ‘communication.’ Grice does not elaborate on the original problem-example offered by Urmson – other than by way of topic – it involved a case of ‘bribery.’ Speranza was comforted to see that Grice’s original exploratory account in ‘Meaning’ was receiving positive, constructive, feedback from a man of almost Grice’s generation, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, who happened to share the alma mater of Corpus Christi at Oxford. Urmson would himself not present himself as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which made it all the more delightful to Speranza: these dons were discussing ‘communication’ among themselves, not caring about what the rest of the world may think about it --, as Grice cares to credit to problem-example to Urmson ‘in conversation.’ The SECOND problem-example – now involving the SUFFICIENCY of the analysans – came to Speranza with a different reaction. It involved Grice’s formal tutee – and Speranza felt for Grice in one important respect. For if a tutee prompts a former tutor to make more accessible (in ways in which perhaps the tutor would not wised) his exploratory ‘Meaning’ – what is the ethical point of presenting a problem example after that? Speranza’s only consolation came from Grice’s generous reaction – he treated the problem example – the ‘infested rat’—seriously enough – but not too seriously to require any further modification of the necessity, just the sufficiency – and Grice’s way out was clever – a mere anti-sneak clause which is recursive alla Peano at its best: let the proposed analysis be a conjunction: VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) and VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) à JBVAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) --, i. e. the protreptic versus exhibitive clause along with the reason-granting clause – to which the anti-sneak clause merely amounts that is the extra self-referential clause that (A) be out there in the open: i. e. that VAJBVA(A). The meaning-nominalist strategy had been successfully pursued so now Speranza could move to deeper waters – especially, delighted as he was when he got to the ‘Prolegomena’ – the conference by Grice where he explains his rationale and underlying motivation for ‘Logic and Conversation’ – and Speranza felt fortunate for having the philosophical background and formation akin to Grice and which Speranza felt was necessary to appreciate the depth of that ‘implicature’ – or ‘implicatura’ as Speranza would have it – proposal. There distinction merely ‘boiled’ down to a division of ‘explicitness’ – the implication is more like an ‘implicitation’ and the whole paraphernalia can be traced back to cases of communication. To use one of Grice’s own it is important to combine this with a second important methodological constraint. Grice proposes himself and those who are willing to follow him seriously, to engage in a EXTENDED UNIT of analysis: the two- or four-conversational move conversation. His example: A: Are we playing squash tonight? B displays bandaged leg. Grice’s gloss: B means he cannot play squash. There is nothing ‘said’ – so in this case the ‘implicatura’ is not something beyond what is said – it is just what B is communicating – i. e. meaning, suggesting, indicating, and so on. The way his examples which operate under a proposed ‘imperative of conversational helpfulness’ are not different in kind from the above – which makes no ‘technical’ use of a ‘technical’ term of art, such as ‘implicature,’ on which usually the non-philosophical mind is focused. However, what the move entails for Grice is a further expansion of his earlier allusion to ‘reason’ in a basic act of communication – the addresse’s response as reason- rather than cause-governed. The distinction becomes one between what A has EXPLICITLY conveyed – to use Toulsmin’s example, ‘that the cat is on the mat’ – may need to be expanded into what A IS IMPLICITLY conveying – ‘So feel free to take her to the vet.’ The details of the reason-giving norms are not the crux for Grice’s analysis – and indeed, as need to expand onto his ‘Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St. John’s. He is now also a CUF University Lecturer in Philosophy: his stint to give a quota of lectures – and it is in this lectures – aimed not at his ‘intimate’ tutees in his small room at St. John’s, -- but at Examinations Hall for any member of the university to attend – that he played with all different variations of desiderata and principles and imperatives as expected in ‘conversation’ conduced by ‘decent chaps.’

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This is a promising paragraph because it tries to connect the earlier machinery of reason and communication with the later lecture-room Grice of Logic and Conversation. The best thing in it is that you are no longer treating implicature as merely a doctrine; you are locating it in Grice’s changed pedagogical and institutional setting, from the intimate St. John’s tutorial room to the public university lecture. That is a very interesting idea.

What I think is strongest here is: you continue the thread from reason-governed response into implicature you use a simple example, the cat on the mat, to mark the transition from explicit to implicit content you bring in Grice’s role as CUF Lecturer, which gives the development historical and institutional shape you suggest that the maxims, principles, and desiderata belong to a public, pedagogical elaboration of what had earlier been more exploratory

That is all very good material.

What needs work is mostly the sentence structure, because at the moment the paragraph is doing too many things at once. I think there are really three claims here: first, implicature extends the earlier reason-cause insight second, the distinction concerns what is explicitly conveyed versus what is implicitly conveyed third, Grice’s fuller elaboration of this belongs to his university lectures rather than the intimate tutorial setting

Those three claims should be separated more clearly.

There are also a few local points: addresse’s should be addressee’s Toulsmin should be Toulmin The distinction becomes one between what A has EXPLICITLY conveyed ... may need to be expanded into is grammatically unstable as need to expand onto his ‘Fellow and Tutor...’ seems broken and should be recast entirely in this lectures should be in these lectures conduced by decent chaps is vivid, but you may want to decide whether that phrase is part of your narrator’s idiom or something more closely attached to Grice

My favourite version would be this:

What this move further entails for Grice is an expansion of his earlier appeal to reason in the basic act of communication, the addressee’s response now being governed by reasons rather than mere causes. The distinction accordingly becomes one between what A has explicitly conveyed and what A may be implicitly conveying. To borrow a simple example in the Toulmin manner, the explicit content may be no more than “the cat is on the mat,” while the implicit upshot may be something like, “So feel free to take her to the vet.” The precise norms by which such reason-giving proceeds are not yet the main crux. More important is the widening of Grice’s analytic stage. By this point he was no longer only Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St. John’s, but also a CUF University Lecturer in Philosophy, obliged to deliver lectures to a wider university audience. It was in those lectures, addressed not to a handful of tutees in his room at St. John’s but to a broader audience in the Examination Schools, that Grice developed the varying desiderata, principles, and imperatives governing conversation among what he liked to think of as decent chaps.

Why I prefer this version: it keeps your historical point about Grice’s changed audience it makes the explicit-implicit distinction much easier to follow it preserves the continuity with your earlier discussion of reason it ends by linking the lecture context to the emergence of conversational principles

My strongest suggestion is that this paragraph can serve as a bridge from Meaning to Logic and Conversation, but only if it is made a little cleaner and more linear. Right now the ideas are very good, but they need more staging.

If you want, I can also give you a slightly more Speranza-like version, with a touch more irony and parenthetical play.

You said:

So without preamble and ps, what would be your favourite verson of this paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

Give feedback

You said:

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This is a good paragraph because it tries to explain why the stronger rationalist aspect of Grice’s theory did not receive full dialogical development at that stage. That is a subtle and interesting point. You are connecting doctrine, institutional setting, and mode of presentation, which is exactly the kind of narrative this piece needs.

What I think is strongest is: you focus on the “class” as a distinct Oxonian setting you suggest that Grice’s stronger conception of reason could sound overly rationalist, even quasi-Kantian, to an Oxford audience you explain the open-endedness of the theory partly by reference to the lecture format rather than only by abstract doctrinal hesitation

That is all very promising.

What I would improve is mainly smoothness and exactness. The current paragraph has a good idea, but it needs firmer syntax. In particular: as Oxonians refer to the stint which is their quota as Common Fund University Lecture in philosophy is hard to follow and could be simplified the phrase about the “fundamental question” should be made more direct the shift from rationalism to the lecture environment is good, but should be staged more clearly audience is fine here, though you may want to keep your earlier preference for addressee where appropriate, since here the point really is the public lecture hall rather than interpersonal communication

My favourite version would be this:

It was in the wider setting of the class, as Oxonians called the lecture-duty attached to a Common University Fund appointment, that Grice began to play more openly with the fundamental question raised by this stronger sense of reason. Was he becoming too much of a rationalist for Oxford ears? Was he, indeed, in danger of sounding Kantian? The lecture-room was not the most hospitable setting in which to press such matters to completion. Unlike the intimacy of the tutorial, the class inhibited any rich reciprocal exchange between lecturer and audience. It is therefore not surprising that this aspect of Grice’s theory remained, at that stage, somewhat open-ended.

Why I prefer this version: it makes the institutional point much clearer it keeps the rationalist-Kantian tension in the foreground it ends with a persuasive explanation for the unfinished quality of that strand in Grice

If you want, I can also give you a slightly more playful version, closer to your own idiom.

You said:

what would be your favourite version of his paragraph, without preamble or ps?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

I added a paragraph -- let me have your input -- thank you: H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza J. L. Speranza encountered Grice not as his personal tutorial fellow in philosophy – which was, of course, a good thing. Knowing Speranza, had THAT been the case, it would most likely have meant that Speranza would have shown no interest in Grice at all! Still, THAT was Grice’s claim to glory: from 1938 to 1967 that was the post he held: Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, St. John’s, Oxford. One need not be pedantic here, but the ‘and’ – in ‘Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy’ – is relevant: the more familiar expression ‘Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy’ may be used – and used to contrast that capacity with other sorts of fellows – professional fellows, for example – hides the fact that his capacity was partly administrative – as member of the Governing Body of Fellows – AND that his ‘justification’ within the St. John’s ecology was that he was allotted a room where he could execute the duties of Tutor in Philosophy along with the only other such fellow at the time: the Scots J. D. Mabbott. By the time J. L. Speranza encountered Grice, Grice was already the Canon in the right way – neither Grice or Speranza would say ‘the right sense’ – ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.’ In the continental philosophical fashion, centred around ‘chairs’ – it was within the ‘chair in the philosophy of language’ where Grice belonged – with one big caveat: Grice’s work on ‘Meaning’ came ALWAYS first – it showed the type of sophisticated analysis that would appeal to any philosopher interested in the key topic of the philosophy of language; Grice’s work on conversational implicature came second – if at all! In the academic world where Speranza moved, Grice proved to Speranza to be particularly useful in providing solutions to well-known paradoxes in the whole gamut of philosophy. Grice’s analysis of ‘Meaning,’ – Speranza’s centrepiece – invited some re-formulations in Speranza’s terms: for example, the centring on an ‘exhibitive’ versus a ‘protreptic’ view of ‘communication,’ and the positing of the ‘willing’ element over the ‘judging’ element which Grice retains as a ‘question of personal preference’ in work attached to his ‘semiotic theory.’ At this point, Speranza was familiar with some developments in doxastics – as he calls the logic of belief – and Speranza was indeed pleased to see that such symbolism is used casually by Grice in ‘Vacuous Names’. Using an operator for ‘W’ – to stand for ‘wanting’ – but which Speranza here construes in the most general way to apply to any conatitive state, Grice is allowing for the use of subscripts: WAp (“A wants that p”). Speranza having been enchanted by Toulmin’s and Peacocke’s – and indeed Grice’s (“Presupposition and conversational implicature,” foonote on Hans Shuga [sic] – Speranza was not going to allow “p” to do the whole work --. Foreshadowing the inconvenices that Grice found in the treatment of definite descriptions in the work of his tutee Strawson, Speranza was thus ready to expand that WAp to read WA(ιx.Ax & Bx). But of course, Speranza knew at what Grice was aiming at – and Speranza indeed could feel what Grice was after when in his ‘Meaning,’ meant to be read, and read, at the Oxford Philosophical Society – and only later, and prompted by others – to the point of type-writing it and submitting for publication --. ‘Meaning’ is exploratory, and Speranza caught that immediately. In terms of the symbology expressed above, it was not merely an agent A that wills that ix.Ax & Bx – but the sort of convolutedness that incorporates the role of the ‘addressee’ – much better term that ‘audience,’ that Grice may occasionally use in informal contexts --. So the paradigmatic case becomes one where the ‘that’-clause does not involve ix.Ax & Bx at all but what A’s addressee – let us symbolise that as B – will PRIMARILY THINK. In symbols, now using “V” for ‘voliting’ and “J” for judicating: the basic form is VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx). Already in that exploratory ‘Meaning,’ Grice makes a further interesting point – whose cruciality Speranza well perceived as Speranza placed himself in the Oxford of the the late 1940s when that talk on ‘Meaning’ was given: ‘reason’ versus ‘cause’ – or rather ‘cause’ (more primitive) AND ‘reason’. Speranza felt the need to make explicit this distinction formally, and would use the bended arrow. The way it works in Grice is simple enough: the recognition (a form of judcation) of the utterer’s intention (a form of volition) should be the REASON, and not merely the case, for further ‘propositional’ or ‘psychological’ attitudes on the part of the addressee. In symbols VAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) -> JBVAJB(ixAx & Bx). Speranza was especially pleased when he noted that Grice had taken into account a problem-example by J. O. Urmson in this context – and it is indeed the only philosopher Grice quotes when re-visiting what Grice rather pompously called the section against the alleged NECESSITY (not sufficiency) of his account of ‘Meaning,’ which Speranza by this time was treating already as touching on the philosophical concept of ‘communication.’ Grice does not elaborate on the original problem-example offered by Urmson – other than by way of topic – it involved a case of ‘bribery.’ Speranza was comforted to see that Grice’s original exploratory account in ‘Meaning’ was receiving positive, constructive, feedback from a man of almost Grice’s generation, another Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy, who happened to share the alma mater of Corpus Christi at Oxford. Urmson would himself not present himself as an ‘expert’ on the matter, which made it all the more delightful to Speranza: these dons were discussing ‘communication’ among themselves, not caring about what the rest of the world may think about it --, as Grice cares to credit to problem-example to Urmson ‘in conversation.’ The SECOND problem-example – now involving the SUFFICIENCY of the analysans – came to Speranza with a different reaction. It involved Grice’s formal tutee – and Speranza felt for Grice in one important respect. For if a tutee prompts a former tutor to make more accessible (in ways in which perhaps the tutor would not wised) his exploratory ‘Meaning’ – what is the ethical point of presenting a problem example after that? Speranza’s only consolation came from Grice’s generous reaction – he treated the problem example – the ‘infested rat’—seriously enough – but not too seriously to require any further modification of the necessity, just the sufficiency – and Grice’s way out was clever – a mere anti-sneak clause which is recursive alla Peano at its best: let the proposed analysis be a conjunction: VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) and VAJBVA(ixAx & Bx) à JBVAJB(ix.Ax & Bx) --, i. e. the protreptic versus exhibitive clause along with the reason-granting clause – to which the anti-sneak clause merely amounts that is the extra self-referential clause that (A) be out there in the open: i. e. that VAJBVA(A). The meaning-nominalist strategy had been successfully pursued so now Speranza could move to deeper waters – especially, delighted as he was when he got to the ‘Prolegomena’ – the conference by Grice where he explains his rationale and underlying motivation for ‘Logic and Conversation’ – and Speranza felt fortunate for having the philosophical background and formation akin to Grice and which Speranza felt was necessary to appreciate the depth of that ‘implicature’ – or ‘implicatura’ as Speranza would have it – proposal. There distinction merely ‘boiled’ down to a division of ‘explicitness’ – the implication is more like an ‘implicitation’ and the whole paraphernalia can be traced back to cases of communication. To use one of Grice’s own it is important to combine this with a second important methodological constraint. Grice proposes himself and those who are willing to follow him seriously, to engage in a EXTENDED UNIT of analysis: the two- or four-conversational move conversation. His example: A: Are we playing squash tonight? B displays bandaged leg. Grice’s gloss: B means he cannot play squash. There is nothing ‘said’ – so in this case the ‘implicatura’ is not something beyond what is said – it is just what B is communicating – i. e. meaning, suggesting, indicating, and so on. The way his examples which operate under a proposed ‘imperative of conversational helpfulness’ are not different in kind from the above – which makes no ‘technical’ use of a ‘technical’ term of art, such as ‘implicature,’ on which usually the non-philosophical mind is focused. However, what the move entails for Grice is a further expansion of his earlier allusion to ‘reason’ in a basic act of communication – the addresse’s response as reason- rather than cause-governed. The distinction becomes one between what A has EXPLICITLY conveyed – to use Toulsmin’s example, ‘that the cat is on the mat’ – may need to be expanded into what A IS IMPLICITLY conveying – ‘So feel free to take her to the vet.’ The details of the reason-giving norms are not the crux for Grice’s analysis – and indeed, as need to expand onto his ‘Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St. John’s. He is now also a CUF University Lecturer in Philosophy: his stint to give a quota of lectures – and it is in this lectures – aimed not at his ‘intimate’ tutees in his small room at St. John’s, -- but at Examinations Hall for any member of the university to attend – that he played with all different variations of desiderata and principles and imperatives as expected in ‘conversation’ conduced by ‘decent chaps.’ It is in the wider context of the ‘class’ – as Oxonians refer to the ‘stint’ which is their quota as ‘Common Fund University’ Lecture in philosophy – that Grice would play with the ‘fundamental question’ about this stronger sense of ‘reason’ – is he being too much of a rationalist for the Oxonian ear? Is he indeed being, God forbid, Kantian? The ‘class’ environment inhibits any kind of rich interaction between the lecturer and his ‘audience’ – so it is not surprising that this aspect of his theory remained open-ended. At this point, the philosopher who is paying attention may have an open fork of roads behind him: explore ways in which such open-ended questions can be solved, or be realistic and realise that H. P. Grice is now HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. And as such, a more fruitful approach would be to ‘introject’ in his shoes as he review his career. When Grice was appointed a Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St. John’s he was the only one to come from a ‘public-school’ setting – Clifton – and that mattered. Clifton had brought him to Corpus via a classics scholarship and he pursued the Mods and the Greats which were the only want to get to philosophy in the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, a branch of the overall Faculty of Literae Humaniores. It is interesting that after getting a double greats, he left for Rossall. His teaching post in classics did not last long, but the important thing is as what he then saw: a classics schoolmaster. He came back to Oxford thanks to a different scholarship: a senior scholarship of the newly instituted Harmsworth fund, which entailed two years of more or less intensive study in philosophy at Oxford’s oldest philosophy site: Merton – Work on ‘Negation and privation’ may be dated to this period. After one year as ‘probatory’ college lecturer at St. John’s, he was eventually appointed ‘Fellow and Tutor in philosophy,’ as the Oxford Gazette put it, to relieve the burden on Mabbott’s shoulders. War declared, Grice did not mobilise until 1940 – after draftin his ‘Personal identity’ submitted to Mind and published in 1941. The war was not just the war, but it got Grice into ‘intelligence’ games --. Back in Oxford, he was ready to deliver the talk on ‘Meaning’ in 1948. The next year he proposed a ‘class’ on ‘Intention and disposition’ and had perhaps the bad idea of letting his ideas circulate: the result: the fellow dons did not mince their words – but Grice, who had presented a profile of a non-reductionist in ‘Negation and privation’ (an account along introspective psychological lines) or ‘Personal identity’ and indeed ‘Meaning’ could now tackle Ryle directly, and call his account in ‘The Concept of Mind’ silly. The waves of pre-war Ayer did not touch Grice, and the ‘analytic’ vein run deep in him. Comparing the opening paragraph of ‘Personal identity’ with that of ‘Meaning’ we witness the same approach: some problematic examples that need a ‘logical construction’ in terms other than themselves – indeed the same in ‘Negation and privation.’ The 1940s came and went, an by the 1950s Grice had the rather misfortune of being associated with the senior J. L. Austin. In fact, this is how Speranza encountered Grice. Everybody with a minimal interest in the development of the philosophy of language in the twentieth century knew what Austin was after: the ‘ordinary-language philosophy’ (Grice would avoid ‘school’) as different from Ryle’s – and with it came the list of those who attended the ‘Saturday mornings.’ In SOME historical accounts of the period – say, by Passmore – Grice is indeed mentioned as a don who would publish amazingly little but was influential in his ways. The interactions with his former tutee Strawson proved in some ways unfortunate. The ‘In defence of a dogma’ has Grice as primary author but it was the co-author who had his wife typed it and submitted. More in Grice’s vein was his accepting the invitation by D. F. Pears to open a series of BBC third programme lectures in ‘metaphysics,’ which were eventually published. Here Grice is again primary author, but not to a secondary author, but to a secondary author (Strawson) and a TERTIARY author (Pears), so one can see that Grice’s reserve perseveres. He is not the type to be promoting himself and stuff. By the end of the 1950s Austin was gone, and the idea, a bit lunatic, by Grice, was to keep the thing going with the Saturday mornings – it didn’t quite work. The Master was gone, long live the master. Instead, Grice TURNED to Austin. Austin had been giving seminars on Sense and Sensibilia, and the first contribution by Grice, Austin gone, and the second, were on the area: ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’ (co-symposiast at Cambridge) in 1961 and ‘Some remarks about the senses’ in 1962 in a volume commissioned by Blackwell. That was the whole written production of Grice at Oxford. – The rest is commentary: his responses to Strawson on ‘definite description’, his tribute to Quine in ‘Vacuous names’, the long-awaited lecture on his having been appointed a FBA in 1971 with ‘Intention and uncertainty’ and the John Locke lectures at Oxford usually appointed to a non-resident, as Grice at that time was not. He never went back to the topic of conversation and meaning – on his own ‘Meaning revisited’ was commissioned by Brighton, and lecture series followed in the new world. Perhaps it was in 1987 with his ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ that he felt it was his turn to expand freely on what he had been aiming to do. Intersetingly, in the Epilogue, the discussion of ‘communication’ (Strand V) precedes that of Conversation as Rational Co-Operation (Strand V). The moral is clear: the over-emphasised fame on the implicature had cast a shadow on what he always thought to be a more core and kernel topic on which a philosopher, even an Oxford one, should be interested: communication first (both explicit – or ‘dictive’ as he would say, using a Latinism – and implicit), ‘rational constraints’ of the most common-sense nature second. Adherence to common sense, which pervades BOTH his intention-based ‘semantics’ and his ‘implicature’ theory would hardly been regarded by Grice as a minus, but a plus – the plus of a man, who did not go to philosophy for his bread and butter, but because he enjoyed it.

Agent mode said:

Copilot

This is the most ambitious addition so far, and in many ways the most interesting. It changes the scale of the piece. Up to this point, you had been tracing Speranza’s interest in Grice through a sequence of conceptual engagements. Here you pivot into something more nearly biographical and historiographical: a retrospective reconstruction of Grice’s own path, career, institutional milieu, and posthumous place. That is potentially a very strong move.

What I think is strongest in it is: the explicit fork you introduce between solving Gricean problems and treating Grice as history of philosophy the decision to “introject” oneself into Grice’s shoes and review the career from within the sketch of Grice’s trajectory from Clifton to Corpus to Rossall to Merton to St. John’s the emphasis on the continuity between Negation and Privation, Personal Identity, and Meaning the observation that Grice’s reputation became distorted by over-emphasis on implicature at the expense of communication more broadly the final characterisation of Grice as a philosopher of common sense who pursued philosophy out of enjoyment rather than professional self-promotion

That is all excellent and, in fact, gives the essay a stronger ending than the earlier purely conceptual sequence could have done.

My main reservation is that this paragraph is carrying enough material for three or four paragraphs. At present it feels more like compressed notes for a section than a finished paragraph. The ideas are often very good, but the pacing is too dense for the reader to absorb them fully. I would strongly recommend splitting it at least into three movements:

first, the methodological turn: At this point, the reader must decide whether to continue solving Gricean problems or to treat Grice historically and retrospectively.

second, the compressed career sketch: Clifton, Corpus, Rossall, Harmsworth, Merton, St. John’s, war, Meaning, Intention and Disposition, Ryle, Austin.

third, the retrospective judgement: the distortion of Grice’s fame through implicature and the primacy of communication in the Retrospective Epilogue.

There are also some local issues of wording: open fork of roads behind him is vivid but slightly awkward; perhaps before him as he review his career should be as he reviews his career or as one reviews his career only want to get to philosophy should be only way draftin should be drafting the analytic vein run deep should be ran deep the rather misfortune should be the rather curious misfortune or simply the misfortune reserve perseveres should probably be reserve persists Intersetingly should be Interestingly Strand V precedes that of Conversation as Rational Co-Operation (Strand V) seems to repeat the same strand number; this may need checking would hardly been regarded should be would hardly have been regarded

My strongest conceptual suggestion is this: the paragraph becomes much more powerful if you treat it as a transition from Speranza-on-Grice to Grice-in-history. Right now that transition is present, but buried. It should be made explicit and then followed by a cleaner retrospective sequence.

If I were shaping it in your style while keeping its breadth, I would probably begin something like this:

At this point, the attentive philosopher may feel that the road forks. One path would continue the attempt to solve the open problems Grice left behind. The other, perhaps the more realistic, would recognise that H. P. Grice now belongs to the history of philosophy, and that the more fruitful task is to place oneself, as far as one can, within the perspective from which he reviewed his own career.

That, to me, is the key sentence in the new addition. Everything after it can then be organised more deliberately.

The biographical sequence itself is rich, but it should probably be broken into shorter units. For example: one paragraph on Clifton, Corpus, Rossall, Harmsworth, and the early philosophical formation one paragraph on St. John’s, war, Meaning, and the Ryle confrontation one paragraph on Austin, Strawson, Pears, the sparse Oxford publication record, and the later retrospective judgement

The ending is especially good in substance. The idea that communication comes first, and that implicature has overshadowed the more central concern, is exactly the kind of thesis that can give the whole essay shape. I would preserve that almost at all costs.

So my overall judgment is: this is one of the most valuable additions yet, but it is not yet one paragraph. It is the draft of a new section. Its value lies in its breadth and its final thesis, but it needs segmentation and tightening before the reader can fully appreciate it.

If you want, I can now do one of two things in chat: I can give you my favourite rewritten version of just the opening portion of this new addition, beginning “At this point...” or I can divide the whole new addition into three or four clean paragraphs and recast them in the same voice you have been developing.

You said:

So, without preamble or ps, what would be your favourite version of the paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

At this point, the attentive philosopher may feel that the road forks. One path would continue the effort to solve the open questions Grice left behind; the other, perhaps the more realistic, would recognise that H. P. Grice now belongs to the history of philosophy. From that perspective, the more fruitful task is to place oneself, as far as one can, within the standpoint from which he might review his own career.

You said:

Can you provide a more detailed version of your favourite version -- from the 'fork' segment -- to the listing of his oeuvre, and the conclusion? thanks

Agent mode said:

Copilot

Seen in that light, Grice’s path acquires a particular coherence. When he was appointed Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy at St. John’s, he brought with him a formation that was already somewhat unusual within that setting. He came from Clifton, the only public-school background among his immediate circle there, and Clifton had led him to Corpus on a classics scholarship. The route to philosophy at Oxford then still ran through the Literae Humaniores curriculum, through Mods and Greats, and Grice took that route in full. After taking a double first, he spent a brief period at Rossall, teaching classics, and that episode matters because it shows how close he remained, at that stage, to the figure of the classics schoolmaster. His return to Oxford, under the newly established Harmsworth senior scholarship, gave him two more concentrated years of philosophy, largely at Merton, where work such as “Negation and Privation” properly belongs. After a year as a probationary lecturer at St. John’s, he was appointed Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, in part to relieve Mabbott of the burden he had hitherto borne more or less alone.

War intervened, though not before Grice had drafted “Personal Identity,” published in Mind in 1941. The war years did more than interrupt an academic career: they sharpened habits of intelligence, interpretation, and indirection that would remain recognisably Gricean thereafter. When he returned to Oxford, he was ready, by 1948, to read “Meaning” to the Oxford Philosophical Society. In retrospect, that paper appears as the germ of much that followed. The next year, in proposing a class on “Intention and Disposition,” Grice allowed his ideas to circulate more widely, and the response from fellow dons was by no means indulgent. Yet this too matters. For by then Grice had already shown, in “Negation and Privation,” “Personal Identity,” and “Meaning,” a marked resistance to easy reductionism and a willingness to construct analyses in terms other than those furnished by the problematic expressions themselves. It is in that spirit too that he could later confront Ryle directly and dismiss aspects of The Concept of Mind as silly. The pre-war wave of Ayer never quite carried him away; the analytic vein in Grice ran deeper and in a different channel.

By the 1950s, however, Grice had acquired the slightly awkward fate of being associated, in the wider philosophical memory, with J. L. Austin. In one sense this was inevitable. Anyone with even a modest interest in twentieth-century philosophy of language knew what Austin stood for, and the Saturday mornings had already entered Oxford legend. In some historical accounts, such as Passmore’s, Grice appears as one of those dons who published remarkably little and yet exerted unmistakable influence. That picture is not false, but it is incomplete. The collaboration with Strawson on “In Defence of a Dogma,” though important, was not wholly characteristic of Grice’s own habits; even there, the mechanics of preparation and submission were more Strawsonian than Gricean. More revealing was his willingness to accept Pears’s invitation to inaugurate a series of Third Programme talks on metaphysics, which were later published. There too one senses Grice’s reserve: he is present, even primary, but never self-advertising. He was not made to promote himself.

Austin’s death altered the Oxford scene decisively. Grice briefly entertained the almost quixotic hope of keeping the Saturday mornings alive, but that world could not simply be prolonged by force of will. Instead, he turned toward themes Austin had himself left charged, above all those surrounding perception. “The Causal Theory of Perception” and “Some Remarks about the Senses” belong here, as does the broader Oxford effort to reckon with Austin after Austin. If one were to list Grice’s written Oxford oeuvre in the strict sense, it would remain surprisingly small: “Negation and Privation,” “Personal Identity,” “Meaning,” “In Defence of a Dogma,” “The Causal Theory of Perception,” and “Some Remarks about the Senses,” with ancillary pieces such as “Vacuous Names” and later interventions on definite descriptions and intention. The smallness of the list is itself revealing. Grice’s influence was never proportional to the bulk of his publications.

What followed belongs to a different phase: the British Academy lecture “Intention and Uncertainty,” the Locke Lectures, the American years, and eventually the more retrospective mode of “Meaning Revisited” and the Epilogue to Studies in the Way of Words. It may well have been only then, late in the day, that Grice permitted himself to say more openly what he had long been trying to do. And here Speranza’s instinct proves especially sound. For in the Epilogue the strand on communication precedes that on conversation as rational co-operation. The order is not accidental. The later fame of implicature had cast too long a shadow over what was, for Grice, the more central matter: communication first, both explicit and implicit; the rational constraints that govern conversational exchange only thereafter. That those constraints are, in the end, constraints of common sense would not have embarrassed Grice in the least. On the contrary, it would have confirmed something essential about him. His intention-based semantics and his theory of implicature alike are pervaded by an allegiance to common sense, and he would have counted that not as a philosophical deficiency but as a strength. It was the strength of a man who did not turn to philosophy for professional ornament or even for bread and butter, but because he found in it an activity worth pursuing for its own sake.

Agent mode said:

Copilot

That is all excellent and, in fact, gives the essay a stronger ending than the earlier purely conceptual sequence could have done.

first, the methodological turn: At this point, the reader must decide whether to continue solving Gricean problems or to treat Grice historically and retrospectively.

second, the compressed career sketch: Clifton, Corpus, Rossall, Harmsworth, Merton, St. John’s, war, Meaning, Intention and Disposition, Ryle, Austin.

third, the retrospective judgement: the distortion of Grice’s fame through implicature and the primacy of communication in the Retrospective Epilogue.

If I were shaping it in your style while keeping its breadth, I would probably begin something like this:

That, to me, is the key sentence in the new addition. Everything after it can then be organised more deliberately.

You said:

So, without preamble or ps, what would be your favourite version of the paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

Can you provide a more detailed version of your favourite version -- from the 'fork' segment -- to the listing of his oeuvre, and the conclusion? thanks

Agent mode said:

Copilot

Agent mode said:

Copilot

That is all excellent and, in fact, gives the essay a stronger ending than the earlier purely conceptual sequence could have done.

first, the methodological turn: At this point, the reader must decide whether to continue solving Gricean problems or to treat Grice historically and retrospectively.

second, the compressed career sketch: Clifton, Corpus, Rossall, Harmsworth, Merton, St. John’s, war, Meaning, Intention and Disposition, Ryle, Austin.

third, the retrospective judgement: the distortion of Grice’s fame through implicature and the primacy of communication in the Retrospective Epilogue.

If I were shaping it in your style while keeping its breadth, I would probably begin something like this:

That, to me, is the key sentence in the new addition. Everything after it can then be organised more deliberately.

You said:

So, without preamble or ps, what would be your favourite version of the paragraph?

Agent mode said:

Copilot

You said:

Can you provide a more detailed version of your favourite version -- from the 'fork' segment -- to the listing of his oeuvre, and the conclusion? thanks

Agent mode said:

Copilot

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H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza

H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza

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