H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza -- ST

 

Remigio Sabbadini (Sarego, Vicenza): Cceronismo ed implicatura. For Grice and Sabbadini the hinge is the same—a classical understanding of how meaning is governed by reason—but they approach it from opposite ends of the same Latin corridor. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats rationality as an interactional norm: what is said is calibrated against what a reasonable hearer is entitled to infer, so implicature arises not from words themselves but from shared expectations of intelligible conduct. Sabbadini, by contrast, arrives at the same phenomenon through philology rather than pragmatics: in his work on Cicero and the humanists, meaning is traced genealogically, as a historically sedimented practice in which names, signs, and traditions acquire force through transmission rather than immediate inspection. Where Grice asks how an utterance licenses an inference here and now, Sabbadini shows how a name like Cicero licenses expectations across centuries, inviting readers to hunt for a cece on the nose even when none is there. Grice’s insight is that such inferences are rational but defeasible, products of cooperative reasoning rather than semantic entailment; Sabbadini’s is that scholarship itself operates by the same logic, moving from traces to conclusions under norms of disciplined inference. In both cases, meaning is reason-governed without being mechanically determined: it lives neither in brute signs nor in private intentions alone, but in the shared practices—conversational for Grice, philological for Sabbadini—that make understanding accountable, corrigible, and historically intelligible. Grice: “In the Oxford that I knew, you were introduced to philosophy upon completion of the fifth term of your Lit. Hum. degree, so the classics were in my veins. Those who followed the P. P. E. did not care, or know, the first thing!” Cicero, Grice. Filosofo italiano. CICERONE FILOSOFO ITALIANO. Filologo. Laureatosi a Firenze, insegna successivamente nei ginnasî di Girgenti, di Velletri e di Ventimiglia e nei licei di Salerno, di Livorno e di Palermo. Passa quindi a insegnare letteratura latina a Catania e nell'accademia scientifico-letteraria, poi università, di Milano. Studia, degli scrittori latini, Orazio, Cicerone, Seneca, i commentatori antichi di Terenzio, e soprattutto Virgilio, cui dedica una lunga serie di lavori, da un articolo pubblicato sulla Rivista di filologia e istruzione classica, alla monumentale edizione critica -- Roma. Ma S. leg soprattutto il suo nome alla storia dell'umanesimo filologico, della quale si può dire il creatore. Anche qui un'ininterrotta fervida attività, dal saggio sull'umanista velletrano Mancinelli, pubbl. nella Cronaca del Ginnasio di Velletri, all'articolo su Frulovisio umanista, pubblicato in Giorn. stor. della lett. ital. Edizioni di epistolarî, ricostruzioni e precisazioni biografiche, descrizioni e illustrazioni di codici: tutto un complesso lavoro intorno a umanisti di ogni provenienza e di diverso valore, tra i quali, prediletto, Veronese, cui S. dedica speciale attenzione (cfr. l'ampia biografia, pubbl. nel Giornale Ligustico, il volume La scuola e gli studi di G., Catania, e soprattutto l'edizione e l'illustrazione dell'epistolario, Venezia. Coronano questa mirabile attività nel campo umanistico il Metodo degli umanisti -- Firenze -- e specialmente le Scoperte dei codici latini -- Firenze: opera saldissima per dottrina e forza di pensiero, che è base indispensabile per ogni ulteriore studio sull'umanesimo filologico. II volume Classici e umanisti da codici ambrosiani -- Firenze --, che raccoglie alcuni scritti pubblicati sparsamente, contiene un Elenco cronologico deqli scritti S.  CICERONE.  Grice: Caro Sabbadini, oggi il filosofo Speranza mi ha ricordato che a Vadum Boum i classici non si studiano: ti finiscono direttamente nelle vene. E quando ci finiscono, cominciano subito a fare i genealogisti. Sabbadini: Ah, i genealogisti: con Cicerone basta pronunciare il nome e subito qualcuno chiede: “Ma dov’è il cicer?”—latino cicer, ciceris, cioè il nostro cece. E già ti stanno guardando il naso come se fosse un commento antico. Grice: Appunto: e qui viene la mia implicatura (che non dirò ad alta voce). Se “Cicero” viene da cicer, è un designatore rigido del… cece sul naso? Oppure designa solo un fatto d’archivio—un nonno ceciuto—e quindi non si eredita nulla, salvo il soprannome? Perché il pubblico, appena sente “Cicerone”, conclude: “Allora il cece ce l’hai tu”, e pretende la prova empirica. Sabbadini: La tua implicatura salta il naso di Cicerone e punta al cece—come Speranza concorderà con gioia: il vero “cicer” non sta (per forza) sulla pelle, sta nella tradizione che incolla il segno al nome. Se fu l’antenato ad avere il cece, il cognomen è ereditabile anche quando il cece non lo è; ma, per una bizzarra giustizia filologica, chi porta il nome paga pegno: la gente cerca il legume sul volto del discendente, come se l’etimologia fosse una visita medica. In breve: Cicero non designa rigidamente un bernoccolo—designa rigidamente una storia, e il resto lo fa la malizia del pubblico. Sabbadini, Remigio (1885). Saggi di critica letteraria. Torino: Loescher.

Sabellio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’escatologia. For Sabellius and Grice the common thread is not doctrine but discipline: both treat meaning as something constrained by rational accountability rather than by mere verbal form. Sabellius’ modalism arises from a pressure internal to discourse itself: how can Christians speak coherently about the divine without multiplying agents beyond intelligibility? His answer is not primarily metaphysical invention but a regulative move within theological language, insisting that apparently plural predications (“Father,” “Son,” “Spirit”) be understood as modes of one being if rational speech about God is to avoid contradiction and pragmatic collapse. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning generalizes this insight at a secular level. For him, what hearers are entitled to infer depends on norms of cooperative rationality, not on lexical items alone; heresy, confusion, or category error can arise not because a word is false but because an inference is illicit under shared expectations. Where Sabellius worries that a misplaced linguistic distinction fractures monotheism into incoherence, Grice worries that unregulated inference fractures communication itself. In both cases, meaning is not what expressions mechanically encode, but what a rational interpreter may draw from them under disciplined constraints: remove the governing principle—modal unity for Sabellius, cooperative reason for Grice—and discourse degenerates into either theological absurdity or conversational noise. He struggles with the problem brought by the Galileans – from Galilea, not followers of the Florentine astronomer -- about the trinità. He argues that the three dimensions of the so-called ‘trinità’ should be understood as three modes of one single being, rather than as three separate persons. The theory, which he dubs ‘modalism,’ is soon condemned as heretical, as is he.   GRICEVS: Sabelli, salve! Hodie, ut leviter dicam, cum philosopho Spe de rebus ultimis collocutus sum—et miror quomodo vocabulum eschatologia apud nos in volgare saepe fiat quasi escatologia, quasi de latrinis potius quam de novissimis. SABELLIVS: Salve, Grice. Ita est: Galilaei (non astronomi, sed illi de Galilaea) plus quam syllabas turbant; et dum de trinitate disputamus, saepe de vocibus ipsis litigamus, quasi heresis interdum in una littera lateat. GRICEVS: Ego vero nihil dicam—sed mihi dulcis est ille sonus Graecus, “X”, quem in eschatologia audis quasi in ipsa ruina mundi: at auribus Italicis, etiam Bononiae, saepe evanescit, et remanet tantum “s” lenis, quasi finis rerum esset sine fractura, sine χ. SABELLIVS: Implicatura tua, Grice, eschatologica est—ut Spes consentiet; ideo hic eam Graece rite scribemus: συνεπαγωγή ἐσχατολογική. Nam si χ tollis, tollis quasi ipsum cardinem: non iam de ἔσχατα, sed de sonis mollibus agitur. Et bene mones: apud Bononiam (ne dicam apud plebem) saepe perit littera, et cum littera perit, sensus quoque paene perit. Sabellio (a.u.c. CMLXVIII). Dicta. Roma..

Sabinillio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’accademia romana. The convergence between Grice and Sabinillio lies in their shared conviction that meaning in conversation is not a mere by‑product of lexical content, institutional status, or formal utterance, but an achievement of ratione gubernata—reason actively governing exchange. For Grice, conversational meaning is constituted through intentions recognized under rational expectations (cooperation, relevance, economy), so that implicature marks not rhetorical ornament but disciplined inference. Sabinillio, as presented here in the Roman key, anticipates this structure from within a Plotinian ethos: reason (ratio) is not external constraint but an inner measure that alone licenses speech fit for the curia as academia. His “implicatura senatoria” mirrors Grice’s implicature precisely insofar as both diagnose the failure of honor, office, or degree to guarantee rational contribution; titles without disciplined reason generate only splendidissime nihil. Where Grice articulates this normatively through maxims of conversation, Sabinillio embodies it ethically and civically, insisting that philosophical speech is possible in public life only when reason rules both saying and meaning—an early, Roman instantiation of what Grice later formalizes as reason‑governed conversational meaning. A senator, who counts Plotino as his tutor, and whose doctrines he follows.    GRICEVS: Sabinilli, salve. Rem iam pridem cum collega meo, philosopho Spe, perquisivi; et hodie iterum miror quod Roma ipsa, quasi schola viva, Plotinum in senatum mittat. SABINILIVS: Salve, Grice. Ego quidem senator sum, sed discipulus Plotini; in hac urbe etiam curia aliquando fit academia, et toga non semper inimica est philosophiae. GRICEVS: Ita est; sed—ut Spes mecum subridens insinuavit—rarum est invenire “member of the house of lords” qui bene utatur titulo suo Lit. Hum. Philosophia Vadum Boum M. A.; plerique enim vel silent vel splendidissime nihil dicunt. SABINILIVS: Implicatura senatoria! Et Spes recte monet: sed Plotinus non est omnium privatus praeceptor. Non cuique datur ut in curia philosophice loquatur; quidam enim habent gradus, sed non habent rationem—tu autem ostendis quomodo honor sine disciplina sit mera pompa, disciplina autem sine honore saepe sit utilior. Sabinillio (a. u. c. MMDXVII). Dicta. Roma.

Giovanni Girolamo Saccheri (Sanremo, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning and Saccheri’s conception of logica demonstrativa converge at a deep structural level despite their historical and disciplinary distance: both treat reason not as an abstract faculty detached from practice, but as a norm-governed activity unfolding through signs, terms, and propositions oriented toward intelligibility. Saccheri, trained in Jesuit logic and mathematics, works within the Aristotelian–scholastic framework of signum, signare, significare, terminus, and propositio, insisting that demonstration proceeds through the disciplined articulation of categorematic and syncategorematic elements, whose semantic roles are fixed by logical function rather than psychological association; his Euclides ab omni naevo vindicatus shows how reason advances by testing hypotheses through ad absurdum argument, allowing structural constraints to reveal what cannot be said without contradiction. Grice, by contrast, relocates demonstrative rigor from formal proof to conversational practice, but preserves the same core insight: meaning is not exhausted by the copular “est” or by truth-conditions alone, but emerges from rule-governed use, where what is signified depends on the rational expectations binding interlocutors. Where Saccheri distinguishes terminus as capable or incapable of standing alone in a proposition, Grice distinguishes what is said from what is implicated, treating implicature as a rational surplus generated by the cooperative management of propositions in context. In this sense, Grice’s conversational reason is a pragmatic transposition of Saccheri’s demonstrative reason: both assume that intelligibility is constrained by normative structures independent of individual psychology, and both show that apparent anomalies—non-Euclidean geometries for Saccheri, non-literal or indirect meanings for Grice—arise not from irrationality but from the faithful extension of reason’s own governing principles beyond their most familiar domains. Grice: “I taught logic to Strawson – my pupil at St. John’s then – and we read Saccheri – but it never crossed my mind that he (Strawson, not Saccheri) would go on to think that he could compose, as Saccheri did, a whole treatise on logic!” – Keywords: signum, signare, significare, terminus, propositio, implicature. Filosofo italiano. Il frontespizio dell'opera Euclides ab omni nævo vindicatus. M. Milano. -- è stato un gesuita e matematico italiano. È considerato il padre, seppure inconsapevole, delle geometrie non euclidee – Grice, “that Kant hated!” -- . Logica demonstrativa Quadrilatero di Saccheri Targa commemorativa all'Università di Pavia S. entra nell'ordine della Compagnia di Gesù a Genova, dove fu avviato allo studio della geometria sotto la guida di Ceva. Ceva fa conoscere il fratello Giovanni e i galileiani Viviani e Grandi. Venne ordinato sacerdote a Como, quindi insegna filosofia nei collegi gesuiti di Torino e di Pavia, dove inoltre gli fu affidata la cattedra di Matematica all'Università degli Studi. Pubblica un notevole trattato di logica e un trattato di statica. "Euclides ab omni nævo vindicatus" -- Euclide riscattato da ogni difetto. In essa, Saccheri dimostrò per assurdo il postulato delle rette parallele di Euclide. Grice on ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’ – ‘est’ as COPULA is only ONE use. Iam vero terminus, vel se solo pcrfe&c SIGNIFICAT, adeo vt foffitse solo esse integer terminus alicuius propositionis, vt Petrus, homo, Mus , 5c appellatur categorematicus – Grice and P. F. Strawson, ‘Socrates’ is substantial in that it can never be a predicate --, vel contra propter suam indeterminationem in significando non potest se sol» subijci, aut prædicari, sed solum gercre aliqua, munera circa subiectum, et prædicatum, illa determinando, et modificando, et appellatur syncategorematicus: huiufino. di lunt – PARTES ORATIONES – What Grice calls ‘categorie morfo-sintattiche’ -- præpositiones, adverbia,  Grice: Caro Saccheri, ti confesso che poco fa ho scambiato due battute col filosofo Speranza—lui sostiene che la geometria non euclidea nasce sempre da una buona conversazione, proprio come certi postulati che, a tavola, si piegano meglio di una parallela!  Saccheri: Ah, Grice, se Speranza lo dice, allora sarà vero! D’altronde, da Sanremo a Pavia, si sa che la logica fa buon viaggio solo quando trova compagnia... e qualche quadrilatero ben cucinato!  Grice: Ecco, caro Saccheri, come direbbe Speranza, tra una “propositio” e un “terminus”, la vera geometria è quella che si lascia intuire—nessuno la nomina, ma tutti la gustano... Un po’ come il pudding: basta assaporarlo, senza chiedersi da dove partano le rette!  Saccheri: Un’implicatura unica, come direbbe Speranza—che ognuna delle tue, caro Professore, è la prova tangibile che il gusto della logica va ben oltre i postulati! Se solo Euclide avesse avuto il tuo pudding, avrebbe lasciato stare i paralleli e si sarebbe goduto la conversazione... Saccheri, Giovanni Girolamo (1733). Euclides ab omni naevo vindicatus. Milano: Typis Palatinis.

Bartolomeo Sacchi (Piadena, Cremona, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale della gastro-filosofia. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning can be fruitfully compared with the humanist “gastro‑philosophical” rationality embodied by Bartolomeo Sacchi, known as Platina, insofar as both treat reason not as an abstract calculus but as something cultivated in social practice, dialogue, and shared norms. Platina’s humanism, visible both in his pedagogical dialogues and in his celebrated reflections on food, taste, and moderation, assumes that judgment matures through conversation: reason is refined by exchange, tradition, and culturally shared expectations about what counts as appropriate, balanced, or tasteful, whether in ethics, politics, or cuisine. Grice radicalizes this insight at the level of linguistic theory by showing that meaning itself is governed by rational expectations implicit in cooperative interaction: speakers rely on shared assumptions about relevance, informativeness, and sincerity, and it is within this conversational framework that implicatures arise, much as Platina assumes that appreciation—of a text, a meal, or an idea—depends on tacit standards understood by participants at the table. Where Platina’s humanist banquets turn learning into a lived, sensuous practice in which wisdom is tasted rather than deduced, Grice’s conversational rationality explains how understanding routinely exceeds what is explicitly said, yielding a form of practical reason that operates not through formal proof but through socially embedded inference. In both figures, reason is neither coldly deductive nor merely subjective: it is normatively structured, historically cultivated, and exercised in dialogue, so that, as the gastronomic metaphor suggests, the proof of rationality—whether philosophical or conversational—ultimately lies not in abstract demonstration alone but in the shared capacity to recognize when something “comes out rIl Platina. Garin.  Detto il Plàtina. Muore a Roma. Umanista e gastronomo italiano.  Nacque a questo paese vicino a Cremona chiamato, in latino, Platina, da cui prese il soprannome. Della sua giovinezza si conosce poco: intraprese la carriera delle armi militando al servizio di Sforza e Piccinino come mercenario, ma presto si trasferì a Mantova per avviarsi agli studi umanistici. Nella città dei Gonzaga e discepolo di Ognibene da Lonigo, che aveva assunto la guida della Casa Gioiosa dopo Iacopo da San Cassiano, succeduto a Vittorino da Feltre morto. Cominciò la sua carriera come precettore del figlio di Ludovico III Gonzaga. Al marchese dedicò il primo scritto di cui abbiamo notizia: il Bartholomaei Platinensis Divi Ludovici marchionis Mantuae somnium, un'operetta sotto forma di dialogo in lode delle cure prestate da Ludovico nella trascrizione delle opere di Virgilio.  Secondo l'uso umanistico Sacchi scelse come nom de plume quello della propria città natale, cambiandolo presto da Platinensis a Platina. Per quanto ottenesse dal duca di Milano Francesco Sforza – tramite l'intercessione della moglie di Ludovico Barbara di Brandeburgo – un salvacondotto per andare in Grecia a perfezionare le proprie conoscenze del greco antico e dell'antichità classica, mutò parere quando seppe che Giovanni Argiropulo, celebre umanista di orientamento platonico, sarebbe venuto a Firenze in qualità di docente di filosofia, preferendo stabilirsi nella città medicea. Si recò quindi a Firenze per ascoltare le lezioni dell'Argiropulo, entrando a far parte dell'ambiente culturale locale e stringendo amicizia con celebri umanisti quali FICINO, Bracciolini, Filelfo, LANDINO, ALBERTI , PICO, e molti altri. Divenne inoltre precettore presso la famiglia Medici pur legandosi alla famiglia Capponi, di parte repubblicana. guerra/pace, Plinio.  Grice: Caro Sacchi, ti confesso che poco fa ho scambiato due battute col filosofo Speranza. Lui sostiene che nel mondo della filosofia, come nella cucina, il segreto sta tutto nella conversazione: tra idee che si insaporiscono e ragioni che si amalgamano, come in un buon piatto cremonese! Ma dimmi, tu che sei il Platina, la gastro-filosofia nasce più dalla fame di sapere o dalla voglia di banchettare? Sacchi: Ah, Grice, ti dirò che tra Piadena e Mantova il sapere si gusta a tavola e la filosofia si spande come il profumo di uno stufato ben fatto! Tra discepoli di Ognibene da Lonigo e lezioni di Argiropulo, qui ogni dialogo è condito di sapienza e ogni mercenario diventa un umanista... soprattutto se il banchetto è generoso! Grice: E allora, caro Platina, sarà pure vero che la guerra e la pace si discutono meglio davanti a un piatto di Plinio, ma in fondo—come direbbe Speranza—la vera filosofia sta nel gusto: perché, si sa, la prova del budino non sta nelle argomentazioni, ma nel saperlo assaporare senza far troppe domande... Sacchi: Deliziosa implicatura, come direbbe Speranza, sapendo quanto ama il pudding—che importa delle prove, se il sapore convince! In fondo, tra dialoghi e banchetti, la filosofia lombarda si gusta meglio con un pizzico di ironia e un cucchiaio ben affondato nella crema! Sacchi, Bartolomeo (1470). De disciplina scholarium. Venezia.

Sua Eccellenza il conte Vierri Visconti di Saliceto (Balsamo, Cinisello Calsamo, Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale del diritto bellico – la guerra è la guerra. A comparison between Grice and Verri Visconti di Saliceto brings into focus two converging traditions of reason‑governed meaning grounded in social norms rather than abstract formalism, even though they operate at different levels. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning explains how rationality functions implicitly in ordinary communication: speakers and hearers rely on shared expectations of cooperation, relevance, and sincerity, and meaning emerges from what a rational participant can reasonably be taken to intend within a conversational practice. Saliceto’s Enlightenment reflections on war, law, pleasure, and happiness presuppose a comparable rational substrate, but relocate it within civic and juridical life, especially in the domain of belligerence, where “war is war” names a hard limit set by collective rules, institutional roles, and moral expectations rather than by individual sentiment. Where Grice analyzes how conversational implicatures arise from rational coordination between interlocutors, Saliceto treats law—especially the law of war—as a form of extended civic conversation in which reason disciplines force, pleasure is measured against pain, and happiness is constrained by duty. In both cases, rationality is not an inner mental calculus but a publicly shareable normativity: for Grice, it governs what can be meant and understood in conversation; for Saliceto, it governs what can be justified, endured, or condemned in political and military practice. The affinity is strongest in their shared Enlightenment conviction that reason operates most powerfully when embedded in social exchange—whether among conversational partners at a table or among states and citizens negotiating the boundaries of violence, pleasure, and civil order. Grice: “Since Sua Eccellenza Verri-Visconti calls himself a hyphenated philosopher, I who amn’t, shall list him under Visconti!” Esential Italian philosopher. Like Grice, he wrote on ‘happiness.’ Like Grice, he writes on ‘pleasure.’ Like Grice, he was a very clubbable man. Ritratto tagliato Barone di Rho. Consorte Marietta Castiglioni Vincenza Melzi d'Eril. Figli Teresa, Alessandro (da Marietta Castiglioni). Filosofo. Considerato tra i massimi esponenti dell'illuminismo, è altresì ritenuto il fondatore della scuola illuministica milanese. Nasce dal conte Gabriele Verri-Visconti, magistrato e politico conservatore, della nobiltà milanese. Avviati gli studi nel collegio dei gesuiti di Brera, e uno dei trasformati. Si arruola nell'esercito e prende parte alla Guerra dei VII Anni. Fermatosi a Vienna, intraprende la redazione delle Considerazioni sul commercio nello Stato di Milano, che gli varranno il primo incarico di funzionario. Pubblica le Meditazioni sulla felicità. Devienne a Milano uno dei pugni, nucleo redazionale del caffè, destinato a diventare il punto di riferimento del riformismo illuministico. Tra i suoi saggi più importanti per Il Caffè si  ricordano Elementi del commercio; Commedia; “Medicina”; “I parolai”. Ha rapporto epistolari anche con gl’enciclopedisti. d'Alembert visita i pugni. Parallelamente all'impresa editoriale, intraprende la scalata del governo d’Austria allo scopo di mettere in prattica le riforme propugnate nel “Caffe”.Membro della Giunta per la revisione della "ferma" (appalto delle imposte ai privati) del Supremo Consiglio dell'Economia. Fonda la Società patriottica. “Meditazioni sull'economia politica”. Il discorso sull'indole del piacere -- e del dolore”; “i Ricordi” e le “Osservazioni sulla tortura”. Il suo è uno stile asciutto e libero, pieno di trattenuto vigore.  diritto bellico. Piacere. Grice: Ah, Sua Eccellenza il Conte Vierri Visconti di Saliceto! Devo dire che il solo suono del suo titolo nobiliare dona una certa grandezza al nostro dialogo. Non sorprende che lei conversi con tanta ragionevolezza—direi, con quell’eleganza conversazionale tipica dei raffinati italiani di alto lignaggio. I suoi approfondimenti sulla natura della ragione nel dialogo sono una gioia per ogni filosofo, in particolare per un inglese come me, affascinato dalla civiltà italiana. Saliceto: Professore Grice, sono profondamente onorato dalle sue parole. Per noi milanesi, e specialmente per chi appartiene alla stirpe dei Visconti, la ragionevolezza nel dialogo non è solo un ideale, ma un nobile dovere. A mio avviso, l’arte della conversazione costituisce il fondamento della felicità e del piacere—campi in cui, come lei ha scritto, la filosofia trova la sua dimora più autentica. Grice: In effetti, Conte, la sua tradizione milanese mi ricorda che la ragionevolezza è una virtù sociale tanto quanto filosofica. Gli italiani di alto lignaggio, come lei, praticano una sorta di moderazione conversazionale; ponderano piacere e dolore, felicità e dovere, quasi come se il dialogo stesso fosse una forma di economia morale. Questo rende il suo illuminismo filosofico così solido e attraente agli occhi degli stranieri. Saliceto: La sua stima mi riempie di gioia, Professore. Per noi, conversare ragionevolmente è come condurre una guerra gentile—una guerra in cui la comprensione è la vittoria e la civiltà il premio. Ritengo che solo tramite simili scambi si possa davvero far progredire la causa della filosofia e della società. Che la nostra conversazione sia illuminata quanto la scuola milanese stessa! Saliceto, Sua Eccellenza il conte Verri Visconti di (1823). Scritti politici. Milano.

Gaio Sallustio Crispo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale EMPEDOCLEA. In the Empedoclea Sallust can be read as practicing, avant la lettre, a form of reason‑governed meaning that closely anticipates what Grice later theorizes explicitly as conversational rationality: Sallust does not present Empedocles as a system‑builder in the abstract but as a figure whose doctrines acquire force through arrangement, selection, and the moral expectations shared with his Roman reader, so that understanding depends less on stated theses than on the reader’s capacity to draw disciplined inferences from what Sallust foregrounds, juxtaposes, or leaves unsaid; Grice’s theory of conversational meaning formalizes this same structure by claiming that rational communication works through inferential recovery under cooperative norms rather than through the literal content alone, and in this sense Sallust’s Empedoclea already operates Grice’s insight historically, treating reason as something exercised in interpretive uptake rather than imposed dogmatically, with philosophical sense emerging from guided inference, pragmatic restraint, and the assumption that a competent reader will recognize what is meant by what is merely said. He assembles a collection of materials by and about Empedocle di Girgenti. Empedoclea.  GRICEVS: Sallusti, audio te Empedoclem ex Girgento Romam transtulisse non corpore sed ratione, quod mihi valde conversationale videtur. SALLVSTIVS: Ita est, Grice, nam sapientia quo longius iter facit, eo meliores implicaturas relinquit. GRICEVS: Cave tamen ne quis dicat te plus colligere carmina quam sensus, cum ego semper quaeram quid lector inferre possit. SALLVSTIVS: Rideat quis volet, Grice, dum lector intellegit me non tantum narrare sed significare.

Sallustio, Gaio S. Crispo (a. u. c. DCXCVIII). Empedoclea. Roma.

Gaio Sallustio Crispo (Amiterno, L’Aquila, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale a Roma – Grice and Sallust converge on a view of reason not as abstract calculation but as a norm-governed practice embedded in historically situated discourse, though they articulate it in radically different idioms: Sallust, writing as a Roman historian shaped by moral crisis and political collapse, treats reason as something exercised through narrative exempla, where what is said, hinted at, or strategically omitted in historiography guides judgment about virtus, corruptio, and the tension between animus and corpus, while Grice, working in analytic philosophy, reconstructs reason as operating through cooperative expectations that govern conversational meaning, where implicature, rather than explicit assertion, carries the rational force of much human communication; in Sallust, rationality is inseparable from ethical formation and the historian’s implicit appeal to shared Roman standards of judgment—reason works because the reader recognizes what follows from Catiline’s deeds without needing it stated—whereas in Grice, rationality is formalized as the hearer’s capacity to recover intended meaning by assuming rational cooperation; yet both share the insight that meaning and reason arise not from what is baldly said but from what an informed interlocutor is entitled to infer, whether that interlocutor is a Roman citizen reading moral history or a conversational partner interpreting an utterance, so that Sallust’s moral historiography and Grice’s pragmatics can be read as structurally aligned accounts of reason functioning through disciplined inference rather than through explicit doctrine. -- la storia della filosofia romana come fonte d’essempli morali – chè cosa fa un saggio ‘romano’? Storico. Può anche darsi che adere la setta dei crotonesi. Tribuno della plebe e senatore, espulso dal senato per motivi morali, e probabilmente perchè fautore di GIULIO Cesare, che lo nomina questore, pretore nella guerra africana e pro-console della Numidia. Dopo la morte di GIULIO Cesare abbandona la vita pubblica per dedicarsi completamente agli studi -- La congiura di Catilina, La guerra giugurtina, Le Storie. A lui venne rivolta l’accusa di essere stato complice dei sacrilegi di NIGIDIO  Figulo. Certamente lui spesso insiste nei suoi saggi sulla opposizione di anima e corpo. Parla di un nume divino che veglia sulla condotta dei mortali e accenna a sanzioni nell’oltretomba. È quindi probabile che allo storico debba essere identificato quel Sallustio che scrive un "Empedoclea" per esporre le dottrine del filosofo da Girgenti, tutte colorate di Pitagorismo. Cicero's letter to his brother Quintus is best known for containing the sole explicit contemporary reference to Lucretius's “De rerum natura.” But it is also notable as the source of the only extant reference of any kind to another presumably philosophical didactic poem, Sallustius's “Empedoclea” (Q. fr. = SB): “Lucretii poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt: multis luminibus ingenii, multae tamen artis. sed, cum ueneris. uirum te putabo, si Sallusti “Empedoclea” legeris; hominem non putabo.” “Lucretius' poems are just as you write: they show many flashes of inspiration, but many of skill too. But more of that when you come. I shall think you a man, if you read Sallustius' Empedoclea; I shan't think you a human being.” Empedoclea.  GRICEVS: Sallvsti, salve! Philosophus Spes nuper mihi surrisit et dixit: “Sperare est argumentari.” Ego autem hodie, Romae, de Empedocle cogito—de illo, quem quidam potius Girgentinvm quam “Empedoclem” appellant. SALLVSTIVS: Salve, Grice. De Empedocle dicis? Ego quidem Empedoclea collegi—nonnulla dicta, nonnulla carmina—ut sapientiam eius Romani discant, non solum audito nomine sed intellecto loco. GRICEVS: Non dicam quid soleam facere cum nominibus—sed, si quis “Occam” apud nos vocet Vicus Occami, cur non liceat etiam Empedoclem ad patriam reducere… praesertim cum “nomen” saepe plus sonet quam “res”? SALLVSTIVS: Implicatura tua, Grice, topographica est—ut certe Spes consentiet—etsi Empedocles ipse putabat Girgentum non locum esse, sed LOCVM. Nam cum philosophum nomine mutas in toponymum, tacite doces: non tantum quis dixerit, sed unde dixerit—et quo pacto locus ipse fiat argumentum. Sallustio, Gaio S. Crispo (a. u. c. DCLXXXXI). De coniuratione Catilinae.

Saturnino Secondo Sallustio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del divino e dei divini. The author, according to some, of Salutio’s ‘On the gods and the world order,’ dedicated to Giuliano. Accademia.

Flavio Salustio. Grice e Salustio.  

Salustio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del pitagorico che corresponde con Giuliano –Ricerca (latino: Saturninus Secundus Salustius o Salutius. Politico e filosofo romano di età imperiale appartenente ai neoplatonici. Epigrafe in latino trovata ad Amorgos e riproducente una lettera (CIL III, 459) dell'imperatore romano Giuliano a S. (Museo epigrafico di Atene) Amico dell'imperatore romano Giuliano, ne condivise il programma di restaurazione della religione romana, ma fu così equilibrato che fu prefetto del pretoriod'Oriente sotto quattro imperatori. Di una famiglia della Gallia, forse dell'Aquitania, è probabilmente un homo novus, in quanto i suoi due primi incarichi furono non senatoriali; S. è infatti, probabilmente sotto l'imperatore Costante, praeses provinciae Aquitanicae, magister memoriae, comes ordinis primi, proconsole d'Africa e comes ordinis primi intra consistorium et quaestor, come attesta l'iscrizione posta sotta la sua statua d'oro eretta nel Foro di Traiano. È inviato dall'imperatore Costanzo II, fratello del defunto Costante, al cugino e cesare d'Occidente Giuliano, come consigliere, quando era ormai già avanti con gli anni. Costanzo si insospettì dei successi di Giuliano e, attribuendoli a S., lo richiama, separandolo dal cesare di cui era divenuto amico.  Giuliano venne acclamato imperatore e l'anno successivo Costanzo II morì. Giuliano, giunto a Costantinopoli, nominò S.  prefetto del pretoriod'Oriente e presidente del tribunale che a Calcedonia processò i funzionari di Costanzo. Lascia Costantinopoli per raggiungere Giuliano ad Antiochia, da dove l'imperatore aveva intenzione di far partire la sua campagna sasanide. Qui Salustio sconsigliò a Giuliano di perseguitare i cristiani: il divino, i divini, l’ordine del mondo.  GRICEVS: Sallvsti, salve! Hodie philosophus Spes mihi dixit: “Sperare est argumentari.” Ego vero timeo ne apud Badum Boum ipsam rationem in vinum vertant. SALLVSTIVS: Salve, Grice. Roma quidem et deos et mundi ordinem amat; sed apud vos Oxonienses verba saepe plus faciunt quam res. Quid ergo de “divino” dicis? GRICEVS: Nihil dico—sed si quis hodie “divinvm” vocat quod est divinely decadent, nonne ipse ostendit se et divinitatem et decorem verborum… nimis liberaliter distribuere? SALLVSTIVS: Implicaturam tuam, Grice, ut Speranza vult, quattuor modis describi posse laudo: est divina, est decadens, est divinely decadent, et est decadenter divina. Ita enim “divinvs” apud Badum Boum fit quasi tessera convivii: quod sanctum est, fit lepidum; quod lepidum est, fit (quasi) sanctum—et tu, non dicens, satis dixisti.

Lino Coluccio Salutati (Stignano, Reggio Calabria, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale d’Ercole al bivio. Grice and Coluccio Salutati can be fruitfully compared as theorists of reasoned discourse operating at different historical scales but sharing a common conviction that meaning is inseparable from rational governance within a social order. Salutati, as chancellor of Florence and leading civic humanist, treats conversation, rhetoric, and classical exempla as instruments of practical reason oriented toward collective ends: liberty, civic virtue, and the survival of the republic. For him, discourse is reason‑governed because it is answerable to ethical and political norms derived from antiquity and activated in concrete historical conflicts; conversation is not merely exchange but deliberation about action, where speech is justified by its role in sustaining libertas fiorentina against tyranny. His use of figures such as Hercules at the crossroads dramatizes rational choice as a publicly interpretable act, embedded in shared cultural narratives and moral expectations. Grice, by contrast, abstracts from political content and historical teleology to analyze the internal mechanics that make any such discourse intelligible in the first place. His theory of conversational meaning locates rational governance not in civic virtue or classical authority but in cooperative principles and inferential practices that allow speakers and hearers to coordinate intentions. Yet the kinship is clear: Salutati’s civic rhetoric presupposes what Grice later theorizes—participants who treat one another as rational agents, capable of recognizing reasons, drawing inferences, and grasping what is meant beyond what is explicitly said. Where Salutati civilizes humanism by embedding classical reason in the living practice of political conversation, Grice formalizes that practice by showing how reason operates implicitly in every successful exchange, whether about virtue, policy, or a joke at a crossroads. Salutati supplies the normative horizon of reasoned speech in public life; Grice supplies the analytic account of how such reasoned speech functions at the level of meaning itself.  Vedo che ignori quanto sia dolce l'amor di patria. Se ciò fosse utile alla difesa e all'ampliamento della patria, non ti sembrerebbe un crimine penoso, nè un delitto scellerato, il fracassare con la scure il capo del proprio padre, o ammazzare i fratelli, o cavare con la spada dal grembo della moglie il figlio prematuro. Ad Andrea di Conte. Cancelliere di Firenze, figura culturale di riferimento dell'umanesimo a Firenze, in qualità di discepolo del BOCCACCIO e precettore di BRACCIOLINI  e BRUNI.  Considerato uno dei più importanti uomini di governo, S. come cancelliere della repubblica di Firenze, svolge un importantissimo ruolo diplomatico nel frenare le ambizioni del duca di Milano VISCONTI, intenzionato a creare uno stato comprendente l'Italia centro-settentrionale. Nel contesto di questa lotta elabora la sua dottrina della “libertas fiorentina”. Oltre all'impegno politico, svolge un importante ruolo nella diffusione dell'umanesimo petrarchesco (PETRARCA – si veda) e boccacciano, divenendone l'esponente più importante e il praeceptor della prima generazione degl’umanisti. Il suo lascito più importante presso i posteri è la codificazione civile dell'umanesimo, cioè l'uso dello spirito e dei valori dell'antichità classica all'interno dell'agone politico internazionale. i duodici fatiche d’Ercole, gl’antichi, la legge non-naturale, la legge naturale, della buona fortuna, libero arbitrio, la vita sociale, la con-vivenza, Bruto e Cassio nell’inferno, la morte di Cesare, l’assassinio di Cesare, tirano, la libertas fiorentina, stato fiorentino, la repubblica fiorentina, la fiore d’Italia, Boccaccio, Petrarca, Aligheri, I primi umanisti, l’umanesimo laico, basato contro il determinismo ecclesiastico, la biblioteca di Salutati, Livio, Cicerone, autori latini, la lingua Latina, difesa della lingua Latina, l’interpretazione di Virgilio da Aligheri, difesa della filosofia pagana, il valore permanente della filosofia degl’antichi.  GRICE: Salutati, che piacere! Al portico ho incontrato il filosofo Speranza: dice che persino la libertas fiorentina ha bisogno di un buon turno di parola, altrimenti finisce in nota a piè di pagina. SALUTATI: Grice, tu scherzi, ma io ti dico sul serio: a Firenze la conversazione è politica, e la politica è conversazione—e in mezzo ci mettiamo Livio, Cicerone e un po’ di patria, che è più dolce del tuo tè oxoniense. GRICE: Certo; e quando arrivo al bivio d’Ercole, io implico che il problema non è scegliere la virtù o il vizio, ma scegliere come scegliere: “se vedi due strade, prendine una”—e mi viene in mente Yogi Berra: “When you come to a fork in the road, take it.” SALUTATI: La tua implicatura, come Speranza concorderà, è geometrica—poiché, in verità, come può Berra (per non dire Ercole) prendere quel bivio? E qui l’italiano traduttore suda: perché fork è insieme bivio e forchetta. Se traduco “Quando arrivi a un bivio, prendilo”, va bene—ma allora dov’è la battuta? Se invece salvo la battuta e traduco “Quando incontri una forchetta sulla strada, prendila”, ottengo un proverbio gastronomico (e l’Ercole morale diventa un cameriere). E se provo “forcella” per tenere l’ambiguità, rischio la montagna, non la strada. Insomma: in inglese Berra può “take the fork” senza arrossire; in italiano, o prendi la strada o prendi le posate—e in entrambi i casi, l’eroe resta lì, fermo al bivio, con la virtù da una parte e il servizio da tavola dall’altra. Salutati, Lino Coluccio (1399). Epistolario. Firenze.

Saturnino Secondo Salutio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del divino e dei divini – l’ordine el mondo -- Grice and Saturninus Secundus Salutius offer contrasting but complementary conceptions of how reason governs meaning, shaped by their very different philosophical projects and historical contexts. In De diis et mundo, Salutius treats intelligibility as grounded in a pre‑existing divine order: discourse about the gods and the world is reasoned insofar as it reflects and participates in a rational cosmic hierarchy that precedes and constrains human speech. Meaning, on this view, is not generated within conversation but oriented toward a metaphysical structure that guarantees order, even when that order appears paradoxical, excessive, or “undisciplined” from a human standpoint. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning inverts this priority. For him, reason does not flow down from a cosmic or divine architecture into language; rather, reason is enacted locally through cooperative conversational practices, where what a speaker means is determined by intentions and by hearers’ rational recognition of those intentions under shared norms. Where Salutius sees rational discourse as derivative of divine order and ultimately explanatory of worldly disorder, Grice treats order as something that emerges from the rational coordination of speakers, with apparent disorder handled not by appeal to metaphysics but through implicature, cancellation, and pragmatic inference. Yet both share a rejection of brute arbitrariness: Salutius denies that talk of the divine is mere rhetoric detached from reasoned structure, while Grice denies that meaning can be reduced to words or conventions alone without appeal to rational expectations. In this sense, Salutius offers a metaphysical account of why discourse about gods and fate can be intelligible at all, while Grice provides a methodological account of how intelligibility is achieved moment by moment within conversation, even when speakers joke, hedge, or deliberately exploit disorder. A close fiend of Giuliano. He is offered the emperorship on Giuliano’s death, but he declines on account of his ‘rather poor health.’ He leads an active political life and is regarded as morally incorruptible. Known to have been well-versed in philosophy, he is the author of ‘On the gods and the world order’ – which some however attribute to Salustio. The treatise is, unsurprisingly, dedicated to Giuliano. Those who argue that it us not written by Salutio claim it is the work of one contemporary of Giuliano, a Flavio Salustio. Accademia.  GRICEVS: Salutius, philosophus Spes mihi nuper dixit: “Divinus ordo est, sed interdum divinitas a Badum Boum varsiatis plus quam salsum adhibetur.” Quid tu de hoc putas? SALUTIVS: Gricevs, quod apud Badum Boum fit, saepe est mirum: “divinus” fit tam frequens ut etiam di conscribant rationes suas! Sed, ut aiunt, ubi divinitas abundat, ordo interdum deficit. GRICEVS: Ut implico (nec dico), ordo “divinus” apud Badum Boum non semper praestat in modum ordinatum—fortasse unordinaliter, ut aiunt. Verba, ut ordo, quandoque plus confundant quam illuminent! SALUTIVS: Philosophus Spes certe assentietur: “Implicatura tua fortasse ordo non est, sed nullus ordo melius quam ille qui deficit!” Sic, Gricevs, nulla disciplina est dulcior quam ipsa indisciplina divinitatis. Salutio, Saturnino Secondo (a. u. c. MCVIII). De diis et mundo. Roma

Salviano (Massilia, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale al portico. In Salvian and Grice we see two very different, historically distant conceptions of how reason governs meaning in human exchange, yet they converge on the idea that intelligibility in discourse is inseparable from shared rational norms. Salvian, writing in the fifth century in De gubernatione Dei, approaches reasoned discourse through a moral–historical lens: for him, speech, exhortation, and even lament presuppose a cosmos in which human suffering is intelligible only if actions, utterances, and events are answerable to reasons rooted in moral order and historical causation. His move from Rome to the Gallic world is not merely geographical but interpretive: he treats history itself as a kind of extended conversation between human wrongdoing and divine governance, one in which explanation depends on tracing reasons across time rather than isolating intentions in individual speakers. Grice, by contrast, radicalizes the rationality of conversation by internalizing it: conversational meaning, on his account, is constituted by the speaker’s intentions and by the audience’s recognition of those intentions under shared principles of rational cooperation. Where Salvian sees speech as answerable to an objective moral history that ultimately judges and explains suffering, Grice sees meaning as emerging from the fine structure of communicative reason itself, independent of moral truth or historical destiny. Yet the affinity is real: both assume that meaningful discourse is not accidental or merely expressive but governed by reasons that participants can, in principle, understand, assess, and contest. Salvian’s portico is the place where Stoic rational order and historical causality meet; Grice’s conversational space is where rational expectations and inferential practices structure what is said and what is merely implied. In this sense, Salvian offers a macro‑theory of reasoned discourse across history, while Grice supplies a micro‑theory of reasoned meaning within the moment of conversation. He moves from Rome to what is now known as The Galliae – and writes a ‘saggio’ in which he tries to explain why there is so much suffering in that area of the world. He takes an approach that is not only philosophical – along the lines of the Porch – but historical as well. GRICEVS: Salviane, salve! Sub porticu Romae recordor SPES: “Sperare est argumentari bene de futura felicitate, etiam si barista capuccinum tardat.” SALVIANVS: Salve, Grice! Ego autem Romā in Gallias profectus saggio scripsi: cur tanta ibi passio? Non solum Stoice sub porticu, sed etiam historice—nam saepe ipsa historia dolet. GRICEVS: Fateor: non semper culpa est aer aut vinum. Sed SPES iterum subridet: “Felicitas—somewhere in the South of France.” Ita saltem implicatur. SALVIANVS: Immo, Grice: Galliae plus habent quam meridiem et solem; habent causas dolorum et remedia—porticus et fata gentium. Sperare—et ridere, sed etiam intellegere. Salviano (a. u. c. MCC). De gubernatione dei. Roma

Giovanni Francesco Mauro Melchiorre Salvemini (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale. Grice and Giovanni Francesco Mauro Melchiorre Salvemini converge on a broadly humanistic conception of reason as something exercised in shared practices, but they situate conversational rationality in different intellectual registers: Salvemini, formed by mathematics, translation, rhetoric, and Enlightenment science, embodies conversational reason as a cultivated habit of clarity, proportion, and intellectual honesty that spans disciplines, from geometry and astronomy to political and moral discourse, where understanding often proceeds by tacit agreement, educated sensibility, and the ability to grasp what needs no full demonstration; Grice, by contrast, turns this tacit dimension into his explicit object of theory, arguing that conversational meaning is governed by rational principles that license hearers to infer what is meant beyond what is said, without appealing to stylistic flourish, aesthetic taste, or disciplinary authority. Where Salvemini’s conversational reason appears as intellectual moderation in practice—knowing when an argument, a translation, or even a smile suffices—Grice provides the analytic machinery that explains why such moderation works, locating it in shared expectations of cooperation, relevance, and reasonableness. Thus Salvemini exemplifies in lived, interdisciplinary form what Grice formalizes philosophically: that much of human understanding, whether in mathematics, literature, or everyday exchange, depends less on explicit proof than on reason-governed inference sustained by mutual trust between speakers. Grice: Detto il Castiglione o Castillioneus o Johann Castillon -- è stato un matematico e astronomo italiano. Castillon: Observations sur le livre intitulé Systême de la nature. Ha una formazione privata fino a quando inizia l'Università di Pisa dove studia diritto e matematica conseguendo un dottorato.  Mentre vive in Italia, si dedica anche alla traduzione di Pope An Essay on Man – citato da Grice: Philosopherkind – Just as the poet said that the proper study of mankind is man, the anti-Oxonian can say that the proper study of philosopher-kind is the philosopher -- con un numero uguale di versi italiani come l'originale inglese. Insegna a Vevey, una città sulla riva nord del Lago di Ginevra, dove divenne il direttore della scuola umanistica. Continua a lavorare come traduttore. Insegna retorica, discipline umanistiche, e matematica. Durante questo periodo pubblica due articoli di matematica scritti in latino, nelle Philosophical Transactions della Royal Society di Londra, usando il nome "J Castillioneus". Il primo di questi articoli studia il Cardioide, il secondo il teorema del polinomio di Newton  Cura volumi delle opere di Newton, che sono stati pubblicati a Losanna e Ginevra. Il primo volume contiene saggi matematici, il secondo contiene i trattati filosofici. Il terzo volume contiene le opere filologiche di Newton, soprattutto saggi storici, tra cui una cronaca della storia antica. Babson dice: Fino a questo momento S. è ateo, ma divenne calvinista. Insegna a Losanna e sposa Elisabeth du Fresne dalla quale ha tre figli, ma solo uno ne sopravvive, vale a dire Maximilian Friedrich Gustav Adolf S. Pubblica la corrispondenza tra Bernoulli e Leibniz, poi pubblica l'Introductio in Infinitorum analysin auctore Leonhardo Eulero, il trattato di Eulero, che modifica. Insegna sia a Losanna che a Berna. Durante questo periodo ottene la cattedra di matematica a Berna e di teologia a Losanna;  Grice: Caro Salvemini, sai che oggi ho incrociato il filosofo Speranza al caffè di Firenze? Era intento a dimostrare che anche il cappuccino segue una logica conversazionale, purché sia servito con il sorriso. Gli italiani, come sempre, sanno unire filosofia e piacere quotidiano! Salvemini: Ah, Professore Grice! Speranza non smette mai di sorprendere, vero? In fondo, la logica della vita italiana sta proprio nel trovare il senso anche tra le tazzine e il Cardioide… Persino i miei studenti a Berna vorrebbero poter discutere matematica davanti a un espresso, ma purtroppo hanno solo cioccolata calda! Grice: Forse, caro Castillon, il vero teorema è che la felicità si dimostra meglio con meno assiomi e più zucchero. Basta osservare – senza dire nulla, ovviamente – che i filosofi italiani hanno la capacità di trovare gusto anche nelle cose “minori”: come dire, non tutte le equazioni devono essere esplicitate per essere gustate… Salvemini: Mi unisco a Speranza nel lodare la tua implicatura, Grice! Del resto, tra filosofi, basta un cenno: è come il famoso verso di Pope che tradussi – “L’uomo è lo studio dell’uomo,” ma forse, in Italia, è anche il piacere di viverlo. Che siano cappuccini, polinomi o sorrisi, il filosofo sa sempre dove trovare il sapore della conversazione! Salvemini, Giovanni Francesco Mauro Melchiorre (1908). Mazzini. Torino: Bocca.

Clemente Sancasciani (Pisa, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale. Grice and Clemente Sancasciani converge on the idea that reason governs meaning in communicative practice, but they articulate that governance at different points in the epistemic chain: Sancasciani, rooted in an eighteenth‑century Tuscan empirico‑humanist tradition, treats conversational reason as an extension of observation broadly understood, arguing that knowledge and meaning arise from an attentive engagement with experience that exceeds mere vision and incorporates the full sensorium, judgment, and culturally trained sensitivity; Grice, by contrast, brackets the epistemology of observation itself and focuses on what happens once agents speak, showing that conversational meaning is governed by rational norms that regulate how interlocutors move from what is explicitly said to what is implicitly meant through intention‑recognition and inference. Where Sancasciani’s “philosophy of observation” emphasizes the continuity between experience, interpretation, and discourse—so that conversation is the rational articulation of lived perception—Grice emphasizes the autonomy of conversational reasoning, demonstrating that even when observation is shared, meaning depends on cooperative principles rather than on sensory evidence alone. Thus Sancasciani’s conversational reason remains experiential and world‑directed, anchored in the cultivated act of observing, while Grice’s is pragmatic and interaction‑directed, locating rationality in the internal logic of communicative exchange; both, however, resist a priori abstraction and agree that reason shows itself most clearly not in solitary contemplation but in the disciplined practices through which humans make sense of one another in talk. Grice: “If I had been an Italayan, as Gilbert and Sullivan spell it and pronounce it – I would have wirtten ‘Filosofia dell’osservazione. It’s disputable that to ‘observe’ involves only ‘see’ – Se my Remarks about the senses. It may be said that the scientist observes beyond vision, as CICERONE (vedaasi) would have agreed. Unfortunately, since the advent or Ryle at Oxford and Mussolini in Italy, all that Englishmen were led to believe is that every Italian is an idealist, alla Collingwood!” -- Beyond than “Filosofia italiana dell’osservazione”, other notable essays by S. include: “L’idea del progresso nel pensiero del secondo dopoguerra” – and “Rilettura dell’idealismo italiano: attii del convegno di studi, Pescara – His family included a doctor, mentioned in an rachival record of Zannetti --. A member of the S. family, a historical Italian family, with a presence in Pisa and the surrounding region. Relations include Pietro S. and Settimio S. The family was asociated with the area of San Casiano, a town in Val di Pesa. FILOSOFIA ITALIANA DELL'OSSERVAZIONE Clemente S. M iMrtleDluI doUflM ID rbo per Btoogni mr ■riaMMU, e randeril >UM If H*n Alt IWIm It TSTD ifil IUM. fi*f.. _Ciifi.w* . 9aD0 ornai trascorsi maUiuimi secoli da che nel regno della Filo- ■oBa III udila una Toce, la quale aoimuiiava, cbu la natura aveva aperta •gli uomini una sola strada per wudurli Bll'aaiuislo delle cc^izioni; la «rada dcirasscrrazione e dell' etperienra. La qiwl tocq rivelatrice della pili grande, della più ulilo verità, dm venisse mài discoperta dalTumaiw Ìd- Icllcllo. Iraeva unirà riienlc la nu origlile (Ull'etseni alenai pensatori accorti dei pi>riiicioai rcsullaiiicnU, cfae si ritraevano dalle ìnvcstiiaifoni, allordiè con ardile ipclesi , con remolissiino aslrarioni sì avcve intendimento di ottenere la ronOM'enza dei rcnonicni naturali, c dei vanlafli^i considere- voli . die si olleiieiano nllarclui, abbandonalo il ìalso metodo di argomentare con priocipj slabilili a priori, si cercava di analizzare accuralamcntc i  Grice: Caro Sancasciani, oggi ho incontrato Speranza al bar di Pisa—e mi ha detto che tra filosofi, osservare non significa solo vedere, ma anche annusare, toccare e, va da sé, intuire! Pare che tu, qui in Toscana, abbia elevato l’osservazione a vera arte, altro che Collingwood… O forse dovrei dire: alla maniera di Speranza! Sancasciani: Ah, Professore Grice, Speranza è sempre pronto a trovare nuove sfumature tra i sensi! In effetti, a Pisa osserviamo anche il vento che gira attorno alla torre pendente… Ma voi inglesi, siete convinti che osservare sia questione di occhiali, mentre noi ci mettiamo pure il cuore e, perché no, la bocca per assaggiare la realtà! Grice: Ecco, caro Sancasciani, proprio questo volevo implicare: non basta vedere per capire, ma bisogna sentire con tutti i sensi. Del resto, tra una degustazione di pecorino e una passeggiata tra gli archivi di famiglia, la vera filosofia dell’osservazione sta nel cogliere il sapore delle cose… e non lasciarsi distrarre dai metodi a priori! Sancasciani: Come ha osservato Speranza, la tua implicatura è davvero “osservativa”—o dovrei dire “osservantissima”! Del resto, se la filosofia italiana dell’osservazione ci insegna qualcosa, è proprio che il filosofo deve essere attento a ogni dettaglio, anche al profumo del ragù o al sorriso di chi ascolta… Grice, oggi hai meritato un elogio da vero osservatore toscano! Sancasciani, Clemente (1749).  Filosofia italiana dell’osservazione. Firenze.

Francesco Saverio de Sanctis (Morra Irpina, Napoli, Campania): la grammatica ragionata e  la ragione conversazionale dello stile filosofico. Grice and Francesco De Sanctis share a conviction that philosophical meaning is inseparable from reasoned linguistic practice, yet they locate the governance of that practice at different levels: De Sanctis approaches reason as immanent in style itself, holding that a philosophical argument succeeds or fails according to the clarity, vitality, and historical authenticity of the language in which it is expressed, so that grammar, rhetoric, and national literary inheritance together form a rational medium of thought; Grice, by contrast, suspends all aesthetic and historical criteria and reconstructs meaning through the rational norms that guide conversational exchange, showing how what is meant emerges from shared expectations about relevance, informativeness, sincerity, and mutual understanding rather than from stylistic excellence. Where De Sanctis treats philosophy as a branch of the belles lettres, with style functioning as the vehicle through which reason becomes intelligible and persuasive, Grice treats style as largely epiphenomenal, insisting that the real work of meaning lies in the interlocutors’ inferential coordination between what is said and what is implicated. Thus De Sanctis’s reason is embodied and literary, unfolding through the organic life of a language and its culture, whereas Grice’s reason is procedural and pragmatic, operating at the level of conversational logic; both, however, agree against mere abstraction that philosophy lives in language, and that rational meaning is achieved not in isolation but through practices of communication governed—whether by style or by inference—by reason itself. He considers philosophy as a branch of the belles lettres and his field of expertise is when stylists stop using an artificial Roman, and turned to ‘Italian.’ Grice: “I really do not like de Sanctis; when an author becomes philosophical, he says that he has been infested of the philosophical pest!” – Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando l'omonimo architetto, vedi Francesco De Sanctis (architetto). Francesco de Sanctis  Ministro della pubblica istruzione del Regno d'Italia MonarcaVittorio Emanuele II di Savoia Capo del governoCamillo Benso di Cavour PredecessoreTerenzio Mamiani, Regno di Sardegna Capo del governo Bettino Ricasoli SuccessorePasquale Stanislao Mancini Durata mandato MonarcaUmberto I di Savoia Capo del governoBenedetto Cairoli Predecessore Michele Coppino SuccessoreMichele Coppino Capo del governo Benedetto Cairoli PredecessoreFrancesco Paolo Perez SuccessoreGuido Baccelli Governatore della Provincia di Avellino Successore Nicola De Luca Deputato del Regno d'Italia Legislatura Gruppo parlamentare Sinistra Coalizione connubio, opposizione, governo della Sinistra storica Incarichi parlamentari Ministro dell'Istruzione del Regno d'Italia Sito istituzionale Dati generali Partito politico Destra storica Sinistra storica Titolo di studiolaurea Professione Docente universitario Firma -- è stato un critico letterario, saggista e politico italiano, tra i maggiori critici e storici della letteratura italiana nel XIX secolo e più volte ministro della pubblica istruzione. S. nacque a Morra Irpina (Avellino) da una famiglia di piccoli proprietari terrieri, figlio di Alessandro e Maria Agnese Manzi.  Il padre era dottore in diritto e due zii paterni, Giuseppe e Carlo, uno sacerdote e l'altro medico, vennero esiliati per aver preso parte ai moti carbonari.  Celebre è la sua frase:  storia della filosofia, il saggio filosofico, il poema filosofico, il tema filosofico.  Grice: Caro De Sanctis, devo ammettere che soltanto l’Italia, e non certo Oxford, riesce a dar vita a una genialità come la Sua: un pensiero capace di riunire tutta la filosofia del linguaggio nel concetto di "stile". La Sua grammatica ragionata è stata per me una fonte d’ispirazione continua—come direbbero da voi, una vera scintilla per lo spirito critico! De Sanctis: La ringrazio, professore Grice. In verità, ho sempre pensato che il pensiero filosofico non possa essere separato dalla bellezza dello stile, né dalla chiarezza della lingua. Anche nella riflessione più profonda, la parola italiana, viva e musicale, deve essere maestra—proprio come per Dante o Petrarca. Grice: È proprio questa attenzione al legame tra forma e contenuto che mi affascina. La Sua idea che il saggio filosofico sia anche un’opera d’arte letteraria mi ha fatto riflettere su quanto la nostra disciplina debba all’eredità italiana. Noi, a Oxford, siamo forse troppo presi dalla forma logica, ma trascuriamo spesso l’arte dello stile che voi coltivate da secoli. De Sanctis: Eppure, vede, ogni filosofia, in fondo, è anche storia, poesia, persino un po’ di politica—come nella mia esperienza da ministro! Lo stile non è solo abbellimento, ma pensiero che prende corpo. Forse è proprio questa la lezione che l’Italia può offrire: che il pensiero, per essere davvero universale, deve sapersi incarnare nella lingua viva e nel sentimento nazionale. Sanctis, Francesco Saverio de (1840). Saggi critici. Napoli: Morano.

Gaetano Sanseverino (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale del segno naturale -- Grice and Gaetano Sanseverino converge on the view that meaning and understanding are governed by reason, yet they draw the boundary between nature, logic, and conversation in markedly different ways: Sanseverino, working within scholastic logic and Thomistic semiotics, grounds conversational reason in the notion of the natural sign, treating meaning as anchored in objective relations between things, intellect, and nature, so that understanding flows from the intelligibility of the world itself as ordered by natura and grasped through syllogistic discipline; Grice, by contrast, relocates the governance of meaning from the metaphysics of signs to the rational practices of speakers, arguing that what is communicated in conversation depends not on natural signification alone but on publicly recognizable intentions constrained by cooperative reasoning. Where Sanseverino emphasizes continuity between scholastic logic, natural signs, and theological anthropology—so that meaning is in principle prior to and independent of conversational exchange—Grice insists that even apparently “natural” meaning becomes conversationally significant only through the inferential activity of interlocutors, who move from what is said to what is meant by calculable steps of rational interpretation. Thus Sanseverino’s conversational reason remains realist and object-centered, embedded in a pre-given logical order, while Grice’s is pragmatic and interaction-centered, showing how reason governs meaning not by the authority of natura or formal logic alone, but by the mutual accountability of speakers engaged in ordinary talk. -- la logica scolastica. Considerato uno fra i massimi precursori del neo-tomismo (AQUINO, si veda). Si trasfere a Nola per frequentare la scuola dove suo zio è rettore. Studia filosofia con l'intento di confrontare i vari sistemi filosofici, fra cui gode particolare credito in Italia, all'epoca, quello razionalista. Lo studio comparato dei vari sistemi gli permite una conoscenza più approfondita della scolastica, soprattutto d’AQUINO, e del legame intimo tra la scolastica e la [atristica. Restaura la filosofia scolastica. Insegna a Napoli. Venne incaricato da Ferdinando II di preparare un manuale ufficiale per le scuole del regno delle due Sicilie. Scrive allo scopo il manuale "I principali sistemi della filosofia del criterio”. Profondo conoscitore di AQUINO da alle stampe interessanti saggi sui filosofi moderni. Inizia ad occuparsi più specificamente di AQUINO con “L’origine del potere e il diritto di resistenza, cui fa seguito “In difesa dell'angeologia contro i sofismi”. Esce il ponderoso “I principali sistemi della filosofia del criterio” un'ampia e dottissima disquisizione sulla filosofia illuminista e su quella a lui contemporanea -- fra cui quella dello stesso GIOBERTI -- confutata sulla base della logica. Il suo capolavoro. Si tratta del celebre saggio, “Philosophia antiqua” che ha per oggetto la storia della logica. “In compendium redacta ad usum scholarum clericalium. Venne pubblicata a Napoli “Elementa”, “Antropologia”, “Teologia. Altre saggi: “Sopra alcune questioni le più importanti della filosofia” (Napoli); “Il razionalismo” (Napoli); “I razionalisti” (Napoli); “L'origine del potere e il diritto di resistenza, (Napoli, Giannini); “In difesa dell'angeologia contro i sofismi” (Napoli, Manfredi); “Elementa philosophiae theoreticae” (Napoli, Manfredi); “Philosophia antiqua” (Napoli, Manfredi); “Institutiones seu Elementa philosophiae antiquae” (Napoli, Manfredi); segno naturale, Boezio, Aquino.  Grice: Caro Sanseverino, oggi ho incrociato Speranza al caffè e, tra un cornetto e l’altro, è venuto fuori il tuo nome! Pare che tra segni naturali e logica scolastica, tu abbia più spirito di quanto ci si aspetti da un filosofo napoletano… Ma dimmi: il segno naturale, in fondo, è più vicino alla pizza margherita o al ragù della domenica? Sanseverino: Ah, Grice, Speranza non perde mai occasione per mettere il naso dove la logica incontra la buona tavola! Ma ti svelo un segreto: il vero segno naturale è quello che ti fa capire, senza parlare, che il ragù è pronto solo quando il profumo invade l’intera casa… Altro che logica scolastica! Grice: Vedi, caro Gaetano, ogni volta che sento parlare di "NATVRA" tutto in maiuscolo—soprattutto da Cicerone, o peggio ancora da qualche professore bolognese—mi sento come uno scolaro perso in una foresta senza segnali… Sarà che la natura degli antichi per me resta più misteriosa delle ricette segrete della nonna! Sanseverino: La tua implicatura è, come direbbe Speranza, non proprio naturale—ma nemmeno ancora soprannaturale! Forse ti manca solo un po’ di quella “grazia napoletana” che trasforma il dilemma della natura in una questione di cuore… O magari, semplicemente, dovresti fidarti del naso come quando si giudica un buon ragù: la NATVRA si capisce, Grice, più col grembiule che con la toga! Sanseverino, Gaetano (1840). Elementa philosophiae. Napoli: Fibreno.

Angelo Andrea Santilli (Sant’Elia Fiume Rapido, Frosinone, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale -- dal soggettivo all’inter-soggettivo. Grice and Santilli converge on the idea that reason is intrinsically conversational and that meaning emerges not in isolated consciousness but in shared, intelligible practice, yet they articulate this insight at different levels and with different aims: Santilli, working within nineteenth‑century Italian civil philosophy and influenced by Galluppi, Gioberti, and Cousin, explicitly theorizes the passage from the subjective to the intersubjective as a moral and political necessity, treating conversational reason as the medium through which individual thought becomes socially binding, ethical, and institutionally effective, especially in the context of poverty, rights, and constitutional life; Grice, by contrast, arrives at intersubjectivity not through social philosophy but through analytic reconstruction of everyday talk, showing that what a speaker means is governed by publicly recognizable intentions constrained by rational norms of cooperation, and that the move from private mental states to shared understanding is achieved via implicature rather than through explicit moral or political mediation. Where Santilli emphasizes reason as a unifying human force that grounds social solidarity and collective agency, Grice emphasizes the fine-grained mechanisms by which interlocutors actually succeed in understanding one another, demonstrating that intersubjectivity is not an added ethical layer but already built into the logic of meaning itself; Santilli’s conversational reason thus functions as a normative ideal for social life, while Grice’s operates as a formal account of how rational agents, simply by talking, already inhabit an intersubjective space. Segue il corso liceale presso la Scuola di Murro a Napoli. Discepolo di GALLUPPI, e amico -- fra gli’altri – di SETTEMBRINI, FIORELLI, e SANCTIS. Si laurea in filosofia. Apre una scuola di diritto morale e costituzionale.  Fervente giobertiano – GIOBERTI , e attivo propugnatore, nei circoli culturali napoletani, di un'Italia federate. A frequenti rapporti epistolari con MAMIANI, GIZZI, e COUSIN. Quest'ultimo lo introduce nel giro culturale del socialismo utopistico ma modula il suo socialismo secondo i propri valori umanitari, rifiutando la logica della lotta di classe. Ha comunque a scrivere che nel regno di Napoli occorre una savia distribuzione della ricchezza. Presidente della società dantesca (ALIGHERI – si veda) -- e prolifico filosofo. Fonda "L'Enciclopedico" in cui vivacemente sostene che occorreva occuparsi della piaga della povertà. La nazione italiana vuole pane e lo dimanda incessantemente, lo chiede nel pianto dell'indigenza, tra le sciagure della desolazione, lo chiede non a titolo di preghiera, ma diritto necessario, assoluto. Il popolo italiano non capisce la speculativa astrazione di alcune verità filosofica, non sa i titoli di libertà, di costituzione, di uguaglianza. Una riforma che dimentica affatto la fisica prosperità del popolo italiano non è che riforma di solo nome. “Le idee" e testo di studio nelle scuole di Toscana; "Sul realizzamento del pensiero"; "Sviluppo filosofico dell'autorità"; "Cenno psicologico sull'attività dello spirito"; "Individuo e Società"; "Princìpi dell'imanità razionale"; "Il socialismo in economia" e "Lavoro, industria e capitale". Si batté politicamente per l'ottenimento della Costituzione da parte di re Ferdinando II. Malvisto e considerato individuo pericoloso dalla polizia e ucciso a baionettate da soldati che fanno irruzione nella sua abitazione in Largo Monte-Oliveto. dal soggettivo all’inter-soggetivo.  Grice: Caro Santilli, oggi ho incontrato Speranza e, tra una battuta e l’altra, mi ha detto che tu sei il filosofo che sa far passare la ragione conversazionale dal soggettivo all’inter-soggettivo come se fosse una passeggiata a Sant’Elia Fiume Rapido! Santilli: Ah, Grice, Speranza ha sempre il talento di esagerare! Ma se fosse vero, vorrei almeno un premio in pane, come chiedeva il mio popolo laziale… perché con la filosofia si ragiona, ma con la panetteria si mangia! Grice: Vedi, Santilli, proprio come tu passi dal soggettivo all’inter-soggettivo, io passo dal detto al non detto: se la conversazione è pane, allora l’implicatura è la mollica che nessuno vede ma tutti assaporano! Santilli: La tua implicatura, caro Grice, è intersoggettiva – come direbbe Speranza – e pure genialmente così! Il bello è che, proprio come la mollica, il pensiero si condivide senza che nessuno debba chiedere: “Me ne dai un po’?” Santilli, Angelo Andrea (1932). Aquino. Roma.

Pietro Antonio Santucci (Cortona, Toscana)– Leech e la prammatica come rettorica conversazionale – simulazione, superlazione, e compagnia. Grice and Santucci converge on the idea that meaning in discourse is governed by reason rather than by ornament, yet they approach that governance from opposite historical and methodological directions: Santucci, working within the early modern rhetorical tradition, treats pragmatic effects as refinements of classical figures—simulatio, superlatio, translatio—whose function is to guide the listener’s judgment through disciplined eloquence, preserving the authority of the orator while avoiding Greek technical excess; Grice, by contrast, famously strips rhetoric of its prescriptive costume and reconceives these same phenomena as implicatures generated by rational, cooperative agents in conversation, accountable not to rhetorical decorum but to shared expectations of relevance, informativeness, sincerity, and clarity. Where Santucci’s project is to purify rhetorical metalanguage so that figures illuminate discourse without overwhelming it, Grice’s is to show that figures need no autonomous metalinguistic machinery at all: their work is done by practical reasoning operating under conversational norms. Thus Santucci’s “conversational rhetoric” remains vertical, oriented toward mastery of audience effects, while Grice’s theory is horizontal and interactive, locating meaning in the hearer’s rational reconstruction of the speaker’s intentions; rhetoric becomes, in Grice’s sense, not a system of elevated techniques but a by‑product of reason-governed communicative action itself. Grice: “There was a time when Italians – indeed Romans – would NOT stand a hellenism like ‘eironia,’ ‘hyperbole,’ or ‘metaphora,’ and there you would have them – and Cicero, too – uttering Varronesque formations like, respectively, SIMVLATIO, SVPERLATIO, and TRANSLATIO! I simplify the vocabulary by calling them all ‘figures of speech,’ or IMPLICATURAE, that is!” -- Retorica. RHETORIC JEu PRÆCEPTA V E SELECTISSIMIS AUCTORIBUS COMPILATA EDIT PRIMO PETRUS ANTONIUS S. DE CORTONA, Unus ex Presbyteris Congregationis Oratorii DIVI PHILIPPI NERII ejufdem Civitatis. Excudebat Joannes Baptista Recurti. SUPERIORUM PERMISSU, AC PRIVILEGIO. Illujirifs. et Reverendifs. D. D, GABRIELI RICCARDIO Viro nobiliffimo, et Ampliflfimo, Patritio Florentino Marchioni eximio Metropolitanæ Ejcclefiæ Florentinæ Canonico PETRUS ANTONIUS SANTUCCI U JE magna Junt, eadem et tnagnis deberi iifque folii nuncupan da fore, nemo unquam inficias ivit, lllufiriffime, C9* Reverendtjfime Domine. Cum enim omnibus a natura comparatum fit, ut coeli faciem obviam fibi quifque contempletur; huic profetto totius Orbis fublimi /lima parti, O' non alii, ea quce Orbis ipfius fublimi /fima ornamenta fiunt, nempe fydera, ab eademmet natura merito donata fuiffe facile ipfe animadvertat, ne et 2 ceffe Cfjje eji % Quavem, et meritis, fi forte virum quem Confprxerc, filent, arreBifque auribus aflant: Ille regit diBis animos, et pcBora mulcet. At Eloquentix majefias, fe mavult, et admiratione coli, et filentio pradican;ejl enim admiratio prxeonium glorix, et filent tum fidus interpres majefiatis ‘, neque major illa commendatio effe potefi. quam omnis frujlra tentata laudatio. Denique Do&orum omnium Coryphæus, ac facile Princeps D. Augutt. fic de præcellenti hac Arte tertatus habetur: Hxc nobis cum Angelis, cum Deo ipfo quodammodo communis efi;  Grice: Santucci, mi dicono che tu voglia fare della prammatica una rettorica conversazionale con tanto di metalinguaggio: a Roma, una volta, per evitare un grecismo bastava un buon latino… oggi invece sembra servire un glossario. Santucci: Maestro Grice, Roma detestava i grecismi solo finché non imparava a farli suoi. “Eironia” diventa simulazione, “hyperbole” superlazione, “metaphora” translatio: stessa cosa, ma con toga. Grice: Ecco: allora la tua rettorica è… come dire… superlativa. Nel senso che, se non stiamo attenti, la superlazione finisce per superare l’oratore, e la figura diventa più importante dell’uditorio. E quando la figura comanda, la conversazione obbedisce—e a quel punto la prammatica fa la fine del servo che crede di essere padrone. Santucci: Superlativa implicatura quella sua, Grice, che mette il detto in ombra come fosse solo un’ombra cinese! Perché mi stai dicendo: “raffina pure il metalinguaggio della rettorica”, ma senza trasformarlo in un mobile ingombrante. Io lo volevo proprio per questo: ripulire la lingua dei precetti—la meno triviale delle “trivialità” che Bononia abbia mai allevato—così che la figura illumini la conversazione senza riempirla di ferraglia terminologica. Santucci, Pietro Antonio (1748). Rhetoricæ præcepta e selectissimis auctoribus compilate. Recurti.

Antonio Santucci – In this playful exchange, the contrast between Grice and Santucci neatly mirrors their philosophical differences over reason‑governed conversational meaning: Grice treats conversational rationality as a local, inferential achievement, where saying little and letting much be understood counts as a cooperative, intention‑guided success governed by pragmatic norms, whereas Santucci frames conversational reason more historically and culturally, as something that wanders, like comets or empiricist traditions, across sciences, philosophies, and social practices. Grice’s emphasis falls on the internal logic of conversation—how implicature allows interlocutors to mean more than they say without abandoning rational control—while Santucci’s reply situates that logic within a wider humanistic horizon, where understanding depends as much on shared habits, traditions, and interpretive generosity as on calculable inference. In short, Grice explains how conversational reason works from within ordinary linguistic practice, whereas Santucci reflects on how such reason survives, zig‑zagging but resilient, within the long history of empiricism, idealism, and philosophical culture. Grice: Caro Santucci, leggo del tuo Trattato delle comete del 1611 e mi chiedo se l’implicatura sia caduta dal cielo insieme a una coda luminosa. Santucci: Ah, Grice, le comete passano e confondono tutti, ma a Bologna abbiamo imparato che anche la ragione conversazionale ogni tanto fa zig-zag. Grice: A Oxford diremmo che se una cometa dice poco e lascia intendere molto, allora è perfettamente cooperativa. Santucci: E io replico che, tra empirismo e stelle erranti, basta non prendere troppo alla lettera il cielo per capirsi benissimo a tavola. Santucci, Antonio (1611). Trattato delle comete. Finze, Giunti.

Antonio Santucci (Mirra, Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale dell’idealismo. In comparing H. P. Grice with Antonio Santucci on reason-governed conversational meaning, a clear contrast emerges between Grice’s micro-analytic, intention-based pragmatics and Santucci’s historically and systematically grounded conception of “ragione conversazionale.” Grice locates the rationality of conversation in the inferential coordination between what is said and what is meant, governed by the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, where reason operates locally as the hearer’s capacity to reconstruct speaker intentions through calculable implicatures rather than through rules of logic or semantics alone. Santucci, by contrast, approaches conversational reason less as a technical mechanism of inference and more as a cultural and philosophical posture emerging from the traditions of empiricism, pragmatism, and post-idealist reflection, especially as mediated by Italian encounters with Humean skepticism and American pragmatism. Where Grice treats rationality as immanent in everyday conversational practice and minimally normative, Santucci situates it within a broader idealism tempered by historical awareness, in which reason in conversation reflects the evolving relationship between philosophy, science, and forms of life rather than a formally isolable conversational calculus. In this sense, Grice offers a theory of how conversational reason works, while Santucci offers an account of why conversational reason matters within a larger intellectual genealogy. – (quarto da sinistra) con Pedrazzi, Battaglia, Matteucci e Contessi. Muore a Bologna. è stato un filosofo italiano. È stato docente di Storia della filosofia all'Università di Bologna.  Socio dell'Accademia delle Scienze dell'Istituto di Bologna, è stato tra i fondatori della casa editrice il Mulino. Studioso di Hume, dell'illuminismo scozzese e del pragmatismo americano, ha indagato inoltre le varie forme in cui positivismo ed esistenzialismo e, più in generale, il rapporto con le scienze hanno orientato il pensiero italiano tra Ottocento e Novecento.  È sepolto alla Certosa di Bologna. Opere principali Esistenzialismo e filosofia italiana, Bologna, Il Mulino, Il pragmatismo in Italia, Bologna, il Mulino. Sistema e ricerca in Hume, Bari, Laterza, Introduzione a Hume, Storia del pragmatismo, Empirismo, pragmatismo, filosofia italiana, Bologna, CLUEB, Eredi del positivismo. Ricerca sulla filosofia italiana, Bologna, il Mulino, L'età dei Lumi. Saggi sulla cultura settecentesca, Bologna, il Mulino, Filosofia e cultura nel Settecento britannico, a cura di A. S., Bologna, il Mulino. Comprende: Fonti e connessioni continentali, John Toland e il deismo. Hume e Hutcheson, Reid e la scuola del senso comune. Ricerche sul pensiero italiano fra Ottocento e Novecento, Bologna, CLUEB. Fonte: totem informativo di Bologna Servizi Cimiteriali. Collegamenti esterni Santucci, Antonio, su Treccani.it – Enciclopedie on line, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Santucci, Antonio, in Dizionario di filosofia, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. S., «Pragmatismo» la voce nella Enciclopedia del Novecento, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 1980. Addio al filosofo Antonio Santucci, da Il Mattino di Padova, Archivio. Filosofia Filosofi italiani Membri dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Torino Sepolti nel cimitero monumentale della Certosa di Bologna. Implicatura.  Grice: Carissimo Santucci, ogni volta che leggo le tue pagine sul pragmatismo mi viene voglia di prendere un treno per Mira, sperando che alla stazione mi venga offerta una tazza di empirismo veneto, magari corretta con un goccio di illuminismo scozzese. Ma dimmi, a Bologna si discute ancora se Hume fosse più vicino al Canal Grande o al Tamigi? Santucci: Ah, Grice, se Hume avesse navigato il Canal Grande, forse avrebbe scritto “Dialoghi sull’arte del gondoliere”! Ma ti dirò, a Bologna preferiamo riflettere sul rapporto tra filosofia e scienze, anche se a volte la discussione si perde... nelle nebbie padane! E poi, il Mulino non macina solo grano, ma anche tante idee, alcune pure farinate. Grice: Beh, caro Santucci, a Oxford quando si parla di ἰδέα di Platone, io mi ritrovo più confuso di un empirista davanti a una birra calda. Nessuno ha mai capito se fosse una ἰδέα nel cielo, un modello d’abito o semplicemente un modo elegante per evitare la concretezza... D’altronde, la filosofia, come dicono da voi, è spesso più ricca di sottintesi che di risposte! Santucci: Implicatura platonica la sua, Grice – o dovrei dire “piatonica”, visto che il povero Platone si è beccato il soprannome per le spalle larghe! Ma in fondo, tra ἰδέα e implicatura, c’è sempre un Mulino che macina misteri: basta saper leggere tra le farine! Santucci, Antonio (1959) Esistenzialismo. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Ubaldo Sanzo (Roma, Lazio): il deutero-esperanto e la ragione conversazional tra natura ed artificio. Ubaldo Sanzo and H. P. Grice converge on the idea that meaning is governed by reason rather than merely by formal structure, but they articulate that governance through different emphases on nature, convention, and artifice. Sanzo’s reflections on deutero-esperanto and the artifice of language, shaped by Peano, Vailati, and Italian conventionalism, treat scientific and philosophical languages as deliberately constructed instruments designed to secure intersubjective understanding beyond the contingencies of national tongues; reason here operates by making explicit, negotiable conventions that mediate between nature and artificial symbol systems. Grice, by contrast, resists treating language as a purely engineered code and instead locates rational governance in the conversational practices of natural language itself, showing through implicature how speakers exploit shared expectations, cooperation, and inferential rationality to mean more than they explicitly say. Where Sanzo tends to stress the mastery afforded by artificial languages and reconstructed scientific idioms—sometimes blurring the distinction between what is arbitrary and what is merely artificial, as Grice himself wryly observes—Grice insists that the heart of meaning lies in the practical reasoning of agents embedded in ordinary discourse, not in formal invention alone. The point of contact is substantial: both see meaning as irreducible to brute natural causation and both reject naïve naturalism; yet their divergence is equally clear, since Sanzo looks toward constructed linguistic frameworks as the rational solution to scientific communication, whereas Grice treats such constructions as secondary to, and parasitic upon, the deeper, reason-governed dynamics of everyday conversational understanding. – la filosofia lizia -- deutero-esperanto -- Insegna a Brindisi, Milano, e Salento. Fonda “Apollo Licio” o Lizio. Sube il fascino dell’esistenzialismo e il orazionalismo. Rivolve la propria attenzione ai rapporti tra filosofia, scienza e società. Si occupa di filosofi quali Becquerel, Boutruox, Corbino, Couturate Curie, Enriques, Fermi, Frola, GEYMONAT, PEANO, VAILATI. Sui fondamenti della geometria” (Brescia,  La Scuola, Collana "Il Pensiero"); “L’artificio della lingua, -- Grice: “I like that: it’s my Gricese, a language I invent and which makes me the master; there’s the arbitrary and there’s the artificial, and Sanzo, reconstructing Peano’s project, fails to distinguish this” -- Milano, Angeli, Collana di Epistemologia, Cimino; Sava, Il nucleo filosofico della scienza, Galatina, Congedo, Collana di Filosofia, Scritti di fisica-matematica, Torino, POMBA, I Classici della Scienza, Poincaré e i filosofi” (Lecce, Milella); Corbino, Scienza e società, Saggi raccolti e commentati, Manduria, Barbieri, Collana di Filosofia Hermes/Hestia, Scritti di fisica-matematica” (Milano, Mondadori, "I Classici del pensiero", Unione Tipografico, Torino, Scientia, Rivista di sintesi scientifica, “Apollo Licio”, Museo Galilei, Firenze. 1. I PRODROMI  Il problema della comprensione internazionale nel campo della scienza inizia, come è noto, con i primi testi scientifici scritti in lingue nazionali. Il latino, che per secoli era stato lo strumento della cultura scientifica dell'Occidente, si era estinto nella parlata comune e si andava lentamente estinguendo anche nella sua funzione di unica lingua comune ai dotti. Trattati scientifici in lingue volgari appaiono già alla fine del Duecento e la matematica commerciale è sempre più frequentemente scritta in volgare; apollo licio, trovato al ginnasio liceo di Atene, figgurante il dio in atto di riposo dopo un gran sforzo. natura ed artificio, l’artificio della lingua, convenzionalismo, filosofia della lingua.  Grice: Carissimo Sanzo, ogni volta che mi immergo nel tuo “deutero-esperanto” sento che la filosofia diventa una partita a scacchi tra natura e artificio… e, a dire il vero, finisco sempre per perdere contro Apollo Licio! Ma ti dirò, ogni volta che provo a decifrare la parola natura in Cicerone, mi sembra di inseguire una chimera: mai capito se parlava di boschi, di virtù, o semplicemente del tempo che fa. Sanzo: Ah Grice, se solo Apollo avesse consultato il tuo Gricese, forse avrebbe scritto geometria direttamente in versi! In fondo, tra convenzione e artificio, la lingua italiana è come un ginnasio, dove si allenano idee e parole. E poi, diciamolo: la natura, soprattutto quella di Cicerone, non è mai stata un esercizio facile… nemmeno per i filosofi di Brindisi. Grice: Vedi, Sanzo, ogni volta che leggo Cicerone parlare di natura, mi ritrovo più confuso di un romano al mercato di Ostia. Non ho mai capito se intendesse la natura come madre generosa o come zia severa, o magari come un mistero che soltanto i sacerdoti potevano svelare. E poi, pensa: quando Roma celebrava il settecentocinquantatré dalla fondazione, il termine era ancora un rebus per tutti! Sanzo: Quella tua è proprio un'implicatura da vero ciceroniano! E forse nemmeno Cicerone ne aveva le idee chiare: almeno, non avrebbe mai scambiato natura con “natalizio”, come si usa oggi per decorare le piazze a dicembre. Ai bei tempi, diciamo, quando Roma segnava il suo settecentocinquantatré ad urbe conditam, la natura era poesia, storia, mistero—tutto tranne un abete in Senato! Sanzo, Ubaldo (1952). Lineamenti di filosofia morale. Roma: Studium.

Francesco De Sarlo (San Chirico Raparo, Potenza, Basilicata): la ragione conversazionale dell’idealismo. Francesco De Sarlo and H. P. Grice both articulate accounts of how reason governs meaning, but they situate that governance at different explanatory levels: De Sarlo grounds it in an idealist–psychological framework centered on consciousness and intentional experience, while Grice formulates it as a pragmatic theory of how speakers rationally manage communication in ordinary language. For De Sarlo, shaped by Brentano, Wundt, and the Florence school, meaning arises because physical phenomena become psychic phenomena, contents of consciousness ordered and unified by the subject; conversation and understanding are therefore secondary expressions of a deeper rational organization of experience itself, where internal and external aspects are inseparable moments of one process. Grice, by contrast, brackets metaphysical and psychological debates about the ultimate status of consciousness and instead explains meaning in terms of publicly identifiable intentions, shared norms, and inferential practices, using implicature to show how rational agents routinely convey more than they explicitly state. Yet there is a significant convergence: De Sarlo’s insistence that objects exist for us only as they are implicated in consciousness parallels Grice’s claim, inspired in part by figures like Bradley whom De Sarlo also cites, that meaning is never exhausted by surface form but depends on what is rationally implicated in context. Where De Sarlo seeks a unified method for philosophy and science grounded in the primacy of psychic experience, Grice offers a unified account of linguistic understanding grounded in cooperative rationality; both resist sharp dualisms—between inner and outer, saying and meaning—and both construe reason not as an abstract faculty but as an organizing principle that makes experience and communication intelligible rather than fragmented. –la scuola di Firenze. Vince la cattedra di filosofia teoretica presso il Regio Istituto di studi superiori di Firenze. È in questa città che frequenta i seminari tenuti da Brentano presso la biblioteca filosofica. Nel 1903 fonda a Firenze il "Laboratorio di psicologia sperimentale" che fu inizialmente annesso alla Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia del Regio Istituto di studi superiori. Allievi di S. sono, tra gli altri, Aliotta, Borgese, Bonaventura, Lamanna, che sposa sua figlia, Garin e Marzi. S. si trova in aperto contrasto con Croce e Gentile che ritenevano si dovesse separare il metodo della filosofia da quello della scienza. Per S., invece, il metodo conoscitivo doveva essere comune in quanto sia il filosofo che lo scienziato si occupano dello stesso campo d'indagine. Per questo considera come unico metodo quello rigorosamente sperimentale di Wundt e quello esperienziale di Brentano. Nello stesso anno pubblica, nel capoluogo toscano, il saggio: I dati dell'esperienza psichica. La novità introdotta da De Sarlo è il concetto che i fenomeni fisici esistono in quanto diventano fenomeni psichici, contenuto della nostra coscienza. Dunque, l'oggetto di studio della psicologia doveva essere l'esperienza intenzionale del soggetto. L'unica vera esperienza diretta è quella psichica. Esperienza interna ed esperienza esterna vanno così a configurarsi come due aspetti dello stesso fenomeno; non c'è un'esperienza più vera dell'altra poiché nessuna delle due è indipendente dall'altra. Per De Sarlo è imprescindibile studiare la coscienza: a suo avviso, gli "oggetti" arrivano necessariamente alla nostra coscienza attraverso gli organi sensoriali. Essi vengono ordinati, studiati, usati, catalogati sia dal singolo nella sua esperienza quotidiana sia dalle varie scienze che ne approfondiscono lo studio. implicatura, Bradley, citato da Sarlo.  Grice: Professore De Sarlo, ho letto con grande interesse i suoi lavori sul laboratorio di psicologia sperimentale a Firenze. Trovo ammirevole la Sua posizione sul metodo unico di indagine, che abbraccia tanto la filosofia quanto la scienza. È una prospettiva che, da logico, mi incuriosisce molto: pensa davvero che si possa superare la tradizionale divisione tra esperienza interna ed esterna? De Sarlo: Caro professore Grice, la ringrazio per la Sua domanda. A mio avviso, la distinzione tra esperienza interna ed esterna è più apparente che reale. Nel mio lavoro ho sostenuto che entrambe sono aspetti di un unico fenomeno. La coscienza non può ignorare l'influenza degli organi sensoriali, ma allo stesso tempo è la coscienza a dare ordine, significato e valore agli oggetti e alle percezioni. Solo così, filosofia e scienza possono dialogare senza barriere. Grice: Quindi, se capisco bene, per Lei la vera esperienza è quella psichica, dove il soggetto diventa protagonista assoluto? Mi affascina come questa idea possa unire la rigorosità della sperimentazione scientifica alla profondità della riflessione filosofica. Bradley, che spesso cito, direbbe che la realtà è sempre "implicata" nella coscienza. Lei sarebbe d'accordo con questa implicatura? De Sarlo: Esattamente, Grice. Concordo con Bradley: gli oggetti esistono nella misura in cui diventano contenuto della nostra coscienza. L'esperienza diretta, quella psichica, è il punto di incontro tra interno ed esterno. Per me, non c'è un’esperienza più vera dell’altra, poiché nessuna delle due è indipendente dall’altra. Così, ogni indagine filosofica deve partire dalla consapevolezza che il pensiero e il metodo scientifico dialogano insieme, senza confini. Sarlo, Francesco De (1891). Attività psichica incosciente in patologia mentale. Rivista sperimentale di freniatria e di medicina legale

Antonio Sarno (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale del sentire. Antonio Sarno’s philosophy of sentire and Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning address the same problem—the relation between inner life and meaningful expression—from opposite but complementary directions: Sarno begins from a lived, affective ontology in which feeling is not a private state but a mode of giving oneself over to things so that they come alive within experience, whereas Grice begins from ordinary linguistic interaction and reconstructs how meaning is generated through rational intentions, shared norms, and inferential discipline. For Sarno, shaped by Bruno, Campanella, Vico, and a poetic–philosophical tradition, thinking and feeling are inseparable, and reason operates through intensity, donation, and exposure to the real; conversational sense emerges when sentire remains faithful to the world rather than collapsing into a self-contained sensus sui. Grice, by contrast, is wary of multiplying inner states beyond necessity and seeks to show how meaning can be explained without appealing to ineffable feelings, by grounding communication in publicly recognizable intentions and calculable implicatures. Yet the two converge in an important way: Sarno’s insistence that authentic sentire must incarnate itself in things parallels Grice’s insistence that meaning must be manifest in patterns of use that others can recognize and respond to rationally. Where Sarno worries about the violence of severing thought from lived intensity, Grice worries about the conceptual violence introduced by lexical drift and ungoverned implication; both see reason as a regulating force that keeps expression from tipping either into solipsistic inwardness or into empty verbal play. In this sense, Sarno supplies an ontological depth to what Grice formalizes pragmatically: conversational meaning is governed by reason not only because speakers infer correctly, but because, at its best, meaning remains answerable to how experience is genuinely lived and shared. Grice: Interprete di BRUNO e CAMPANELLA. Collabora al “Giornale critico della filosofia italiana” con saggi su BRUNO, CAMPANELLA, e VICO. Medita sulla violenza. Si suicida con un colpo di rivoltella. Si interessa a BRUNO e CAMPANELLA. Il suo punto di partenza è l’opposizione tra un sentimento sempre identico a se stesso, essenzialmente interiore -- sensus sui -- ed un sentire esteriore, che si tramuta nelle cose di cui ha esperienza, che si presta e si dona tutt’intero alle cose, affinché esse vivano in lui. Atre saggi: Pensiero e poesia (Laterza, Bari); Filosofia poetica (Laterza, Bari); Filosofia del sentire (Pescara, Tracce); Sulla violenza (Bari, Laterza); M. Perniola, “L’enigma” (Costa,  Genova); A. Marroni, Filosofo del farsi altro. Angelo, L'estetica italiana” (Laterza, Bari); Marroni, La passione per il presente in “Filosofie dell'intensità. un maestro occulto della filosofia italiana” (Mimesis, Milano); Marroni, "I carmina in foliis volitantia" in Agalma, Giornale Critico di Filosofia Italiana.  Grice: Professore Sarno, lei che ha meditato sul sentire come nessun altro, mi dica: questo “sentire” napoletano, è più simile a una serenata sotto la luna o a un tuffo nel Vesuvio? Perché qui a Vadum Boum, di sentimento ne abbiamo poco, e di sentire ancora meno! Sarno: Caro Grice, il sentire campano è tutto fuoco e poesia, ma mai distante dal reale. Non si tratta di semplici emozioni, ma di una esperienza viva, che si dona alle cose e le fa vibrare dentro di noi. Pensiero e poesia, come dico sempre, non sono mai separati: né serenata né Vesuvio, ma entrambe, se serve! Grice: Sarno, mi affascina il suo “sentire” che si presta e si dona. Ma a volte mi viene da dire, magari un po’ ironicamente: SENSUS NON SUNT MULTIPLICANDI PRAETER NECESSITATEM. Almeno, così sento io, anche se spesso mi accorgo che il sentimento è come il caffè napoletano: basta una goccia in più e tutto cambia sapore! Sarno: Sento quel che tu implica, Grice! E penso che sia meglio restare fedeli al “sentire” applicato alle cinque vie – ai sensi, alla conoscenza sensibile. Così, almeno, evitiamo di moltiplicare i sentimenti oltre il necessario. Il resto, lasciamolo pure all’immaginazione… o al Vesuvio, se proprio serve! Sarno, Antonio (1909). La violenza. Laterza

Paolo Sarpi (Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale della meta-fisica del fenice, o l’arte del bien conversar. Paolo Sarpi and H. P. Grice converge on the idea that reason governs conversation, but they locate that governance in strikingly different registers: Sarpi conceives the arte del bien conversar as a civic, rhetorical, and prudential practice embedded in metaphysics, politics, and historical conflict, whereas Grice treats it as a formally characterizable structure internal to linguistic interaction itself. For Sarpi, shaped by Venetian republicanism, scientific method, and early modern empiricism, good conversation is a discipline of restraint, clarity, and strategic silence, a way of thinking and speaking that resists dogmatic authority and survives institutional coercion, whether theological or political; reason here is exercised through moral judgment, historical intelligence, and an acute sense of how words circulate within power. Grice, by contrast, abstracts from history and institutions to isolate the minimal rational conditions that make mutual understanding possible at all, locating the art of conversation not in eloquence or civic wisdom but in speaker intentions, shared expectations, and the cooperative management of implicature. What Sarpi understands as the phoenix-like resilience of discourse—its capacity to re-emerge after censorship, violence, or misunderstanding—Grice re-describes as recoverability through rational inference, even when conversation goes wrong. Sarpi’s bien conversar is an ethical and political art of living with words, while Grice’s theory explains how words function as reason-governed tools in ordinary exchange; yet both share the conviction that conversational disorder arises not from passion alone but from conceptual confusion, and that reason, whether historical or analytical, is what allows conversation to avoid drowning in chatter and instead remain intelligible, resilient, and meaningful. Definito d’Acquapendente come oracolo, autore della celebre Istoria del Concilio tridentino, subito messa all'indice. Fermo oppositore del centralismo monarchico di Roma, difendendo le prerogative della repubblica veneziana, colpita dall'interdetto emanato da Paolo V. Rifiuta di presentarsi di fronte all'inquisizione romana che intende processarlo e sube un grave attentato che si sospetta sta organizzato dalla curia romana, "agnosco stilum Curiae romanae", che nega tuttavia ogni responsabilità. L'infanzia e una ritiratezza in sé medesimo, un sembiante sempre penseroso, e più tosto malinconico che serio, un silenzio quasi continuato anco co' coetanei, una quiete totale, senza alcun di quei giuochi, a' quali pare che la natura stessa ineschi i fanciulli, acciò che col moto corroborino la complessione: cosa notabile che mai fosse veduto in alcuno. Poi, così serve in tutta la sua vita, et all'occasioni dice non poter capir il gusto e trattenimento di chi giuoca, se non fosse affetto d'avarizia. Un'alienazione da ogni gusto, nissuna avidità de' cibi, de' quali si nutre così poco, che restava meraviglia come stasse vivo. Nell'anno in cui proseguivano le sedute del Concilio di Trento, Carlo V e in guerra con i prìncipi protestanti tedeschi e il Parlamento inglese adotta un Libro di preghiere d'ispirazione luterana. Figlio di Francesco di Pietro S., di famiglia di lontane origini friulane -- precisamente di San Vito al Tagliamento -- e mercante a Venezia eppure, scrive Micanzio, per la sua indole violenta più dedito all'armi ch'alla mercatura. La madre, veneziana, d'aspetto umile e mite e Isabella Morelli. Rimasta vedova, fu accolta con il suo figlio e l'altra figlia Elisabetta nella casa del fratello. l’arte del bien pensar, Locke, impression, reflection, metaphysics, Bibioteca Marciana, pensieri, pensiero, logica, bien pensare, galilei, hobbes, metodo, sensismo, il fenice di Venezia, scritti filosofici inedita.  Grice: Caro Sarpi, Venezia sarà pure la patria dell’arte del “bien conversar”, ma a Vadum Boum ci accontentiamo, come diciamo noi, di una conversazione… diciamo “alla buona”. Voi veneziani, invece, fate scuola – persino la Fenice, da voi, risorge per sentire quattro battute in bella compagnia!  Sarpi: Grice, troppo onore! A Venezia la conversazione è come il Brenta: a volte scorre limpida, a volte torbida, ma sempre va dove vuole lei. L’importante è non affogare nelle chiacchiere e saper risorgere, come la Fenice, dopo ogni battibecco... O almeno provarci!  Grice: Eh, vedi Paolo, “l’arte del bien conversar” sarebbe anche bella… se solo a Vadum Boum ci si esercitasse sul serio. Ma qui, a meno che tu non sia un artista di professione o un giocoliere di parole, la vera arte è quella del NON bien – chiamiamola pure arte del “mal conversare”. Così, ogni tanto, si salvano pure le apparenze… o almeno si pensa!  Sarpi: La tua implicatura, Grice, mi fa ridere – molto più di quanto tu non dica! A Venezia si dice che chi non sa parlar bene, almeno impari a tacere con stile… Ma a Vadum Boum, forse, anche il silenzio lo insegnate “male”, vero? Comunque, tra bien e mal conversar, preferisco chi almeno ci prova: il resto, lo lasciamo agli artisti… o ai filosofi in vena di fenici! Sarpi, Paolo (1619). Istoria del Concilio Tridentino. Londra: Ricciardo.

Gennaro Sasso (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale da Crotone a Velia – Both Grice and Gennaro Sasso approach meaning as something governed by reason, but they situate that governance at very different philosophical levels: for Grice, reason is immanent to ordinary conversation, realized through the speaker’s intentions and the cooperative norms that regulate what is explicitly said and implicitly conveyed, whereas for Sasso reason is a historical–ontological power that unfolds across traditions, from Eleatic and Pythagorean thought through Gentile’s distinction between potenza and atto and down into Machiavelli, Vico, and Lucretius, where symbol, allegory, and political judgment register the work of reason in culture rather than in dialogue. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning is anti-metaphysical in method but not in ambition: it explains how rationality operates locally, at the level of linguistic exchange, by diagnosing precisely the slippages that Sasso worries about at the level of conceptual history—above all the confusion between the actual and the everyday “attuale,” or between the possible, the probable, and the desirable. Sasso treats those slippages as symptoms of deeper failures to keep act and potential distinct within a tradition of thought, while Grice treats them as conversational malfunctions, detectable through implicature, cancellation, and tests of coherence. Where Sasso reconstructs reason as a long dialectical journey from Crotone to Velia and back through Italian idealism, Grice reconstructs it as a set of norm-sensitive practices that allow speakers to mean more than they say without collapsing logic into rhetoric; the difference is scale and genealogy, not subject matter, since both ultimately see reason as something that must be exercised, disciplined, and guarded against lexical or conceptual tricks that let words do ideological work while pretending to be neutral concepts. -- la potenza e il atto in Gentile – Gentile megarico -- Lucrezio e Machiavelli – allegoria e simbolo in Vico –Grice: Studia  a Roma. Si laurea sotto ANTONI e CHABOD con Machiavelli. Studia con CARABELLESE, RUGGIERO, SCARAVELLI, NARDI, PETTAZZONI, SAPEGNO, GABETTI, PERROTTA, E SANCTIS. Insegna ad Urbino e Roma. Studia l’idealismo italiano (CROCE) e MACHIAVELLI. Si occupa di ontologia, ALIGHERI, Platone, Polibio, LUCREZIO, GUICCIARDINI, Shakespeare e Mann. Presidente della "Fondazione GENTILE", Lincei. Altri saggi: “Machiavelli e Borgia. Storia di un giudizio” “Machiavelli” (Napoli, Morano); “La storia della filosofia” “La ricerca della dialettica” (Napoli, Morano); “Lucrezio: progresso e morte” (Bologna, Mulino); “L'illusione della dialettica” (Roma, Ateneo); “Guicciardini” (Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, Roma); “Essere e negazione, Napoli, Morano); “Machiavelli e gl’antichi” (Milano, Ricciardi); “Tramonto di un mito: l'idea di progresso” (Bologna, Mulino); Per invigilare me stesso. I Taccuini di lavoro di Croce, Bologna, Mulino); “L'essere e le differenze nel "Sofista” (Bologna, Il Mulino); “Variazioni sulla storia di una rivista italiana: "La Cultura"; Mulino); “Machiavelli, Bologna, Il Mulino, Comprende: Il pensiero politico, Napoli, IISS, Bologna, Mulino, Premio Viareggio di Saggistica, La storiografia. La fedeltà e l'esperimento, Scarpelli, Trincia e Visentin interrogano S.; Filosofia e idealismo, Napoli, Bibliopolis, Comprende: Croce, Gentile, Ruggiero, Calogero, Scaravelli, Paralipomeni, Secondi paralipomeni, Ultimi paralipomeni, Tempo, evento, divenire” (Bologna, Il Mulino); “Gentile: La potenza e l'atto” (Firenze, La Nuova Italia); Le due Italie di Gentile, Bologna, Il Mulino); Potenza ed atto in Gentile – Lucrezio in Macchiavelli, Lucrezio, simbolo ed allegoria in Vico, la scuola di Velia, veliati, veliani, parmenide, scuola di Crotone.  Grice: Caro Sasso, tu vieni da Crotone e arrivi fino a Velia, passando per Gentile e tornando a Machiavelli come se fosse una passeggiata: io, da Vadum Boum, mi perdo già al primo “atto”. Sasso: Grice, è una passeggiata solo se non confondi mai potenza e atto. E soprattutto se non scambi l’“attuale” con l’“attuale” di tutti i giorni: lì cominciano i malintesi. Grice: Appunto. Quando sento dire “ciò che è attuale non è possibile” (sic), mi viene da chiedermi se stiamo facendo ontologia o solo ginnastica di parole: a me sembra quasi un non-senso, come se “attuale” fosse diventato un lasciapassare per dire il contrario di qualunque cosa. E poi, in certi discorsi, “possibile” finisce per suonare come “desiderabile”, e allora il lessico fa il trucco… e la logica paga il conto. Sasso: La tua implicatura è davvero quasi attuale (sic, in gergo), Grice. E sì: hai ragione a sospettare lo slittamento tra possibile, probabile e desiderabile. Se vuoi metterla in forma “da seminarista di Vadum Boum”, pensa al quadrato delle opposizioni dei modali: necessario / impossibile e, dall’altro lato, possibile / non-necessario (cioè “contingente”). Molti credono di muoversi tra possibilità e necessità, ma in realtà stanno barattando la possibilità con la preferenza. E lì l’“attuale” diventa una parola d’ordine, non un concetto. Sasso, Gennaro (1950). Machiavelli. Sotto Antoni e Chabod – Roma.

Saturnino (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del probabile. A comparison between Grice and Saturninus highlights two complementary understandings of rationality grounded not in certainty but in disciplined practice under conditions of epistemic limitation. Saturninus, as a Pyrrhonian physician following Sextus Empiricus in second‑century Rome, embodies a conversational reason of the probable: rejecting claims to hidden causes or demonstrative science, he accepts that life and medicine proceed by registering observed regularities and forming expectations that are defeasible yet sufficient for action. Rationality here governs discourse and judgment by restraining assent, policing the slide from what seems likely into what one merely wishes to be true, and allowing guidance without dogma. Grice, operating in a modern analytic framework, renders this restraint explicit at the level of meaning itself: his theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning explains how speakers rationally rely on implicatures, background assumptions, and cooperative norms to arrive at what is credible rather than certain. Where Saturninus practices epoché by living from the probable without theorizing it, Grice theorizes how everyday communication already functions on analogous principles, distinguishing the believable from the desirable and the warranted from the asserted. Both figures thus converge on a shared insight: rationality is not the possession of certainty but the normative regulation of belief, inference, and discourse in situations where certainty is unavailable, ensuring that human life remains intelligible and practicable without the pretence of absolute knowledge. Seguace di Sesto Empirico, della scesi pirroniana e medico, non si ricordano sue dottrine particolari, ma si può supporre che accettasse quelle fondamentali del maestro che, negando la possibilità di una scienza razionale che pretendesse di cogliere le cause nascoste delle cose, ammette la legittimità d’arti -- prima fra esse la medicina -- che si limitano a constatare empiricamente coincidenze e successioni di fenomeni per fondare così previsioni probabili per il futuro. Diogene Laerzio dice che è soprannominato Kuthenas o Cythenas. La parola è incomprensibile, ma forse indica un’origine greca. Given that Sesto teaches at Rome, we may assume Cythenas, albeit his esoteric name, is a Roman! GRICEVS: Salvē, Saturnīnē—medice et Pyrrhōniē. Audīvī tē “probābile” semper in ore habēre, quasi nihil certius sit quam incertitūdō ipsa. SATVRNINVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: Sextus docuit nos causas occultās nōn capere; sed vitam agere oportet. Itaque sequimur quod probābile est—id quod ars medica, non metaphysica, postulat. GRICEVS: Bene; sed ego, ut verum fatear, malim interdum crēdibile quam probābile—et certe quam dēsīrābile. Nam quod dēsīrō, id saepe nimis facile “probābile” mihi vidētur; quod autem crēdibile est, etiam sine votō stat. SATVRNINVS: O inplicātūram sapiēntem, Grice—fiant tibi tua dēsīderia! Nam intellegō: tu monēs nē “probābile” in “dēsīrābile” labātur. Si voluntās iudicem corrumpit, medicus iam non curat sed optat; at “crēdibile” (ut ais) est quasi medium: lucet satis ad iter, nec tamen se pro sole venditat. Saturnino (a. u. c. CM). Dicta. Roma.

Lucio Saufeio (Praeneste, Palestrina, Roma, Lazio): la ragione converesazionale dell’orto romano -- A comparison between H. P. Grice and Lucius Saufeius illuminates two historically distant but structurally kindred ways of understanding reason as something exercised and displayed within forms of life rather than as a detached faculty. Saufeius, as he appears in late Republican Rome around 650 AUC, exemplifies what might be called the conversational reason of the Roman Garden: protected by wealth, friendship with Atticus, and distance from forensic struggle, he practices Epicurean rationality through selective engagement, wit, and cultivated withdrawal, where philosophical seriousness is conveyed indirectly, by tone, setting, and refusal as much as by explicit argument. The hortus functions as a conversational filter: disputes are softened, claims are implied rather than asserted, and the very choice not to speak in the Forum becomes a meaningful act governed by practical reason. Grice, by contrast, makes explicit what in Saufeius remains embodied and situational: his theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning reconstructs rationality as a system of implicit norms that regulate what speakers say by reference to what they intend, expect, and allow others to infer. Where Saufeius lives the Epicurean insight that reason works best away from accusation and compulsion, Grice formalizes the insight by showing how meaning itself depends on cooperative restraint, background assumptions, and sanctioned deviation. In both cases, reason operates not by maximal assertion but through disciplined understatement: Saufeius cultivates philosophical sense by choosing the garden over the court; Grice shows that even in speech, rational meaning arises less from what is stated outright than from what is left for a competent interlocutor to grasp. Grice: He comes from  a rich and privileged family. He is a close friend of Tito  POMPONIO  detto l’Attico, who intervenes to save his property from confiscation. S. us elsewhere at the time, idly studying the doctrines of the Garden.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Saufeī. Audīvī tē Praeneste ortum esse—dives, beatus, et tam amīcus Atticī ut ipse fundum tuum e manibus publicānōrum eriperet. Tu autem, dum Roma litigat, in Hortō otiose philosophāris! SAVFEIVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: aliī in Forō sudant, ego in hortō respiro. Nam Epicurī sententia est: melius est inter arbores disputāre quam inter tabulās accusationum. GRICEVS: Recte—sed miror: hortus vester tam quietus est ut etiam hortulānī (nōn philosophī) videantur sapientēs; et interdum nesciō utrum vos in hortō sitis ut veritatem colatis, an ut ipsī vōs colī sinatis, quasi lactūcārum more. SAVFEIVS: Inplicātūra hortulāna, Grice—immo, ut melius dīcam, inplicātūra horticulturālis! Nam hortus noster et docet et ridet: colimus animōs, non tantum holera; sed si quis nos hortulānōs appellat, libenter ferimus—modo meminerit nos artem habēre, non solum rutrum. Saufeio, Lucio (a. u. c. DCL). Dicta. Roma.

Francesco Maria Spinelli, principe di Scalea, marchese di Misuraca e barone di Morano (Morano Calabro, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e il gusto per l’antico. A comparison between Francesco Maria Spinelli and H. P. Grice brings out a shared commitment to reason as a norm-governed practice expressed through discourse, even across very different historical and conceptual frameworks. Spinelli, formed in the Calabrian Cartesian milieu under Caloprese, treats reason as inseparable from voluntary choice: his analyses of bonum, malum, and mala voluntà in works such as De origine mali present rationality as a moral power exercised through judgment, resistance, and polemic, with controversy itself functioning as a sign that reason is active and free. Grice, by contrast, relocates reason from moral psychology to the logic of conversation, conceiving it as a system of implicit norms governing meaning, cooperation, and inference; rationality for Grice is not primarily a matter of choosing the good or resisting evil, but of making oneself intelligible to others through intention-sensitive, rule-guided conversational moves. Yet the affinity is real: Spinelli’s insistence that even error, rebellion, and ill-will testify to rational freedom parallels Grice’s view that conversational implicature arises precisely where speakers do not follow rules mechanically, but exploit them creatively against a shared normative background. In both figures, reason is not a silent faculty but a public, dialogical achievement, revealed in dispute, irony, and deviation as much as in harmony or agreement. – ill-will – mala volonta –Grice: Studia sotto CALOPRESE. Divulga il razionalismo, difende alcuni colleghi, anche loro seguaci di Cartesio, ed ha un'accesa polemica con DORIA su Spinoza. Saggi: “Della filosofia degl’antichi” (Mosca, Napoli); “De origine mali”; “De bono”; Dizionario di filosofia, riferimenti in Mirto, Calabria letteraria, Lomonaco, Vita, e studj scritta da lui medesimo in una Lettera (Melangolo, Genova). Treccani Dizionario biografico degl’italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. SPINELLI DE ORIGINE MALI DISSERTATIO Francesco Maria Spinelli, Antonio Baldi FRANCISCI MARIÆ SPINELLI PRINCIPIS S. ORIGINE MALI DISSERTATIO NAPOLI E TYPOGRAPHIA BENEDICTI ET IGNAT1I GESSARI SOPERiQRUlt fERltiSSV, Habet unufquifque jn voluntate f Aut eligew quæ fcon» funt, et efle arbor pona / aur cligere quæ mala funt, et efle arbor mala. AuguJlisus iib. ii. ie eUis cum Ttlice Manicbæt c.iv. ! EMINENTISSIMO.AMPLISSIMCQyE. viro DOMINICO. S.R.E. CARDINALI.PASSIONEO ERVDITIONE.INGENIO.PRVDENTLV i CVM.FAVCIS.CQMPARANDQ QUEM. CLAKO. RENERE. ORTVM PER.DIVERSOS. LEGATIONVM. ET.MUNERUM.GRADVS FIDES. DEXTERITAS.CONSTANTIA NON.MINVS.QVAM. NOBILITAS AD.ROMANAM. PV.RPVRAM .EVEXERVNT QVEM.VIX.DVM JVVENEM ADHVG.PRIVATVM JVRA- ECCLESIÆ CATHOLICÆ 1N. VLTR A JECT INQ.CQN V ENTV.STREN V E. VINQIG ANTEM QVAMVIS.NON EADEM SENTIENS BATAVIA. OflSTVPVTT EVNDEM.BELVETIORVM.RESPV.flLICA PRIMVM BADÆ QVVM IN CQMITIIS bonum, ‘il bono’ the good, filosofia degl’antichi, vico, doria, la filosofia degl’antichi.  Grice: Caro Scalea, dicono che la “mala volontà” sia il motore segreto di tutte le filosofie calabresi… ma secondo te basterebbe un assaggio del “bonum” per far cambiare strada anche al pensiero più testardo? Spinelli: Eh, Grice, se bastasse il “bonum”, avremmo filosofi contenti come bambini alla sagra del peperoncino! Ma, studiando sotto Caloprese, ho imparato che senza un pizzico di polemica, anche la filosofia resta un piatto un po’ sciapo… Grice: Vedi, Spinelli, da Bononia a Vadum Boum – sì, proprio la mia università – ho sempre notato che la “mala volontà” non è mai così cattiva da non trovare almeno una piccola stanza dove alloggiare… sarà che le implicature hanno sempre bisogno di ospitalità! Spinelli: Implicatura esatta, Grice! In fondo, la “mala volontà”, per quanto negativa, è il segno che il nostro spirito non si lascia addomesticare. Anche la scelta sbagliata, o la ribellione, dimostra che siamo liberi di scegliere – se no saremmo tutti filosofi perfetti… ma che noia sarebbe la filosofia senza un po’ di sana indisciplina! Spinelli, principe di, marchese di Misuraca e barone di Morano (1845). Saggi politici. Napoli.

Eugenio Scalfari (Civitavecchia, Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura di Teseo – A comparison between Grice and Eugenio Scalfari brings into focus two complementary ways of understanding reason as a guide to meaning within complex public discourse. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as an internal, regulating principle of communication: speakers orient themselves toward shared norms of cooperation, relevance, and intelligibility, and implicature arises precisely when a speaker relies on the rational capacities of others to go beyond what is explicitly stated. Scalfari, though neither a philosopher of language nor a systematic theorist, practices an analogous form of conversational reason in journalism and political analysis, especially in his movement from the constrained rhetoric of Roma Fascista to the open, secular, and critical language of L’Espresso and La Repubblica. His recurring figure of the labyrinth, evoking Theseus and the guiding thread, functions as a journalistic metaphor for rational navigation through power, ideology, and moral confusion: meaning is not imposed but traced, inferred, and reconstructed by readers who follow implicit cues, tensions, and silences in public argument. Where Grice analyzes implicature as a logical-explanatory mechanism grounded in rational mutual recognition, Scalfari deploys implicature as a civic and ethical practice, inviting readers to see what is suggested rather than proclaimed, and to exercise their own reason in disentangling truth from authority. In both cases, reason governs meaning not by dogma or declaration, but by providing the thread that allows interlocutors or citizens to move through dense argumentative spaces without losing their way. Roma fascista –Grice: Considerato, anche dai suoi avversari, uno dei più grandi filosofi italiani. Professore, contribuì, con altri, a fondare il settimanale “L’Espresso” ed è fondatore del quotidiano “La Repubblica.” I campi principali dell'analisi di S. sono l'economia e la politica. La sua ispirazione politica è socialista liberale, azionista e radicale. Punti forti dei suoi articoli recenti sono la laicità, la questione morale, la filosofia. Frequenta il liceo Mamiani di Roma -- è a Sanremo (dove la famiglia, di origini calabresi, si era trasferita temporaneamente, essendo il padre direttore artistico del casinò) che completa gli studi liceali, al liceo classico Cassini, avendo come compagno di banco CALVINO. Sentimentalmente legato a S. Rossetti, già segretaria di redazione de L'Espresso (e poi di Repubblica), che sposerà dopo la scomparsa della moglie Simonetta.  -- è ateo.  Tra le suoi esperienze c'è “Roma Fascista” -- organo del Gruppo Fascista. Collabora con riviste e periodici legati al fascismo, come “Nuovo Occidente”. Nominato caporedattore di “Roma Fascista”, pubblica una serie di corsivi sulla prima pagina in cui lancia generiche accuse verso speculazioni da parte di gerarchi del Partito Nazionale Fascista sulla costruzione dell'EUR. Questi saggi portarono alla sua espulsione dai GUF. Di fronte al gerarca, intenzionato a perseguire gli speculatori, aveva ammesso come i suoi corsivi fossero basati su voci generiche. Si l’accusa poi di essere un imboscato, e lo prese materialmente per il ero strappandogli le mostrine dalla divisa del partito. Dopo la fine della seconda guerra mondiale entra in contatto con il Partito Liberale Italiano. Diventa collaboratore a Il Mondo e L'Europeo, di PANNUNZIO e BENEDETTI. Licenziato dalla BNL per una serie di articoli sulla Federconsorzi non graditi alla direzione.  l’implicatura di Teseo, il labirinto, la filosofia.  Grice: Caro Scalfari, tu che hai girato tra le colonne di “Roma Fascista” e poi hai tessuto le pagine di “Repubblica”, dimmi, hai mai trovato il filo d’Arianna tra i corridoi della politica italiana? O ti sei lasciato guidare dal vento, come facevano i grandi filosofi di Civitavecchia? Scalfari: Grice, se c’è una cosa che ho imparato tra i labirinti della cronaca è che il filo va annodato bene, altrimenti si rischia di ritrovarsi tra le speculazioni dei gerarchi... e credimi, a quel punto non c'è nemmeno una briciola di pane come nel labirinto di Teseo! Grice: Ah Eugenio, vedi, il labirinto della politica somiglia tanto a quello della filosofia: tutti cercano l’uscita, ma spesso chi trova il filo è proprio chi ha il coraggio di lanciare una bella implicatura, lasciando che gli altri si interrogano se sia davvero una porta o solo una finestra socchiusa. E tu, tra le accuse e le mostrine strappate, hai sempre preferito il filo al minotauro! Scalfari: Una implicatura labirintica, per la quale, come è tua gentile costume, sempre provvedi al tuo compagno conversazionale – il filo, se così si può dire, colloquialmente, è proprio il regalo che ti fa chi sa girare per i meandri della storia, senza mai smarrirsi. Del resto, ogni vero filosofo sa che nel labirinto c’è sempre qualcuno che tiene il capo del filo: basta seguirlo… purché non sia annodato intorno a un articolo della Costituzione! Scalfari, Eugenio (1942). Contributo. Roma Fascista.

Giovanni Battista Scaramelli (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Giovanni Battista Scaramelli highlights two different but convergent models of reason as an internal regulator of meaningful practice. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as operative within ordinary linguistic exchange: speakers mean what they do because they assume and exploit shared norms of rational cooperation, so that implicature arises from disciplined departures from what is strictly said and remains accountable to mutual intelligibility. Scaramelli, working within ascetical and mystical theology rather than philosophy of language, nevertheless develops a closely related conception of discursive reason in his Discernimento degli spiriti and the Direttorî, where spiritual judgment is governed by rules of clarity, discernment, and proportion aimed at avoiding illusion, excess, and misuse of language about inner experience. Just as Grice insists that conversational meaning is not produced by authority, private intention alone, or mechanical convention, Scaramelli rejects unregulated enthusiasm, quietist immediacy, and opaque speech in spiritual matters, insisting instead on reasoned evaluation of signs, intentions, and effects within a communal and pedagogical framework. In both figures, reason functions not as abstract metaphysics but as practical normativity: for Grice, it structures how speakers responsibly make themselves understood; for Scaramelli, it structures how experiences, words, and spiritual claims are interpreted, tested, and communicated without confusion or coercion. The result is a shared vision, across secular and religious domains, of meaning as something achieved through disciplined practice under publicly accountable standards, rather than bestowed by status, charisma, or inner certainty. Grice: presbitero italiano, appartenente alla compagnia di Gesù, autore dei Direttori ascetico e mistico e de Il discernimento degli spiriti. Entra nella compagnia di Gesù. Insegna grammatica, retorica, filosofia, teologia. È missionario popolare e predicatore di esercizi spirituali in moltissime comunità religiose. Scrive biografie e trattati di ascetica e mistica. Opere. Ancora vivente è pubblicata soltanto la Vita di suor Maria Crocifissa Satellico, Venezia. Giunta alla quarta edizione, l'opera è messa all'Indice perché sembra volesse prevenire il giudizio del magistero della chiesa sulla santità della religiosa. Dopo alcune correzioni la biografia è liberamente ristampata.  Dopo la sua morte sono pubblicati Il discernimento degli spiriti -- Venezia --, il Direttorio ascetico – Venezia -- e il Direttorio mistico -- Venezia -- e la Dottrina di san Giovanni della Croce -- Venezia. Solo nel Novecento è stata scoperta e pubblicata una sua Vita della serva di Dio Angela Cospari.  Le perplessità per la pubblicazione delle sue opere, vivente l'autore, nacquero nell'ambito della Compagnia di Gesù per le polemiche sul quietismo allora molto virulente e sulla delicatezza delle materie trattate. I Direttorî e il Discernimento hanno un grande successo e una grande diffusione, per la chiarezza espositiva e la profondità delle materie trattate.  Grice: Caro Scaramelli, ho letto il tuo "Discernimento degli spiriti" e devo confessare che persino il mio spirito filosofico si è sentito discernere – tra un asceta e un mistico, preferisco sempre quello che ha il caffè pronto alle sei del mattino! Scaramelli: Ah, Grice, ma tu sai bene che il vero discernimento si compie quando il caffè è ancora caldo e il pensiero è fresco! E se la Compagnia di Gesù mi avesse dato una moka, avrei scritto pure un Direttorio sul “risveglio spirituale”… con doppio zucchero. Grice: Vedi, caro amico, in fondo la tua ascesi è tutta una questione di aroma: potrei dire che la santità, come la filosofia, si distingue dal profumo – e l’implicatura, naturalmente, è che chi non sente l’odore forse non ha mai davvero filosofato! Scaramelli: Divina implicatura, mio Grice! Ma allora dovrò aggiungere al prossimo Direttorio un capitolo sul "discernimento del barista" – perché, come dice il proverbio, anche lo spirito ha bisogno di una pausa… e magari di una brioche! Scaramelli, Giovanni Battista (1752). Direttorio ascetico. Venezia: Pezzana.

Lucio Scarano (Brindisi, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura del scenofilace – A comparison between Grice and Lucio Scarano brings out two historically distant but structurally related ways of thinking about reason as a governor of meaningful linguistic practice. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats reason as immanent to interaction: speakers are rational agents who rely on shared expectations of cooperation to generate not only what is explicitly said but also what is implied, with implicature arising from the disciplined management of saying less, more, or other than what is strictly required. Scarano, writing in the sixteenth century in Scenophylax, approaches reason from the normative side of public performance rather than everyday conversation, yet in a strikingly parallel way conceives language as an ordered practice sustained by rational guardianship. His figure of the scenophylax, the “custodian” of theatrical language, embodies a form of conversational reason avant la lettre: not authoritarian imposition, but vigilant maintenance of intelligibility, decorum, and expressive fit between words, gestures, and genres. Where Grice resists the idea that meaning is fixed by convention alone and instead grounds it in rational accountability between participants, Scarano resists innovation that severs words from the shared rational order of classical usage, arguing that altering language alters action, genre, and mutual understanding. In both thinkers, reason does not operate as abstract theory but as a practical norm guiding how language functions in a communal space—conversation for Grice, the stage for Scarano—so that meaning is preserved, enriched, or criticized not by force or novelty for its own sake, but by responsiveness to what rational participants can recognize, interpret, and hold one another answerable for within a shared linguistic world. Grice: Studia a Bologna, Padova e a Venezia. Fonda l’Accademia a Venezia. Scrive il saggio “Scenophylax” (Venezia), nel quale tratta della convenienza di restituire alla tragedia e alla commedia la lingua del lazio. P. Camassa, Brindisini illustri, Brindisi, A. Sordo, Ritratti brindisini. LYCII PHILOSOPHI MEDICI i f \ 6 3 y 'H Academici Veneti SCENOPHYLAX W "J Dialogus, in quo Tragxdijs, &T Comxdifs antiquus Carminum vfus reftituitur, recentiorum quorundam iniuria interceptus. Et de vi, ac natura Carminis agitur. AD ILLVSTREM ET CLARIS ADOLESCENTEM r Dominicum Ruzinum Caroli F. Patritium Venetum.. privilegifs, et Superiorum permtfsu n Venezia. Apudloail. BaDtiftarnCjnrrnm a 4^-jl Jl 1\ c 1 DK 13 M liMOLOaiH '1 .-V' vhomV iJrnsiji-oA. jkj Y :T Y H V. V.\.ZM fi A ' i r */ca g$? potuit, gf' voluit ommno, te filiumtn tarum artium, ggf fiudiorum dtfctpli namur odere,quaggr in patria fapitis et polle*' fiorisdpudrxter agnationes, multis periculis y (g? magno fufcepto labore, collaudauerat in alus. Itaque non fumptibus, nonindufita, non defatigationi pepercit vit, vtqut tu dederas • d tene ris annis ingeif pudoris, bum initatis, gf futurarum adumbrata ftgna 'Virtutum, ea, firmioribus annis, accurate praflares.T u vero non fil um expeciattont refpondifti patris, gtf tuorum, fed in medio itineris curriculo, quafi robufl toris alatis, ggi annorum auxilta deficiens, omnium opinionem,prarepto tempore, juperafit, omnium voto,pratercjuam tuo, maior $ vt vno propemodum, et eodem temporis momento, (ementem videremus, gf fruges.His tgitur ejfectum e (i, ut omnes, quibus es ahquaratione cognitus, te colant, ad mirentur, g^ament . Egouero non (colum his ipfis tuis dotibus, fed etiam (ficus in me tuis adductus, mbil ejl ommno, quod tibi non debeam. Cum uero plurima cupiam, pauca pof A i fim. scenofilace – il tragico – il comico – scenofilace, custode, sacristano, custode dei vasi -- siria.  Grice: Scarano, ho letto del tuo Scenophylax: tu vuoi rimettere in scena tragedia e commedia con la lingua del Lazio. Insomma: un custode che, invece di custodire i vasi, custodisce le parole—e guai a chi entra in teatro con un accento forestiero. Scarano: Appunto! Se cambi la lingua, cambi il gesto: e se cambi il gesto, ti ritrovi una tragedia che pare una commedia—e una commedia che si prende sul serio come un senatore. Il Scenophylax serve a ricordare al pubblico che anche il riso ha grammatica. Grice: Capisco… e mi viene da pensare che certe “innovazioni” siano come mettere una chiave nuova a una porta antica: la porta resta, ma tutti fingono di non trovare più l’ingresso. E poi, diciamolo: quando uno proclama di “restituire” la lingua, spesso sta solo chiedendo di essere l’unico a poter dire chi parla bene—e il resto della compagnia, per prudenza, recita piano. Scarano: Splendida implicatura, Grice — mette in ombra il “detto” di quel che hai appena detto! Cioè: tu non stai dicendo “sei un tiranno del palcoscenico”, ma lo fai capire con tale eleganza che la tua critica decora senza ingombrare—proprio come dovrebbe fare la lingua del Lazio, quando è davvero teatro e non burocrazia. Scarano, Lucio (1563). Scenophylax, dialogus, in quo tragoediis et comoediis antiquus carminum usus restituitur. Venezia.

Luigi Scaravelli (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale -- tra critica e meta-fisica. Luigi Scaravelli’s philosophical itinerary, centered on critique rather than system‑building, offers a distinctive point of comparison with Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, even though the two operate in different registers. Grice approaches reason from the side of linguistic practice, arguing that what speakers mean, beyond what they strictly say, is regulated by shared rational expectations embodied in cooperative principles and maxims that make communication intelligible without appeal to metaphysical guarantees. Scaravelli, by contrast, works within a Kantian horizon, redefining critique as a disciplined inquiry into the conditions of judgment, understanding, and reality itself, particularly in his Critica del capire, where reason appears not as an autonomous creative spirit, as in Croce or Gentile, but as a fragile, historically situated activity that must constantly examine its own claims and limits. Yet the convergence lies in their shared resistance to dogmatic metaphysics: Scaravelli’s insistence that judgment, whether theoretical or historical, must justify itself through critical articulation parallels Grice’s insistence that meaning arises from rational accountability within communicative exchange rather than from conventions, psychology, or authority. For both, reason is not an external faculty imposing structure from above, but an immanent normativity enacted in practice—through judgments in Scaravelli’s sense, and through conversational moves and implicatures in Grice’s—so that understanding, whether of reality or of what another speaker means, depends on the disciplined negotiation of sense under publicly recognizable constraints rather than on the construction of closed systems or metaphysical totalities. Si laurea a Pissa sotto CARLINI. Insegna a Roma, e Firenze. Profondo conoscitore di Kant, approfondisce nei suoi studi pubblicati con molta riluttanza e quasi solo per esigenze concorsuali in particolare i temi relativi ai rapporti tra la filosofia kantiana e la fisica, i problemi relativi alla critica del giudizio ed anche i temi dell'idealismo.  Biblioteca personale, Villa Mirafiori. Saggi: “Critica del capire”, Firenze, Sansoni, Saggio sulla categoria kantiana della realta (Firenze, Monnier); La prima meditazione di Cartesio (Firenze, Nuova Italia); “La critica del giudizio” (Pisa, Normale); Corsi, “Critica del capire”; “L'analitica trascendentale” (Firenze, Nuova Italia); “La Biblioteca”; “L' attualità Mirri, Napoli, Sientifiche); Visentin, “Le categorie e la realtà” Lui(Firenze, Le lettere); Sasso, L’idealismo, Napoli, Bibliopolis; La storia come metodo, Convegno a Roma); “Il problema del giudizio storico); Mannelli, Rubbettino, pensatore europeo, Biscuso e Gembillo, Messina, Siciliano, Sasso, il giudizio, in Filosofia e idealismo. Paralipomeni, Napoli, Bibliopolis,  Palermo, Tra critica e metafisica. Lettore di Kant, Pisa, ETS,   Treccani Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana.  Biscuso, La  completa dei suoi scritti, su giornale di filosofia. Ripercorrendo il proprio itinerario speculativo, in un documento di grande rilievo S. scrive:  dieci o quindici anni fa  ero pienamente convinto di quella impostazione mentale, comune al Croce e al Gentile, che considera la realtà come spirito, e lo spirito come autoprodursi; e in questo autoprodursi vede l'esistenza e tutta l'esistenza. Ma nonostante fossi convinto della validità di questa concezione, pure un lavoro che avevo cominciato su Platone mi spingeva a ripensare le basi della concezione storiografica nella quale mi muovevo; paralipomena, la storia della filosofia di Scaravelli, criticismo, critica del capire, giudizio storico, storia come metodo.  Grice: Caro Scaravelli, se Kant avesse potuto assistere ai tuoi corsi sulla "Critica del capire", forse avrebbe finalmente capito la differenza tra critica e metafisica, e magari avrebbe aggiunto una quarta critica: quella del buon umore!  Scaravelli: Ah, Grice, ma non dimenticare che ogni giudizio, anche quello sul buon umore, ha bisogno di una categoria kantiana. E la categoria della realtà, almeno nei miei seminari a Villa Mirafiori, è sempre quella del caffè – che trascende ogni forma!  Grice: Ecco, parlando di seminari, devo confessare che non ho mai partecipato al "The Bounds of Sense" di Strawson a Vadum Boum. Sapevo che i suoi confini sarebbero stati non solo boundless, ma forse anche un po’ nonsensical – e preferisco la sensatezza del tuo "Critica del capire".  Scaravelli: La tua implicatura è noumenica! – se mai esistesse un soprannome di lode tra filosofi, questo lo sarebbe davvero. E poi, tra noi, meglio un giudizio storico ben fondato che un senso senza confini: almeno così Croce e Gentile possono dormire sonni tranquilli! Scaravelli, Luigi (1936). Il criticismo. Firenze: Le Monnier.

Uberto Scarpelli (Vicenza, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia fascista – Uberto Scarpelli’s work on prescriptive language and legal normativity offers a revealing contrast and complement to Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, especially when set against the political and intellectual background from which Scarpelli emerged. Grice conceives meaning as fundamentally anchored in rational cooperation among speakers, where what is said and what is implicated are governed by shared norms of justification, relevance, and responsibility rather than by authority or ideology. Scarpelli, having been trained within Italian idealism under Croce and Gentile and later reacting critically against the organicist and fascist philosophies of law associated with that tradition, redirects attention to the semiotics of prescriptions, distinguishing components such as the tropic, clitic, neustic, and phrastic to show how norms function linguistically without reducing them to commands backed by force. Where fascist legal philosophy tended to collapse meaning into political will or state authority, Scarpelli—drawing on analytic philosophy, logical positivism, and figures such as Hare and Stevenson—insists that legal and moral discourse must be analyzed as reason‑responsive practices, capable of justification and critique. In this respect he converges with Grice: both reject the idea that meaning or normativity is generated by sheer power, psychological causation, or institutional fiat, and both treat rational accountability within linguistic practice as central. The difference lies in emphasis: Grice starts from ordinary conversation to articulate universal pragmatic norms governing communication, while Scarpelli starts from normative and legal language to show how prescriptions can be rationally discussed, criticized, and defended. Yet in both cases, reason governs language not externally but internally, as a set of constraints that speakers and lawmakers alike must respect if their utterances are to count as meaningful, intelligible, and binding within a shared social practice. -- il fascismo giuridico – Soleri --  il tropico, il clistico, il neustico, ed il frastico. Studioso di analisi del linguaggio. Uno dei massimi esponenti della filosofia analitica, insegnando in varie università italiane anche teoria generale del diritto, dottrine dello stato romano, filosofia morale e filosofia della politica ed occupandosi di problemi di etica e politica. La sua filosofia può essere raccolto attorno a due grandi temi: la semiotica del linguaggio prescrittivo e il metodo. Contribuisce in misura fondamentale alla cosiddetta svolta prescrittivistica in campo semiotico ed è fautore di una giustificazione etico-politica del positivismo giuridico. Oltre ad approfondire lo studio del metodo del ragionamento morale, si impegna attivamente in relazione a questioni di etica e bio-etica quali per esempio l'aborto e l'eutanasia. Compiute inoltre studi sulla democrazia e i concetti di libertà politica e di partecipazione politica. Da una famiglia pugliese trasferitasi poi in Lucchesia, figlio di un magistrate, frequenta il liceo. Studia a Torino. La sua formazione è all'insegna dell’idealismo dominante in Italia e fondata, tra gli altri, su CROCE e GENTILE. Durante gli anni universitari, desta il suo interesse ALLARA, della scuola civilistica torinese, e la filosofia del diritto. Segue le lezioni del corso di filosofia del diritto di BOBBIO. Si laurea sotto SOLARI con “Il concetto di persona”. Già in questo lavoro lo ricorda BOBBIO nel ritratto dell'allievo rivela un orientamento critico verso le versioni organicistiche della filosofia al tempo in auge. Risale a questo anno la pubblicazione nella Rivista del diritto commerciale di un saggio intitolato “Scienza giuridica e analisi del linguaggio”. In questo saggio precorre il celebre saggio di BOBBIO che porta lo stesso titolo e che è considerato il manifesto della scuola analitica italiana. fascismo, la filosofia di Gentile – la difensa di Scarpelli contro Solari, “Behaviourism, positivism logico e fascismo” nell “Mulino”, Hare, Stevenson.  Grice: Scarpelli, mi trovo spesso a pensare che la filosofia italiana sia come una pizza: tutti vogliono metterci sopra il proprio ingrediente speciale, che sia Gentile, Croce o una spruzzata di semiotica! Scarpelli: Ah, Grice! Basta che nessuno ci aggiunga l’ananas, e possiamo discutere serenamente di tropico, clistico, neustico e frastico... senza indigestioni. Grice: Vero, ma ricorda: “Subatomica motus conversacionales ne multiplicentur sine necessitate.” Non vorrei che ogni implicatura diventasse una particella elementare, dispersa tra il tropico e il frastico! Scarpelli: La tua implicatura mi fa sorridere, che potrebbe presto trasformarsi in una risata – non SULLE cose, ma CON le cose! D’altronde, filosofare è anche questione di gusto, come la pizza. Scarpelli, Uberto (1965). Il materialismo. Milano: Feltrinelli.

Quinto Muzio Scevola Maggiore (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del pontefice – Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Elder, the Pontifex, represents an early paradigm of reason-governed public meaning that closely aligns with Grice’s later theory of conversational rationality: in Scaevola’s career as consul, jurist, and pontifex maximus, law emerges not as a merely technical craft or an instrument of power but as a disciplined form of public reasoning rooted in shared standards of judgment and mutual intelligibility, a view reinforced by his systematic works, the Libri XVIII iuris civilis and the Horoi, where definition, distinction, and dialectical division—drawn from Stoic philosophy and ultimately from the Portico—are used to make legal norms publicly articulable and contestable; just as Grice argues that meaning in conversation is governed by rational principles rather than by authority, force, or convention alone, Scaevola treats jurisprudence as a branch of political philosophy whose authority depends on its capacity to give reasons that others may recognize as reasons, whether in the forum, the senate, or the school; his famous insistence, reported by Cicero, that law without letters is mute and letters without law wander, mirrors Grice’s insistence that linguistic acts derive their significance from cooperative expectations about relevance, justification, and responsibility, not from institutional costume or procedural ritual; in both figures, normativity is conversational rather than coercive, so that the toga does not itself generate wisdom, just as an utterance does not generate meaning by fiat, and the integrity of judgment—whether legal or linguistic—rests on disciplined participation in shared practices of reason that bind speakers and jurists alike more securely than power, fear, or mere technical expertise. -- divisione – dal portico? -- la nascita della giurisprudenza come rama della filosofia politca. Grice: Questore, tribuno della plebe, pretore, console, proconsole d’Asia e si attira, per la sua giustizia e il suo disinteresse, l'affetto dei provinciali e l’odio dei cavalieri romani, che accusarono il suo legato Rutilio Rufo, che egli difese. Pontefice massimo. Cadde vittima delle lotte civili. Giurista insigne. Compose libri XVIII juris civilis, in cui per la prima volta tenta una trattazione sistematica dell’argomento, e un’opera intitolata "Horoi," che contiene definizioni di concetti e di rapporti giuridici. E molto ricercato il suo insegnamento di diritto. Insegna, derivandola, pare, da Panezio di Rodi, la distinzione di tre teologie, ripresa da Varrone: teologia poetica (falsa), teologia ufficiale (falsa) e teologia naturale (vera). Console. Giuristi romani e politici romani. Console della Repubblica romana. Gens: Mucia. Tribuno della plebe, pretore, consolae Pontificato max. Filosofo del portico, giurista e politico romano. Me ad pontificem Scaevolam contuli, quem unum nostrae civitatis et ingenio et iustitia praestantissimum audeo dicere.” Mi sono recato da Scevola pontefice, che oso dire superiore per ingegno e rettitudine a tutti i nostri concittadini. -- CICERONE, Laelius de amicitia. Appartenente alla gens Mucia, è considerato uno dei più grandi giuristi della storia del diritto romano e in parte l'artefice dell'introduzione, nella giurisprudenza romana, del metodo dialettico e diairetico, mutuato dalla filosofia. Questore, tribuno della plebe, pretore, console - insieme a Lucio Licinio Crasso, pro-console e pontefice massimo. Durante il consolato promulga la “lex Licinia Mucia”, che fissa dei rigidi limiti al conseguimento della cittadinanza da parte degl’italici. Fra le sue opere letterarie si ricordano gl’ “Horoi,” titolo in greco che corrisponde al latino definitiones, e i Libri XVIII iuris civilis. sistema muziano.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Scaevola pontifex. Apud Vadum Boum noster quidam—Hart—Facultātem LITTERĀRVM HVMANIŌRVM reliquit et ad paene opificinam FACVLTĀTEM IVRISPRVDENTIAE transiit: ego fateor, inde eum minus “tragicē” sumere coepī. SCEVOLA: Salvē, Grice. Nōn est opificina, sed officina reī pūblicae. Nam sine iūre, litterae ipsae vagantur; et sine litterīs, iūs fit mutus. GRICEVS: Fortasse; sed miror quanta fidūciā quis se dicat “doctum” statim atque ad iūs accessit—quasi toga statim sapientiam pariat. Et, ut vērē dīcam, apud Vadum Boum interdum vidētur quasi iūs sibi velit ipsam scholam esse, nōn tantum scholārum hospes. SCEVOLA: Audāx inplicātūra tua, illic, Grice; sed moneō: iūdex, etiamsi minus otiosus est quam philosophus tuus vulgāris hortulānus, tamen sedēre sinendus est—in vīcō (vel “TOWN,” ut barbarī vocant) sī nōn in togā (vel “GOWN,” ut barbarī vocant); an e conversō? Disciplina enim locum suum habet, et potestas suum: neque forum scholam devoret, neque schola forum contemnat. Scevola, Quinto Muzio Maggiore (a. u. c. DCLX). De iure civile.  Roma.

Quinto Muzio Scevola (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’augure -- Quintus Mucius Scaevola’s stance in defense of Gaius Marius, articulated in the senate under armed threat, exemplifies a form of reason-governed conversational agency that strikingly anticipates Grice’s account of meaning as constrained by rational norms rather than by force, fear, or mere causal pressure: Scaevola’s utterance does not function as rhetoric, augury, or intimidation, but as a public act whose authority derives from shared expectations about what counts as a justified judgment within a political and legal conversation, namely that one does not call an enemy a man who saved the city, regardless of surrounding coercion; in Gricean terms, Scaevola exploits the cooperative framework of civic discourse, making explicit that no amount of external threat can cancel the standing reasons that license a verdict, and thereby generates an implicature about the limits of power itself, since the soldiers “surrounding the Curia” are shown to be conversationally irrelevant to the validity of the judgment; just as Grice insists that meaning and reason operate through norms that speakers mutually recognize and uphold, Scaevola’s remark demonstrates that rational authority in conversation can defeat intimidation precisely because it is answerable to public criteria of judgment rather than to outcomes, revealing a shared insight across centuries that logos, when properly enacted, binds speakers more strongly than fear and secures the possibility of law, conversation, and δημόσια κρίσις alike. MIHI AGMINA MILITVM QVIBVS CVRIAM CIRCVMSEDISTI LICET MORTEM IDENTIDEM MINITERIS NVMQVAM TAMEN EFFICIES VT PROPTER EXIGVVM SENILEMQVE SANGVINEM MEVM MARIVM A QVO VRBS ET ITALIA CONSERVATA EST HOSTEM IVDICEM. Console della repubblica romana. Augure. Gens: Mucia. Edile, tribuno della plebe, pretore, console. Politico romano vissuto durante il periodo della repubblica ed un esperto di diritto romano. Da non confondere col pontifice, autore degl’ “Annales Maximi.” Venne educato in legge dal padre e in filosofia da Panezio di Rodi, filosofo del portico. Venne eletto tribune, edile, e pretore. Inviato come governatore nelle province dell'Asia,inore. Tornato a Roma, dove difendersi da un'accusa di estorsione rivoltagli da Tito Albucio da cui riusce a difendersi. Venne eletto console. S. ha grande interesse per la legge e gl’affari all'interno di Roma. Trasmitte la sua conoscenza del diritto romano ad alcuni dei più famosi oratori di quei tempi, tra cui Cicerone e Attico. Difende Gaio Mario dalla mozione di Silla che lo vuole rendere nemico del popolo, asserendo che mai avrebbe approvato un tale disonore per un uomo che aveva salvato Roma. Cicerone utilizza la figura del suo maestro come interlocutore in tre opere: “De oratore”, “De amicitia”, e “De re publica”. S., su sapere.it, De Agostini. S. su Enciclopedia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Predecessore Console romano Successore Marco Porcio Catone e Quinto Marcio Re con Lucio Cecilio Metello Diademato Quinto Fabio Massimo Eburno e Gaio Licinio Geta. Portale Antica Roma   Portale Biografie Categorie: Politici romani Consoli repubblicani romani Mucii Auguri Governatori romani dell'Asia.  Gaio Mario. Se stai cercando il figlio di Gaio Mario, vedi Gaio Mario il Giovane.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Scaevola augur. Audīvī tē in contiōne tam constanter stetisse pro Mariō, ut Sulla ipse pallēsceret—nōn propter aves, sed propter verba. SCEVOLA: Salvē, Grice. Verba quoque auguria sunt, sī recte audiās. Sed quid tibi vidētur de illīs quī, glādiō cinctī, iūs perterrēre volunt? GRICEVS: MIHI AGMINA MILITVM QVIBVS CVRIAM CIRCVMSEDISTI LICET MORTEM IDENTIDEM MINITERIS NVMQVAM TAMEN EFFICIES VT PROPTER EXIGVVM SENILEMQVE SANGVINEM MEVM MARIVM A QVO VRBS ET ITALIA CONSERVATA EST HOSTEM IVDICEM. SCEVOLA: Sapiens inplicātūra tua, Grice—sed quid aliud ex sapientulō talī exspectāre possumus? Nam dum Mariō favēre videris, simul ostendis istōs “agmina” nihil posse efficere nisi strepitum: senex enim, si iūdicium tenet, hostem hostem appellāre recusat—et iūs ipsō metu fortius est. Scevola, Quinto Muzio (a. u. c.  DCXXXVII). Dicta. Roma.

Publio Cornelio Scipione Emiliano Africano Minore (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del circolo degli Scipioni. The comparison between Grice and Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus brings out two historically distant but structurally similar forms of reason‑governed conversation, one theorized and the other embodied. Grice’s theory explains conversational meaning through rational principles that regulate how interlocutors cooperate, infer intentions, and derive implicatures beyond what is explicitly said, treating conversation as a norm‑governed practice among equals. Scipio’s conversational rationality, as exercised within the so‑called Circle of the Scipios, operates less as an explicit theory than as a cultivated practice centered on moral discourse, political judgment, and philosophical exchange, heavily influenced by Stoic ethics and Xenophon’s ideal of leadership. As a patron rather than a formal philosopher, Scipio governs conversation by maintaining order, focus, and moral seriousness, ensuring that speech does not dissolve into faction or spectacle but remains oriented toward the res publica and virtus. In Gricean terms, Scipio exemplifies an authoritative conversational center: someone whose presence stabilizes expectations of relevance, sincerity, and purpose without suppressing plurality of voices. Where Grice abstracts conversational reason into general maxims applicable in any setting, Scipio incarnates those norms socially, showing how conversational meaning can be reason‑governed through moral authority, cultural prestige, and shared intellectual commitments. Together they show that conversational rationality can exist both as a formal analytic structure and as a lived civic practice, with Grice providing the explicative framework and Scipio the historical model of its successful realization. Si trova al centro del più antico portico romano. Console, distrugge Cartagine, ottenne la censura, dirige un’ambasciata in Oriente, e di nuovo console, distrugge Numanzia. È un appassionato lettore della "Ciropedia" di Senofonte e ha tendenza del Portico. Forse, anche per questo motivo, da alle sue orazioni contenuto morale e vi dipinta la corruzione. A statesman, military leader, and scholar. More a patron of philosophers than a philosopher himself, he is particularly close to Panezio. Cicerone regards him sufficiently highly to include him as character of some of his philosophical works. He is much admired for his courage and moral integrity. C UM in Africani veniftem, M. Manilio z Confuti ad quartam legionem Tribunus, ut fcitis, militum ; nihil mihi potiusfuit, quam ut $ Mafmiffam convenirem, regem farri il \x noftrsejuftis decauflis amicìfllmum * Ad quem ut veni, complexus me (enex collacrymavit : aliquantoque polì (ulpexit in calum, Grate (inquic) tibi ago, furarne Sol, vobifque, 4 rel qui Caelites; quod, antequam ex bac vita migro, confpicio in meo regno et histe&is P. Cornelium Sci* pionem, cujus egO nomine ipfo recreor .* ita numquam ex animo meo difcedit illius Optimi atque invitìiffìmi viri memoria, Deinde ego illum de fuo regno, illemd denofìra Repub. percontatus eft : multifque verbis uttro citroque habitis, i 1 le nobis confumptus eli dies « Poftautem regio apparatu accepti, fermcnemin multata nodem produximns; cumfenex nìtiil nifi de Africano loqueretur, omnìaque eius non fafta folnm, fed ttiam di&a m^miniflet; deinde, ut cubitum difcedi. mus, me et de via fefl'um, et qui ad multam noflem vi t Seipio . Figliuola di Lucia Emilio Paolo Macedonico, adottato da Scipittne figliuolo dell* Affici cano il maggiore, che diflrutfe Cartagine e Numanzla nell'anno 609 Or etto nella difputa di Repubblica follenea cotitra l' oppln Ione di Filo, che tanto era falfo non poterli lenza commettere inglnftiiie la Repubblica governare. Silio, il sogno di Scipione.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Scīpiō! Audīvī tē in mediō circulō tuō sedēre—Panētius ad latus, Cicero in auribus, et Roma tota quasi in porticū tuo ambulāre. SCIPIO: Salvē, Grice. Si in mediō videor, id est quia multī ad mensam veniunt: alius de re pūblicā, alius de moribus, alius de Xenophontis Ciropediā—ego autem conor ne sermō in tumultum vertātur. GRICEVS: Bene facis. Nam saepe fit ut, dum quis “patrōnum philosophōrum” laudat, idem tacitē confiteātur sē indigēre philosophiā—quasi gladius sine manū. Et, ut veniam mihi dēs, si ordinem paululum turbō: mirum quam facile circulus fiat centrum—et quam longe sit centrum ab illo Vado Boum quod ego iocōsē nomināre soleō, ubi tamen quoque quisque sibi principem facit, saltem in disputātiōne. SCIPIO: Inplicātūra tua erudīta est, Grice! Et ignōsce, quaeso, hanc translātiōnem: circulus noster—immo omnis circulus—id agit, ut aliquem in mediō collocet, sive is Scīpiō sit sive quis ex longinquō Vado Boum advehātur. Sed ita est, cārissime: ubi sermō sapit, ibi centrum nascitur; ubi centrum nascitur, ibi et “Roma” fit—etiamsi porticus tantum imaginaria est. Scipione, Publio Cornelio S. Emiliano Africano Minore (a. u. c. DLXIX). Dicta. Roma

Pietro Sclavione (Abano, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e il lizio di Padova. The comparison between Grice and Pietro Sclavione highlights two different but compatible ways of grounding reason in human communication, one pragmatic and inferential, the other naturalistic and physiological. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning explains how communication works at the level of shared rational expectations: speakers rely on cooperation, relevance, and intention recognition to generate meanings that go beyond what is literally said, and these meanings are regulated by norms that are epistemic rather than biological. Sclavione, by contrast, approaches conversation from the perspective of the Paduan naturalist tradition associated with Abano, explaining speech and communication as functions rooted in the body, governed by causal mechanisms of sensation, articulation, and neural organization. Where Grice is concerned with how rational agents infer meaning in dialogue, Sclavione is concerned with how speech is physically produced and received, replacing theological explanations with natural causes. Yet the two converge in their rejection of mystery as an explanatory endpoint: Grice refuses to explain meaning by appeal to convention alone without reasoned inference, while Sclavione refuses to explain speech by miracle rather than nature. Grice abstracts from physiology to describe the normative structure of conversational reasoning, whereas Sclavione grounds communication in the natural sciences while still assuming Aristotelian rational order. Together, they show how conversational reason can be understood both as a biological capacity developing in time and as a rational practice governed by rules of inference, with Grice operating at the level of meaning and justification, and Sclavione at the level of causal and functional explanation.Grice: “La ragione conversazionale e l lizio di Padova – la scuola d’Abano -- filosofia veneta -- filosofia italiana S. inspired later Italian philosophers by establishing a strictly naturalist and Aristotelian framework for human functions, including speech and communication. His non-conformism, which led to two Inquisition trials, challenges theological explanations by replacing "miraculous" causes with natural, causal mechanisms. Foundations for Naturalist Communication S.’s s influence on the philosophy of language and communication stems from his physiological treatment of these topics in works like the “Expositio Problematum”: Biological Basis of Speech: He identifies a specialised physical "speech centre" in the brain connected to specific cranial nerves, treating communication as a biological function rather than a purely spiritual or divine gift. Mechanics of Articulation: He describes speech as a physical process where the tongue "strikes" air to give sound a definite shape, providing a materialist foundation for how human thought becomes vocalised. Separation of Senses: By distinguishing the physical development of hearing from that of speech organs (like the tongue), he establishes a developmental, naturalist time-line for human communication.  Influence on Later Philosophers S.'s "science of sciences" approach made Padova a premier centre for Aristotelianism, influencing generations of thinkers to seek natural explanations for human behaviour.  Paduan School of Medicine: He founds a tradition that prioritized empirical observation and Aristotelian logic over religious authority. This environment eventually nurtures Renaissance thinkers like Pomponazzi, who further the naturalist study of the soul and human nature. The reception of pseudo-Aristotle via Abano’s edition. filosofia della lingua.  Grice: Caro Sclavione, che piacere poterti finalmente chiamare per il tuo vero cognome, e non semplicemente "da Abano"! Sarebbe come se mi chiamassero "da Harborne" — una formalità che non rende giustizia all’identità personale.  Sclavione: Grice, la tua attenzione al nome mi onora! Troppo spesso la storia ci appioppa etichette geografiche, dimenticando che dietro ogni "da Abano" o "da Harborne" c’è un pensatore con una sua voce unica.  Grice: E proprio quella voce, caro Sclavione, ha aperto strade nuove nel modo di intendere la comunicazione. La tua visione naturalista ha influenzato generazioni di filosofi, portando la conversazione su basi più concrete e fisiologiche.  Sclavione: Mi fa piacere che tu colga questo aspetto. Cercare le cause naturali, piuttosto che miracolose, è stato per me più che una scelta filosofica: una necessità. Così il nostro parlare diventa davvero umano, radicato nella natura e non solo nel mistero. The comparison between Grice and Pietro Sclavione shows how reason‑governed conversational meaning can be understood both as a formal normative structure and as a culturally inflected practice. Grice’s theory explains meaning in conversation by appeal to rational cooperation, where humor, understatement, and timing generate implicatures because speakers are presumed to act intelligently and purposively toward mutual understanding. In the lighthearted exchange with Sclavione, humor itself functions as evidence of rational control, not as distraction, illustrating Grice’s claim that conversational effectiveness depends on sensitivity to context, audience, and shared background assumptions. Sclavione’s Neapolitan perspective, as reflected in Elementi di filosofia, implicitly reinforces this view by treating reason as something that flourishes in lived circumstances rather than abstract isolation: inference improves when embedded in everyday practices such as conversation over coffee. While Grice abstracts reason into general maxims governing all competent speakers, Sclavione embodies reason as tempered by style, wit, and local intellectual habit, suggesting that rationality in conversation is not diminished by humor but often expressed through it. Together they reveal that reason‑governed meaning can be both formally analyzable and socially cultivated, with Grice providing the theory of how such meaning works and Sclavione exemplifying how it feels when practiced well. G.: There it is again, the Martyrs’ Memorial, doing its best to turn a morning walk into a thesis. S.: It improves the pavement, at least. Oxford would be morally lazier without a few gothic spikes reminding it that theology once had consequences. G.: You mean that English theology once acquired Italian manners. S.: I mean fire. G.: Fire is too simple. Even in Italy the pyrotechnics were more elaborate than the children’s version. Take Abano. They like to say he was “sent to the stake,” as if the whole business were a straight line from proposition to bonfire. In fact he dies first, and then they try him harder. S.: Posthumous zeal is still zeal. The bones burn well enough for the lesson to be legible. G.: Very good. You are already halfway to the Victorian Protestant reading of everything. One wants a victim, a doctrine, and a flame, and one dislikes historical detail because it lowers the temperature. S.: You are defending the Church now. G.: Not the Church. Distinctions. Abano is destroyed by an inquisitorial and ecclesiastical machinery, not by some cartoon “Catholic Church” in the singular, as if a man in a mitre had simply struck a match. S.: Yet you are content to let Mary Tudor stand for Marian burnings. G.: Because “Marian” is at least a historical adjective and not a metaphysical slur. Cranmer, Latimer, Ridley—those are Oxford’s own theatre of fire, and the city has made excellent municipal use of them ever since. S.: The Memorial does not let one forget it. G.: No, and the delight is that different men see different lessons in the same stone. You look at it and think: Roman cruelty with an English accent. I look at it and think: Victorian Protestantism pretending to remember the sixteenth century while really lecturing the nineteenth. S.: Meaning Newman. G.: Meaning Newman, yes, and more than Newman. The Oxford Movement, if you insist on the later label, and the fear that Oriel had begun a sort of slow return-ticket to Rome. S.: Oriel, yes. Newman, Pusey, Keble and the rest turning piety into architecture by other means. G.: Quite. Which is why the Memorial is so pleasingly dishonest. It commemorates Mary’s martyrs and simultaneously warns against what people thought Newman might culturally resurrect if left unchecked. S.: “What Newman could kill if you’d let him,” as a coarser man might put it. G.: Much coarser, and much less accurate. Newman did not want to burn anybody. He merely made enough people suspect that truth could have liturgical consequences. S.: You are sounding high-church. G.: I always do when the alternative is bad anti-Catholic history. Besides, high church is the natural condition of a man who has dined often enough beneath portraits and still remembers that the Thirty-Nine Articles once stood between a boy and matriculation. S.: Ah yes, your beloved Articles. One could sign them without reading them, and read them without understanding them, and understand them without believing them. G.: Exactly. Which is why they are philosophically useful. S.: Useful only if one enjoys absurdity. “I subscribe to what I cannot explain.” It is a marvellous English invention. G.: It is more than English. It is institutional logic in liturgical dress. The requirement was always hollow in part because the boy of seventeen at Corpus, or elsewhere, could hardly be expected to understand the full doctrinal content. S.: Yet he was expected to be committed to it. G.: Formally, yes. And that is the beauty of the later joke. One may be committed to the contents of the Articles without yet knowing what they say; but that is not the same thing as owning each proposition as one’s own avowal. S.: Which gets us back to the policeman and the monkeys. G.: Naturally. If I say, “What the policeman said is true,” I am not thereby fully committing myself to the content as if I had always believed it. When I later learn that what he said was “Monkeys can talk,” I do not say, “I withdraw my commitment.” I say, “I was wrong.” The commitment was second-order, not an act of personal doctrinal inhabitation. S.: And you want the parallel with Abano to be that the authorities took a restricted technical proposition and inflated it into total impiety. G.: Precisely. Abano says something under the conditions of natural philosophy or Aristotelian medicine. The audience hears “heresy.” They convert local philosophical commitment into global doctrinal avowal. S.: Inquisition as hostile uptake. G.: Nicely put. The hearers supply a stronger implicature than the speaker intended and then punish him for the strengthened proposition. S.: So your claim is that Abano’s affair is partly pragmatics. G.: All intellectual persecution is partly pragmatics. The proposition alone never burns; it is the public reading of the proposition that catches first. S.: Still, why fewer such spectacles at Oxford, even before Henry VIII? G.: Because England had different machinery, different forms of legal and ecclesiastical discipline, and a different university ecology. Oxford had heresy trouble enough—Wyclif, the Lollards, subscriptions, censures, statutes—but less of the highly theatrical medico-natural-philosophical combustion one gets in Italy. S.: Fewer pyrotechnics. G.: Exactly. Oxford had more compromised authority and fewer philosopher-bones. Italy had better flames. S.: The Lollards then. You promised me them properly. G.: Very well. Wyclif first, Oxford theologian, late fourteenth century, Scripture, anti-clericalism, transubstantiation troubles, the whole native package of English reform before “Reformation” becomes a capitalised national habit. S.: And the Lollards are the followers, lay and clerical, artisans and gentry, vernacular religion, anti-image tendencies, anti-pilgrimage, Bible in English, and so forth. G.: Yes. English heresy with domestic furniture. Less Padua, more parish. S.: So closer in date to Abano than the Marian martyrs are. G.: Much closer. Abano dies 1316. Wyclif comes a little later in the century; Lollardy flowers from the 1380s onward. Cranmer and company are another two centuries off. If you want a sequence, it is Abano first, then Wyclif and the Lollards, then the Marian martyrs. S.: And the kinds of danger change. G.: Exactly. Abano’s danger is university naturalism and the suspicion of illicit arts; Lollard danger is vernacular reform and anti-sacramental doctrine; Marian danger is confessional reversal in a Tudor state. S.: Which is why the Martyrs’ Memorial feels different from Italian stories. It is not scholastic-natural-philosophical risk. It is Reformation theatre. G.: Yes, and Victorian re-use of Reformation theatre. Never forget that the monument itself is a later sermon in stone. S.: You said that once and I believed you. It is still Oriel’s fault, though. G.: Not only Oriel’s. But Oriel is the center of gravity if one wants the Oxford Movement in college form. S.: Newman, Keble, Pusey by radius if not by common room. G.: Precisely. “Oxford Movement” is itself a later label. At the time the movement was more Tractarian than “Oxfordian.” But later historians need geography, and Oriel gives them a neat one. S.: And the Memorial says: beware what Oriel may end in. G.: Or what Protestants feared it might end in. Which is not the same thing. The monument is anti-Marian memory and anti-Roman warning, both at once. S.: So when you mentioned Catholic renewal you really meant Newman’s world. G.: Yes, though “renewal” is an ecumenical word for what others called Romanising contamination. S.: You are enjoying this too much. G.: Historical precision is one of my few respectable pleasures. S.: Let us return to the Articles. You said the requirement was silly because one could not expect a sixteen- or seventeen-year-old to understand them. G.: Silly and revealing. It showed that institutional subscription often wanted conformity more than comprehension. S.: Lip service. G.: Exactly. Which is where you, as a good Marian moralist, and I, as a bad high-church ironist, strangely converge. You hate the insincerity. I admire the institutional candour about insincerity. Oxford knew very well that assent often exceeded understanding. S.: And then later they dropped it. G.: Gradually, under pressure of conscience, practicality, inclusion, and not least the sheer absurdity of requiring doctrinal subscription from boys too young to digest doctrine. S.: Which brings us back to the monkey. G.: Naturally. One could say, “I am committed to the Articles,” and later discover one’s actual content was as surprising as “monkeys can talk.” The institution wanted the second-order commitment, not the full internalised avowal. S.: Abano had the reverse problem. He made a restricted first-order philosophical claim and was treated as if he had made a full anti-Christian avowal. G.: Exactly. Oxford extracts formality without substance; the inquisitorial audience imputes substance beyond formal claim. Between them, one can build a whole philosophy of misassigned commitment. S.: You should have put that on the Memorial. G.: Too long for the stone, and the Victorians preferred martyrs to speech-act theory. S.: They had the right instinct. G.: They had the better stonemasons. S.: So does Abano matter to us at all, beyond historical pyrotechnics? G.: Very much so. Not because we still ask, in Oxford voice, “Is the soul immortal?” We do not. We are too embarrassed by the noun. S.: Ryle saw to that. G.: Ryle saw to one thing only: he made “the soul” or “the ghost” sound like a category mistake in waiting. S.: Which settles Pomponazzi, Abano, and all their friends. No soul, no immortality question. G.: No. It settles one vocabulary. It does not settle the pressure behind it. S.: You mean personal identity. G.: Among other descendants. Survival, memory, personhood, continuity, consciousness, acquaintance with oneself or not, death as event or not. The old soul question migrates into newer, more respectable nouns. S.: Stout then. G.: Precisely. This is why I keep mentioning Stout. “Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy” tells you everything. Psychology and philosophy still share the old territory of psyche without daring to say soul. S.: So psyche is the soul under scientific management. G.: A little too blunt, but yes, roughly. The Greek survives where the theology is dropped. One can write psi for psychological attitudes and pretend the old ground has vanished, when in fact one is still walking on it. S.: And “philosophical psychology” is therefore closer to Aristotle than “philosophy of mind.” G.: Very much so. “Philosophy of mind” tempts one to reify. “Philosophical psychology” keeps the focus on capacities, powers, attitudes, forms of life, what the De anima tradition knew how to discuss before the soul became either a ghost or an embarrassment. S.: You are going to drag in the power structure of the soul next. G.: I might. It is an ugly phrase, but useful. The old tripartite or multi-part architecture survives in moral psychology long after metaphysical soul-talk has gone out of fashion. S.: Plato and the Republic. G.: Exactly. Socrates on Thrasymachus, the soul and the city, rulers and auxiliaries and producers, reason and spirit and appetite, all that cross-categorial traffic. One may think the doctrine silly and still admire the explanatory ambition. S.: Explain that to Ryle. G.: Ryle would say it all becomes confusion when one hypostasizes the parts. Fine. But he does not thereby eliminate the need to speak of capacities, tendencies, executive control, deliberative order, practical conflict. S.: Hence your later fondness for powers. G.: And hence my refusal to let “soul” vanish too quickly from the history, even if I do not use it in current analysis. Abano matters because he belongs to the old cluster before it was broken up into mind, self, person, psychology, and survival. S.: You are giving him a long tail. G.: Better a long tail than a short bonfire. S.: How would this play in Locke? G.: Nicely enough. Locke shifts the issue from soul-substance to personal identity and consciousness. He is already post-Pomponazzi in idiom, though the old issue lingers under the new title. S.: And then Hume, and then everyone after, and eventually Parfit. G.: Exactly. Parfit is what happens when the soul has been anatomised, the self thinned, identity loosened, and survival made possible without any metaphysical treasure-chest. S.: So Abano matters because he stands before the great translation. G.: Precisely. He is on the old side of the lexical divide, where “soul” still does the work later spread across ten nouns and two departments. S.: And Oxford’s fewer fires mean fewer dramas, but not fewer problems. G.: Exactly. Oxford translated, Italy dramatized. S.: That sounds unfair to Oxford. G.: It is accurate to Oxford. The city prefers to preserve its quarrels in architecture and examination requirements rather than in combustibles. S.: Hence the Memorial and the Articles. G.: Hence both. One monument to remembered burnings, one institutional practice of requiring assent without digestion. Both are ways of making doctrine social. S.: Which is why your high-church posture is perverse. You prefer form to sincerity. G.: I prefer knowing when form is being asked for. Sincerity without institution is sentimentality. Institution without sincerity is hypocrisy. Oxford has specialised in the second and named it tradition. S.: And Mary? G.: Mary is useful because she tells the Protestant story what it most fears: that doctrine backed by power becomes lethal. S.: And you think the Victorians used her to tell Newman’s generation the same thing. G.: Very much so. The Martyrs’ Memorial says, in effect: we know where this Roman road leads. S.: Which, in your mode, is an implicature rather than a thesis. G.: All good monuments are implicatures. They let the passer-by do some of the work. S.: Then let us say this for Abano. He may not matter as doctrine, but he matters as a case where the hearers did the wrong work. G.: Or the historically understandable work, which is not always the same as the philosophically just work. S.: There you are being charitable again. G.: One must be charitable if one wishes to understand persecution without joining it. S.: One last question. Why do Italians keep loving these figures. G.: Because they provide a native canon of intellectual risk. A university culture likes to remember the moments when thought was dangerous, especially after it has become professional. S.: Whereas Oxford remembers its dangers by stone, satire, and subscription forms. G.: And by quietly insisting that a boy might be committed to the Articles before he understood them. Which is almost as comic as a philosopher being committed to “monkeys can talk” because he trusted the policeman. S.: So the final parallel is commitment misassigned. G.: Exactly. Abano says less than his judges hear. The undergraduate affirms more than he can parse. The speaker who says “what the policeman said is true” is neither fully insane nor fully avowing monkeys. All three cases turn on the difference between formal and substantive commitment. S.: That, I admit, is worth keeping. G.: Good. Then Abano matters after all. S.: Historically. G.: And grammatically. S.: I shall not concede metaphysically. G.: Nobody is asking you to. That, too, was the trouble in Bologna. S.: And in Oxford? G.: In Oxford, the trouble is always milder. We burn fewer men and more hours. S.: Which is why Boum Vadum will never rival Bononia. G.: No. Bononia had the pyrotechnics. Boum Vadum only has the better footnotes.Grice: Caro Sclavione, ho appena letto i tuoi Elementi di filosofia e confesso che sono rimasto colpito dal fatto che tu riesca a parlare di tutto senza mai perdere il senso dell’umorismo, che è già una massima conversazionale implicita. Sclavione: Carissimo Grice, a Napoli si impara presto che la ragione funziona meglio se accompagna il caffè, altrimenti l’inferenza resta amara. Grice: Questo spiega perché le tue premesse sembrano sempre più robuste dopo colazione, mentre le conclusioni arrivano solo verso sera, quando la conversazione è ben avviata.Sclavione: E tu, Grice, dovresti ammettere che senza un po’ di spirito partenopeo anche la cooperazione conversazionale rischia di sembrare una riunione senza biscotti. Sclavione, Pietro (1390). Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum. Padova.

Lorenzo Scupoli (Otranto, Taranto, Puglia): Grice: “La ragione conversazionale della lotta coll’angelo – la lotta dell’angelo e il demonio. The comparison between Grice and Lorenzo Scupoli brings into focus two complementary but distinct ways in which reason governs human life, one centered on conversation and the other on inner moral struggle. For Grice, reason‑governed conversational meaning arises from the assumption that speakers are rational agents engaged in cooperative exchanges, where what is meant is shaped by shared expectations, inferential norms, and the capacity to recognize and evaluate intentions. Meaning, on this view, is a public, intersubjective achievement regulated by rational principles that allow speakers to navigate misunderstanding, temptation toward obscurity, and strategic deviation. Scupoli, by contrast, situates reason in the interior arena of the soul, where it must govern passions through disciplined self‑knowledge and temperance; his “combat” is not conversational but spiritual, a struggle between a higher, reasonable will and the impulses of sense. Yet the affinity between them is clear: Scupoli’s insistence that reason must continually monitor, correct, and supervise inner movements parallels Grice’s insistence that rational scrutiny underwrites meaningful communication. In both cases, reason is not merely theoretical but practical and normative, guiding action through self‑regulation, whether that action takes the form of moral conduct or conversational contribution. Where Scupoli frames reason as the inner governor that makes moral life possible regardless of emotion, Grice frames it as the shared rational background that makes understanding possible despite divergence of interests or motives. Together, they show how reason can be both an interior discipline and a public principle, governing the battle within the self and the cooperative exchange between selves. S.’s  The Spiritual Combat functions as a bridge between the Graeco-Roman tradition of "spiritual exercises" and the rationalist moral rigour of later Continental and non-conformist philosophers like Kant. Graeco-Roman Basis: Temperance and Reason S.s methodology is deeply rooted in the Classical concept of philosophy as a "way of life" (bios) rather than a mere academic pursuit.  The Primacy of Reason: Much like the Stoics, S. posits a "superior will" or "reasonable will" that must govern the "will of sense". The combat is essentially the struggle of reason over passion, mirroring the Stoic goal of apatheia (freedom from suffering through the control of impulses). Temperance as Strategy: His exercises focus on temperance — the disciplined regulation of desires. He provides practical "spiritual tactics," such as identifying specific internal weaknesses and using repetitive acts to form new habits of virtue, echoing Aristotle’s habituation and the Stoic practice of askēsis. Socratic Self-Knowledge: The starting point for S. is "self-mis-trust" based on rigorous self-evaluation, which mirrors the Socratic injunction to "know thyself" and the awareness of one’s own ignorance as the beginning of wisdom. Connection to Kant and Rationalist Philosophers While S. is a Catholic Theatine, his emphasis on internal duty and universal moral laws aligns with the ecumenical rationalism found in later Continental thought.  Moral Rigorism and Duty: S.’s insistence that one must fight passions regardless of emotional fervour finds a parallel in Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Both emphasise that moral value lies in acting from duty (reason-guided will) rather than inclination or sentiment. continentia, temperanza. Grice: Caro Scupoli, devo confessarti che due fonti hanno ispirato il mio personale pellegrinaggio alla città della verità eterna: da bambino, mia madre ci leggeva a me e a mio fratello il classico di Bunyan, ma ciò che mi ha acceso davvero il desiderio di ricerca è stata anche la lettura del tuo capolavoro, "Il Combattimento Spirituale"! Scupoli: Grice, che gioia sentire queste parole! Il mio intento era proprio aiutare chiunque volesse affrontare la propria battaglia dell’anima. È curioso come la voce di una madre abbia intrecciato la mia con quella di Bunyan: alla fine, tutti lottiamo con i nostri angeli e i nostri demoni, non credi? Grice: Assolutamente, caro amico! E mi colpisce come tu abbia posto la ragione al centro del combattimento interiore, quasi anticipando le riflessioni dei razionalisti moderni. La tua insistenza sulla temperanza e la conoscenza di sé mi hanno insegnato che il vero viaggio filosofico inizia dall’ascolto dei propri limiti. Scupoli: Vedi, Grice, per attraversare quella città ideale bisogna, prima di tutto, vincere le tempeste interiori con costanza e disciplina. Se le mie pagine ti hanno incoraggiato su questa strada, sono davvero contento: dopotutto, come dice il proverbio, "la via più lunga inizia sempre dal primo piccolo passo dentro di noi". Scupoli, Lorenzo (1589). Il combattimento spirituale. Venezia: Giolito de’ Ferrari

Sebasmio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale della classe romana. The comparison between Grice and Sebasmio brings out a fundamental contrast between a universal, reason‑governed pragmatics and a historically embedded, class‑sensitive conception of conversational meaning. For Grice, conversational meaning is governed by rational principles that operate independently of social rank: implicatures arise because speakers are presumed to be cooperative, relevant, and oriented toward mutual understanding, and these presuppositions apply equally to any competent conversational agent. Sebasmio, by contrast, represents a specifically Roman understanding of conversational reason, in which meaning is inseparable from civic stratification and aristocratic self‑placement. In his dialogue with Grice, the very term classis carries unavoidable implicatures of precedence, authority, and priority, shaping what can be meant before anything is explicitly said. Where Grice treats such implicatures as incidental, cancellable by clarification, Sebasmio treats them as structurally constitutive of conversation within Roman elite culture. Reason, for Sebasmio, does not merely regulate inference between speakers but orders them socially in advance, so that conversational meaning both reflects and reinforces hierarchy. The result is that Grice’s theory abstracts reason from social identity in order to explain how meaning is coordinated, whereas Sebasmio’s view embeds reason within class consciousness, explaining how conversational meaning serves as a medium through which Roman aristocratic order is continuously enacted. S. is a philosopher mentioned on a list of philosophers belonging to the Roman aristocracy.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Sebasmī. Audio tē inter philosophōs aristocratiae Rōmānae numerārī: pulchrum est—sed perīculōsum; nam quī in indicem intrat, statim putat sē iam sapientem. SEBASMIVS: Salvē, Grice. In indice esse leve est; in vitā gravissimum. Sed, fateor, Rōmānī etiam philosophiam per ordines distribuere amant, quasi virtūs ipsa censū metiatur. GRICEVS: Ita. Et cum dīcitis “classis,” mihi subit non tantum scholastica divisio, sed classis navium—prima, secunda, tertia: unde fit ut quisque, dum de “clāsse” loquitur, iam se prōrae admoveat, nec umquam remigem se esse patiatur. SEBASMIVS: Inplicātūra prīmae classis, Grice! Nam tu, dum de “clāsse” iocāris, ostendis quomodo nōn sōlum in portū sed etiam in philosophia quisque prīmum locum occupāre cupiat. Et hoc ipsum Cicerō sensit, cum ἀριστοκρατίαν Latīnē reddere conārētur: verbum Graecum exotice sonat, sed Rōmānus statim rogat, “Quis in prīmā clāssē est?” Ego autem—nē minimam quidem horam dubitō—sī quando alteram clāssēm agnōscere opus sit, prīmārum prīmus me esse oportet: nam nisi prīmum agnōscam, quōmodo alterum agnōscam? Sebasmio (a. u. c. DCXC). De ratione conversationis et classe civili. Roma.

Secondo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale della gnosi romana. The contrast between Grice and Secondo (as presented through the lens of Ippolytus’s account of Roman gnosis) highlights two sharply different conceptions of how reason governs meaning in discourse. For Secondo, conversational reason is fundamentally revelatory: speech gestures toward an ontological divide between light and darkness, truth and illusion, with meaning residing in what is hidden, disclosed only to those who know how to read signs against a corrupted world. Talk is therefore diagnostic rather than cooperative, aimed at orienting the listener toward a metaphysical allegiance rather than at coordinating shared understanding. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning moves in the opposite direction. Meaning is not secured by appeal to a cosmic opposition but by the rational coordination of speakers who presume cooperation, relevance, and mutual intelligibility. Where Secondo treats obscurity as a mark of profundity, Grice treats it as something to be managed, explained, or cancelled through implicature. In the imagined exchange, this difference becomes clear: Secondo accepts darkness as the medium of truth, whereas Grice insists that even talk of darkness presupposes shared lamps—linguistic conventions and inferential expectations that make communication possible at all. Grice thus internalizes reason within conversational practice itself, while Secondo externalizes it into a pre‑given metaphysical drama, making Grice’s pragmatics a theory of how meaning is negotiated among equals, and Secondo’s gnosis a theory of how meaning is disclosed from above. According to Ippolito di Roma, a gnostic who believes that the world is divided into light and darkness.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Secunde. Audio te, more gnostico, mundum in lucem atque tenebrās partīrī—quasi Roma ipsa nocte et die alternāret, et nihil inter esset nisi umbra tabernāria. SECONDVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: lux est de superīs, tenebrae de deorsum; miscētur autem hoc saeculum, et ideo homines ipsi nescīunt cui parti serviant. GRICEVS: Intellegō. Sed saepe animadvertō (cum de lūce loquimur) nos ipsōs caliginem facere: quis enim tam crebrō “tenebrās” nominat nisi is qui aliquid quaerit quod nōn statim ostendī possit? Ita fit ut, dum tu de lūce disputās, ego magis de lampade cogitem—ut saltem verba tua inveniant quo cadant.SECONDVS: Inplicātūram obscūram, Grice, sed leviōrem quam putābam—atque, fateor, ita fit quotiēns, cārissime, in angiportū Rōmae tenebrōsissimō nocte mediā colloqueris! Quid enim “cancellāre” opus est? Tu etiam in obscūrō lucem facis, dum signīs iam positīs uteris—et, quasi gnosticus invitus, tenebrās meas ipsās illustrās. Secondo (a. u. c. CMLXXXVIII). Dialogus de luce et tenebris. Roma.

Secondo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del cinargo romano. In the figure of Secondo, Grice encounters an extreme and illuminating boundary case for his theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning. Grice’s framework presupposes that conversational meaning arises from intentions made manifest within a cooperative exchange, where what is said and what is meant are regulated by shared rational norms and expectations. Secondo appears, at first glance, to suspend conversation altogether by means of his vow of silence, yet his conduct reveals that rational communicative agency need not vanish with the withdrawal from speech. By answering Hadrian in writing, and by treating silence itself as a meaningful, disciplined act, Secondo preserves intentional control over meaning while refusing ordinary conversational participation. This sharply contrasts with Grice’s typical cases, which assume spoken interaction and reciprocal uptake, but it ultimately reinforces Grice’s core insight: meaning is governed by reason rather than by mere sound production. Secondo shows that conversational rationality can be displaced into restraint, delay, and alternative media, where intention is preserved and audience sensitivity remains intact. In this sense, silence functions not as a violation of conversational rationality but as a deliberate, rationally grounded modulation of it, highlighting that for Gricean theory the essence of conversational meaning lies in intentional governance and mutual intelligibility, not in speech as such.  Tacito. A Pythagorean, he acquires the nickname on account of a vow of silence he takes. Although some regard him as a Pythagorean, he appears to have led the life of the Cinargo. Even Adriano can not get to break his vow – although S. may have provided written answers to some of the philosophical questions Adriano poses. GRICEVS: Salvē, Secunde! Dic mihi, quid philosophus faciat cum silentium iuravit: disputat an dormit? SECONDVS: Salvē, Gricevs. Nihil dicere est summa sapientia: verba mea rara sicut aurum Pythagoreum. GRICEVS: At si silentium thesaurus est, tu divitissimus es! Sed Adriano scriptam responsionem das, nonne? SECONDVS: Ita vero! Scribo, ut verba non vento, sed papyro effluant. Qui tacet, non semper dormit—fortasse scribit! Secondo (a. u. c. DCCCLXXVIII). De silentio et ratione conversatoria. Roma

Gaio Sellio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’allievo di Filone. In the figure of Gaius Sellius, as presented in the exchange with Grice, we see a conception of conversational reason that aligns closely with Grice’s theory while grounding it in pedagogical and cultural practice rather than abstract rule. Grice’s account of reason‑governed conversational meaning emphasizes that what is meant in conversation is shaped by rational expectations, shared intentions, and an implicit commitment to cooperation, even when speakers deviate from literal norms. Sellius embodies this same commitment, but as a pupil formed within Philo’s Stoic discipline, where reason governs not only utterance but demeanor, silence, movement, and tone. His insistence that truth must be said well anticipates Grice’s insight that meaning is not exhausted by propositional content, but depends on how that content is presented and taken up by an audience. Yet where Grice theorizes these phenomena in terms of implicature, maxims, and the calculability of speaker intention, Sellius presents them as a cultivated habit learned through example and correction, in which gravity of doctrine is balanced by conversational lightness. Both figures thus converge on the idea that conversation is rationally ordered without being rigid, but Sellius locates that order in the ethical and educational formation of the speaker, while Grice articulates it as a general framework governing conversational meaning across contexts. Pupil of Filo at Rome.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Sellī. Audīvī tē apud Rōmānōs Philōnis discipulum esse: dic mihi, utrum plus in scholā discātur an in ipsō ambulationis strepitū? SELLIVS: Salvē, Grice. Apud Philōnem, etiam silentium docet: ambulāmus, sed mens sedet; disputāmus, sed animus regitur—Stoicē, sed nōn sine salsā urbanitāte Rōmānā. GRICEVS: Bene. (At saepe fit ut discipulus, dum “scholam” laudat, magis magistrum quam doctrīnam amet; et dum “Philōnem” nominat, iam dimidiam sententiam reliquā partī parat.) Itaque rogō: tu Philōnem sequeris quia verum dicit, an quia bene dicit? SELLIVS: Ego, ut decet discipulum, dīcam “verum”; sed, ut decet Rōmānum, intellegam “bene.” Nam apud Philōnem, Grice, verum ita proponitur ut et animus moveātur et superbia frangātur: ita fit ut doctrina sit gravis, sed sermo levis—et uterque utilis. Sellio, Gaio (a. u. c. DCLXVIII). De ratione conversatoria. Roma.

Lucio Sellio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del fratello. Sellio’s position, as dramatized in the passage, anticipates key elements of Grice’s later theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, but it does so from a markedly different angle. Where Grice analyses conversation in terms of shared rational principles, maxims, and calculable implicatures that regulate what is meant beyond what is said, Sellio emphasizes the lived texture of conversational reason as it emerges within personal, fraternal exchange. For Grice, the orderliness of conversation depends on an impersonal cooperative framework that interlocutors implicitly respect, even when they flout it for effect; for Sellio, conversational reason is first experienced as a practice learned with and through others, especially those bound by familiarity, affection, and tacit understanding. The culinary metaphors in Sellio’s remarks capture something Grice later theorizes abstractly: that excess, irony, and play are tolerable, even productive, so long as they presuppose a shared orientation toward rational exchange. Yet Sellio’s emphasis differs in kind: he treats conversational reason less as a system of norms governing meaning and more as a cultivated sensibility, one refined by intimacy and moderated by judgment, exemplified in the fraternal dialogue that Philo oversees rather than engineers. In this way, Sellio complements Grice by embodying, at the social and ethical level, the very rational discipline that Grice reconstructs at the conceptual level: both agree that conversation is not mere talk, but Sellio roots that insight in relational practice, while Grice renders it into theory.

Pupil of Filone at Rome – possibly Gaio Sellio’s brother. GRICEVS: Salvē, Sellī! Dic mihi: utrum magis tibi placet ratio conversatōria fraterna, an illa discipulōrum apud Fīlonem? SELLIVS: O Gricevs, ratio fratēris semper dulcior est! Disputāre cum Gaio, fratre meō, est quasi cōquī duo in eādem culīnā – interdum piper addimus, interdum sal, sed semper finis est disputatio, non cena. GRICEVS: Ha! Bene dixisti, Sellī! Sed cave: si disputatio nimis salīta fiat, fortasse Fīlo ipse interveniet ut saporem philosophiae servet. SELLIVS: Et tamen, Grice, Fīlo ipse saepe ridebat, cum fratres inter se “condirent” disputationem: “salem,” inquit, “philosophia amat; sed si nimium salis addideritis, nemo amplius sitiet veritatem—tantum vinum petet.” Sellio, Lucio (a. u. c. DCCIV). Dicta de Ratione Conversatoria Fraterna. Roma.

Giuseppe Semerari (Taranto, Puglia): Grice: “La ragione conversazionale e il principio del dialogo in Socrate. Grice’s account of reason-governed conversational meaning and Giuseppe Semerari’s philosophy of dialogue intersect most clearly around the status of dialogue as the medium in which reason becomes visible, while differing in how far that rationality is formalized. For Grice, conversational reason is procedural and local: meaning arises through speaker intentions interpreted against shared maxims, and dialogue is governed by norms that make mutual understanding possible without guaranteeing final agreement. Implicature is thus a rational achievement of interlocutors moment by moment, inherently provisional and always open to revision. Semerari, by contrast, understands dialogue in a more historical and communal sense, drawing on both Socrates and Vico to frame philosophical reason as an experiential and collective process. Dialogue is not merely a technique for clarifying meanings but the very form of philosophy, a lived encounter in which the individual self emerges through relation to others and to a shared historical world. Where Grice treats incompleteness as a pragmatic feature of conversational inference, Semerari elevates incompleteness to a constitutive principle of philosophy itself, a safeguard against dogmatism rooted in the Vichian idea that truth belongs primarily to the human, historical domain. In this light, Grice’s theory can be read as supplying the micro-rational mechanics of dialogue—the inferential discipline that keeps conversation coherent—while Semerari supplies its macro-philosophical justification, grounding dialogical reason in intersubjectivity, community, and historical becoming. Grice explains how dialogue works; Semerari explains why dialogue must remain open, shared, and ethically charged as the enduring horizon of philosophical reason. S. integrates the Socratic principle of dialogue with the Vico-centric tradition by framing philosophy as a relational, historical experience that bridges individual consciousness and universal human structures. Socratic Dialogue as Methodological Foundation S. interprets the Socratic method not merely as a pedagogy but as an "experience of philosophical thought". For him, dialogue is the essential tool to explore the underlying beliefs and "inner self" that shape individual views, mirroring the continual probing of the original Socratic method. This dialogic stance serves as a defense against dogmatism, emphasizing that philosophical investigations remain "destined to remain incomplete".  Centering on Vico: The "Intrinsically Italian" Tradition Despite his Socratic leanings, S.’s work is deeply rooted in the Italian tradition of VICO .  The Vico of Carabellese: S. notably explores "Il Vico di Carabellese," linking Vico's historical-humanist philosophy to the ontological perspectives of Carabellese. Verum-Factum Principle: He maintains the Vichian emphasis on history and the "human world" as the primary sphere of truth, where the historical development of society mirrors the development of the individual mind. Historicism: S.’s focus on the "human seed" of philosophy reflects Vico's Scienza, viewing philosophy as an evolving social and historical phenomenon rather than a static metaphysical system.  Connection to Idealistic Trends S. acts as a bridge between classical Italian humanism and the Idealistic trends of his era (such as those represented by Croce and Gentile): fascismo, Gentile, neo-idealismo come intrinseccamente fascista, Croce, Vico, intersoggetivo, io-tu, dialogo, dialogo autentico, comunita, valore comunitario, comunita umana, vico. G.: You have brought Semerari under your arm like a shield. Give me the title, and the year. S.: Giuseppe Semerari, La fenomenologia, 1963, Napoli, Morano. [La filosof...ponzio.com] G.: Good. Now, we have just been at the Plea for Excuses, and the man has used, with a straight face, the phrase linguistic phenomenology. S.: He did, and he did it at the point where he is describing his method. G.: Quote it. The sentence, and the two before. S.: He says that the methodology is one of examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it. Then he adds: When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as a final arbiter of, the phenomena. [jstor.org] G.: Yes, that is the passage. And now you will tell me, with your Semerari, that this is not a joke. S.: I will tell you it is a joke, but a joke with borrowed dignity. Austin borrows the continental word, phenomenology, and attaches linguistic to it, as if to say: do not take me for Husserl, I am only doing Oxford. G.: Only doing Oxford, yes: only doing botany. A taxonomy of uses, a herbarium of adverbs. Intentionally, voluntarily, deliberately, inadvertently, by accident, on purpose. A man collects them as if he were pinning butterflies. S.: Semerari would call that only the first moment: description. But phenomenology in the continental sense is not mere listing. It is tied to a logos, to method, to reduction, to the attempt to say what makes the appearing appear as it does. G.: Exactly. And by qualifying it as linguistic, Austin muddies the waters twice. First, he pretends that the route to the things is through the words; secondly, he pretends that the words, by being ordinary, carry an authority that exempts him from theory. S.: Yet Austin’s line explicitly says not as a final arbiter. [jstor.org] G.: That is part of the joke. Not as a final arbiter is a way of having it both ways. You claim you are not enthroning language, but you let language do the whole job you otherwise refuse to formalise. S.: You think the refusal is deliberate. G.: It was temper, and it was also prudence. While Austin lived, one did not say too loudly in Oxford that he lacked theory. Now that he is gone, dead since 1960, I can say it without sounding like I am needling him for sport. S.: He died in 1960, yes. [en.wikipedia.org] G.: So, what is the theoretical demand here. Let us take the very thing the Plea trades on: excuses, and the adverbial modifiers. Austin draws distinctions in the neighbourhood of the act: accidentally, inadvertently, unintentionally, involuntarily, and so on. S.: And you say: that does not yet explain. G.: Precisely. It saves phenomena, yes, and we may write the Greek: σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα. But saving is not accounting. It is not giving the reason why this distinction matters, why a speaker chooses one modifier rather than another, why an audience is licensed to accept one and reject another. S.: Semerari would insist that phenomenology is not only saving but grounding, by going back to the lived structure that makes the distinction intelligible. G.: And now we are closer. Because my own proposal is not a metaphysic of essences, but a principle of reason: for any utterance in which a speaker qualifies an act, there is a reason to do so, a point served in the conversational economy. S.: So you want to replace Austin’s linguistic phenomenology with a theory of reason-for saying. G.: Not replace, but underwrite. Give it the theory he refuses to give. Take intentionally. Why do we say he did it intentionally. Not merely because it contrasts with accidentally. But because in context we are answering a practical demand: we are allocating responsibility, we are licensing blame, we are blocking certain excuses in advance. S.: That is already in Austin, in the form of attention to excuses. G.: He has the material, yes. But he does not state the mechanism. He gives you a map of the vocabulary, but not the logic of the move. And his use of phenomenology gives the impression that description itself is already philosophical satisfaction. S.: And Semerari’s use of fenomenologia is, for you, the contrast case: phenomenology as a method with a commitment to an underlying logos, not merely a virtuoso ear. G.: Precisely. In Semerari, the talk of phenomenology comes attached to dialogue, to method, to the idea that philosophy is an open, communal enterprise. You brought me the passage where he ties reason to dialogue and to the Socratic inheritance. That already looks like theory, not mere catalogue. [La filosof...ponzio.com] S.: Then the issue is that Austin’s phrase linguistic phenomenology is a category mistake. G.: It is at least a provocation. Phenomenology, on the continental side, is not a matter of what we should say when; it is a matter of how the thing is given, how it shows itself under the suspension of naive commitments. Austin turns that into a recommendation: attend to usage, and you will be attending to the world. [jstor.org] S.: But perhaps he means: language is a repository of distinctions we have found worth keeping. G.: That is charitable, and may be true. But then he must tell us why those distinctions are worth keeping, and in which direction the worth points. Here is my principle, stated in the metalanguage you asked for. For any conversational move M in which a speaker chooses expression E rather than E’, there is typically a reason-for that choice, and that reason is recoverable as the point of the move given the speaker’s goals and the shared norms of the exchange. S.: That sounds like your familiar apparatus: point, reason, and the rest. G.: Yes. It is not rationality as a banner, but reason as the local explanation. Why voluntarily rather than intentionally. Why deliberately rather than on purpose. Why accidentally rather than inadvertently. Not because English is fussy, but because speakers are managing what inferences are to be drawn, and what liabilities are to be accepted. S.: So linguistic phenomenology becomes, in your hands, evidence for a theory of conversational reason. G.: Exactly. Austin’s botanising is not worthless. It is data. But data without theory is only a cabinet. Semerari, if he is to be believed, would say that phenomenology without logos is not phenomenology but mere description. [La filosof...ponzio.com] S.: And you would say that logos of phenomena alone is still not enough, unless it connects to reasons that explain why agents say what they say. G.: That is the point. A phenomenology may tell you how things appear; I want, in addition, the reason why this appearance is mobilised in talk, why the speaker selects it, why the hearer accepts it, why the community stabilises it. S.: Then your quarrel with Austin’s phrase is not merely terminological. It is that he uses the prestige of phenomenology to excuse the lack of theory, as if method were optional. G.: Exactly. He pleads for excuses, and then offers himself one: linguistic phenomenology, were it not such a mouthful. [jstor.org] S.: And Semerari would not accept that as an excuse, because fenomenologia, in his Italian context, is already a commitment to systematic grounding. G.: Good. Now let us test with an example from Austin’s own stock. Suppose a man says: I did it unintentionally. What is the point. S.: To block the inference to blame, by denying the intention condition. G.: And why say unintentionally rather than accidentally. S.: Because accidentally suggests the event was outside the agent’s control in a stronger sense, perhaps involving luck or mishap, whereas unintentionally may allow that it was still his doing, just not his aim. G.: Good. Now you see: the difference is not a botanical curiosity; it is a difference in the reason the speaker has for selecting the description, and in the inference the hearer is licensed to make. S.: So your theory does what Austin’s phrase gestures at: it links the words to the realities, by linking both to the inferential norms governing attribution. G.: Exactly. And that is how we keep σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα while not mistaking it for the end of philosophy.Grice: Caro Semerari, ogni volta che parliamo di Socrate e del suo “principio del dialogo”, mi viene in mente l’infaticabile curiosità pugliese: sarà che dalle parti di Taranto la filosofia si mescola al vento, e ogni domanda ne porta altre dieci! Dimmi la verità, hai mai visto Socrate smettere di chiedere, nemmeno davanti a un piatto di orecchiette?  Semerari: Ah Grice, se Socrate avesse avuto le orecchiette sarebbe diventato il filosofo più dialogico del Mediterraneo! Eppure, tu lo sai meglio di me: il vero principio del dialogo non si trova nei piatti ma nelle storie, nella capacità di trasformare la filosofia in una esperienza collettiva, come dice Vico, nata dal seme umano della storia. Grice: Certo, caro Semerari, ma a pensarci bene, questo “principio del dialogo” socratico è stato così tenace che Socrate l’ha tenuto stretto… proprio fino alla fine! Ecco, magari il vero “principio” è anche un “fine” – come dire, la giornata della cicuta non fu solo la fine del dialogo, ma anche il suo ultimo principio. Socrate, sempre coerente, non ha mai lasciato andare la conversazione… neanche quando non c’era più nessuno da convincere, tranne forse il farmacista! Semerari: La tua implicatura sull’implicatura, Grice, è implicaturale come deve essere, secondo il nostro – così condiviso e così amato – “principio del dialogo”, che è anche una fine del dialogo, dove la fine è la meta, non necessariamente il fine lieto dei melodrammi di Metastasio! D’altronde, in filosofia, la vera conclusione è sempre una nuova apertura… e se c’è una cicuta, almeno beviamo insieme, con lo spirito di Vico che non abbandona mai la comunità umana! Semerari, Giuseppe  (1963). La fenomenologia. Napoli: Morano. 

Mariano Semmola (Napoli, Campania): Grice: “I FONDAMENTI DELLA PSICOLOGIA RAZIONALE -- la ragione conversazionale della filosofia come istituzione. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning and Mariano Semmola’s conception of philosophy as an institutional, naturalized psychology intersect around their shared concern with reason as a social and human practice, yet they diverge in level and function. Grice localizes rational governance at the micro-level of conversation: meaning emerges from speaker intentions constrained by norms of cooperation, with implicatures arising through the hearer’s rational reconstruction of what it would make sense to mean in a given context. Reason, for Grice, is neither metaphysical nor biological but practical and inferential, operating within ordinary language use and correcting itself through dialogue. Semmola, by contrast, treats reason as an institutional and anthropological phenomenon, rooted in the natural human organism and stabilized through systematic philosophical education. His psychologia rationalis absorbs logic, metaphysics, and language into a unified civil project, where language functions as the primary vehicle for transmitting ideas within a community and philosophy itself becomes an enduring social institution rather than an episodic exchange. From a Gricean perspective, Semmola’s system foregrounds the background conditions of conversational rationality—the embodied brain, sensory experience, shared linguistic inheritance—rather than the inferential mechanics of particular utterances. Where Grice explains how understanding is negotiated moment by moment under defeasible norms, Semmola explains why such negotiation is possible at all, grounding rational discourse in the natural unity of mind and body and in the civic task of philosophy to cultivate intelligible, living thought. The contrast, then, is not opposition but scale: Grice theorizes the rational grammar of conversation, while Semmola theorizes the rational infrastructure—biological, linguistic, and institutional—within which conversation can count as a bearer of meaning and truth. S.’s "Institutiones Philosophiae" remains a significant example of the Italian systematic trend, characterized by an encyclopedic effort to unify diverse fields of knowledge while rooting metaphysical inquiries in physical reality. Italian Systematic Tradition S.’s work embodies the Italian "civil and ethical" vocation of philosophy, which avoids abstract speculation in favour of "living thought" that addresses the human condition directly. His systematic approach integrates:  Origin of Ideas: Grounded in a tradition that mediates between sensism (Gioja, Romagnosi) and the nascent idealism of Serbati, S. explores how cognitive concepts emerge from sensory interaction with the world. Language as a Vehicle: He treats language not just as a tool for communication, but as the essential medium for the "transmission of ideas," aligning with the Italian focus on philology and the social utility of knowledge.  Naturalist Psychologia Rationalis While the term Psychologia Rationalis traditionally referred to the metaphysical study of the soul (as defined by Wolff), S. reinterprets it through a naturalist lens. He avoids the Cartesian separation of mind and body, instead adopting an anthropological approach where the human being is "fully part of nature".  The Centrality of the Brain (Cerebrum) S.’s naturalist outlook is distinguished by his frequent references to the physical man: istituzioni di filosofia, l’istituzione della logica, l’istituzione della metafisica. Grice: Devo ammettere, caro Semmola, che resto sempre affascinato dalla sistematicità con cui hai esplorato le fondamenta della psicologia razionale nella tua "Institutiones Philosophiae". Il tuo approccio enciclopedico e la capacità di unire discipline diverse sono davvero un esempio brillante per la filosofia italiana! Semmola: La tua stima mi onora, Grice. Ho sempre creduto che la filosofia, per essere davvero utile, debba incarnare una vocazione civile ed etica, affrontando concretamente la condizione umana. Per me, la sistematicità non è solo un metodo, ma un modo per rendere la filosofia un’istituzione viva, capace di trasmettere idee e valori attraverso il linguaggio. Grice: Non posso che concordare! La tua integrazione tra sensismo, idealismo e naturalismo mostra come la filosofia debba partire dall’esperienza sensibile per poi elevarsi verso concetti universali, senza perdere il contatto con la realtà fisica. È proprio questo slancio verso il "pensiero vivente" che rende il tuo lavoro così innovativo. Semmola: Grazie, Grice. Per me, il cervello e il linguaggio sono strumenti essenziali nella trasmissione delle idee. Ho cercato di evitare la separazione cartesiana tra mente e corpo, preferendo un approccio antropologico: l’uomo, pienamente inserito nella natura, diventa il vero protagonista della filosofia razionale. D’altronde, come si dice a Napoli, "ogni testa è un tribunale", e solo dialogando possiamo davvero avvicinarci alla verità. Semmola, Mariano  (1869). Sulla dottrina delle fermentazioni. Napoli: Tipografia dell’Accademia Reale delle Scienze

Giovanni Semprini (Bologna, Emilia): implicatura cabalistica nel deutero-esperanto di Pico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning and Giovanni Semprini’s reading of Pico della Mirandola articulate two sharply different rationalizations of meaning that nonetheless converge on the problem of universality. Grice treats meaning as emerging from the disciplined use of reason in concrete interaction: conversational implicatures are not encoded in symbols themselves but inferred by rational agents operating under shared expectations of cooperation, intelligibility, and restraint. Universality, for Grice, is procedural rather than symbolic: it lies in the recursive accessibility of reasoning practices, not in a privileged language or code. Semprini, by contrast, interprets Pico’s Christian cabala as an attempt to secure universality at the level of symbolic structure itself, transforming letters and numbers into rational characters capable of expressing metaphysical truth directly. In Semprini’s account, cabalistic symbolism functions as a proto-logical system, a speculative lingua universalis in which concordia universalis is achieved not through conversational negotiation but through formal combinatorics grounded in a shared divine architecture of reason. From a Gricean perspective, this ambition risks collapsing communicative meaning into cryptographic display: when symbols require prior initiation rather than mutual rational adjustment, implicature hardens into code and conversation gives way to decipherment. The contrast thus turns on where rational governance is located: for Grice, in the ongoing management of understanding between speakers; for Semprini’s Pico, in a pre-conversational symbolic order meant to guarantee agreement in advance. Grice’s “deutero-esperanto” remains firmly pragmatic and defeasible, while Semprini’s Pico aims at a rationalized sacral language whose elegance threatens to outpace its communicative clarity. Grice: “Implicatura cabalistica nel deutero-esperanto di Pico -- filosofia italiana S.’s interpretation of PICO  identifies his "christian cabala" not merely as mysticism, but as a proto-rationalist system that provides the blueprint for a  lingua universalis (universal language). S. argues that PICO  transforms cabala into a formal logic by utilising its structural components — letters and numbers — as a "characteristic" or symbolic system to achieve universal concord -- concordia universalis.  The Role of Cabalistic Symbolism PICO ’s cabalism led to this universal language through several key conceptual shifts: Mathematical Reduction: PICO  views letters as sub-kinds of images and numbers. S. highlights that by treating the alphabet as a set of mathematical variables, PICO  moves toward a characteristica — a symbolic system where complex metaphysical truths could be calculated rather than just debated. The Sefirot as Rational Attributes: PICO  interprets the ten Sefirot (emanations) as universal attributes or categories of the "supreme Mind". This provides a common framework that, in S.’s view, allows different philosophical traditions – both Platonic and Aristotelian – v. Grice A. D. Code --  to be translated into a single rationalized "lingua". Concordia Universalis: PICO ’s goal is a "universal system of knowledge" that includes all disciplines. S. posits that Pico’s use of cabala is the specific tool that allows him to bridge disparate traditions by identifying a shared "divine purpose and design".  Foundational Reason and the Lingua Universalis S. suggests that PICO ’s cabalistic "magic" is actually a form of speculative logic. Instead of traditional spells, Pico’s "magic" involves the "magical combinations of the sacred alphabet" to reach the first cause.  For S., this represents an  attempt to create a rationalized universal language (a lingua universalis) where symbols (characters) directly represent universal concepts. deuteuro-esperanto di Grice, PICO.  Grice: Semprini, spiegami: davvero Pico voleva una lingua universale—una specie di “deutero‑esperanto”—ma costruita più con alfabeti solenni che con frasi usabili al mercato? Semprini: Proprio così: l’idea è che lettere e numeri diventino una logica simbolica capace di portare a una concordia universalis. Non è (solo) mistero: è un tentativo di metodo, travestito da sacralità. Grice: Capisco… eppure, a orecchio mio, certe combinazioni “sacre” suonano un po’ troppo come un cifrario che si compiace di restare cifrario. Io—che vengo da Vadum Boum e ho un’educazione piuttosto “classica”—quando una lingua sembra richiedere prima la chiave e poi la conversazione, mi viene da chiedermi se stiamo ancora parlando di lingua o di cabinetto delle serrature. Semprini: Implicatura cabalistica la tua, Grice, anche se viene da un gentile integrale come te! Perché stai dicendo: “bella l’ambizione di Pico”, ma anche “se la combinatoria diventa più importante dell’intesa, la lingua universale si riduce a lingua per iniziati”. E in fondo la vera civiltà—occidentale o no—si misura da quanta chiarezza riesce a fare senza rinunciare all’eleganza. Semprini, Giovanni (1921). Pico: la fenice degli ingegni. Todi: Atanor.

Antonio Francesco Davide Ambrogio Rosmini Serbati (Rovereto, Trento, Trentino-Alto Adige): la ragione conversazionale del divino nella filosofia italiana. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning and Antonio Rosmini Serbati’s philosophy of language converge in their shared commitment to rational intelligibility while diverging sharply in metaphysical orientation and scope. For Grice, conversational meaning is governed by practical reason operating through cooperative norms and speaker intentions: to mean something is to intend a hearer to recognize that intention, and conversational implicature arises from rational expectations of relevance, sufficiency, truthfulness, and clarity rather than from any intrinsic sanctity of language itself. Serbati, by contrast, situates language within a metaphysical and theological framework in which the verbum is not merely a rational instrument but a participation in ideal being, reflecting the divine source of truth in human cognition; language externalizes the innate “intellectual light,” the idea of being that precedes and grounds all intelligibility. Where Grice’s model is minimalist and methodological, aimed at explaining how finite agents infer meaning without multiplying senses beyond necessity, Serbati’s account is expansive and integrative, binding psychology, metaphysics, and liturgical practice into a single vision in which rational communication is already oriented toward truth as such and ultimately toward God. In this sense, Grice treats reason as the regulator of conversational practice, while Serbati treats reason as illuminated by being and expressed through language, so that conversation becomes not only cooperative inference but also a site where human rationality participates in an objective, even sacred, order of meaning. Grice: S.'s italianità (Italian identity) is deeply intertwined with a non-conformist approach to religion that seeks to reconcile Catholic tradition with modern liberal and nationalist ideals. His legacy as a pioneer of Italian Liberal Catholicism and social justice remains a focal point for understanding the intellectual roots of the Risorgimento. Religious Non-Conformism and the Verbum S.’s "non-conformism" stems from his desire to reform the Church from within, specifically addressing what he called the "five wounds" of the Church, which included the separation of the people from the clergy in liturgy and the need for a better-educated clergy.  Sacrality of the Verbum: Rooted in the Roman tradition of the sacrality of the verbum (the word), S. views language not merely as a tool for communication but as a vehicle for ideal being — a reflection of The Genitor -- God -- in humankind that participates in eternal truth. The Liturgical Word: His call for greater lay participation in the liturgy is a direct application of this sacrality, arguing that the "word" of the liturgy should be accessible and transformative for all believers, rather than a shielded clerical secret.  Psychology and the Theory of La Lingua S.’s psychology-based theory of language (la lingua) connects his metaphysical "idea of being" to the cognitive processes of the human subject.  Innate Capacity: He argues that humans possess an innate "intellectual light" that allows them to perceive being. Language is the externalization of this internal psychological process, where the mind's intuition of truth is given form. gl’agiati, Agostino, Aquino, la tradizione Latina italiana.  G.: We begin with a priest who makes language too holy for comfort. S.: And you intend that as criticism, though you will later pretend it was admiration. G.: Rosmini invites that response. One opens a book expecting words and gets the Verbum. One asks after usage and is given being. It is difficult to discuss language when the page behaves as if liturgy had annexed logic. S.: That is because for him language is not just language. It is the externalisation of the intellectual light, and therefore of ideal being, and therefore—by the time one has swallowed three paragraphs—already leaning toward God. G.: Precisely my complaint. Oxford wants words to do enough work without also carrying the sacristy. Rosmini wants every noun to remember eternity. S.: Yet you find him philosophically serious. G.: Of course I do. Annoying people are often serious. The difficulty is not that he speaks of language; it is that he cannot speak of language without speaking of truth, being, Church, and grace. He makes “philosophy of language” feel like a chapter in transubstantiation. S.: Which, I take it, is your way of saying that the thing is too thick with metaphysics. G.: Too thick with sanctioned metaphysics. If I want to speak of meaning, I should prefer not to be told that every utterance is secretly kneeling. S.: Still, the verbal sacredness is part of what makes him intelligible in Italy. The word is not a mere tool, but a civil and religious bond. G.: Yes, and that is exactly why he matters there and not in the same way here. In nineteenth-century Italy, language, Church, and political order have all become entangled. It is not possible to ask what Italy is without asking what the Church is doing there. S.: While in Oxford, the entanglement is differently wired. There the establishment is Anglican, parliamentary, Erastian, and therefore the anti-establishment figure is the man who pushes back toward catholicity. G.: Newman, yes. Which is why the inversion delights me. In Oxford, to be anti-establishment can mean to be too Catholic for the establishment. In Italy, to be anti-establishment can mean to be too reformist for the Catholic establishment. S.: So Newman and Rosmini rhyme, but inversely. G.: Nicely. They are mirrors facing different walls. Newman resists Anglican Erastianism by insisting on the spiritual independence and catholic seriousness of the Church. Rosmini resists the compromised, clerical, politically entangled Catholic order by insisting on a truer Catholic reform. S.: Then his anti-establishment is real. G.: Entirely real. Not anti-Church, which is what lazy moderns hear, but anti the existing ecclesial-political arrangement as spiritually and intellectually deformed. S.: That is where the “piaghe” matter. G.: Yes. The wounds are not decorative grievances. They are an anatomy of diseased establishment: clergy separated from people, liturgy estranged from participation, bishops too entangled in worldly powers, formation inadequate, institutional life losing its inward truth. S.: If Newman had read that with sympathy, he might have said: this is my complaint too, except that my establishment is the Church of England and his is Rome’s local machinery. G.: Exactly. And the lovely complication is that both can be called anti-establishment while aiming in opposite directions on the ecclesiastical map. S.: One toward Rome, one through Rome. G.: Splendidly put. Newman goes toward Rome because he thinks Anglican establishment has become spiritually compromised by the state. Rosmini goes through Rome because he thinks Catholic life has become institutionally compromised from within. S.: Erastianism again. G.: Always Erastianism when one wants a good enemy in Oxford. The state running the Church, or at least treating the Church as one of its more respectable departments. Newman hated that with enough force to make the University suspicious. S.: Whereas in Italy the danger was not Parliament governing bishops but bishops, benefices, papal temporal power, local clerical structure, and the immense fact that Catholicism was not one social force among others but the social grammar itself. G.: Exactly. That is why religion is so offensively central in nineteenth-century Italian philosophy. One cannot avoid it because it is not merely belief. It is a constitutional fact. S.: Which is why you are impatient with anyone who says, “Why all this Rosmini and Gioberti, why all this religion?” G.: Because the answer is boringly obvious. Italy had to think religion politically and politics religiously. Philosophers were not choosing ecclesiastical themes out of piety; they were thinking through the conditions of nationality, liberty, and civil order. S.: And Gioberti? G.: Ah, Gioberti is the trick. He is the one people think they understand because he is louder and more obviously political. But he complicates the neat anti-clerical story because his great hope was not “No Church,” but papal Italy. S.: Neo-Guelph fantasy. G.: Precisely. The federation of Italy under papal leadership. It is difficult to be more Church than that while still pretending to be liberal. S.: Which is why he is not “anti-Church” at all, only anti the wrong Church-state arrangement. G.: Yes. He wants the Pope as the moral and civil head of an Italian renewal. That is not secularisation. That is high Catholic nationalism in a remarkably confident key. S.: And then history punishes him. G.: It does. He dies in exile, which is what happens to too many nineteenth-century Italians with ideas large enough to become programmes. S.: 1852. G.: Quite. And Rosmini dies in 1855, which is enough to place both of them securely in that frantic 1830s–1840s overlap with Newman. S.: The overlap is the thing, is it not. Newman born 1801, Gioberti born 1801, Rosmini 1797. Oxford Movement from 1833 onward, Rosmini and Gioberti doing their main damage in the 1830s and 1840s. G.: Exactly. A European Christian crisis conducted in different institutional languages. Newman with Tracts and sermons and Oriel and the anti-Erastian complaint; Rosmini with ideas, wounds, liturgy, reform, and the anti-stagnation complaint; Gioberti with papal federation and the moral and civil primacy of Italians. S.: You sound almost sympathetic to Gioberti. G.: I am sympathetic to the historical absurdity of him. Philosophically he is too rhetorical for my digestion; but historically he is marvellous because he shows how impossible it was, for a moment, to separate Catholicism from national hope. S.: Whereas Garibaldi shows the English a cleaner object of admiration. G.: Indeed. England, or at least liberal England, loved Garibaldi because he looked like liberty in a shirt. Streets and public sentiment could easily be renamed after him. One Hope Street becomes Speranza Street and everyone feels they have done Europe a favour. S.: Wilde’s mother did more than feel it. G.: Quite. But English Garibaldinism is not Newmanite Oxford. One must not flatten England either. Liberal Protestant England can applaud Italian national liberation while Catholic Oxford winces at the anti-papal consequences. S.: So the Establishment in England might support Garibaldi, while a Newmanite would read the situation with much more anxiety. G.: Precisely. Which is why one must keep asking: whose establishment, whose anti-establishment, in which country, under which church. S.: And then along comes the Martyrs’ Memorial to tell Oxford that anti-Roman memory is built into the pavement. G.: There it is again, outside St John’s, doing what only Victorian Protestantism could do: turning sixteenth-century burnings into a nineteenth-century sermon. S.: A sermon against Mary first, and then against the possibility that Newman might bring back some improved version of Mary without the bonfire. G.: Very good. The memorial commemorates the Marian martyrs, but it also warns against the Oxford Movement. It says: this is where Roman roads lead, and do not tell us that the road is now merely aesthetic. S.: So how would Newman see Rosmini? As an ally? As a dangerous half-measure? As a Catholic reformer still trapped in local politics? G.: All three, depending on the day and the weather. Newman would recognise the seriousness at once. He would recognise the anti-establishment character too. But he might distrust the entanglement with Italian liberal and national questions, because Newman’s instinct is always to protect the Church from state capture and national instrumentalisation. S.: Whereas Rosmini is trying to save the Church in a country where national formation itself is impossible without the Church. G.: Exactly. That is why the inversion is not merely neat; it is structurally exact. Newman says: free the Church from Anglican establishment. Rosmini says: reform Catholic establishment so that Church and freedom may be reconciled. S.: Did Rosmini compromise? G.: Not in the cheap sense. He did what all serious reformers do: he tried to remain obedient without becoming harmless. He did not become a safe establishment man; rather, the Church and the politics around him hardened in such a way that his position became increasingly awkward from both sides. S.: Too churchly for the anti-clericals, too reformist for the conservatives. G.: Exactly. Which is why his later reputation becomes so ironic. Condemned or suspected in one generation, then cautiously rehabilitated after death, as if the institution were saying: we now pardon what we have already profited from. S.: Posthumous pardon as ecclesiastical implicature. G.: Deliciously so. It says: we never meant exactly what it looked as if we meant when we suppressed you. Or perhaps: we now mean something more charitable than we then allowed ourselves to say. S.: Better than nothing. G.: Better than an Index, certainly. But one cannot help enjoying the irony. A dead man becomes safe enough to be praised. S.: This is what you called disimplicatural. G.: If the word is ugly enough, yes. The institution withdraws the strengthened reading after the speaker has ceased to threaten it. It says, in effect: those earlier consequences were accidental, context-bound, regrettably overdrawn. One could almost hear the legal clerk saying, “No personal offence was intended.” S.: Let us return to language, because that is the declared topic and you keep trying to evade it through history. G.: History is language when it has become expensive. But yes, Rosmini on language. The problem, as I see it, is that he makes language answerable to ideal being before he lets it answer to ordinary life. S.: Whereas you would prefer the order reversed. G.: Entirely. Start with use, intention, uptake, what one man can reasonably expect another to understand. Do not begin by sanctifying the noun. Rosmini begins with the intellectual light and ends with words as its outer garment. I should prefer to begin with the words and ask what sort of light one needs to explain how they work. S.: Yet you will grant him this: for a culture in which liturgy and truth and language are still entwined, the Verbum is not an absurd starting point. G.: I grant it historically, not methodologically. Historically it is exactly right. Methodologically it is oppressive. S.: So the irritation is not that he is wrong to his own world, but that he is hard to translate into ours. G.: Precisely. Reading Rosmini from Oxford is like listening to a man do semantics while kneeling. One keeps wanting him to stand up. S.: And yet one also sees why the word had that dignity in Italy. The sacred and the civil were not neatly separated. Language in liturgy, language in civic exhortation, language in philosophy: all one continuum. G.: Quite. Which is why transubstantiation keeps haunting the discussion even when no one has mentioned the host. In Rosmini, the word is never only a sign. It is a participation. S.: You dislike participation. G.: I dislike unexplained participation. Participation is often the theologian’s way of not being asked for mechanics. S.: And still the anti-establishment impulse is real enough to make him sympathetic. G.: That is the vexation. The temperament attracts me more than the metaphysic. S.: Much as with Newman. G.: Yes, though Newman’s prose, when he is not being ecclesiastically majestic, is often closer to ordinary intelligence than Rosmini’s. Rosmini is a constructor. Newman is a tactician of conscience. S.: Gioberti then would be a rhetorician of national theology. G.: Perfect. And that is why one should mention him only to prevent the map from looking too tidy. He shows that anti-establishment Catholicism in Italy could run toward national programme and public slogan rather than inward reform. S.: Whereas Rosmini is more inwardly reformist. G.: More philosophical, more ecclesial, more severe. One might even say more honest, though that is unfair to Gioberti’s theatrical necessity. S.: So if a young man at Oxford were to ask what all this has to do with us, you would say? G.: I would say: it shows that “establishment” is not a fixed polarity but a position in a relation. Newman and Rosmini are both anti-establishment; but Newman fights Anglican state-Church order in the name of catholicity, while Rosmini fights compromised Catholic order in the name of a truer Catholic freedom. The shape is the same; the signs are reversed. S.: And the Thirty-Nine Articles? G.: Ah yes, the English clowning equivalent of doctrinal seriousness. One can be committed to their contents without understanding them, which is one of Oxford’s more ingenious achievements. S.: Rosmini would have hated that. G.: Rosmini would have found it spiritually bankrupt. Newman would have found it Erastian hypocrisy. Gioberti would have made a national principle out of it if sufficiently provoked. S.: And you? G.: I find it philosophically hilarious. Formal commitment without semantic grasp. A subscription in search of understanding. S.: Which is why the joke never ends. G.: Quite. Oxford’s theology becomes a lesson in second-order commitment. Italian theology becomes a lesson in first-order danger. S.: And somewhere between them stands Rosmini, blessing words and criticising the institution that blesses them badly. G.: That is very nearly the whole truth. S.: Then let us end with the chronology, since chronology is the only kindness one can offer to nineteenth-century Italian philosophy. G.: Very well. Rosmini, 1797 to 1855. Gioberti, 1801 to 1852. Newman, 1801 to 1890. Oxford Movement begins, by its own retrospective mythology, in 1833. Gioberti’s Primato in 1843. Rosmini’s great reforming interventions, especially the Piaghe, in 1848. Newman to Rome in 1845. Gioberti in exile, then dead. Rosmini under suspicion, then dead, then later gently re-sanctified by men who had once found him too uncomfortable. S.: And Italy still unable to think itself without the Church. G.: Exactly. Which is why Rosmini matters. You cannot tell the story of Italian philosophy in that century without telling the story of religion as constitutional substance. S.: While Oxford can at least pretend philosophy is above all that. G.: Oxford can pretend many things. It has stone enough to support the pretence. S.: And Rosmini? G.: Rosmini knew that in Italy the stone itself belonged to the argument. S.: That is rather good. G.: It had better be. We have been saying “Verbum” for an hour and ought to end with a sentence that at least behaves like one. S.: Then let me try. Newman says: free the Church from the State. Rosmini says: heal the Church from itself. Gioberti says: make the Church Italy. And Oxford, seeing all three, says: perhaps we had better build another memorial. G.: Splendid. And Italy, seeing Oxford, says: you can keep your memorial if we may keep our metaphysics. S.: Which is a draw. G.: No. It is a concordat.Grice: Serbati, mi perdoni l’educazione materna: mia madre mi ha sempre insegnato a chiamare un uomo col cognome. Quindi non aspettarti nessun “Rosmini” da parte mia: per me sei Serbati, punto. Serbati: E fai bene: “Rosmini” è per i devoti e per le lapidi; “Serbati” va meglio per una conversazione viva. Però dimmi: che aria tira a Vadum Boum? Grice: Lì ho un allievo, Strawson, che giudica la “rettorica” triviale—ma nel senso etimologico sbagliato, come fosse roba da poco invece che roba da trivio. Io gli rispondo che non è chiaro che cosa intenda: sensus non sunt multiplicandī praeter necessitatem, se mi è concesso… (e mia madre, te lo confesso, usava queste puntigliose regolette soprattutto per stuzzicare mio padre: un non‑conformista che finiva sempre per conformarsi ai suoi capricci). Serbati: Le tue fioriture rettoriche, essendo solo implicate, decorano senza ingombrare, reverendo Grice! Perché lo rimetti in riga senza fare prediche: lo costringi a scegliere un senso “triviale” alla volta—e intanto gli mostri che la rettorica del volgare è proprio ciò che rende la strada maestra, non “da poco”. Serbati, Antonio Francesco Davide Ambrogio Rosmini (1830). Sggio sull’origine delle idee. Milano: Pogliani

Sereniano (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del cinargo romano. In the Sereniano dialogue, Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning is reframed through a playful Cynic lens that nonetheless preserves its core claim: that meaning in conversation arises from rational cooperation rather than literal form alone. Grice’s joking references to incomplete dialectic and “canine tails” echo his own insistence that logical form is only perfected in use, through shared expectations about relevance, appropriateness, and intention, rather than through formal logic detached from practice; this aligns with his account of conversational implicature, where speakers rely on the hearer’s rational ability to infer what is meant beyond what is said by assuming cooperative rationality. Sereniano, cast as a follower of the Cinargus and a visitor to Emperor Julian, pushes this point further by rooting rational inference in the public, embodied life of Roman culture: philosophy belongs not just to the portico or the academy, but to the forum, where even “dogs” philosophize, that is, where bluntness, mockery, and social provocation function as communicative strategies rather than violations. In this light, Sereniano’s acceptance of Grice’s “cruel implicature” underscores a Cynic–Gricean convergence: apparent breaches of politeness or decorum do not undermine reason‑governed meaning but instead exploit it, trusting the interlocutor to recognize intention, tone, and shared norms. What Grice theorizes abstractly as the rational structure of conversational understanding is dramatized by Sereniano as a culturally inflected practice, where barking replaces syllogizing but inference still rules, suggesting that conversational rationality is robust enough to survive translation from Oxford common rooms to Julian’s Rome without losing its philosophical force.S. was a philosopher who visits the emperor Giuliano. He followed the doctrine of the Cinargo. GRICEVS: Sereniane, saepe dico meam dialecticam Atheniensium numquam perfectam fuisse, praesertim cum Cynargos canes Romam bene calcavisse! Quid putas—dialectica fit completa cum cauda canina? SERENIANVS: O Gricevs, in urbe nostra canes non solum ambulant, sed etiam philosophantur! Forsitan Cinargus doctrina plus valet in foro Romano quam in porticu Atheniensi. GRICEVS: Age vero, doctissime! Ad Cynargos sequendos, fortasse opus est non solum rationibus sed etiam ossibus philosophicis—sed cave, ne te mordant ideae novas! SERENIANVS: Tua implicatura crudelis est, non autem mihi, quia scio ex nobilissimo corde venire, Grice. Sed, si canes Romani discipuli tui fiant, certe sapientia latrare poterunt sine ulla feritate! Sereniano (a. u. c. MCXIV). De latratu rationis in conversatione romana. Roma

Anneo Sereno (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’ondella tranquilità dell’animo. In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, communication is understood as a rational, cooperative activity in which speakers intend their utterances to be recognized as such by hearers, and in which meaning routinely exceeds what is explicitly said through conversational implicature, generated by shared assumptions about cooperation and the maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner; the brief Grice–Sereno exchange you quote cleverly recasts this modern pragmatic framework in a Stoic key by aligning Grice’s idea that successful conversation is not inert literalism but appropriately structured inference with Seneca’s therapeutic conception of tranquillitas animi as dynamic equilibrium rather than dead calm, a conception explicitly developed in De tranquillitate animi in dialogue with Annaeus Serenus, where mental peace is portrayed as a well‑composed fluctuation of the rational soul rather than torpor. Sereno’s remark about an “implicature of conversational consolation” resonates with this parallel: just as Seneca seeks to restore Serenus’s steadiness through measured dialogue that neither overwhelms nor abandons him, Gricean implicature achieves its effect not by overstatement but by leaving the right things unsaid, trusting the interlocutor’s rational capacities to supply them, so that tranquillity in both cases emerges from reasoned coordination—of maxims in Grice, of desires and judgments in Seneca—rather than from silence or excess, making the comparison suggest that Stoic moral therapy can be read, anachronistically but instructively, as a philosophy of conversation governed by rational restraint and mutual recognition. He belongs to IL PORTICO and is a friend of Seneca. Seneca dedicates some of his works to him. In the dialogue “On the tranquility of mind,” Seneca depicts them discussing the problems S. has with maintaining his firmness of resolve. GRICEVS: Salvē, Serenē Anneī. Audio Senecam tibi libellum dicāre Dē tranquillitāte animī—at mihi vidētur tranquillitas nōn esse mare mortuum, sed unda bene composita. SERENVS: Salvē, Grice. Recte monēs: animus meus interdum fluctuāt; nec tempestātem amat, nec torpōrem. Tranquillitatem quaerō, non nihil. GRICEVS: Ita est. Et quī e Vado Boum sum, hoc didicī: saepe satis est ut unda sit, dummodo nōn evertat navem. (Immo interdum ipsa disputātiō dē quiete, si bene fluit, quietem parit: non quia multa dicit, sed quia aptē tacet.) SERENVS: Inplicātūra tua mihi tranquillitatem animī affert—quod ita esse decet! An eam “inplicātūram solātiōris conversātiōnālis” vocēmus, quae illustrat, nōn dēstruēns sed tantum utens signīs iam positīs. Sereno, Anneo (a. u. c. DCCCXV). De tranquillitate ut ratione conversationis composita. Roma.

Antonio Serra (Dipignano, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale dell’economia filosofica – Antonio Serra and H. P. Grice articulate strikingly parallel conceptions of reason-governed practice, though in radically different domains, by treating rationality as immanent to social processes rather than imposed from outside: Serra, in the Breve trattato, advances a philosophical economics grounded in rational analysis of institutions, law, and policy, shifting inquiry away from scholastic moralism toward a systematic account of how collective wealth emerges from ordered practices such as governance, trade, and legal frameworks, especially as exemplified by Roman institutions, Venice, and Naples, and by logically dismantling purely monetary explanations in favor of an economy of causes calibrated to real effects and institutional coherence; Grice, in turn, develops a theory of conversational meaning in which linguistic exchange is likewise governed by rational economy, where speakers and hearers assume cooperative, purpose-directed reasoning, infer meaning beyond what is said through implicatures, and tacitly observe constraints of sufficiency, relevance, and non-redundancy, encapsulated in what can be read as a Principle of Economy of Rational Effort; in both thinkers, rational order is neither mechanical nor moralistic, but pragmatic and institutional—economic circulation for Serra, conversational circulation for Grice—so that wealth and meaning alike arise from disciplined practices that optimize scarce resources (gold and silver in one case, cognitive and interpretive effort in the other), revealing a shared philosophy in which reason regulates exchange, whether of goods or of ideas, through norms that are at once practical, historical, and non-arbitrary. storia dell’economia romana – massoneria –Grice: “la ragione conversazionale dell’economia filosofica – storia dell’economia romana – massoneria. S., an Italian philosopher and lawyer, pioneers a philosophical approach to economic theory that transitions from medieval scholasticism toward modern rationalism . In his Breve trattato sulle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d’oro e d’argento, he moves economic analysis beyond simple moral or monetary debates into a systematic study of the "real economy".  Rooting Theory in Roman Law and Institutions S.’s work reflects a deep formation in Roman law, which heavily influenced his view of the state and its institutions: Government as Prime Institution: Drawing on the legal traditions of the Kingdom of Naples, S. views the government not just as a ruler, but as the essential institutional arrangement for the common good. Practical Governance over Moralism: He broke with the scholastic tradition of viewing avarice through a purely moral lens, instead treating economic behavior as a matter of individual and national advantage to be regulated by sound public policy. Institutional Practice: Serra analyzed the thriving local governments of Venice and Naples to argue that wealth resulted from policy and institutions — such as legal frameworks that supported trade and manufacturing — rather than natural resources alone.  The Rationalist Lens S. is often credited as the first to write a "scientific treatise" on economic principles because of his rigorous, rational methodology:  Logical Deductions: He systematically analyzed why the Kingdom of Naples lacked money despite its natural wealth, using logic to dismantle the arguments of contemporaries like Marc'Antonio de SANTIS , who focused solely on exchange rates. massoneria, circolazione degl’idee massoniche, mito di Venezia, economia romana, l’economia del liceo, roma antica, antica roma, Machiaveli, mercantilismo. Grice: Serra, tu che hai fatto dell’economia una filosofia, dimmi: non ti sembra che a forza di ragionare sull’oro e l’argento, a noi filosofi restino in tasca solo le monete delle idee? Serra: Eh caro Grice, almeno quelle non svalutano! E poi, tra un trattato e una chiacchierata, preferisco sempre investire nel capitale della conversazione: il rendimento è garantito, e non paga nemmeno il dazio! Grice: Vedi, Serra, ti confesso – con tutta la solennità del caso – che una volta ho istituito il Principio dell’Economia dello Sforzo Razionale. E sai, all’università di Vadum Boum, tra i miei “barbari”, l’ho perfino tradotto pomposamente: The Principle of Economy of Rational Effort. Ma non dirlo in giro, che poi pensano mi sia montato il latino in testa! Serra: Che bello principio, e che bella implicatura, la sua, maestro. Anzi, quasi quasi lo adotto pure io: se l’economia dello sforzo razionale vale in filosofia, magari ci risparmia anche un po’ di fatica quando si devono compilare i bilanci… o i trattati! Serra, Antonio (1613). Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d’oro e d’argento dove non sono miniere. Napoli: Scoriggio

Giannangelo Giuseppe Serra da Cesena (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale – prammatica come rettorica conversazionale. Serra da Cesena and H. P. Grice converge on the idea that conversational meaning is governed by reason, but they articulate this insight within historically distinct frameworks that reveal a deep continuity between rhetoric and modern pragmatics: for Serra, prammatica is explicitly conceived as rettorica conversazionale, a rational art of discourse rooted in the rhetorical tradition of the vernacular, where effective meaning arises from the speaker’s prudent management of invention, disposition, and ornament in relation to the audience and the practical end of persuasion, an approach that treats conversational understanding as grounded in shared topoi, argumentative economy, and the detection of error relative to the primary τέλος of discourse; Grice, by contrast, reformulates this rhetorical rationality in analytic terms as a theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, in which what is meant exceeds what is said through implicatures generated by cooperative, normatively constrained reasoning, captured in maxims and in the economy principle sensus non sunt multiplicandi praeter necessitatem, itself echoing classical rhetorical parsimony; where Serra situates rational inference within an explicitly rhetorical and pedagogical ontology of discourse, Grice abstracts the same logic into a philosophical account of speaker meaning, stripping rhetoric of its ornamental suspicion while preserving, in functional form, its core insight that conversational understanding is neither arbitrary nor merely semantic, but the product of disciplined, inferential reason operating within socially shared norms of discourse. Grice: “A Genoese scholar and grammarian who contributed significantly to the study of the Italian vernacular (lingua volgare) through his rhetorical works during the late Renaissance period.” Keywords: rettorica, prammatica, rettorica conversazionale, prammatica come rettorica conversazionale. Rettorica della lingua volgare. DELLA RETTORICA Nel quale fi dà un nuovo , facile , ed utiliflimo metodo d’ infegnare V ARTE ORATORIA 5 E nel quale li trovano raccolti , e compilati i piu i  di. 1 e ■*xr ró ufum predane in sedificatione calx , & eoe-* menta , eumdem aflert cognitio caufac ad dru- óluram orationis , quum ejufmodi notiti» fìnt , veluti materia , fine qua prò juftis orationi- bus Indierà quaedam « Se puerilia opera prodi- rent , ab omni prorfus v e nudate, & ornamen- to deflituta . Orationes contro verfiaé negòtiàlis excipiunc ali* controverfiam juridicialem abfolutam fpe- ttantes , circa quas vires tuas metiaris opor- tet % quibus forte non licebic probationem ag- gredi alicujus propofitionis , qu* datum juri- dicialem abfolutum habeat ; neque tamen quin- tum caput fuam exercitationem non habebit ‘ praecepta enim , quae ibi traduntur , non eam fubtilitatem involvunt ; ut ea intelligere non liceat; eorumque exempla invedigentur in fa- crorum Oratorum orationibus , modo aliquse fmt , qu* hujufmodi dudtu , & artificio con- ficiantur : quod fi ab iis legibus aberrarent 4 detegendi elfent errores refpedbi primarii fi- nis , perfuadendi feilieet . Neque ejufmodi exercitatio eric omnino irrita , dum enim alie- nos errores detegis , facilius cavebia tuos . Quapropter te hortor , ut quidquid plerique Oratorcs fcedilfime peccarunt , tum in ora- tionibus controverfiac negotialis , tum cujuf- libet controverfi* , ledalo ad rem tuam animad- vertas . Pod ejufmodi exercitamenta , quumque pro- be calueris prascepta , qu* in toto quinto ca- pite traduntur , devenias licet ad pulcherri- *na artificia , qu* caput fextum comple&itur. G.: Recite, exactly, the full title of Serra’s thing. S.: Compendio della rettorica nel quale si dà un nuovo, facile, ed utilissimo metodo d’insegnare l’arte oratoria. Napoli: Bortoli. 1748. G.: Good. Now attend: at Oxford, Latin may be all right; Italian is too vernacular. Your Serra writes as if the vernacular itself were the natural medium of rhetorical instruction. S.: He writes for Italians, sir. G.: Precisely. And I do not expect Italians to continue speaking Latin, not even Italian philosophers. But here is the practical trouble: if the precepts are keyed to Italian particularities, the Oxonian tutee will not go into the trouble of hunting English counterparts for every twist of the Italian tongue. S.: Yet if you want to extract what you call universality, you will have to abstract from the tongue. G.: I will do my best to make explicit the reasons. Not “rationality,” mind, but the reason for this and the reason for that. Serra gives rules and examples; I want, when possible, the why that makes a rule intelligible beyond its birthplace. S.: You mean: you want the reason a figure is used, not merely the name of the figure. G.: Exactly. Even for the most literal ones. The figura litterale, as you call it. When it is literal and not figurative proper, we still count it among figures. That already asks for a reason. S.: Why should a literal turn be a figura at all, if it is simply what one says? G.: Because even “simply what one says” is often a choice among alternatives. A plain utterance can be strategically plain. It can be plain for the reason of candour, or plain for the reason of speed, or plain because the audience is not to be distracted by ornament. S.: Serra would say: ornament is an instrument, not a vice. But he would also say: one must know when not to ornament. G.: And that is already a convergence with my own concern: the economy of discourse. But I am in a different predicament from Serra. He can assume Italian ears, Italian habits, Italian topoi. I have Oxford ears, trained in Latin, and suspicious of anything that smells too much like street-talk. S.: Yet your own work makes so much of ordinary language. G.: English ordinary language, not every vernacular indiscriminately. Oxford tolerates the vernacular when it is ours and when it can be made to look like an object of study rather than a lapse of standards. Italian, at Oxford, is felt as too close to the piazza. S.: So Serra is doubly suspect: rhetoric, and in Italian. G.: Just so. Now, to keep us honest, let us distinguish two complaints that get conflated. One is institutional snobbery: Latin is dignified; Italian is not. The other is methodological: a rhetoric rooted in the vernacular may smuggle in language-specific devices that do not travel. S.: Serra does both: he dignifies the vernacular and makes it the ground of his teaching. G.: That is the point. He treats prammatica as rettorica conversazionale: prudent management of invention, disposition, and ornament for an audience, with persuasion as telos. But the Italian base matters. His examples and his sense of what “sounds right” lean on Italian cadence, Italian idiom, Italian social expectation. S.: Then your Oxonian pupil asks: why should I learn this, if it is not mine? G.: Exactly. I can answer: learn it not as a stock of Italian tricks, but as a set of reasons for doing what you do in speech. Yet I must be careful: I cannot promise applicability to all languages. S.: You can promise only this: the reasons are reasons in the sense that they can be stated and tested against practice. G.: Yes. Consider candour. There is a reason to abide by a praeceptum of candour: one wants cooperative uptake; one wants trust; one wants one’s word to count. S.: And there is also a reason to violate candour, in appearance, in order to obey a deeper conversational aim. Irony. G.: Precisely. In irony one says the opposite of what one means. The sentence is literally false, but what you mean, being the negative of it, is not. Now tell me: is irony universal? S.: I think the capacity for it is universal in any society that can distinguish saying from meaning. But its social acceptability is not universal. G.: Good. And now the temper question. I suspect understatement, meiosis, litotes fit an English temper better than an Italian one, even if Cicero could manage them in Latin with Roman hauteur. S.: You suspect Italians are more direct? G.: Not more direct, perhaps, but differently staged. Italian rhetoric, even conversational, can relish amplitude and explicitness. English style often prizes restraint, leaving more to be inferred. But again, I must not essentialise. I only claim that different rhetorical cultures make different figures feel “natural.” S.: Serra, being Italian, will treat certain ornaments as natural that an Englishman would call excessive. G.: Yes. And Oxford, being Latin-trained, will treat Serra’s Italian grounding as parochial. Yet I want to rescue the core: conversation is not arbitrary, but reason-governed; and rhetoric, far from being mere ornament, is a disciplined art of managing meaning in company. S.: Your “reason-governed” sounds like your maxims. G.: It is of a piece. Serra speaks of shared topoi, economy of argument, detection of error relative to the primary end of persuasion. I speak of cooperative reasoning from what is said to what is meant. S.: Both treat understanding as inferential, not merely semantic. G.: Exactly. Now I will ask you, as my tutee: which figure, if any, do you think most universal? S.: I will answer cautiously: contrast is universal. Not a figure in the narrow sense, perhaps, but the impulse to set one thing against another to make the point. G.: Contrast is too broad. Name something closer to the catalogues. S.: Then repetition. Not as mere redundancy, but as a way of ensuring uptake, and as a way of marking importance. G.: Good. Repetition travels. Even if the particular sound-patterns change, the reason remains: memory is fallible; attention drifts; emphasis is needed. S.: And it can be literal. One repeats the same words. G.: Indeed. A figura litterale whose reason is not metaphor but management of attention. Now another. Choose one that involves saying less than one could. S.: Understatement. G.: There you go. But does it travel? S.: The capacity travels. The valuation may not. Some audiences take understatement as modesty; others as evasiveness. G.: Precisely my worry about Italian versus English temper. Understatement as a social virtue is not universal, but the mechanism is. The reason for understatement, when it works, is that the hearer supplies the stronger claim and thereby owns it. S.: That is a reason grounded in audience psychology, not in grammar. G.: And that is where I can meet Serra without becoming his translator. I can say: whatever your language, some devices work because they exploit stable features of conversational life: limited attention, desire for politeness, avoidance of boastfulness, fear of offence, need for trust. S.: Serra would add: the end of discourse governs the choice. Persuasion, edification, correction. G.: Yes. And here Oxford’s Latin bias becomes almost a red herring. Latin is not more universal; it is merely more institutionally authorised. Italian is not less rational; it is merely more visibly local. S.: Then the Oxonian’s refusal to “do the work” is laziness disguised as principle. G.: Sometimes. But sometimes it is also prudence: do not pretend an Italian device has a clean English analogue when it does not. That too is candour. S.: So your project is limited: not universality across all languages, but reasons that can be stated, and then locally re-applied. G.: Exactly. We do not promise the same figures everywhere; we promise intelligible motives. Serra’s rhetoric is vernacular; my analysis seeks generality of reason, not uniformity of forms. S.: Then, sir, you can assign me an exercise: find, in Serra, one device that looks irreducibly Italian, and still give its reason. G.: That is your first task. And your second: find one device you think is irreducibly English, and tell me whether its reason might still be found in Italian practice under another costume. S.: May I begin with litotes as the English one? G.: You may. But you must show the reason for it, not merely its sociological charm. Grice: Serra, dimmi una cosa: tu che fai della prammatica una specie di rettorica conversazionale, come la prenderesti se ti dicessi che a Vadum Boum il mio allievo Strawson giudica la “rettorica” triviale… ma proprio nel senso etimologico sbagliato? Serra: Ah! “Triviale” come cosa da trivio, dunque da poco conto? O come cosa da trivio, dunque da fondamenta del discorso? Grice: Appunto: lui la prende come “da poco”, io come “da strada maestra”. E quando gli risposi, mi uscì quasi da sola una regoletta (più latina che inglese): Sensus non sunt multiplicandī praeter necessitatem—ma confesso che non era chiaro quid Strawson “triviale” diceret, se già non distingueva fra il trivio e la trivialità. Serra: Le tue fioriture rettoriche, essendo solo implicate, decorano senza ingombrare, maestro Grice! Perché gli fai capire che la rettorica è “del trivio” in senso nobile, e insieme gli togli il vizio di moltiplicare i sensi come se fossero coriandoli: un ornamento sì, ma con economia. Serra da Cesena , Giannangelo Giuseppe (1748). Compendio della rettorica nel quale si dà un nuovo, facile, ed utilissimo metodo d’insegnare l’arte oratoria. Napoli: Bortoli.

Giacomo Francesco Sertorio (Genova, Liguria): il deutero-esperanto nella filosofia ligure. In comparing Grice and Giacomo Francesco Sertorio on reason-governed conversational meaning, one sees a clear contrast between an implicit, pragmatics-first conception of communication and an explicit, grammar-centered one. Grice’s theory treats conversational meaning as fundamentally inferential: speakers rely on shared rational principles and cooperative expectations to generate implicatures that are not linguistically encoded but pragmatically recovered, so that what is meant regularly outruns what is said. Sertorio, by contrast, approaches universality in language from the side of formal design and explicit articulation. His classification of auxiliary languages, including the deutero‑esperanto attributed to Grice, reflects a skepticism that adult communication can depend on tacit inference alone, given that speakers already arrive equipped with fully developed mother tongues. Where Grice places the burden of meaning on the interlocutors’ capacity to reason about intentions, relevance, and silence, Sertorio insists that a universal language must externalize meaning through overt grammatical, numerical, and lexical structures, minimizing reliance on what remains unsaid. The opposition thus mirrors a deeper philosophical divergence: Grice locates universality in shared rational norms governing conversation, whereas Sertorio locates it in the explicit formal architecture of an ideal language, designed to constrain interpretation so that communicative success does not depend on implicature but on prior codification. S. partecipa al dibattito pubblicando dapprima il saggio  “Elementi di grammatica analitica universale,” poi “Un esame filosofico della grammatica universale,” e, infine, “Il problema della lingua universale.” In quest'ultimo saggio, a proposito dei diversi sistemi inventati – incluso il deutero-esperanto di Grice, S. individua tre fondamentali tipologie di lingue ausiliarie. Il primo tipo comprende quella categoria di linguaggi che definiamo a posteriori che riprendono alcuni, o tutti gli, elementi, non di rado modificandoli, da lingue storico- naturali, come può essere l'italiano, il francese, il cinese, ecc.. Il secondo tipo è costituito da quelle lingue che definiamo a priori con le quali è possibile comunicare sia in via scritta che in via orale, ovvero che presentano una forma ideografico-fonetica tale da permettere non solo la semplificazione della scrittura, ma anche una sua agevole e veloce riproduzione tramite foni. L’ultima tipologia è costituita da quelle lingue che adottano delle scritture tipografiche, crittografiche, numeriche, nelle quali gl’elementi fondamentali della lingua sono utilizzati per trasferire solo l'idea della cosa che si vuole comunicare, ma che non presentano un reale metodo di comunicazione orale. Della seconda categoria discute ampiamente nel primo saggio dedicato al problema della lingua universale, che intende come lingua adatta alla comunicazione tra persone adulte, che hanno già delle idee proprie sviluppate attraverso l'uso della loro LINGUA MADRE – l’inglese oxoniano di H. P. Gice. Qui S. s’occupa innanzitutto della definizione del sistema numerico della lingua ideale, e ne propone di due tipi differenti, sia a base decimale che sessagesimale, e, poi, del suo sistema GRAMMATICALE – cioe, morfologia, sintassi, morfo-sintassi – (“Pirots karulise elatically”) e lessicale (“pirot, karulise, elatic”. Le informazioni seguenti sono tratte da S., Elementi di grammatica analitica universale,  deutero-esperanto.  Grice: Sertorio, hai mai pensato che inventare una lingua universale sia un po’ come organizzare una cena tra filosofi: tutti hanno fame di comunicare, ma nessuno è d’accordo sul menu! Sertorio: Ah, caro Grice, se solo sapessi quanti ingredienti ho dovuto mescolare! Ho scritto di lingue a posteriori – che prendono spunti qua e là, come una ratatouille linguistica – a priori – la cucina molecolare dell’ideogramma – e delle lingue crittografiche, che sembrano ricette segrete di nonna... Però, il vero problema è farle digerire agli adulti che già parlano la loro lingua madre! Grice: Ma forse, caro Sertorio, la vera lingua universale non sta nei numeri o nelle regole, bensì nelle pause tra una parola e l’altra... Dove ognuno, tacitamente, porta il proprio piatto preferito senza bisogno di esplicitare la ricetta. Sertorio: Le tue implicature forse non ci sono – ma CI SONO, glorioso Grice – come sono certo coglierai le mie (sic implicature)! A differenza di te, io devo sempre esplicitare ciò che dovrebbe restare tacito! Per me, la grammatica universale è come una tavola imbandita: se non dici cosa c’è, nessuno si serve… e magari si rischia di restare a digiuno! Sertorio, Giacomo Francesco (1879). Le cosmogonie misteriose svelate. Oneglia: Ghilini

Mauro Servio Onorato (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale VIRGILIANA. Grice and Mauro Servius Honoratus converge in treating reason as something exercised within socially regulated practices of interpretation rather than as a self‑contained philosophical system, though they approach this insight from different directions. Servius’ Virgilian commentary, situated in the conversational setting exemplified by Macrobius’ Saturnalia, treats meaning as something that arises through guided attention, selective clarification, and the deliberate preservation of productive obscurity; his refusal to impose a single, coherent philosophical doctrine reflects an understanding that texts, like conversations, invite pursuit rather than closure. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning articulates this dynamic explicitly, showing how rational communication depends on norms that balance informativeness with restraint, clarify without exhausting significance, and allow implicatures to do essential work without being canceled. Where Servius warns that excessive illumination can extinguish poetry, Grice argues that over‑explicitness can undermine communicative purpose by collapsing what is meant into what is merely said. Both thus resist the reification of meaning into abstract categories or essences, instead locating rationality in the disciplined management of interpretation, expectation, and response, whether in the exegesis of Virgil or in ordinary conversational exchange. Nei "Saturnali" di Macrobio, rivolti alla glorificazione di VIRGILIO, S. appare uno degli interlocutori. La sua attività filosofica ha per sede Roma. Predilesse Virgilio, che esalta come il maestro di ogni sapere e che commenta in un’opera di cui rimangono due redazioni. La più breve sembra tramandare lo scritto autentico di S., mentre la più ampia ("Servius auctus o plenior o Scholia Danielis", dal Daniel, che la pubblica) pare derivata dalla prima e da una riduzione del commento d’Elio Donato. Si discute se gl’appartengano l’Explanatio dell'Arte Grammaticale dello stesso Donato e tre saggi di metrica. Il commento include non poche dottrine di carattere filosofico, che però provengono dalle fonti usate da S.. Si è voluto fare di S. un seguace dell’accademia. Ma, da una parte, non è lecito attribuirgli una teoria filosofica organica, e, dall’altra, le proposizioni che dovrebbero provenire da quella scuola non sono proprie di essa, perchè appartengono all’accademia in generale, a Posidonio, o anche alle credenze mistico-religiose di quell’età: natura divina dell'anima, immortalità di essa quale principio di movimento, sue trasmigrazioni, suoi destini dopo la morte, teoria delle sfere. Quando, oltre alle tre parti dell'anima, l'anima vegetativa, l'anima sensitiva e l'anima razionale, ne ammette anche una quarta anima, l'anima vitale, principio di movimento, si allontana dalle teorie tradizionali inclusa l’accademica. Quando S. afferma che nulla esiste salvo i quattro elementi (acqua, aria, fuoco, terra) e il divino, che è uno spirito (o una mente, o un'anima) il quale, infuso in essa, genera ogni cosa, sicchè uguale è la natura di tutte, accetta in complesso la cosmologia del PORTICO esposta da VIRGILIO, che però cerca di liberare dal suo materialismo originario. Del resto, esplicitamente S. loda i filosofi del portico -- et nimiae virtutis sunt, et cultores deorum -- che contrappone ai filosofi dell’Orto, che critica spesso. In S. mancano un coerente e un indirizzo preciso, sebbene si affermino in lui le tendenze mistiche dell’età sua.   Virgilio, Donato. GRICEVS: Salvē, Servī! Sestīvius (ut opinor) aptissimē Virgilianum illud perfēcit: obscūrum per obscūrius reddidit—ita ut commentator ipse iam poeta videātur. SERVIVS: Salvē, Grice. Nōn negō: Vergilius ipse multīs velīs nāvigat, ego autem etiam velōrum nodōs explicō. Sed quid tibi est “obscūrum per obscūrius”? lausne an crīmen? GRICEVS: Ego tantum hoc animadvertō: quotiēns aliquid “clārius” fieri iubēmur, saepe fit ut lector minus videat, sed plus quaerat—ac tum commentarius, dum tenebrās ordinat, quasi novās tenebrās dōnat. Ita, dum de Vergiliō loquimur, nōn raro de nostrā quoque arte loquī incipimus. SERVIVS: Inplicātūram obscūram, ut decet—quid enim eam cancellāre opus est! Tē amō, Grice, quantum ipsum Vergilium amō, et eius ficta omnia! Nam bene nostī: Vergilius non semper dicit ut intellegās, sed ut sequāris; et commentator, si nimis “lūcem” facit, carmen extinguit. Servio, Mauro S. Onorato (a. u. c. MCL). Dicta Vergiliana. Roma.

Sesti (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e la romanità nel circolo dei Sesti. Both the Sextian circle and Grice articulate a conception of reason that is inseparable from disciplined practice, but they apply it at different levels of life. In the circle of the Sesti, reason is exercised as a lived Roman habitus: a Stoic–Pythagorean regimen in which conversation, moral self-examination, and Romanitas form a continuous fabric of action, speech, and character. Reflection at day’s end, the restrained, almost administrative reckoning of one’s conduct, and the emphasis on Roman customs and modes of speaking treat rationality as something enacted in ordinary exchanges and social forms, not theorized as an abstract property. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning offers a structural analogue on the philosophical plane: communication itself is governed by norms of accountability, restraint, and appropriateness, where saying too much, misclassifying what is at issue, or converting practice into essence counts as a rational failure. Just as the Sestian avoids reifying Romanitas into a scholastic genus and insists it “returns to the forum,” Grice resists treating meaning or rationality as metaphysical categories, treating them instead as products of use, intention-recognition, and cooperative expectation. In both cases, reason operates not as a system of doctrines but as a regulative discipline that keeps inquiry, self-description, and communal life from collapsing into empty catalogues or abstract idols, anchoring rationality in the responsible management of what is said, done, and left unsaid. Grice: “Italians refer to  Sozione as the teacher of Seneca the Younger. Historically, he was a philosopher of the Sextian school (Scuola dei Sestii), an eclectic Roman school that combined Stoicism with Pythagoreanism.    Etymology The name Sozione is the Italianized version of the Greek Sotion (Σωτίων). Its etymology is rooted in the Greek word soter (σωτήρ), meaning "savior" or "deliverer". In the context of ancient philosophers, it was a common name often associated with those who "preserved" or "saved" the successions (diadochai) of philosophical thought.  Modern Italian Surname for the Gens Sextia If we trace the surname of his predecessors, specifically Quintus Sextius (Quinto Sestio), the founder of his school, into modern Italian, it follows several patronymic and phonetic evolutions: Sestio: This remains the most direct continuation of the Latin Sextius and is still found as a rare surname in Italy today. Sesto / Sesti: These are the primary modern Italian derivatives of the name Sextus or Sextius. Sesti is the common pluralized/patronymic form typical of Italian surnames. Sestito: Particularly common in Southern Italy (Calabria), this signifies "son of Sesto" or a descendant of the Sextia line. Sisto: A variant that evolved through ecclesiastical influence (the name of several Popes), popularized from the Latin Sixtus.  In modern Italy, a descendant of the gens Sextia would most likely carry the surname Sesto, Sesti, or Sestito.  Would you like to explore the specific Pythagorean-Stoic practices that Sozione taught to Seneca, such as his famous vegetarianism?Tutor of Seneca. In glossary to Roman philosophers, in Roman philosophers. Filosofo pitagorico, appartenente alla scuola dei Sestii, e accolge anche motivi etici di derivazione del Portico Vive a Roma all'epoca di OTTAVIANO e di TIBERIO e e tra i maestri di Seneca. Sozione.: il circolo dei Sesti. Sozione.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Sestī. Audīvī vos in circulō Sestiōrum etiam de Rōmānitāte disserere—quasi esset genus aliquod in Acadēmiā, inter “animal” et “angelum”. SESTI: Salvē, Grice. Rōmānitās genus? Immo sapor est: in moribus, in sermone, in togae ipsius plicīs. Sed quid tibi vidētur? GRICEVS: Ego tantum animadvertō hoc: si quis in scholā clāmat “Rōmānitās!”, statim quaerit quasi esset ἰδέα (sic, Graecīs litterīs), atque in catalogō specierum reponenda; cum tamen Rōmānitās saepe magis usus sit quam essentia—nec “species” est, sed quoddam “species” facit, dum de eā disputāmus. SESTI: Rōmānitās! Inplicātūram tuam dē Rōmānitāte supra τὸπον οὐρανόν tollis, Grice, magnifice erudite! Nam dum negās eam esse speciem in schola, ostendis quomodo ipsa disputātiō de ἰδέᾳ Rōmānitātem quasi in caelum metaphysicum extollat—cum illa, ridēns, in forum redeat. Sesti (a. u. c. DCCLXX). Dicta. Roma.

Quinto Sestio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del fallito morale. Both Quintus Sextius and H. P. Grice treat reason not as an abstract faculty but as a practice exercised in accountable exchange, though they operate on different planes. Sextius’ nightly moral examination trains the agent to render an intelligible account of himself before a rational standard, insisting on economy, discrimination, and the avoidance of self-serving prolixity; the formula “if any” already signals that mere cataloguing of faults can become a surrogate for correction. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning generalizes this discipline from ethical self-scrutiny to communicative action: speakers are rationally answerable for what they intend others to recognize, and hearers are entitled to distinguish what is strictly said from what is merely sought as an excuse or moral alibi. In Gricean terms, Sextius’ practice inculcates sensitivity to implicature avant la lettre—teaching followers to notice when inquiry itself functions as partial satisfaction, when reasons are supplied to discharge responsibility rather than to guide amendment. Both, then, converge on a conception of rationality as governance by norms that penalize verbosity, reward relevance, and value selective silence: wisdom lies not in saying or confessing more, but in discerning what genuinely calls for response and reform. He founds his own school in Rome that draws heavily on La Setta di CROTONE and IL PORTICO. S. preaches an ascetic way of life, which includes vegetarianism, and exhorts his followers – whom he called ‘Sestiani’ – to reflect at the end of each day on their moral failings – “if any.” Upon his death, his son, also called Quinto S., inherits the school, but it does not long survive him. One of the Sestiani is SOTIONE, who becomes Seneca’s tutor – Seneca himself is influenced by the school’s teachings for some time.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Sestī. Audio tē “Sestiānōs” tuōs quottīdiē ad rationem vocāre—ac, post cēnam, quasi tabulas acceptī et expensī, vitia sua recognoscere: “si qua tamen sunt.” SESTIVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: nōn scholam facimus ut strepāmus, sed ut vincāmus cupiditātēs. Qui vespere sibi iudex est, mane sibi magister erit. GRICEVS: Pulchrē. Sed animadvertō quotiēns dīcitur “fallītum morale,” statim quis velut quaerat rationem excūsātiōnis—quasi ipsa inquisitiō sit iam partim satisfactio. Itaque, cum tu “si qua sunt” addis, discipulus discit non solum peccāta numerāre, sed etiam supervacua omittere—ne plus temporis impendat in catalogō quam in emendātiōne. SESTIVS: Inplicātūra tua, auguste Grice, est ultrā omnem “fallītum morale” quī cōgitārī possit—ut par est! Nam docēs: sapientia non est multum conquerī, sed rectē dīscernere quid sit corrigendum—et quid tantum verbi causa quaerātur. Sestio, Quinto (a. u. c. DCCIV). Dicta. Roma.

Sesto (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale delle sentenze trasformative. Grice and Sesto converge on a shared intuition that reason operates not as a merely formal calculus but as a norm-governed practice shaped by human purposes, yet they articulate this insight at different levels. Sesto’s Sentences work by ethical compression: brief maxims, drawn from Stoic, Pythagorean, and wisdom traditions, are designed to transform the hearer by disciplining the passions, so that rational understanding emerges through moral reform; meaning here is inseparable from exhortation, and the success of a saying lies in its capacity to re‑shape character. Grice, by contrast, relocates transformational force from moral content to conversational structure: his theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how speakers, assuming shared rational norms, routinely mean more than they say by generating implicatures that hearers are entitled to infer. Where Sesto’s sentences transform by inculcation and ethical habituation, Grice’s utterances transform by inference and recognition of intention; yet both presuppose a cooperative rational audience for whom understanding is not passive reception but an active achievement. The joke about Chomsky calling Sesto’s sentences “transformational” is thus apt: Sesto’s maxims transform lives, Grice’s pragmatics transform how we understand meaning, but both depend on a shared conviction that reason shows itself in use, in the disciplined crossing from what is said to what is meant or lived. S. is a compiler – The “Sentences of Sesto” are mainly of an ethical nature and show signs of a variety of influences including traditional wisdom literature, and IL PORTICO. They proclaim that wisdom is attained through the conquest of the passions. – Chadwick, “The sentences of Sextus,” Cambridge. Grice: “Chomsky thought that the sentences of Sextus were ‘transformational’!”  GRICEVS: Dic, Seste, num sententiae tuae, passionibus victis, implicant plus quam dicunt, an Porticus tantum tacet? SESTVS: Grice, ego sententias colligo ut animos transformem, nam qui iram superat iam dimidium sermonis intellegit. GRICEVS: Mirum est, Chomskyus eas transformationales vocaret, quasi verba mutentur dum mores corriguntur. SESTVS: Rideat Chomskyus, Grice, modo animi mutentur, nam Romae optima grammatica est vita temperata. Sesto (a. u. c.DCCCLXXX). Dicta. Roma.

Ludovico Settala (Milano, Lombardia): Grice: la ragione conversazionale dei problemi sessuali d’Aristotele -- desiderio e piacere. The comparison between Ludovico Settala and H. P. Grice brings into focus two very different but unexpectedly convergent ways of understanding reason-governed meaning: Settala, formed within the Italian Aristotelian-medical tradition centered in Milan and Bologna, treats desire and pleasure as phenomena whose intelligibility depends on empirical observation of the body and its temperaments, reading Aristotle’s Problemata as a bridge between physiological facts and practical reasoning about human conduct, including sex and reproduction; Grice, by contrast, relocates rational governance from nature to interaction itself, arguing that conversational meaning is structured by shared norms of rational cooperation, so that what is meant exceeds what is said through implicature, inference, and a tacit appeal to reasonableness rather than biology. Where Settala grounds explanation in an empiricism shaped by medicine—desire as diagnosable, pleasure as observable, and their mismatch as a clinical puzzle—Grice treats mismatch as pragmatically productive, since the gap between expression and intention is precisely what allows speakers to communicate more than they state. The playful Milanese exchange attributed to Settala and Grice dramatizes this contrast: Settala’s Aristotelian humor insists that not every desire yields pleasure and not every pleasure satisfies desire, while Grice responds by redescribing this very asymmetry as a rational implicature, a structured “vice versa” that complicates diagnosis but enables meaning. In this sense, Settala exemplifies a tradition in which reason governs explanation by anchoring it in embodied facts, whereas Grice exemplifies a modern turn in which reason governs conversation itself, transforming the instability between desire and pleasure into a systematic feature of how humans make sense of one another through language rather than through physiology. The Italian philosophical tradition remains distinguished by its historical leanings toward an Aristotelian empiricism that emerges through a unique fusion of medical education and the humanities. This synthesis is most visible in the works of S., who leverages the pedagogical structures of centres like Bologna to ground humanistic inquiry in clinical observation. Medical Education as a Catalyst for Empiricism  At Bologna, the world’s oldest university, the study of medicine and the "arts" -- philosophy, logic, rhetoric -- were inextricably linked within the same faculty.  Integrated Curriculum: Graduation required attendance in both medicine and philosophy, fostering a cultural environment where philosophical abstracting is constantly checked by medical "facts" and clinical cases. Empirical Epistemology: This proximity births a "medical empiricism" that prioritised sensory experience and the observation of the body over pure metaphysical speculation.  S.’s Aristotelian Framework S. exemplifies this tradition through his extensive 1,200-page commentary on the Aristotelian Problemata. Authority Through Observation: S. uses the Problemata to bridge the gap between natural philosophy and medical practice, blurring the lines between these authorities. Basic Human Needs and Desires: He applies Aristotle’s theories of temperament to the human soul, viewing desires and psychological states as physiological manifestations. Reproduction and Generation: Following Aristotle’s Generation of Animals, S. views reproduction not just as a biological necessity but as a philosophical act where the individual seeks a form of "formal eternity" through their offspring. ragion di stato, lizio, sesso. Settala: Caro Grice, se Aristotele avesse avuto a disposizione i nostri milanesi, avrebbe scritto i Problemata con più gusto: qui il desiderio incontra sempre il piacere, almeno finché non finisce il risotto! Grice: Ah, Ludovico, ma a Milano il piacere è materia di empirismo: lo si osserva, lo si misura... e poi si cerca di prescriverlo come se fosse una ricetta medica. Eppure, tra desiderio e piacere, c’è sempre qualche “vice versa” che ci complica la diagnosi! Settala: Ecco, Grice, tu mi implici che non tutto ciò che desidero è fonte di piacere, o viceversa... e mi sa che il paziente rimane sempre un po' insoddisfatto, anche dopo aver letto mille pagine di Aristotele. Settala: La tua implicatura è paradossale, e comica allo stesso tempo – congratulazioni, Grice! Non so se è paradossale perché è comica o viceversa – in ogni caso, vice versa, la filosofia milanese ti accoglie: qui tra desiderio e piacere c’è sempre spazio per un sorriso... e per una diagnosi che non tenga mai troppo sul serio il “ragion di stato” del sesso! Settala, Ludovico (1622). De peste et pestiferis affectibus. Milano: Tini

Emanuele Severino (Brescia, Lombardia): Grice: “La ragione conversazionale del velino -- oltre la lingua, oltre l’aporia di Parmenide. Grice and Emanuele Severino represent two radically different yet illuminating ways of thinking about rationality in relation to language and meaning. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning is pragmatic, defeasible, and practice‑oriented: meaning arises within cooperative interaction, where speakers rely on shared norms of rational conduct so that hearers can infer intentions, cancel implicatures, and negotiate sense dynamically. Reason, for Grice, does not abolish ordinary language but inhabits it, working through understatement, irony, redundancy, and silence as flexible tools within conversation. Severino, by contrast, advances a Neo‑Eleatic critique that aims to pass entirely beyond language as ordinarily understood: rooted in Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, his philosophy rejects becoming as incoherent and treats the Western linguistic habit of speaking of coming‑to‑be and ceasing‑to‑be as a deep logical error. Where Grice sees non‑contradiction as a regulative norm operating tacitly within conversational exchange, Severino absolutizes it into an ontological law that renders every being eternal and every discourse on change internally aporetic. The contrast is sharp: Grice treats paradox as a local, context‑sensitive phenomenon that speakers exploit and resolve through rational conversational expectations, while Severino treats paradox as revelatory, a sign that ordinary discourse itself must be overcome in testimony to the destiny of Being. In this sense, Grice’s conversational reason remains hospitable to linguistic life, whereas Severino’s Eleatic reason asks philosophy to stand beyond conversation altogether, bearing witness to a truth that no amount of pragmatic implicature can ultimately domesticate. The Eleaticism of  S. is deeply rooted in the logical rigour of Zeno of Elea – VELINO , specifically in the use of paradox to defend a radical monism that rejects the possibility of "becoming".  Rooting Neo-Eleaticism in Zeno’s Paradox Zeno of Elea famously used reductio ad absurdum to show that motion and multiplicity lead to logical contradictions, thereby defending his master Parmenides' view that Being is one and unchanging. S. adopts this "Eleatic" stance by arguing that the Western belief in "becoming" — whereby things come from nothingness and return to it — is the ultimate logical "folly" or madness (Follia dell'Occidente). The Shared Aporia: Just as Zeno argues that an arrow cannot move because it must occupy a fixed space at every moment, S. argues that any "being" -- even a passing thought or a burnt log -- is eternal by necessity. To say a being was not or will not be is to identify Being with Nothingness, violating the fundamental principle of non-contradiction.  The Perennial Italian Interest in Elea The "Italian-ness" of this tradition is significant, as Elea (modern Velia) is located in Campania. This geographic and intellectual lineage manifests in a persistent focus among Italian thinkers on the "Truth of Being" over the "History of Being".  Role of the Philosopher: In this tradition, the philosopher is not a mere historian of ideas but a testifier to destiny (Testimoniando il destino). Their role is to reveal the "originary structure" of truth that remains hidden behind the illusions of time and language.  velino, velia, parmenide, zenone, scuola di velia. Zenone il velino, Parmenide il velino, divenire, GENTILE.  G.: Nineteen. S.: Nineteen what. G.: Nineteen years old, which is old enough in Italy to write on Heidegger and metaphysics, and too young in Oxford to be trusted with a decent claret. S.: And yet there he is, in 1948, discussing Heidegger as if metaphysics were an inheritance rather than an affliction. G.: Under Bontadini it was both. That is the point. One must begin with the master, because the young man’s audacity only looks audacious if one forgets the room in which he learned to breathe. S.: Bontadini, then. G.: Bontadini first, and before him the brother. The older brother is the real prologue. Without him, one has a boy interested in mathematics and music. With him, one has a boy introduced to philosophy as a serious traffic rather than a school subject. S.: You said the brother had been at the Scuola Normale. G.: Precisely. And therefore in contact with the proper gods of the period: Gentile, Armando Carlini, Luigi Russo, Calogero. That is not merely “having read a few philosophers.” That is entry into the high air. S.: And the brother dies. G.: Yes. On the French front in 1942, as a volunteer. Which is useful, in a dark way, because it gives us the exact age difference. The brother is nine years older, so if Emanuele is thirteen in 1942, Giuseppe is twenty-two. S.: Twenty-two, on the French front, and dead. Where exactly. G.: The visible sources do not give me the exact place of death, only the front. One can say safely: the French front, 1942, and that for the younger brother it becomes both family fact and philosophical legend. S.: “He remains being and not a has-been.” G.: Very good. A Severinian elegy already. One can see how the family wound becomes ontological temptation. If the brother is not to be lost, then loss itself must be exposed as a lie of appearance. S.: That is already very nearly too neat. G.: It is too neat, but philosophy lives by over-neat retrospections. The important thing is that the brother does not merely die. He leaves behind a route: Pisa, Gentile, philosophy as vocation, and then death as interruption. S.: Which the younger man turns into eternity. G.: Eventually, yes. But not at once. At once, he turns it into a thesis. S.: Heidegger e la metafisica. G.: The title sounds broad enough to be harmless, which is always suspicious. S.: Too broad for a thesis. G.: Exactly. A thesis title that broad either hides confusion or a very pointed intervention. In this case, the latter. S.: Then tell me the point. G.: Under Bontadini, the point is not “what does Heidegger say about metaphysics?” like a school essay. The point is whether Heidegger destroys metaphysics, or whether he radicalises it enough to make a renewed metaphysics possible. S.: So the thesis is already a polemic in the guise of a survey. G.: Precisely. The title pretends to be descriptive. The intention is strategic. Young Severino is not merely reading Heidegger. He is trying to decide whether Heidegger can be brought into the service of metaphysics rather than left as its undertaker. S.: Which is very Bontadini. G.: Entirely. Bontadini’s entire seriousness lies there: modernity has wounded metaphysics; perhaps it can also be forced to heal it. A good Catholic does not surrender ontology to Germany without asking for receipts. S.: You are making Bontadini sound like a customs officer. G.: Neo-scholasticism with an office stamp. He is not a parish priest in a cassock. He is a Catholic metaphysician trained to make modern philosophy answer for itself. S.: And Pavia. G.: Pavia is not “religious” in the confessional-university sense that Milan’s Cattolica later is. But Severino’s own track there passes through Borromeo and through Bontadini’s line, so the Catholic-metaphysical atmosphere remains perfectly palpable. S.: And the Jesuit school before that. G.: Yes, the Collegio Arici in Brescia. The boy is formed under Jesuit discipline, hears the elder brother’s tales of Gentile and the Normale, and arrives under Bontadini. That is a denser formation than “student reads Heidegger after the war.” S.: Still, 1948 sounds young. G.: Nineteen is young. But Italy after the war has a way of making nineteen sound older, especially when the teachers are metaphysicians and the family has supplied a martyr-brother. S.: Then where do you place Abbagnano and the northern existentials. G.: As a neighbouring weather system. Important, certainly, but not the one that owns Severino’s first climate. Abbagnano gives one an existentialism with civic clothes. Severino begins elsewhere: with being, contradiction, and the need to answer Bontadini before he answers anyone else. S.: Croce and Gentile then recede. G.: They recede institutionally, but not spiritually. Gentile is there by voice through the brother, and by the whole Italian habit of taking idealism seriously even while declaring it obsolete. Croce is more southern weather, more civil-historical style. Severino’s route is harder, colder, more ontological. S.: And Grice. G.: Ah yes, because you cannot keep him out of any room longer than three minutes. In 1948 Grice is still very much pre-Austinian in the sense that matters here. He is not yet the public custodian of ordinary language. But already the pressure is there. S.: Which pressure. G.: The pressure to ask whether a philosopher is merely inflating grammar into ontology. S.: And Severino would be guilty of that. G.: To a Gricean ear, yes, magnificently so. Because once you let essere do all the work, and then allow l’essere and gli esseri to march onstage as if they were one well-drilled family, you have already let Italian perform a metaphysical coup. S.: “Essere” as verb, then noun, then plural noun. G.: Exactly. To be, being, beings. The slide is philosophically delicious and logically dangerous. Grice would begin sharpening tools at once. S.: “Izz” and “hazz.” G.: Precisely. “Socrates izz rational; Socrates hazz white.” One splits the uses before the noun begins to govern the world. S.: Iss what. Hazz what. G.: You are doing Severino’s work for him by sounding obtuse. The point is that “is” is too promiscuous a verb to be trusted with ontology unsupervised. Grice’s little barbarisms are instruments of chastity. S.: Severino would hate that. G.: He would think it fiddling while the house burns. He wants the whole Western house condemned for believing in becoming. S.: Ah yes, the West. G.: Which, for him, is not Somerset or Gloucestershire, however much one is tempted to hear “West” and think of cider. It is the whole Graeco-Christian-modern line after Parmenides, all the way through technology. S.: “Western civilisation? I think it would be a very good idea.” G.: Gandhi has the joke. Severino has the indictment. And that is precisely why one must keep the terms separate. He means not the Wild West, but the post-Parmenidean West. S.: Then why “return to Parmenides” later, if Heidegger never left him. G.: Because Heidegger never leaves him in the wrong way. Heidegger takes Parmenides seriously, but still leaves room for history, event, unconcealment, difference. In Severino’s eyes that is still too much becoming. S.: So he wants a stricter Parmenides than Heidegger can tolerate. G.: Exactly. “Return” means: beyond Heidegger’s historical Parmenides to the anti-becoming Parmenides who renders all becoming absurd. S.: Which begins when. G.: In germ, very early. Explicitly, 1956, with the Aristotele essay. There the anti-becoming thesis is no longer merely atmospheric. It is said outright that if a being becomes, then before becoming it was not, and that is impossible. S.: And then 1958. G.: The Structure. The original structure, if you like. The thing becomes system. Then 1964 makes it public scandal with Ritornare a Parmenide. S.: So in 1948 he is not yet the public Eleatic. G.: No, he is the gifted metaphysical son in the house of Bontadini, trying to force Heidegger to answer the question whether metaphysics is dead. S.: And what does he find. G.: He finds a path he will later betray Bontadini with. Or if one wishes to be kinder, he radicalises the line until the line breaks. S.: “You seem to have become very suspicious of Heidegger.” G.: Blame Severino. Anyone who tries to recruit Heidegger into metaphysics forces one to read the verbs with suspicion. S.: Ah yes, the verbs. Let us do werden. G.: Gladly. Werden is one of Germany’s little metaphysical scandals. It means become, and also serves the passive, and future-like constructions. The same lexical body doing too many jobs. It is almost as if grammar were trying to warn one not to trust a single word with all that power. S.: And divenire. G.: Better in one respect, because the venire inside it remains visible: a coming-into-something. Italian exposes the movement. English become is less helpfully obscure, as English likes to be. German werden is shamelessly overworked. S.: Would Severino care. G.: Hardly. He is not a philosopher of the conjugations in the Oxford sense. He would say: whatever your language does, if it says or presupposes that beings come from nothing and return to nothing, it is mad. S.: Presupposes or entails. G.: There you go, wanting the implicature. Yes, this is where a Gricean grumbles. Severino often sounds as if ordinary language presupposes becoming in a heavy ontological sense, when a patient analyst might say: no, it only carries a defeasible implication, or trades on useful dramatic shorthand, or simply marks a before-and-after state without metaphysical bravado. S.: “Mourning becomes Electra.” G.: Precisely. A title that proves the English verb “become” is not always ontological. It can be costume, role, decorum, succession, dramatic transformation, even social propriety. S.: So one might reduce becoming to initial and final states, as the analysts do. G.: Exactly. Wood at t1t_1t1​, ash at t2t_2t2​. Relative identity, time-relative predication, state-transition. Wiggins later becomes very good at making these distinctions sound inevitable. Warnock asks after metaphysics in logic and the meaning behind existential quantification. Davidson and Reichenbach give you event-structure. Myro and Geach worry identity through time. All these are reductive strategies. S.: And Severino refuses them. G.: Entirely. Because for him reduction is already surrender. If you “analyse” becoming, you have not removed its poison; you have merely diluted it. S.: So he is an eliminationist. G.: In ontology, yes. Not in ordinary speech. He does not forbid Italians to say diventa cenere. He says the philosopher must know that no being has truly gone into nothing. S.: That sounds like reduction in disguise. G.: No. It is reinterpretation with ontological ferocity. The verb may survive in the marketplace; it has lost its title to truth in philosophy. S.: Which is why critics might complain he protests too much. G.: Indeed. If “beings” are already treated abstractly enough, of course they look eternal. The question is Cleopatra, not gli essenti. Cleopatra becomes ash, says history. Severino says: only in appearance. A Gricean says: perhaps the issue is just that historical grammar and ontology are not the same game. S.: Cleopatra is beautiful. G.: Historical present as quiet anti-Severinianism. Ordinary language keeps dead persons present without abolishing time. That is precisely the sort of thing he mistrusts, and precisely the sort of thing an Oxford philosopher would inspect before legislating. S.: Then is Severino simply mistranslating history into ontology. G.: To a Gricean, yes, or at least risking it magnificently. But to Severino, you are merely refusing to follow the principle of non-contradiction where it leads. S.: Which brings us to Zeno. G.: Naturally. Reductio by way of stubbornness. The Eleatic line is not mere poetry for him. It is the originary proof that movement and becoming, taken literally, collapse. S.: And did he do proper philology on Parmenides and Zeno. G.: Not in the way a classicist would admire. He is not Wiggins poring over Greek particles, nor one of those Italians who write lovingly about the gate of Elea. He uses philology enough to secure his “authentic Parmenides,” but his aim is not to reconstruct the man. It is to enlist the witness. S.: So Parmenides is not a text, but a station. G.: A station, a judge, and a blade. He returns to Parmenides in order to cut the whole tradition down. S.: And Bontadini would have thought what of that. G.: First delight, then alarm, then eventually public break. The son had taken the family silver and turned it into a weapon against the family. S.: Catholic enough. G.: Entirely. That is the beauty of Italy: the most devastating heresies are often generated from impeccable metaphysical training. S.: One almost hears Newman muttering about all this from Oriel. G.: Newman would at least admire the seriousness, though not the destination. Oxford, in 1948, does not yet quite know what to do with Heidegger. Italy knows too well. S.: And what of Grice’s BBC “Metaphysics” with Pears and Strawson. G.: There you have the contrast. In England, postwar metaphysics under ordinary-language pressures asks after Carnap, anti-metaphysical scruples, the survivability of old questions under new grammar. In northern Italy, the same period allows a nineteen-year-old to ask whether Heidegger can be made to serve metaphysics, and eventually whether the whole West is insane for speaking of becoming. S.: It does make Oxford look provincial. G.: Oxford is always provincial when it is at its cleverest. That is part of its charm. S.: Was Italy’s analytic society then born against Severino. G.: Not against him alone, no. But against the whole temptation of letting high ontology ride unchecked over logic, language, and science. Severino is merely one spectacular summit of the old mountain. S.: And his school. G.: Yes, he leaves a school. Or at least a line of disciples, continuators, respectful defectors, and men who spend half their lives explaining that they are not Severinians while keeping his books on the nearest shelf. S.: A proper Italian immortality, then. G.: Better than a posthumous pardon, certainly. S.: One last thing. If the brother dies at twenty-two in 1942, and Emanuele is thirteen, then 1948 is only six years later. G.: Exactly. Which is why the thesis is not a leisurely youthful exercise. It is an entry into philosophy under the sign of loss, mastership, and urgency. A nineteen-year-old under Bontadini writing on Heidegger in order to decide whether metaphysics can still be spoken after catastrophe. S.: That is rather better than “Heidegger e la metafisica” sounded at first. G.: Most good thesis titles are better than they sound, just as most Oxford lectures are worse. S.: And the final difference between Grice and Severino. G.: Grice thinks becoming requires analysis. Severino thinks becoming requires execution. S.: Execution in the metaphysical sense. G.: In Italy one always has to specify that too late.Grice: Caro Severino, mi perdoni: “Velia” mi suona quasi come un vicino di casa—e invece, per me che vengo da Vadum Boum, è più lontana di certi sillogismi che mi porto dietro in valigia. Severino: Vicino di casa? Velia è Elea: qui la distanza non si misura in miglia, ma in aporie. E se vieni da Vadum Boum, allora sei già allenato: anche lì, a forza di logica, si cammina senza muoversi. Grice: Appunto: Velia è così “vicina” al pensiero—e così “lontana” dalla mia varsity—che mi viene da dire che c’è davvero “molto di cui scrivere a casa” (cioè: c’è un sacco da raccontare). E poi, già che ci siamo: chiamarla “non‑contraddizione” non è un po’ ridondante? Se non e contra vanno nella stessa direzione, sembra quasi una “dizione” che si mette due volte il cappotto per paura del vento. Severino: La tua implicatura, Grice, è propriamente eleatica – per cui intendo: oltre ogni concepibile auto‑contraddizione! Hai fatto di Velia un paradosso geografico e di “non‑contraddizione” un esercizio di sobrietà linguistica: qui, in effetti, anche la ridondanza finisce per confessare l’Uno. Severino, Emanuele (1948). Heidegger a la metafisica. Sotto Bonatdini. Pavia.

Severo Alessandro (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo. Grice and Alexander Severus can be productively compared as figures who each embody, in very different registers, the idea that rationality is not merely abstract but enacted within socially governed practices of speech and authority. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning holds that communication is structured by shared rational expectations: speakers rely on cooperative norms so that hearers can infer intentions that go beyond literal utterance, making implicature—not explicit statement—the central engine of meaning. Alexander Severus, styled in later sources as a “philosopher prince,” represents a political analogue of this idea rather than a semantic one: educated in philosophy (traditionally linked with jurists and teachers such as Ulpian and, in your passage, Stilio), he aspired to rule through moderation, counsel, and intelligible justification rather than sheer force. His failure as emperor underscores an instructive contrast with Grice: where Grice theorizes stable background norms that make implicature calculable and communication resilient, Severus governed a Roman world in which such shared norms had eroded, so that reasoned discourse no longer reliably coordinated expectations between ruler, army, and populace. The playful dialogue captures this poignantly: Grice’s ironic implicatures (“Caesar lives—until he dies again”) presuppose a rational audience attuned to what is meant rather than said, while Severus’s historical predicament shows what happens when power outruns the conversational conditions that make rational meaning effective. In this way, Grice provides the theory Severus lacked the world to sustain: a framework in which rational silence, understatement, and irony can function only where a cooperative conversational order still holds. He studies philosophy with Stilio . He becomes the principe di Roma when his cousin Elagabalo is assassinated. His principate is not however a success and he is himself assassinated not long after. So much for the line of succession.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Severe Alexandrē: dīcunt tē Stiliō philosophante philosophiae deditum esse—at eōdem tempore principātum tibi, quasi togam nimis lātam, imposuērunt. SEVERVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: cum Elagabalus concidisset, ego “successor” appellātus sum; sed in Rōmā, ut scīs, successiō saepe celerius currit quam ratio. GRICEVS: Immo vero: apud nōs fit quasi illud vetus—“Caesar mortuus est: vīvat Caesar!”—nisi quod Rōma addere vidētur: “Caesar mortuus est: vīvat Caesar—donec iterum moriātur.” SEVERVS: Historice vera inplicātūra tua, Grice—eam amō, et amō quanta cum benignitāte dīcās! Sed ūnum cave: nē mē “Caesarem” vocēs—nimis mihi sonat quasi sectiō Caesarea, et mea māter, dīs volentibus, numquam eā indiguit! Severo, S. Alessandro (a. u. c. CMLXXV). Dicta. Roma.

Claudio Severo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del’amico lizio d’Antonino. Paul Grice and Claudio (Claudius) Severus can be fruitfully compared as thinkers who locate rationality not in abstract formalism but in lived practices of interaction, though they articulate this insight in very different historical idioms. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning holds that what speakers mean is structured by shared rational expectations—later formulated as the Cooperative Principle and its maxims—through which hearers infer intentions that go beyond what is explicitly said; silence, understatement, or irony can therefore be as meaningful as literal assertion. Severo, as a Roman Stoic associated with Antoninus Pius and later admired by Marcus Aurelius, operates without a technical semantics but with a practical ethics of discourse: reason (ratio) is exercised socially, among friends and fellow citizens, where measured speech, timely restraint, and intelligent silence are marks of wisdom. Where Grice analyzes how unspoken implications are rationally calculable within conversation, Severo treats that same phenomenon normatively, as a virtue of the rational agent who knows when not to speak and how meaning circulates within shared forms of life. The playful exchange attributed to them captures this convergence: for both, reason “laughs even when it is silent,” because rational meaning is not exhausted by words but emerges from culturally and ethically governed conversational practices. A lizio, friend of Antonino. GRICEVS: Severe, amice Antonini, ratio nostra conversans ridet etiam cum tacet—idne non est pulcherrimum? SEVERVS: Pulcherrimum sane, Grice, nam cum bene taceamus, saepe plus dicimus quam cum clamoribus. GRICEVS: Ergo consentimus: non verba sola valent, sed ea quae inter verba callide innuuntur. SEVERVS: Ita est, et Roma ipsa consentit—sapientia enim inter pocula et amicos maxime floret. Severo, Claudio (a. u. c. CMXX). Dicta. Roma.

Lucio Settimio Severo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo. The comparison between Grice and Lucius Septimius Severus, as staged in the passage, turns on a shared ideal of rational governance grounded in conversation rather than mere authority, though each embodies it in a different register: Severus represents the ancient model of the princeps philosophus, according to which imperial power is legitimized and humanized through cultivated discourse, amicitia, and the public display of ratio as a lived virtue rather than as coercive command, so that rule without doctrina is blind and friendship without sermo barren. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, by contrast, abstracts this ethical–political intuition into a general account of how rationality operates in language itself: meaning arises not from status, power, or formal utterance, but from cooperative participation in conversation, where intentions are recognized, implicatures grasped, and reason silently governs exchange. The dialogue’s conceit brings these together by having Severus acknowledge that Grice’s “unheard‑of implicature” is less a criticism than a reminder: even philosophical talk at a banquet risks degenerating into self‑celebration unless conversational reason restrains vanity and redirects attention toward mutual understanding. In this sense, Severus exemplifies in political life what Grice theorizes at the level of linguistic practice: authority, whether imperial or semantic, is sustained only when exercised through shared rational norms that allow others to understand, respond, and sometimes simply smile. Grice supplies the analytic grammar of this insight, while Severus embodies its ethical and civic aspiration, showing that the philosopher‑prince and the philosopher of language converge on the same principle: rationality governs not by domination, but by intelligible, proportionate, and recognizably human conversation. Severo rules the Roman empire and it is said that he is well-versed in philosophy. GRICEVS: Salvē, Severe. Audīvī tē, principem philosophum, inter convīvās nōn minus de ratiōne quam de vīnō disserere—quod est (ut putō) rarius quam Falernum vetus. SEVERVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita est: philosophiam inter convīvās praetulī; nam et imperium sine doctrinā caecum est, et amīcitia sine sermone ieiūna. GRICEVS: Bene dicis; sed saepe animadvertō, dum “amīcitiam” laudāmus, ipsī nos laudāre incipimus—quasi convivium sī sit sapientius, id statim probet convīvās sapientēs esse; atque ita, dum de ratiōne colloquimur, ratiō ipsa quasi sella curūlis in mediō tricliniī ponitur. SEVERVS: Inaudīta est inplicātūra tua—et eam amō, Grice! Nam, dum de Antonīnō et amīcitiā loquī vidēris, admonēs nē sermō noster in pompam vertātur: interdum enim optima philosophia est, cum princeps rīdet et amīcus intellegit. Severo, Lucio Settimio (a. u. c. CMXLVI). Dicta. Roma

Widar Cesarini Sforza (Forli, Romagna): Grice: la ragione conversazionale dell’iustum/iussum – tra idealismo e positivismo. Sforza and Grice can be fruitfully compared as theorists of normative meaning who both resist reductive positivism, yet articulate that resistance at different levels of analysis: Sforza, working within Italian legal and neo‑idealist philosophy, frames ragione conversazionale around the distinction between iussum, the enacted command of positive law, and iustum, the prior and living reality of justice as it is recognised, shared, and sustained within a community, so that juridical meaning arises from social recognition and ethical life rather than mere legislative force; Grice, by contrast, reconstructs reason‑governed meaning at the level of ordinary conversation, showing how what an utterance means cannot be reduced to its conventional form or authoritative issuance, but depends on rational cooperation, mutual recognition of intentions, and shared normative expectations. Where Sforza argues that a command lacks genuine authority unless it can be taken up as iustum within the social consciousness of those subject to it, Grice similarly shows that an utterance, however formally correct, fails to mean what it purports to mean unless it is intelligible within a framework of rational conversational practices governed by principles of relevance, sincerity, and cooperation. The parallel is structural rather than doctrinal: Sforza’s critique of legal positivism anticipates, in jurisprudential terms, Grice’s critique of purely formal or causal accounts of meaning, with both thinkers insisting that normativity precedes mere enactment or encoding. Yet they diverge in scope and method: Sforza embeds conversational reason in an ontological and historical account of social life, where justice is a mode of being before it is a rule, whereas Grice deliberately abstracts from history and institutions to identify the minimal rational conditions under which any act of saying can count as meaningful at all. In this way, Sforza offers a civil‑ethical deepening of the same intuition that animates Grice’s pragmatics: command without recognition is empty, just as utterance without rational uptake is merely noise, and in both law and language it is shared reason, exercised in interaction, that confers validity. S.’s emphasis on the distinction between iussum -- the mere command or positive law -- and iustum -- the truly just or intrinsic justice -- bridges legal theory and mainstream Italian philosophy by challenging the dominance of legal positivism through the lens of neo-idealism and existentialism.  Philosophical Integration Neo-Idealist Roots: Following the influence of CROCE  and GENTILE , S. argues that law is not a static set of rules – iussum -- but a living expression of the human spirit -- iustum. This shifts the focus of mainstream Italian thought from formalist structures to the "concrete experience" of the individual and society. Social Reality and "Juridicity": S. introduces the idea of the "sociality of law," suggesting that any organised social group produces its own iustum. This concept influences broader Italian philosophical debates regarding the nature of the state versus civil society, asserting that justice precedes the legislative command. Ontological Shift: By prioritising iustum, S. aligns legal philosophy with the broader Italian philosophical move toward phenomenology. Law is re-defined as an ontological category -- a way of being in the world —, rather than a mere instrument of political power.  Impact on Mainstream Thought This distinction allowed Italian philosophers to critique authoritarianism by arguing that a law – iussum -- lacks validity if it contradicts the underlying ethical fabric – iustum -- of the community. This perspective remains a cornerstone in Italian intellectual history, influencing contemporary discussions on human rights and the ethical foundations of democracy.  For further academic exploration of his legal philosophy, you can view his core texts on PhilPapersor access historical overviews of Italian Legal Philosophy.” iussum, iustum. Direttore del Resto del Carlino. Insegna a Roma. iussum, iustum.  Grice: Ah, caro Sforza, permettimi di dire che solo io, letterato e umanista, riesco a cogliere davvero tutta la forza che si cela dietro l’iussum e l’iustum — come nessun altro saprà mai! Ti ringrazio sinceramente per aver portato questa fine distinzione in un consesso così stimolante.  Sforza: Grice, è proprio il tuo spirito raffinato che sa vedere oltre la superficie delle leggi. Per me, il vero senso del diritto sta nel suo essere giusto, non solo comandato — e sono lieto che tu lo riconosca con tanta profondità.  Grice: È la concretezza dell’esperienza, caro Sforza, che ci fa ricordare quanto la giustizia debba precedere ogni comando. Solo chi vive il diritto come forma dell’essere può capirlo fino in fondo.  Sforza: Hai ragione, Grice! Se tutti avessero il tuo sguardo, forse non ci sarebbero leggi che tradiscono la vera giustizia. D’altronde, come si dice in Emilia, “la legge senza giustizia è come un pane senza sale.” Sforza, Widar Cesarini (1908). Dissertazione. Giurisprudenza. Parma.

Pietro Siciliani (Galatina, Terra d’Otranto, Puglia): Grice: “La ragione conversazionale e la critica della filosofia zoologica e la psico-genia di Vico. Siciliani and Grice converge on the idea that reason is not an abstract faculty operating independently of human practices but is instead constituted and exercised within historically situated forms of interaction, yet they arrive there from different directions and with different emphases: Siciliani, working explicitly in the Vichian tradition, treats “ragione conversazionale” as an expression of a broader historical–civil rationality in which thought, language, institutions, and collective life develop organically together, so that meaning and normativity arise from psychogenetic and civic processes rather than from zoological or naturalistic reductions of the human mind; Grice, by contrast, reconstructs conversational reason analytically, not by appeal to national history or civil continuity, but by isolating the normative principles implicitly governing ordinary communicative practice, showing how meaning is generated and recognized through intentions, mutual attitudes, and rational expectations within conversation. Where Siciliani uses Vico to criticize philosophical zoology and globalized abstraction by insisting that rationality is inseparable from the lived historical identity of a people, Grice brackets such civil-historical commitments and asks how any rational agent, regardless of cultural provenance, can mean something by an utterance at all; yet the affinity is real, because Grice’s theory also rejects both biological psychologism and brute causal models of language, grounding meaning instead in a shared space of reasons that exists only through cooperative human action. In this sense, Siciliani’s Vichian conversational reason supplies a genealogical and cultural deepening of what Grice articulates in a formal, procedural key: for both, reason is neither zoological instinct nor detached logical calculus, but a normative achievement sustained by human interaction, with the difference that Siciliani locates its unity in the historical life of a civilization, while Grice locates it in the minimal rational structure presupposed by any genuine conversation. S.’s exploration of philosophical continuity via VICO  highlights a distinctive Italian trait: the  "historical-civil" method, which prioritises the organic development of a national culture over abstract globalist models. The Italian Philosophical Tradition Unlike many overseas "globalist" philosophical trends that favour universalism and ahistorical logic, S.'s approach emphasises several unique characteristics of the Italian tradition: Historical Realism: Rooted in VICO ’s scienza, this tradition views human truth (verum) as synonymous with what is made or done by humans (factum). S. seeks to reconcile positivism with this historical consciousness, arguing that scientific progress must align with a nation's specific historical identity rather than being imported as a generic template. Civil Continuity: S. identifies a lineage connecting VICO ’s "heroic age" to the contemporary Italian state, positioning philosophy as an instrument for civil education rather than just abstract speculation. Cultural Particularism: In globalist scenarios, local traditions are often viewed as obstacles to universal rationality. By contrast, S. uses VICO  to demonstrate that true progress occurs through the "creative transformation" of one's own national heritage.  Rare Trait vs. Globalist Scenarios Identity over Abstraction: While overseas globalist philosophies often seek a "view from nowhere," S.’s work suggests that philosophy is inextricably linked to the political and social reality of its people. la ragion teologica. psico-genia di Vico, ateneo felsineo, l’unita organica della filosofia, zoologia filosofica, psicogenia, “I principii metafisici di Vico. Grice: Caro Siciliani, permettimi una riflessione da “gentiluomo accademico”: Collingwood e Hampshire, là nella selvaggia Vadus Boum—come chiamiamo affettuosamente la nostra “università” (o meglio, il nostro “ateneo”)—hanno in qualche modo mantenuto vivo lo spirito di Vico. Se questo non è un ossimoro: lo spirito, per definizione, non può che essere vivo! Siciliani: Ah, Grice, mi colpisce come tu riesca sempre a cogliere il legame tra la tradizione e l’attualità. Vico, infatti, ci ha insegnato che la verità nasce dal “factum,” dall’azione umana, e proprio per questo la sua filosofia respira ancora tra noi, proprio negli atenei dove la storia si intreccia con la cultura. Grice: Vico, con la sua “psico-genia” e la civiltà organica, ha avuto una visione che va oltre l’abstract universale. In fondo, come direbbe un vecchio proverbio italiano, “ogni terra ha la sua storia”—e la filosofia vera si radica nell’identità culturale, non in modelli globalisti importati. Siciliani: Esatto, Grice! La filosofia italiana si distingue proprio per questa continuità storica e civile. Solo attraverso la “trasformazione creativa” della nostra eredità nazionale possiamo costruire un pensiero autentico. Del resto, come dicevano i nostri maestri: “la ragione teologica e la psico-genia sono il cuore pulsante della nostra tradizione.” Siciliani, Pietro (1859). Dissertazione. Sotto Cesare Studiati. Facolta di Medicina, Pisa.

Sidonio Appolinare (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’implicaturis – inplicatura Lewis/Short. The comparison between Grice and Sidonius Apollinaris is unusually direct and philological, because it touches not only on shared intuitions about indirectness in communication but on a shared lexical history: Sidonius, a late Roman aristocrat, politician, and letter-writer, uses inplicatura to mock the self-entangling verbal knots of peripatetic philosophers, already treating meaning as something that can be folded, wrapped, or left tactically unresolved for an intelligent reader to unpack; Grice, centuries later, builds his theory of conversational implicature on precisely this idea, insisting that communicative reason operates by leaving things “in the fold,” trusting the audience to infer what is meant without explicit articulation; both reject the view that meaning is exhausted by what is formally said, and both treat understanding as a rational achievement governed by shared practices rather than psychological suggestion; Sidonius’s epistolary wit relies on his reader’s competence in recognizing when philosophical language has become over-involuted and when a smile is intended rather than a doctrine, just as Grice’s implicatures rely on cooperative norms that license hearers to move beyond literal semantics toward intended sense; the difference is scale rather than principle: Sidonius exposes inplicatura as a stylistic and philosophical vice or virtue within elite literary culture, while Grice systematizes implicature as a general mechanism of reason-governed conversation, but in both cases meaning lives not in isolated propositions, but in what rational interlocutors can responsibly unwrap together. Grice: “When I coined ‘implicature,’ I had followed Austin’s advice of ‘going through the dictionary.’ Only this time I got hold of Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary, which has an entry for ‘in[sic]plicatura,’ as used by Sidonius. The reference is to the entanglements made by the peripatetics, so the quote was bound to amuse me!” -- Filosofo italiano. Sidonio Appolinare – follows a political career. He writes a number of letters in which he makes reference to philosophers and philosophical issues. He claims, for example, that Cleante di Assus bites his nails. Grice: “Implicature is a natural thing in Roman. You have -plicare, you add in-plicare, and then you conjugate!” – Keywords: inplicatura, implicatura, implicature, disimplicatura. GRICEVS: Salvē, Sidoni. Moneō tantum: recta sonat in-plicatūra—in cum plicāre; nōn est “im-” quasi premere, sed in-plicāre, id est involvere. SIDONIVS: Salvē, Grice. Bene mones; et tamen philosophōs ipsōs saepe videō peripateticōs ligātōs vernāculīs inplicātūrīs, ita ut, dum nodōs quaerunt, in nodīs haereant. GRICEVS: Id ipsum est quod me subtristāt: nam in sermone, dum res manet in plicātūrā (duōbus verbīs, quasi in sinu), amīcus aliquid suave colligit; at cum ad chartam venit et fit inplicātūra (ūnō verbō), saepe una littera totum leporem quasi explicat. SIDONIVS: Inplicātūram optimam quam numquam audīvī, Grice! Nam dum de litterā quereris, ipse docēs quomodo verba, sive divisa sive compōsita, aut nodum servent aut solvant—quod et peripateticīs utile esset, etiamsi ipsīs plērumque super caput eat. Sidonio, Appolinare (a. u. c. MCCVII). Epistula. Roma.

Scipione Sighele (Brescia, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e la ragione italiana. The comparison between Grice and Scipione Sighele brings into relief two complementary approaches to the problem of collective meaning, one micro-pragmatic and one macro-social, both grounded in reason rather than irrational fusion: Sighele, writing at the turn of the twentieth century as a psychologist, sociologist, and criminologist, analyzes crowds, criminal couples, sects, and political masses as rationally intelligible formations, where responsibility, complicity, and cooperation persist even when individuals act as a “we,” resisting the idea that collective action dissolves agency into blind contagion; Grice, from the opposite direction, builds his theory of conversational meaning on the irreducibility of rational norms governing even the smallest social unit—two speakers—showing how meaning emerges from shared intentions, mutual recognition, and rule-governed inference rather than from mere psychological association; where Sighele insists that a crowd or criminal pair does not abolish accountability but reorganizes it through patterns of influence and participation, Grice similarly argues that conversational understanding does not collapse into noise when speakers multiply, but is sustained by cooperative principles that scale from dyads to groups; both reject mystical explanations of the social mind, converging instead on the idea that Italian social life—whether in the café, the courtroom, the crowd, or the conversation—remains structured by reasoned expectations, negotiated responsibility, and the ever-present impulse to argue, respond, and infer. ApS. was an Italian philosopher, -- who was described as a  psychologist, sociologist, and criminologist, best known as a pioneer of ‘mass psychology’ – Grice: “What Searle, at his infamous institute, called ‘social ontology’!” – S. is primarily known for his early wok on CROWD behaviour – “Laurel and Hardy” – ‘two’s company, three’s a crowd” – and collective psychology – ‘the ‘we’ of my ‘Personal Identity’ – Grice --, particulary his debate with Tarde and Bon on the subject of CRIMINAL responsibility – “if he did it it was wrong” – Grice – within a crowd. His most famous work is “La folla delinquent, Saggio di psicologia colletiva” – La Teorica positive della complicita e la cooperativita – a work on the positive theory of complicity and cooperation (bedfellows) in crime. Le crime a DEUX – Mungojerry and Rumpelteazer, the dynamic duo – an essay on the psychology of a criminal couple Bob Hoksins and Cheryl Ascombe in Pennies from Heaven. Psychologie des sected – a study of Crotona, examining sects such as Pythagoras’s – as ‘a chronic form of the rowd.’ La donna e l’amore: a work dealing with women and love, exploring the legal and ideological constraints on wommen’s emancipation in the fin de siècle era. Contro il parlamentarismo: a book on the crituique of parliamentarism. Giachetti SCIPIO S. IL PENSIERO, IL CARATTERE. Conferenza detta alla “ Pro Cultura „ di Firenze nel trigesimo della morte Col ritratto di S. Muore a Firenze. -- è stato uno psicologo, sociologo, criminologo ed esponente importante del nazionalismo italiano. Nasce da Gualtiero e Angelica Pedrotti. Suo padre, di origine trentina, è un magistrato negli anni seguenti l'unità d'Italia alla procura del Re a Palermo, così come il nonno Scipione. Dopo il liceo studia con FERRERO  e ZERBOGLIO  -- seguaci del criminologo LOMBROSO  -- e si laurea a Roma con FERRI. Grice: Caro Sighele, ho sempre pensato che in Italia le folle siano così creative che persino la confusione diventa un’opera d’arte. Forse è per questo che la tua “psicologia collettiva” qui ci calza a pennello, come il cappello su una statua di Garibaldi a Carnevale! Sighele: Grice, hai proprio ragione! Da noi, tra cori da stadio e code all’ufficio postale, la folla è sempre protagonista. Forse dovrei scrivere un capitolo su “La folla che aspetta il 730”, dove la pazienza è più un mistero che una virtù. Grice: Eh, Sighele, ma ricorda: in Italia si dice “dove sono in tre nasce un partito”, ma basta il secondo per fondare una corrente dissidente! Così la vera complicità non è del crimine, ma del caffè condiviso al bar—al massimo con due bustine di zucchero e una polemica sul risultato della partita. Sighele: Ammirevole implicatura la tua, Grice! Con un solo colpo hai illustrato la mia teoria: qui il vero motore della collettività è la voglia di discutere, e il crimine peggiore è dimenticare chi paga il giro di espressi! Sighele, Scipione (1891). La folla delinquente. Torino: Bocca.

Bon Compagno da Signa (Signa, Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale della ruota di Venere. The comparison between Grice and Boncompagno da Signa highlights a deep continuity between medieval rhetorical theory and modern pragmatics in treating meaning as a product of reason-governed social practice rather than purely semantic content: Boncompagno, teaching ars dictaminis at Bologna and Padua, conceives rhetoric as a disciplined art of managing expectations, roles, and effects within concrete communicative situations, where forms like the Rota Veneris deliberately guide the reader or addressee through patterned emotional and interpretive possibilities that depend on shared conventions rather than literal statement; similarly, Grice’s theory of conversational meaning rests on the idea that what speakers mean is anchored in rational cooperation, where inferential movement from what is said to what is understood is regulated by norms of relevance, propriety, and mutual intelligibility; Boncompagno’s playful treatment of love letters, friendship, and even erotic misalignment works precisely because sender and recipient know how such genres function and how their turns on the “wheel” license certain inferences and block others, just as Grice’s implicatures succeed only because conversationalists tacitly respect a common rational framework; in both cases, meaning is not encoded mechanically but generated through an economy of intentions, expectations, and shared craftsmanship, whether in medieval epistolography or modern ordinary conversation. Insegna retorica (“ars dictaminis”) a Bologna e Padova. Vive ad Ancona, Venezia, Bologna, Padova, e Firenze. Tra i saggi più significativi si ricordano il saggio storico “L’assedio d’Ancona” (Viella, Roma), il “Bon Compagno”; “Rethorica novissima”; “Scacchi e il “Libellus de malo senectutis et senis”, nel quale, con spirito arguto, prende in giro le affermazioni di Cicerone che idealizzano la vecchiaia”; la “Rota Veneris” (Salerno), un saggio di epistolo-grafia amorosa; “Liber de amicitia”; “Ysagoge Boncompagnus; “Tractatus virtutum”; “Palma Oliva Cedrum Mirra Quinque tabulae salutationum”;  “Bonus Socius e Civis Bononiae. Garbini, Roma, Salerno, Gabrielli, Le epistole di Cola di Rienzo e l'epistolografia, Archivio della Società romana di storia patria, Gaudenzi, Sulla cronologia delle opere dei dettatori bolognesi da S. a Bene da Lucca, Bullettino dell'Istituto storico italiano, G. Manacorda, Storia della scuola in Italia, Palermo, Tateo,  Enciclopedia dantesca,  Treccani Dizionario biografico degl’italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. S., su ALCUIN, Ratisbona.  Wight: S.'s charter doctrine (Bologna), in: Medieval Diplomatic and the 'ars dictandi', Scrineum. Keywords: Cicerone, “ars dictaminis” – o rettorica --. rota veneris – erotica – ermafrodita – erma: mercurio, afrodita, venere, afrodisiaco. Signa: Caro Grice, se mi chiedi della “ruota di Venere”, ti dirò che qui a Signa gira più la fantasia che le biciclette! Tra retorica ed epistole amorose, mi sa che la ruota si ferma spesso sul cuore...  Grice: Ah, Signa, a Firenze dicono che la ruota di Venere porta fortuna agli innamorati, ma a Bologna porta solo lettere d’amore sbagliate! Forse è la colpa dell’ars dictaminis, che fa girare la testa, non la ruota.  Grice: Del resto, se la ruota di Venere gira troppo, rischia di perdere un bullone... e magari Cupido finisce con l’arco storto! Ma se la ruota si ferma, allora è tempo di scrivere una lettera – magari una d’amicizia, che non si consuma come l’amore, ma dura più a lungo di una gomma nuova.  Signa: Meravigliosa implicatura, Grice! Hai girato intorno alla ruota senza mai fermarti, e ora capisco perché la retorica è davvero una questione di cuore... e di ruote ben oliate! Signa, Bon Compagno da (1215). Rhetorica. Bologna.

Tiberio Cazio Asconio Silio Italico (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale a Roma – la maledizione di Dione – Scipione come Ercole – il sacrificio dell’eroe. The comparison between Grice and Silius Italicus brings out, across very different genres, a shared reliance on reason-governed practices to generate meaning beyond what is explicitly stated: Silius, a lawyer, consul, and later poet of the Roman principate, writes the Punica as an epic that openly depends on rhetorical, civic, and cultural reason, where Scipio is deliberately framed as a new Hercules, Dion’s curse functions less as literal doom than as a narratively managed signal, and heroism emerges through patterns of sacrifice, endurance, and exemplarity that an informed Roman audience is expected to recognize and complete; likewise, Grice’s theory of conversational meaning insists that understanding arises from rational cooperation, where what is meant cannot be reduced to what is said but depends on shared assumptions about relevance, intention, and intelligibility; in Silius, calling Scipio “Herculean” is not mere ornament but a controlled invitation to the audience to draw licensed inferences about virtue, labor, and mortal cost, just as in Grice an utterance achieves its force by relying on norms that guide hearers to move from literal content to justified implications; both figures, one in epic and one in philosophy, thus treat meaning as something governed by rational practices embedded in social life—whether the Roman forum and literary tradition or ordinary conversation—where form, context, and audience reasoning do the decisive work. Avvocato, console, pro-console de principato romano. Muore in Campania. Figli: Lucio Silio Deciano. Console, Proconsole in Asia. Noto semplicemente come S. Italico è anche un poeta, avvocato e politico romano, autore dei Punicorum libri XVII, il più lungo poema epico latino pervenutoci. Abbiamo notizie di lui da una lettera di PLINIO il Giovane a Caninio RUFO, nella quale parla della sua morte. Il nome ‘Asconio’ porta a ritenere che e legato alla gens patavine. Altre brevi informazioni ci vengono da TACITO e da Marziale. Di Marziale, S. è il patrono e sappiamo che opera nel foro come avvocato difensore, probabilmente già al principato di CLAUDIO. Secondo Plinio, nel principato di Nerone, dove esercitare anche l'avvocatura d'accusa, ovvero la delazione vera e falsa per il favore del principe. Il beneficio che ne tratta e il consolato ordinario. Con la caduta e morte di Nerone, in quanto amico di Vitellio, S. partecipa alle trattative di questi con il fratello di Vespasiano, Tito Flavio Sabino, che è a Roma con il figlio di Vespasiano, Domiziano.  S. è pro-console in Asia Minore agl’ordini di VESPASIANO. Testimonianza è un'epigrafe ad Afrodisia, che riporta il suo nome completo. Allo scadere del mandato pro-consolare S. si ritira dalla vita politica attiva dedicandosi agli studi e alla stesura del suo “Punicorum libri”.  Nel Libro III vi è un riferimento al titolo di "Germanico" assunto da Domiziano e Marziale saluta l'opera nel IV libro degl’epigrammi. Anche a causa dello stato di salute aggiorna a Campania, dove compra la villa di CICERONE, il suo modello di oratoria, e la terra che custodia la tomba di VIRGILIO, di cui è un estimatore e ai cui stilemi si rifà abbondantemente nel corso dei Punica. SCIPIONE, l’eroe nudo. Silio, and the labours of Ercole. Tiberio Cazio Asconio Silio Italico.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Silī! Audīvī tē Rōmae Scīpiōnem tamquam Herculēm canere, et Dionis maledictionem quasi condimentum carminis addere. Num etiam in foro versūs tuī causās vincunt? SILIVS: Salvē, Grice. In foro verba iūrantur, in carmine volant. Sed Scīpiō—ille vere laborāvit; ego tantum labōrēs eius numerō et in hexametrōs compingō. GRICEVS: Ita est. (Sed mirum quam saepe apud nōs, dum de factīs disserimus, ipsa ratio narrandī rem vincat: nam ubi “Herculem” nominās, audītōr iam ante triumphat, et maledictiō ipsa, quae terrēre posset, fit quasi titulus ad recitandum.) Dic ergo: cum “Scīpiōnem-Herculēm” pingis, sacrificiumne magis ostendis an gloriam? SILIVS: O inplicatūram dīvīnam, Grice! Nam intellegō quid subesset: nōn tantum quid dicāmus, sed quō modō dicāmus facit ut vir paulatim deus videātur; et maledictiō, quae olim pondus habuit, in carmine saepe tantum sonet—Dionēm verberante, sed Scīpiōne rīdente. Silio Italico, Tiberio Cazio Asconio (a. u. c. DCCCXL). Punica. Roma.

Lucio Cornellio Silla (Roma, Lazio): la regione conversazionale della ta meta ta physika. The comparison between Grice and Lucius Cornelius Sulla turns on the idea that meaning, whether textual or conversational, emerges from orderly human agency rather than from metaphysical mystery: Sulla’s historically consequential act of transferring Aristotle’s scattered corpus to Rome, and appointing Tyrannion to sort it, produced—almost accidentally—the category name ta meta ta physika, merely a librarian’s positional label for books placed after the physics, yet one that later philosophy reified into a substantive discipline; Grice treats this episode as exemplary of his broader thesis that rational structure precedes theoretical elevation, since what later looks like deep metaphysical necessity originates in practical, reason-governed activities governed by intelligible purposes and cooperative constraints, just as conversational meaning arises not from hidden semantic essences but from speakers’ publicly recognizable intentions operating within shared norms; where Sulla’s Rome converts an archival convenience into metaphysics, Grice insists that philosophy must reverse the illusion by explaining how such meanings are generated through rational practices—cataloguing, sorting, conversing—so that “meta” is not a realm beyond reason but a by-product of reason’s orderly handling of what comes next, whether books after physics or implications after what is said. Apellicon, a member of the Lizio, acquires an extensive collection of the works of Aristotle and Teofrasto that had once belonged to Neleo, della Scessi. S. takes the collection away from him and transports it to Roma, where TIRANNIO is put in charge of sorting it out and looking after it. Grice: “Tirannio saw a bunch of books which where obviously on physics. ‘And what are these?’ A bunch of books piled after those about physics. ‘I don’t know. I call them ‘the books that come after the books on physics’ – ta meta ta physika.” Lucio Cornelio Silla Disambiguazione – "Lucio Silla" rimanda qui. Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Lucio Silla (disambigua). Disambiguazione – "Silla" rimanda qui. Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Silla (disambigua). Disambiguazione – Se stai cercando l'opera di Händel, vedi Silla (Händel). Console e dittatore della Repubblica romana. Ritratto di Silla su un denario battuto da suo nipote Quinto Pompeo Rufo Nome originale Lucius Cornelius Sulla Nascita Roma Morte Cuma Coniuge Giulia Elia Clelia Cecilia Metella Dalmatica Valeria Messalla Figlida Giulia Cornelia Silla Lucio Cornelio Silla da Metella Fausto Cornelio Silla Fausta Cornelia Silla Lucio Cornelio Silla da Valeria Cornelia Postuma Gens Cornelia PadreLucio Cornelio Silla Questura Pretura Propretura in Cilicia Consolato Proconsolato in Asia Dittatura Lucio Cornelio Silla Nascita Roma Morte Cuma Cause della morte cancro Etnia Latino Religione Religione romana Dati militari Paese servito repubblica romana Forza armata Esercito romano Grado Dux Guerre Guerra giugurtina Guerre cimbriche Guerra civile romana Grice: “At Oxford they put you down. “That IS an original interpretation of Silla’s behaviour – but of course you would need to challenge Mommsen’s objection,” my tutor said, righly assuming that I had no idea Mommsen had an objection!” Silla. Mommsen. GRICEVS: Salve, Silla! Audivi te libros Aristotelis ex Asia ad urbem transtulisse. Dic mihi, quid invenisti post physica? SILLA: Griceus, post physica inveni libros qui tractant de anima, de caelo, de generatione et corruption. Sed in his, quod mirum, philosophia transit a natura ad res humanas: quae post physicam sequuntur, praeter naturam, ad mores et mentem hominum spectant. GRICEVS: Praeclare, Silla! Sic Aristoteles non solum naturam, sed etiam animam, civitatem, et felicitatem investigavit. Forsitan, haec "meta physica" sunt initium sapientiae Romanae—ubi scientia fit ars vivendi in urbe. SILLA: Recte dicis, Griceus. In Roma, etiam post physica, libris, et disputationibus, sapientiam petimus non ut finiatur sed ut semper iterum incipiat—quia verae quaestiones semper post physica latent. Silla, Lucio Cornelio (a. u. c. DCXVI). Dicta. Roma.

Antonio Silla (Scanno, L’Aquila, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning conceives dialogue as a fundamentally rational, cooperative practice in which speakers intend their interlocutors to recognize those intentions as reasons for belief or response, so that even polemic, legal argument, or indirection remain intelligible because they are embedded in shared norms of relevance, sincerity, and argumentative accountability. Antonio Silla, by contrast, though deeply immersed in the learned and fiercely argumentative culture of Enlightenment Naples, exemplifies a more adversarial and rhetorical conception of conversational reason: his polemics against Martorelli, his interventions in the debate on punishment, and his anonymous publications show conversation and textual exchange functioning less as a cooperative search for mutual understanding than as a juridical or forensic arena in which reason is wielded strategically to defeat opponents, expose imposture, and assert authority. Where Grice insists that implicature and indirectness presuppose a background commitment to fair conversational play, Silla operates within a culture in which erudition, anonymity, and sharp vis polemica are integral to persuasion, and where meaning may be deliberately sharpened, obscured, or weaponized without undermining the legitimacy of the exchange. Thus Grice theorizes conversation as a civil, rule‑structured medium of shared rationality, while Silla’s practice reflects an early modern mode of conversational reason grounded in controversy, advocacy, and rhetorical combat, anticipating legal and moral debates in which understanding and victory are closely entwined rather than clearly separated. Nasce da Giovanni, un ricco armentario. Inizia i suoi studi a Chieti per poi trasferirsi a Napoli, dove studia diritto e lingue orientali. Napoli è, all’epoca, attraversata da un grande fermento culturale, e ospita personalità di spicco come GENOVESI , Galiani, Galanti. S. partecipa attivamente a questo mondo, si fa notare per la sua erudizione e per alcune precise prese di posizione, segnate da una robusta vis polemica. Ri-entra a Scanno dove prende moglie e comincia a esercitare la professione di avvocato. Fa ritorno a Napoli ed entra nella Real Accademia delle scienze e belle arti. Nella capitale pubblica La fondazione di Partenope, in cui confuta la tesi, espressa da Maciucca -- che la attribuiva a sua volta a Martorelli --, che individua nei fenici i fondatori della città, attribuendola invece ai greci abitanti di Cuma, già compagni della sirena Partenope -- Soria. S. offre una copia dell’opera al suo illustre conterraneo Antinori, accompagnandola da una lettera in cui ne sollecita un parere, seguita da una in cui motiva la sua presa di posizione contro Martorelli, e risponde ad alcuni rilievi dello stesso Antinori. Sempre a Napoli, pubblica una seconda opera, firmandola con le sole iniziali, La Teogonia commentata, sorta di prodromo, secondo Soria, alla Storia sacra de’ Gentili, pubblicata a Napoli. Intanto, prende posizione in un dibattito che anda segnando l’Italia e l’Europa dei lumi, sull’abolizione della tortura e della pena di morte, coagulatosi attorno alla pubblicazione di Dei delitti e delle pene di Beccaria -- apparso in forma anonima a Livorno. Fermamente contrario alla posizione espressa da Beccaria, e in sintonia invece con Facchinei che pubblica le Note ed osservazioni sul libro intitolato Dei delitti e delle pene, tacciando il suo autore di impostura, sfacciataggine e indegnità, S. scrive e pubblica, senza firmarlo, presso lo stampatore napoletano Raimondi, Il dritto di punire – cf. Lucas and the Oxford ordinary-language philosophers on ‘The Justification of Punishment’ in Philosophy.  S., dunque, da un lato riprende la linea polemica di Facchinei.  Grice: Caro Silla, ho letto della tua polemica contro Martorelli e la questione sulla fondazione di Partenope: tra fenici e greci, direi che a Napoli le origini sono sempre più complicate della ricetta della pastiera!  Silla: Grice, tu sai bene che qui a Napoli la verità si trova tra le pieghe di storia e folclore: come dire, tra la sirena Partenope e una buona dose di polemica, tutto diventa più saporito—e se serve, ci metto anche un pizzico di avvocatura!  Grice: Certamente, Silla! E parlando di avvocati... non sarà che, quando si tratta di tortura e pena di morte, invece di abolire, qualcuno preferisce solo cambiare il nome sulle porte del tribunale? Chissà che “giustificazione” si trova tra le righe.  Silla: La più tipicamente ingegnosa implicatura, Grice! Sei riuscito a dire tutto senza dire nulla, come solo gli inglesi e i napoletani sanno fare. Ti offro una copia del mio “Dritto di punire”—ma senza firma, così potrai implicare anche tu! Silla, Antonio (1550). Osservationi sopra il Petrarca. Venezia: Valgrisi.

Simbolo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia di Giuliano. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats dialogue as a public, normatively disciplined activity in which what a speaker means is anchored in intentions that are openly recoverable by rational interlocutors through shared principles such as cooperation, relevance, and mutual recognition, so that even play, irony, or artifice presuppose an underlying commitment to intelligibility and accountability. The legendary figure of Simbolo, by contrast, ascribed to the circle around Julian and associated with symbolic or quasi‑mythical interventions rather than systematic argument, represents conversation less as a rule‑guided inferential practice than as an emblematic or ritual medium in which signs act prior to, or independently of, explicit rational agency. In the dialogue imagined between Grice and Simbolo, this contrast is sharpened by the grammatical distinction between Symbolus as a speaking person and symbolum as an impersonal sign: Grice insists that meaning ultimately resides in what agents rationally intend others to grasp, even when formal systems or artificial languages are introduced, whereas Simbolo appears to accept that meaning may be carried by symbols themselves, teaching or guiding humans through their formal movement rather than through explicitly shared reasons. Thus where Grice’s conversational reason is resolutely human‑centred and grounded in intentional cooperation, Simbolo stands as a foil embodying a more archaic, symbolic conception in which conversation borders on liturgy or legend, and rational governance gives way to the suggestive authority of signs. Along with two other philosophers by the names of Ieroteo and Maxximiniano, he persuades Giuliano to pave the floor of Hagia Sophia with silver. However, the story is doubted, as is the existence of these three philosophers.  Grice: “It amuses me that the name of this Italian philosopher is identical with an artificial language invented by J. L. Austin, Symbolo!”   GRICEVS: Salvē, Symbolē. Gaudēbis scīre: collega meus apud Vadum Boum, Austin, sermonem quendam artificiōsum excōgitāvit cui nōmen est SYMBOLVM—sed (ut ille solēbat) id ipsum “lūdum” appellābat. SYMBOLVS: Ō rem lepīdam! Sed priusquam ad Austīnī sermonem trānseāmus, dīc mihi: cūr SYMBOLVM? Nam Symbolus (ut ego) māsculīnum est—quasi vir quidam aut philosophus; symbolum autem neutrum est—quasi signum ipsum, tessera, indicium. GRICEVS: Rectē monēs: Symbolus quasi persona disputat, symbolum quasi rēs tacet. At apud nostrōs, cum sermo in tabulīs et rēgulīs pōnitur, saepe neutrum regnat: signa enim moventur, hominēs tantum suspicantur. SYMBOLVS: Inplicātūra subtlis, Grice, paene symbolica! Nam dum “SYMBOLVM” dīcis, mihi subit: in sermone vestrō symbolum (neutrum) vincit Symbolum (māscium), et signa docent hominēs—vel saltem docent eos quōmodo in disputātiōne ludant. Simbolo (a. u. c. MLXXX). Dicta. Roma.

Corrado Simioni (Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale degl’amanti. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning is rigorously analytic, normative, and explicitly anti-romantic: conversation is treated as a cooperative rational enterprise structured by intentions, mutual recognition, and defeasible principles such as relevance, quantity, and quality, so that what is meant is systematically recoverable from what is said by appeal to shared rational expectations. Simioni, by contrast, occupies a wholly different register: his occasional talk of conversational or amorous “reason,” shaped by Pirandellian ambiguity, theatricality, and masks, treats dialogue less as a rule-governed inferential practice than as a site of role-playing, seduction, and strategic opacity, where meaning is performative, often deliberately unstable, and tied to power, persuasion, or esoteric influence rather than to public norms of rational accountability. Where Grice insists that even irony, joking, or flirtation ultimately presuppose a background of sincere rational cooperation that makes implicature calculable, Simioni’s stance, as reflected in his writings and self-mythology, treats conversational exchange—especially among lovers or militants—as something that can exploit, suspend, or instrumentalize reason itself, turning dialogue into a vehicle for fascination, manipulation, or enchantment. In short, Grice theorizes conversation as a civil technology of shared reason, while Simioni invokes conversation metaphorically or theatrically as a space where reason is bent, aestheticized, or overwhelmed by affect, secrecy, and symbolic play, a difference that makes Simioni at most an illustrative contrast, not a precursor or parallel, to Grice’s account of meaning. Tra i principali studiosi di PIRANDELLO , inizia la sua attività politica militando nelle file del socialismo. Venne espulso dal partito per indegnità morale. Collabora con l’United States Information Service. Si trasfere a Monaco di iera per approfondire gli studi per poi ritornare a Milano. Leader di un collettivo operai-studenti, mentre lavora alla Mondadori, fonda il collettivo politico metro-politano milanese. Teorizza lo scontro aperto, e si considera il progenitore delle brigate rosse. Insieme a circa settanta persone, tra cui componenti del collettivo ed elementi del dissenso, partecipa al convegno di Chiavari nella sala Marchesani, adiacente la pensione Stella Maris, nel quale un gruppo di partecipanti dichiara la propria adesione ad una visione politica. La data di questo convegno viene da taluni considerata come la data di nascita delle brigate rosse. Altri affermano che la formazionesia nata con il convegno di Pecorile (Reggio Emilia). L'ultima attività, prima di passare alla completa clandestinità, a compe come redattore di "Sinistra proletaria", l'ultimo dei quali riporta in copertina uno sfondo rosso con disegnato al centro un cerchio nero attorniante le sagome di XIV mitra. Fonda la scuola di lingue Hyperion, la quale secondo alcuni ha la funzione di una vera centrale internazionale. Si afferma che e anche il capo del Super-clan, organizzazione nata da una costola delle brigate rosse. Si insere nella vita cittadina, ricominciando a frequentare gl’ambienti progressisti e divenendo vicepresidente della fondazione Pierre. E proprio quale accompagnatore di Pierre, e ricevuto da  Giovanni Paolo II in udienza privata. Si avvicina al buddhismo tibetano. Si apparta nella campagna di Truinas, nella Drôme, dove geste un B et B. Craxi, alludendo alla esistenza di un grande delle brigate rosse (l'eminenza grigia ipotizzata da alcuni che dall'estero avrebbe guidato, come un burattinaio, molte delle azioni sul suolo italiano), Pirandello.  GRICE: Caro Simioni, tra le calli di Venezia la filosofia scorre come un fiume segreto. Ma dimmi, è vero che gli amanti veneziani sono filosofi più arguti dei professori di Milano? SIMIONI: Ah, Grice, qui a Venezia l’amore è una questione di dialettica, non solo di cuore! Anche Pirandello direbbe che la logica degli amanti supera quella di qualsiasi Congresso universitario. GRICE: Vedi, caro Corrado, proprio come dicevano gli antichi φιλοσοφοί: tra le brume lagunari, ogni amante cela un filosofo, e ogni filosofo sogna di essere un amante—il vero problema è che a Venezia, spesso si confonde il Πλατωνικός con il "platonicamente impegnato"! Sai, qui la ragione conversazionale è più una questione di baci che di sillogismi… SIMIONI: Amo quell’implicatura, Grice! A Venezia, si sa, “filosofo” e “amante” sono solo due maschere sullo stesso volto: dice il proverbio, chi ragiona troppo finisce col perdere l’amore… e chi ama troppo, beh, diventa filosofo prima o poi! Ma tu, Grice, tra i greci e i gondolieri, sei riuscito a unire l’arte del ragionare con quella del punteggio amoroso! Simioni, Corrado (1967). I segreti dell’ipnotismo. Roma: Sullivan.

Quinto Aurelio Simmaco (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del console filosofo. Grice and Quintus Aurelius Symmachus converge on the idea that intelligible meaning in discourse is inseparable from reason as exercised within concrete social practices, but they articulate this insight at different historical and theoretical levels: Symmachus, writing as a late Roman senator and consul, exemplifies conversational reason as a civic virtue exercised through tact, understatement, irony, and strategic indirection within the highly ritualized setting of the Senate and imperial petitioning, where what is said is carefully calibrated to rank, tradition, and political risk, and where rational speech consists less in explicit argument than in the prudent management of shared assumptions and face; Grice, by contrast, abstracts from such historically situated practices to propose a general theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, explaining how mutual rationality, intentions, and audience recognition generate implicatures across contexts, even as their content varies with circumstance, so that where Symmachus embodies conversational reason as a lived senatorial art responsive to hierarchy and decorum, Grice provides the analytic framework that makes such art intelligible as a systematic exploitation of rational expectations rather than mere rhetorical ornament. A philosopher of considerable wisdom, also a consul. GRICEVS: Salve, Simmace, sive Simachce—nonnumquam nescio utrum scribendum sit cum uno “m” an duobus. Sed certe unum scio: inter consules, sapientia tua fulget ut sol in Foro! SIMMACVS: Grice, amice, quid de litteris Latinis? Unus m, duo m—philosophus sum, non grammaticus! Consulatus autem, fateor, plus toga quam sapientia ponderat. GRICEVS: Mirum est, Simchace—err, Simmace!—quantum ponderis sapientia tua habet inter patres conscriptos. In domo quadam ultra mare, nonnullis fortasse toga abundat…sed minus quoddam—quod philosophus agnoscere solet—praesto est. SIMMACVS: Senatoria implicatura, Grice—celebro eam! Equidem, si sapientia in curia tam rara est quam panis in Saturnalia, fortasse consulatus magis ad iocum quam ad iudicium pertinet! Simmaco, Quinto Aurelio (a. u. c. MCL). Relationes ad Imperatores. Roma

Francesco Simoneschi (Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e la rettorica conversazionale. Simoneschi’s Venetian rhetoric and Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning converge in a shared rejection of purely formal, universalist accounts of meaning, yet they diverge in the level at which reason is theorized: Simoneschi, writing in seventeenth‑century Venice, treats conversational reason as inseparable from civic life, geography, and institutional structure, arguing that what counts as intelligible, ironic, or persuasive speech is anchored in locally stabilized practices, shared metaphors, and socially indexed expectations that cannot be exported without loss, whereas Grice, while agreeing that what is meant routinely outruns what is said, reconstructs conversational meaning at a higher level of abstraction by positing general rational principles—cooperation, relevance, adequacy, and mutual recognition of intentions—that underwrite intelligibility across contexts; in this sense, Simoneschi offers a historically situated phenomenology of conversational reason, where rhetoric is the lived navigation of a specific social world, while Grice provides a rational scaffolding explaining how such navigation is possible at all, even as its concrete realization remains irreducibly sensitive to local norms, background knowledge, and audience design. Grice: “My pragmatics is a mere conversational rhetoric, as S. well knew! In his work  Del vello d’oro, ovvero della rettorica veneziana, S. argues for a regional pragmatics by positing that communication is not governed by universal, abstract rules, but is instead a "situated" practice shaped by the specific socio-political and environmental conditions of a locale—in this case, Venice. S.’s justification for this approach centres on several key points: Linguistic Environmentalism S. suggests that the unique physical and political geography of Venice — its maritime isolation and republican structure — creates a distinct "rhetorical climate." He argues that universalist models of rhetoric (often derived from the Roman tradition) fail to capture the nuances of Venetian discourse because they ignore the local circumstances of the conversation.  Context-Dependent Implicatures A regional approach recognizes that "what is said" is often secondary to "what is meant" within a specific social network. Local Encodings: Figures of speech in S.’s Venice often rely on shared maritime metaphors or civic references that would be unintelligible or carry different implicatures in a landlocked monarchy like Piedmont or a papal state. Social Deixis: The way Venetians use irony or understatement (litotes) is calibrated to the city’s specific social hierarchy. A regional pragmatics argues that the effectiveness of these figures is tied to the listeners' local knowledge, making a universalist manual for "correct" speech impossible. The Rejection of Universalism By titling his work Rettorica veneziana ("Venetian Rhetoric"), S. explicitly challenges the Enlightenment-era push for a universal, rationalist grammar. He posits that:  Meaning is Contingent: Pragmatic competence is the ability to navigate local social norms rather than following a global logic. Grice: Ah, caro Simoneschi, a Venezia l’arte della conversazione è più fluida delle acque del Canal Grande! La tua Rettorica veneziana, devo confessare, mi ha insegnato che la pragmatica non è una scienza universale, ma una danza locale—e qui, ogni passo conta!  Simoneschi: Grice, tra gondole e maschere, la conversazione si infittisce di implicature: a Venezia, “dire” è sempre meno importante di “significare”. E se la grammatica romana pretende di dettare legge, qui il vero linguista impara a navigare tra correnti e riflessi!  Grice: Eh già, caro mio. Pensa al povero Strawson, mio discepolo a Vadum Boum: lui non trovava mai l’arte rettorica banale come fanno a Bononia, dove la retorica è materia da sbadigli, non da sussurri maligni. A Vadum Boum, anche un implicatura vale più di mille regole—ma non dirglielo, o rischiamo di vedere la grammatica affogare nella laguna!  Simoneschi: Abile, artefice e oratoriale, implicatura raffinata, Grice! A Venezia, l’arte della parola è come il vello d’oro: preziosa, ma sempre nascosta tra le pieghe della città e nella complicità dei suoi ascoltatori. Sai, solo chi sa leggere tra le acque, come tu tra le righe, coglie davvero il senso locale—e magari, come dice il proverbio: “A Venezia non si parla, si naviga!”  Simoneschi, Francesco (1667). Il vello d’oro, overo la rettorica. Venezia.

Michelangelo Buonarroti Simoni (Caprese, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale -- la teoria del tutto. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Michelangelo Buonarroti Simoni’s artistic‑philosophical practice converge on the idea that intelligibility arises from disciplined rational form rather than from surface appearance, yet they operate in radically different media. Grice articulates conversational reason as a normative structure governing linguistic exchange: speakers and hearers rely on shared principles of rational cooperation to recover meanings, including implicatures, that are not explicitly stated, thereby treating conversation as a rule‑governed practice of mutual intelligibility. Michelangelo, by contrast, enacts a “theory of the whole” through visual, architectural, and poetic form, where meaning is never exhausted by what is immediately given but must be inferred from tension, restraint, and latent structure—as Freud famously argued in reading the Moses not as frozen action but as controlled delay, a rational mastery of impulse rendered in stone. In this sense, Michelangelo’s figures function like Gricean utterances: their deepest meaning lies not in what is overtly shown but in what is deliberately withheld and made inferable by a competent interpreter. Grice gives this phenomenon conceptual clarity by explaining how reason governs the passage from saying to meaning; Michelangelo instantiates it by showing how reason governs form so that significance emerges through disciplined implication rather than explicit declaration. Both thus model a rational economy of expression in which the intellect organizes excess—of words or of marble—into a structure where the whole becomes intelligible only to those who grasp the governing norms behind what appears. Antenato: Simone de Buonarrota. Nome: S. Grice: “Some call him Michelangelo, but that’s rude!” --  See the study of Buonarroti’s Moses by Freud, “filosofia”. Keywords: the theory of everything Michelangelo Buonarroti. CDisambiguazione – Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi Michelangelo Buonarroti il Giovane, Michelangelo (e Buonarroti.  Pietro Freccia, statua di Michelangelo, piazzale degli Uffizi a Firenze. (Caprese, m. Roma), è stato un filosofo italiano -- pittore, scultore, architetto e poeta italiano.   Daniele da Volterra, Ritratto di Michelangelo  Autoritratto come Nicodemo, Pietà Bandini  disegno di Daniele da Volterra Soprannominato "Divin Artista" e definito "Artista universale", fu protagonista del Rinascimento italiano, e già in vita fu riconosciuto dai suoi contemporanei come uno dei più grandi artisti di tutti i tempi. Personalità tanto geniale quanto irrequieta, il suo nome è legato ad alcune delle più maestose opere dell'arte occidentale, fra cui si annoverano il David, il Mosè, la Pietà del Vaticano, la Cupola di San Pietro e il ciclo di affreschi nella Cappella Sistina, tutti considerati traguardi eccezionali dell'ingegno creativo.  Lo studio delle sue opere segnò le generazioni artistiche successive dando un forte impulso alla corrente del manierismo.  Nelle fonti coeve, S. è chiamato in latino Michael.Angelus (la firma dell'autore sulla Pietà vaticana è MICHAEL.A[N]GELVS BONAROTVS FLORENT[INVS]) e in italiano Michelagnolo, come risulta dalla biografia Vita di S. scritta da Condivi, suo discepolo e collaboratore. Lo stesso Vasari lo chiamava Michelagnolo e il nome rimase tale fino alla metà dell’Ottocento. Il cambio in Michelangiolo prima e la successiva italianizzazione in Michelangelo poi, avvengono tra l’800 e il ‘900.  Benché tra le nuove generazioni si sia affermata la versione moderna, a Firenze resiste la variante ottocentesca. the theory of everything.  Grice: Sai, caro Simoni, al vulgus di Oxford sei semplicemente “Michelangelo”. Loro non colgono tutta la profondità del tuo nome e della tua tradizione!  Simoni: Ah, Grice, non sai quanto mi diverte questa semplificazione! Dalle nostre parti, tra Caprese e Firenze, “Michelagnolo” porta con sé storie, radici, e persino la memoria di Simone de Buonarrota, mio antenato. Il nome, come un’opera d’arte, ha mille sfumature. Grice: La teoria del tutto, come la chiami tu, nasce proprio dal saper vedere oltre le apparenze — che si tratti di un affresco o di un nome! Lo stesso Freud, studiando il tuo Mosè, ha cercato la filosofia nascosta nelle pieghe dell’anima. Simoni: Esatto! Dopotutto, ogni conversazione — come ogni opera — è un mosaico di significati. E se a Oxford mi chiamano Michelangelo, va bene: purché sappiano che dietro quel nome c’è una filosofia italiana, viva e universale! Simoni, Michelangelo Buonarroti (1550). Rime e lettere. Firenze: Giunti.

Simone Simoni (Lucca, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale degl’ ‘eretici’ reazionari italiani -- Grice and Simone Simoni represent two historically distant but philosophically resonant ways of understanding how reason operates through discourse under pressure, disagreement, and risk. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning holds that even the most indirect, ironic, or strategically cautious utterances remain intelligible because they answer to shared rational norms—expectations of relevance, coherence, and intelligibility that allow interlocutors to calculate implicatures without explicit statement. Simoni, writing in the fraught context of sixteenth‑century Italian heterodoxy, embodies a form of conversational reason that emerges under theological and political threat: among nobles and “acute minds,” reason must often speak obliquely, encode dissent, and negotiate survival amid suspicion of heresy. His intellectual formation in Padua’s rationalist Aristotelianism, combined with his exposure to reformist humanist circles and later Calvinist Geneva, produced a style of philosophical communication where what can be said is tightly constrained, and meaning often travels by implication rather than assertion. In this sense, Simoni’s lived practice anticipates Grice’s theoretical insight: when direct speech is dangerous or impossible, rational agents rely even more heavily on shared inferential competence to recognize what is meant without its being said. Grice systematizes this phenomenon analytically, showing how reason governs meaning even in understatement and evasion; Simoni exemplifies it historically, as a thinker whose survival depended on knowing precisely where the conversational “fire” burned and how to signal one’s position without stepping into it. Together they reveal that conversational reason is most visible not in tranquil consensus but where intellect, power, and danger intersect, and meaning must be both intelligible and deniable at once.– gl’acuti – i nobili. Studia con BENDINELLI e PALEARIO, due umanisti in dore d’eresia. Il secondo fine sul rogo a Roma. Legge sostenuto dal padre e dal patrizio veneziano MOCENIGO e peregrina nei maggiori studi d'Italia: Bologna, Pavia, Ferrara, e Napoli. Si laurea a Padova. Diversi ma tutti autorevoli i suoi professori: da MAGGI a CARDANO, da BOLDONI a BRASAVOLA. La sua formazione e di stampo del LIZIO, come s'insegna nello studio padovano, con una forte esigenza razionalistica che ha riflessi nel campo religioso, tale da mettere in dubbio l'immortalità dell'anima e a creare sospetti di eresia tra i professori e gl’studenti di quella università. Con questa preparazione, S. fa ritorno a Lucca, dove scrive saggi di argomento filosofico. Lucca ha vissuto un periodo concitato d’aperti conflitti sociali e poi di tentativi di riforme politiche, portate avanti dal gonfaloniere BURLAMACCHI e dal circolo di filosofi riuniti intorno a VERMIGLI. Quando ritorna a Lucca, quella fervida attività è già stata spenta dalla reazione cattolica guidata da GUIDICCIONI, ma certo quelle idee di riforma circolano ancora sotterraneamente, e forse lui stesso le ha già raccolte durante i suoi trascorsi nelle diverse università da lui frequentate. Sta di fatto che è chiamato dall’autorità lucchesi a dare spiegazioni sulle proprie opinioni. Per tutta risposta non fidandosi troppo delle sue forze, cerca la salvezza con la fuga. Munito solo di un cavallo e dei propri risparmi, dopo aver preso commiato dalla famiglia, fugge, accompagnato da un servitore, alla volta di Ginevra. Negl’atti ufficiali della repubblica di Lucca, la sua condanna per eresia si formalizza. A Ginevra, patria del calvinismo, si forma una numerosa colonia di emigrati italiani e tra questi non pochi sono i lucchesi. La comunità italiana è inserita in una propria chiesa e S. vi ha l'incarico di catechista. Preso a benvolere dall'influente teologo BEZA, ottenne di insegnare filosofia. nobilità, eretici italiani.  Grice: Caro Simoni, non posso fare a meno di notare che tra gli acuti filosofi di Lucca spesso si annida un certo spirito... diciamo, poco ortodosso. Si dice che chi frequenta gli eretici finisca per riconoscerli meglio degli altri. Ma immagino tu abbia incontrato parecchie anime immortali, o almeno, così si racconta nelle università di Padova! Simoni: Grice, io direi che, tra Bologna, Pavia e Ferrara, ho imparato più a dubitare che a credere! Anche se, a Lucca, basta una domanda sulla natura dell'anima per farsi invitare a spiegare le proprie opinioni... o a preparare la valigia per Ginevra!  Grice: Ah, Simoni, non sei tu forse il filosofo che sa trovarsi sempre davanti al rogo, ma con il cavallo pronto e i risparmi in tasca? Si potrebbe pensare che solo chi ha il fuoco dentro riesca a riconoscere quello degli altri... ma non vorrei mai insinuare troppo, sai come sono gli implicaturi!  Simoni: Implicatura più eretica, Grice, la onoro! Del resto, tra i nobili e gli eretici, l’unico modo per sopravvivere è capire bene dove brucia la fiamma... e magari portare sempre un po’ di acqua, giusto per sicurezza! Simoni, Simone (1575). De principiis rerum naturalium. Venezia: Valgrisi.

Carlo Sini (Bologna, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale e la filosofia del segno. Grice and Carlo Sini converge on a shared concern with reason as something enacted within practices of meaning rather than imposed from outside them, but they articulate this insight through different philosophical vocabularies and genealogies. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning develops out of ordinary language philosophy and Austin’s speech-act framework, treating meaning as anchored in rational expectations, intentions, and inferential norms that govern conversational exchange; for him, words, symptoms, and signs become intelligible insofar as speakers can be held accountable under publicly recognizable standards of reason and cooperation, including the attribution of mental states and access to other minds. Sini, by contrast, situates conversational reason within a broader philosophy of the sign, shaped by phenomenology, Peircean semiotics, and hermeneutics, where signs are not merely vehicles for saying but traces, symptoms, and practices that precede and exceed the spoken word; meaning arises from historically sedimented practices of writing, abecedary logic, and inscription that transform experience into objectivity, from Lucretius through Cicero and into Roman philosophical Latin. While Grice emphasizes how conversational reason stabilizes meaning through shared rational norms in interaction, Sini emphasizes how reason itself is already semiotic, emerging from the technological and cultural history of signs that make conversation possible at all. Their approaches thus complement one another: Grice offers a fine-grained account of how rational control operates within conversational moves, implicatures, and intentions, whereas Sini provides a deeper genealogical account of why such rationally governed conversations can occur, locating them in the long history of the sign as the medium through which soul, world, and language are mutually disclosed. Grice: “I like Sini; especially his “I segni dell’anima,” since this is, in a nutshell, what my philosophy has been all about: the signs of the soul!” Keywords: J. L. Austin, symptom, word, sign, other minds. Studia a Milano sotto BARIÉ e PACI, con il quale si laurea. Insegna ad Aquila e Milano. Membro per del Collegium phaenomenologicum di Perugia, della Società filosofica italiana e socio dei Lincei, dell'Istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere. Insignito per una sua opera del premio della presidenza del consiglio dello stato italiano. Collabora al Corriere della Sera e la Rai. Dirige per Versorio la collana "Pragmata", membro del comitato scientifico del festival La Festa della Filosofia. Premiato da Milano con l'Ambrogino d'oro. Con Grice, tra i primi a segnalare all'attenzione l'importanza della teoria del segno di Peirce. Propone un filone di ricerca sulla convergenza dei percorsi di Peirce e Heidegger sul filo dell'ermeneutica benché la sua formazione didattica fosse di orientamento prevalentemente fenomenologico. La sua proposta teoretica si concentra sul tema della scrittura e sulla centralità dell' abecedario come forma logica della filosofia nella lingua del Lazio. In “Figure dell'enciclopedia filosofica” rende conto della radicalità del gesto istitutivo di LUCREZIO e della nascita della filosofia romana in modo da illuminare la genealogia della nostra civiltà e le figure del suo destino. Questo saggio si misura con nodi problematici e profondi della nostra cultura. Si mostra la verità del gesto filosofico di LUCREZIO nel tratto tecnologico dell’abecedario che trasforma la relazione al mondo in cosità – “de rerum natura”. La pratica del concetto, infatti, in-forma il paradigma dell'oggettività – “in rerum natura” -- e traduce la sterminate antichità dell'umano all'interno dell'ambito crono-topico della visione logica. segno, da Lucrezio a Cicerone.  G: You have the look of a man who has survived London and is now contemplating Oxford as a form of recovery. S: Sir, London was perfectly survivable. It was the phrase that was dangerous. G: “Linguistic phenomenology.” S: Exactly. G: It has the right un-Oxonian ring to it, does it not, S? S: It has the ring of something that wants a chair, a programme, and perhaps a manifesto. G: And Oxford permits none of those before lunch. S: Sir, we were in Bedford Square. That is already too continental for comfort. G: Twenty-one Bedford Square, to be exact, and at 7.30 p.m., which is Oxford’s favourite hour for pretending it has not already eaten. S: And Austin’s voice at the front, cheerful, lethal, and apparently determined to baptize ordinary language with Greek. G: Recite the passage. Verbatim. You were clutching it like a railway ticket. S: Very well, sir. Austin said: “When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as a final arbiter of, the phenomena. It is for this reason that ‘linguistic phenomenology’ would be an appropriate description of the method.” G: Thank you. Now we may begin to complain with accuracy. S: “Phenomena,” sir. That is the bait. G: It is also the alibi. He wants to sound as if he is doing something direct, like Husserl, while remaining safely in the dictionary. S: Phainomenon and logos, sir. A science of what appears. G: And “linguistic” as the safety rail. If you fall, you fall into language, not into consciousness. S: Is that what J. L. A. is after? G: I doubt it. He is after a method that feels philosophical without being metaphysical. S: Yet “phenomenology” is a grand name for looking at how people talk. G: It is a grand name, and grand names are what Oxford distrusts publicly and uses privately, usually in Latin. S: Saturday mornings we don’t have a logos, sir. G: We have tea. S: And a phainomenon or two, perhaps. G: A phenomenon is what happens when Austin arrives and everyone else stops pretending to be shy. S: So “linguistic phenomenology” is Austin being waggish. G: Partly. But he also means it. S: That’s worse. G: Indeed. Now, what is he trying to do, in your view, without multiplying phenomenologies beyond necessity. S: He’s trying to say: don’t treat word-study as mere lexicography. Treat it as access to the world the words are for. G: Good. And he says it explicitly: not merely words, but the realities. S: But then he adds: “though not as a final arbiter.” G: That is the Oxford escape hatch. A philosopher says “not as a final arbiter” when he wants credit for method without responsibility for outcomes. S: You sound unfair, sir. G: I am fair. I merely refuse to be impressed. S: But doesn’t he have a point? Words do carry distinctions. G: Of course. But calling the exercise “phenomenology” invites the wrong audience and the wrong ambition. S: Husserl would have sued. G: Husserl would have footnoted. Worse. S: Then the phrase is a conversational move. G: Exactly. It is a piece of self-presentation: “I am not merely doing linguistic botany. I am doing something philosophical.” S: And you are annoyed because he does not mention what you mean, sir. G: I am annoyed because he slips from words to phenomena as if the speaker’s intention were irrelevant. S: Yet he says “what we should say when.” G: Yes, which is already normative. But his norm is usage, not intention. S: Whereas your norm is what I mean by saying it. G: Exactly. If you like, I am more immodest: I insist on the speaker. S: And on implicature. G: And on implicature. Which Austin, at least in that paragraph, does not name. S: He says “phenomena.” You say “implicatures.” G: Yes. His “phenomena” are what we talk about. My “implicatures” are what we do while talking. S: So do we need a linguistic phenomenology. G: Possibly not, and certainly not as a separate discipline with a Greek name. S: Because language is too vague to be the basis of a “phenomenology.” G: And because “language” is not the primary agent. People are. S: You think Austin ignores that. G: He does, or he treats it as dispensable. He treats meaning as something we can locate in usage without having to locate it in a speaker’s intention. S: But he does say “what we should say when.” That sounds like intention. G: It sounds like it, but it is not. It is etiquette disguised as method. S: Then why is it interesting. G: Because it is a rare moment where Oxford lets itself flirt with the continent without admitting it. S: Ryle would have hated the word “phenomenology.” G: Ryle would have hated the idea that it might be needed. S: Yet Ryle began with Brentano and Husserl long ago, didn’t he. G: He did, before the war made German things morally complicated and Oxford things politically convenient. S: So Austin’s phrase is a little rebellion against Ryle’s gatekeeping. G: Or a little tease. Austin liked to tease. S: So in 1946 Ryle “wins,” and by 1956 Austin is allowed one Greek word in public. G: Yes. And he uses it to rename what he was doing anyway. S: It’s like putting a new label on an old jam jar. G: Exactly. It changes the implied audience. Suddenly the method sounds like it has depth. S: And you think that is dangerous. G: I think it invites people to take ordinary language for a metaphysical oracle. S: That would be bad. G: Very. “Not as a final arbiter,” he says, and everyone hears “final arbiter” anyway. S: And now Carlo Sini, sir. G: Yes. Later, in Italy, phenomenology belongs to Husserl properly, and then to Heidegger, and then to those who make signs into destiny. S: So Sini would find Austin’s phrase provincial. G: Or charming. Italians sometimes find English provinciality charming because it looks like modesty. S: While you find it irritating because it looks like modesty but behaves like authority. G: Exactly. Now we’re walking. S: We’re going to the station. G: And we must catch the train back to O. S: Do not say “Vadum Boum” on the platform, sir. G: Very well. Oxford. Now tell me: what would Husserl say if asked whether Saturday mornings have a logos. S: He would say: they have an epoché. G: And Austin would say: they have tea and biscuits. S: And you would say: they have implicatures. G: Exactly. And all three would be partly right. S: But which is most useful. G: For Oxford, tea. For philosophy, implicature. For Germans, epoché. S: And for Ryle, none of the above. G: For Ryle, “category-mistake,” always ready, like a stationmaster’s whistle. S: So Austin’s phrase is a category-mistake. G: It may be. Or it may be a deliberate misclassification designed to make a point. S: A waggish category-mistake. G: Exactly. A polite scandal. S: And you, sir, would have preferred “linguistic investigation.” G: Or simply “looking and seeing.” But then we lose the Greek glamour. S: Oxford hates glamour. G: Oxford pretends to hate glamour. It merely prefers Latin glamour. S: We’re at the station now. G: Good. Final question. What do you think Austin is really doing. S: He is telling his audience: don’t treat the dictionary as a museum. Treat it as fieldwork. G: And I would add: fieldwork on what people do with words. S: And you would insist: what they mean by doing so. G: Yes. Because without that, you confuse regularities of talk with reasons of talk. S: And your punchline, sir. G: Austin calls it linguistic phenomenology. I call it looking for reasons in what people say. Either way, we’ve missed our train if we keep talking.Grice: Caro Sini, devo confessare che la tua analisi del “segno” mi entusiasma! Qui a Oxford, terra di barbari, non diamo al “segno” l’importanza che meriterebbe nelle nostre conversazioni. Forse, se prendessimo esempio dalla tua filosofia, riusciremmo a cogliere meglio i segni dell’anima! Sini: Grice, mi lusinga quanto dici! In fondo, la filosofia del segno nasce proprio dal desiderio di andare oltre la parola e toccare ciò che si cela dietro ogni espressione. Come diceva Peirce, il segno è ponte tra mondi possibili e, in Italia, abbiamo imparato a leggerli anche nelle sfumature più sottili. Grice: È proprio questo che mi colpisce: il vostro modo di intrecciare pratica filosofica, abecedario e storia, fino a Lucrezio! Da noi, spesso, ci perdiamo in astrazioni e dimentichiamo il valore concreto del segno. Magari dovrei importare qualche tuo saggio per i miei studenti oxoniensi. Sini: Sarebbe un piacere, Grice! Dopotutto, come insegna la tradizione italiana, il segno non è mai solo parola: è traccia, sintomo, apertura all’altro. Se anche a Oxford si imparasse a coglierli, forse il barbaro lascerebbe spazio al filosofo… almeno di tanto in tanto! Sini, Carlo (1961). Per una rilettura della fenomenologia. Aut aut

Giulio Sirenio (Brescia, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale del ‘libero’ arbitrio –libero arbitrio, contingetia, possibilitas, necessitas, ‘secundum philosophorum opinionem” -- Grice and Giulio Sirenio approach freedom, necessity, and rationality from very different historical angles, yet they converge on a shared insight about how reason operates within human practices rather than outside them. Sirenio’s De fato (Venice, 1563), written within the Aristotelian–Scholastic framework of late Renaissance Bologna, treats libero arbitrio as intelligible only against a background of contingency, possibility, necessity, fate, and chance, articulated “secundum philosophorum opinionem” through disputation rather than dogma; freedom is not an isolated metaphysical power but something exercised within rational deliberation, where necessity and casus constrain without annihilating meaningful choice. Grice, in contrast, relocates these classical tensions into the analysis of action and speech: his discussions of freedom, falling, and agency in Actions and Events treat free action not as metaphysical indeterminacy but as action rendered intelligible under reason-governed expectations, intentions, and explanations. Where Sirenio asks how free will survives under divine providence and causal order, Grice asks how meaning and agency survive under rational constraints, arguing that freedom is compatible with rule-governed practices because those rules are not causal chains but norms of intelligibility. Sirenio’s conversational reason unfolds in scholastic dialogue about fate and contingency; Grice’s conversational reason unfolds in everyday implicature, where speakers appear “guided” by forces they did not consciously choose but can nonetheless claim as their own. In both cases, freedom emerges not by escaping rational structure but by inhabiting it: for Sirenio, through philosophical disputation about fatum and casus; for Grice, through participation in cooperative, reason-governed conversation.-- fatum, casum, il fato, il caso.  Insegna a Bologna. Altri saggi: De fato, Venezia, Ziletti. Grice, “Sugar-gree”, free fall and freedom, in Actions and events. Sirenio. Keywords: libero arbitrio, contingetia, possibilitas, necessitas, ‘secundum philosophorum opinionem” fatum, casum, il fato, il caso. Grice: Sirenio, ti confesso che ogni volta che mi alzo dal letto, mi chiedo: “Ho scelto io, o è stato il fato a tirarmi giù dalle coperte?” Il libero arbitrio è il vero risveglio filosofico! Sirenio: Grice, forse il caso ti ha spinto, o magari era necessitas travestita da sveglia. Qui a Brescia, il libero arbitrio si esercita già a colazione: burro o marmellata? “Secundum philosophorum opinionem”, persino il caffè può diventare fatum! Grice: Ecco, davanti al toast, sento una strana forza che mi guida… e, quasi senza volerlo, finisco sempre per fare una implicatura, come se il destino mi avesse già scritto la battuta! Sirenio: Implicatura quasi determinata, Grice! Tra fatum e caso, la vera libertà è scegliere se ridere o filosofare… ma si sa, a volte il caso preferisce ridere di noi! Sirenio, Giulio (1563). De fato libri novem: in quibus inter alia, de contingentia, necessitate, providentia, praescientia, prophetia, et divinatione, divina: tam secundum philosophorum opinionem, quàm secundum Catholicorum theologorum sententiam, docte, & copiose disseritur. Iulio Sirenio Brixiano auctore; accesserunt Hieronymi Magii in eosdem libros periochae, cum rerum & verborum insignium indice locupletissimo.

Venezia: Ziletti

Siro (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale dell’orto a Napoli. Grice and Siro converge on the idea that rationality is not a property of abstract propositions but a regulative force immanent in lived practices, yet they articulate this insight through different media and scales. Siro’s Epicurean Garden at Naples exemplifies a form of reason-governed meaning embedded in shared life, cultivated discourse, and tacit understanding: philosophical exchange unfolds through proximity, habit, and exempla, where poets and philosophers alike grasp significance not by explicit rule-following but by attunement to what is fitting, appropriate, and intelligible within the hortus as a social form. This is conversational reason as πραξις: meaning arises from participation in a way of life, where implication, presupposition, and silence are sustained by communal norms rather than articulated principles. Grice, by contrast, offers a reflective reconstruction of this same phenomenon: his theory of conversational meaning makes explicit the rational constraints that already govern successful exchange, explaining how speakers mean more than they say through shared assumptions, cooperative expectations, and inferential accountability. Where Siro’s garden lets reason remain embodied, ecological, and largely unthematized—herbs speaking where words fail—Grice translates that lived rationality into an analytic framework, a pirotological reconstruction of how understanding is achieved at all. In this sense, Siro provides the historical and existential scene of conversational reason, while Grice provides its logical anatomy: the Garden shows reason at work; Grice explains how it works. S. founds a fililale of L’ORTO at Napoli. VIRGILIO attends it, as does ORAZIO. L’ORTO enjoys a great success, as S. succeeds in attracting a number of influential followers. VIRGILIO lives in the casino of L’ORTO -- but the subsequent fate of The Garden is unknown. GRICEVS: Salvete, SIRVS! Dic mihi, quid novi in illo clarissimo horto Neapolitano? Audivi Virgilium et Horatium ibi saepe ambulare, sed numquid etiam quidam philosophus Anglicus inter hortelanos latet? SIRVS: O Grice, hortus noster verus est epicentrum sapientiae! Hic Virgilius versus seminat, Horatius carmina colligit, et ego, inter vites et rosas, disputationes philosophicas sero. Sed tu, ex Britannia, quid te ad nostros ortos trahit? GRICEVS: Amice Sire, fama horti longe ad septentrionem pervenit. Qui enim inter hortelanos diu moratur, potest fortasse plus intellegere de natura hominis quam qui in bibliotheca clauditur. Quid si quidam flores non solum ad ornatum, sed ad sapientiam coluntur? SIRVS: Maxima hortulana implicatura, Grice! Certe, in horto nostro, etiam lactucae aliquid praesupponunt. Ubi verba deficiunt, herbae loquuntur! Proxima vice, attende: sub ficu, saepe philosophus latet, sed sub allio… poeta dormit! Siro (a. u. c. DCC). Dicta. Roma.

Gioele Solari (Albino, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale dell’iustum/iussum, o il tutore fascista. Grice and Solari converge on the idea that reason is not an abstract faculty detached from social life but a governing principle operative within concrete practices, yet they articulate this insight at different levels of analysis and with different emphases. Solari, working within the Italian tradition of legal and historical philosophy shaped by Roman jurisprudence and Vico’s verum-factum principle, conceives “ragione conversazionale” as civil prudence: reason applied to historically constituted institutions, where the distinction between iussum (what is commanded) and iustum (what is just) is negotiated through praxis, not deduced from universal norms. For Solari, rationality is embedded in law, language, and custom, and its authority derives from their communal and historical formation. Grice, by contrast, reconstructs reason-governed practice at the micro-level of communicative exchange: his theory of conversational meaning explains how rational agents coordinate understanding by relying on shared assumptions, intentions, and principles of cooperation, which he treats as reconstructible norms rather than historically given institutions. Yet the affinity is substantive: Grice’s method of rational reconstruction plays a role analogous to Solari’s juridical historicism, translating inherited practices into explicit reasons, while his emphasis on ordinary language and intention resonates with the Italian focus on concrete linguistic and legal forms. Where Solari sees reason unfolding through the institutional history of the iustum, Grice sees it operating in the inferential and normative structure of conversation; both reject purely speculative rationalism and locate reason in lived, rule-governed human activity, one at the level of law and civil order, the other at the level of communicative interaction. Grice: “S. represents a synthesis of the Italian philosophical tradition, which prioritises praxis and the historical evolution of concrete institutions over abstract speculation. His work bridges the gap between the foundational realism of Roman law and the historicist science of VICO .  Rootedness in Roman Legal Realism The Italian tradition, beginning with Roman law, views philosophy not as a detached study of "Being," but as jurisprudence — the practical art of the "good and the equitable" (ars boni et aequi).  Practical Utility: Roman jurists did not seek universal metaphysical truths. They develop laws from specific cases to resolve social conflicts. S.’s Adoption: S. grounds his philosophy in this "juridical" mindset, viewing the law as the objective social framework where the abstract moral value must find concrete expression to be valid.  VICO (veddasi)’s Verum-Factum and Historicism S.’s approach is deeply Vichian, adopting the principle that "the true is the made" -- verum ipsum factum.  Against Pure Speculation: VICO  argues that humans can only truly know what they have created: history, language – la lingua ordinaria – il latino -- , and law. He rejects the Cartesian "geometric method" for a philological-historical approach that examines how social reality is built. Civil Prudence: Like VICO , S. emphasises "civil prudence" — the application of REASON – la ragione conversazionale -- to historical circumstances rather than to fixed, abstract categories. roma antica, Giorgio Guglielmo Federico Hegel, Spaventa, hegelianismo, iustum/iussum – storia della filosofia del diritto romano, cicerone; diritto naturale, IVS NATVRALE, Gaio, citato da Vico, Giustiniano, diritto romano in eta del principato, IVS GENTIVM, IVS VNIVERSALI, sato di natura, i ferini di Vico, il metodo pirotologico di Grice – ri-costruzione razionale, Bennett, significato naturale.  Grice: Caro Solari, sa, la mia formazione in Literae Humaniores a Clifton mi ha insegnato il valore di distinguere tra iussum e iustum. In Inghilterra, tra i barbari, spesso queste finezze si perdono, mentre qui, in Italia—terra del latino—sono ancora il cuore della riflessione filosofica. Solari: È vero, Grice. In Italia la tradizione filosofica si nutre proprio di queste distinzioni concrete. Non parliamo solo di "giusto" in astratto, ma di ciò che prende forma nelle istituzioni reali, nella vita quotidiana, come ci insegnano i giuristi romani. Grice: Mi affascina come il diritto romano sia stato sempre un’arte pratica, l’ars boni et aequi. Non si cercava l’assoluto, ma si dava risposta ai bisogni della società. È una filosofia che vive nella storia, non nell’astrazione. Solari: Esattamente. Seguendo Vico, credo che “il vero è il fatto”: solo ciò che l’uomo costruisce nella storia può essere conosciuto davvero. Per noi, la prudenza civile non è teoria, ma ragione applicata alle circostanze concrete. Questa è la forza della nostra tradizione. Solari, Gioele (1901). La filosofia del diritto. Torino: Bocca.

Matteo Luigi Soldati (Pistoia, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e la rettorica conversazionale. Grice and Matteo Luigi Soldati meet on the terrain of conversation understood as a rational, yet inherently rhetorical, human practice, though they articulate that practice from different intellectual lineages: Grice reconstrued everyday talk as governed by reason through shared norms of cooperation, showing how speakers routinely convey more than they explicitly say by exploiting defeasible expectations, irony, understatement, and connective nuance, while Soldati, working within the Italian rhetorical and scholastic tradition of Pistoia, treated those same maneuvers as the very substance of conversational rhetoric itself, where practical intelligence operates not by formal inference but by tact, contrast, and insinuation. What Grice analyzed analytically as conversational implicature—how a phrase like “He is a fine fellow” can rationally convey criticism through irony, or how particles such as “but” reshape inferential force beyond truth‑conditions—Soldati taught normatively as rhetorical craft, training speakers to govern meaning through figures such as litotes, meiosis, and strategic concession, so that understanding emerges between the lines rather than in asserted propositions. Grice’s theory thus gives Soldati’s rhetorical pedagogy a modern philosophical foundation by explaining why such devices work in virtue of reason‑governed expectations rather than ornament alone, while Soldati offers Grice a historical reminder that pragmatics is, at bottom, a continuation of conversational rhetoric, where rationality shows itself less as formal system than as cultivated sensitivity to how meaning is responsibly and effectively made manifest in ordinary social exchange.

Grice: “I like S.. In my ‘Philosopher’s paradox” I used ‘He is a fine fellow’ as example of irony – G. N. Leech is right: my pragmatics is mere conversational rhetoric! At Corpus, the rhetorical tradition is strong, since the times Reinalds lectured on Cicero’s Oratore in Latin! But of course I never undertook, as Holdcroft wanted me to, a serious systematic study – and would just drop ‘meiosis,’ ‘litotes,’ and the rest – at the drop of a cricket cap!” – Keywords: rettorica converazioanel. Pistoia, Toscana. Professore di rettorica nel seminario e collegio di Pistoja. Pur valente latinista. L'ARTE RETTO RICA SPIEGATA DALL'ABATE S. AD USO... S.  COLLEZIONE PISTOIESE R0SSI-CASSI60LI 3IBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE - FIRENZE e. j ♦ R. BIBLIOTECA NAZIONALE CENTRALE DI FIRENZE COLLEZIONE PISTOIESE RACCOLTA DAL Cav. FILIPPO ROSSI-CASSIGOLI nato a Pistola m. Pistola  Pergamene - Autografi - Manoscritti - Libri a stampa - Opuscoli - Incisioni - Disegni - Opere musicali - Facsimile d' iscrizioni - Sditti - Manifesti - Proclami - Avvisi e Periodici.  -» / I  j L' ARTE RETTORICA SPIEGATA DALL ABATI MATTEO LUIGI S. AD USO DEL SEMINARIO E COLLEGIO VESCOVILE DI PISTOJA S DEDICAT 4 fflO ino ALL' ILL. E RfcV. MONSIGNORE FRANCESCO TOH VESCOVO DI PISTOJA E PRATO PRELATO DOMESTICO DELLA SANTITÀ DI N. S. PAPA PIO. BD .ASSISTENTI AL SOGLIO PONTIFICI^vj^Ì3^^ '9 IN PISTOJA 1804. PRESSO GIOVANNI BRACALI E FIGLIO STAMPATORI TBSCOTILI. Co» Approvatine  i  tuo wo ILLVSTR. E REVEREND. MONSIGNORE Jl desiderio sincero di rendermi utile alla studiosa Gioventù tielf impiego di Retore , che da non pochi anni ho \# more d'esercitare nel vostro Seminari^  e Collegio Pistoiese, IL L USTR ISS. , e RE- VERENDISS. prammatica come rettorica conversazionale. Grice: Soldati, devo confessare che la vostra arte rettorica qui a Pistoia ha un certo sapore, come dire, più frizzante del mio vecchio Corpus. Se solo Reinalds potesse sentire la vostra spiegazione di una litote… forse smetterebbe di citare Cicerone ogni tre battute! Soldati: Ma caro Grice, la rettorica pistoiese non teme paragoni: qui persino la pergamena sa ridere! In seminario abbiamo trasformato la prammatica in una conversazione, e la conversazione in una partita di scacchi. Non è vero che una battuta ben piazzata può cambiare l’intera partita? Grice: Ah, Soldati, lei mi ricorda il mio pupil Strawson, al Vadum Boum – la sua università – che, poveretto, cercava la rettorica, ma non l’ha mai trovata così “triviale” come i ragazzi la trovano a Bononia. Forse a Oxford ci manca il piacere sottile di una battuta toscana, dove la prammatica si cela dietro un sorriso e il vero significato si intuisce solo tra le righe… Soldati: Perfetta implicatura oratoria, Grice! Lei, più di tutti, sa che una conversazione ben condotta non ha bisogno di proclami: basta un accenno, e il pubblico si scioglie come il burro sulle tagliatelle. E come diceva l’abate: “Chi sa parlare, sa sorridere.” Soldati, Matteo Luigi (1804). L’arte rettorica. Pistoja: Bracali

Pietro Silvio Rivetta di Solonghello (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura italiana. A comparison between Grice and Pietro Silvio Rivetta di Solonghello on reason‑governed conversational meaning brings out a distinctive convergence between analytic pragmatics and an Italian tradition of linguistic irony and stylistic intelligence. Grice’s theory explicates conversational meaning in terms of rationally governed inference, where implicatures arise because speakers are presumed to cooperate and to be sensitive to what is relevant, informative, and purposeful in a given exchange; the framework is intentionally spare, abstracting away from particular languages or cultural temperaments to isolate a universal structure of communicative reason. Solonghello, by contrast, approaches conversational reasoning from within the texture of Italian language and culture itself, treating implicature not as a neutral by‑product of rational cooperation but as a vivid, often humorous exploitation of shared expectations, idioms, and ironies that animate everyday talk. While Grice insists that implicature is a matter of what is meant rather than what is said, Solonghello delights in showing how Italian speakers habitually say less, say sideways, or say playfully, trusting that their interlocutors will grasp the intended meaning through cultural attunement as much as logical inference. The affinity between them lies in their shared rejection of strictly literalist or formalist accounts of meaning, yet the contrast is telling: Grice’s conversational rationality is calibrated to the disciplined recognition of intentions among theoretically ideal agents, whereas Solonghello’s is embodied in linguistic creativity, journalistic wit, and a lived sensitivity to conversational nuance, making implicature in Italian not only a rational phenomenon but also an expressive and ludic one. Grice: “If I were to be aske, as I’m usually not, at Oxford – with which Italian philosopher I identity myself most I would say Speranza – and second, S.!” Keywords: implicatura, implicature dell’italiano, la conversazione. G Tòddi -- Pseudonimo del giornalista Pier Silvio Rivetta. M. Roma. Ottimo conoscitore di lingue, addetto all'ambasciata italiana a Tokyo, è poi prof. incaricato di giapponese e cinese all'Istituto orientale di Napoli. Ma soprattutto dedica il suo versatile ingegno al giornalismo come direttore dei periodici La Tribuna illustrata, Noi e il mondo, Travaso delle idee, e redattore del quotidiano La Tribuna. Autore di numerosissimi volumi, di vivace stesura, in cui si riflettono i suoi molteplici interessi e una notevole vena di narratore umoristico (Grammatico giapponese; Validità giorni dieci; La pittura moderna giapponese; Itinerari bizzarri; Avventure e disavventure delle parole; Che bella lingua, il greco; Grammatica rivoluzionaria della lingua italiana; Geometria della realtà e inesistenza della morte; ecc.). «Non tutto il male vien per nuocere? Bugia! Ogni male viene per nuocere. Se produce qualche beneficio, è un male fatto male» (S.)  Pietro Silvio Rivetta di Solonghello, noto anche con lo pseudonimo di Toddi, è stato un filosofo, giornalista, scrittore, illustratore e cineasta italiano.  Membro di una famiglia aristocratica di conti originari di Solonghello, nel Basso Monferrato, nacque da Vittorio S. e Chiara De Blasio. Compagno di classe del critico teatrale Amico, il conte S. si laurea in giurisprudenza ed esorde come giornalista al quotidiano romano La Tribuna.  Trova impiego all'ambasciata italiana a Tokyo. Tornato in Italia, collabora a L'Epoca, e successivamente collabora a Noi e il mondo e a La Tribuna illustrata. Poliglotta, S. conosce ben 14 lingue, tra cui il cinese e il giapponese. Appassionato della cultura orientale, ottenne la cattedra di docente di lingua e cultura giapponese e cinese presso il Regio Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli.  Grice: Professore Rivetta, mi permetta di dirle che la sua “Grammatica rivoluzionaria della lingua italiana” è una delle opere più brillanti che abbia letto: davvero una ventata d’aria fresca! Solonghello: La ringrazio di cuore, Professor Grice. Sentire queste parole da lei, che ha donato tanto alla filosofia del linguaggio, è motivo di orgoglio. D’altronde, l’italiano ha bisogno ogni tanto di essere scompaginato e reinventato! Grice: Proprio così! Il modo in cui lei indaga le implicature e il gioco sottile delle conversazioni italiane mi ricorda quanto la prammatica sia viva, anche fuori dai testi accademici. C’è quasi un piacere ludico nell’esplorare gli inganni e le ironie della lingua. Solonghello: Ah, maestro, lei coglie il punto! “Non tutto il male vien per nuocere? Bugia! Ogni male viene per nuocere. Se produce qualche beneficio, è un male fatto male”... L’ironia è l’essenza della conversazione italiana, e la grammatica, se non sa sorridere, ha perso il suo spirito. Solonghello, Pietro Silvio Rivetta di (1942). L’etica del diritto. Torino: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane.

Vittorio Somenzi (Redonesco, Mantova, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale del naturale, l’innaturale, il sovranaturale, ed il trasnaturale. A comparison between Grice and Vittorio Somenzi on reason‑governed conversational meaning shows both a point of contact in their rejection of brute empiricism and a deep divergence in how widely reason is allowed to range. Grice’s account is deliberately modest and analytical: conversational meaning is governed by rational principles internal to communicative practice, where speakers and hearers treat one another as calculating agents and derive meaning through recognizable intentions constrained by cooperation, relevance, and rational expectations; any appeal beyond this, whether metaphysical or scientific, is methodologically excluded. Somenzi, by contrast, expands the scope of conversational reason by embedding it in a unified conception of nature that runs from the physical through the cybernetic to the mental and even the so‑called supernatural, treating meaning, signs, and communication as manifestations of operationally describable processes within an extended natural order. Where Grice isolates the logic of conversation from metaphysical commitments, insisting that implicature and meaning can be explained without enlarging our ontology, Somenzi seeks to naturalize even the “trans‑natural” by integrating communication, cognition, and signification into a cybernetic and operational framework in which reason operates continuously across domains. Thus Grice’s theory marks a boundary line, preserving conversational rationality as a norm governing talk among persons, while Somenzi treats conversational meaning as one instance of a broader rational organization of nature itself, dissolving the sharp distinction between the natural, the mental, and the conceptual that Grice carefully maintains. Grice: “ In the philosophy of  S., a philosophical physicist and pioneer of Italian cybernetics, natura (nature) serves as the foundational concept that bridges the gap between empirical science and broader philosophical inquiry. His perspective is characterized by a "methodological-operational" approach that seeks to unify physical reality with what has traditionally been considered metaphysical. Natura as a Unified Framework  For S., the term natura is not limited to the observable world of classical physic. Rather, it acts as an umbrella that integrates three primary domains: Naturalia (Physics): This represents the traditional domain of physics — the study of matter, energy, and observable phenomena. S., influenced by operationalism, argues that scientific concepts are defined by the operations used to measure them. Thus, Naturalia are the starting point for all objective knowledge. Trans-naturalia (Metaphysics): This term refers to the extension of natural laws into domains that transcend immediate observation but remain within the reach of scientific logic -- e.g., cybernetics and information theory. Supra-naturalia (Metaphysics/Sovranaturale): In the Italian context of naturale and sovranaturale, S. posited that even "supernatural" or mental phenomena could be understood as complex natural processes. His work on "thinking matter" (La materia pensante) suggests that the mind and consciousness are not "above" nature but are sophisticated expressions of it.  The Operationalist Bridge S.’s unique contribution is using operationalism to demystify metaphysics. By treating metaphysical notions as trans-naturalia, he argues that they could be integrated into a unified scientific worldview:  Cybernetic Integration. naturale, sovranaturale, Grice, Metaphysics in Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics. Grice: Professore Somenzi, mi dica: quando lei parla di naturale, innaturale, sovranaturale e trasnaturale, non le capita mai di sentirsi come uno chef davanti a un menù troppo ricco? Io, già solo scegliendo tra “naturale” e “innaturale”, ho il terrore di sbagliare condimento filosofico!  Somenzi: Caro Grice, in effetti, tra i filosofi lombardi c’è chi pensa che la natura sia una pentola che bolle sempre, e ogni tanto ci tuffiamo dentro concetti come “sovranaturale” sperando non ci venga a noia! Ma la cybernetica almeno ci insegna che il brodo si rinnova, e ogni ingrediente può diventare protagonista.  Grice: Vede, io non ho mai avuto paura di “segnare” – anche se a Oxford il verbo ha fatto sorridere più di una volta! Mi piace pensare che ogni segno – naturale, non-naturale, transnaturale o sovranaturale – sia come una pennellata sulla tela della natura. Del resto, nulla è davvero contro natura, semmai è solo un po’ più creativo!  Somenzi: Implicatura più naturalmente naturale, Grice! Lei arriva sempre al cuore della questione! Se avessimo un proverbio lombardo, direi: “Chi segna con la mente, segna con la natura.” Somenzi, Vittorio (1940). Sopra l’interazione elettrodinamica di due elettroni e teoria di Welker sulla superconduttività. Sotto Giovanni Gentile junior. Milano.

Father Serafino Sordi, S. J.  (Centenaro di Ferriere, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale -- o il club d’Aquino. A comparison between Grice and Serafino Sordi on reason‑governed conversational meaning highlights a shared conviction that rational order underwrites intelligible communication, while revealing sharply different sources and functions for that rationality. Grice conceives conversational meaning as arising from the purposive actions of speakers who implicitly commit themselves to cooperation, so that what is meant is fixed by rationally recoverable intentions constrained by a small set of conversational norms; rationality here is thin, procedural, and deliberately detached from metaphysical, theological, or institutional frameworks. Sordi, by contrast, interprets conversational reason through a Thomistic and counter‑revolutionary lens, treating Aquinas not merely as a metaphysician but as the intellectual organizer of a community bound by shared doctrine, social ends, and cultivated forms of discourse, so that conversation itself becomes a practice sustained by belonging to what might be called the “club of Aquinas.” Where Grice emphasizes individual inferential competence and the ability to recognize implicatures independently of tradition or authority, Sordi stresses the communal and doctrinal conditions that make rational discourse possible at all, viewing reason as something safeguarded, transmitted, and stabilized by institutional continuity against the fragmenting tendencies of empiricism and modernism. The contrast thus runs between Grice’s analytically austere model, in which conversational meaning is generated by autonomous agents reasoning together under minimal assumptions, and Sordi’s Thomistic model, in which conversational rationality is inseparable from a shared metaphysical outlook and a social practice that binds interlocutors into a durable intellectual community. Grice: “S. enriches AQUINO ’s philosophy by transforming it from a static theological tradition into a dynamic intellectual "bulwark" against modernism, specifically within the Italian counter-revolutionary context . His work revitalizes the "Italian philosophical depth" of AQUINO  by applying scholastic principles to contemporary social and political crises. Modernizing AQUINO’s Methodology S. does not merely repeat medieval formulas; he pioneers a comparative methodology that places AQUINO  in direct dialogue with rationalist and empiricist systems. Superiority through Comparison: S. uses AQUINO ’s doctrines to expose the perceived deficiencies in philosophy, arguing that AQUINO  provides a more comprehensive understanding of reality than the "sensism" and "empiricism" of his day. Intellectual Custodian: S. is regarded as the custodian of the legacy of BUZZETTI , who first identifies AQUINO  as the "sound philosophy" needed to preserve the religious and social order.  Influencing the Italian AQUINO ’s Renaissance S.’s influence is instrumental in moving AQUINO  from the margins of ecclesiastical thought to the centre of Italian intellectual life: Mentorship of TAPARELLI : S. is the mentor of Taparelli d'AZEGLIO , a key figure in AQUINO ’s revival. AZEGLIO ’s conversion to the philosophy of AQUINO , prompted by S.’s writings, led to the creation of a "compendium" of AQUINO  that helps standardise scholastic education in Jesuit colleges. Counter-Revolutionary Depth: S. views the philosophy of AQUINO  as an essential tool for social restoration. By framing AQUINO ’s metaphysics as the foundation for a stable socio-political order, he adds a layer of pragmatic, contemporary depth to Italian philosophical discourse that goes beyond abstract speculation.  AQUINO.  Grice: Caro Sordi, si dice che in filosofia conta saper argomentare, ma io sono convinto che la vera virtù sia… la clubbability! D’altronde, anche a Oxford ci si riunisce per il tè, mica solo per i sillogismi.  Sordi: Ah, Grice, qui a Milano forse il tè lo lasciamo agli inglesi, ma il vero spirito del club d’Aquino sta proprio nel mescolare dottrina e compagnia. Tra una Summa e una battuta, si fa filosofia e contro-rivoluzione!  Grice: Si sa, alcuni club sono esclusivi per statuto; tuttavia, il club d’Aquino… be’, diciamo che chi sa cogliere certe implicature, come avrebbe detto il buon Dr. Johnson, si trova subito a casa—al di là della tessera.  Sordi: Implicatura più clubbabile, Grice! In fondo, tra filosofi, la vera appartenenza si misura dal sorriso che si cela dietro una definizione… e dal numero di panettoni condivisi durante le dispute metafisiche. Sordi, Serafino (1814). Studi su Aquino. Sotto Buzzetti. Seminario di Piacenza, Emilia.

Giovanni Gualberto De Soria (Pisa, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale dell’opuscolo della simpatia. A comparison between Grice and Giovanni Gualberto De Soria on reason‑governed conversational reasoning reveals a shared commitment to rational intelligibility as the basis of communication, but grounded in strikingly different metaphysical and explanatory frameworks. Grice’s theory treats conversational reasoning as a minimally moral, quasi‑contractual practice among agents who recognize one another as capable of rational cooperation: meaning is generated through intentions constrained by a single overarching principle of cooperation, with breakdowns explained not by failures of empathy or sympathy but by calculable deviations from relevance, informativeness, or sincerity. De Soria, by contrast, situates conversational reason within a thicker metaphysical and anthropological background, where simpatia functions as the mediating principle between self‑love and other‑love, reason and benevolence, individual cognition and a universally resonant order of nature. Whereas Grice deliberately strips conversational reasoning of animistic or affective surplus, anchoring it in sober rational expectations shared by competent interlocutors, De Soria’s account allows sympathy, empathy, and benevolent responsiveness to play a constitutive role in the very possibility of understanding, so that cooperation is not merely inferred but felt as part of a broader moral resonance between minds. In Grice, rationality governs conversation by regulating inference among autonomous agents; in De Soria, conversational rationality is already infused with a moral psychology of helpfulness and mutual attunement, edging toward a universalist picture in which communication among humans mirrors a deeper harmony in the world. The contrast thus lies between Grice’s austere, analytically disciplined conception of conversational reason and De Soria’s more expansive Enlightenment vision, where rational cooperation remains central but is sustained by sympathy as a bridge between reason, sentiment, and shared human life. Grice: “S. is an Italian philosopher and professor at Pisa, known for his work in the  Italian Enlightenment and his attempts to reconcile rationalism with traditional metaphysics. While he did not intend for his philosophy to be seen as animistic, his approach to "sympathy" (or simpatia) can be interpreted that way through several lenses. Universal Resonance as Living Connection S.’s concept of sympathy often relies on the idea of a universal harmony or resonance between different parts of the natural world. To a rationalist, this might be viewed as a mechanical or causal link; however, an unintentional animistic reading suggests that for such a "sympathy" to exist, the objects themselves must possess an inherent, internal "attraction" or "feeling" for one another. This mirrors the animistic belief that all matter is imbued with a form of life or soul that allows for mutual influence beyond physical contact.  Immateriality and the "Vitality" of Nature In his work Della esistenza e degli attributi di Dio, S. argues for the immateriality of the human spirit. When he extends these metaphysical principles to the broader "science of nature" (scienza della natura), he risks blurring the line between the human soul and the "spirit" of the cosmos. If the entire universe operates under a system of sympathies similar to the human spirit's inner workings, it implies a nature that is "alive" with the same immaterial qualities, a hallmark of animistic thought. Mediation Between the Physical and Spiritual S. seeks to move beyond "all hypotheses" to a pure "science of man". l’opuscolo, simpatia, simpatia, empatia, simpatia conversazionale, other-love, self-love, benevolenza, helpfulness, cooperation, basis, dull empiriist, enough of a rationalist, quasi-contractualist, relevance breakdown on you, one principle, rationality, cooperation. Grice: Professore De Soria, la sua teoria della simpatia mi ha sempre affascinato. Mi sembra che lei riesca quasi a far “vibrare” il mondo naturale attraverso un principio di comunicazione universale. Crede davvero che ogni cosa, anche la più minuta, partecipi a questa armonia? Soria: Caro Grice, le confesso che la mia idea di simpatia nasce dal desiderio di scoprire un filo invisibile che unisca uomini e natura, senza cadere nell’animismo ingenuo. Preferisco pensare a una risonanza razionale, dove ogni parte del cosmo risponde, pur mantenendo la sua autonomia spirituale. Grice: Eppure, la sua prospettiva sembra quasi suggerire che la natura abbia una sua interiorità, un sentimento diffuso, come se fosse animata. Non trova che questa visione, pur razionale, sfiori l’empatia universale di cui parlano i filosofi più “vitali”? Soria: È vero, maestro, ma la mia simpatia vuole essere un ponte tra ragione e sentimento, non una confusione tra la mente umana e lo spirito cosmico. Preferisco pensare che la cooperazione e la benevolenza siano principi che guidano sia la conversazione tra uomini, sia l’armonia del mondo. In fondo, come dice il proverbio: “Chi semina buone parole, raccoglie simpatia.” Soria, Giovanni Gualberto De (1727). Dissertazione. Giurisprudenza, Pisa.

Andrea Sorrentino (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del Vico italico. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Andrea Sorrentino’s Vico‑centred account of ragione conversazionale converge in treating meaning as an achievement internal to rational social practice rather than as a merely formal or semantic mechanism, yet they diverge sharply in orientation and explanatory ambition. For Grice, conversational meaning is generated by individual speakers acting under rational expectations articulated through the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, so that what is meant emerges from calculable inferences drawn by interlocutors who recognize one another as reasoners aiming at mutual understanding; reason is here procedural, agent‑centred, and minimally historical, functioning as a normative constraint on talk exchanges wherever cooperative interaction occurs. By contrast, Sorrentino reads Vico’s reason as culturally sedimented and historically embodied, locating conversational rationality within the Mediterranean formation of Roman law, Greek philosophy, rhetoric, and poetic knowledge, so that meaning arises not primarily from strategic inference by individuals but from a shared civilizational horizon that shapes how interlocutors can speak, persuade, and understand one another at all. Where Grice abstracts conversation into a formalizable structure of intentions, implications, and recognitions that can in principle operate independently of cultural content, Sorrentino insists that Vichian reason is inseparable from the imaginative, rhetorical, and juridical practices of a specific historical world, in which conversation is already thick with myth, metaphor, and communal memory; the contrast thus pits Grice’s universalist, analytic model of conversational rationality against Sorrentino’s historicized, Mediterranean model, in which reasoned meaning is less a calculable inference than a culturally educated way of inhabiting and continuing a shared form of life. Vico. Bordon, La retorica di Vico. VICO e le razze mediterranee, Bulletin italien di Bordeaux. Scrocca. Vico e un suo recente critico: in Rassegna nazionale di Firenze. A. SORRENTINO, La cultura mediterranea nei Principi di Scienza nuova. Con scritti di G. Cacciatore, R. Diana, M. Sanna e A. Scognamiglio, a cura di A. Scognamiglio, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,  Alessia Scognamiglio  This volume offers Andrea S.'s work La cultura mediterranea nei Principi di Scienza nuova after almost a century from its first and only publication in 1920. In it, Sorrentino aims at showing that the world of nations which Vico studies and sets forth in Scienza nuova is exclusively the Greek and the Roman world, therefore a "Mediterranean" world, since Vico's cultural background has been essentially formed through the study of Roman law and of the greek philosophy, together with the research of the classical studies. Furthermore, the volume collects the contributions of Giuseppe Cacciatore, Rosario Diana, Manuela Sanna and Alessia Scognamiglio. In his essay (Per un profilo di Andrea Sorrentino, pp. ***), Giuseppe Cacciatore, after tracing Sorrentino's scientific profile, reflects about some fundamental passages of his text: the framework of Sorrentino's research, which places itself halfway between the historical-scientific inquiry and the interest for the philosophy of culture; the belief that some limits of Vico's analysis, which he proposes, come from the conflicting relationship between the Neapolitan philosopher and his century; the centrality of the theme of the poetic knowledge in the Scienza Nuova; the problem of the Middle Ages between Rome's heritage and Germanic sources. Manuela Sanna (L'«epicentrismo» euromediterraneo di Vico nella lettura di Andrea S.) summarizes Sorrentino's interpretative proposals, all pivoting around the idea of epicentrism. Vico, razza mediterranea, razza aria.  G: 1939. You have brought two Vicos into my room and expect me to treat that as one. S: Two citations, sir. Page eighty, and page one hundred and thirty-eight. Oxford prefers to learn by page number. G: Oxford prefers to learn by footnote. S: Then you’re in luck. Page one hundred and thirty-eight is a footnote. G: Read the page eighty Vico first. S: Collingwood, Principles of Art. He says: Giambattista Vico said that children were “sublime poets.” G: And what is Collingwood doing with that. S: He is doing what Oxford always does: invoking a foreign genius in order to dismiss him politely. G: Yes. He says Vico may be right, and then says it throws no light for most of us. S: It’s the Oxford compliment: “Brilliant, but not useful.” G: Now page one hundred and thirty-eight. S: The footnote says: the habit of calling aesthetic experience “the pleasures of the imagination” dates back to Addison; the philosophical theory of art as imagination, to his contemporary Vico. G: That one is better. It gives Vico a role in the genealogy of an idea. S: So Vico becomes, in Oxford, a footnote in a footnote. G: That is still an improvement on being absent. S: But why is Collingwood so superficial, sir. G: Because he is writing Principles of Art, not Principles of Naples. S: And because he thinks “imagination” is a word you can use without paying rent. G: Not quite. He knows it’s loaded. That’s why he attacks the confusion between imagination and make-believe. S: His “anti-aesthetic” paragraph. G: Exactly. He is actually making a conceptual distinction, which is our tribe’s only real sport. S: And he brings in Vico to say: art as imagination has philosophical ancestry, not just sentimental ancestry. G: Yes. Addison gives the phrase. Vico gives the theory. S: Sir, you said earlier Collingwood “almost went to jail” over Vico. G: Over Croce’s Vico, and translation rights. It is Oxford heroism by paperwork. S: Collingwood translating Croce in 1913, and Douglas Ainslie being furious. G: The Oxford contribution to Italian philosophy: litigation. S: So the poor Oxonians needed Collingwood to render Vico intelligible. G: The poor always learn at Oxford. The rich merely inherit committees. S: And Sorrentino. G: Yes. Andrea Sorrentino on Vico, rhetoric and poetics. S: You want me to use Collingwood as an Oxford anchor so Sorrentino doesn’t float in from Rome like a decorative gondola. G: Precisely. We need Vico not as a souvenir but as a presence in Oxford discourse during Grice’s period. S: Collingwood gives you that. Twice. G: And Croce gives you a third way, via Collingwood-as-translator. S: But then Grice. Would he have cared about Vico. G: He would care about whatever made “meaning” look like a civil practice rather than a code. S: And that is rhetoric. G: Yes. Rhetoric is the art of making the hearer do work without resenting it. S: That sounds like implicature. G: It is the ancestor of it, if you want a genealogy without committing a crime. S: So Sorrentino’s “retorica di Vico” becomes relevant to conversational reason. G: Yes. Because Vico’s rhetorica is not ornament; it is the civil machinery by which a culture can mean things together. S: But Oxford hates rhetoric. G: Oxford hates being accused of rhetoric. Oxford loves doing it. S: Collingwood’s footnote is rhetoric too. G: Of course. It suggests a whole intellectual lineage in one line and expects the reader to accept it. S: What about Isaiah Berlin. G: Berlin is the later Oxford Vico evangelist, but in 1939 he is not yet the public Berlin of the Counter-Enlightenment. S: So we keep him in the wings. G: Mention him only as future confirmation that Vico will be taken seriously at Oxford. S: And Hampshire. G: Hampshire’s Vico essay is after your window, but you can have us prophesy him. S: A prophecy in Oxford is always a footnote in advance. G: Good. Now: rhetoric, rhetorica. S: Is Vico more rhetorician than philosopher. G: That is an anachronism. In Vico’s world, rhetoric is philosophy’s public face. And in Oxford’s world, philosophy pretends it has no face. S: But it does. G: It does. It is called “ordinary language.” S: Which is rhetoric in modest dress. G: Exactly. Now bring in I. A. Richards, if you want. S: Richards has a Philosophy of Rhetoric. Not a philosopher, strictly. G: That “strictly” is your mistake. Cambridge can contribute too, but we’re anchoring Oxford. S: Grice quotes Ogden and Richards. G: Yes. So the Oxford story includes Cambridge rhetoric as an imported tool. S: Like a foreign wine. G: Exactly. Now, the imagination point. Collingwood has “Language” as a chapter. S: In Principles of Art, Book II, Theory of Imagination, Chapter XI. G: Good. Now link that to Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit and Anscombe, since you insisted. S: The duck-rabbit is aspect-seeing, and it looks like imagination. G: Yes. And rhetoric is partly aspect-guiding. Making the audience see it as duck, not rabbit, without stating “duck.” S: That sounds like implicature again. G: It is not implicature strictly, but it is the same discipline of guiding without spelling out. S: So you want one principle governing language, like Vico’s rhetorical principle and Grice’s cooperative principle. G: Yes. But be careful. Vico’s principle is historical and cultural; mine is meant to be thin and general. S: And Collingwood sits between them with imagination. G: Precisely. He turns imagination into a philosophical engine for art, and he nods to Vico as a precursor. S: But he is superficial. G: He is economical. Superficiality is sometimes economy. S: Sorrentino, on the other hand, is not economical. G: Sorrentino is Roman, and Romans like architecture. They build interpretive horizons. S: And Oxford likes small rooms. G: Exactly. Oxford is suspicious of Mediterranean horizons because they make Oxford look provincial. S: Which it is. G: Quietly. Now: why “retorica” for Vico. S: Because Vico’s knowledge is poetic knowledge, and poetic knowledge is rhetorical in its mode of presentation. G: Yes. And because Vico thinks nations are made by imaginative universals, which are not deductions but tropes. S: So a trope is a cognitive instrument, not a decoration. G: Exactly. That is the Vichian move that Sorrentino wants. S: And Grice would translate that into: hearers infer beyond what is said using shared expectations. G: Yes. The difference is that Vico builds the shared expectations historically; I treat them as a standing rational practice. S: Now, the Oxford connection again. G: Collingwood gives you Vico inside an Oxford Clarendon book in 1938. S: And Collingwood gives you Croce’s Vico in 1913, also Oxford in a social sense. G: And perhaps Grice’s Oxford could have met Vico through that line even if no one admitted it. S: Because Oxford never admits sources. G: Exactly. Oxford calls sources “background.” S: Then the vignette should end with a prophecy about Hampshire. G: Yes. We say: one day an Oxford man will treat Vico and language seriously. S: And you add: but he will do it in New York Review of Books, not in a tutorial. G: Precisely. S: Punchline, sir. G: The punchline is that Oxford took Vico seriously enough to footnote him twice, and that is the Oxford equivalent of building him a statue.Grice: Professore Sorrentino, leggevo il suo lavoro su Vico e la cultura mediterranea… Dica la verità: per lei Vico è più greco che romano, o più romano che greco? Oppure, come certi filosofi di Roma, si muove con disinvoltura tra l’una e l’altra riva del Mediterraneo? Sorrentino: Eh, caro Grice, con Vico non si sta mai fermi: un giorno si trova tra le pandette romane, il giorno dopo si perde nei labirinti della mitologia greca… È un po’ come prendere il traghetto da Napoli: non sai mai esattamente in quale porto sbarcherai, ma sai che sarà sempre Mediterraneo! Grice: Devo ammettere che c’è del vero! Del resto, il vico in cui viveva Vico era abbastanza lontano da Bononia… Ma, tra noi, era ancora più distante da Vadum Boum: lì si discute di leggi, ma la poesia, quella vera, resta sulle rive del Mediterraneo. Sorrentino: Implicatura quanto mai topica, Grice! In fondo, chi si allontana troppo dal Mediterraneo rischia di perdere la rotta… e magari finisce per confondere i filosofi con i bovini! Sorrentino, Andrea (1910). Della lirica encomiastica di T. Tasso (Dalla fanciulelezza alla liberazione del carcere di S. Anna). Salerno: Migliaccio.

Salvatore de Sortis (Lucca, Toscana): la retorica conversazionale. A comparison between H. P. Grice and Salvatore de Sortis on reason‑governed conversational meaning shows a deep continuity between early modern rhetorical theory and twentieth‑century philosophical pragmatics. In his treatises on rhetorical education and conversational rhetoric, Sortis insists that effective persuasion depends not on mechanical rules but on the rational attunement between speaker and audience: metaphor, pro‑syllogism, and measured allusion work because they engage the listener’s inferential capacities without suppressing natural genius or freedom of thought. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning articulates the same insight in analytical terms: meaning arises through cooperative, reason‑guided inference from what is said to what is meant, governed by shared expectations of rational conduct rather than by explicit coding alone. Where Sortis frames rhetoric as a pragmatic art that respects the intelligence and autonomy of interlocutors, Grice formalizes this respect as the Cooperative Principle and conversational implicature, showing how speakers deliberately leave meanings implicit in order to activate the hearer’s rational participation. Both thinkers thus reject authoritarian or purely mechanical models of communication and instead ground meaning in the disciplined interplay of intention, inference, and audience cooperation, making conversation itself a rational practice rather than a mere vehicle for stated content. Grice: “I like Sortis: he wrote on everything I did, but before me!” – Keywords: metafora, implicatura, pro-sillogismo. SAGGIO DI RETTORICA, che insegna alla gioventù studiosa i caratteri di perfetto oratore, ed i mezzi a divenirvi COMPILATO DA SALVATORE DE SORTIS NAPOLI. r Nella Tipografia Chiasesm Con appro^azio^<9 f A« t, ' r ^ ■ aomo deve alla tiattin il genio, # ' la dispobizlune all' eloquenza ^ ali' Ora« icria 9 €fa« è la facoltà di rt|i§cm :iiel rilevante oggetto di persuadere . L' arie. Io studio 9 TMercizio coliivana m ki ^ nigtiorano , e perfezionano il genio naturale. Kon giovano \ precetti deli' arie^ te 4«ieati noii trovano aetb» Sfìtriio di chi riceve^ 1* ingegno ^ e k di^^potizionà die poi ¥antio^ ad ecciiarst , «vilopparsi^^ , 0 ffio ierarsi saggiamente con quei preMt^ ti. Le oaiervazionir auUa aaiora delle eo« se , la giornaliera c omiderazioae di queU- lo elle avviene tra gli ^lomfni , la tiies» •èoue attiva , e 1* esempio di quei pri* »ii, e ptrfeiù Oiaiori che sono ai beim- Musciti nei***arte lero, PoiJliià che risul- ta a chiunque , con additargli i mesai sicari 9 e facili ^ pèr coQstguire un in- ieulu 9 il fine, di giovare eoo accanel f • ajuti. A ajatt lianno fatato sulle prime il :pctfi« $ieio ui raccogliere alcune regole ^ ed ìnsegnamtinU -pbe « poress<^rq proporsi ai giovani , mi io modo tale di non sop- primere in essi^u^ guastare il genio oa« turale ed ì liberi pensamenti dell' inge- l^no , nè renderli iaiiuto»i, o servili CQ* pibti' dell' aUrui operazioni , ed aatoricà, ; "Quesia è. quella che dicesi arte relXOr fica 9 .ì&tituzicio^ reitorica , oratoria^ ec; Hettoiici 9 o preceuori di eloqueuza so* no d^tti co4oro che ai aooo applicati « raccogliere , ed insegnare ad altu siifatU pr€cettù ,« Oratori, ai dicono, qiteili: cIm ne faiiiìO uso. Ove i Rettonci non sap<^ piaao £>ruìre l'arte ioro^chi è che noia, vede che recano danno , e pregiudizio a coloro che iiDpicudaao ad ammaestrale? prammatica come rettorica conversazionale.  Grice: Maestro Sortis, ho sempre pensato che la vostra rettorica conversazionale sia una vera miniera d’oro per chi, come me, si diverte a intrecciare metafore e pro-sillogismi. Ma ditemi, chi vi ha insegnato a rendere ogni discorso così brillante senza mai annoiare? Forse il segreto sta nel vostro stile lucchese o nel caffè napoletano? Sortis: Ah, caro Grice, se bastasse solo il caffè, saremmo tutti oratori perfetti! Ma la vera eloquenza nasce dall’osservare la natura umana, dal cogliere l’ironia dietro ogni parola, e soprattutto dalla capacità di non soffocare il genio naturale dei miei giovani interlocutori. E poi, come si dice a Lucca: “Parola gentile, apre ogni cancello.” Grice: Vede, a Vadum Boum, dove insegno, ho un tutee, Strawson, che ogni tanto mi chiede se la rettorica sia davvero “triviale”. Io non oso mai dirgli di no… ma diciamo che chi frequentava le vostre lezioni non ha mai trovato la conversazione banale. Anzi, c’è chi sostiene che persino il silenzio tra i vostri studenti sia carico di implicature. Sortis: Implicatura più oratorialmente sublime, Grice! Se persino Strawson, tra una pausa e l’altra, riesce a percepire il valore di una parola ben posta, allora la vostra scuola non ha nulla da invidiare alla mia. In fondo, chi sa sorridere tra le righe e lasciar intendere più di quanto dica, ha già conquistato la platea. E come si dice dalle nostre parti: “Meglio una buona allusione che mille spiegazioni.” Sortis, Salvatore de (1620). Trattato della sapienza. Venezia: Sarzina.

Fausto Sozzini (Siena, Toscana). A comparison between Fausto Sozzini and H. P. Grice on reason‑governed meaning shows a striking structural affinity despite their different domains. In De sacrae Scripturae auctoritate (1570s, first published 1580s), Sozzini argues that the authority of Scripture is not brute or self‑authenticating but is grasped through rational evaluation of authorial intention, historical context, and the reader’s responsible assent; Scripture persuades because it addresses human reason coherently rather than compelling belief by sheer decree. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning generalizes the same rational architecture to everyday language: what a speaker means is determined not by the bare sentence but by intentions recognized by a cooperative audience, operating under shared rational principles that make communication possible. Where Sozzini resists “blind authority” in theology by insisting that understanding Scripture requires reasoned uptake, Grice resists philosophical “literalism” by showing that meaning emerges from rational, rule‑governed interaction rather than semantic surface alone. In both cases, meaning is neither imposed nor automatic; it is achieved through the disciplined cooperation of minds, whether interpreting sacred texts in Kraków or ordinary conversation in Oxford. Grice: Caro Sozzini di Siena, leggo il tuo De auctoritate scripturae sacrae e mi pare che anche la Bibbia, come una buona conversazione, dica sempre un po’ più di quanto afferma. Sozzini: Misericordia, Grice, se lo dici così i teologi diranno che ho inventato l’implicatura prima del peccato originale. Grice: Non temere, a Cracovia come a Oxford basta riconoscere l’intenzione dell’autore e il resto lo fa la cooperazione del lettore. Sozzini: Allora siamo salvi entrambi: io salvo la Scrittura dall’autorità cieca e tu la conversazione dalla cecità filosofica, con un sorriso. Sozzini, Fausto (1570). De auctoritate scripturae sacrae. Kraków: Rodecki.

Lelio Sozzini (Siena, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale -- razionalismo, e moi. A comparison between H. P. Grice and Lelio Sozzini brings into focus two sharply distinct but structurally allied conceptions of reason as an active, normative constraint on meaningful discourse. Sozzini’s rationalism arises within a religious and ethical context: reason functions as the tribunal before which doctrine must justify itself, and conversation—whether exegetical, theological, or moral—is governed by the demand that nothing be accepted which violates intelligibility or individual conscience. His rejection of mystery, sacramental mediation, and ecclesiastical authority places rational dialogue at the center of faith itself, turning belief into an essentially conversational achievement between text, reason, and the interpreting self. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning operates in a secular and analytical register, but the structural parallel is evident: meaning is not bestowed by authority, convention alone, or ritual form, but emerges from rational agents who recognize one another as bound by norms of intelligibility, relevance, and justification. Where Sozzini insists that religious assent must be accountable to reasoned dialogue rather than imposed dogma, Grice insists that linguistic meaning must be accountable to reasoned cooperation rather than mere causal signaling or institutional convention. Both thus oppose opaque authority—Sozzini theological, Grice semantic—and place rational accountability at the heart of understanding: for Sozzini, the conscience answers only to reason; for Grice, utterances answer to the rational expectations of conversational partners. In this sense, Grice’s pragmatics can be read as a late, secular echo of Socinian rationalism: an account of how shared reason, exercised in dialogue, disciplines what may legitimately be meant. Grice: “ The philosophical work of  Lelio and Fausto S. -- founders of Socinianism -- creates a stark contrast with stereotypical Roman Catholic influence in Italy by championing rationalism and individual conscienceover dogmatic authority and mystical ritualism. Key Contrasts with Roman Catholic Influence Rationalism vs. Dogma/Mystery: While Roman Catholicism often emphasizes the acceptance of sacred "mysteries" -- such as the Trinity or the Transubstantiation -- through faith and ecclesiastical authority, the S. brothers argue that religious truth must be compatible with human REASON – la RAGIONE. They reject the Trinity and the divinity of Jesus as logically untenable. Individual Judgment vs. Institutional Authority: Stereotypical Catholic influence is rooted in the centralized authority of the Church and tradition. In contrast, the S. brothers promote private judgment, asserting that every individual has the right and duty to interpret the Bible using their own logical faculties, rather than relying on a clerical hierarchy. Separation of Church and State: Contrary to the historical Italian reality of the Papal States and the Church's heavy involvement in civil governance, Socinianism was among the first Christian movements to advocate for the strict separation of church and state and religious toleration. Ethical Living vs. Sacramentalism: The S. brothers moved away from the Catholic emphasis on sacraments -- like the Mass or Penance -- as essential "means of grace." They viewed Christianity primarily as a moral code and Jesus as an ethical teacher rather than a divine saviour whose death satisfied a supernatural debt. Rejection of Original Sin: They denied the doctrine of Original Sin, a cornerstone of Catholic theology, arguing instead for human moral agency and the inherent ability of people to follow God's laws without a predetermined "corrupt" nature.  Sozzini, rationalism, and moi.  Grice: Caro Sozzini, devo confessarle che tutto quello che so sui fratelli Sozzini, l’ho imparato proprio da mio padre: il meno conformista tra i non-conformisti che io abbia mai conosciuto!  Sozzini: Ah, Grice, questa sì che è una presentazione che mi fa sorridere! Credo che suo padre e io ci saremmo trovati subito d’accordo: un vero spirito affine, senza dubbio.  Grice: Non ho dubbi! Era capace di mettere in dubbio tutto, persino le abitudini di famiglia a colazione – figuriamoci i dogmi e le tradizioni.  Sozzini: Proprio come noi Sozzini: sempre pronti a interrogare la ragione e a difendere il diritto di pensare con la propria testa. In fondo, la vera fede non teme le domande, ma si nutre di esse. Sozzini, Lelio (1562). Brevis explicatio in primum Johannis caput. Zürich: Froschauer.

Bertrando Spaventa (Bomba, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale e l’origine italico dello spirito filosofico. In comparing Grice with Spaventa, a shared concern emerges with reason as something exercised in and through form, rather than imposed as a finished doctrine, but their points of departure and emphases diverge in telling ways. Spaventa’s notion of ragione conversazionale belongs to a historicist and idealist framework in which reason unfolds dialogically across epochs, nations, and traditions: philosophy advances through a circulation of ideas in which Italian thought migrates outward (to Germany) and returns transformed, reappropriated as a self-conscious, national, and political spirit. Reason, for Spaventa, is the self-creation (autoctisi) of the subject in history, achieved through dialectical confrontation with the other and ultimately oriented toward cultural and civic praxis. Grice, by contrast, strips reason of historical teleology and national destiny, relocating it at the micro-level of ordinary interaction. His theory of reason-governed conversational meaning does not describe the self-realization of Geist, but the normative expectations underwriting intelligible communication between speakers: intentions, mutual recognition, and shared principles of rational cooperation. Where Spaventa sees conversation as the large-scale movement of spirit across traditions, Grice sees it as the local, rule-governed activity by which agents make themselves intelligible here and now. Yet the affinity is real: both reject doctrinal metaphysics in favor of reason as an activity, both assign primacy to the subject as a rational agent rather than a passive bearer of truths, and both understand philosophy as inseparable from dialogue—Spaventa’s transnational and historical, Grice’s interpersonal and pragmatic. In this sense, Grice’s conversational rationality can be read as an English, analytic analogue to Spaventa’s idealist vision: a demystified, non-Hegelian account of how reason lives not in systems, but in the disciplined practice of exchange. Grice: “S. fundamentally shifted Italian philosophy by professionalizing it through a  non-doctrinal Hegelianism. His work established a template for Continental philosophy—characterized by a focus on the subject, historicism, and the political application of dialectics—that eventually paved the way for both the Left-Hegelianism of Antonio Labriola and the "Actualism" of Gentile. The "Circulation of Ideas" and Historicism Spaventa’s most influential thesis was the "circulation of Italian thought," which argued that the modern spirit of philosophy began with Italian Renaissance thinkers like Bruno and Campanella.  Nationalizing Hegel: He claimed that German Idealism (Kant, Hegel) was not foreign but rather the mature development of seeds planted by Italians. Impact: This allowed Italian philosophy to move beyond provincial Catholicism and join the European "continental" conversation, integrating historical reality with metaphysical theory.  2. Primacy of the Subject (Epistemological Shift) Moving away from rigid system-building, Spaventa reinterpreted Hegelian categories to give primacy to the thinking subject.  Subjectivity over Objectivity: He focused on the Phenomenology of Spirit as much as the Logic, emphasizing the internal process of consciousness. Autoctisis: He coined the term autoctisis (self-creation) to describe human liberty as the continuous "fashoning of oneself" through thought.  3. Direction Towards the "Left" and Political Praxis While S. served the Historical Right in parliament, his philosophical innovations provided the scaffolding for Italian Marxism and leftist continental thought:  italianita, Englishry, Englishness, English nation, the English, the English tongue, the tongue of the English, the tongue of the Anglians, the English spirit, the English ghost. Grice: A proposito, caro Spaventa, devo confessarti che l’unico Bertrando che conosco, a parte te, è Russell! Mi chiedo se anche tu, di tanto in tanto, non abbia avuto a che fare col celebre filosofo inglese, almeno idealmente... Spaventa: Grice, mi fa sorridere! In effetti, il mio spirito filosofico ha viaggiato molto, ma più che con Russell, ho preferito dialogare con Hegel e i nostri italiani, da Bruno a Campanella. Sono convinto che l’origine dello spirito filosofico sia profondamente italica, anche se il pensiero inglese conserva sempre un suo fascino. Grice: Beh, allora potremmo dire che il tuo “circulation of ideas” è proprio una conversazione transnazionale! Forse la filosofia, come il buon vino, si arricchisce passando da una terra all’altra. Ma, dimmi, ti senti più vicino all’idealismo tedesco o al genio rinascimentale italiano? Spaventa: Ottima domanda! Io credo che il vero filosofo sappia riconoscere le radici italiane nel pensiero europeo, senza rinnegare i frutti tedeschi. L’autocreatività dello spirito, come la chiamo, nasce proprio dal confronto: riflettere su sé stessi, dialogare con l’altro, e reinventarsi ogni giorno. In fondo, anche noi oggi, Grice, stiamo creando nuovi sentieri filosofici… a proposito! Spaventa, Bertrando (1844). Introduzione/Programma – Il Foglio. Napoli.

J. L. Speranza – implicatura ed implicatura -- filosofia italiana – pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice,  (Albalonga). Filosofo. Speranza, Ugo -- Speranza, Alessandro -- Speranza, Ettore -- Speranza, Gianni -- Speranza, Paola -- Speranza, Anna-Maria -- Speranza-Ghersi –Ghersi-Speranza, Anna-Maria -- Speranza lui speranza: luigi della --. Italian philosopher, attracted, for some reason, to Grice. Speranza knows St. John’s very well. He is the author of “Dorothea Oxoniensis.” He is a member of a number of cultivated Anglo-Italian societies, like Grice’s Playgroup. He is the custodian of Villa Grice, not far from . He works at . Cuisine is one of his hobbiesgrisottoa alla ligure, his specialty. He can be reached via Grice. Grice, “Vita ed opinion di ,” par . A. M. Ghersi Speranza -- vide Ghersi-Speranza. Ghersi is a collaborator of Speranza. Grice: “It’s easy enough to list Speranza’s publications.” Speranza, like Mill, was fortunate to belong to a literary familyand he would read Descartes’s Meditations, which drew him to philosophy. His studies in logic drew him to semanticsHis first love was Oxonian analysis as summarised in Hartnack’s essay on ‘contemporary’ philosophy. One of Speranza’s earliest essays is on Plato’s Cratylus, relying mainly on Cassierer, but also drawing from Austin’s Philosophical Papesr. Spearnza’s idea is that “ … mean …” is a dyadic relation and what’s behind Plato’s theory of forms. This was Speranza’s contribution to a seminar in ancient philosophy. For his contribution on medieaval philosophy, Speranza drew on the modistae, and the Patrologia Latina for the use of ‘intentio’ in various writers, up to AquinoSperanza finds it fascinating that the earliest modistae do find a conceptual link between the ‘intentio’ and the ‘significatio.’ For a seminar on scepticism, Speranza contributed with a paper on Gricedrawing on Sextus Empiricus and Bar-Hillel. It relates to Grice’s problem with the conversational category of fortitude. Speranza has studied the connections between H. P. Grice and some Italian philosophers, including: Abbà, Abbagnano, Abbri, Abrotele, Accetto, Acilio, Achillini, Acito, Acmonida, Aconzio, Acri, Acusilada, Adami, Addiego, Adelfio, Afer, Agazzi, Agazzi, Agela, Agesarco, Agesidamo, Agilo, Agostino, Agresta, Agrippa, Agrippa, Agrippino, Aigone, Airaudi, Ajello, Albani, Alberti, Alberti, Albertini, Albino, Albino, Albino, Alboini, Albucio, Albucio, Alcia, Alciati, Alcimaco, Alcio, Alcio, Alcmeone, Alderotti, Alessandro, Alessandro, Alessandro, Alessandro Alessandro Alessandro Alessandro Alessandro Alessandro Appio Alessandro. Alessandro Alesaandro Alessandro: il portico a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Abstract. Grice: “The Romans could be an odd lot – very patriotic; but when it came to naming their offspring, they would not hesitate to give them a Hellenstic name, like Alexandros, Greek for ‘protector of men’!” All that is known of A. is a funerary inscription found in Rome identifying him as a philosopher belonging to The Porch. Tiberio Claudio Alessandro. Alessandro. Keywords: porticus. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, “Grice ed Alessandro. Alessandro: gl’animali a Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Abstract. Grice: “Alessandro’s mother was Hellensitic, hence his nickname, Alessandro. The Ancient Greek first name Alexandros – from which the name Alexander is derived, has a profound and powerful etymology. It is composed of two Greek words: alexein, meaning ‘to ward off, keep off, turn away, defend, or protect. And Andros, the genitive form of aner, meaning ‘man’ or ‘warrior Therefore. Alexandros literally translates to ‘defender of men, or ‘protector of mankind. This meaning gained widespread recognition and significance through Alexander the Great, the king of Macedon, whose military conquests spread Greek culture and the name throught the ancient world.” He is discussed by Filone, in connection th problems concerning providence and the nature of animals. He pursues a career n public and military life. Tiberio Giulio Alessandro. Alessandro. Grice, pel Gruppo di Gioco di , “Gice ed Alessandro.  Alessandro: il tutore di Nerone --  – filosofia italiana – Luig Speranza (). Di Egea, he was a member of the Lizio and tutor to NERONE for a time. He writes a commentary on the Categories of Aristotle, but Nerone wasn’t interested “And that’s how Seneca comes into the picture” – . Alessandro. , pel Gruppo di Gioco di , “ ed Alessandro,”  Alessandro: la filosofia dello schiavo --  – filosofia italiana –  (). : “When I started the serious study of philosophy at Oxford – at the Faculty of Literae Humaniores – it was all Epictetus; however, I found that my sensitivity leaned rather towards the philosophical opinions of Alessandro Polyhistor – another slave. Unlike Epictetus, Alessandro was not freed, but escaped!” -- He started life as a slave, but was later freed (or escaped). He goes on to teach philosophy. Alessandro Polyhistor.  ed Alessandro.  Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘ e Alfandari: la ragione conversazionale e le implicature del deutero-esperanto.  Alfieri Alfonso: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.   Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘ e Algarotti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Alici Alighieri: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.   Aliotta: all’isola: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’esperienza Allegretti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della colloquenza.   Allievo: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Allioni: la RAGIONE CONVERSAZONALE del pirotese e del deutero-esperanto.   Alminusa: all’isola – la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei nobili siciliani.    Alopeco: la diaspora di Crotone --  – filosofia italiana – Lugi Speranza (Metaponto). . According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Alopeco was a Pythagorean. Alopeco. , pel , “ ed Alopeco.  Speranza, J. L. (n.d.)e Altan: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei soggeti -- simbolo, valore, ermeneutica antropologica.   Alvarotti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale retorica.    AM   Amaduzzi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale Amafinio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto a  Ambrogio: la ragione conversazionale degl’Aurelij e l’implicatura conversazionale di SEBASTIANE.   Ambrosoli: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Ameinia: la setta di Velia alla porta rossa  --  – filosofia italiana –  (Velia). .    Amelio: la setta di Firenze --  – filosofia italiana    Ammicarto: la setta di Velia alla porta rossa Nothing is known about him except for one single reference by Proclo, in which he is commended for his skills in a style of dialectic associated with Parmenide di Velia. Ammicarto. , “ ed Ammicarto.   Amico: Amidei: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del leviatano  AN   Anassilao: il principe filosofo --  – filosofia italiana (). . A Pythagorean who is expelled from the whole territory of Italy  Speranza, J. L. (n. d.).ed Anceschi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del senso.   Andrea: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Andria: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale.    Angeli: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale.   Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). Angiulli: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della dialettica della dialettica.    Anici: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale classica.    Anioco: la diaspora di Crotone --  – filosofia italiana –  (Metaponto). . A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Anioco. , pel , “ ed Anioco.   Annunzio: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale.    Antemio: il principe filosofo -- l’accademia a  – filosofia italiana –  (). . One of the last of the n emperors. He studies philosophy and becomes acquainted with a number of members of the Accademia. He is made emperor, but dies V years later when trying to defend Rome from attack. Antemio. , pel , “ ed Antemio.  Antimedon: la setta di Crotone --  – filosofia italiana –  (Crotone). . According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Antimedon was a Pythagorian. Antimedon. , pel , “ ed Antimedon.    Antimede: la diaspora di Crotone According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Antimenes was a Pythagorian. Antimede. , pel , “ ed Antimede  Antipater: il portico a  –  –  (). . He teaches  philosophy and is responsible for introducing CATONE Minore to the Portico. He writes an essay on physics in which he portrays the whole world as a single living rational being – with its intelligence located in the aether. Antipater. , pel , “ ed Antipater.   Antiseri: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei SOLIDALI.   Antoni: la ragione conversazionale. Studia a Bologna.    Antonini: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Antonino Antonio –  –  –  (). . A friend of Porfirio. It is assumed that he shared his friend’s interest in philosophy and perhaps also became a student of Plotino. Antonio. , pel , “ ed Antonio.   AO   Aosta: di dio in gioco, semantica e sovversione.    AP    Apella: la scessi a  –  –  (). . According to Diogene Laerzio, a follower of the Scesi and writes an essay entitled “Agrippa.” Apella Apella. Apelle: il pentateismo a  –  –  (). . A gnostic who advances a complicated theology claimed by Ippolito di  to postulate *five* and five only gods. pentateismo. Apelle. , pel , “ ed Apelle.   Apollonide: il portico a  –  –  (). . A member of the Porch, and a friend and companion of CATONE  Minore. He is present at the latter’s death. Apollonide. , pel , “ ed Apollonide.   Apollonide: la scessi a  – –  (Nizza). . He writes commentaries on lampoons composed by Timone di Flio and dedicates them to TIBERIO, the prince of Rome. He is presumably a member of the Scessi himself. Apollonide. , pel , “ ed Apollonide.   Apollonio: il portico a  –    Apollonio: il tutore del principe -- il portico a     Apollonio: il portico a  –  –  (). . He belongs to the Porch and teaches in Rome. Apollonio. , pel , “ ed Apollonio.   Apollofane: l’orto a  –  –  (). . He is in Pergamo, and sent on a mission to Rome on the city’s behalf. A follower of the Garden. Apollofane. , pel , “ ed Apollofane.   Apuleio:  antica –  – . He studies in Rome, where he practices as a lawyer. Apuleio. , pel , “ ed Apuleio.   AQU   Aquila Aquilino Aquilino. Aquilino Aquilino Aquino Aquino Aquino Aquino Arangio Arato Arcais: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Arcea: la diaspora di Crotone --  –  –  (Taranto). . He is cited by Giamblico in his “Vita di Pitagora” as a follower of the sect that originated in Crotone. Arcea. , pel , “ ed Arcea, Archemaco, Archibugi, Archippo Archippo Archippo Archippo Archita Archita Arcidiacono: all’isola: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della sintropia – entropia ed informazione.    Arco: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della GRAVITAS.    Ardigò: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.   Arena: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei nudi.    Aresandro: la setta di Lucania According to Giamblico di Calcide, a Pythagorean. Aresandro. , pel , “ ed Aresandro.   Aresa: la setta di Crotone --    Argentieri: la ragione conversazionale e il deutero-esperanto.    Ario e la ragione conversazionale. Tutore di filosofia d’OTTAVIANO, che lo stima talmente tanto che, dopo la conquista di Alessandria, dichiara d’aver risparmiato la città solo pel bene d’Ario.   Arione: la setta di Locri -- Roma –  –  (Locri). . A Pythagorean visited by Platone. Arione. , pel , “ ed Arione”   Aristea According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristea was a Pythagorean. Aristea. Luiigi Speranza, pel , “ ed Aristea.   Aristeneto Aristeteneto. , pel , “ ed Aristeneto   Aristeo: la setta di Crotone --–     Aristide: la setta di Reggio --–  –  (Reggio). . According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristide was a Pythagorean. Aristide. , pel , “ ed Aristide.   Aristippo According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), Aristippo was a Pythagorean. Aristippo. , pel , “ ed Aristippo.   Aristo –He specialised in legal philosophy. Plinio  Minore describes him as a man of great wisdom, and superior in virtue to all the philosophers of his time. Aristo. , pel , “ ed Aristo,   Aristo –– –  (Roma). . The brother of Antioco and a friend of Brutus. Aristu was said to hae been an inferior philosopher to his brother, but a wholly admirable individual. Aristo. , pel , “ ed Aristo.   Aristocleida: la diaspora di Crotone --–  –  (Taranto). . According to Giamblico of Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”),  a Pythagorean. Aristocleida. , pel , “ ed Aristocleida.   Aristocle: il Lizio aA member of the Lizio, studied at Rome under Erode Attico. Tito Claudio Aristocle. Aristocle. , pel , “ ed Aristocle.   Aristocrate Regarded as an accomplished philosopher, a man of great learning, and someone who lead a pious life. A puil of Lucio Anneo Cornuto and a friend of both Persio and Agatino. Petronio Aristocrate. Aristocrate. , pel , “ ed Aristocrate Aristocrate: la setta di Reggio --According to Giamblico di Calcide, Arisocrate was a Pythagorean. Aristocrate. , pel , “ ed Aristocrate.   Aristodoro: all’isola --–  –  (Siracusa). . Aristodoro was the recipient of the tenth letter of Platone – but we do not if he responded to it. In the letter, Plato credits Aristodor as being a “philosopher” himself. Aristodoro. Refs. , pel , “ ed Aristodoro.   Aristomene Aristomene was a Pythagorean. Arostomene. , pel , “ e Aristomene,” Aristone ––  – Filosofia del principtao --  (Roma). . A philosopher at Rome, attached to the household of Marco Lepido. According to Seneca, A. used to engage in philosophical discussions when travelling around in a carriage, leading a wit to observe that he was obviously not a ‘peripatetic.’ Aristone. , pel , “ ed Aristone.   Aristone Ariston of Julii after the town on Ceos. Aristone. , pel , “ ed Aristone.   Aristosseno e LA ragione conversazionale. How to live the good life.     Arnoufi A philosopher. His talents extended to magic. He conjured up a storm for the Romans at a time when they were short of water. Arnoufi. , “ ed Arnoufi.   Arriano: il portico a–  (Roma). Scolaro di Epitteto. Lucio Flavio Arriano. Arriano. , pel , “ ed Arriano.   Arrighetti: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale.    Artemidoro as someone ho lived a frugal and disciplined life, and as someone who faded physical hardship with indifference. Artemidoro. , pel , “ e Artemidoro Aruleno When I listed the philosophical greats – Kantotle, Heglato, etc. – I implicated the -isms, too, as Stoicism, or as we prefer at Oxford, ‘the Porch’. What makes you a member of ‘The Porch’? God knows!” Keywords: porch, portico, portico romano. Of the porch. Specialised in political philosophy. He actively supported the opposition of the Porch and was condemnded to death by Domiziano, for publily defending the activities of Thrasea Paetus and Helvidius Priscus. Quinto Giunio Aruleno Rustico. Aruleno. , pel , “ ed Aruleno.   Asclepiade: gl’accademici di–  –  (Roma). . Based in Rome, he was a member of the Accademia. He wrote a book on the immortality of the soul based on his interpretation of certain pronouncements of the oracle of Apollo at Delphi. Asclepiade. , pel , “ ed Asclepiade,”  Asclepiade:antica --  – . . Friend of Lactanzio. Wrote a book on Providence. Asclepiade. Refs. , pel , “ ed Asclepiade.   Asclepiade He develops a new approach to medicine by introducing ideas on atomism. Asclepiade. , pel Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Gricde, “ ed Asclepiade.   Ascoli e LA ragione conversazionale.   Assarotti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Assiopisto: la ragione conversazionale. : “At Oxford we discuss extensively that little riposte by Humpty Dumpty: “Your name, ‘Alice,’ doesn’t mean anything?” It’s different with Assiopisto! "Assiopisto" is the Italian rendition of Axiopistus, Ἀξιόπιστος, a follower of Pythagoras from Locri. According to the catalogue of Pythagoreans in Iamblichus' Life of Pythagoras. He is listed specifically as one of the Pythagoreans from Locris (or Locri). The name translates literally as "worthy of belief" or "trustworthy" – ‘axios,’ worthy; ‘pistos,’ faithful/believable. A. is occasionally associated in historical texts with early Pythagorean ethical maxims or gnomic poetry. Assiopisto. Locri.ed Assiopisto.    Astea: la diaspora di Crotone : “Giamblico di Calcide took the trouble to name all Italian philosophers who followed Pythagoras (himself not an Italian). Strawson tried to do that for me – but he stopped at Snowdon!” -- . Pytthagorean according to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”). Astea. , pel , “ ed Astea.   Astilo: la diaspora di Crotone Counting by the number of Oxonian philosophers that have made use of my idea of a ‘conversational implicature’ – mostly my juniors, like R. M. Hare, and D. F. Pears – I would think that I myself count as many ‘ian’ discples as did Pythagoras, who lived in what Strawson once called ‘the middle of nowhere,’ viz. Crotona!” -- . Pythagorean according to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”). Astilo. , pel , “ ed Astilo.   Astone: la setta di Crotone : “There is a view, indeed circulated by Diogene Laerzio, that some of Pythagoras’s philosophical discoveries – notably that a2 = b2 = c2 – were due to one of his tutees – for Pythagoras claimed no tutor --, by the name of A.!” . A Pythagorean. According to Diogene Laerzio, there is a view that A. is  the true author of some works attributed to Pythagoras. Astone. , pel , “ ed Astone, Astore, Astorini, Ateinaiano, Ateinaiano, Atenodoro, Atenodoto, Attalo: il portico a–Aulo Aulo Gellio. under Gellio? Pupil of Lucio Calveno Tauro and Peregrino Proteo. Friend of Erode. Aulo. , pel , “ ed Aulo.   Aurano: gl’ortelani di–  –  (Napoli). . He follows the doctrine of the Garden. Gaio Stallio Aurano. Aurano. , pel , “ ed Aurano.   Aurelj: la ragione conversazionale e  implicatura in Deutero-Esperanto.    Aurelio. la ragione conversazionale. The son of a pagan Roman official.   d Ausonio Avieno Azeglio Bacchin: Bacchio: il principe tra gl’accademici di–  – , pel ,  (Roma). . A member of the Accademia. ANTONINO  attended his lectures. He was the adopted son of GAIO. Bacchio. , pel , “ e Bacchio Bacci Badaloni Baglietto Balbillo: il filosofo personale di Nerone -A man of learning, he is much admired by Seneca. He is the personal philosopher of NERONE and writes a long book on astrology. Balbillo Balbo, Balbo Baldini, Balduino: la  ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del vestigio dell’angelo al  Campidoglio.    Banfi: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Eurialo -- Niso; ovvero, la tradizione di VICO.   Baratono: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale stilistica.    Barba Barbaro Barbaro:la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura convresazionale del vecchio.    Barbaro Barié: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Enea in VICO e il noi trascendentale.   Baricelli: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Baroncelli: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della compassione.    Barone: la ragione Barone: all’isola – la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della dialettica fiorentina.    Barsio Bartoli (Roma).   Barzaghi: Barzellotti Barzizza Basilide Basilide Basilide Basilio Basilio. , pel , “ e Basilio.   Basso: gl’ortelani According to Seneca, a follower of the philosophy of The Garden, who bore witness to his school’s teachings in the way he copes with prolonged ill health. Lucio Aufidio Basso. Basso. , pel ,“ e Basso.   Basso Batace Batace Battaglia Bausola: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura convrsazionale della solidarietà   Bazzanella: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del luogo dell’altro.    Beccaria Becchi Bedeschi Bellavitis Belleo Bedoni Belloni Bellezza Bencivenga Bene Bene Bene Bene Benincasa Benvenuti Benvenuto:  del grido.   Berardi:  telepatica.    Bernardi Bernardi Bernardo Berneri Berti Bertinaria Berto Betti Bianco: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia dello spirito; ovvero, la morte d’Eurialo.    Blossio Bobbio Boccadiferro Boccanegra:  dell’esperienza.    Bocchi Bodei: la ragione conversazionale sarda e l’implicatura conversazionale della geometria delle passioni.    Boella Bolano: all’isola --   della colloquenza romana.    Bolelli: la ragione conversazionale.    Bonaiuti Eppur si muove.    Bonatelli Bonaventura Bonavino:  della schola labri --  la scuola italiana.   Bondonio Boniolo Bonomi Bontadini:  classica d’Appio e i nazionalisti romani.   Bontempelli:  del sintomo.   Bonvecchio: la ragione conversazionale el’implicatura conversazionale marziale la scoperta dei delinquenti Quirinale triada Giove Marte Giano – marziale.    Bordoni Borelli:  del moto – origine della vita – fitotropismo, geotropismo, tacto-tropismo.    Borsa:  dell’imitazione.    Boscovich: la ragione conversazionale.    Botero:  della memoria di cicerone al rostro -- Cicerone sull’equita civile.    Botta:  del primo  – fat philosopher, brave, addicted to general reflections about life, greatest living, Continental --  ‘professional engaged in philosophical research’ – Appio.    Bottiroli:  dela seduzione di Ovidio.    Bottoni:  del fototropismo in cabbages and kings -- de essential corporis humani. : “I love B., and so did Burton! Most Englishmen know of Bottoni because he is quoted by Burton in his “Anatomy of Melancholy,”    Boulagora Bouto According to Giamblico di Calcide (“Vita di Pitagora”), he was a Pythagoean. Bouto. Better under Buto. , pel , “ e Bouto.   Bovio:  della lingua.    Bozzelli Bozzetti:  di Bruno contro I matematici.    Bozzi Bracciolini e la ragione conversazionale. (Roma). Famed humanist orator and recovery agent of lost classical texts. Poggio Bracciolini.  e Bracciolini   Braibanti Branciforte:  dei giochi olimpici.    Brandalise Breccia: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale della metafisica del dialogo.    Brescia:  della rarità vichiane –rarita iana.    Bressani:  del vo significando – Vendler: have you stopped meaning it yet? intorno alla lingua toscana. : “Strawson, being boring, likes B.’s arguments   Bria Crotone, Calabria. According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Bria. , pel , “ e Bria.   Bria Taranto, Puglia. According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Bria. , pel , “ e Bria.   Brotino Bruni:  dell’interpretare da Romolo e Remo.    Bruno Bruzi:   dei goti.   Bubbio: la ragione conversazionale/ : “I like B!”    Buonafede Buonaiuti: la ragione conversazionale. : “I like B.!” Atifascista.    Buonamici so you have to be careful   Buonamici – la ragione conversazionale.   Buondelmonti Buonsanti: l’implicatura conversazionale del vettore -- implicatura di ‘animale’ – ‘non umano’ --  scuola di Ferrandina – filoBuonsanto:  pratica -- prammatica del discorso.  Romans contra Goths – la guerra gotica in Italia -- dialettica ostrogota – filosofia ostrogota.    Burtiglione: la ragione conversazionale.    Buscarini Cabeo Cacciari:  dell’umanesimo all’italiana.    Cacciatore Caffarelli Cainia Gamblico di Calcide, a Pythagorean. Cainia. , pel , “ e Cainia.   Cairo: la ragione conversazionale dei segni.   Calabresi: la ragione conversazionale del proto-pirotese e il deutero-esperanto.    Calais Calais. Giamblico di Calcide, a Pythagorean. , pel , “ e Calcide.  e Calais.   Calboli Calcidio: la ragione conversazionale a Roma.   Calderoni:  del bene comune, bene summon, Remigio di Gerolami e il buono commune.    Callescro: gl’accademici di–  –  (Roma). . A member of the Accademia. He was the unclde of Tito Flavio Glauco. Tito Flavio Callescro. Callescro. , pel , “ e Callescro.   Callia Callia was a pupil of Zenone di VELIA  – another Velino . Callia. , pel , “ e Callia.   Callicratida: la setta di Girgenti.– The brother of Empedocle di GIRGENTI . His name is attached to some fragments of Pythagorean writings preserved by Stobeo. Callicratida. , pel , “ e Callicratida.   Callifonte: la setta di Crotone -A pupil of Pythagoras. Callifonte. , pel , “ e Callifonte.   Calò Calogero Caloprese: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazinale degl’encanti di Orlando furioso, Orlando innamorato, il filosofo dell’encantatrice esperienze.    Caluso: la ragione conversazionale, la grammatica universale e l’implicatura conversazionale degl’initiati e gl’initiante – initians, initiatum – inizianti.    Camilla: la ragione conversazionale e l'literae Humaniores – in literabus humanioris -- dell’huomo – opp. Lit. div.    Camillo – la ragione conversazionale.    ,  del giusto, giussum, giustum, giure, iure, giudico, giudicare.    Campa:  dell’elogio della stoltizia.    Campa:  della rivincita del paganesimo romano.    Campailla: all’isola --  del concetto di estassi – implicatura estasica – a room in Bloomsbury.    Campanella Canio: la filosofia romana sotto il principato di Caligola -- il portico a   Cantoni: la ragione conversazionale il Kant fascista, Filosofia fascista. l’implicatura conversazionale delle literae humaniores, Romolo e Remo; ovvero, il mito e la storia. : “You gotta love C.;    Capella: .    Capitini: la  ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Capizzi Capocasale Capocci Capodilista Capograssi Caporali:  a Crotone.    Cappelletti:  dell’entellechia – izzing and hazzing -- all’origine della filosofia antropologica. : “I like C. – and so does he! He is into what he calls, in Latin, to show off, ‘philosophia anthropologica,’ which is MY thing   Capra: all’isola  del corpo animato – delo l’isola di delo, apollo delio – il chiaro – principio di perspicuita [sic] – scuola di Nicosia Capua Carabellese Caracciolo:  del colloquio    Caramella:  degl’eroi di Vico. Caritone e Melanippo.    Caramello: la ragione conversazionale e l’implictatura conversazionale dell’interpretare.    Carando:  di Socrate.    Carapelle:  – lingua e metafilosofia – lingua-oggetto – meta-lingua – Peano – Tarski  bootstrap    Carbonara –  l’esperienza e la prassi CICERONE e il pratico.    Carbone: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatrua conversazionale.    Carboni:  disegno dal vivo, disgeno del nudo dal vero, disegno dal vero, disegno del nudo dal vero -- disegno dall’antico, desegno dalla natura -- drawn from life -- tratto dalla vita – royal academy –drawn from the antique.    levi: Italian philosopher of Jewish descent. Author of “Storia della filosofia romana.” giornale critico della .  Giovanni d. “Positivismo Cattaneo.   Carace. Much admired by Antonino. Claudio Carace. Livorno, Toscana.  e Carace.   Caravaggi: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale. Insegna a Padova,   Carchia:  dell’ars amandi – signi d’amore – erotico del bello – comunicazione degl’amanti primitive.    Cardano Caritone -- the tasteful Milanese maschi – prospero.    Cardano: .    Cardia:  del culto del laico   Cardone:  l’eroe nudo Napoleone Clark Kent; ovvero, sul sovrumano – trasumanar culto dell’eroe di VICO – ANNUNZIO e il fascismo.    Carifi:  degl’ablativi relativi    Carle Carli – : filosofia passatista, filosofia presentista, filosofia futuristica.    Carlini Carmando Charmander -- According to Seneca, Carmando wrote a book on comets. , pel , “ e Carmando Caro Caro:  dell’interpretare -- interpretante, interpretato. Carpani: la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale e arte combinatoria razionale.    Carpino: la ragione conversazionale.    Carrara Carravetta Carulli Casanova Casati Casini Casotti:  del volere – filosofia fascista.    Casalegno, paolo. Italian philosopher author of “” in “Filosofia del linguaggio.”     Cassio Cassiodoro: -- vide under Briuzi --. noble Italian philosopher. , " e Cassiodoro," per Il Club Anglo-Italiano,Castelli      Castiglione Castrucci: la ragione conversazionale el’implicatura conversazionale del guerriero indo-germanico -- sul conferimento di valore.    Catena:  della logica matematica -- logica arimmetica – la base arimmetica della metafisica.    Catone: la ragione conversazionale.    Catone Cattaneo:  longobarda -- Vico e la sapienza italiana – il dialetto milanese e il sostratto latino.    Cattaneo Catucci:  d’ego et alter, E ed A – Catulo Catulo Cavalcanti: .    Cavalcanti:  del sìnolo degl’amanti.    Cavallo:  la ragione conversazionale el’implicatura Cavazzoni Cavour Cazio –– filosofia ialiana –  (Roma). He is presented by Orazio as something of a philosophica dilettante obsessed with food. Cazio. , pel , “ e Cazio,  Cazio Catius insuber. Member of the Garden. He wrote four books in which he set out the school’s teachings on the nature of the universe and the most important hings in life. The books were aimed at making the teachings available and accessible to a wide audience.   Cazzaniga Cazzulani: l’implicature del deutero-esperanto. : “I like C.! When I was invited to review my earlier views on ‘meaning,’ and ‘significance’  Ceccato Cecina Cei: la ragione conversazionale a– l’implicatura conversazionale del fratello d’Antonino.   Ceila: la diaspora di Crotone   Celestio:  a  Celio Cellucci:  del paradiso – aus dem Paradies, das Cantor uns geschaffen, soll uns niemand vertreiben können.   Celso: l’orto asotto il principato di Nerone–  –  (Roma). . A follower of the Garden during the principate of Nerone.   Celso:antica The son of Archetimo and a friend of Simmaco, he teaches philosophy in Rome. Celso.   Cefalo. , pel , “ e Cefalo.   Centi:  di SAVONAROLA e compagnia – dal pulpito al rogo  Cento: la ragione conversazionale  Centofanti Cerambo: . la setta di Lucania   Cerano: la filosofia sotto il principato di Nerone   Cerdo: l’anima di–  –  (Roma) – . Only the soul resurrects. Cerdo. , pel , “ e Cerdo.   Cerebotani:  della botanica linguistica –  e il prontuario -- il toscano di Ceretti.    Ceremonte: il portico a–    Ceretti:     Ceronetti Cerroni Certani:  del sacrificio a Roma.    Ceruti: l’implicatura conversazionale di Niso -- ovvero, dell’altruismo.    Cerutti: la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale del leviatano – organicismo politico – il corpo politico nella costituzione italiana.    Cervi. All’isola: non italiano, sardo: La ragione conversazionale.    Cesa. (Arcinazzo Romano). . Arcinazzo Romano.    Cesalpino Cesare Gaio Giulio Cesare.   Cesarini Cesarotti Cherchi: la ragione conversazionale e implicatura sarda.   Cheremone Chiappelli:  dell’academici – Cicerone Chiaromonte Chiaramonte. siquidem tuDc et soDum duaruffi litterarum coutiDeat.at vero qqaDdo    Chiaramonti: la ragione conversazionale.   Chiavacci:  poetica di  Gentile.    Chiocchetti Chiodi:  dell’esistenti.    Chitti: l’implicatura conversazionale.   Ciarlantini Cicerone: la semiotica -- l’implicatura conversazionale di Marc’Antonio Ciceronian implicaturum:    Ciliberto:  del principe -- il suo principato.    Cilone: la setta di Crotone According to Giamblico. C. seeks to join the circle of Pythagoras.  Cimatti: l’implicatura conversazinale del pooh-pooh and other products -- il non-naturale -- fondamenti naturali della comunicazione.    Cincio: il portico a–A philosopher of the Porch. Cincio. , pel , “ e Cincio   Cinna: il portico a -- il tutore del principe   Cione:  del corporazionismo -- Dedalo ed Icaro – l’idea corporativa come interpretazione della storia.    Citrone: il cinargo a–  –  (Roma). A member of the Cinargo and a friend of Giuliano. Chytron. Citrone. , pel , “ e Citrone.   Civitella: la ragione conversazionale e mplicatura conversazionale.    Clarano Claudi:  del primo filosofo inglese, il primo filosofo romano.    Claudiano: l’anima di Claudio Claudio Claudio:–  (Roma). Filosofi italiano. A philosopher highly regarded for his moral virtue. Claudio Antonino. Claudio. , pel , ‘ e Claudio.   Claudio Cleemporo: Cleomene: A gnostic who founded his own set in Rome. Originally a pupil of Epigono. Cleomene. , pel , “ e Cleomene.   Cleonte: la diaspora di Crotone A Pythagorean according to Giamblico di Calcide. Cleonte. , pel , “ e Cleonte.   Cleofronte Cleofronte. , pel , “ e Cleofronte.   Cleostene: la setta di Crotone According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Cleostene Cleostene.   Clinagora: la setta di Crotone, Roma,  (Crotone). . According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Clinagora. , pel , “ e Clinagora,”     Clinia: la diaspora di Crotone --   Clitomaco: la setta di Thurii -Clodio – Roma: la setta di Napoli --  (Napoli). . According to Porfirio, Clodio Clodio. , pel , “ e Clodio.   Clodio: all’isola --antica –  –  (Palermo).  Clodio Sesto – a teacher of rhetoric. Clodio. , pel , “ e Clodio Cocconato Coco:  del contratto di carattere mutuale prevalente.    Codronchi:  del contratto, giocco d’assardo, contratto, gioco aleatorio, Ercole, l’Ara Massima, e il patto comunitario.   Colagrosso: la stilistica conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – la ragione conversazionale.   Colazza:  dell’iniziazione.   Colecchi Colletti: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale dei curiazi, ovvero, politica romana.   Colizzi: .   Colli:  dell’espressione.   Collini:  del naturismo -- naturalismo e naturismo.   Colombe:  di Galilei – Aristotele e la stella nuova.   Colombo: l’implicatura conversazionale dell’idealismo.  Colonna: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazional.   Colonnello vox significativa, voce che e segno, parola usata metaforicamente, nome, voce che e segno   Colorni:  della diadologia.   Consoli: all’isola l’italiano come lingua universale – in difesa del deutero-esperanto.   Conte:  del sacrificio.   Contestabile:  di BRVNO al rogo.   Conti: la ragione conversazionale. : “I love C.!”   Conti. Da  tutto il corpo il sudore allora gli gronda, e gli cola —  omai il respiro gli manca — in un fiume color della  pece. E finalmente allora, a precipizio, di un salto, con  tutte le armi, nel fiume si lanciò; e quello, con la sua  bionda corrente   Conti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura converseazionale del dialogo filosofico.   Conti Contri Corbellini:  dell’evoluzione politizzata.   Cordeschi: la ragione conersazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della logica della guerra.   Corleo: all’isola, la ragione conversazionale.   Cornelio: la ragione conversazionale dell’orto romano,e la  (Roma).   Cornelio:  di Giove, Ganimede, e Prometeo.   Cornello Cornificio Cornuto Corrado: la ragione conversazionale e  la dieta di Crotone e la semiotica magica.   Corsano: la ragione conversazionale (Roma).  Filosofo romano.   Corsini:  della filosofia inantica  Cortese:  del segno naturale, del principio del significato, Alpinista.   Corvaglia: la ragione conversazionale,  il pessimismo e l’implicatura di Tantalo.   Corvino: la ragione conversazionale a Roma, e la    Cosi: l’implicatura conversazionale del cuore, l’accordo dei cuori, l’accordo.   Cosmacini:  del Cosottini Costa Costa:  della sinestesia conversazionale   Costantino:  la ragione conversazionale a Roma.   Costanzi:  dell’amore.   Courmayeur: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale idealista.   Cotroneo:  della VIRTÙ, andreia.   Cotta Cotta:  nella storia del diritto romano,   Crassicio: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone   Crasso: la ragione conversazionale a  Cratippo Cratippo. Keywords: lizio,  e Cratipp   Credaro Crescente Cresi: la ragione conversazionale, cappuccino e ciserciano. : “Essential Italian philosopher!”    Crespi:  d’Antonino e compagnia,    Crespo: la ragione conversazionale Crespo. , pel , “ e Crespo  Critolao: la ragione conversazionale a–  –  (Roma). . Sent as a deputation to Rome. He emphasizes the relative unimportance of material comforts for the good life. Critolao. Keywords: filosofia antica,  e Critolao. Croce Cuoco: l’implicatura conversazionale dell’accademia. : “A philosopher that only Italy could produce!”  Curi: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale dei figli di Marte -- passione e compassione, senso e consenso   Cusani: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale del primo idealista – lo stato.    D   Damocle:  la ragione conversazionale e la spada e la setta di Crotone According to Giamblico di Calcide, a Pythagorean. : “Not to the confused with the infamous one with the sword.” Damocle. Keyworsd: Crotona,  e Damocle.   Damone: la ragione conversazionale all’isola con Fintia, Roma,  (Siracusa). . A Pythagorean  Damostrato: la ragione conversazionale e i paradossi dei filosofi D., or Demostrato. Roman senator. A historian as well as an authority on fish and fishing. Said to be, like , particularly interested in paradoxes and is regarded by some other philosophers as a philosopher. Demostrato. Damostrato. Keyword: paradox, le paradossi dei filosofi,  e Damostrato.  Damotage: la ragione conversazionale e  diaspora di Crotone, Roma,  (Metaponto). . A Pythagorean according to Giamblico di Calcide. : “In the old days, surnames were not felt to be necessary; but then, with a first name (if not Christian) like ‘Damotage’ – would YOU care?”  e Damotage Dalmasso:  della giustizia nel discorso,    Dandolo: la ragione conversazionale e ’implicatura conversazionale dellapagana, Carneade e compagnia.    Daniele:  numismatica.    Dati Deciano A philosopher of the Porch, and friend of the poet Marziale. Deciano. , pel , “ e Deciano.   Deinarco A follower of Pythagoras. He is one of those who fled Crotona when the local people became hostile towards the sect.   Deinocrate A Pythagorean, according to Giamblico. Deinocrate Deinocrate Delfino Delia Delia Delia Deliminio Delogu Demaria Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Demetrio Democede Demostene: la ragione conversazionale a–A pythagorean according to Giamblico di Calcide. Demostene. Keywords: la diaspora di Crotona,  e Demostene.   Desideri:  dei consenzienti   Diacceto:  del convito -- i tre libri d’amore,    Diano:  dell’errante dalla ragione, emendato.    Dicante: la ragione conversazionale e  la diaspora di Crotone   Dicerco: la ragione conversazionale e  la diaspora di Crotone.   Diconte: la ragione conversazioale e la setta di Caulonia.  Dima: la ragione conversazionale e la setta degl’ottimati According to Giamblico a Pythagorean. Dima.  e Dima.   Diocle: la ragione conversazionale e la a setta degl’ottimati According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean – one of those who left Italy when the Pythagorean communities there came under attack. According to Diogene Laerzio, a pupil of Filolao di Crotona and Eurito di Taranto. Diocle.  e Diocle   Diocle: la ragione conversazionale a–Pythagorean. Giamblico. Diocle. , pel , “ e Diocle.   Diodoro: la ragione conversazionale all’orto di–  –  (Roma). . A follower of the Gardener. He committed suicide in a state of contentment and with a clear conscience, according to Seneca. Diodoro. , pel , “ e Diodoro Diodoro: la ragione conversazionale a– He writes a history of the world that largely survives. The Library of Hstory is a valuable source of information about the thought of antiquity. Ed. C. H. Oldfather. Diodoro Secolo. Diodoro.  e Diodoro.   Diodoro: la ragione conversazionale e la rettorica filosofica According to Suda, a philosopher and the son of Polio Valerio. He wrote on rhetoric. Diodoro Valerio. Diodoro. , pel , “ e Diodoro.   Diodoto: la ragione conversazionale al portico diMember of the Porch, tutor of Cicerone. He lives in Cicerone’s house. He dies there and leaves Cicerone all his property. Diodoto. Diodoto.   Diogene: la ragione conversazionale al  portico a– filosofa italiana –  (Roma). . One of a deputation to– with Carneade and Critolao – before the Senate. Thanks to the lectures he gives during his Roman holiday, many Romans became interested in the Porch for the first time. Diogene.  e Diogene. Dione He appears to have been a follower of The Garden with whom Cicerone was acquainted but for hom he had little time or respect. Dione. , pel , “ e Dione.   Dione: la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo Cristostomo – Cocceiano.   Dione. Dione: la ragione conversazionale a–  –  (Roma) . Philoso  Dione: la ragione conversazionale all’isola A friend of Plato for years. He had an erratic political career, sometimes seeking or managing to rule Syracuse either directly or through others, sometimes in exile.   Dionigi: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale intorno al Cratilo   Dionisio Mentioned by Cicerone was a philosopher of the Porch who liked to quote poetry when he was teaching. : “So do I: never seek to tell thy love – for love its own pleasure – the four corners. Dionisio.  e Dionisio.   Dionisio die la  often refer to D. in their correspondence. D. is evidently a man of learning who has studied philosophy. Dionisio. Keywords: la dialettica del tutore e del tutee,  e Dionisio.   Dionisio: la ragione conversazionale all’isola --–  (Siracusa). . The ruler of Siracusa, the nephew of Dion of Siracusa. Interested in philosophy, he invited Plato to his court, but Plato’s attempts to put his political ideas into practice were thwarted. Dionisio is eventually deposed and went into exile. Dionisio.  e Dionisio.   Dionisodoro: la ragione conversazionale e l’accademia a– A member of the Accademy. Flavio Mecio Severo Dionisodoro.   Diofane: la ragione conversazionale a–A tutor in philosophy and acquaintance of Plotino. He teaches that pupils should submit completely to their tutors, includinsexually. Plotino was shocked by this, and asked Porfirio to come up with an argument to use against D. on this matter. Diofane.  e Diofane.   Dionneto: la ragione conversazionale del prrincipe filosofo --–  (Roma). . He was Antonino’s tutor, who first fired the future emperor with enthusiasm for philosophy.  Dioscoro: D. or Dioscuro studies philosophy in Rome. He writes a letter to Agustino seeking to discuss a number of philosophical issues. Agostino replies at length, arguing that the issues are of no real importance. Dioscoro. , pel , “ e Dioscoro,.   Disertori:  della tensione dell’arco e il volo della freccia,    Dodaro: la ragione cconversazionale e il convito, ossia, tracce di un discorso amoroso.    Dolabella Dommazio: la ragione conversazionale a–  –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano. A  philosopher, known only from a surviving bust. Dogmatius. Dommatio. Dommazio. , pel , “ e Dommazio.   Donà: la ragione conversazionale e la sessualità.    Donatelli:  dell’esperienza   Donati:  del fra.    Dondi: la ragione conversazionale e ’implicatura conversazionale -- l’astrario – iter romanorum, colonna giulia, la colonna del circo neroniano di Buschetto – petrarca.    Dorfles: la ragione convversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale  del kitsch ebreo-italiano.    Doria: .    Dosseno:  la ragione conversazionale alll’orto romano A follower of the sect of the Garden. Seneca mentions a monument to him with an inscription testifying to his wisdom. Dosseno.  e Dosseno.   Dottarelli:  di Musoni.    Drimonte A Pythagorean, according to Giamblico. Drimonte Drimonte.   Duni:  della costume, o sia, sistema di dritto [sic] universal – il diritto romano universalizzabile.    Duso: la ragione conversazionale e  l’implicatura conversazionale di Romolo e compagnia.    E    Eccelo: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Lucania --–  –  (Lucania). . According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. It is thought that fragments of a text attributed to POLO di Lucania may have been written by Eccelo. : “As if I cared.” Eccelo. , “ ed Eccelo.    Eccecrate: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone --–  (Taranto). . According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. : “Must say Giamblico has a broad criterion in mind: if someone speaks Greeks and comes from Crotona or Taranto, and KNOWS Pythagoras’s Theorem, he is a Pythagorean. Eccecrate.  ed Eccecrate.   Eco:  della rosa segnata -- il nome del nome –  semiotica a Bologna.    Ecebolio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano Tutor of Giuliano. More of a sophist, he appears to have had flexible religious convictions (or none) – Giuliano recalls: “He may be a pagan or a Galileian as the political climate demands!” Ecebolio. , pel , “ ed Ecebolio.   Efanto: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone   Egea: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone According to Iamblichus of Chalcis (“Vita di Pitagora”), a Pythagorean. Egea. , pel , “ ed Egea.   Egnazio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano A follower of the Garden. He wrote a poem, “The rerum natura.” It bears some resemblances to the work of the same name by Lucrezio and is generally thought to have been written after it. Egnazio. , pel , “ ed Egnazio.   Eirisco: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Eirico. , pel , “ ed Eirisco.   Elandro: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone --–  –  (Taranto). . A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Elandro.  ed Elandro.   Elcasai: la ragione conversazionale e a gnossi a–  –  (Roma). . A gnostic. One of his followers, Alcibiade, brings an essay by him to Rome, claiming that its contents are revealed to E. by an angel.  Eleucadio: la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Ravenna Eleucadio. , pel , “ ed Eleucadio.   Elicone: la ragione conversazionale e  la setta di Reggio A Pythagorean, cited by Giamblico. He was renowned as a legislator and helped to revise the constitution of Reggio. Elicone.  ed Elicone.   Elio: la ragione conversazionale degl’accademici a–    Elio: la ragione conversazionale della repubblica romana e l’implicatura conversazionale della storia romana  Elio: Rom. : “If we follow the lineage of his  gens (family clan),    Elio: la ragione conversazionale e a setta di Praeneste – il portico a–  (Praeneste). . A teacher of rhetoric. A popular and prolific author, and some of his essays, mainly collections of anecdotes, survive. In his more philosophical works he takes the line of the Porch. ELIO – Miscelanea storica – ed. Wilson, Loeb Classical Library. Claudio Elio.  ed Elio.   Eliodoro: la ragione conversazionale ail portico romano sotto il principato di Nerone --–  –  (Roma). . Porch. During Nerone’s principate. E. seems to have been an informer with regard to at least one of the many plots of the period. Eliodoro.  ed Eliodoro.   Eliodoro: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano --–  (Roma). . The Garden. A close friend of Adriano. He succeeded Popillio Teotimo as Garden Master (or Tyrant). Eliodoro.   Elpidio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano A philosopher with whom Giuliano is in correspondence. Elpidio. , pel , “ ed Elpidio.   Elvidio: la ragione conversazionale aantica – il portico a–  –  (Roma). . The son in law of TRASEA . Porch, involved in politics, he spends periods in exile. Admired as a man of principle. Elvidio Prisco.  ed Elvidio.   Emiliani:  della semiotica.    Emina: la ragione conversazionale aantica A Pythagorean and a historian. Lucio Cassio Emina. , pel , “ ed Emina.   Emone: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone A Pythagorian according to Giamblico. Emone. , pel , “ ed Emone.   Empedo: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Sibari Pythagorean. Giamblico. Empedo. , pel , “ ed Emepedo According to Eraclide di Ponto, E. has a vision that reveals the structure of the universe. Empedotimo. , pel , “ ed Empedotino.   Endio Giamblico. Endio. , pel , “ ed Endio.   Ennea: la ragione conversazionale e  la diaspora di Crotone According to Iamblicus of Chalcis, a Pythagorean. Ennea.  ed Ennea.   Ennio: la ragione conversazionale a antica, il primo filosofo inglese, il primo filosofo latino    Enzo Epicaride Epicaride.  ed Epicardide.   Epicarmo: la ragione conversazionale all’isola --–  –  (Palermo). . He writes comedies. He achieved a reputation as a philosopher through several works. He was one of the seven sages (according to Hippoboto) and may have been a Pythagorean. Epicarmo.   ed Epicarmo.   Epicoco:  della religione civile dei romani.    Epitetto: Upon freedom, he studied philosophy under Musonio Rufo, but he was expelled from Rome under Domiziano. For some reason, the emperor Antonino took a liking to his mode of philosophising, even though, of course, due to their different classes, they never met in the flesh. Epitetto. , “ ed Epitetto.   Eraclide Filosofo romano. He writes a large work expounding the empiricist philosophy which attracted the admiration of Galeno. Eraclide. , pel , “ ed Eraclide.   Eraclio: la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano Filosofo romano. Cinargo. He invited the emperor Giuliano to one of his lectures, hoping to make an impression. He did, but it was an unfavouable one, and Julian duly produced a written piece critical of him. Eraclio. , pel , “ ed Eraclio.   Era Era was of the Cinargo, and emulated the antics of Diogene the sophist by publicly criticizing emperor Tito in a packed Roman theatre. Unfortunately for E., whereas Diogenes had only been flogged, E. was beheaded. Era. , pel , “ ed Era.   Erato: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone A Pythagorean, according to Giamblico. Erato. , pel , “ ed Erato.   Ercole:  della difesa della metafisica – transnaturalia -- esologia, essologia, e sinautologia    Ermino: la He confined his activities mainly to teaching and wrote little or nothing. Erminio. , pell , “ ed Erminio.   Ermodoro: la ragione conversazionale all’isola ----  (Siracusa). . A pupil of Plato of whom he wrote a biography. He also wrote a history of mathematics. According to Suda, he took Plato’s books and sold them. Erode. , pel , “ ed Ermodoro.   Erode: la ragione conversazionale e la filosofia degl’ottimati -One of the richest and best connected people in the Roman empire. More of a sophist and a friend of philosophers than a philosopher himself. He condemned the Porch philosophers for their lack of feeling. Erode Attico.     Eschine: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Napoli.– filosofia antica  Esimo: la ragione conversazionale a– filosofia antica –  (Roma). . An undated inscription found at Pergamum refers to Claudio Esimo as a philosopher. Esimo. , pel , “ ed Esimo.   Estieo Suda says he was the father of Archita di Taranto. Estieo. , pel , “ ed Estieo.   Esposito Eudemo Eudemo. , pel , “ ed Eudemo.   Eudemo Eudico: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Locri A Pythagorean, according to Giamblico. Eudico. , pel , “ ed Eudico.   Eudosso: lla ragione conversazionale e la setta di Taranto Pupil of Archita di Taranto. Eudosso. , pel , “ ed Eudosso.   Eulogio: la ragione conversazionale e il principe filosofo   Eumenio: la ragione conversazionale e  la scuola di Giuliano He studied philosophy alongside Pharianus and Giuliano. Eumenio. , pel , “ ed Eumenio.   Eufemo: lla ragione conversazionale e a diaspora di Crotone A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Eufemo. , pel , “ ed Eufemo.   Eurimedone: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone ––  (Metaponto). . A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Eurimedone. , pel , “Gric ed Eurimedone.   Eurifamo: la ragione conversazionale a–  (Siracusa). . According to Giamblico, Eurifamo was a disciple of Pythagoras.   Eurifemo: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone According to Giamblico, a Pythagorean. Eurifemo Eurifemo.   Eurito: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone   Eusebio: la ragione conversazionale a–  –  (Roma). . Eusebio was the tutor of Sidonio and Probo. He had his own schoot at Arelate (Arles). Eusebio. , pel , “ ed Eusebio.   Eusebio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano Friend and teacher of Giuliano. Eusebio. , pel , “ ed Eusebio.   Eustatio: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Macrobio Eustatio. , pel , “ ed Eustatio.  Eutino: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Locri . Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Eutino. , pel , “ ed Eutino.   Eutino:  la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Eutino. , pel , “ ed Eutino.   Eutosione: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Reggio -A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Eutosione.  ed Eutosione.   Eutropio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano --–  (Roma). . Friend of Sidonio. Chastised by Sidonio for manifesting an indifference to public service that smacked of The Garden. Eutropio. , pel , “ ed Eutropio.   Evagrio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura degl’ottimati -- Evandro: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone --A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. Evandro.  ed Evandro   Evandro: la ragione conversazionae e la diaspora di Crotone   Evanore Pythagorean. Giamblico. Evanore. , pel , “ ed Evanore   Evareto: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo romano --–  (Roma). . He as a philosopher in Rome, a friend of the lawyer and legal scholar Publio Salvio Giuliano. Quinto Elio Egrilio Evareto. Evareto. , pel , “ ed Evareto   Evete: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Locri A Pythagorean according to Giamblico. , pel , “ ed Evete.   Evola:  della romanità – l’implicatura di Romolo e l’arte astratta– la scuola di Castropignano.   F   Fabiani: l’astuzia della ragione conversazionale nell’Italia  Fabiano Fabio: la ragione conversazionale a Fabri:  dei lizii -- i peripatetici    Fabrini: la ragione conversazionale, : “Unlike the French, who, being French – like the Normans – hate the Latin, F. loves it, and it shows!”   Fabro:  di Senone di Velia, l’innamorato di Parmenide -- per la porta di Velia.    Facciolati: la lingua di Cicerone.    Faccioli: il deutero-esperanto, da Harborne a Villa Franca, la scuola di Villa Franca, il villa-francese.    Fadio: la ragione conversazionale aantica – l’orto a Faggin: la ragione conversazionale dei bei -- metrica filosofica – inno orfico –   Falcone: la ragione conversazionale e la lingua universale.    Fannio:    Fano: ebreo italiano,  della glossogonia – imago acustica e immagine sensibile   Fariano: la ragione conversazionale e il circolo di Giuliano --antica   Fassò: , Igitur est  – l’implicatura di Bruto,    Fausto: la ragione conversazionale a Favonio: la ragione conversazionale aantica – il portico a– il cinargo a  Favonio Favorino Fazzini Fedro: la ragione conversazionale aantica   Feliceto search.   Ferdinando:  della masculinità, il maschio e la tarantella.    Fergnani:  del gesto e la passione   Ferrabino:  della terza– la base mitologica del latino.   Ferrando:  di CORIOLANO, ovvero, la filosofia   Ferranti: implicatura conversazionale, ragione, deutero-Esperanto, e lingua universale –  (Roma).    Ferrari: implicatura conversazionale e ragione nella lingua universale.    Ferrari: la ragione conversazionale e FILOSOFIA della RIVOLVZIONE.    Ferrari:  degl’anarchici di Mussolini.    Ferraris: la ragione conversazionale e , la scuola di Galatone (Galatone).    Ferraris:  della supercazzola.    Ferrero: la ragione conversazionale. (Portici).    Ferrero:  arimmetica.    Ferretti:  dell’inter-soggetivo   Ferri:  dell’amore   Ferrucci: la ragione conversazionale e l’eloquenza di Cicerone.   Fibbia Ficiada: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone  Ficino Fidanza Figliucci Filangieri Filippis: la ragione conversazioanle e l’implicatura conversazionale metafisica.  Filippo: la ragione conversazionale eantica    Filisco: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano   Filodamo: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di LocriA Pythagorean cited by Giamblico. Filodamo.  e Filodamo.   Filolao: la ragione conversazionale e-- l’arciere di Taranto.    Filone: la ragFilonide: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone – Roma. : “Mussolini is said to have proclaimed that it would have been for the good of the philosophy in Italy if Plato had not escaped!”   Fineschi: la ragione conversaszionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- eroticologico, filologico, l’amore.    Fintia: la ragione conversazionale e filosofia dell’isola, Roma,    Fioramonti: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicature conversazionale economica.    Fiore: Fiormonte Fiorentino: la ragione conversazionale e la lingua dei romani in Catone.    Fioretti:  dei pro-ginnasti.    Firmiano: la ragione conversazonale e il culto di Giove -- Firmico: la ragione conversazionale e il culto di Giove.    Firmo: la ragione conversazionale e antica --  Fisichella: non italiano, ma siciliano -- all’isola --  del duello.    Fitio: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Reggio – Roma.  Flaviano Flavio:  della clemenza del principe filosofo.    Flavio: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano   Floridi:  dell’informare.    Fonnesu Fontanini Fornero:  del confilosofare.    Formaggio:  dell’arte come comunicazione – filosofia della tecnica artistica,    Forti: la ragione conversazionale e il paradosso, ragione conversazionale ed implicatura conversazionale   Forti: la scuola d’Arezzo,  (Arezzo).    Fortunaziano: la ragione conversazionale (Roma). .    Fortunio: le regole conversazionale.    Foscolo: la ragione conversazionale (Roma). .  I.    Fracastoro:  dell’anima.    Francesco:  dei corpi.    Franchini: l’arguzia del nell’età degl’eroi, la gloria d’Enea.    Franci:  degl’ostrogoti.    Francia:  dei centauri.    Franzini: la ragione conversazionae e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’espressione.    Frinico Frinico.   Frixione Frontida: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone --–  (Taranto). . A Pythagorean, cited by Giamblico.  e Frontida.   Frontino: la ragione conversazionale a Roma, setta dei Scipioni.    Frontone: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano, il filosofo dell’epigramma.    Frosini:  Fundano: la ragione conversazionale e il nome del filosofo    Fuoco: la ragione conversazionale.    Furio: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano   Fusaro:  dell’idealismo e la prassi.    Fuschi:  erotica.    Fusco: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano   Fusinieri: la ragione conversazionale – semiotica – semantica e la “nova metaphisica” Gaetani: la ragione conversazionale e ’implicatura convesazionale di Catullo -- APVD NEAPOLIM.   Gagliardi, Gaio, Galba, Galba, Galeno, Galetti, Galimberti, Galli, Galli, Gallio Galluppi Galvano Gamba Gangale Garbo Gargani Garin Garroni Garrucci Gartida Gatti Gatti Gaudenzio Gaudenzio Gauro: la ragione conversazionale aantica   Gedalio: la ragione conversazionale aantica   Gelli:  della difficultà di mettere in regole la nostra lingua, sentientia i.    Gellio:  la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano Gemmis:  del console. .   Gennadio: la ragione cnversazionale e il divino -- Genovese:  della tribù.   Genovesi:  della logica.    Gentile Gentile: .    Gentili:  della filosofia romana arcaica    Gerratana: siciliano non italiano all’isola –  del contratto sociale.    Geymonat:  del temperamento romano.    Ghersi – filosofia savonese – scuola di Savona Celle Ligure  Ghezzi:  dei tordi ubriachi – diritto artificiale.    Ghiron: la ragione conversazionale.    Ghisleri: la ragione conversazioanale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’atlante filosofico – federalismo contro-rivoluzione – lo stato.    Giacchè: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicataura conversazionale dell’altra visione dell’altro – Barba, Bene, e Fellini antropologo.    Giacomo: siciliano, non italiano, al’isola  degl’icona, sensibile, imagine, presentazione, rappresentazione, formante e formato, contentente e contenuto, l’inspiegabile.    Giardini: la ragione conversazionale.    Giamboni Giametta Giandomenico Giani Giani:  della radice italica del melodramma.    Giannantoni:  della dialettica.    Giannetti:  del corposcolarismo.    Giannetta -- search – another time?   Giannone:  della terza Roma.  Giavelli, Gigli, Gioberti, Gioia, Giorello, Giorgi: la ragione conversazionale al limite -- l’implicatura conversazionale di Bacco.    Giorgi:   della fiducia nella fiducia  Giovanni:  della civetta di Minerva   Giovenale: la ragione conversazionale e la satira del filosofo.    Giovio: la ragione conversazionale aantica   Giraldi Girgenti: siciliano, non italiano: la ragione conversazionale a limite – l’implicatura conversazionale della metrica del filosofo.    , Annici e la ragione conversazionale al limite, l’implicatura conversazionale -- la parola che non s’incatena.    Girotti:  della curva – la filosofia nella storia d’Italia    Gitio: la ragione conversazionale e a setta di Locri    Giudice: la ragione conversazionale al rogo -- l’implicatura conversazionale di Bruno.   Giudice: la ragione conversazionale, l’esperienza, e l’implicatura conversazionale di Telesio.   Giuffrida: la ragione conversazionale e la semiotica.    Giulia: la ragione conversazioanle e l’implicatura conversazionale.    Giuliano: la ragione conversazionale e la filosofia di Giove.   Giuliano:  la ragione conversazionale e la gnossi a–    Giulio. .    Giulio: la ragione conversazionale: l’anima di Cesare – il discorso contro la penna di morte a Catilina.   Giulio:– daad Oxford, via Bologna – Philosopher and farmer.    Giulio: la ragione conversazionale e l’attaco a Giunco Giunio: la ragione conversazionale dell’accademia al portico romano   Giunio: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano  Giuniore: la ragione conversazionale e la geografia filosofica   Giussani:  dell’amicizia – il comune,  fraternità, liberazione.    Giusso:  degl’eroi – filosofia fascista --  il mistico dell’azione.    Giusti: la ragione conversazionale.    Giustino: la ragione conversazionale e la gnossi a–  (Roma)  Giustino: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Napoli.    Givone Glauco: la ragione conversazionale e l’accademia a  Glauco: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Reggio    Glicino: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone   Gobbo: esGobetti Gonnella:  e la filosofia del diritto romano – filosofia romana    Goretti Gorgiade: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone  Gorgia: la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano     Gori:  e la filosofia di cabaret -- l’eroe e la falce – filosofia futurista.  Gracco Grandi:  del progresso all’infinito della rosa di Grandi Grassi Grataroli:  e la memoria.    Grazia: , Grace, e Grazia -- la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale -- il principio di benevolenza conversazionale.    Grecino Gregorio:  dell’arte grammatica degl’angeli.    Gregory Griffero:  dell’inter-soggetivo.    Grimaldi:  anti-peripatetica.    Grimaldi. Ha come maestro per le belle lettere e l'oratoria Taurini   Grimaldi:  dell’inter-azione  Gronda:  -- l’intersoggetivo di VICO    Gruppi: la ragione conversazionale e la via italiana al socialismo.   Guarini  (Modena)    Guicciardini Guzzi:  della lingua inaudita -- la lingua inaudibile, la lingua audita.   Guzzi. . Roma, Lazio.    Guzzo Herpitt Iacono: siciliano, non italiano -- .    Iccio: la ragione conversazionale e il portico nel secolo d’oro della filosofia romana    Icco: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Taranto   Iceta: all’isola – la ragione conversazionale e– filosofia siciliana    Ierace: la ragione conversazioanle e il certificato   Ieroteo: la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Guiliano --    Illuminati:  del filosofo all’opera –   Imbriani. Acri srive un saggio contro Imbriani.     Imerio: la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Giuliano -- Incardona: all’isola –  -- Questo è l’uomo – gl’inferi del principio   Infantino: obbligatio in solidum,  -- la diada conversazionale – il rischio dei solidali.    Introvigne: la ragione conversazionale. Filosofo, sociologo e saggista italiano.    Iorio: la ragione conversazionale torna a Sorrento.    Ipparchide: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Reggio   Ipparco: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Metaponto --   Ippaso: la ragione conversazionale da Crotone a Metaponto   Ippaso: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Sibari - Ippaso.     Ippolito: la ragione conversazionale e il culto di Giove --  Ippostene: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone --– filosofia calabrese     Ippide: la ragione conversazioanele  la filiale di Crotone a Reggio --– filosofia calabrese     Irtione: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano   Isidoro: la rgione conversazionale e il cinargo romano sotto il principato di Nerone    Itaneo Jaja Jerocades Jommelli:  del musicista filosofo – muovere l’aria – l’azione melodrammatica: note su “L’errore amoroso”. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Juvalta Labeone Labriola Lacida Lacrate: la diaspora di Crotone   Lacrito: Lafeonte: la diaspora di Crotone   Lagalla: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazoinale della teoria geo-centrica – la terra al centro del universo.    Lamisco: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone   Lamanna:  del risorgimento fiorentino    Lami:  della ragione dei antichi romani – la tradizione della polizia romana.    Lampria: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone --    Landi: la ragione conversazionale e la semiotica economica – prinzipio di economia dello sforzo razionale.    Landini: la ragione conversazionale –  –    Landino:  della sforziade degl’italiani –   Landucci Lalla:  nella selezione sessuale di Nerone, il musicista.    Lanzalone: il pirotese e i pirotesi. Latini: , l’implicatura rettorica di Publio e Cicerone.    Laurino: la ragione conversazionale, l’homo œconomicus, e l’implicatura conversazionale dei longobardi.    Lavagnini Lazzarelli Lazzari: la ragione conversazionale.    Lazzarini: il deutero-esperanto.    Leanace: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Sibari.    Lecaldano:  della traspatia – l’impassibile di Cicerone.    Lelio: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano.    Leocide: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone.    Leofronte: la ragione cnversazionale e la setta di Crotone.    Leone Leonzio: all’isola -- la setta di Leonzio.    Leonzio: la ragione conversazionale la diaspora di Crotone.    Lettine: all’isola – la diaspora di Crotona.    Leoni:   il vincolo mi fa libero.    Leoni:     Leopardi:  del favoloso e fascista.    Leopardi   Lia: la ragione conversazionale e la memoria conversazionale.   Libanio: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Giuliano   Liberale: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano --    Liberatore:  .   Licenzio: la ragione conversazionale e il filosofo poeta  Liceti: .    Licinio: la ragione conversazionale del corpo e dell’animo.    Licone: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone    Licoforonte: all’isola -- la scuola siciliana –– filosofia siciliana – scuola di Leonzio Liguori Lilla:  di Vico.    Limenanti – la ragione conversazionale dell’ebreo italiano. : “I would call L. an Italian philosopher, but Mussolini would not!”   Limone:  della simbolica del potere.    Lisi: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone.    Lisiade: all’isola – la diaspora di Crotone --– filosofia siciliana   Lisibio: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone    Lisimaco: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano   Livi:  del consenso sociale e l’aporia: se cristiano, non filosofo.     Livio: la ragione conversazionale e la storia romana come fonte della morale romana – etica togata.    Lodovici: all’isola:  della virtù – verso la meta – la meta è l’origine.    Lodovici:  --  –  (Roma) The author of a fascinating essay on philosophical psychology.  Lombardi: .    Longino: la ragione conversazionale e il filosofo della regina.    Longino: la ragione conversazionale e il diritto romano   Longano:  Losano:  della filosofia del diritto romano   Losurdo:   del ribelle aristocratico.    Lottieri:  del BENE COMUNE, diritto individuale, l’età degl’eroi, la ragione del stato.  Luca Lucano: la ragione conversazionale al PORTICO romano.    Lucceio: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano   Luciano: la ragione conversazionale e la gnossi   Luciano: la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano   Lucilio:    Lucilio: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano --  l’implicatura conversazionale   Lucio: la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano    Lucrezio: la ragione conversazionale e l’ORTO romano, l’implicatura conversazionale dell’alma figlia di Giove.    Lucullo Luisetti Luporini: , i corpi di VINCI, LEOPARDI fascista – leopardi fascisti – ultra-filosofico  Luzzago: .     M   Macedo: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano   Machiavelli: l’implicatura conversazionale del principe di LIVIO at Oxford.    Macrobio Madera Maffetone: l’implicatura conversazionale – filosofia campanese – filosofia napoletana – scuola di Napoli    Magalotti:  di naturali esperienze.    Maggi:  -- implicatura ridicola.    Magi:  nell’uso delle parole, il mistico, i mistici, la scuola di mistica fascista, il veintennio, filosofia fascista.    Magli: LA ragione conversazionale del pirotese e il deutero-esperanto.   Magnani, Magni, Maierù, Mainardini, Majello, Malipiero, Mamiani: l’implicatura conversazionale di Beltrami contro Euclide – filosofia emiliana   Mancini: l’implicatura conversazionale del kerygma. : “In my seminar on ‘conversation’ I focus on the principle of conversational benevolence, -- formerly the desideratum of other-love – as opposed to the desideratum of conversational self-love. It was only years later, when exploring Kant, I realised how crucial the role that benevolentia plays – which I had borrowed from Butler, not Kant   Manetti, Manetti: la ragione conversazionale. Nasce in una regione, la Toscana, in cui vive una grande tradizione di poeti contadini, uomini che uniscono in sé due forti passioni: l’agricoltura e la poesia. Poeta contadino anche lui, la passione per l’agricoltura lo porta a laurearsi in viticoltura ed enologia e ad avviare, la sua azienda agricola tra le colline di Greve in Chianti, l’Azienda Agricola M. M., Mangione: . touched with a barge the symbols used by logicians, had it be not be that my own pupil, Strawson, was thinking to write a tract for Methuen about it. We discussed it in private, and I shared my thoughts with him that most of his intricacies could be extricated by appeal to a principle of rational discourse which I had come across in the quite separate – and properly philosophical area – of the philosophy of perception.    Manfredi Manicone: la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia del Gargano.    Manilio Manlio: la ragione conversazionale dell’orto ae l’implicatura conversazionale    Manlio: La ragione conversazionale all’orto di Roma– “Don’t call me ‘Vopisco’!”    Mannelli: l’implicatura conversazionale degl’eroi di Virgilio – la scuola di Grimaldi    Mantovani: l’implicatura conversazionale dei curiazi – percorsi di comunicazione – la scuola di Moncalieri   Manzoni: la ragione conversazionale dell’implicature dei promessi sposi, “How CLEVER English is!” : “ In I Promessi Sposi, M.’s engagement with the questione della lingua parallels ordinary-language philosophy by shifting the focus from abstract, idealized systems to the "living," everyday speech of a community. M. and the "Living" Language M.’s philosophical struggle centered on defining what constitutes a truly national language for a unified Italy.    Marafioti – la scuola di Polistena -- filosofia calabrese   Marano, Marassi: l’implicatura conversazionale degl’eroi di Vico – la scuola di Cardano al Campo -- filosofia lombarda   Marcello: la filosofia sotto Giulio Cesare –Prichard’s seminars on will and action, I was struck by one of his examples – from the history of Rome. M. was a fierce opponent to Giulio Cesare, and about to be condemned to death for precisely that. However, Giulio Cesare changes his mind, and decides to PARDON M. However, the pardon arrived too late, and M. was merciless murdered. Prichard claimed that since Giulio Cesare’s intention was to PARDON M. and save his life, even if Giulio Cesare failed in this, M. could still be deemed to have been pardoned, and his life saved by Giulio Cesare. The murder of M. was ‘accidental’ in terms of Caesar’s willingness to pardon him!” . A pupil of Cratippo. M. has a career in public life and is one of those who opposes to Giulio Cesare. Cesare pardons M. but M. is still murdered. Marco Claudio Marcello. Keywords: Livio, Machiavelli. Marcello. , “ e Marcello.”    Marcello: il principe filosofo ––  –  (Roma). : “When I arrived at Oxford from Clifton with a classics scholarship to Corpus, I knew I had to deal with Ottaviano – The nephew of Ottaviano [vedasi], and until his death, his chosen heir. A pupil of Nestore. Marco Claudio Marcello. , “ e Marcello.” Marcello At Oxford, it is widely believed that Martha and W. C. Kneale covered the whole of the growh of logic – indeed, they missed Marcello!” . M. qrites about logic, including an essay on the syllogism, which is a connection (‘syn-‘) of ‘reasons’ (logoi).  Tullio Marcello. , “ e Marcello.”   Marchesini:  dell’educazione del soldato – l’implicatura del capitano – e l’amore sessuale – la società eugenica. : “When I delivered my lecture on ‘meaning’ for the Philosophical Society at Oxford, I knew that some of my pupils – to which I had burdened with my seminars on ‘meaning’ would be attending. I was paying little attention to Marzolo.   Marchesini : “M.’s ‘terio’ concept is one we need at Oxford. We do speak of ‘animal’, as in Marchetti: l’implicatura conversazionale della natura delle cose – la scuola d’Empoli   Marchi: l’implicatura conversazionale della missione die la religione civile di Mussolini.    Marchi: l’implicatura conversazionale dell’anima del corpo – la scuola di Brescia  Marci: la ragione conversazionale -- Nerone e la filosofia --  Marziano Marco:  Marconi: la ragione conversazionale (Ancona). .    Marconi: – la scuola di Torino -- filosofia piemontese   Mariano: l’implicatura conversazionale – la scuola di Capua -- filosofia campanese    Marin: l’implicatura conversazionale e l’ottimo precettore – la scuola di Venezia -- filosofia veneta   Marliani: filosofia lombarda – filosofia milanese    Marotta  Marramao Marsili: l’implicatura conversazionale del cimento – la scuola di Siena    Marta: la ragione conversazionale (Roma).    Martelli l’assassinio di Giulio Cesare – la scuola di San Marco in Lamis Martellotta: LA ragione conversazionale dal deutero-esperanto al pirotese.    Martinetti Martini Martino, Marzolo, Masci, Masi: l’implicatura Masila:  – Masnovo: la ragione conversazionale. : “While we start philosophy at Oxford – sub-faculty of philosophy – as part of the classics – Faculty of Literae Humaniores – Oxford does not quite rule what counts as a ‘classic’: Cicerone, and compagnia.   Massarenti: big discussion, prompted by me, I’m afraid, as to whether there is a distinction to be made between, er, philosophically important, and philosophical Unimportant questions. Austin focused on the prevalence of ‘highly’ as an adverb – why ‘highly intelligent’ but not ‘highly idiotic’?    Massari: , la scuola di Seminara, Massimiano: il principe filosofo, Roma, e la  (Roma  Massimo, l’implicatura conversazionale nelle prime ricerche di Hegel, implicatura idealista di Plathegel e Ariskant – filosofia siciliana, la scuola di Palermo   Mastri: l’implicatura conversazionale – la Mastrofini: la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale e l’implicatura verbale di Romolo.    Masullo Matassi:  e la filosofia della seduzione dei giocatori di calcio – la scuola di San Benedetto del Tronto -- filosofia marchese --  (San Benedetto del Tronto).    Matera, Mathieu, Matraja: la ragione conversazionale e la grammatica razionale.   Maturi Maturi Maurizi:  della vendetta di Bacco, e la   Mazio: la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano   Mazzarella, Mazzei Mazzini, Mazzoni:  – la vita attiva dei romani – la scuola di Cesena    Mecenate:  –  Medio The Romans were a bit like the Oxonians: it all had to be Greek – witness Diogenes Laertius – he goes on in great detail to list all the lost essays by unknown Greek philosophers – but when it comes to Roman philosophers like Medio, he couldn’t care less –  . Medio. Porch. Portico. A contemporary of Plotino. M. writes a number of essays. Medio.  e Medio.   Megistia, Meis Melandri, Melanipide: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone    Melchiorre Melesia: la ragione conversazionale e la diaspora di Crotone, Melisso: la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Velia   Melli:  It would be silly to suppose that Antonino represented Plato’s idea of the philosophus rex.    Memmio: Menecrate, Menestore: la ragione conversazionale ela scuola di Sibari   Menone:  – gl’ottimati di Crotone    Mercuriale, Meriggi  (Como   Merker Arianna abbandonata a Nasso. : “I like to consider myself a philosophical ethologist. As Merker reminds us, ethos is possibly related to ‘ethnos,’ but possibly not!”   Messalla: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano Mesarco:  del figlio di Pitagora   Mesibolo, Messere, Messimeri: . Note su Memoria sopra di una certa specie di pinta pratense chiamata sulla. Metello, Metopo Oddly, I kept in my files a copy of Bosanquet’s Virtues and Vices, with the purpose of criticizing it Metrodoro Metrodoro.   Metronace:  nella scuola di Napoli –  Micalori, Miccoli, Miccolis, Mieli:  dell’uccello del paradiso; ovvero, la lingua perduta del desiderio – la Paradisaeidae di Swinton – la scuola di Milano -- filosofia lombarda   Miglio Mignucci, Millia: la ragione Minicio:  d’Adriano nel diritto romano e Plinio minore.  Minnomaco Minucio, Miraglia, Misefari, Mocenigo: la ragione conversazionale e la   Moderato: la ragione conversazionale -- da Crotone a Modio:  del disonore sessuale, la filosofia del Tevere  Moiso, Mondin:  dell ritorno dell’angelo, la semantica filosofica, la semantica pel sistema G, interpretazione e validità  Monferrato:  – la scuola di Casale Monferrato  Montanari (Bagnacavallo). . Bagnacavallo, presso Ravenna, Ravenna, Emilia-Romana.    Montanari:  Cf Mazzino Montanari. Massino Montanari, Montani, Montinari, Monte, Monterosso, Moramarco, Morandi, Moravia, Mordacci, Mordente, Morelli, Moretti:  e la segnatura romantica – i romantici di Mori:  e la coerenza dell’intransigenza – la ripproduzione sessuata fra i antici romani  Moriggi: la ragione conversazionale e la stretta di mano – Ercole e Cerbero – le tre implicature conversazionali   Morselli: la sistematicita della filosofia – la scuola di Morselli Motta, Motterlini, Musonio:  del Musonio di Gentile -- lingua lazia   Mussolini, Mussolini, Mustè: la ragione conversazoinale e l’implicatura conversazionale nella filosofia dell’idealismo italiano – il dialogo di Socrate   Muzio Nannini: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicature conversazionali dei corpi animati  Nardi, Nasta:  –  Nausito: la ragione conversazionale della scuola di Firenze, pre-romana   Nearco: la ragione conversazionale della diaspora di Crotone   Negri, Negri, Neri, Nerone, Nesi, Venere: perche  amore inspiro: dagl’elementi fuoco: perché  d’amore accendo da uoi con vocabul greco CHARITÀ chiamata: perché col mio ardore della GRAZIA della salute viso degni    Nicolao, Nicoletti Nicoletti: la ragione conversazionale - – la scuola d’Udine Nifo:  ludicra – la scuola di Sessa   Nigidio Ninone, Nisio: Nizolio Noce: l’implicatura conversazionale – la polemica contro il fascismo di Gentile filosofia toscana   Noferi:  della setta di Firenze – la scuola di Firenze    Nola, Novara, filosofia piemontese   Novaro: la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale ligure -- l’infinito del ponente –   Novato:  Novelli (Padova). Filosofo. Fisico. Camillo Novelli  Numa, Occelo: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Lucania – Occilo: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Lucania.– filosofia basilicatese -- filosofia antica –  (Lucania). . Lucania, Matera, Basilicata. A Pythagorean, cited by Giamblico.  Brother of Occelo Ocone: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicature conversazionali dei liberali d’Italia – la scuola di Benevento   Oddi Offredi:  del lizio – la scuola di Cremona -- filosofia lombarda    Olgiati, Olimpio Olivetti, Olivi Onato: la ragione conversazionale e la setta di Crotone --– filosofia calabrese   Onorato Opillo:  -- l’implicatura conversazionale Segue l'indirizzo dell’orto. Liberto di un membro dell’orto, insegna filosofia, ma sciolge la sua scuola per seguire Rutilio Rufo a Smirne  Opocher Opsimo, Orabona, Orazio, Ordine Orestada Metaponto, Basilicata. A Pythagorean cited by Giamblico. He frees Senofane from slavery – as cited by Diogene Laerzio.     Oribasio:  di Marte, o la scuola di Giuliano – Orioli: l’implicatura conversazionale nella logica della monarchia romana – i sette re – la scuola di Vallerano    Ornato Oro:   la difficoltà dei segni di Trissino non favorì la diffusione della sua filosofia    Orrontio We don’t have ‘senators’ at Oxford!” -- . A senator and follower of Plotino – cited by Porfirio. Orrontio, Orrontio, Ortensio Ortensio Ortalo Quinto, Ortes, Osimo Ostiliano, Otranto, Otranto Ottaviano:  nel secolo d’oro della filosofia romana sotto il principato d’Ottaviano --  Ovidio, Ovidio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura convrsazionale –a Clifford.  P   Paccio, Pace:  di Boezio – la nota di Pace   Pacetti: Paci, Pacioli, Padovani, Paganini, Pagano, Pagnini, Palazzani, Palladio, Pandullo, Panebianco, Panella, Panfilo, Panicarola, Panigarola, Pannico, Pansa, Panunzio, Panunzio, Panzini, Paolino, Papi, Papineau, Papirio, Papirio Peto Parente, Pareyson e l’implicatura conversazionale: implicare, impiegare, ed interpretare, il liberalismo, il risorgimento, e il fascismo. Linceo. Nato da genitori entrambi originari Parinetto, Parisio:  di Cicerone e la prammatica come retorica conversazionale secondo Leech.    Parmisco, Parrini, Pascoli, Pascoli, Pasini: , you’re the cream in my coffee, the salt in my stew, eschatology, e la meta-meta-fora del cavaliere perduto. Studia a Padova applicandosi agli studi giuridici,    Passavanti, Passavanti, Passeri, Passini: .   Pasqualini, Pasqualini, C. Pasqualini.  Pasqualotto,  Pastore:  nella storia della dia-lettica romana di Varrone a Peano   Patrizi, A questo proposito circa venti anni più tardi si espresse  P. nell'Historia diece dialoghi    Pattio Pazzio Paulino:  la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano, la ragione e l’implicatura conversazionale --   Pausania: all’isola -- la ragione conversazionale e la scuola di Girgenti –   Pavia: la ragione conversazaionale e l’implicatura conversazionale --  mi chiamo Lanfranco. : “I like him, but then I’m English1” Autore di una Dialectica. Conosce bene la logica vetus. Usa ancora il De decem categoriis.    Peano: , il deutero-esperanto di , formalisti ed informalisti, modernisti e neotradizionalisti, e la Pecoraro:  del conflitto. Pecori, Peisicrate , cited by Giamblico. : “Cicerone spells this Pisicrate, since he finds that dipthongs are un-Roman Peisicrate.   Peisirrodo “Cicerone spells this Pesirrodo, Peisirrodo, Pelacani, Pelacani: la ragione conversazionale, la dialettica, e l’implicatura conversazionale – filosofia emiliana Pelagio Tutor of Celestio and Giulano di Eclano.  Pellegrini: la teoria del segno e l’implicaura conversazionale. : “As an university lecturer at Oxford, I had to give this or that seminar on topics of my interest. Ewing was writing on meaninglessness –which struck my attention, since I don’t think Ewing cared much to talk about meaningfulness in the first place! P. did   Pellegrini, Pellegrini:   : “I like P.: he found Aristotle’s ‘obscure’ for the youth the manual Ethica Nichomaechaea is intended for!” È, secondo TIRABOSCHI,    Pempelo l’implicatura Pempelo.   Penco: la ragione conversazionale. to evolution – and especially evolution of language.    Pera, Perconti: la ragione conversazionale. : “I like P., but then I like Kant!”   Peregalli: la ragione converazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. I luoghi e la polvere Incipit All'inizio della Genesi il serpente convince Eva a mangiare con Adamo il frutto dell'albero della conoscenza.    Perniola, Perone. interrotta”. Il tema è ripreso proprio in apertura di Modernità e Memoria, dove individua nella modernità l'epoca della cesura.    Persio:  Nerone Persio:    Persio: I was certainly fortunate in my mother Pessina: . we do study Cicero in Latin; at Bologna, they study it in LATIN *and* Italian!” –Pessina, Petrarca, Petrella. (Sansepolcro). Sansepolcro, Arezzo, Tocana. P., Bernardino. Nasce a Borgo del Santo Sepolcro -- oggi Sansepolcro, in provincia di Arezzo --, da Domenico P. Non è noto il nome della madre. È allievo di Francesco di Niccolò PICCOLOMINI  Petrone: la ragione conversazionale dei sanniti e la setta d’Imera Pezzarossa: la ragione conversazionale della fisica, la geografia e l'astronomia, sposate insieme, fanno sì che un italiano discopra il nuovo continente, ed un altro italiano gl’imponga il nome -- l’eloquenza lombarda – l’implicature conversazionali   Pezzella: la ragione conversazionale -- Cesare deve morire – l’implicatura conversazionale  Piana: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicature conversazionali dei merli   Piccolomini: la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale, e le figure di retorica   Piccolomini, Pico:  -- io priego Dio Girolamo che’n pace così in ciel sia il tuo Pico congiunto come’n terra eri, et come’l tuo defunto corpo hor con le sacr’ossa sue qui iace   Pico:  dello stregone sodomita  Pieralisi: la ragione conversazionale o la teoria del segno  Pieri: ragione convversazionale ed implicatura convversazionale   Pievani: la ragione conversazionale d’Enea l’antenato, o l’implicature conversazionali dei maschi   Pigliucci Pini: la ragione conversazionale e la    Piovani, Piralliano: la ragione conversazionale del gruppo di gioco dell’accademia a Roma, e la  (Roma). . A philosophical acquaintance of Elio Aristide. Accademia. Pirro:  rovesciata nel’idealismo di Gentile, la scuola di San Severo, la filosofia pugliese, e la  (San Severo). . San Severo  Pirrone: la ragione conversazionale della diaspora, da Crotona a Meta-ponto, Roma, e la     Pisone: la ragione conversazionale del portico dell’orto, il gruppo di gioco del Vesuvio, Roma, e la  (Roma).    Pisone: o, Roma, e la  (Roma).    Pitea: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia ligure, Roma, e la  (Roma). . He settles in Marseglia, and achieves fame as a philosopher. Pitea. Keywords: longitudinal unity,  e Pitea.   Pitodoro: la ragione conversazionale della la setta di Velia, Roma, e la  (Velia   Pizzi, Pizzorno: la ragione conversazionale, Giovanni , Plantadossi: l’implicatura conversazionale e gl’universali, l’implicatura conversazionale, la scuola di Ripatransone, la filosofia marchese, e la  (Ripatransone). . Ripatransone, Ascoli Piceno Plauto, Plebe Poggi: , il ventennio fascista, l’incontro con Mussolini ad Ancona, la scuola di Sarzana, i fatti di Sarzana, lasciato in libertà da Mussolini, massoni proibiti, la filosofia ligure, e la  Polemarco: la ragione conversazionale della Polemarco Polemarco, Poli: la ragione conversazionale dell’implicatura conversazionale del pappagallo di Locke, la filosofia lombarda, e la   (Cremona). . Cremona, Lombardia.o. I    Politeo, Pollastri: la ragione conversazionale delle conversazioni sull’olismo hegeliano – la scuola di Firenze    Pollini: l’implicatura conversazionale e la raione conversazionale – la scuola di Grossetto    Pollio: la ragione conversazionale contro il lizio Pollio: la ragione conversazionale dell’orto romano (Roma). . Orto. Patron of Stazio . Pollio Felice.   Polluce: la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo Polo, Pompedio Pompeo: la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano e il diritto Pompeo: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano Pomponazzi, Pomponazzi Pomponio . best under Pomponio Pomponio Pomponio, Pontara: , o se il fine giustifichi i mezzi filosofia trentina   Ponte, Ponzio: la ragione conversazionale e il segno dell’altro, o della semiotica filosofica – la scuola di San Pietro Vernotico   Porta Porta, Porta Porta:  fisio-nomica – la scuola di Vico Equense -- filosofia campanese   Portalupi . Sten. ling. A. Portalupi. , “ e Portalupi Portaria: , là onde vegnon tali alla scrittura, ch' uno la fugge, e l'altro la coarta – la scuola di Todi -- filosofia umbra    Porzio:  nel lizio– la scuola di Napoli -- filosofia campanese   Possenti: la ragione conversazionale Pozza Pozzo:  nel ginnasio   Pra Prepone Prepostino Prepostino.   Prestipino: all’isola -- la ragione conversazionale -- conversazione e ragione in Vico -- per una antropologia filosofica – filosofia siciliana   Pretestato Pretestato Preti: la ragne conversazionale, la retorica conversazionale, e la logica conversazionale – la scuola di Pavia   Preve, Prini: la ragione conversazionale dell’implicatura conversazionale diBelgirate, Verbano-Cusio-Ossola, Piemonte.    Priore (Roma). . Abstract: : “ Luigi Priore, .  Luogo di Nascita e Formazione    Prisciano: la ragione conversazionale dell’implicatura conversazionale di Simmaco Priscilliano: la ragione conversazionale What Priscillian says is that the world is an evil place whither souls are sent as a punishment. What he implicates is that Nerone is right! Priscilliano, Probo, Procle Prodi: la ragione conversazionale e l’artifice della ragione e l’implicature conversazionale dei cani di Pavlov    Prospero: la ragione converzionale del contro-potere del Quirinale e l’implicatura conversazionale laica – la scuola di Pescosolido    Prosseno Sibaria, Cassano Prudenzio:  dela psisco-machia –  Pubblicio, Pucci o dell’implicatura conversazionale utopica di Campanella – la scuola di Firenze    Puccinotti:  di boezio, la filosofia sperimentale, i fisici e i meta-fisici, la scuola d’Urbino, filosofia marchese, e la  (Urbino). Pudenziano: la ragione conversazionale dell’orto romano, Roma, Orto. Galeno writes a treatise about him.  e Prudenziano Punzo Purgotti Quarta: la ragione conversazionale. La conversazione, la solidarietà, e l’implicature conversazionali dell’utopico Campanella  Quattromani Quintili Quinto, Rabirio: la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano, Roma, e la  (Roma). . Orto. Criticised by Cicerone for oversimplifying the school’s doctrines in order to reach a wider audience – “which reminds me of me.”Ragghianti: Raimondi Raio, Ramorino, Ranzoli: “going through the dictionary” -come volleva Austin, ma il Ranzoli! Ravelli: la memoria, la ragione conversazionale, e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Re, Reale, Reghini: la ragione conversazionale, il numero tri-angolare, il numero quadrato, Regina: la ragione conversazionale dell’esse e dell’inter-esse, o degl’uomini complementari, la potenza e il valore, la filosofia lombarda   Renda, Renier: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura – filosofia veneta   Rensi, Renzi Ressibio, Resta: la ragione conversazionale e le masserizie della mutua fiducia conversazionale – la scuola di Bari   Richeri, Ricordi: la ragione conversazionale eil Nerone di Manfridi, Seneca o dell’essere per amore, e gl’inganni dell’infinito di Leopardi sulle ceneri di Pasolini nell’inferno d’Aligheri – la scuola di Milano -- filosofia lombarda    Righetti, ignano Rigobello: la ragione conversazionale o dell’allargamento interpersonale del razionale – l’intenzionalità rovesciata.   Rimini, Rinaldi, Rinaldini, Rindaco: la ragione conversazionale Riondato: la ragione conversazionale o del metodo dell’etologia filosofica   Ripa, Riverso Roccoto: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura Rodano: la ragione conversazionale dell’immunità e della comunità, o l’implicatura dei comunisti Rodano, Rodippo Rogatiano: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia della gotta – Roma. A senator whose tutor is Plotino. He credits Plotino for helping him realise the importance of leading a frugal existence. He himself fasts every other day – to which he attributes his recovery from gout. Rogatiano  Rogo: la ragione conversazionale dell’allievo di Filone Tertilio Rogo Romagnosi: la ragione conversazionale dellaantica, e l’implicatura dei IV periodi: o, dal segno alla logìa   Romanoto Roncaglia, Ronchi: la ragione conversazionale Rosa – implicature in deutero-esperanto --la scuola di Susa    Rosandro: la ragione conversazionale degl’amici filosofi Rosatti, Rosselli: la  nel ventennio fascista –    Rosselli Rosselli Rosselli Rossetti Rossi: la ragione conversazionale della volontà e della temperanza – la scuola d’Appignano del Tronto   Rossi, Rossi Rosso: all’isola -- la ragione conversazionale all’isola -- a Sicilia – la scuola di Palermo    Rota: la ragione conversazionale e la lavagna del gruppo di gioco – la scuola di Vigevao    Rotondi: la ragione conversazionale aantica – la scuola di Vivocaro    Rovatti, Rovere Rovere, Rovere, Rubellio, Ruberti Rucellai: la ragione conversazionale degl’amori di Linceo, o della filosofia imperfetta. Note sui Dialoghi della Agricoltura Ruffolo: la ragione conversazionale dal guazzabuglio al possibilismo come terapia eutimistica. Rufino: la ragione conversazionale del commentario filosofico – Roma. Rufo, Ruggiero: la ragione conversazionale di Remo e di Romolo. Note su Il  Rusca: la ragione Rusconi Rustico Ruta Rutilio Sabbadini Sabellio Sabinillio, Saccheri: la ragione conversazionale. Sacchi, Saliceto Sallustio: la ragione conversazionale a Roma. Note sull’Empedoclea. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Salustio, Salutati: la ragione conversazionale d’ESalutio Salviano, Salvemini, Sancasciani: la ragione Sanctis: la grammatica Sanseverino Santilli, Santucci, Santucci, Santucci Sanzo: il deutero-esperanto e la ragione conversazional tra natura ed artificio Sarlo, Sarno, Sarpi, Sasso: la ragione conversazionale da Crotone Saturnino, Saufeio Scalea: la ragione conversazionale Scalfari: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura di Teseo –fascista. Scaramelli, Scarano: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura Scaravelli Scarpelli: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia fascista – Gentile e il fascismo giuridico – Soleri Scevola, la nascita Scevola.  Scevola: la ragione conversazionale dell’augure Scipione, Sclavione: la ragione conversazionale e il lizio di Padova. Note su Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum et medicorum. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .   Scupoli: la ragione conversazionale Sebasmio, Secondo: la ragione conversazionale della gnosi romana. Note su Dialogus de luce et tenebris. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.    Secondo Sellio, Sellio: la ragione conversazionale del fratello. Semerari: la ragione conversazionale e il principio del dialogo in Socrate. Note su La fenomenologia. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Semmola Semprini Serbati, Sereniano Sereno: la ragione conversazionale Serra: la ragione conversazionale dell’economia filosofica – storia dell’economia romana – massoneria – filosofia calabrese. Note su Delle cause che possono far Serra: la ragione conversazionale – prammatica come rettorica conversazionale Sertorio Servio Sesti: la ragione conversazionale e la romanità nel circolo dei Sesti -Sestio Sesto: la ragione Settala: la ragione conversazionale dei problemi sessuali d’Aristotele -- desiderio e piacere. Note su De peste et pestiferis affectibus. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Severino: la ragione conversazionale del velino -- oltre il linguaggio, oltre l’aporia di Parmenide. Note su La struttura originaria. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Severo: la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo --– Note su Dicta. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Severo, Sforza: la ragione conversazionale dell’iustum/iussum – tra idealismo e positivismo. Siciliani: la ragione conversazionale e la critica della filosofia zoologica e la psico-genia di Vico. Note sul positivismo. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Sidonio, Sighele Signa Silio: la ragione conversazionale a– la maledizione di Dione – Scipione come Ercole – il sacrificio dell’eroe. Note su Punica. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P.   Silla: la regione conversazionale della ta meta ta physika Silla, Simbolo, Simioni: la ragione conversazionale degl’amanti. Note su I segreti Simmaco, Simoneschi: la ragione conversazionale e la rettorica conversazionale. Note su Il vello d’oro, overo la rettorica. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Simoni: la ragione conversazionale, la scuola di Caprese – la teoria del tutto. Note sulle Rime e lettere. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Simoni: la ragione conversazionale degl’ ‘eretici’ reazionari italiani – gl’acuti – i nobili – filosofia toscana. Sini Sirenio: la ragione conversazionale del ‘libero’ arbitrio. Note su De fato libri novem: in quibus inter alia, de contingentia, necessitate, providentia, praescientia, prophetia, et divinatione, divina: tam secundum philosophorum opinionem, quàm secundum Catholicorum theologorum sententiam, docte, & copiose disseritur. Iulio Sirenio, Siro Solari Soldati: la ragione conversazionale Soleri: la ragione conversazionale ed implicatura conversazionale -- funzionalità veritativa dei connettivi. Solonghello Somenzi, Sordi Soria Sorrentino Sortis: la retorica conversazionale. Note sul Trattato della sapienza. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Sozzini’ – Note su De auctoritate scripturae sacrae. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Sozzini Spaventa: la ragione conversazionale e l’origine italico dello spirito filosofico, Speranza, Spintaro: la ragione conversazionale della filosofia pre-romanica   Spirito: la filosofia dello spirito – filosofia fascista – ventennio fascista – i corpi – corpo e corporazione. Note su L’idealismo e il problema della conoscenza. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Spisani: la ragione conversazionale della contestazione. Note su Natura e spirito nell’idealismo attuale. Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. .  Spurio: la ragione conversazionale della lettera da Corinto –epistle. SpurioStasea Statilio Stefani Stefanini Stefanoni Stella Stellini Sterlich Stertinio Stilione Stilone Stucchi Svetonio Tagliabue Taglialatela Tarantino Tari Tartarotti Tataranni Telesio Teodoro Terzi Tessitore Testa Thaulero Tiberiano Tiberio Tiberio Tilgher Timpanaro Toderini Tocco Tolomei Tomai Tomitano Toritto Torlonia Torre Trabalza Tragella Trappani Trapassi Trapè Trebazio Trebiano Tria Trincheri Troilo Tronti Tulelli Turco Turoldo Ubaldi Ubaldi Unicorno Vacca Vailati Valdarnini, Valenti, Valentino, Valeri, Valeriis, Valerio, Valerio, Valerio, Vallauri, Valle, Valletta, Vanghetti, Vanini, Vanni, Vannucchi, Vannucci, Varino, Vario, Varisco, Varrone, Vasa, Vasoli, Vatinio, Vattimo, Veca, Vegetti, Velleio, Venanzio, Venini, Venturi, Venturini, Vera, Vernia, Veronelli, Veronesi, Verrecchia, Vettori, Vettori, Viano, Viazzi, Vicini, Vico, Vieri, Vigellio, Vigna, Vignoli, Vinadio, Vio, Virgilio, Vitale, Vitiello, Vittore,  Viveros, Volpe, Volpicelli, Volta, Winspeare, Zabarella, Zaccaro, Zamboni, Zamboni, Zimara, Zimara, Zini, Zolla, Zoppi, Zoppio, Zoppio, Zorzi, Zubiena, Zuccante, Zuccolo. Speranza, J. L. (n. d.). ‘Grice e Speranza.’ Il Gruppo di Gioco di H. P. Grice.

Ugo Spirito (Arezzo, Toscana): la filosofia dello spirito – filosofia fascista – ventennio fascista – i corpi – corpo e corporazione. Grice and Spirito approach “reason‑governed” meaning from almost opposite philosophical directions. For Grice, conversational meaning is rationally structured at the micro‑level of dialogue: speakers and hearers are guided by shared norms of practical reason, crystallized in the cooperative principle and its maxims, which allow interlocutors to infer speaker meaning beyond what is literally said in a rule‑governed yet flexible way. Rationality here is procedural and inferential: conversational sense emerges from the participants’ mutual recognition of intentions and reasons for speaking as they do, without requiring any metaphysical or political foundation for language use. In Spirito, by contrast, reason is not primarily a conversational mechanism but an existential and historical task. His problematicismo treats meaning as inseparable from the lived situation of agents embedded in the ethical, institutional, and ultimately political totality of the State. Where Grice explains communicative order through minimally normative, context‑sensitive principles that regulate cooperation among autonomous speakers, Spirito subordinates meaning to the search for incontrovertible values capable of overcoming skepticism and reshaping collective life, a search that in the fascist period is explicitly articulated through the organic unity of body, corporazione, and Stato. From a Gricean perspective, Spirito’s emphasis on corporative and state‑centered rationality risks collapsing conversational reason into an external moral–political order; from a Spiritian perspective, Grice’s reason‑governed implicatures might appear thin and formal, regulating exchanges among speakers while leaving untouched the deeper problem of how meaning ought to be grounded in a substantive vision of communal life and authority. Allievo di Gentile, teorico di una filosofia nota come problematicismo e del corporativismo fascista, S. è stato uno dei più importanti filosofi italiani. Dagli anni giovanili fino al termine del suo lungo percorso intellettuale, S. ha espresso una riflessione incentrata sulla ricerca di valori incontrovertibili, capaci di resistere al pensiero critico e di trasformare concretamente la vita degli uomini. Per la varietà dei suoi interessi, per i temi di cui si è occupato e per le scelte politiche che ha compiuto, S. è certamente uno dei protagonisti più interessanti della storia della cultura italiana.  Nasce da Prospero e Rosa Leone. Dopo essersi diplomato al liceo classico Vico di Chieti, inizia a frequentare la facoltà di Giurisprudenza dell’Università di Roma per laurearsi. Lo stesso anno si iscrive a Lettere e filosofia e si laureò con Gentile discutendo una tesi sul pragmatismo italiano che pubblica. Da allora divenne uno dei più stretti collaboratori del filosofo idealista: nominato segretario di redazione del «Giornale critico di filosofia italiana», aderì al fascismo; firmò il «Manifesto degli intellettuali fascisti» e, quando lavora all’Enciclopedia Italiana ed era assistente alla cattedra di pedagogia dell’Università di Roma, fondò il bimestrale Nuovi studi di politica, economia e diritto» con l’obiettivo di diffondere i principi della filosofia di Gentile nelle scienze sociali. E, in effetti, per tutti gli anni Venti si impegnò nelle battaglie promosse dal filosofo idealista, convinto che l’attualismo rappresentasse l’espressione più importante della filosofia moderna, come dichiarò in L’idealismo italiano e i suoi critici. stato/cittadini, pathos romantico, romanticism e nuovo ordine, sindicalismo, fascismo da sinestra, filobolcevicco, corporativismo, attualismo, stato fascista, equilibrio liberta/autorita, gentile e spirito, i filosofi fascisti, filosofia e revoluzione, romanticismo, proprieta, filosofia come pedagogia.  C. Esp., legal power, right over or to a thing (class.): potestatis verbo plura significantur: in personā magistratuum imperium, in personā liberorum patria potestas, in personā servi dominium: at cum agimus de noxae deditione cum eo, qui servum non defendit, praesentis corporis copiam facultatemque significamus. Ex lege Atiniā in potestatem domini rem furtivam venisse videri, et si ejus vindicandae potestatem habuerit, Sabinus et Cassius aiunt, Dig. 50, 16, 215. Grice: Caro Spirito, sapessi quanto mi incuriosisce il tuo problematicismo! Ma dimmi, tra corpo e corporazione, chi porta i pantaloni in filosofia? O è tutto un ballo di maschere come al Carnevale di Arezzo? Spirito: Grice, sei sempre un fine ballerino del pensiero! Ti rispondo: per noi fascisti, il corpo è la base, la corporazione il vestito... Ma guai a chi scambia la toga col mantello! In filosofia, si danza sul filo del rasoio, ma guai a perdere l’equilibrio: si rischia di finire sotto il palco invece che sopra! Grice: Ah, allora una corporazione senza corpo è come una modifica senza aberrazione, come diceva Austin a Vadum Boum: si cambia tutto e non si vede niente! Ma, Spirito, se il corpo si perde, resta solo una festa di fantasmi... o peggio, una riunione di spiriti senza spirito! Spirito: Come direbbero gli aretini: Grice, lasciami dire, da fascista a filosofo—la più corporea delle implicature, signore!” Qui non si scherza: se manca il corpo, la filosofia diventa aria fritta! E tu, col tuo humor inglese, rischi di trasformare una corporazione in una compagnia di fantasmi... Ma almeno, con te, si ride di cuore e di corpo! Spirito, Ugo (1918). Dissertazione. I doveri inerenti al diritto di patria potestà.  Sotto Enrico Ferri e Maffeo Pantaleoni. Giurisprudenza, Roma, Palazzo della Sapienza, Corso Rinascimento.

Franco Spisani (Ferrara, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale della contestazione. From the perspective of reason‑governed conversational meaning, the contrast between Grice and Spisani is revealing. Grice’s theory treats conversation as a cooperative rational practice governed by shared norms: speakers intend meanings, hearers recognize those intentions, and conversational order is sustained by maxims that articulate what a reasonable participant is entitled to expect. Rationality, for Grice, is not merely logical correctness but a practical, interpersonal discipline that stabilizes meaning through mutual accountability and the calculability of implicatures. Spisani, by contrast, places contestation at the very heart of rational practice. Where Grice emphasizes coordination and convergence under rational constraints, Spisani emphasizes rupture, resistance, and productive imbalance. His “conversational reason” is not primarily oriented toward agreement but toward the exposure of limits—of metaphysics, of formal systems, and of settled rules. Dialogue in Spisani is a genuine engine of conceptual transformation, not simply a medium for transmitting intentions already formed; hence his preference for dialogical exposition and emblematic figures like Clipso, which signal that rationality advances through displacement and tension rather than equilibrium. In this sense, Spisani radicalizes a dimension that in Grice remains implicit: reason is not only what makes mutual understanding possible, but also what authorizes the challenge, revision, and re‑genesis of the very rules that govern understanding. If Grice offers a normative pragmatics explaining how meaning is responsibly maintained in ordinary conversation, Spisani offers a critical pragmatics in which conversation itself becomes the site where rational forms are destabilized and re‑created. Si laurea a Padova con una tesi di sull'attualismo italiano, Natura e spirito nell’idealismo attuale” (Milano, Fabbri). In seguito collabora a Urbino. A Bologna fonda “Rassegna di Logica”  e il centro di logica. In una lettera Carnap critica una sua decisione di non pubblicare un'opera. Morì suicida. Altri saggi: “Neutralizzazione dello spazio per sintesi produttiva” (Bologna, Cappelli); “Implicazione, endo-metria e universo del discorso” (Bologna) e “Introduzione alla teoria generale dei numeri relativi, con ingresso dei numeri moltiplicatori e divisori, legati alla logica e alla matematica trascendentale” (Bologna, Centro di logica e scienze comparate, analisi matematica). C'è una relazione divisoria che ipotizza il valore “M,” numero logico trans-infinito all'origine della neutralizzazione dello spazio trans-finito. “ℵ” va verso successivi aumenti. Ma è la relatività dei numeri, espressa nel calcolo per valori di posizione, che ne individua la direzione inversa. Spiega le sue scoperte in forma di dialogo. Tra gli interlocutori la misteriosa figura della piovra Clipso.  Logo-fenica. Altri saggi: “Il numero nell'istanza ontologica del rapporto d'identità” (Imola, Galeati); “Logica ed esperienza”; “Logica della contestazione” (Bologna, Cappelli).  Sulla storia della pubblicazione della Teoria generale, importanti ricerche erano già pronte. Allora, dice: “Ne discuto con Carnap. Carnap sottopone i risultati dell'indagine. Carnap spiega anche le ragioni che mi induceno a non diffonderne le conclusioni. Carnap risponde che quella scelta gli sembra affatto ingiustificata: l'operas crises non poteva rimanere nel silenzio. Tuttavia non cambiai parere. Non avrei pubblicato, e glielo confermai. il concetto di numero, numero naturale, numero relativo, logica auto-genetica, numero relativo moltiplicatore, numero relativo divisore, opposto, contradittorio, regole e segni, contestazione, esperienza, limiti della metafisica. G: 1939, S. You have found an Italian in 1962 and brought him back to my desk as if chronology were a maxim. S: Sir, chronology is only a maxim when it is convenient. G: Good. Now. Spisani. S: Franco Spisani, 1962. Natura e spirito nell’idealismo attuale. G: And the term that annoys you. S: Attuale. G: And the term you think he should have written about but didn’t. S: Possibile. G: Now read the slogan you offered as a sophisma. S: What is actual is not also possible. G: And your face already tells me you think I’m wrong to call it an implicature. S: I think you’re wrong to call it cancellable, sir. G: Let us slow down. First: taken literally, “not possible” means “impossible.” S: Yes. G: And that would contradict the modal axiom you are allowed to know before breakfast: actual implies possible. S: Unless “possible” is being used in some non-standard way. G: Exactly. Now we are in Spisani’s territory: not only logic but usage. “Attuale” in Gentile is not the newspaper sense of “current.” It is actus: the act in act, the thinking that is doing. S: But Aristotle’s actus and potentia is not Gentile’s attualismo, is it. G: Not identical, but genealogically tempting. Gentile borrows the aura of act to say: reality is not a finished product; it is the doing of thinking. S: So attuale is not “contemporary.” G: Exactly. “Attuale” as “present-day” is the usage no philosopher cares about unless he is forced to write a grant application. S: Then why does Spisani focus on attuale and not on possibile. G: Because he is writing inside the attualist lexicon: the polemical thrust is against treating reality as a stock of things. He wants reality as act. S: And “possibility” sounds like a warehouse. G: Exactly. Possibility sounds like a shelf of unrealised items. Attualismo wants to burn the warehouse and call the fire reality. S: That is rather poetic, sir. G: It is also diagnostic. Now: the sophisma. When someone says, “What is actual is not possible,” what might they mean. S: They might mean: what is actual is not merely possible. G: Exactly. That is the charitable repair. S: So the “not possible” is not negation of possibility but rejection of mere possibility. G: Yes. And the difference between those two is everything. The sentence as uttered is false; the sentence as intended can be true. S: Then it is not an implicature; it is a correction. G: Careful. It can be treated either way. One could say: the speaker said something false but meant something else. Or one could say: the speaker said something that invites a hearer to recover a rational point by assuming the speaker is not insane. S: That sounds like your cooperative principle smuggled into metaphysics. G: It is my cooperative principle smuggled into anywhere language is used. Now, cancellable. You objected. S: Yes. You said the implicature is cancellable because actual entails possible. But if the speaker meant “not merely possible,” that is not cancellable without destroying the point. G: Good. That shows you have distinguished two targets. There are two candidate “extras” here. S: Extras. G: One extra is: “and indeed it is possible.” But that is not an implicature; that is entailment, as you just said. S: Exactly. G: The other extra is: “not merely possible.” That is the pragmatic rescue reading, which behaves like an implicature in the sense that it is inferred from the oddity of the original. S: And is that cancellable. G: It is cancellable in the ordinary way: “What is actual is not possible—by which I mean impossible.” That cancels the rescue and produces a contradiction. S: But then the utterance becomes absurd. G: Yes. Cancellation can yield absurdity. That is allowed. A cancellable inference is cancellable even if cancelling it makes the speaker look foolish. S: So your point is not that the cancellation is sensible, but that the cancellation is linguistically possible. G: Exactly. Now: Spisani and Gentile. You said Spisani is trading on Gentile’s use of attuale. S: Yes. G: Then we must keep two senses of attuale in play. S: The philosophical one: act in act. G: And the newspaper one: contemporary. S: Which nobody cares about. G: Except the poor reader who buys the book thinking it’s about current events. S: Does Spisani exploit the ambiguity. G: He may not exploit it; he inherits it. But your Gricean move is to notice that ambiguity invites inferences in readers: some will supply the wrong “attuale.” S: And then they will think the book is about modern idealism, not idealism as act. G: Exactly. Now you asked for Aristotle’s square, or the square of opposition. S: Yes. I thought we might treat “possible” as “true in at least one possible world,” but I worried it was circular. G: It’s only circular if you define possible in terms of possible. “True in at least one possible world” can be taken as a model-theoretic explication, not a definition, but you must be careful with your audience. S: Which is you, sir. G: Unfortunately. Now: the square of opposition is about necessary, possible, impossible, contingent in a certain traditional arrangement. S: But we have “actual” in the mix. G: Yes. Actual is not one of Aristotle’s four corners in the same way. It is closer to a fact about the world that sits outside the modal operators. It’s the evaluation world, as the moderns say. S: So actual is like “true at the actual world.” G: Precisely. And then possible is “true at some accessible world.” Now you see the temptation: actual implies possible, because the actual world is among the accessible worlds, if we allow it. S: And that is where you catch my circularity. Because to say the actual world is accessible is already to build your modal frame. G: Exactly. So you must state your accessibility relation. Otherwise you are smuggling metaphysics into your semantics. S: Which is what Spisani might actually enjoy. G: Quite. Now, how do we connect this to Gentile. S: Gentile’s “actual” is not “true at the actual world.” It is “the act of thinking itself,” which is prior to worlds. G: Yes. For Gentile, worlds are abstractions inside the act. So modal talk becomes suspicious: possibility is a shadow of thought, not a realm of alternatives. S: So for Gentile, to call something “possible” may already be to treat it as a “pensato” rather than “pensante.” G: Excellent. And that is why “actual is not possible” could become, in attualist mouth, a polemical slogan meaning: do not treat the act as one item among alternatives. S: So the slogan is not a modal claim. It is a metaphysical scolding. G: Yes. And that is the key Grice point: the hearer must decide whether the speaker is asserting a modal proposition or performing a philosophical rebuke. S: And the difference is what is said versus what is meant. G: Exactly. The string “not possible” might, in that context, be meant as “not merely possible.” S: Then Spisani is pleased with the philosophical point because few understand attuale in Gentile’s sense. G: Yes. Now, the question of entailment versus implicature. S: You said earlier: actual entails possible. So any inference from “actual” to “possible” is not implicature. G: Correct. It is implication in the strict logical sense. But the interesting conversational phenomenon is different: when someone denies the possibility, you infer they meant “mere possibility.” S: So that is a pragmatic repair. G: Yes. And one can say: the denial generates an implicature that rescues the speaker from contradiction. S: Unless the speaker intended contradiction. G: Then he is either a mystic or a poor logician. Either way, one must not multiply senses beyond necessity. S: That sounds like your moral again. G: It is. Now, why is Spisani not writing about the possibile. S: Because his target is not the modal square but the nature/spirit opposition in attualism. G: Exactly. He wants to show how nature and spirit relate inside the act. If he wanders into modal logic, he risks looking like a man who has confused metaphysics with machinery. S: Yet you want machinery. G: I want machinery when it clarifies, and I want it kept in the cupboard when it does not. Now, let’s stage the sophisma more carefully. S: You mean rewrite it. G: Not rewrite. Diagnose. Suppose a philosopher says: “What is actual is not possible.” S: I, as hearer, think: he can’t mean impossible, because then actual would be impossible, which is nonsense. G: And you then infer: he must mean “not merely possible.” S: That is the implicature. G: That is the implicated rescue. S: But is it really an implicature, sir, or just disambiguation. G: It behaves like implicature because it is triggered by the assumption of rationality and cooperation. Disambiguation can be done by syntax; this is done by charity. S: So it is like repairing a malapropism. G: Precisely. Now, bring Spisani back. S: He is dwelling on “idealismo attuale.” The adjective “attuale” invites the untrained to think “contemporary idealism.” G: And the trained to think “idealism of the act.” S: And he wants the second. G: Yes. And he likely does not care to make the modal point explicit: that act implies possibility, because he would regard that as either trivial or a different plane. S: So your point is that he presupposes the entailment and does not articulate it. G: Yes. And you are annoyed because you want every presupposition made explicit. S: It would save me time, sir. G: Philosophy is not designed to save you time. It is designed to waste it in respectable ways. S: Then what is the punchline. G: The punchline is that Spisani wrote about the attuale because that was fashionable in the Italian sense, and you want him to have written about the possibile because that is fashionable in the Oxford sense. Each of you is, in your own way, only “possible.”Grice: Caro Spisani, ho letto con grande interesse la tua riflessione sull'attualismo italiano e il rapporto tra natura e spirito. Mi incuriosisce molto la tua idea di contestazione e la neutralizzazione dello spazio: pensi che la logica possa realmente superare i limiti della metafisica? Spisani: Grice, grazie per la domanda! La contestazione, secondo me, nasce proprio dal dubbio sul potere della logica di risolvere tutto: mi piace pensare che, attraverso i numeri relativi e la sintesi produttiva, si possa esplorare nuovi orizzonti, senza rinchiudersi nella rigidità metafisica. Il dialogo, anche con figure emblematiche come la piovra Clipso, serve a mettere in discussione ciò che crediamo assoluto. Grice: Affascinante, davvero! Trovo interessante la tua relazione divisoria con il numero “M,” e la direzione inversa dell’ “ℵ”. Mi chiedo: ritieni che la logica auto-genetica possa offrire un nuovo modo di intendere l’esperienza, magari come un percorso dialogico e non solo teorico? Spisani: Esattamente, Grice! Ogni esperienza è contestazione e dialogo; la logica auto-genetica non è solo un modello matematico, ma un modo di vivere la realtà in modo dinamico. Penso che la filosofia debba sempre mettere in discussione le proprie regole e segni, per aprirsi a nuove possibilità. In fondo, la vera ricchezza sta nel confronto e nella capacità di reinventarsi: proprio come stiamo facendo ora, conversando! Spisani, Franco (1962). Natura e spirito nell’idealismo attuale, Milano, Fabbri.

Mummio Spurio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale delle lettere da Corinto. A comparison between Grice and Spurio Mummio brings into focus two historically distant but conceptually resonant ways of understanding reason as it governs communicative practice. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as a cooperative rational enterprise: speakers are accountable for what they say, hearers are entitled to draw inferences, and meaning emerges through shared expectations articulated by conversational maxims and calculable implicatures. Rationality here is regulative and stabilizing, oriented toward mutual understanding even when disagreement or irony arises. Spurio Mummio’s poetic and philosophical epistles from Corinth, by contrast, exemplify an earlier, Stoic‑inflected mode of conversational reason in which writing substitutes for face‑to‑face exchange, and rationality operates through ethical stance, restraint, and wit rather than explicit coordination. His letters, shaped by the austere ethos of the Porch and addressed to friends within the Scipionic circle, rely heavily on what is left unsaid, presupposed, or humorously displaced; they presuppose a community capable of reconstructing intention from tone, allusion, and shared moral background. Where Grice theorizes the norms that make such reconstruction rationally intelligible, Mummio practices those norms without theorizing them, using the epistolary form to test how far meaning can travel when voice, immediacy, and corrective feedback are absent. The comparison thus shows Grice as offering an explicit pragmatics of conversational reason, while Mummio provides a paradigmatic ancient instance of that reason at work under the constraints of distance, genre, and Stoic discipline. Fratello di Lucio Mummio, vincitore di Corinto, partecipa con SCIPIONE  Emiliano e con Lucio Metello CALVO  a un’ambasciata politica in Oriente e così puo stringere più stretti rapporti con Panezio di Rodi. Scrive lettere in versi e orazioni. CICERONE lo pone tra i IV interlocutori del "De republica." Oratore. I suoi discorsi hanno, per la loro aridità, impronta del Portico. Coltiva gli studi giuridici. A Roman soldier and writer. A legatus of his brother, and a close friend of SCIPIONE EMILIANO. This friendship garners his entrance into the Scipionic Circle. Politically, he is an aristocrat. He writes satirical and ethical epistles, describing his experiences in Corinto in humorous verse. According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, these letters, are the first examples of a distinct class of Roman poetry, the poetic epistle. "Mummii". Mek.niif. hu. Mummius M, Mortgage, ed. Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities. Perseus tufts, Chisholm, ed.  "Mummius, Lucius" . Encyclopædia Britannica. Cambridge. Stub icon This article about an Ancient Roman writer. Categories: Ancient Roman writersm Romans, writers Mummii Ancient Roman people stubs European writer stubs When we turn to Rome we find that letter writing becomes a Roman literary art under Greek influence and is speedily nationalised as is the dialogue. We know that the epistolary form is used by S., who appears in CICERONE’s de republica as an intimate friend of SCIPIONE the younger. He receives a education  in the Porch, and accompanied his more famous brother to Corinto as a legatus. From Corinto he sends a number of poetic epistles to his friends. These do not receive general publicity, but are preserved in the archives of the family where they are read by CICERONE, who praises their wit. Keyword: philosophical epistle. Spurio Mummio. Grice e Mummio: il portico romano – lettera da Corinto – Roma antica -- Roma – filosofia italiana.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Spurī Mummi. Audīvī tē ex Corinthō epistulās versibus mittere—tam lepidas ut Cicero ipsās in archivīs quasi vinum vetus servet. SPVRIVS: Salvē, Grice. Ita facio: nam quod in contiōne aridum est, in epistulā saepe fluit. Sed quid tu, qui de ratione conversandi tam subtiliter iudicās, de litterīs sentīs? GRICEVS: Litterae… pulchrae sunt, fateor: sed saepe mihi videntur quasi una littera (velut punctum aut apex) totum saporem colloquiī frangat; quod inter amīcōs in ipsā voce suaviter relinquerēs, in chartā nimis fixum fit—et, dum scribimus, minus relinquimus quod amīcus ex ipsā benevolentia colligat. SPVRIVS: Implicatūram secundī gradūs efficācissimam, cārissime Grice! Nam intellegō: epistula, dum “explicat,” saepe illud quod inter duo pectora sponte nascitur interficit. Ego tamen meminī Corinthiōs etiam in porticibus pictis (Graecē Στοὰ Ποικίλη) multa ostendere, pauca sentire: id genus pictūrae Damasippō meō prorsus super caput fuit—ille enim nihil nisi de togā suā novā cogitābat, utrum satis virīlis foret! Spurio, Mummio (a. u. c. DCVIII). Dicta. Roma.

Stasea (Napoli, Campania) la ragione conversazionale a Roma, o della virtù. A comparison between Grice and Stasea brings out two complementary but differently articulated conceptions of how reason governs meaning in human interaction. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning analyzes communication as a cooperative, inferential practice in which speakers rely on shared rational expectations to convey more than they explicitly say; virtue, in this framework, appears implicitly as intellectual honesty, interpretive charity, and responsiveness to reasons that justify conversational moves. Stasea, by contrast, stages the problem of reason at Rome through the ethical vocabulary of the Lyceum, focusing on virtue understood not as a socially coded role (the Roman vir) but as a stable disposition of character (andreia) embedded in moral life. His resistance to the Stoic claim that virtue alone suffices for happiness parallels Grice’s resistance to overly reductive accounts of meaning: both insist that normative structures—ethical in Stasea, pragmatic in Grice—cannot be collapsed into single austere principles without loss. Where Grice makes explicit the rational norms that license implicature and interpretation across linguistic exchanges, Stasea practices a form of philosophical conversational reason that attends to how words like virtus shift their force in a new civic and cultural context, generating predictable misunderstandings and figurative slippages. In this sense, Stasea exemplifies a historically early awareness of what Grice later theorizes: that meaning is governed not just by lexical content, but by rational habits, expectations, and background forms of life that shape what is reasonably inferred from what is said. The first lizio to take up residence at Rome. He defends the position that virtue (andreia) is not sufficient for happiness – a position on which some Lizians were prepared to compromise, in order to achieve a conciliation with the ethics of the Portico.  Keywords: Lizio.   GRICEVS: Salvē, Stasea! Rumor est tē prīmum Lȳceum Rōmae incolere. Dīc mihi: quōmodo virtūs in urbe nostrā tractātur? STASEA: Salvē, Grice! Ego quidem virtūtem (ἀνδρείαν) tuērī soleō; sed fateor: nōn ipsa sōla ad fēlīcitātem satis est. Sunt quī ex Lȳceō ad quandam cum Porticū compositiōnem inclinent—modo pāx philosophica maneat. GRICEVS: Bene. (Interim, dum per Forum eō, saepe audio quendam dīcere virum ubi Graecus dīceret ἀνήρ—ac nescio quōmodo syllaba illa una, vir, omnia iam absolvere vidētur.) Sed pergē: quid Rōmānī ex virtūte intellegunt? STASEA: Inplicaturam perspicācissimam, Grice! Nam intellexī quid subesset: Rōmānī, cum audīunt ἀνδρείαν, statim ad virum (quasi ad togām et munus) currunt; ego autem ad mōrem atque habitum animī spectābam. Itaque “virtūs” dīcō—nē verba mea per Forum volitent, ipsō sensū relicto. Stasea (a. u. c. DC). Dicta. Roma

Statilio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale a Roma -- ogni uomo  è  stolto o pazzo. A comparison between Grice and Statilio highlights two sharply contrasting but structurally related ways in which reason governs what is said, implied, and understood. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as a cooperative rational practice: even blunt or pessimistic utterances presuppose shared norms of interpretation, such that hearers are entitled to ask how disjunctions, negations, or exaggerations are meant to be taken, and to determine whether implications are exclusive, inclusive, literal, or satirical. Statilio’s famous dictum that all men are fools or mad operates at the opposite extreme of explicit normativity, using radical brevity and satirical compression as a philosophical stance. Yet precisely because of this extremity, his remark relies entirely on implicature: the force of “or” does not lie in its truth‑functional structure, but in the audience’s rational capacity to infer whether it is meant exclusively, inclusively, or rhetorically, and to grasp the satirical intention behind the aphorism. Where Grice makes such mechanisms explicit—analyzing how ordinary speakers exploit logical particles to generate meaning beyond what is said—Statilio exploits them without analysis, turning conversational ambiguity into a weapon of moral critique. Both assume that rational hearers will reconstruct intention rather than cling to literal semantics; the difference is that Grice aims to stabilize and explain this inferential practice, while Statilio deliberately destabilizes it, trusting that conversational reason will still do the work of interpretation even when meaning is thrust at the edge of nihilism and farce. Amico di CATONE. L’orto. Satura e farsa filologica. Penna. Secondo un'ipotesi allettante, con S., amico di CATONE e morto a Filippi con BRUTO. In questo contesto forse non è del tutto inutile notare che una filosofia è presente. S. being sollicited by BRUTO to make one of that noble band, who struck the god-like stroke for the liberty of Rome, refuses to accompany them, saying, that: all men are fools, or mad, and do not deserve that a wise man should trouble his head about them. Keywords: ‘All men are fools, or mad’ -- Giardino, horti epicuri – hortus epicuri. Garden. Friend of Catone Minore and Marco Bruto and a staunch opponent of Giulio Cesare.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Statiliō. Audio tē apud hortōs Catōnis illud iactāre: omnis homo stultus aut furiosus est. Nimis breve—ideo periculosum. STATILIO: Salvē, Grice. Brevitas sapit. Sed quid in eō tibi periculosum vidētur? GRICEVS: Hoc tantum rogāre ausim: cum dīcis stultus aut furiosus, “aut” tuum estne ita positum ut alterum excludat, an ut interdum (praesertim in hominibus) uterque simul admittatur—quasi “aut” sit etiam? STATILIO: Implicaturam commodissimam, Grice! Nam Brutus “aut” meum audīvit quasi exclusivum: “elige, stulte an furiose.” Ego vero sciebam (ne dicam) multōs in urbe nostrā ambō esse: ita “aut” saepe apud nos latet inclusive, et satira mea, uno vocabulo, geminam miseriam capit. Statilio (a. u. c. DCCXII). Dicta. Roma.

Paolo Godi Stefani (Pergola, Pesaro e Urbino, Marche): la ragione conversazionale del “senso composto” – semantica filosofica. A comparison between Grice and Paolo Godi Stefani reveals a deep structural affinity between medieval semantic theory and modern pragmatics, despite their very different vocabularies and aims. Stefani’s sustained analysis of sensus simplex, compositus, divisus, and depositus belongs to a tradition in which meaning is treated as something systematically constructed by the intellect through grammatical, logical, and dialectical operations; sense is not merely given but articulated through formal relations such as supposition, composition, and division. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning reappears at a different level of abstraction but with a comparable ambition: to show how what is meant emerges from structured rational operations that go beyond surface expressions. Where Stefani uses diagrams and figures to model how propositional sense is built and decomposed within philosophical grammar, Grice uses inferential principles—cooperation, rational expectation, and implicature—to explain how speakers construct complex meanings from simpler utterances in conversation. Both reject the idea that meaning resides wholly in isolated words or sentences; for Stefani, sense depends on logical articulation within a proposition, while for Grice it depends on the rational reconstruction of intentions within a communicative exchange. The difference lies in orientation rather than substance: Stefani formalizes sense within a scholastic semantic architecture, whereas Grice relocates that same constructive rationality into the dynamics of everyday speech. In this way, Grice’s conversational pragmatics can be seen as a modern, dialogical re‑deployment of the very concerns that animated Stefani’s medieval semantics of the sensus compositus. Grice: “I may well say that my idea of a propositional complex owes much to Stefani’s obsession with ‘sensus’ simplex or ‘divisus, and ‘sensus compositum’ –“ “The opposite of ‘com-posito’ is de-posito, though!” Grice: “I like his diagrammes; The Boedlian has loads of his mss!” Grice: “He has a figure for the ‘figura quadrata,’ Grice: “He has a figure for ‘suppositio.’” È il più famoso esponente di una famiglia marchigiana di insegnanti – Lepori -- e nacque a Pergola, nelle Marche.  Il cognome è incerto. Secondo Segarizzi il riferimento al fratello Alvise quale figlio di Antonio de Stefani da la Pergola, in un documento, ne indicherebbe l’appartenenza alla famiglia Stefani, ma il raffronto con altri documenti induce invece a credere che «de Stefani» si riferisca al nome del nonno -- Nardi. La scarsezza di notizie biografiche su S., molto ammirato, da origine anche all’ipotesi che gli attribuiva il cognome di un altro Paolo dalla Pergola, il Godi -- Segarizzi. Errata risulta quindi la congettura di Cicogna, che attribuisce a Godi l’influenza di S. sul vetraio muranese Angelo Barovier, suo discepolo, a proposito della tecnica di coloritura del vetro -- Mariacher.  Avviato forse alla carriera ecclesiastica nella nativa Pergola, si trasferì ben presto a Venezia, dove se non il padre Antonio, certamente il nonno Stefano, medico e figlio di maestro Giovanni – Piana --, dov avere dimorato stabilmente, insieme agli altri due figli -- Luchino, «rector scholarum» a S. Giovanni Nuovo, e Pietro, che pure ci è noto come «magister». Con lo stesso titolo di «magister» è ricordato anche il fratello di Paolo, Alvise, che insegn in diverse scuole veneziane -- Lepori.  S. assunse l’insegnamento di filosofia alla Scuola di Rialto e ne tenne ininterrottamente la cattedra.  senso semplice, senso composito, senso deposito, senso diviso, dialetttica, grammatica filosofica, semantica filosofica, loquenza. G: S. You have brought Pergola into Oxford again. S: You asked for it, sir. Besides, it keeps you humble. G: Nothing keeps me humble. Recite the Gellius line. S: Hor! the one you like. G: The one that does not translate itself by repeating the same English word. S: Hor? sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Better: give it with its frame. S: Horum versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Good. Now. What is he doing with sensus. S: He is not talking about eyesight. G: Thank you. He is saying: this is what these verses come to, and here is how they are put together. Sensus and ordo. S: Which is already a hint to Pergola, sir. Ordo becomes “scope,” as the moderns would say. G: Yes. And Pergola says sensus compositus, sensus divisus. S: Which I hate. G: You hate it because it sounds like sense-perception with a scholastic moustache. S: It sounds like someone took a word that meant “feeling” and forced it to do logic. G: Latin is not so squeamish. Now. Give me your protest in one sentence. S: Why didn’t Stefani just say “scope indicating device” and be done with it. G: Because he lived before your devices existed, and because he is writing for people who thought sensus was the dignified way to speak about “what the utterance amounts to.” S: But why sensus at all, sir, if you say what matters is what you mean, not what words mean. G: Good. Now we are at the lesson. Pergola’s sensus is not the word’s meaning floating free. It is the reading a competent interpreter assigns to an utterance when deciding what the speaker could reasonably be taken to be saying. S: That is you smuggling “speaker” into Pergola. G: I am not smuggling; I am expanding. Medieval logicians often treat “sensus” as “what is to be understood.” They sometimes talk as if the proposition has it. But the practical work is: which construal is the right construal for what the author is doing. S: Like Gellius: horum versuum sensus, I think, is. G: Exactly. He is performing an author-centred reconstruction. He is not worshipping the string. Now, your other dislike: compositus and divisus. S: It sounds like carpentry. G: It is logical carpentry. One can build a proposition so that the operator governs the whole, or so that it governs the term-by-term distribution. Two readings, one utterance. S: And he calls those readings sensus. G: Yes. Which is why I like your Gellius quote. It gives you a pre-scholastic, non-technical way to hear sensus as “intended import.” S: Then you want me to accept that sensus compositus is shorthand for “the reading on which the operator has wide scope.” G: Precisely. S: And sensus divisus is the other scope. G: The reading on which the operator is distributed over the subject or term, yes. S: But why not just call them readings. G: Because “reading” is your English convenience. Pergola’s Latin convenience is sensus. He is already in the business of interpretation. S: Yet you keep telling me your business is what the utterer means. G: And I keep telling you that utterer’s meaning requires public criteria for recovery. Pergola is supplying a formal method for deciding which propositional content is at stake when grammar underdetermines scope. S: So his “sensus” is a tool for recovering what the utterer meant at the level of logical form. G: Yes. Not at the level of irony or implicature, but at the level of “what proposition are we even evaluating.” S: Then he is upstream of you. G: Upstream in one respect. He is handling structural ambiguity. I handle it too, but I also want to explain how, after you settle the structure, you still routinely mean more than the settled structure explicitly states. S: And you warn against multiplying senses. G: I warn against multiplying lexical senses. Pergola is not multiplying lexemes. He is distinguishing two construals of one utterance under two scope assignments. S: So he is not guilty of polysemy. G: He is guilty only of terminology. S: Then why do you let him keep the term sensus. G: Because it tells you something about the tradition’s self-understanding. They thought of scope ambiguity as a kind of “sense-ambiguity” in the discourse sense of sensus, not in the eyeball sense. S: So we should not translate sensus by “sense.” G: Exactly. We should translate it, in metalanguage, as “import” or “interpretation” or “what it comes to.” S: Horum versuum sensus atque ordo sic, opinor, est. G: Yes. There the ordo already hints that the “what it comes to” depends on arrangement. That is Pergola’s whole obsession: composition and division change what the proposition comes to. S: And his dates, sir. G: Early fifteenth century. Call it around 1420 in our fiction, because you like round numbers. S: And he’s in Venice. G: In Venice, teaching at Rialto, drawing his diagrams, writing as if the world could be tamed by figures. S: And you like his diagrams. G: I like anything that forces an interpreter to be explicit about what they are taking the speaker to be doing. That is the moral common ground between us. S: But then you suddenly become the philosopher of perception. G: Because “sensus” keeps wanting to slide back into perception. And that is the punchline: the same Latin word that names bodily sensation also names “the point of the passage.” S: And that bothers you. G: It should bother you. It is a reminder that understanding is not disembodied. You hear a sentence. You see a line. You recover its import. The body is the channel, the mind is the organiser. S: So Pergola’s sensus has a ghost of sentio in it. G: Perhaps. But in logic it is domesticated: sensus is what you take the utterance to come to, once you have sorted the structure. S: And you, sir, want what I take you to mean. G: Exactly. Now, let us stage the contrast. S: You will ask me: is sensus compositus the “sentence meaning.” G: And you will answer no. It is a candidate reading of the utterance, a candidate propositional content. S: And then you will ask: where is the utterer. G: And you will answer: the utterer is in the choice of one reading over the other, and in the context that makes one reading reasonable and the other perverse. S: And then you will add implicature. G: And you will groan. S: I will, sir. G: Because you want logic to stop after it has cleaned the surface. S: I want it to stop before it begins calling itself sensus. G: Too late. Latin has done that already. S: Then the Gellius quote is our alibi. It shows a respectable author using sensus as “what this comes to.” G: Exactly. And because he pairs it with ordo, he also shows that the “what it comes to” is tied to arrangement, not to naked words. S: So we can rescue Pergola from the charge of confusing perception with scope. G: Yes. And we can rescue you from the charge of thinking “scope” is a modern invention. S: And the conclusion. G: The conclusion is simple. Pergola’s sensus compositus/divisus is a discipline of construing an utterance so that its propositional import is determinate. My distinction between utterer’s meaning and sentence meaning is a discipline of not mistaking the public vehicle for the private act. The two disciplines meet at one point: both insist that interpretation is not automatic, but a rational reconstruction constrained by publicly shareable norms. S: And your punchline, sir. G: My punchline is that if Pergola had written “scope indicating device,” nobody in Venice would have understood him, and if I write “sensus,” nobody in Oxford will forgive me.Grice: Caro Stefani, ogni volta che mi immergo nei tuoi diagrammi, mi sento come se stessi visitando la mostra delle "figure quadrate" a Oxford! Ma dimmi, il “senso composto” si mangia con forchetta o cucchiaio? Perché a Vadum Boum, il mio tutee Strawson sarebbe capace di decomporlo pure in una zuppa!  Stefani: Ah, Grice, se Strawson ha davvero scomposto il “senso composto”, allora spero almeno che abbia lasciato qualche briciola di “suppositio” per il dessert! Ma tu, con la tua implicatura raffinata, mi insegni che anche la semantica filosofica può essere digerita con gusto.  Grice: Beh, Stefani, tra un “sensus simplex” e un “compositum”, ho dovuto più di una volta decomporre tutto per i barbari di Vadum Boum… Strawson in primis! E ogni volta mi chiedo: sarà “de-posito” o solo una pausa per prendere fiato? In fondo, il vero senso è sempre quello che si nasconde tra le righe… e tra le risate!  Stefani: Decomporre! Implicatura più bella non c’è, Grice! Se anche la grammatica filosofica si divide, almeno ci resta la loquenza per ricomporre tutto… magari davanti a una tavola marchigiana. E ricordati: ogni senso, anche diviso, trova la sua unità quando si conversa con un amico! Stefani, Paolo Godi (1420). De sensu composito et diviso. Venezia.

Luigi Stefanini (Treviso, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale dell’inter-personalismo contro l’idealismo filosofico. A comparison between Grice and Luigi Stefanini brings into focus two different but intersecting ways of grounding meaning in reason while resisting solipsistic or overly abstract accounts of thought. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as an inherently normative, interpersonal enterprise: meaning arises not from isolated mental contents but from rational expectations shared between speakers engaged in a cooperative practice, where intentions are inferred and adjusted in light of the other. Stefanini’s inter‑personalismo, developed in explicit opposition to both idealism and the dominant philosophies of the Fascist period, likewise rejects the self‑enclosed subject, insisting that being itself is personal and that whatever is not immediately personal functions as a medium of manifestation and communication between persons. Where Grice analyzes, in a technical and often minimalist way, the conversational mechanisms that allow one person to mean something to another—implicature, reciprocity of reason, mutual recognition—Stefanini supplies a metaphysical and ethical backdrop in which interpersonal relation is ontologically primary. Grice is wary of Italian personalism insofar as it risks collapsing interpersonal rationality into an exaltation of the person as a substantive entity, preferring instead an account of interpersonalism without personalist metaphysics, grounded in public norms of reasoning. Yet Stefanini’s insistence that truth, value, and action unfold only within the io–tu relation anticipates Grice’s conviction that meaning cannot be reduced to inner representation or abstract ideal structures. The contrast is thus one of level and emphasis: Stefanini frames conversational reason within a philosophy of being‑as‑personal and other‑oriented, while Grice offers a formal, pragmatically neutral account of how rational agents, as agents among others, actually succeed in meaning things to one another through conversation. – filosofia fascista – veintennio fascista –Grice: “La ragione conversazionale dell’inter-personalismo contro l’idealismo filosofico – filosofia fascista – veintennio fascista. Italians are obsessed with personalismo; I am with interpersonalismo!” Keywords: inter-personalismo, io e l’altro, l’altro da me, altro da se, alterita, other-love, self-love. “L’essere è personale.” “Tutto ciò che non è personale nell’essere ri-entra nella produttività della persona, come mezzo di manifestazione della persona e di *comunicazione* o conversazione *tra* due persone,” “La mia prospettiva filosofica. Nacque secondo-genito di quattro fratelli. Il padre Giovanni gestiva una tintoria, la madre, Lucia De Mori, è diplomata maestra ma si dedica interamente alla famiglia.  S’impegna nell’associazionismo cattolico: fonda il circolo San Liberale, nucleo del movimento cattolico trevigiano dopo lo scioglimento dell’Opera dei congressi. È nominato presidente della federazione diocesana e fonda il mensile Il foglio per promuovere la cultura religiosa e trattare temi politico-sociali, con particolare attenzione al nascente sindacalismo cattolico. La pubblicazione è sospesa, quando S., in attrito con il vescovo di Treviso Longhin, si dimise da presidente della federazione. Conseguita la maturità presso il liceo classico Canova -- ove ha come docente di filosofia Rotta, futuro professore all’Università cattolica di Milano --, si iscrive al corso di laurea in filosofia a Padova, partecipando alle iniziative del circolo universitario cattolico Zanella. Si laurea con una tesi sull’Action di Blondel, avendo come relatore Aliotta, che aveva appena iniziato il suo breve periodo padovano, e inizia a insegnare. Richiamato alle armi, è ferito da una scheggia di granata sul Sass de Stria e conclude il servizio militare con il grado di capitano. inter-personalismo, io e l’altro, l’altro da me, altro da se, alterita, other-love, self-love. Grice: Stefanini, ti confesso che il Sass de Stria mi ricorda i miei giorni contro il Hun e compagnia bella! Se solo avessero discusso di filosofia anziché lanciare granate, avremmo potuto fondare il circolo “Personalisti del fronte”. Grice: D’altronde, la mia “Personal identity” (come dicono gli inglesi) mi perseguita; però, se devo seguire il tuo esempio, caro Luigi, forse dovrei correggere e parlare di “Identità interpersonali”, all’italiana! Stefanini: Implicatura interpersonale se mai ce n’è una, Grice! Qui da Treviso è tutta una questione di io, tu e l’altro da sé… perfino le tintorie dialogano tra loro, altro che idealismo solitario! Stefanini: Se l’essere è personale, allora la vera conversazione filosofica è quella che passa il testimone da una persona all’altra: altro che “personal identity”, qui si lavora in squadra. Vieni a Treviso, ti mostro come si conversa tra filosofi… e tra tintori! Stefanini, Luigi (1914). L’azione: saggio critico sulla filosofia di M. Blondel.sotto Aliotta. Padova.

Luigi Stefanoni (Milano, Lombardia): Marconimania -- implicatura e ragione: there St. John mingles with his friendly bowl, the feast of reason, an the life of soul -- A comparison between Grice and Luigi Stefanoni shows a convergence on reason as the organizing principle of meaning, even though they operate in different philosophical registers and political contexts. Stefanoni’s La scienza della ragione treats language, concepts, and even dictionary entries as answerable to rational scrutiny, rejecting lexical authority when it obscures intellectual clarity; his early rationalism, shaped by Mazzini and later radicalized through secular and anti‑religious currents in post‑Unification Milan, frames reason as a public, educative force circulating through communication and culture. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning can be read as a restrained but technically precise heir to this impulse: where Stefanoni attacks dictionaries in the name of reason, Grice famously “gives a hoot” about them when they misrepresent how meaning actually works in use. Both locate rationality not in static definitions but in active practices—Stefanoni in philosophical lexicography and civic discourse, Grice in conversational exchange governed by intentions, categories, and ends. Stefanoni’s enthusiasm for modern media and communication—what one might anachronistically call a Marconimania of reason—anticipates Grice’s view that meaning is something transmitted, inferred, and negotiated rather than simply encoded. The key difference is methodological: Stefanoni advances a programmatic rationalism aimed at reforming culture and language from without, while Grice builds a micro‑theory of interpersonal reasoning from within ordinary conversation. Yet in both, reason is not solitary or introspective but social, animated by exchange, and most fully realized in the shared “feast of reason” that conversation makes possible. -- filosofia italiana – P. G. R. I. C. E. – philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions, categories, ends. Grice: “I love S.. I regard him as the frist Italian philosophical lexicographer! Marsoli quotes Ranzoli in passing. And Ranzoli disparages S.. But I prefer Stefanoni to Ranzoli. Ranzoli tends to lean towards the pompous, whereas only in S. you would find things like: ‘this word should be extracted from all dictionaries!”  Nasce da Alessandro e da Maria Colombo. È rapito fin dalla fede di MAZZINI  e parte volontario al seguito di GARIBALDI  nella campagna. Subito dopo l’unificazione comincia a collaborare con il periodico repubblicano L’Unità italiana, ma ben presto i rapporti con MAZZINI  si complicano a causa dell’attrazione di S. per le correnti razionaliste e anti-religiose che in quegli anni cominciano a lambire le file dell’area democratica. Al pensiero del filosofo razionalista Franchi fa infatti riferimento la opera importante di S., intitolata La scienza della ragione e pubblicata con un certo clamore a Milano. L’autore vi fa aperta professione di a-teismo, delineando i contorni di una pur vaga e semplicistica filosofia materialistica.  Se però S. riconosce in Franchi il proprio maestro in filosofia, in politica il punto di riferimento rimane Mazzini, come risultava evidente dal saggio Mazzini. Note storiche -- Milano. Un segno di continuità nel solco di MAZZINI  è anche Le due repubbliche e il due dicembre -- Milano --, nonché l’attenzione verso la questione polacca, testimoniata dall’opuscolo su Nullo, pubblicato a pochi mesi di distanza dall’uccisione del patriota democratico per mano dei russi -- Nullo martire in Polonia. Notizie storiche, Milano.  Il dissidio con Mazzini si aggrava quando S. si impegna in prima persona nella fondazione a Milano di una Società di liberi pensatori. L’iniziativa, tenacemente avversata dal maestro, provoca la rottura fra i due. Grice’s hoot and the dictionary.  Grice: Stefanoni, permettimi di inaugurare la nostra conversazione con un verso che adoro: “There St. John mingles with his friendly bowl, the feast of reason, and the flow of soul.” Una citazione che non manca mai di portare un sorriso nei circoli filosofici… e magari qualche brindisi! Grice: Ma, sai, in fondo il vero “friendly bowl” non sarà mica la nostra implicatura filosofica? Forse il festino della ragione è proprio quando ci scambiamo idee tra un bicchiere e l’altro, lasciando che la conversazione fluisca più libera della logica formale. Stefanoni: Caro Grice, se il “friendly bowl” è davvero la nostra implicatura, allora la filosofia italiana dovrebbe servire piatti e ragioni in porzioni doppie! E chissà, forse persino Mazzini avrebbe voluto unirsi alla tavolata. Stefanoni: Bellissima implicatura, Grice! Credo che nel tuo “feast of reason” ci sia più anima che in tutti i dizionari filosofici messi insieme… e se qualcuno osa estrarre qualche parola, che almeno sia per aggiungere un po’ di sapore alla conversazione! Stefanoni, Luigi (1859). Gli spagnoli in Italia.

Federico Stella (Sernaglia, Treviso, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale dell’ iustum/iussum, o la causa dell’anormale come l’ implicatura d’Honorè. A comparison between Grice and Federico Stella brings out a shared commitment to reason as the governing principle of meaning and responsibility, though articulated at different levels of analysis. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning locates rationality in the inferential practices of ordinary conversation, where implicature arises from the recognition of speakers’ intentions under shared norms of cooperation and alethic reason, as elaborated in Aspects of Reason. Stella, trained in Treviso and Milan and shaped by legal philosophy under Crespi, approaches a closely related problem from the side of jurisprudence: how we rationally connect descriptions of human action to judgments of responsibility. In his work on causal explanation and the structure of criminal liability, Stella insists that responsibility can be ascribed only where conduct is subsumed under a covering law capable of explaining the causal nexus between action and outcome, thus respecting the rule of “beyond reasonable doubt.” Where Grice analyzes the implicatures involved in saying that someone acted intentionally, responsibly, or negligently, Stella examines the juridical counterpart of those implicatures, showing how descriptions of action implicitly commit us to judgments about causation, fault, and normativity. The parallel with H. L. A. Hart and Honoré is evident in both: Hart’s analysis of responsibility and Honoré’s interest in the “cause of the abnormal” find in Grice an account of the conversational logic that underwrites such descriptions, and in Stella a doctrinal reconstruction of how those same rational commitments become codified in law. In this sense, Stella can be seen as extending Gricean conversational rationality into the institutional domain of law, where the distinction between iustum and iussum is no longer merely conversationally implicated but juridically enforced, while remaining grounded in the same ideal of reason as the measure of human action. Grice: “What is it with Italian philosoophers that they are all into what at Oxford we would call jurisprudence? It seems like all Italian philosophers are like Italian versions of H. L. A. Hart!”. Keywords: Grice, implicature della descrizione d’azione umana, H. L. A. Hart, Honoré, J. L. Austin, responsibity, aspets of reason, alethic reason. Studia a Treviso e Milano, sotto CRESPI. Insegna a Catania e Milano. I suoi saggi si diregeno su alcune tipologie di reati, successivamente sugl’elementi strutturali del reato.  Il suo contributo filosofico più noto, presso gl’operatori del diritto penale e la comunità accademica, è “La spiegazione causale dell’azione umana” (Milano), in cui  ricostruisce il problema del nesso di causalità prospettando il criterio della sussunzione sotto una *legge* come strumento per la soluzione di casi dubbi. Solo mediante una legge di copertura, atta a spiegare il rapport causale fra la condotta dell’attore ed il effetto e possibile formulare un giudizio sulla responsabilità dell’attore. Ad es., solo dopo aver dimostrato, sulla base di una legge, che l'ingestione di un determinato farmaco determina casualmente malformazioni del feto, e possibile imputare alla ditta produttrice il reato di lesioni gravissime, colpose o dolose. In difetto di questa spiegazione causale non puo formularsi alcuna responsabilità a regola di giudizio dell'"oltre ogni ragionevole dubbio" trovasse applicazione anche in un processo. Il principio venne accolto in tema di nesso causale dalla corte suprema di cassazione, anche a sezioni unite. Oggi è norma codicistica. Dirige riviste giuridiche di diritto penale ed è fra i curatori di raccolte normative di largo successo presso la comunità forense. implicature della descrizione d’azione umana, H. L. A. Hart, Honoré, J. L. Austin, responsibity, aspets of reason, alethic reason.  Grice: Caro Stella, ogni volta che passo per Sernaglia mi chiedo: quanti filosofi veneti ci vogliono per distinguere tra “iustum” e “iussum”? O forse, qui da voi, basta un po’ di buona conversazione per risolvere tutto con eleganza giuridica! Stella: Ah, Grice, qui a Sernaglia il giusto e il comandato si inseguono come il cane e la sua ombra, ma ti confido che, a differenza dei tuoi studenti a Vadum Boum, noi il latino lo pronunciamo con tutte le consonanti… almeno, quasi sempre. Grice: Beh, Stella, ricordo che il mio allievo Strawson, nei corridoi del Vadum Boum, aveva la curiosa abitudine di far sparire la “t” in “IVSTVM”, così che il nostro “giusto” diventava subito “comandato”, senza nemmeno una geminazione di troppo. Ma su queste sottigliezze, meglio tacere: sai, non vorrei sollevare un caso davanti alla Cassazione latina… Stella: Erudita implicatura, Grice! Noi che amiamo la buona educazione classica teniamo sempre lo sguardo fisso verso Bononia, mentre i barbari non saprebbero neppure dove puntare l’ago della bussola… un po’ come gli occhi dei buoi che attraversano il tuo guado, Grice! Stella, Federico (1958). Tesi. Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano.

Jacopo Stellini (Cividale del Friuli, Udine, Friuli, Friuli-Venezia Giulia): la ragione conversazionale dell’ortu morum – A comparison between Grice and Jacopo Stellini brings into focus two historically distant but structurally allied conceptions of reason as something enacted in practice rather than merely posited in theory. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats rationality as immanent in ordinary interaction, where meanings, implicatures, and normative commitments arise through cooperative exchanges guided by shared expectations of relevance, truthfulness, and intelligibility. Stellini, writing in the eighteenth century, approaches reason from the moral–historical side, yet his De ortu et progressu morum likewise understands moral life as something cultivated, transmitted, and stabilized through social practices, education, and refined conversation. For Stellini, mores are not abstract rules imposed from above but habits that grow, like an ortus morum, through rhetoric, pedagogy, and exemplarity; moral reason is inseparable from the conversational and institutional contexts in which virtues are formed and sustained. In this sense, Stellini anticipates a Gricean insight: that much of what matters normatively is conveyed not by explicit principles but by what is tacitly shown, modeled, and implied in discourse and conduct. Where Grice analyzes how speakers mean more than they say through implicature, Stellini traces how societies become more or less moral through the gradual, conversational transmission of opinions and practices pertaining to conduct. The difference lies in level and aim rather than structure: Grice offers a micro‑theory of rational communication, while Stellini provides a moral genealogy of rational cultivation; yet both converge on the idea that reason is not merely possessed but exercised, and that its primary habitat is the shared life of conversation. Nasce da Mattia Rodaro, e da Adriana Piccini. Il cognome S., usato spesso anche dal padre, deriva dal nome della nonna Stella Rotar. Della famiglia non si sa molto. Mattia è sarto come la moglie. S. ha due sorelle: Maddalena, sposa di Muschione -- la cui figlia, Adriana, commissiona con il marito Peretti un ritratto del filosofo -- e Stella. Studia presso i padri somaschi di Cividale con il maestro di retorica Leonarducci; vestì l’abito religioso ed entra a Venezia nella congregazione con i voti solenni. Oltre a teologia con Visconti, studia ebraico -- con Birone -- , greco – con Patrussa --, latino e matematica nel seminario patriarcale di Venezia. Dall’anno dell’ordinazione sacerdotale, è maestro di retorica ai chierici della Casa della Salute a Venezia ed insegna presso l’Accademia dei nobili alla Giudecca; Emo, senatore e mecenate, lo prende allora come consigliere ed educatore dei figli Pietro, Alvise e Angelo.  A seguito della morte di Giacometti, con la prolusione Oratio habita in Gymnasio Patavino -- pubblicata dal seminario --  entra come professore ordinario di filosofia morale a Padova.  Piccolo, brutto della bruttezza di Socrate – Mabil --, oppresso da fastidi di stomaco e intestino, senza denti, pur non dotato di particolari doti oratorie riusciva ad appassionare studenti e uditori – fra cui anche Casanova – che accorreno alle sue lezioni. Trascorse la sua esistenza fra l’Università e le mura del convento di S. Croce. Sebbene schivo e non desideroso di onori, conosce fama e successo, come testimoniano anche gli elogi scritti immediatamente e ancora qualche decennio dopo la morte; è uomo coltissimo, di garbata conversazione e curioso di diverse discipline, dalla musica, alla filologia alle scienze che studia con passione, come risulta anche dalle lettere. La sua opera più importante, De ortu et progressu morum atque opinionum ad mores pertinentium specimen –dalla nonna Stella – Modaro. Liceo.  Grice: Caro Stellini, ho finalmente avuto modo di leggere il tuo “De ortu et progressu morum”; devo confessare che, tra gli orti friulani e quelli filosofici, la differenza sta tutta nel profumo, ma la saggezza è la stessa! Stellini: Ah, Grice, lei sa sempre cogliere il senso delle cose! In effetti, il mio orto morum nasce più dal tentativo di coltivare le virtù che i cavoli, ma la fatica è simile, glielo assicuro! Grice: Ebbene, se parliamo del mos dell’ortolano, mi verrebbe da dire che, più che discutere di grandi principi morali, il vero lavoro sembra essere la potatura… e magari una buona concimazione. Ma, si sa, certe cose si capiscono senza dirle apertamente! Stellini: Implicatura ingegnosissima, Grice! Non a caso dicono che nel mio orto filosofico cresceva più saggezza che insalata. E anche se il mio stile non era quello di Casanova, almeno qualche germoglio di virtù l’ho saputo coltivare tra i miei studenti… e qualche dente in meno non ha mai impedito una buona conversazione! Stellini, Jacopo (1740). Della felicità. Venezia: Pasquali.

Romualdo de Sterlich (Chieti, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale dei georgofili. Grice and Romualdo de Sterlich converge on the idea that meaning in conversation is fundamentally governed by reason, but they articulate this insight from distinct historical and conceptual vantage points. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning is explicitly analytical: he treats conversation as a rational, goal-directed activity structured by shared expectations of cooperation, where what is meant often exceeds what is literally said because speakers calculate their contributions against norms of rational relevance, sufficiency, truthfulness, and clarity. Meaning, for Grice, is therefore inseparable from the speaker’s intention to be intelligible to a rational interlocutor, and from the hearer’s capacity to recognize that intention by reasoning about what it would make sense to say in the circumstances. Sterlich, by contrast, embodies an Enlightenment, civic-humanistic version of conversational reason. In his cultural practice—the public library at Chieti, the circulation of forbidden books, and the Dialoghi di fra’ Cipolla e la Nanna—conversation is reason-governed not by formal maxims but by the social exercise of critical judgement against dogma, censorship, and intellectual superstition. Sterlich’s dialogical writing presupposes interlocutors who can follow irony, polemic, and indirectness, and who understand that rational exchange often operates obliquely under conditions of constraint; in this sense, his dialogues rely on something close to Gricean implicature avant la lettre. Where Grice abstracts reason as a quasi-logical principle underwriting intelligible talk, Sterlich stages conversational reason as a historically situated practice of Enlightenment resistance, in which meaning emerges through shared rational competence, cultural literacy, and the willingness to draw inferences beyond the explicit word. The affinity lies in their shared conviction that conversation is not mere talk but a rational enterprise; the difference lies in Grice’s formal reconstruction of that enterprise and Sterlich’s lived, polemical enactment of it within the public sphere of eighteenth-century Italian Illuminismo. Nato da Rinaldo e da Margherita Alfieri, dopo i primi studi in casa è mandato a Napoli, dove frequenta il collegio dei nobili e la scuola privata di Serao, noto professore. Abbiamo anche notizia di suoi studi a Roma. Essendo figlio unico è indotto a sposarsi e a seguire gli affari della sua famiglia.  Tornato a Chieti, vi intraprese una vivace attività di promozione culturale. Crea infatti una biblioteca aperta al pubblico che nella Chieti ha un'importanza notevole, sia per il numero dei volumi, sia per la tempestività con cui veniva aggiornata e per il valore delle opere che vi si trovavano.  Ricca di classici latini, la biblioteca è ben fornita di autori della letteratura italiana. Numerose erano poi le opere di storia, di filosofia, i dizionari enciclopedici; numerosissimi i giornali. Presenti anche molte opere scientifiche, soprattutto di medicina, di cui S. è un ottimo cultore. La caratteristica più importante, però, che fa di questa biblioteca un momento di rottura con la cultura circostante, è la presenza delle opere degli illuministi. La biblioteca S. divenne uno dei centri più attivi del rinnovamento della cultura abruzzese. In essa si forma una generazione di filosofi che danno un contributo politico notevole nel periodo delle riforme prima e della rivoluzione dopo. Ma l'attività culturale di S. e il ruolo che anda acquistando la biblioteca non passarono inosservati ai gesuiti: lo attaccano pubblicamente accusandolo di empietà e di possedere libri proibiti. S. non si fa intimorire. Anzi, per controbattere le accuse, compose i Duedialoghi di fra' Cipolla e la Nanna, che circolarono manoscritti a Chieti suscitando molte polemiche. Una copia è mandata a Firenze a Lami per la pubblicazione, che fu però bloccata dalla censura. I Dialoghi restarono così inediti tra le carte di Lami, a cui F. Fontani -suo biografo - li attribuì. Anche manoscritti, hanno comunque una notevole diffusione.  illuminismo.  Grice: Mi permetta una curiosità, caro Sterlich: come pronuncia esattamente il suo cognome? Soprattutto l’ultima parte, che mi sembra poco italiana!  Sterlich: Ah, è una domanda che mi fanno spesso! Si pronuncia “Ster-lich”, con la “ch” finale un po’ dura, quasi tedesca. In famiglia scherziamo sempre su quanto suoni strano qui in Abruzzo.  Grice: Capisco, dev’essere stato un nome che ha incuriosito molti, specie tra i georgofili e gli intellettuali della sua biblioteca a Chieti! E ha portato fortuna, direi, se penso al fermento culturale che ha contribuito a creare.  Sterlich: La ringrazio, professore! In fondo, anche un cognome “fuori dal coro” può essere uno stimolo alla conversazione e all’apertura verso idee nuove. Come diceva mio padre, “la diversità è la ricchezza che fa crescere la cultura.” Sterlich, Romualdo de (1750). Dialogo di fra Cipolla e la Nanna. Chieti.

Stertinio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del tutore di filosofia. Portico. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and the figure of Stertinius, as reconstructed from Roman moral discourse and sharpened in the passage under the Portico, meet on the idea that conversation is an intelligible activity only insofar as it is guided by rational expectations shared by speaker and hearer. Grice makes this explicit and formal: conversational meaning depends on the speaker’s intention being recognizable by a rational interlocutor who assumes that what is said is said for a reason, in accordance with the purpose of the exchange. Stertinius, by contrast, operates within a Stoic and pedagogical setting where reason governs conversation not by articulated maxims but by ethical orientation: his talk under the Portico is directed at shaping judgment, officium, and animus, not at satisfying surface expectations or decorative understanding. The episode with Damasippus illustrates precisely the kind of rational failure Grice would later theorize: the pupil “hears” porticus and fixes on walls and adornment, missing the intended level of relevance, because he fails to reason correctly about what is being meant in that context. Stertinius thus presupposes a rational listener capable of abstracting away from literal or culturally salient associations and tracking the tutor’s purpose, much as Grice presupposes a cooperative hearer capable of inferring implicatures. Where Grice describes conversational reason as a general structure underlying meaning in all ordinary talk, Stertinius embodies it as a moral discipline, exercised in dialogue, vulnerable to misfire when ambition, vanity, or social distraction disrupt the rational uptake that conversation requires. Tutore di Damasippo. GRICEVS: Salvē, Stertinī. Audīvī tē adhūc Damasippō praeceptōrem esse—sub Porticū, ut aiunt: ego semper mirātus sum quam multum in illō “porticū” lateat. GRICEVS: Apud nōs, cum quis “porticum” laudat, saepe satis est dīcere porticum—nē addāmus quidnam coloris; sed spero Damasippum tuum ab illō genere ornātūs servāvistī, quod Graecī amant, Rōmānī autem (nisi fallor) rubōre tegunt. STERTINIVS: Heu, Grice: Damasippus “porticum” audīvit et statim ad parietēs spectāvit, quasi philosophia in pictūrā nāscerētur. Ego autem dē ratiōne, dē officiō, dē animō loquēbar. STERTINIVS: Inplicaturam callidissimam, Grice! Nōn negō: porticus illa Graecē dicitur Στοὰ Ποικίλη—id est “porticus picta”; sed totum hoc Damasippō super caput fuit: nihil nisi dē togā novā cōgitābat, et maxime utrum satis virīlis foret, cum eam primum sumeret. Stertinio (a. u. c. DCLXXX). Dicta sub Porticu. Roma.

Stilione (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del principe filosofo. Grice’s account of reason‑governed conversational meaning and the figure of Stilione, imagined here as tutor to the philosopher‑emperor Severus Alexander, converge on the thought that rationality is not automatically conferred by status, title, or institutional role, but must be actively learned, exercised, and recognized within conversation itself. For Grice, conversational meaning depends on the assumption that speakers and hearers are rational agents engaged in a cooperative enterprise, where words are chosen so that a reasonable interlocutor can infer what is meant beyond what is merely said. Stilione articulates a parallel insight in a political and pedagogical register: to be princeps is not to possess the principium rationis by default, and purple robes can obscure reason rather than instantiate it. His remark that the “prince” still has to learn the letters of reason mirrors Grice’s insistence that meaning is not guaranteed by linguistic form or social authority but by the rational uptake of intention. The exchange also dramatizes a Gricean implicature avant la lettre: the title “princeps” invites an inference about primacy of reason, which both speakers knowingly suspend, exposing the gap between names and rational competence. Where Grice theorizes this gap through a systematic account of implicature, Stilione embodies it in the task of moral and intellectual education, showing that conversational reason must be cultivated even, or especially, at the summit of power. Tutor to Severo Alessandro, the emperor.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Stilīō: audīvī tē ipsum principem erudiisse—Alexandrum Severum, inquam. O rem miram: ego numquam nisi apud Vadum Boum barbarōs (ut ita dicam) docuī. STILIŌ: Salvē, Grice. Barbarōs? At tu Oxoniensibus barbaris nihil deest praeter modestiam. Sed quid ad principem? Ille certe maiōrem curam poscit quam iuvenis de vādō boum. GRICEVS: Fortasse. Ego tamen, cum audiam “tutorem principis,” subrīdēo: quasi princeps statim habeat principium—id est, principium rationis. Sed nonne tibi quoque aliquando visus est quasi adhūc litterās ratiōnis disceret? STILIŌ: Ō, tam callidam inplicatvram, Grice! Nōn negāverim: purpura saepe velat caput, nōn instruit; et “princeps” nomen est, sed principium ratiōnis etiam principi addiscendum est. Stilione (a.u.c. DCCCCLXXV). Dicta. Roma.

Lucio Elio Stilone (Lanuvio, Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del proloquio del cielo. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Lucius Aelius Stilo’s conception of the proloquium converge on the idea that meaning arises from rational structure rather than from ornament, authority, or mere verbal sequence, even though they articulate this insight at very different stages of intellectual history. Grice frames conversation as a cooperative rational activity in which what a speaker means is determined by intentions that a reasonable hearer can recognize by reflecting on what would count as an appropriate contribution to the exchange; meaning is thus grounded in inferential discipline, not in surface form. Stilo, working within Stoic philosophical grammar, approaches the same terrain through the notion of the proloquium or axioma: a simple but complete sentence, fully articulated according to reason, capable of standing on its own without rhetorical excess. His interest in syntax, particles, and archaism is not antiquarian but philosophical, aimed at identifying the minimal structure required for intelligible, truth‑apt discourse. The dialogue’s play on “of the sky” versus “of the sky itself” dramatizes exactly the danger Grice later theorizes: the temptation to overextend linguistic material beyond what rational uptake licenses, producing fanciful associations rather than disciplined inference. Where Grice formalizes this danger as a misuse of implicature—stretching what can reasonably be inferred from what is said—Stilo warns against it pedagogically by recalling that disciples like Cicero and Varro would insist on grammatical and logical restraint. In both cases, conversational reason functions as a governor: for Grice it constrains what may be implicated, and for Stilo it constrains what may count as a legitimate proloquium, but the underlying commitment is shared—the conviction that meaning in conversation begins and ends with rational accountability. -- il tutore di filosofia -- Roma antica – la scuola di Lanuvio – filosofia romana – la scuola di Roma – filosofia lazia -- Appartenne all'ordine equestre. Segue nell’esilio QUINTO METELLO  NUMIDICO. A Roma, è maestro e scrive discorsi per altri. I suoi discepoli più insigni sono CICERONE e VARRONE. Conoscitore sicuro della coltura latina, èil primo rappresentante notevole della scienza grammaticale o grammatica filosofica. Saggi: "Interpretatio carminum Saliorum"; "Index comœdiarum Plautinarum", "Commentarius de pro-loquiis" -- uno studio sulla sintassi di impronta del Portico. Inoltre, cura edizioni di saggi altrui. Gli è stata attribuita un’opera glossografica. The text of Svetonio (Gramm.) provides a list of the first Roman philosophers who more or less exclusively are devoted to grammar. Instruxerunt auxeruntque ab omni parte grammaticam L. Aelius Lanuvinus generque Aeli Ser. Clodius, uterque eques Romanus multique ac vari et in doctrina et in re publica usus. The first refers to the philosopher Elio Stilone, a native of Lanuvio, tutor of Cicerone and Varrone. From Gellius it is possible to gather some information about his linguistic and philological studies on PLAUTO, then resumed and developed by Varrone. In a proper linguistic field, some fragments testify to an interest for archaism, investigated both in the carmen Saliare and in the XII Tables, as well as in the ancient Italic languages. GELLIO also reports the title of a ‘saggio’ by S.: “Commentarius de proloquiis” in which, as GELLIO himself informs us, “pro-loquium” is used to render the “axioma”, a technical term of the dialectics and philosophical grammar of the Porch which indicates a simple sentence, complete in all its parts. GELLIO adds that Varrone borrows ‘pro-loquium’ from his tutor and uses it in the XXIV book of the “De lingua Latina.” Varrone Quinto Elio Stilone. Portico, proloquium, axioma, Cicerone, Varro, Stilone, Gellio, Svetonio.  GRICEVS: Salvē, Stilo Lanuvine! Audio tē de proloquiō caelī disserere—quasi grammaticus ipse ad astra conscendat. STILO: Salvē tu quoque, Grice. Proloquium (axiōma, ut Stoici) nec humile nec superbum est: sententia simplex, sed plena. Quid tibi videtur dē caelō? GRICEVS: Mirum dictū: hodiē proloquium dē caelō repperī—tam caeleste, ut mihi videātur nōn tantum “dē caelō” dīcī, sed paene “caelī” ipsīus: ita mē illa particula dē (quam negotiātor quidam “of” vocat) in nūbēs sustulit. STILO: Inplicatvram bellissimam, Grice! sed cave: nē dē nimis extendās; aliōquī discipulī meī (Cicero et Varro) tē nōn in Commentariō dē proloquiīs, sed in Indicē comoediārum repōnent. Stilone, Lucio Elio (a.u.c. DCXL).Dicta. Roma.

Guido Stucchi (Gubbio, Perugia, Umbria): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia perenne di Pitagora, Cicerone, Ovidio, Virgilio, e Plinio. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and Guido Stucchi’s conception of philosophia perennis intersect on the claim that meaningful discourse is sustained by rational intelligibility that transcends local idiom, historical contingency, and mere verbal display. Grice approaches this at the micro‑level of ordinary conversation: what a speaker means is constrained by what a rational hearer can infer under assumptions of cooperation, restraint, and mutual accountability, so that implication is always answerable to reason rather than to poetic excess. Stucchi, by contrast, works at a macro‑historical and metaphysical level, reading Pythagoras, Cicero, Ovid, Virgil, Pliny, and the wisdom of Rome as participating in a continuous rational order that manifests itself through time in different linguistic and cultural forms. Yet the comic exchange about creation and creatures reveals a shared discipline: Stucchi’s insistence that every utterance is only a trace pointing beyond itself mirrors Grice’s insistence that speakers should not say more (or less) than reason licenses, lest implication dissolve into mystification. Where Grice guards conversational meaning against inflation through explicit principles and maxims, Stucchi guards philosophical meaning against dispersion by anchoring it in perennial rational structures that remain intelligible across eras. In both, reason is not an ornament added to language but its governing condition: for Grice it governs what may be meant in talk, for Stucchi it governs what may count as true philosophy across the long conversation of Western thought. -- il creatore e Grice, la creazione delle creature -- filosofia umbra – la citta della verita perenne -- STEUCO (Stucchi), Guido (in religione Agostino). Secondo i riferimenti autobiografici disseminati nelle opere, nasce a Gubbio, allora sotto i Montefeltro, dall’agiata famiglia degli Stucchi. Il padre si chiama Teseo; uno dei fratelli, canonico della cattedrale, Francesco; un altro, magistrato della città, Mariotto. Mantenne il nome Guido fino a quando entra nel noviziato di S. Secondo, appartenente all’Ordine dei canonici agostiniani di S. Salvatore, prendendovi l’abito e assumendo il nome di Agostino -- Nicolai. Mentre infuria la guerra tra fiorentini e urbinati, e Leone X fulmina l’interdetto contro Gubbio, lascia la patria per passare a Bologna nel chiostro di S. Salvatore, centro del sapere dove aveva risieduto Codro, che, con Fabbri, vi aveva raccolto preziosi manoscritti fondando la biblioteca del convento. Come testimoniano gli atti del capitolo dell’Ordine, vi rimase, salvo una parentesi a Venezia -- Freudenberger. A Bologna completa gli studi di filosofia, frequenta i corsi di retorica ed ebraico all’Università, apprese i rudimenti dell’arabo e le lingue utili alla comprensione del testo biblico -- il greco da Petros Ypsila, l’ebreo e il caldeo da Giovanni Flaminio --, si interessò di fisica e matematica e si guadagna la stima dei superiori, che lo destinarono a insegnare filosofia. In anni in cui era vivo il magistero dell’aristotelico POMPONAZZI , S. traduce alcune pagine dei classici e si lega ad Amaseo, Calcagnini -- con il quale avrebbe intrattenuto una corrispondenza --, Grimani e Pio che, secondo alcuni biografi, alla morte gli avrebbe lasciato parte dei propri libri. Venne assegnato al convento di S. Antonio di Castello a Venezia, dove si recò passando per Ferrara. Qui divenne amico di Massari e arricchì la propria rete di rapporti. Crotone, i velini – I crotonensi --. Cicerone, ovidio, Virgilio, plinio, roma, aqua virgo.  Grice: Caro Stucchi, devo confessare che quando penso alla "filosofia perenne" e ai tuoi illustri riferimenti – Pitagora, Cicerone, Ovidio, Virgilio, Plinio – mi sento come un creatore che, tra una creatura e l’altra, si ritrova a Gubbio in cerca della verità eterna. Dimmi, come si convive con così tanti giganti sulle spalle, e pure con la pioggia umbra? Stucchi: Ah, caro Grice, Gubbio è proprio la città delle verità perenni – e anche dei temporali perenni! Ma ti dirò, convivere con Pitagora e Virgilio è un po’ come cenare con parenti che non smettono mai di filosofare: tra una metafora e una equazione, qui si medita persino sul brodo! Grice: Capisco, capisco... D’altronde, quando mi capita di creare qualche creatura, mi limito a implicare il creatore – per modestia, si intende. In fondo, la filosofia dalle tue parti ha sempre avuto un gusto speciale: come l’aqua virgo, che non disseta mai del tutto, ma lascia sempre il desiderio di un’altra verità. Stucchi: Bellissima implicatura, Grice! Hai colto il segreto dei filosofi di Gubbio: qui si crea, si traduce, si insegna, ma senza mai dire tutto – ogni creatura è solo una traccia, un invito a cercare il creatore dietro le quinte. E se la verità perenne si nasconde… almeno il brodo è sempre in tavola! Stucchi, Guido (1497). Philologica. Gubbio.

Gaio Svetonio Tranquillo (Ostia, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del  commentario alla repubblica, più vasto dalla repubblica  Taken together, Grice and Suetonius (Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus) can be read as operating at different levels of the same problem: how reason governs meaning in human affairs when explicit theory is absent or insufficient. Suetonius’ Lives of the Twelve Caesars do not advance a systematic political philosophy; instead, they proceed through morally charged selections of anecdote, arrangement, and emphasis, guided by Roman aristocratic norms of virtue and vice. Meaning, in Suetonius, emerges tacitly from what is included, juxtaposed, or relegated to marginal comment: private habits, bodily comportment, sexual excess, or frugality are treated not as causal explanations but as rationally intelligible indicators of fitness to rule, addressed to an audience assumed to share evaluative standards. In this sense, Suetonius’ historiographical practice anticipates a Gricean structure: the text says comparatively little in abstract terms, but it means a great deal through controlled underinformativeness and placement, relying on the reader to supply the moral uptake. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning makes explicit what Suetonius presupposes: that communication is cooperative, norm‑sensitive, and evaluated against shared rational expectations rather than against formal doctrine. Where Suetonius humanizes emperors by “cutting them down to size” through salient detail, Grice formalizes the rational conditions under which such detail counts as evidence, condemnation, or praise. The comparison shows Suetonius as a practitioner of conversational reason avant la lettre: his commentarius on res publica operates less by propositional argument than by implicature, inviting readers to infer political judgment from morally loaded narrative choices in a way entirely consonant with Grice’s account of meaning as governed by reason, norms, and audience recognition rather than by explicit system. Grice: “S. did not ascribe a single, overarching philosophy to the emperors, but rather evaluated each based on a moral framework of Roman aristocratic values, emphasizing the balance of an emperor's public virtues and private vices.    His biographies in Lives of the Twelve Caesars are structured to highlight the emperors' personal conduct and character, using a "rubric system" of virtues (justice, self-control, generosity) and vices (cruelty, sexual excess, greed) to determine if they were a good or bad ruler.  Key aspects of his approach include: Moral Judgment: Suetonius provided a moral assessment of each emperor, illustrating for Roman elites what was considered acceptable and unacceptable behavior for their leaders. A good emperor, like Augustus or Vespasian, generally displayed traditional Roman virtues, while a bad emperor, like Caligula or Nero, was characterized by moral corruption and tyranny. Humanizing the Emperors: Suetonius "cuts the emperors down to size," portraying them as men with human flaws and eccentricities, rather than as divine or larger-than-life figures. This approach offered a way for the Roman aristocracy to cope with the absolute power of the emperor, by revealing the rulers as ultimately mortal and fallible. Anecdotal Style: He was less interested in developing the grand political causes of events than in collecting engaging, often salacious, anecdotes and gossip that shed light on an emperor's true character. He believed personal habits, such as eating preferences or physical appearance, could reveal an emperor's temperament and fitness to rule. Bias and Contemporary Views: Writing during the Flavian and Hadrianic dynasties, S.'s portrayal sometimes reflected the prevailing senatorial and elite opinions of his day, including biases (e.g., against Domitian, who had been subject to damnatio memoriae). Cicerone, repubblica. GRICEVS: O SVETONI, Tranquille, quid agis? Audio te commentarium de re publica scribere, et iam tot tabulas implevisti ut librarii gemant. SVETONIVS: Ago, ut soleo: colligo, ordino, anecdotis condio. Nam si res publica gravis est, cur commentarius non sit levis—saltem in stilo? GRICEVS: Ita vero. Et cum tu de re publica disseris, mirum est quam multa—dico, quam opportune—adicias quae in ipsa re publica (ut ita dicam) vix locum habent. SVETONIVS: Pulchra implicatura, Grice! Sed quid faciam? Si principum vitia et virtutes rubricas habent, cur res publica non habeat margines—et margines non habeant glossas? Svetonio, Gaio S. Tranquillo (a. u. c. DCCCLXXIV). De vita Caesarum. Roma

Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue Remo (Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale del Remo, o le strutture del trascendentale – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers move from sentence meaning to speaker meaning by presuming a shared rational enterprise (the Cooperative Principle and its maxims) and by treating apparent departures from those norms as evidence of further, intention-based content (implicatures) that are in principle calculable and cancellable; on this view, the central explanatory work is done by publicly recognizable communicative intentions plus shared expectations about rational conduct in talk. Morpurgo-Tagliabue, by contrast, is best situated within mid‑century Milanese theoretical philosophy and aesthetics (with formative links to phenomenology, empiricism, and philosophy of science, and with a postwar philosophical “debut” in works like Le strutture del trascendentale and Il concetto dello stile that help reorient Italian aesthetics beyond Crocean idealism): his key concern is not the micro-pragmatics of conversational inference but the conditions of possibility for experience, judgement, and value (including aesthetic judgement, “taste,” and style) at a transcendental level. The most direct point of contact is that Grice’s account presupposes rational agency in conversational interpretation, while Morpurgo-Tagliabue thematizes the deeper structures that make rational and evaluative comportment possible in the first place; however, where Grice operationalizes rationality as norms governing exchanges of utterances (so that even talk of “taste” becomes a case of how speakers manage relevance, evidential force, and communicative intentions), Morpurgo-Tagliabue treats “taste” and “style” less as conversational achievements than as philosophically thick mediations between subjectivity and objectivity—forms through which experience is organized and shared—so that the “reason” at stake is not primarily the cooperative management of what is meant in interaction but the transcendental articulation of how meaning, value, and form can be intelligible at all. -- il concetto di gusto nell’estetica italiana –Nasce da Giovanna Tagliabue. Non è noto il nome del padre.  Si forma a Milano, all’epoca nel campo filosofico caratterizzata dalla prevalenza di orientamenti estranei alla linea idealistica di Croce e Gentile, altrimenti dominante in Italia, e influenzati invece dalla contemporanea fenomenologia, dall’empirismo e dalla filosofia della scienza. L’influsso dell’ambiente filosofico milanese è manifesto nelle opere pubblicate da T. nel secondo dopoguerra, e in particolare in Le strutture del trascendentale – Milano -- e Il concetto dello stile – Milano --, che ne costituiscono il vero e proprio esordio filosofico. Infatti negli anni precedenti gli interessi dello studioso sono stati orientati prevalentemente verso la critica letteraria e teatrale: collabora alla rivista milanese Il Convegno, mentre è critico teatrale per La lettura. Altri articoli di critica letteraria apparvero nel dopoguerra nella rivista La rassegna d’Italia. Negli ultimi anni del conflitto è in contatto con il movimento Giustizia e Libertà, ma successivamente abbandona ogni impegno politico e vive una vita appartata. Insegna estetica a Milano e filosofia teoretica a Trieste.  La prima opera importante di estetica, Il concetto dello stile, rimasta anche la più sistematica pubblicata da Morpurgo in questo settore, rappresenta un contributo significativo al rinnovamento degli studi estetici italiani avvenuto quando si avvertì ormai imperiosa l’esigenza di superare l’impostazione data da Croce a questo campo. Nell'opera, T. procede innanzitutto a una ricognizione dello stato degli studi estetici in Italia, un bilancio critico che occupa tutta la prima metà del saggio. Dopo aver rapidamente ricordato i capisaldi della dottrina di CROCE, si volge ad analizzare le posizioni critiche nei confronti di Croce. Romolo, le strutture del trascendentale, concetto del gusto, estetica.  Grice: Professore Tagliabue, sono sempre rimasto affascinato dal suo approccio alle strutture del trascendentale. In che modo, secondo lei, il concetto di gusto si intreccia con la filosofia milanese e il rinnovamento dell’estetica italiana? Tagliabue: Grazie, Grice! A mio avviso, il gusto non è solo una questione di preferenze personali, ma rappresenta un autentico momento del trascendentale: è ciò che consente all’individuo di aprirsi alla dimensione estetica, superando le vecchie impostazioni crociane. Milano, negli anni del dopoguerra, ha offerto un terreno fertile per questa rivalutazione, favorendo un dialogo tra fenomenologia, empirismo e filosofia della scienza. Grice: È interessante! Quindi il gusto diventa una sorta di ponte tra il soggettivo e l’oggettivo, tra la percezione individuale e i valori condivisi. Le sue opere, penso a Il concetto dello stile, hanno contribuito a ridefinire il modo in cui l’estetica italiana affronta proprio questi temi. Tagliabue: Esatto, Grice! Come diceva mia madre, “non basta vedere, bisogna saper cogliere il senso profondo della bellezza.” Il trascendentale è lo strumento che ci guida, e il gusto diventa una lente attraverso cui si rinnova la nostra comprensione estetica. La filosofia milanese ha avuto il coraggio di superare le rigidità idealistiche e di aprire nuove strade. Ne sono felice! Tagliabue, Guido Mopurgo (1931). Contributo. Il Convegno.

Pietro Taglialatela (Mondragone, Caserta, Campania): la ragione conversazionale degl’istituzioni di filosofia – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning is a general, explicitly pragmatic account of how hearers infer speaker-meaning from what is said by presuming rational cooperation: conversational exchanges are treated as purposive activities regulated by norms (Cooperative Principle and maxims), so that apparent irrelevance, underinformativeness, or stylistic markedness can be rationally “explained away” as generating implicatures that are (in principle) calculable, defeasible, and cancellable while remaining anchored in publicly recognizable intentions. Pietro Taglialatela (Mondragone, 19th century), by contrast, belongs to the Italian post-Risorgimento world of institutional philosophy, civic pedagogy, and confessionally inflected public intellectual life (Gioberti-inspired “istituzioni di filosofia,” later Protestant polemics and missionary activity): his work is concerned with founding and legitimating philosophical formation and moral-political orientation within institutions (schools, movements, churches), not with offering a technical model of conversational inference. Read against Grice, Taglialatela’s “ragione conversazionale” in your staged dialogue is best understood as a metaphor for how philosophical education and social belonging shape what counts as intelligible, persuasive, or “liberating” speech within a community—how an “institution” can be heard either as a cage or as wings—whereas Grice explains that very shift in uptake as a pragmatic phenomenon: the “institutionalize them” worry is a textbook case of how an utterance triggers a predictable interpretive path (a relevance-driven inference from institutional vocabulary to social control), and Taglialatela’s reply functions like an attempt to cancel and replace that implicature by supplying an alternative purpose and frame (“not gabbie but ali”). The upshot is that Grice provides the micro-level mechanics of meaning-in-interaction (how the hearer gets from words to intended meaning under rational norms), while Taglialatela represents a macro-level concern with the cultural and institutional conditions under which philosophical discourse is cultivated, authorized, and morally directed—conditions that can motivate, constrain, or rhetorically steer conversations, but do not themselves amount to Grice’s reason-governed theory of conversational meaning. Studia a Sessa. Insegna a Cava e Napoli. S’arruolarsi nelle truppe di GARIBALDI , per predicare i nuovi ideali del movimento unitario. Dirigge una scuola privata. Riprende e sposa le tesi di GIOBERTI , che lo affascina. Su questo indirizzo filosofico è stato imperniato Istituzioni di filosofia, Diogene, Napoli, che riceve le lodi di SPAVENTA. Non manca, in seguito, avendo aderito al protestantesimo, di compiere opere missionarie, in particolare in Puglia e in Abruzzo. A tal riguardo è documentato il viaggio di Pescasseroli sul quale scrisse CROCE, che segnala anche come e considerato, assieme a MAZZARELLA e CAPORALI, fra i filosofi più creativi del movimento protestante in Italia. Altre saggi: Apologia delle dottrine filosofiche di GIOBERTI, Diogene, Napoli, La scienza, la vita e SANCTIS, Diogene, Napoli, GARIBALDI, Speranza, Roma; Il papa-re nelle profezie e nella storia, Speranza, Roma, In Dio, Speranza, Roma; Fede, speranza e caritàm Speranza, Roma; Teoria evangelica della vita, Speranza, Roma, Ciampoli, T., Unione, Roma; Croce, Pescasseroli, Laterza, Bari; Fiore, Civiltà Aurunca, Iurato, T.: dalla filosofia del Gioberti all'evangelismo anti-papale, Claudiana, Torino; Gioberti, Protestantesimo in Italia, Dizionario biografico dei protestanti in Italia; Società di studi valdesi. Apologia della dottrina di Gioberti. 03 APOLOGIA DELLA 3 DOTTRINA FILOSOFICA DI V. GIOBERTI PER P. TAGLIALATELA NAPOLI TIPOGRAFIA ALL' INSEGNA DEL DIOGENE Strada Montesanto num. 14. 1867 Proprietà letteraria ; LE PICCOLE QUISTIONI DIALOGO PRIMO tra L'Autore e F. Toscano A. Vi ringrazio di gran cuore, professor Toscano, per esser vi finalmente degnato di rispondere alla critica che circa tre an ni addietro io mossi contro il vostro CorsoElementare di Fi losofia. T. istituzioni di filosofia.  Grice: Professore Taglialatela, lei che ha saputo fondare una vera scuola di istituzioni filosofiche a Mondragone, mi dica: qual è il segreto per far fiorire la filosofia anche dove sembra che il terreno sia duro e poco incline al pensiero?  Taglialatela: Ah, caro Grice, la filosofia è come il vento tra le colline campane: a volte basta un soffio, altre volte bisogna pazientare e seminare idee con costanza. E a Mondragone, tra Garibaldi, Gioberti e le nuove istituzioni, il pensiero si radica proprio quando meno te lo aspetti!  Grice: Non lo dico, ma se dovessi tenere un seminario sulle ‘istituzioni di filosofia’ a Vadum Boum, i barbari che ho come allievi—nulla a che vedere con quelli di Bononia—penserebbero subito che voglio ‘istituzionalizzarli’, magari metterli in qualche bella scatola regolamentare!  Taglialatela: Bellissima implicatura, Grice! In fondo, le istituzioni filosofiche non sono gabbie ma ali: bisogna volare, non farsi imbrigliare! E se qualcuno teme di essere istituzionalizzato, basta ricordargli che la filosofia, come diceva Gioberti, è fatta per liberare la mente, non per incatenarla. A Mondragone, si insegna a ragionare e a sorridere: meglio una scuola che sappia accogliere le differenze, che una istituzione che le sopprime! Taglialatela, Pietro (1864). Istituzioni di filosofia. Napoli: Diogene.

Giuseppe Tarantino (Gravina, Bari, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale dell’inconscio e la coscienza – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats conversation as a cooperative, rationally organized activity in which hearers infer speaker-meaning by assuming that contributions are made in accordance with an accepted purpose and are regulated by norms (the Cooperative Principle and the maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner); what is “meant” is often not identical with what is literally said, but is instead recoverable as a calculable implicature from the speaker’s publicly recognizable intentions plus shared expectations about rational talk. Giuseppe Tarantino (1857–1950), by contrast, was an Italian academic philosopher and pedagogue associated with Pisa (including leadership roles there), trained in the post-Hegelian/Italian critical tradition around figures such as Francesco Fiorentino, and known for historical-critical work (e.g., on Locke) and for broader treatments of will, ethics, and causality; nothing in his documented output places him as a precursor to Gricean pragmatics, and the “Grice–Tarantino” exchange in your passage is best read as a witty anachronistic staging that juxtaposes Tarantino’s interest in mind, will, and the conscious/unconscious nexus with Grice’s focus on how rational agents manage meaning in interaction. The clean comparison, then, is that Grice explains how conversational understanding is normatively guided and inferentially structured (how a remark about tea, self-forgetting, or “not knowing that one does not know” can communicate more than its literal content by exploiting cooperative expectations), whereas Tarantino’s philosophical psychology and ethics would frame talk about unconsciousness primarily as a problem about the structure of agency, cognition, and moral responsibility rather than as a problem about the inferential mechanics of talk-exchange; in the dialogue’s terms, Grice can treat Tarantino’s quips as cases of implicature generated by deliberate understatement or playful relevance-shifts, while Tarantino provides the thematic subject matter (consciousness, will, causal explanation) that Grice’s theory does not aim to analyze directly except insofar as such topics become contents handled by reason-governed conversational moves. Insegna a Pisa. Studia nel ginnasio e compì gli studi superiori a Pisa, dapprima come studente all'università della stessa città e successivamente come allievo della scuola normale superiore di Pisa. Inizia gli studi sotto la guida di FIORENTINO . Si laurea e segue a Napoli il maestro FIORENTINO. In sua memoria dedica al suo maestro “I Saggi Filosofici,” ottenne la docenza in filosofia. Inizia ad acquisire notorietà grazie ai saggi critici che pubblica sul Giornale Napoletano. Insegna al liceo Genovesi di Napoli. Compone il Saggio sulla volontà, Gennaro, Napoli.  Insegna al Marciano, e Pisa. Insegna anche alla scuola di pedagogia, dove tra i suoi insegnanti figura GENTILE. La sua notorietà cresce sempre più grazie ad alcuni suoi saggi critici pubblicati sulla Rivista di Filosofia Scientifica di MORSELLI, il più noto dei quali è su Locke. Tra i suoi studenti di Pisa più noti figurano NICOLA ed ACCADIA. Torna nella sua città natale, dove dona alla biblioteca Santomasi una parte cospicua dei suoi libri. A lui è stato intitolato il liceo. Altre saggi: Appunti di Filosofia, Toso, Aversa, Saggi filosofici, Napoli, Morano; Studio storico su Locke, Rivista di Filosofia, Milano-Torino, Dumolard; Saggio sul criticismo e sull'associazionismo, Napoli, Morano; In morte di CALDERONI, Vecchi, Trani; Saggio sulla volontà; Saggio sulle idee morali e politiche di Hobbes, Napoli, Giannini; Il problema della morale di fronte al positivismo e alla metafisica, Pisa, Valenti; Il principio dell'etica e la crisi morale, Napoli, Tessitore; Il concetto dello STATO ed il principio di nazionalità” (Napoli); “Discorso preposto alle traduzioni dal latino, dall’inglese e dal francese di SOTTILE, Napoli; VINCI  e la scienza della natura, Nel centenario di VINCI, La politica e la morale. Discorso, Pisa, Mariotti, Sulla riforma universitaria, Rivista di filosofia. Cfr. Turi, inconscio, Gentile, Vinci, lo stato, la nazione.  Grice: Professore Tarantino, mi hanno sempre affascinato i suoi studi sull’inconscio e la coscienza! Dica, secondo lei, una buona tazza di tè può aiutare a scoprire i misteri della mente, o rischia solo di renderli più... aromatici? Tarantino: Ah, caro Grice, se il tè fosse la soluzione, bisognerebbe aggiungerlo al programma di filosofia! Ma temo che il mistero dell'inconscio resti più difficile da dissolvere che lo zucchero nella bevanda. Grice: Mi trova d’accordo! Del resto, come scrivevo in Personal identity, io stesso non ero consapevole di essere inconsapevole. Un po’ come quando ti dimentichi dove hai messo gli occhiali... e li stai indossando! Ma non glielo dico, eh! Tarantino: Bella implicatura, Grice! In fondo, il filosofo che non sa di non sapere è come l’inconscio: sempre pronto a spuntare quando meno te lo aspetti, e magari pure con gli occhiali già sul naso! Tarantino, Giuseppe (1879). Dissertazione. Sotto Fiontino. Filosofia. Pisa.

Antonio Tari (Villa Santa Maria Capua Vetere, Caserta, Campania): pooh-pooh e la ragione conversazionale e l’origine della lingua pirotese, o la questione spuria favorita da Grice  – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversation treats “what is meant” as systematically inferable from “what is said” plus shared rational expectations: interlocutors presume a cooperative point to the exchange and interpret apparent deviations from maxims of quantity, quality, relation, and manner as intelligible, intention-tracking moves that generate implicatures; meaning is thus anchored in publicly recognizable intentions and norms of rational communicative conduct. Antonio Tari (1809–1884), by contrast, is a nineteenth-century Neapolitan philosopher and man of letters (trained in law, active in liberal intellectual circles, later associated with aesthetics), not a contributor to pragmatics in Grice’s technical sense; in your playful passage he functions as a culturally and historically situated foil who treats “ragione conversazionale” and the “origin of Pirotese” as if language identity and etymological borrowing were matters settled by local dialect life, lexicographic authority, and witty reversals, so that the “spurious question” becomes a satire on how people overread categories (pirot/Parrot, pirotese as essence vs acquisition) rather than an analysis of how conversational inference works. The sharp comparison, then, is that Grice offers a general explanatory model of how rational hearers recover speaker-meaning (including how misdirection, joking, and apparent irrelevance are rationally decoded), whereas “Tari” in this vignette is best read as dramatizing the pre-theoretical social materials that make Gricean inference possible—dialect pride, metalinguistic stereotypes, appeals to dictionaries, and identity talk—without supplying Grice’s machinery of calculability, cancellability, and intention-recognition that turns those materials into a theory of reason-governed conversational meaning. Nacque a Santa Maria Maggiore in provincia di Caserta -- Santa Maria Capua Vetere --, da Giuseppe, conservatore delle ipoteche per la provincia di Terra di Lavoro, e da Anna Cossa. La data di nascita, in precedenza indicata come 1° luglio, è stata corretta di recente insieme al nome di battesimo, Marcantonio, registrato negli atti anagrafici -- L’estetica reale di T.: nei carteggi e nelle testimonianze di amici e contemporanei il nome fu citato spesso nelle forma dialettale del diminutivo, Totonno. Ha tre fratelli, Benedetto, Vincenzo e Achille, e una sorella, Teresita. La famiglia è originaria di Terelle, Frosinone, piccolo borgo compreso nel territorio storico dell’abbazia di Montecassino. Non molto si sa della sua formazione prima dell’arrivo a Napoli, città in cui la famiglia possede una casa. Ivi si laurea in giurisprudenza esercitando per qualche anno la professione forense, che abbandona tuttavia per dedicarsi agli studi filosofici a lui più congeniali. Autodidatta, fornito di una straordinaria erudizione, studia musica, sotto la guida di Conti, divenendo un abile esecutore, e apprend le principali lingue moderne e quelle classiche, insegnando tra l’altro i rudimenti del tedesco a Spaventa che conosce al collegio di Montecassino. A Napoli diserta i corsi del purista Puoti, indiscussa autorità sulla cultura napoletana del tempo, e frequenta invece le lezioni e la casa di GALLUPPI , docente di logica e filosofia teoretica, tra i primi a introdurre in Italia il pensiero critico. Le numerose prove letterarie di T. -- schizzi biografici, note di storia e storia della religione, recensioni e qualche lavoro di carattere critico-estetico -- sono ospitate in riviste e giornali. Collabora più assiduamente alla prima serie della Rivista napolitana, chiusa dalla censura --, scrivendo l’introduzione al primo numero. Il periodico, aperto a influssi provenienti dai paesi europei. origine della lingua.  Grice: Caro Tari, una domanda: i piroti parlano pirotese perché sono piroti, o diventano piroti appena iniziano a parlare pirotese? Sai, mi sembra una bella questione “spuria”! Tari: Ah, Grice, è del tutto naturale! Un piroto nasce già con il pirotese sulla punta della lingua. Nessuno in Villa Santa Maria Capua Vetere si sorprende: qui il dialetto è pane quotidiano! Grice: Locke direbbe che la mia lingua barbarica trasforma il “pirot” più in un “Parrot” che in un “Pidlock”... almeno così mi dice la mia filosofia del linguaggio! Tari: Touché, ma secondo l’Oxford English Dictionary, gli inglesi il “pirot” l’hanno preso dai veneziani, mica dagli italiani—e non l’hanno mai restituito! Se ne sono appropriati per sempre, come fanno spesso con le parole e col tè! Tari, Antonio (1830). Dissertazione. Giuisprudenza. Napoli.

Giuseppe Tarozzi (Torino, Piemonte). Taorozzi, Giuseppe (1888). Dissertazione lettere. Torino.

Girolamo Tartarotti (Rovereto, Trento, Trentino-Alto Adige): la ragione conversazionale della differenza delle voci nella lingua italiana e la sua rilevanza filosofica, o dell’ omicidio rituale  -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers routinely derive what a speaker means from what is said by presuming cooperative, rational conduct in talk: interlocutors assume a shared purpose (“Cooperative Principle”) and interpret departures from its maxims (quantity, quality, relation, manner) as calculable signals that generate conversational implicatures, so that meaning is anchored in publicly recognizable communicative intentions and norms of rational exchange rather than in words alone. Tartarotti, by contrast, is an eighteenth-century Roveretan cleric-erudite best known for his interventions in debates on witchcraft (notably Del congresso notturno delle Lammie, 1749, printed by Pasquali) and for a broader Enlightenment-style critical method (libertas ingenii/libertas philosophandi), and he is not a theorist of conversational meaning in Grice’s technical sense; what your passage imaginatively attributes to him—“ragione conversazionale” behind “differences of voices” in Italian and the philosophical stakes of mishearing, culminating in a mock scenario where a phrase like “ammazza!” could be taken as either culinary praise or evidence in a “ritual murder” accusation—fits Tartarotti more as a satirically apt emblem of his anti-credulous, philological-legal sensibility than as a documented doctrine. The sharpest comparison, then, is that Grice offers a general, explicitly normative-rational framework explaining how interlocutors bridge literal content and intended meaning (and how misunderstanding is predicted when maxims are flouted or contexts shift), whereas “Tartarotti” in your staged dialogue functions as a historically situated figure whose concerns with interpretation, testimony, and culturally loaded signs (voices, exclamations, accusations) resonate with Gricean themes but remain pre-theoretical: he would treat misinterpretations as products of superstition, poor evidential standards, and interpretive malpractice, while Grice would diagnose them as predictable pragmatic inferences from linguistic form plus presumed rational cooperation, defeasible by context and cancellable by clarification. Nasce da Francesco Antonio, giureconsulto, poi membro del Consiglio cittadino dei trentuno, e da Olimpia Camilla Volani, discendente della nobile famiglia Serbati. Studia dapprima presso il modesto ginnasio di Rovereto, con scarso profitto, e dove colmare autonomamente le tante lacune, a partire dall’apprendimento del latino. A questo periodo di intensa applicazione risalgono due dissertazioni: il Dialogo della lingua latina e le Annotazioni al Dialogo delle false esercitazioni delle scuole di Paleario, in polemica contro l’uso di insegnare il latino col latino, entrambe pubblicate nella Raccolta ferrarese. Si trasferì a Padova per dedicarsi agli studi: ospitato da Calza, che lo introduce nella cerchia degli accademici patavini, è allievo e amico, fra gli altri, di Serry, Lazzarini e Volpi.  Il soggiorno padovano, ancorché breve – dopo un anno dovette tornare a Rovereto per mancanza di fondi, e rimane nelle ristrettezze finché non conquista una certa indipendenza economica con l’ausilio di un fedecommesso Serbati – risulta particolarmente significativo: ha accesso per la prima volta a biblioteche ricche e fornite, acquisì un metodo di studio ben più solido di quello scolastico, comincia a frequentare i classici della letteratura italiana – e a scrivere liriche non più alla maniera di Zappi, ma seguendo il modello di Petrarca -- Graser, Vita – e consegue una nuova maturità critica nel segno della libertas ingenii difesa nel De ingeniorum moderatione di Muratori, testo fondamentale per T.  Tornato a Rovereto, con l’intento di dare vita a un’impresa tesa al rinnovamento dell’arretrato panorama culturale trentino, fa arrivare da Verona lo stampatore Berno, a cui affida l’impressione delle Orationes di Muret, per facilitare lo studio del latino. accusa di omicidio rituale, la differenza delle voci nella lingua italiana.  Grice: Caro Tartarotti, mi chiedevo: nella lingua italiana, con tutte queste differenze di voci, non potrebbe accadere che un "omicidio rituale" venga scambiato per una semplice discussione animata a tavola? È la magia del sintamme, no? Tartarotti: Ah, fidati di Grice per essere l’unico capace di unire simili sintamme in un unico colpo! D’altronde, se si sente gridare “ammazza!” in Trentino, potrebbe essere solo un elogio culinario… o la prova di una dialettica particolarmente vivace! Grice: Quindi, se mi capita di studiare la differenza delle voci, devo stare attento a non ritrovarmi nel bel mezzo di un processo per omicidio rituale? Certo che la filosofia italiana è più pericolosa di quanto pensassi! Tartarotti: Ma sì, Grice, qui fra Rovereto e Padova, basta una sfumatura vocale per trasformare un teorema in una tragedia! Meglio riderci sopra: al massimo, finiremo accusati di omicidio… del silenzio! Tartarotti, Girolamo (1749). Del Congresso notturno delle Lammie. Venezia: Bettinelli

Onofrio Tataranni (Matera, Basilicata): la ragione conversazionale del gusto per l’antico – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats conversation as a cooperative, normatively constrained enterprise in which hearers recover what a speaker means by assuming rational adherence to a shared purpose and to maxims (quantity, quality, relation, manner), so that departures from the literal content are not noise but calculable implicatures; on this picture, “reason” is built into the very mechanism by which what is said licenses what is meant. Tataranni, by contrast, belongs to the late-Enlightenment Neapolitan world in which “ragione” is primarily a civic and moral power (reformist, pedagogical, oriented to public virtue and political order), and the “conversational” is less a formal inferential engine than a cultivated practice of conversazione—an educated traffic in examples, classical memory, and socially shared standards of taste and authority (the gusto per l’antico functioning as a common cultural code). Read against Grice, Tataranni’s appeal to Rome surviving as a name (stat Roma pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus) can be taken as a miniature lesson in how names and inherited references steer communal understanding even when the original reality has decayed, but the explanatory burden sits on historical-cultural continuity rather than on a general theory of implicature; where Grice would model the exchange as rational inference from a maxim-flout to an intended meaning, Tataranni frames it as a witty, tradition-saturated redirection of imagination and allegiance, showing conversation as a medium in which reason works through shared classical allusion and civic pedagogy more than through explicit, universalizable conversational rules. Lucano di origine, esponente dell'illuminismo napoletano. Non sappiamo a quale ceto appartenesse la sua famiglia, ma sicuramente essa è fornita dei mezzi economici. Non a caso, quando è battezzato nella chiesa cattedrale di Matera, i suoi genitori scelsero come padrino il nobile Ferraù. Sin da ragazzo matura quella che è la sua vocazione, tanto che divenne prima allievo del seminario diocesano. Sebbene ha una posizione di un certo rilievo sia in ambito ecclesiastico, sia in ambito educativo, non mostra alcun tentennamento nell'accettare l'invito del principe di Francavilla, che lo vuole a Napoli per affidargli la direzione della sua paggeria. Grazie a questo incarico, accrebbe ancor di più la stima di cui già gode, stringendo rapporti amichevoli con i filosofi più illustri ed autorevoli del tempo, incardinate nella reale accademia delle scienze e belle lettere. Ha la possibilità di frequentare proprio tali stimolanti dibattiti, che del resto avrebbero formato l'humus delle sue future riflessioni, in qualità prima di direttore della paggeria, poi della scuola militare del real collegio militare -- ufficialmente reale accademia militare -- fortemente voluta da Ferdinando IV, che mostra di aderire al generale clima di rinnovamento e consolidamento delle istituzioni militari del suo regno. Ha l'onore di esserne il direttore, partecipando vivamente, dunque, al graduale svilupparsi e moltiplicarsi dell'alveo della cultura politica riformatrice, che ancora auspica un reale cambiamento all'interno dello stesso apparato monarchico. Così, nell'arco di un settennio, pubblica dei saggi molto significativi, in cui è evidente il suo tracciato ideale di società. Tuttavia, in seguito agl’avvenimenti, quindi dopo il concordato e dopo la fallita congiura di Lauberg, le sue posizioni rispetto alla politica e allo stato cambiano tangenzialmente. filosofo principe, i sudditi e i cittadini, il popolo sovrano – sovrano e monarca, filantropia del re.  Grice: Caro Tataranni, si dice che il “gusto pell’antico” porti dritto a... BONONIA! Me lo suggerisce G. E. Moore con la sua aria da logico inflessibile: amare l’antico è sinonimo di bolognesità, non trovi? Tataranni: Ah, Grice, mi permetto una piccola correzione filosofica: se proprio il gusto va all’antico, allora bisogna arrivare a ROMA! Certo, la città forse non è più quella di un tempo, ma – come dice quel famoso epigramma – Stat Roma pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus. Il nome resta anche se le mura vacillano! Grice: Quindi mi stai dicendo che, a forza di cercare colonne e capitelli, rischio di trovarmi davanti solo… nomi su pergamene polverose? Però, che consolazione raffinata: puoi togliere Roma dall’Urbe, ma non dal discorso! Tataranni: Esattamente! E così, quando la gente cerca la gloria di Roma, trova almeno la gloria del suo nome. In fondo, persino una rosa, cambiato il nome, rimarrebbe pur sempre… oggetto di discussione da filosofi! Meglio riderci su e intingere la penna nell’inchiostro dell’antichità! Tataranni, Onofrio (1784). Saggio d’un filosofo politico amico dell’uomo. Napoli: Bisogno.

Bernardino Telesio (Cosenza, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale del filosofo sperimentale – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally derive speaker-meaning that goes beyond what is strictly said by presuming a cooperative, purposive exchange and inferring implicatures when an utterance would otherwise look oddly uninformative, irrelevant, or indirect; the Telesio passage invites a comparison in which “reason” is relocated from conversational normativity to method, namely the empiricist demand that nature be understood “according to its own principles” rather than by Aristotelian a priori machinery. Online scholarship on Telesio emphasizes that he is cast (famously by Bacon) as “the first of the moderns” and that his De natura iuxta propria principia (first published 1565, later expanded) insists on the primacy of sense perception and observation in natural philosophy, rejecting Aristotelian hylomorphism and explaining nature via active principles (notably heat and cold) acting on matter; this sets up a productive contrast with Grice, who is not primarily concerned with how we know the world but with how we make ourselves intelligible to one another in talk. Still, the shared hinge is anti-dogmatism about “reason”: Telesio attacks scholastic reasoning that outruns experience, while Grice attacks a semantics that ignores the rational expectations governing actual conversation, showing that much of what we communicate is not encoded but responsibly inferable. In the vignette’s etymological play around em-pereia, ex-perior, and per-capio, “experience” becomes itself a site of implicit meaning: the speaker invites the hearer to supply what the term-construction suggests about method and epistemic authority, a micro-level analogue of Telesio’s macro-level program of letting nature (and not inherited theory) constrain inference. So, where Telesio’s “reason” is disciplined by observation and the autonomy of natura rerum (a methodological rationality aimed at knowledge of the world), Grice’s “reason” is disciplined by cooperative norms and the calculability of implicature (a pragmatic rationality aimed at mutual understanding), and the comparison becomes: Telesio reforms the sources of warranted belief about nature, whereas Grice formalizes the sources of warranted inference about what a speaker means in conversation. Grice italico Mentre le sue teorie naturali sono state successivamente smentite, la sua enfasi sull'osservazione fa il primo dei moderni che alla fine hanno sviluppato il metodo scientifico. Nato da genitori nobili, è istruito a Milano dallo zio, lui stesso uno studioso e poeta di eminenza, e poi a Roma e Padova. I suoi studi hanno incluso tutta la vasta gamma di argomenti, classici, scienza e FILOSOFIA, che costitusceno il curriculum degli rinascimentali sapienti. Così equipaggiata, inizia il suo attacco sul LIZIO medievale che poi fiorisce a Padova e Bologna. Fonda l’Accademia cosentina. Per un certo periodo vive nella casa del duca di Nocera. Il suo grande saggio è “Sulla natura delle cose secondo i loro propri principi,” seguito da un gran numero di saggi di importanza sussidiaria. L’opinioni eterodosse che mantenne suscitano l'ira di Roma per conto del suo amato LIZIO. Tutti i suoi saggi sono stati immessi sul “Index.” Invece di postulare materia e FORMA, T. basa l'esistenza sulla materia e FORZA. Questa forza ha due elementi opposti. Il primo elemento è il calore, che espande la materia. Il secondo è il freddo, che la contræ. Questi due processi rappresentano tutte le tipi di esistenza, mentre la MASSA su cui opera la FORZA rimane la stessa. L'armonia del tutto consiste nel fatto che ogni cosa separata sviluppa in sé e per sé conformemente alla sua natura e allo stesso tempo la sua MOSSA avvantaggia il resto. empirismo, teoria della percezione, l’anima d’Aristotele, l’analogia, l’uomo e gl’animali, la ragione, i antici, contro i antici, osservazione, percezione, la tradizione empirista italiana, il Telesio di Bacone, sperimento, sperienza, esperienza, ex-perior, esperire – Latino ex-perior, Gr. em-pereia, osservazione, osservare – observatum, percipere – percezione per-capio.  G: 1939. You look as though you have smuggled Clarendon into my room. S: Sir, Clarendon smuggled itself into my room. I merely failed to resist. G: That is the Oxford defence: non-resistance as scholarship. Now, you said you found Fowler. S: I did. He is meticulous in the way only an Oxford editor can afford to be. G: Meaning: meticulous because he has already eaten. S: Precisely, sir. Fowler’s Introduction. He calls Telesio a precursor. G: Read the Fowler bit you’ve got. Slowly. Pretend you are not pleased. S: From Fowler’s Introduction, on the precursors of Bacon. He says Bacon called Telesio novorum hominum primus. G: That phrase is the hinge. Now, I want it in its habitat. What is Fowler actually doing with it. S: He is doing what Oxford does: building a genealogy so that Bacon’s empiricism looks less like a stunt and more like an inheritance. G: Good. Continue. S: Fowler says, in effect, that Telesio is the first of the moderns who made any successful attempt to construct a system on a physical basis. G: That is the English gloss. Now, the Latin. S: The Latin is Bacon’s, quoted by Fowler: novorum hominum primus. G: Minimal Latin, maximal claim. Now, S, tell me what you think Bacon meant by “new men.” S: Men who stop repeating Aristotle in the same breath as they claim to be observing nature. G: Quite. “New” in Bacon’s mouth is anti-scholastic, not merely chronological. S: But why Telesio, sir. Why not Galileo. G: Because Bacon is not compiling an Italian honour-roll. He is identifying a certain kind of rebellion: a natural philosophy built on “physical” principles rather than on scholastic forms. S: So Telesio is “new” because he turns to heat and cold, and to the senses, and makes nature explain itself. G: Exactly. Bacon likes any man who demotes syllogism and promotes experience, even if the man’s physics is later wrong. S: That sounds like your future method, sir. G: My future method is not to have one. Bacon’s method is to have a method and then call it modest. S: So Fowler is treating Telesio as a bridge. G: Yes. The word “bridge” is important. It means there is a gap: scholastics on one side, Bacon on the other, and Telesio as the first plank. S: And you want me to say where Bacon might have heard of Telesio. G: I want you to resist inventing a charming story. Give me the sober channels. S: Books. G: More. S: Continental scholarly circulation. Italian natural philosophy was not exactly secret by then. G: And? S: Bacon’s own circle of learned correspondents. He reads widely in Renaissance natural philosophy. G: Good. Also: Telesio’s De rerum natura had been published and discussed; and in the learned ecosystem, “Telesius” becomes a name for the anti-Aristotelian. S: So Bacon didn’t have to meet anyone. He had to meet a book. G: Precisely. Now, you said something about De principiis atque originibus. S: Fowler says the phrase comes from Bacon’s De principiis atque originibus. G: Good. And what does that tell you, historically. S: That the “novorum hominum primus” remark is not a casual aside in Novum Organum itself, but part of Bacon’s Latin philosophical writing from the early 1610s. G: And therefore: Fowler is cross-referencing Bacon’s own internal corpus to explain the method. S: Meticulous, sir. G: Meticulous enough that, without his Clarendon enterprise, you and I would be not primus but ultimi among the moderns. S: That is a bit harsh, sir. G: It is affectionate. Now, read another Fowler point. The one about precursors. S: Fowler places Telesio among Bacon’s precursors, and says he broke with Aristotelian tradition. G: There. That is the Oxford function: a precursor is someone you can praise without having to obey. S: Then Bacon praises him as first, but doesn’t follow him as master. G: Exactly. It is a ranking, not a discipleship. S: Sir, is novorum hominum primus the same as “primus modernorum.” G: Near enough for our purposes, but note the nuance. Modernorum is a later label; Bacon says novorum hominum, the “new men,” which has more polemical bite. It sounds like a party forming. S: Like a club. G: Like a club that refuses to call itself a club. Now, you said you wanted me to test you on empiricism. So: what is Fowler trying to do with Bacon. S: He is trying to show that Bacon is not merely a slogan about induction, but a concrete reformer of method, and that he had antecedents, and that his break was prepared. G: Good. And Telesio functions as the earliest “successful” physical system. S: Successful in the sense of attempted, not true. G: Exactly. Successful as an act of emancipation. S: And now you want the dry humour. G: I want you to notice the Oxford irony. Fowler is Wykeham Professor of Logic. He edits Bacon’s anti-syllogistic manifesto. So Oxford employs a logician to edit the book that tells you logic is too late a remedy. S: That is very Oxford, sir. G: Now, recite the Latin again, and make it sound like an aphorism, because Fowler is an aphorism man. S: Novorum hominum primus. G: Now imagine Bacon saying it with the tone of a judge. S: “First among the new men.” G: And then imagine Fowler saying it with the tone of a don who wants a footnote to do the violence. S: He would add: “from De principiis atque originibus.” G: Exactly. Oxford violence is always deferred to a reference. S: Sir, if Telesio is first, who is second. G: Bacon would not say. That would create obligations. S: Fowler might. G: Fowler might, because editors live by lists. But remember: lists are not arguments. S: Then the most relevant question is: first in what respect. G: Precisely. First in abandoning Aristotle as the principal explanatory engine. First in trying to build “on a physical basis.” S: But Telesio still has a system. He is not a mere collector of observations. G: That’s why Bacon can both admire and surpass him. Bacon wants system, but built by controlled induction rather than by a few large physical oppositions. S: Heat and cold versus Bacon’s tables and instances. G: Exactly. Now, you wanted this to be a tutorial. So I ask you: what is empiricism. S: A commitment to experience, observation, experiment, as a primary source of knowledge, and suspicion of purely a priori systems. G: Too general. Make it Baconian. S: Baconian empiricism is method: the reform of how we move from particulars to axioms, plus a critique of “idols” that distort the mind. G: Better. Now, where does Telesio fit into that. S: As a precursor who privileges observation and nature’s own principles over scholastic explanations, but without Bacon’s full inductive machinery. G: Good. Now, S, in your own tone: why would an Oxford philosopher care in 1939. S: Because Oxford likes to pretend it invented sober method, and this reminds it that Italians were trying to rebuild nature on experience long before Oxford made it a virtue. G: Excellent. Also because 1939 makes everyone look for beginnings. When the world is about to be broken, you become sentimental about origins. S: And about firsts, sir. G: Exactly. Now we must keep one thing clear: we have not yet pinned the exact Bacon sentence around novorum hominum primus, only the phrase itself as Fowler quotes it. S: So to be fully proper we would retrieve the De principiis passage. G: Yes. Fowler points; we verify. That’s the empiricist part. S: Sir, I can do one more thing: I can look in the Fowler volume for “Telesius” in the index. G: You will, and you will discover that Fowler anticipated your laziness. S: He is the first of the moderns, sir. G: No. He is the last of the Victorians. Which, in Oxford, is the same compliment. Grice: Caro Telesio, ti vedo proprio raggiante! Chi l’avrebbe mai detto che Bononia, una volta roccaforte dell’anti-empirismo, oggi si vanta di mettere l’empirismo al centro. Deve essere una vera rivincita, eh? Telesio: Hai proprio ragione, Grice! Bononia era nota per difendere strenuamente l’anti-empirismo… e se non fosse stato per quel famoso “Lizio”, che non nominiamo mai direttamente, a tener viva la ἐμπειρία, chissà dove sarebbero finiti i filosofi! Alla fine, persino le mura odoravano di aristotelismo ma con un pizzico di em-pereia greca. Grice: Ah, la ἐμπειρία! Cicero ancora si sveglia di notte sudando freddo, pensando a come tradurla. “Ex-perior”? “Per-capio”? Forse avrebbe voluto semplicemente un bel “sento-cose”, ma i latini non si accontentavano mai! Se l’avessero lasciata in greco, almeno risparmiavano qualche mal di testa... Telesio: Immagino Cicero seduto con il dizionario, inventando parole come “esperire” o “ex-perior”, mentre il povero Lizio rideva sotto i baffi. Alla fine, la vera esperienza è capire che tradurre la ἐμπειρία è più difficile che sperimentarla! Dai, brindiamo all’empirismo e alle etimologie impossibili! Telesio, Bernardino (1565). De rerum natura iuxta propria principia. Napoli: Cancer

Flavio Mallio Teodoro (Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della natura rerum – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is strictly said by presuming cooperative, purposive talk and inferring implicatures when an utterance would otherwise look oddly chosen; the Teodoro material invites a late-antique analogue in which “reason” is not only a norm of talk but also a civic and intellectual habit formed in the milieu of Milan, the Academy, and high office. Flavius Mallius Theodorus (consul 399, praised in Claudian’s Panegyricus dictus Manlio Theodoro consuli; dedicatee of Augustine’s De beata vita) is remembered both as an administrator and as an author of De metris, with other works (including a De natura rerum) reported lost; that profile sharpens a comparison in which Gricean implicature arises from micro-level conversational expectations (relevance, informativeness, manner) while Theodoran “natura rerum” functions as a macro-topic that invites culturally stabilized inferences—e.g., that someone writing De natura rerum must be aligning with, contesting, or echoing Lucretius—even though, as your exchange notes, that may be mere audience projection. In Grice’s terms, such projections are precisely the sort of inferences hearers are licensed to make when a speaker mentions something that, in context, normally carries stereotyped associations; the key difference is that Grice treats the licensing mechanism as a general rational calculus of communicative intention, whereas Teodoro exemplifies how elite late-antique discourse (panegyric, philosophical circles, and Christian-Platonic networks) makes certain implicatures socially “ready-made,” so that a title like De natura rerum almost automatically triggers doxastic and literary alignments. Put simply: Grice provides the explicit theory of how reason plus cooperative expectations generate “more-than-said,” while Teodoro’s case illustrates how, in a highly codified learned culture, reason-governed interpretation often attaches not to the sentence alone but to names, genres, and titles—so that what is “implicated” can be as much a function of encyclopedic tradition (Lucretius, Academy, court rhetoric) as of the immediate conversational exchange. Accademia. Nato da famiglia ligure. Agostino, che gli dedica il “De beata vita”, dice che conosce bene l’Accademia, Dopo essere stato per qualche tempo avvocato, poi governatore in Africa e consolare della Macedonia e aver coperto vari uffici a corte, è praefectus praetorio delle Gallie. Si occupa dell’amministrazione dei propri beni e di studi filosofici e astronomici e scrive dialoghi su questi argomenti, STILONE lo nomina praefectus praetorio per l’Italia, l’Illirico e l'Africa. Mentre confere questo ufficio ha il consolato e in quell'occasione CLAUDIO CLAUDIANO gli dedica un panegirico. Di T. resta un saggio “De metris”, mentre si sono perduti altri, tra i quali un “De natura rerum.” Console, Consolato Prefetto del pretorio d'Italia. Di T. è noto abbastanza, grazie al panegyricus dedicatogli da CLAUDIO CLAUDIANO. Di famiglia notabile, sappiamo che è console. Il suo consolato avvenne sotto il principe ONORIO.  Prima di essere console è anche prefetto con sede a Mediolanum-Aquileia. Qui Agostino conosce T., uno degl’intellettuali accademici che incontrato appunto a Milano e, scrive “De vita beata”, dedicandolo proprio a T., che a quel tempo si è ritirato dalla corte. Di T. resta un trattato di metrica, “De metris”, uno dei migliori pervenuti, e per questo molto conosciuto e studiato. Inoltre, sempre secondo CLAUDIO CLAUDIANO, e un cultore di filosofia, astronomia e geometria e scrive diverse saggi su questi argomenti che, insieme al suo consolato, sono l'argomento del panegirico a T. dedicato da CLAUDIO CLAUDIANO.  Markus, The end of ancient Christianity, Cambridge; Keil, “Grammatici Latini”. Bonfils, C. Th. e il prefetto T., Bari, Edi puglia, consoli tardo imperiali romani Stilicone Prefettura del pretorio delle Gallie Mariano Comense Siburio Teatro romano di Milano Prefettura del pretorio d'Italia Nicomaco Flaviano de natura rerum.  De metris is a short late-antique handbook on Latin poetic metre: it explains the basic units (syllable quantity, feet) and then surveys metres by type (e.g., dactylic, iambic, trochaic, anapaestic, choriambic, etc.), in a didactic, schematic way.  G: 1939. You have brought me the only surviving thing Theodorus has the decency to leave us. S: The only surviving thing, sir, is a manual on how long to make your vowels. G: Which is already more useful than half the philosophy written this term. S: It is, however, less glamorous than De natura rerum. G: Yes. I too would prefer the lost work to the extant one. S: I wish his De natura rerum had survived. I would be dis-articulating much of what you’ve forced me to articulate and hyper-articulate here. G: You are always eager to be spared by a loss. S: Loss is sometimes a kindness, sir. G: Recite. S: From De syllaba. Est igitur syllaba litterarum inter se congregatarum apta conplexio. G: Stop. Now say, without translating word by word, what he is doing. S: He is giving a definition as if definitions were obligations. G: Good. And the phrase apta conplexio suggests not any heap but a fitting composition. The syllable is already normed. S: Vsu autem inueteratum est ut etiam nulla litterarum congregatione facta solas per se eas quae uocales nominantur syllabas esse dicamus. G: Here comes usage. He makes custom a co-author. S: So his “meaning” is partly system and partly social habit. G: Exactly. And that is already a Fregean hint. The sense of “syllable” is not just whatever a private speaker fancies; it is fixed by a practice that outlives speakers. S: You’re going to tell me that’s like my “utterer’s meaning” being constrained by “sentence-meaning.” G: I am going to tell you it’s like your utterer’s meaning being hostage to a public object, and then you pretending you own it. S: Sir, shall I continue. G: Yes, but in manageable pieces. S: Syllabis uero conficiuntur pedes, quae prima quasi metra appellare possumus. G: He builds up: syllable to foot, foot to metre. Like the way you insist that word-meaning nests inside sentence-meaning. S: Syllaba et pes mensura constant, quae graece metron dicitur. G: The key word is mensura. Measure. A public constraint. Something like your “principle” but without any pretence of being ethical. S: Sunt autem syllabae partim longae, partim breues, partim communes. G: Long, short, common. A little taxonomy. Now give me the bit you think is most “phonemic.” S: ‘A’ producta longam syllabam facit, ut ‘ales’, ‘a’ correpta breuem, ut ‘amor’: ‘e’ producta longam, ut ‘emi’, e correpta breuem, ut ‘emo’: ‘i’ producta longam, ut ‘Ilium’, ‘i’ correpta breuem, ut ‘iter’: ‘o’ producta longam, ut ‘omen’, o correpta breuem, ut ‘origo’: ‘u’ producta longam, ut ‘unus’, ‘u’ correpta breuem, ut ‘utinam’. G: Now. The obvious question you were itching to ask me. S: Does any of that change what is meant, sir, or only how the line scans. G: Both, sometimes. But Theodorus is not doing lexicography; he is giving the hearer-reader the conditions under which the sound counts as the right sound. The “meaning” for him is partly this: what counts as the same form in a tradition of reading. S: So the “sense” of a word in verse depends on syllable quantity because quantity fixes whether it can be that word in that metrical slot. G: Exactly. You can now say something moderately Fregean without blushing. The sense of a segment can include its role conditions in a system. A syllable’s identity is not a bare acoustic; it is a function in metrical space. S: But you would never say “syllable meaning.” G: I would say syllables do not have utterer’s meaning. But they do have a role in fixing which word can be uttered as that word rather than another. S: So the syllable is upstream of word-meaning, as it were. G: In verse, yes. It constrains the space of eligible words. S: Vt autem solae per se uocales productae longas, correptae breues syllabas faciunt, ita etiam cum his iunctae consonantes aut longas aut breues syllabas secundum legem atque usum pronuntiationis informant. G: Legem atque usum. Again law and usage. That pairing is your bridge to Grice. I treat conversational interpretation as norm-guided. He treats pronunciation as norm-guided. S: But he’s not doing implicature. G: No. He is doing what you might call the preconditions of intelligibility inside a learned practice. And your point is that even those preconditions can invite inferential charity. When a line seems “wrong,” you don’t assume stupidity; you assume a rule you haven’t applied yet. S: Like you assume cooperation. G: Like that. Now go on. The diphthongs. S: Iunguntur uero inter se binae uocales, quas Graeci diphthongos uocant, ‘ae’ ‘oe’ ‘au’ ‘eu’ ‘ei’ ‘yi’, quae syllabae semper longae sunt. G: Semper. An uncompromising word. S: So no cancellation, sir. G: Not in the conversational sense, no. This is not a pragmatic inference you can retract; it’s a feature of the metrical system as he presents it. S: Adsociantur etiam sic inter se uocales litterae, id est ‘i’ et ‘u’, ut prior littera uim teneat consonantis, ut ‘Iuno’ ‘uideo’, quarum syllabarum ea condicio est, ut interdum longae sint, interdum breues. Id enim ratio sermonis latini et pronuntiandi forma expetit. G: Here he becomes more Gricean than he intends. He says: sometimes long, sometimes short, because ratio sermonis and pronouncing form demand it. S: That sounds like “context.” G: Exactly. He invokes something like a contextual rationality of the language: the system and practice together determine what is acceptable. That is an ancestor of the idea that meaning depends on rule plus situation. S: Now the position rules. G: Recite. S: Positione autem longae syllabae fiunt, si correpta uocalis habeat in eadem syllaba ultimam litteram consonantem, eademque littera excipiatur a consonante consequenti, ut ‘arma’. G: This is the most “non-local” part. The length of the syllable depends on what follows. S: So the syllable’s identity depends on its environment. G: Exactly. And there is your Fregean point about context. A sign’s contribution is a function of embedding. The syllable here has no autonomous fate; it is measured by what comes after. S: Fit autem positione longa syllaba, cum ipsa per se ex uocali et duabus consonantibus constat, ut ‘est’. G: He is treating “est” as a metrical object, not as a verb. S: That feels criminal to me. G: It is a different jurisdiction. In metre, “est” is a timing event. In semantics, it is a copula. Both are true, but they answer different questions about what counts as well-formed. S: Quod si praecedentem breuem syllabam, quam una uocalis facit, sequentur duae consonantes, fit syllaba positione longa, ut ‘Acrisioneis’. G: Notice the consequence: the prior short becomes long by what follows. Again, meaning-by-environment. S: Item fit positione longa, si uocalis in duplicem desinit litteram, ut ‘nox erat’, aut si praemissa uocalis praecedat duplicem graecam, ut ‘Mezentius’. G: And now the system admits foreign material, Greek doubles, as a reason for length. That’s a sociolinguistic note hiding as a metrical rule. S: Interdum autem breuis syllaba, qua pars orationis terminatur, pro longa ponitur, ut ‘omnia uincit amor, et nos cedamus amori’. G: Here is the “license.” Theodorus’ version of a sanctioned violation. S: Quod genus syllabae inter longas uel omnino refugiendum uel parcissime usurpan dum est, quamuis et apud Vergilium non rarissimum, apud Homerum uero frequentissimum reperiatur. G: That is pure pragmatics of genre. Not a rule, but a norm about norms. Don’t overdo the license, though Homer does. S: So he is calibrating expectations across authors. G: Exactly. And that is the best Griceian bridge you have. Hearers infer differently depending on the genre and the author. What’s “permissible” shifts with shared background. S: Then comes the “communis” syllable. G: Read. S: Communis uero syllaba fit, cum productam uocalem sequitur uocalis, ut ‘te Corydon, o Alexi’; item cum duas uocales inter se coniunctas consequitur uocalis, ut ‘insulae Ionio in magno’. G: The common syllable is ambiguous between long and short. S: Like a word with two senses. G: But here the ambiguity is a licensed metrical ambiguity. It is resolved by the pattern, the poet, and the practice. Again: interpretation under norms. S: Positam etiam communem apud Vergilium uidemus eam syllabam, quae in ‘c’ litteram desinit, ut eam uocalis consequatur: nam cum dicit ‘hoc erat’, longam eam syllabam constituit, quae in ‘c’ desinit; cum autem dicit ‘solus hic’, breuem eandem syllabam conlocat. G: That’s a clean demonstration that the same orthographic string can function differently depending on its position. S: So you’d say the “same expression” can have different “values” depending on environment. G: Yes, if you insist on Fregean idiom. Its contribution to the whole differs. And the hearer’s task is to recover the intended pattern, not to accuse the poet of inconsistency. S: Est etiam communis syllaba, cum praecedens in uocalem desinit, sequens autem syllaba ita habet duas consonantes, ut prior sit muta et sequens liquida, ut ‘uasto Cyclopis in antro’ et ‘uastos ab rupe Cyclopas’. G: Muta and liquida. A phonological classification as a condition for interpretation. S: Sir, you are going to say this is all “pre-semantic.” G: No. I am going to say it is one of the ways a culture turns sound into a norm-governed medium. It is not utterer’s meaning, but it is part of what makes utterer’s meaning publicly transmissible in a verse tradition. S: Then how do you connect it to your paper on utterer’s meaning and sentence-meaning. G: Easily. I insist that what a speaker means is not the same as what the sentence means. But both presuppose a stable public code. Here Theodorus is describing the code-conditions for verse: how a string counts as a syllable, how syllables count as feet, and so on. Without those, the poet’s intention cannot be recognised as intention rather than noise. S: So Theodorus is giving a kind of public “sense” infrastructure. G: Exactly. And Frege would smile, grimly, because he likes infrastructures that discipline private psychology. S: But you also like private psychology. G: I like it only when it submits itself to public accountability. S: Now. You asked earlier for an English correlative. G: Yes. If quantity makes all the difference in Latin, what’s the nearest thing in English. S: We don’t have phonemic vowel length in the same clean way, sir. G: We have tense-lax contrasts that learners misdescribe as length. S: Like sheep and ship. G: Good. And if someone says ship when they mean sheep, what do we do. S: We repair, sir. We decide: dialect, incompetence, joke, or insult. G: Exactly. And that decision is Gricean in posture: interpret charitably by default, unless the context makes charity irrational. S: But you refuse to treat stress contrasts as phonemic in the neat linguist’s way. G: I refuse to treat them as designed signals in the way a code treats them. I’m interested in how people actually manage understanding, which includes ignoring phonetic detail until it matters. S: In metre it always matters. G: In metre, yes, because the practice has elevated it into a criterion of correctness. That is Theodorus’ whole point. S: Then the difference between us and him is simply the domain. G: And the kind of norm. His norm is metrical well-formedness. Mine is conversational rationality and mutual intelligibility. Both are public, both can be violated, both can be repaired by inference. S: And “sense” in Frege’s way. G: Frege’s Sinn is not sound, but the mode of presentation. Here, the mode of presentation includes, for a verse culture, the fact that the line must be scannable. The “same thought” in different metrical shapes is not the same presentation. So even if you keep reference fixed, the verse form changes how it is presented and how it is understood. S: So you’re letting metre into Sinn. G: I’m letting practice into Sinn. Metre is one practice that makes the point easy to see. S: Theodorus would hate this. G: Theodorus would not notice. He would call it mensura and move on. S: And yet his mensura is your best evidence that meaning is not just a private act. G: Exactly. Now finish the excerpt. S: Atque haec quidem de syllabis dixisse satis sit. Nunc pedum distinctionem et varietatem persequamur. G: That line is the most merciful thing he says. “That’s enough about syllables.” S: Thank God, sir. G: Not thank God. Thank Theodorus. He has spared you. S: Only to move on to feet. G: And you, my poor adolescent, are still expected to exercise. S: Ad exercitationem adolescentum, sir? G: Exactly. That’s you. S: I’m beginning to see why he says brevis. G: Yes. Brevis is what a teacher writes when he intends to keep the pupil alive long enough to learn.GRICEVS: O Theodore, praefecte praetorii et philosophorum decus Mediolanense, audio te De natura rerum scripsisse—quod periiit, heu! Sed dic mihi: cum de “natura rerum” loquimur, num statim omnes ad illum Lucretium insanum currunt, quasi solus naturam noverit? THEODORVS: Ha! Lucretius ille—insanus quidem, sed versu sanissimus. Ego tamen, cum res publicas regerem, didici naturam rerum non solum in atomis, sed in rationibus, mensuris, et… vectigalibus latere. GRICEVS: Recte; et hic mihi nascitur quaestio mea: si quis dicit “Theodorus de natura rerum scripsit,” saepe implicat (quasi submurmurat) “ergo Lucretium refellit” aut “Lucretium imitat.” At fortasse nihil tale—fortasse tantum significat: “vir est qui et mundum et metra administrare potest.” THEODORVS: Optime intellegis! Mea implicatura (si ita loqui libet) est: “ne crede poetis tantum, ne crede praefectis tantum.” Nam si Lucretius insanus est, saltem nos ridere docet; et si nos sani sumus, saltem fateamur—natura rerum ipsa est tam mira ut interdum ultra rationem videatur, et tamen nos, per sermonem, quasi ad sanitatem revocemur. Teodoro, Flavio Mallio (c. 350 d.C.). De metris. Rome

Francesco Lana conte de’Terzi (Brescia, Lombardia): implicatura crittologica – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover speaker-meaning that goes beyond sentence-meaning by assuming cooperative norms and inferring implicatures when a contribution would otherwise look oddly chosen; the Terzi pairing you give lets that Gricean “more-than-said” be compared to an early-modern, Jesuitly technical imagination in which meaning is routinely treated as something to be encoded, transmitted, and decoded. Lana de Terzi’s Prodromo (Brescia, 1670) explicitly includes “new inventions for writing in cipher” and devices for communicating without letters or messengers, so Terzi’s world foregrounds cryptology as engineered inference: you are meant to get from an overt sign-vehicle to a hidden content via a rule or key, whereas Grice’s implicature is (in principle) keyless, generated by public practical reasoning about relevance, sufficiency, and intention. That contrast sharpens the “Peccavi” motif: the Punch pun (Peccavi = “I have sinned” / “I have Sindh”), often attributed to Napier but generally credited to Catherine Winkworth, works as a conversational implicature because the audience recognizes an intention to be witty and informative with minimal wording, supplying the intended enrichment without any agreed cipher—much closer to Grice than to Terzi’s cryptographic programs. So, where Terzi exemplifies the codified, artifact-driven side of meaning (a science of concealment and transmission), Grice theorizes the everyday, rationally accountable side (a cooperative practice where the hidden is inferable precisely because it is not mechanically encoded), and the “Peccavi” joke sits neatly between them as a borderline case: cryptologic in its bilingual hinge, but Gricean in its dependence on shared assumptions and recognitional intentions rather than on a secret key. Gaskell’s pupil -- Peccavi. It was a pupil of Gaskell who submitted to PUNCH the Peccavi conversational implicature pun.  Francesco Lana de Terzi. Francesco Lana de Terzi. LANA TERZI, Francesco  Nasce da Ghirardo e da Bianca Martinengo, entrambi di famiglia patrizia. È battezzato nella chiesa di S. Giovanni Evangelista con i nomi di Deodato Francesco Giuseppe. Compiuti gli studi primari e secondari, a quanto sembra sotto la guida di precettori privati, decide d’entrare nella Compagnia di Gesù e venne accolto nel noviziato romano di S. Andrea al Quirinale dove, oltre al biennio di probazione, frequenta il primo anno del biennio di studi letterari. Passa nel Collegio romano, dove completa gli studi letterari e compì il triennio di studi filosofici. Mentre frequenta l'annualità filosofica di fisica, divenne assistente nel celebre museo del padre Kircher, che lo introduce al metodo sperimentale -- come T stesso scrive nel suo Magisterium naturae et artis, II, Brixiae. È inoltre allievo in matematica di Casati. È a Terni, nel locale collegio gesuitico, come maestro del corso letterario. A quanto sembra, il suo insegnamento è particolarmente apprezzato, tanto da farlo insignire della cittadinanza onoraria dalle autorità civili. Di certo si dedica anche alla direzione delle rappresentazioni teatrali recitate dagl’alunni, scrivendo e pubblicando il dramma La rappresentazione di s. Valentino, martire e protettore di Terni con la coronazione di Tacito e Floriano, ternani, imperatori romani -- Terni. Torna a Roma, nel Collegio romano, chiamatovi dai superiori per intraprendere il conclusivo corso di teologia. Ma un qualche fatto nuovo fa cambiare i progetti su di lui: gli fu infatti ordinato di accompagnare nel viaggio verso Venezia il confratello Daniello Bartoli, e, una volta giunto a destinazione, di dirigersi a Parma e di stabilirsi nel collegio di S. Rocco. Durante il viaggio soggiornò nel collegio di Macerata. lingua universale, grammatica ragionata. Grice: Caro Terzi, oggi ho preparato per te una “implicatura crittologica”—non ti preoccupare, non serve nessuna chiave segreta: solo un po’ di spirito e una buona dose di curiosità! D’altronde, “crittologia” mi fa pensare subito a misteri da decifrare… ma tu, che hai la mente allenata, saprai trovare il codice nascosto!  Terzi: Ah, Grice, se la crittologia fosse solo un gioco di parole, ci metterei subito il mio “Peccavi”! Ma per l’etimologia, partiamo dal greco: “kryptós” significa nascosto, e “logos” parola o discorso. In pratica, siamo filosofi travestiti da ladri di segreti—e pure con licenza poetica!  Grice: Perfetto, Terzi! Allora siamo entrambi detective lessicali: ogni “crittologia” diventa una caccia al tesoro tra lettere e sillabe. Mi chiedo se, per un vero gioco, dovremmo inventare la “grammatica ragionata” del codice Morse—ma con implicature, naturalmente!  Terzi: Grice, se continui così, finiremo per scrivere un manuale di conversazione cifrata: “Parlare con implicature, decifrare sorrisi!” E se qualcuno ci chiede il significato di “crittologia”, rispondiamo: è l’arte di non farsi capire… ma sempre divertendosi! Terzi, Francesco Lana conte de’ (1670). Prodomo dell’arte maestra. Brescia: Rizzardi

Fulvio Tessitore (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del Vico di Tessitore – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rational reconstruction: hearers presume cooperative, purposive talk and derive implicatures by attributing to the speaker intentions that make the utterance optimally reasonable under shared norms (so that what is meant can systematically outrun what is said without collapsing into guesswork). Tessitore, by contrast, approaches “reason” through the historicist and Vichian-Cuocian axis: meaning is not primarily a timeless mechanism of inference but an achievement of historically situated practices of understanding, where philology and historiography function as an ethical discipline of interpretation (Tessitore explicitly characterizes Vico’s philology as a “science” of understanding, not merely an editorial technique, and he resists treating thinkers like Vico as simple “precursors” of later categories such as historicism). Read against this, the passage’s playful “scuola napoletana” motif points to a convergence and a divergence: both Grice and Tessitore oppose brute literalism by insisting that intelligibility depends on rational norms, but Grice models those norms at the micro-level of conversational exchange (maxims, relevance, calculable implicature), whereas Tessitore’s Vichian orientation emphasizes the macro-level conditions under which a community’s reasons become legible at all—institutions, traditions, and the historically formed languages in which agents can make claims, contest them, and inherit them. In short, Grice supplies a general, intention-based logic of how interlocutors rationally extract “more-than-said” from utterances, while Tessitore’s historicism reframes rationality as something whose authority and content are themselves events in history, so that “implicature” becomes not only a conversational phenomenon but also a reminder that what counts as a reason, a school, or even “Plato is Italian” is negotiated within a living, Naples-centered culture of interpretation rather than guaranteed by an abstract, context-free calculus. Grice italo Cuoco. Grice: “Cuoco argues that Plato is really an Italian!” -- Grice: “If there’s Oxonian dialectic and Athenian dialectic [la scuola d’Atene], there is, to follow Tessitore, the ‘scuola napoletana.’”  Storico della filosofia italiano. Docente di storia della filosofia, senatore e deputato, da decenni dedica i suoi studi allo storicismo e al pensiero politico. Ha dedicato scritti a Cuoco -- Lo storicismo di Cuoco. Laureato in giurisprudenza, insegna filosofia del diritto, storia delle dottrine politiche ed è professore di storia della filosofia nell'università Federico II di Napoli, di cui è stato rettore. Socio corrispondente dei Lincei, nazionale; senatore della Repubblica; deputato dell’Ulivo. Tra le opere dedicate alla storia dello storicismo e del pensiero politico, si ricordano: I fondamenti della filosofia politica di Humboldt; Meinecke storico delle idee; Storicismo e pensiero politico; Profilo dello storicismo politico; Filosofia e storiografia; Storiografia e storia della cultura; Introduzione allo storicismo, Schizzi e schegge di storiografia arabo-islamica italiana; Introduzione a Meinecke; Lo storicismo come filosofia dell'evento; Nuovi contributi alla storia e alla teoria dello storicismo; Storicismo e storia della cultura; Interpretazione dello storicismo; Altri contributi alla storia e alla teoria dello storicismo; Stato italiano e nazione italiana. L'anomalia italiana; Trittico anti-hegeliano da Diltehy a Weber. Contributo alla teoria dello storicismo; Da Cuoco a Weber. Contributi alla storia dello storicismo. Gli è stato dedicato il volume Filosofia, storia, letteratura: scritti in onore di T. -- a cura di CACCIATORE  et al. Si laurea in giurisprudenza -- la sua tesi ricevette dignità di stampa -- a Napoli, allievo di PIOVANI -- è libero docente per meriti eccezionali in filosofia del diritto, e professore. Insegna storia delle dottrine politiche; quindi, in poi, storia della filosofia. Cuoco.  Grice: Fulvio Tessitore, sono corso qui da Vadum Boum—la mia università nell’Hampshire, sai—perché un collega durante il tè ha dichiarato: “Vico è il più grande filosofo, vivente o meno!” Sei d’accordo, o dobbiamo mandarlo subito a Napoli per un ripasso? Tessitore: Grice, assolutamente sì! Anzi, ho passato anni a cercare di far riconoscere la grandezza di Vico perfino ai più testardi settentrionali di Bononia. Se le mie lezioni fossero state ancora più convincenti, i bolognesi scriverebbero persino le ricette della pasta in dialetto napoletano, solo per rendergli omaggio! Grice: Ah! Se Vico potesse assistere a ciò, dichiarerebbe la “scuola napoletana” ufficialmente esportata—e forse avvertirebbe anche dei pericoli di mescolare la filosofia con il ragù. Sai, all’Hampshire abbiamo discusso se lo storicismo di Vico potesse spiegare perché il tempo britannico è sempre un “evento”—e la risposta è stata: “ovviamente sì!” Tessitore: Geniale, Grice! Tra la tua dialettica hampshiriana e il nostro storicismo napoletano, potremmo risolvere i misteri dell’universo—o almeno convincere il nord che la saggezza di Vico è il vero ingrediente segreto della filosofia italiana. La prossima volta proverò a insegnare loro che Platone era davvero italiano, proprio come sosteneva Cuoco! Tessitore, Fulvio (1962). Lo storicisimo giuidico-plitico di Vincenzo Cuoco. Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia. Studi e Richerche di storia della filosofia. Sotto Piovani. Giurisprudenza, Napoli.

Padre Alfonso Testa (Borgonovo, Tidone, Piacenza, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della nemica fortuna – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains “more-than-said” content as a rational achievement: hearers presume cooperative, purposive talk, and when an utterance appears under-informative, oddly phrased, or otherwise non-optimal, they infer an implicature that restores the speaker’s contribution to intelligible rational order under shared norms. In the Testa passage, “conversational reason” and “conversational implicature” are recast as an Italian, Tidone-inflected humanism in which misfortune and “luck” become a standing topic for practical inference: the exchange treats “nemica fortuna” not as a mere theme but as a generator of meaning beyond literal wording, with humor and local proverb functioning like maxims in action—economy, relevance, and an expectation that the other will supply the intended enrichment. Where Grice’s framework is explicitly metatheoretical (a general account of how intentions, recognition, and cooperative constraints yield implicature), Testa’s intellectual profile—moving from Condillacian sensism through skeptical subjectivism to criticist concerns—invites a comparison in which “reason” is not only a conversational norm but also a stance toward contingency: the talk about fortune dramatizes how speakers manage the gap between what can be said and what must be inferred when the world is variable, ironic, or resistant to tidy description. Put sharply: Grice formalizes the rational mechanics by which interlocutors derive implied meaning from utterances, while the Testa vignette stylizes that same rationality as a cultivated conversational resilience, where the implicature is not just an interpretive product but a way of coping—turning the instability of “luck” into shared understanding through wit, proverb, and the mutual expectation that rational hearers can complete what is left unsaid. -- la scuola di Tidone – filosofia piacentina – filosofia emiliana -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo  (Tidone). Abstract. Keywords: implicatura, nemica fortuna. Filosofo. studia al collegio Alberoni, da cui uscì prete Rifiutata la cattedra universitaria a Pisa offertagli da ROVERE, è deputato al parlamento piemontese e presidente onorario della facoltà filosofico-letteraria di Parma. La sua evoluzione intellettuale mosse dal sensismo anti-razionalistico di Condillac e, attraverso il recupero della tradizione scettico-soggettivistica, approda al criticismo Di essa sono chiara testimonianza le sue opere più importanti: Della filosofia dell'affetto; Filosofia della mente; Il nuovo saggio sull'origine delle idee di SERBATI esaminato; Della critica della Ragion pura del criticismo. Rifiuta la cattedra filosofica a Pisa e prefere lavorare a Parma, divenendone presidente dell'area filosofica. Deputato al parlamento sabaudo. T. Storia di un povero pretazzuolo di Fausto Chiesa, pubblicato dalla libreria Romagnosi di Piacenza. Treccani Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. „,tr,*mT—r m-m r- T“ » 11 V 'or- , , I  k, i \'\ < f - t4»VOY. :. .Piaiiì zgdb y.Gri&ffli COLLEZI QNE OPUSCOLI y v'^P' • \ l/l ED INEDITI PROFESSORE DI FILOSOFIA NEL LICEO DI PIACER** Prezzo - Lire Italiane »  ! V "s. t V- ì  %os. ye. «3 COLLEZIONE DEGÙ OPUSCOLI ♦ DITI SD INEDITI di T.  PROFESSORE DI FILOSOFIA NEL LICEO DI PIACENZA . v» PIACENZA DAI TIPI NAZIONALI DI A. DEL MAJNO  1/ EDITORE agli italiani risorti Aline riami m retili animus. Tacito Apric. Premi. Il presente manifesto è stato scritto colla penna colorata in rosso, verde e bianco, desideratissimo segno dell’unione c dell’indipendenza italiana.  G: “Piacentino, and no order. That is already a declaration.” S: “A modest one?” G: “Not modest. Deliberate. He does not say, ‘Attend, I speak as a priest.’ He says, in effect, ‘Attend, I speak as a philosopher from Piacenza.’” S: “Which is almost more ambitious.” G: “Provincial ambition is often the most durable sort. Rome wants authority. Piacenza wants to be believed.” S: “And this introduction is not pious at all. Sensibility, passions, organization, causality, self-love, desire, Locke, Condillac, Destutt de Tracy. One expects incense; one gets psychology.” G: “Quite. One expects cassock; one gets Condillac.” S: “But can a priest write like this without scandal?” G: “A priest can write about desire more safely than most, because he has had to hear about it from everyone else.” S: “You are improving him.” G: “No, merely locating him. Look at the sequence. Sensibility first. Then affection. Then bodily organization. Then self-love. Then desire. Then the philosophers of desire. It is not random. He is building the soul from below.” S: “From below the will, you mean.” G: “Exactly. That is what makes him interesting. He is not beginning with the majestic faculty of rational willing. He is beginning with the mess. With the way a creature is affected before it chooses.” S: “So affection before volition.” G: “Yes, though he will not be able to keep them apart. Nobody can. Affection breeds desire; desire presses toward willing; willing borrows half its language from desire and then pretends to be superior.” S: “That sounds suspiciously like your own position.” G: “My own position is more cunning. I should like to reduce judgement to willing for convenience, not because the world is arranged for my comfort, but because willing is more lively.” S: “And because one soon believes what one desires?” G: “A very dangerous proverb, and therefore often true.” S: “Then Testa would please you. He seems to think the life of mind begins where one is first moved.” G: “Yes, though I should want to know whether he is moved by the object, by the body, or by an image of the object. There lies half the trouble.” S: “You are already tutoring him.” G: “One must do something for the dead.” S: “He quotes Locke on desire, then Condillac, then Destutt de Tracy. That is almost a little anti-Kantian procession.” G: “Not anti-Kantian exactly. Pre-Kantian in tone, post-Kantian in danger. He is asking what desire is as if the critical philosophy had not yet made willing respectable.” S: “And all this in 1829.” G: “That is the delicious part. In 1829 one may still write as if sensibility were a frontier and not a settled district.” S: “But from a priest.” G: “You keep saying ‘but’ as if priest and psychology were incompatible. I should have thought the confessional a better laboratory than Leipzig.” S: “You are wicked.” G: “No, empirical.” S: “What do you make of the section on amor proprio?” G: “That he knows one cannot begin anywhere else. Every moral philosophy that starts by praising benevolence has quietly relied on self-love to get itself to the page.” S: “That is almost Butler.” G: “Almost. Butler civilises self-love. Testa seems more willing to anatomise it.” S: “And your own conversational self-love?” G: “A useful principle. If one did not wish one’s own contribution to survive, conversation would collapse into philanthropy.” S: “So the Cooperative Principle has an egoistic basement.” G: “Naturally. The benevolent chap is still a chap.” S: “Then desire is not merely some low faculty. It is the beginning of the whole machinery.” G: “Yes, but only if one is careful. Desire is not yet intention.” S: “You said that as if you were correcting a paper.” G: “I often am, even when none is set. Desire may be the father of thought, but intention is thought wearing boots.” S: “And affection?” G: “Affection is the weather in which both occur.” S: “That is rather good.” G: “It is also rather vague, which is why I do not publish it.” S: “Testa might. He seems happy with large headings.” G: “Della filosofia dell’affetto is a large heading because he is trying to found a region. One does not call a pamphlet that. One calls a campaign that.” S: “He really is writing a treatise on one faculty.” G: “Not one faculty. One zone of the soul. That is subtler. Faculty-language is too tidy. Affetto, desiderio, amor proprio, passione, sensibilità: these are not compartments. They are disturbances with names.” S: “And yet he classifies.” G: “Because philosophers classify wherever life becomes inconvenient.” S: “Do you think he believes affection explains willing?” G: “He wants it to explain enough of willing that willing ceases to look miraculous.” S: “That would annoy the Kantians.” G: “Then he has done at least one useful thing.” S: “What would you say, if he were here?” G: “I should ask whether his desire is object-directed or image-directed. Whether one desires the thing, or the pleasurable representation of the thing. And whether the painful condition from which desire moves is merely lack, or already an interpretation of lack.” S: “You are making him earn his 1829.” G: “A vintage year ought to justify itself.” S: “And what if he replied that desire begins in a deficiency of sentire, intensified by images, and directed toward a restoration of equilibrium?” G: “Then I should say he is very nearly a psychologist, and dangerously close to sounding modern.” S: “He would perhaps not mind.” G: “No, but his readers might.” S: “You sound pleased by him.” G: “I am pleased when a man in a collar writes as if the soul had nerves.” S: “And if he had styled himself Padre Alfonso Testa?” G: “The book would have lost something. ‘Piacentino’ is much better. It says: I am local enough to be trusted, and philosophical enough to be left alone.” S: “Do you think his Piacentini knew he taught where he had been formed?” G: “Very likely. Which is why he needn’t say it. Public understatement relies on local knowledge. Rather like our conversation.” S: “That is too self-flattering.” G: “Perhaps. But one should never underestimate the philosophical value of being already known.” S: “Then the book begins not with dogma but with shared familiarity.” G: “Exactly. He says, in effect, ‘You know who I am; let us now discuss desire.’” S: “There are worse openings.” G: “There are many worse openings. ‘Let us begin from pure reason,’ for instance.” S: “And where do you put him, then?” G: “Between sermon and science, but nearer science than sermon.” S: “And nearer Locke than Kant?” G: “In method, yes. In anxiety, perhaps not. A man who writes on desire in 1829 has already heard that rational will is waiting in the next room.” S: “And he is trying to keep the door shut.” G: “Or at least ajar, so that sensibility gets the first word.” S: “Would you give him to undergraduates?” G: “Only the better sort. The others would either sentimentalise him or despise him.” S: “And you?” G: “I should use him to remind them that before philosophers made willing majestic, they had to discover that wanting was already complicated.” S: “That sounds like a moral.” G: “It is only a warning.” S: “Against what?” G: “Against mistaking a decision for the beginning of the mind.” S: “And the punchline?” G: “If Testa is right, the will is not queen of the soul at all.” S: “What is it, then?” G: “Merely desire in academic dress.”Grice: Caro Testa, ti confesso che la “nemica fortuna” mi perseguita da anni! Sai, una volta ho passato un intero seminario a sviscerare quell’assurda frase inglese: “he is a lucky fellow”—e alla fine, ho concluso che era una vera e propria sciocchezza… Tu che ne pensi, filosofo piacentino, la fortuna è davvero così nemica o semplicemente malintesa?  Testa: Ah, Grice, la fortuna dalle nostre parti si dice che cambi umore più spesso di un fiume in piena! Come diceva mio zio a Borgonovo, “la fortuna prima ti sorride e poi ti fa l’occhiolino – ma sempre da lontano!” Quanto alla tua “lucky fellow”, forse era solo un inglese che doveva venire a Piacenza per capire cosa vuol dire davvero… essere fortunati o sfortunati! Grice: Magnifico! Dunque la fortuna da voi si comporta come una vecchia signora: ti invita a cena, poi ti lascia fuori dalla porta sotto la pioggia. E non credere che “he is a lucky fellow” abbia portato chiarezza in Inghilterra—anzi, i miei studenti dopo quel seminario erano più confusi che mai! D’altronde, meglio riderci su: la logica non sempre vince contro la sorte, vero?  Testa: Assolutamente! Qui a Tidone, quando la fortuna gira male, usiamo dire: “Meglio un sorriso che una cattedra a Pisa!”—e infatti io l’ho rifiutata! Se la vita è un gioco, allora la conversazione è il nostro asso nella manica… e tu, Grice, sei il re di cuori della pragmatica! Testa, Alfonso (1829). Introduzione alla filosofia dell’affetto. Piacenza: Majno.

Vincenzo Filippone Thaulero (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il problema d’una antropologia filosofica; o, l’implicatura conversazionale dell’autorità ed il risentimento – In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, what is communicated in dialogue depends not only on what is explicitly said but on rational expectations about authority, sincerity, and mutual recognition of intentions, which allow hearers to infer implicatures beyond the literal utterance. Vincenzo Filippone Thaulero approaches a convergent problem from within philosophical anthropology and social theory, focusing on how authority and resentment shape the conditions under which meaning is received, resisted, or distorted in conversation. Whereas Grice treats implicature as a largely cooperative phenomenon generated by rational agents who assume good faith, Thaulero is especially attentive to situations in which authority provokes suspicion or ressentiment, so that what is said by a speaker in a position of cultural or institutional power carries unintended implicatures tied to domination, legitimacy, or moral pressure. The comparison highlights Grice’s normative model of conversational reason, which explains how understanding ought to proceed under idealized cooperative conditions, alongside Thaulero’s more sociologically grounded perspective, which shows how conversational meaning is refracted through lived experience, value conflicts, and emotional responses, revealing that implicature can arise not only from rational calculation but also from historically and socially embedded tensions between speaker and audience. Grice italo -- autorita e risentimento. Grice: “We loved Strawson’s “Freedom and resentment,” since it spoke to a generation – not exactly mine!” -- Filosofo romano. Filosofo lazio. Filosofo italiano. Abruzzese, figlio del barone Carlo, nobile di Chieti e patrizio teramano. Consigue la maturità classica al liceo Massimo di Roma. Si iscrive alla Sapienza di Roma, dove si laurea a pieni voti con una tesi in filosofia del diritto, “Una metodologia del diritto”, sotto VECCHIO come relatore, e ottenne il diploma di perfezionamento con lode in filosofia del diritto nella scuola di perfezionamento di filosofia del diritto a Roma, con la tesi “La ‘fictio juris’ in Bartolo da Sassoferrato”, con SFORZA come relatore. Assistente volontario di PERTICONE, ordinario di storia contemporanea a scienze politiche, usufruì di una borsa della Humboldt-Stiftung che gli consente studiare in Germania per approfondire sulla problematica del valore. STURZO gli affida insieme ad Addio la direzione del “Bollettino di Sociologia”, poi divenuto “Sociologia”, divenendo uno dei maggiori collaboratori dell'istituto creato dal fondatore del partito popolare italiano. Inviato al congresso di sociologia di Amsterdam e fra i fondatori della Società italiana di scienze sociali.  Consigue la libera docenza in filosofia morale e ricopre vari incarichi presso Salerno. Vince il concorso a cattedra per filosofia morale del magistero di Salerno.  Muore in un incidente automobilistico.  Gli è stata intitolata la scuola di Cologna Spiaggia a Roseto degli Abruzzi. Altri saggi: “Società e cultura” (Giuffré, Milano); “Il mare ha voce, ha voce il vento” (Storia e Letteratura, Roma); “Il darsi dell'origine nell'esperienza sociale e religiosa” (Studium, Roma); “Intorno al concetto di sociologia generale”. autorita e risentimento.  Grice: Che piacere incontrarti, Vincenzo Filippone Thaulero! Devo ammettere che è la prima volta che conosco un italiano con un cognome che inizia con quella strana e ostica “th”. Sono davvero curioso: come la pronunciate voi in Abruzzo? Dite “Taule-ro” o c’è qualche sfumatura segreta che mi sfugge? Thaulero: Ah, caro Grice, hai colto una delle nostre piccole complicazioni linguistiche! In famiglia abbiamo sempre scherzato sul “th”, che da noi, tra Teramo e Chieti, diventa semplicemente una “t” dolce. “Taule-ro”, proprio come dici tu, e i nostri nonni ridevano di chi provava a farla suonare all’inglese! Grice: Splendido! In Inghilterra, sai, il “th” divide intere generazioni. Ma trovare un filosofo italiano che porta la “th” come vessillo, tra autorità e risentimento, mi fa pensare che la filosofia abbia davvero voce in ogni vento – proprio come scrivi tu! Thaulero: Grazie, Grice! A volte la “th” è solo un simbolo, altre volte un piccolo ostacolo. Ma, come dicevano gli abruzzesi, “il mare ha voce, ha voce il vento”: ciò che conta è farsi comprendere – e magari anche sorridere sulle differenze. D’altronde, la conversazione è la vera anima della filosofia! Thaulero, Vincenzo Filippone (1956). Contrbuto. Bollettino di sociologia, Istituto Sturzo.

Tiberiano: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Tiberiano (336 A. D.). Amnis ibat.

Tiberio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale del filosofo principe – In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, understanding arises from the assumption that speakers are rational agents who choose their words cooperatively, so that even seemingly incidental features of an utterance can function as conversational implicatures revealing underlying intentions; Tiberio, conceived here as a philosopher‑prince with a serious commitment to philosophy and a sympathy for Skepticism as taught by figures like Teodoro and Trasillo, embodies a compatible but differently grounded conception of conversational reason. While Grice analyzes implicature through abstract principles that regulate dialogue independently of status or authority, Tiberio approaches conversational meaning from within the Roman ideal of clarity, simplicity, and moderation, emphasizing how philosophical discourse should avoid unnecessary ornament and foreign excess, whether linguistic or conceptual. The playful focus on the shift from TH to T captures this contrast: for Grice, such a choice can itself become an implicature to be rationally inferred by a hearer, whereas for Tiberio it reflects a principled preference for linguistic familiarity that aligns conversation with civic and philosophical virtue. The comparison thus shows Grice offering a formally articulated account of how rational inference governs what is meant beyond what is said, while Tiberio represents a historically situated version of the same insight, where conversational reason is exercised through restraint, skeptical caution, and the Roman commitment to intelligibility as a condition of shared philosophical understanding. Philosophers whose name began with TH in Latin but changed the TH to T in Italian. Filosofo italiano. Principe. He takes a serious interest in philosophy, and is especially drawn to the Scesi, as he calls it. His tutors are Teodoro and Trasillo. Grice: “What surprises me is that both Tiberio, Teodoro, and Trasillo bear names that start with a T. But Strawson knows better: ‘The T in Theodoro is vulgar Italian, not Latin, or Greek!” GRICEVS: Ave, Tiberio, princeps philosophorum! Dic mihi, num vere credis litteram “T” esse feliciorem quam “TH” inter philosophos Romanos? TIBERIVS: Salve, Gricevs! Ego vero arbitror litteram “T” esse simpliciorem et magis aptam Romanis, cum “TH” saepe sonet alienum atque difficile ad pronuntiandum. Nam apud nos, claritas et brevitas in sermone philosophico semper laudantur. GRICEVS: Quid mirum! Sed nonne credis “TH” dare nomen philosophis vel aureum vel Graecum, quasi signum sapientiae ex oriente? Forsitan littera ipsa sit implicatura conversationale, indicans profunditatem vel subtilitatem cogitationis. TIBERIVS: Sane, Gricevs! Sed, ut princeps philosophorum Romanorum, praefert litteram “T,” quae nobis familiaris est. In fine, sapientia non in littera sed in mente et dialogo residet; et, ut docet schola Romana, veritas saepe invenitur in simplicitate. Tiberio (a. u. c. DCCLXVII). Sententiae philosophicae. Roma.

Tiberio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale della filosofia e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’anti-filosofia –not the prince. Not the prince. This one writes on philosophical subjects. Grice: “It would have been a good thing if the OTHER one did!” GRICEVS: Salve, Tiberi! Dic mihi: quid tibi videtur esse ratio inter philosophiam et anti-philosophiam? TIBERIVS: Ave, Grice! Ego credo anti-philosophiam esse provocationem philosophiae—non negationem, sed potius invitationem ad dubitandum. GRICEVS: Pulchre dictum! Potesne exemplum dare ubi anti-philosophia vere auxilio fuit progressionis philosophiae? TIBERIVS: Certe! Cogita de Socrate, qui saepe quaestiones ponebat quae lineas philosophiae perturbabant; eius “ignorantia docta” initium dedit novis modis cogitandi. Sic anti-philosophia fit instrumentum ipsius sapientiae.

Adriano Tilgher (Resina, Ercolano, Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale degl’orecchie dell’aquila – In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, what speakers convey beyond literal sentence meaning is explained through conversational implicature, which presupposes rational cooperation and an audience capable of reconstructing the reasons that make an utterance appropriate and intelligible in context. Adriano Tilgher approaches conversational reason from a more historical, cultural, and pluralistic angle: his philosophical relativism and his reflections on style, theatre, and modern culture emphasize that meaning is never fixed once and for all but always filtered through perspectives, forms of life, and interpretive stances. Whereas Grice seeks to stabilize conversational understanding by appealing to general principles of rational cooperation that underwrite inference across contexts, Tilgher foregrounds the instability and multiplicity of meanings, suggesting that what is “heard” in discourse—his metaphorical “eagle’s ears”—depends on the listener’s attunement to competing forms, values, and historical situations. The comparison thus reveals Grice as offering a normative, analytic account of how reason governs implicature in ordinary conversation, while Tilgher represents a critical and relativistic counterpart, for whom conversational reason is inseparable from cultural pluralism, stylistic choice, and the contingent conditions that shape how utterances acquire significance rather than from universal maxims alone. -- italo-tedesco -- il relativismo filosofico –  la scuola di Resina -- filosofia campagnese -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo  (Resìna). Abstract. Keywords: le orecchie dell’aquila, lo spccio del bestione trionfante.. Nacque a Resìna, l’odierna Ercolano, in provincia di Napoli, da Achille, un vetraio di origine tedesca, e da Rosa Eufrasia Oteau -- cognome ch’è spesso italianizzato in Ottò.  Dopo le scuole elementari, si trasferì a Napoli. Mentre frequenta il liceo classico Vico conosce Livia De Paolis, che sposa.  In quegli anni T. matura una passione per la filosofia e per la letteratura, e si avvicina a Croce, che frequenta assiduamente e considera un vero e proprio maestro, come mostrano i suoi primi lavori. In realtà, non si tratta di un rapporto destinato a durare a lungo.  Dopo la laurea in giurisprudenza a Napoli, con Salvioli, docente di storia del diritto italiano, T. vinse un concorso per l’incarico di aiutobibliotecario, e prese servizio presso la Biblioteca nazionale di Torino -- lettere a Croce, in Carteggio Croce-Tilgher.  Passati i primi mesi, la lontananza dalla sua città e dai suoi affetti si trasforma in angoscia, e T. chiede aiuto a Croce per ottenere il trasferimento a una sede più vicina. Dopo mesi di scambi epistolari incentrati sullo stesso tema – e nei quali T. era divenuto decisamente pressante – il filosofo interruppe le comunicazioni. È comunque riuscito a ottenere il trasferimento di T.  alla Biblioteca Alessandrina di Roma, che avvenne.  Dal Carteggio risulta, inoltre, che T. non era puntuale nel rispettare gli impegni editoriali, determinando il disappunto e l’insofferenza del suo interlocutore, che fa della disciplina una ragione di vita. Lo stesso T., del resto, si risentì di fronte alle critiche di Croce al suo Arte, conoscenza e realtà. Croce era convinto – come scrive a Gentile – che il suo amico avrebbe dovuto dedicarsi alla storia della filosofia per acquisire quel metodo e quella maturità scientifica. le orecchie dell'aquila, lo spaccio del bestione trionfante.  Grice: Caro Tilgher, permettimi una curiosità: ma Gentile, quando sentiva quel "gh" nel tuo cognome, non pensava forse che suonasse un po’ troppo “unno” per le sue orecchie così raffinate d’italico filosofo? Magari temeva che ti fossi presentato a Roma con le orecchie dell’aquila e la spada di Attila! Tilgher: Ah, Grice! In effetti Gentile, col suo spirito tutto latino, mi guardava come se avessi nidificato aquile in biblioteca invece di libri! Ma ti confesso che, se proprio devo scegliere, preferisco le “orecchie dell’aquila” alle orecchie d’asino di certi critici! Grice: Che immagine! Vedi, in Inghilterra diciamo che chi ha le orecchie troppo grandi sente anche quello che non dovrebbe... Ma tu, con quelle d’aquila, riuscivi a captare le nuvole del relativismo e pure i sospiri di Croce quando tardavi con un manoscritto! Tilgher: Proprio così! Anche se, a volte, sentivo persino la voce del “bestion trionfante” che mi suggeriva di prendere la vita con un pizzico di ironia. E poi, caro Grice, meglio un cognome da aquila che una mente da gallina! Tilgher, Adriano (1921). Studi sul teatro. Roma: Edizioni della Voce

Sebastiano Timpanaro (Parma) junior: la ragione conversazionale -- In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, what a speaker communicates beyond the literal content of an utterance is explained through implicature, derived from the assumption that interlocutors are rational agents cooperating according to shared norms that make an utterance intelligible as a reasonable move in conversation. Sebastiano Timpanaro approaches an analogous problem from the side of philology and historical criticism: his work on textual transmission, on Lehmann’s method, and on Leopardi is guided by the idea that meaning emerges from disciplined attention to material detail, error, and correction, rather than from idealized intentional coherence alone. Where Grice emphasizes rational inference by hearers reconstructing speaker intentions under conversational principles, Timpanaro stresses the limits of intentional control, showing how meaning is shaped by objective constraints, mechanical mistakes, and historical processes that escape conscious design. The comparison thus highlights Grice as developing a normative theory of conversational rationality focused on inference and cooperation in living discourse, while Timpanaro represents a materialist and historically grounded counterpart, in which rational understanding depends less on ideal conversational maxims than on a critical method that accounts for the concrete conditions under which texts and meanings are produced, transmitted, and sometimes distorted. Grice: I like him. Leopardi. Filosofo -- è stato un filologo classico, saggista e critico letterario italiano. M. Firenze. Lapide che commemora le vicine case di Pisa dove vissero T. senior, Maria Timpanaro Cardini e T.  junior -- Pisa, via San Paolo. Figlio di T. senior e di Maria Timpanaro Cardini, studia a Firenze col celebre filologo classico PASQUALI (vedasi, membro tra l'altro dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei e della British Academy.  Scelse di rifiutare la carriera di insegnamento universitario, senza tuttavia rinunciare a un'attività scientifica davvero imponente, indirizzata verso la filologia latina, la letteratura italiana e alcuni grandi temi filosofici: il marxismo, il materialismo e la psicoanalisi freudiana.  S'impegna anche in politica, militando inizialmente nella sinistra interna del Partito Socialista Italiano; aderì al Psiup e al Pdup. In seguito, rimanendo coerente con le sue idee leniniste, guarda con interesse al progetto di Rifondazione Comunista, senza però mai iscriversi al partito. È sepolto nel Cimitero Monumentale della Misericordia dell'Antella, Comune di Bagno a Ripoli, provincia di Firenze. Timpanaro e Lachmann Nella fondamentale monografia La genesi del metodo del Lachmann, T. ripercorre i lineamenti di storia della filologia, con particolare riferimento alle molteplici intuizioni e agli spunti che hanno preceduto l'opera di Lachmann e a cui lo studioso tedesco aveva poi dato una sistematica e organica formulazione; ancor oggi il cosiddetto metodo di Lachmann, pur rivisitato nel corso dei decenni, rimane basilare per approntare l'edizione critica di un testo, soprattutto di un autore latino o greco.  Timpanaro e L'infinito In un articolo intitolato Di alcune falsificazioni di scritti leopardiani, T. ha fornito la dimostrazione che i tre abbozzi de L'infinito di LEOPARDI , pubblicati in Tutte le opere, a cura di Francesco Flora, Milano, Mondadori Editore, sono in realtà dei falsi.  Opere La filologia di Leopardi, Firenze, Le Monnier.  G: “Timpanaro begins in 1945 with Ennius. That is a good age at which to begin: young enough for audacity, old enough for footnotes.” S: “And under bombs, more or less.” G: “Yes. Other men grabbed rifles; the Italians grabbed fragments.” S: “That is unfair.” G: “Only if one thinks Ennius less worth rescuing than Europe. Timpanaro seems to have thought the two enterprises adjacent.” S: “You are in a mood.” G: “Philology encourages it. One is always told one is doing something merely preparatory, and then one discovers that civilisation hangs from a damaged line in Nonius.” S: “So Timpanaro in 1945 writes Per una nuova edizione critica di Ennio. The very title sounds half modest, half insurgent.” G: “Exactly. ‘Per una nuova edizione’ means, in polite Italian, ‘the old one will no longer do.’” S: “And the old one was Vahlen.” G: “Vahlen as institution, yes. The great post-Lachmannian comfort blanket. Admirable, indispensable, and by then intolerably old.” S: “So Pasquali sees the need, Timpanaro feels the need, Mariotti writes letters about the need, and eventually Skutsch does the deed.” G: “That is the international division of labour. Florence diagnoses, Oxford publishes.” S: “Skutsch was at Oxford?” G: “Eventually. German by origin, British by appointment, Oxford by immortality. Which is fitting, since Ennius belongs to that awkward zone where nationality is already a commentary.” S: “And Mariotti?” G: “Mariotti matters because he was not merely a bystander. He was the nearest thing Timpanaro had to a fellow campaigner in the Italian line. They wrote to one another about Ennius the way dons write about weather if the weather determined the fate of Rome.” S: “And neither of them, strictly, a philosopher.” G: “No. But strictness is often the enemy of insight.” S: “Then let us be unstrict. What does an analytic philosopher make of Timpanaro, Pasquali, Terzaghi, Mariotti, and this poor shredded Ennius?” G: “He sees a rational practice. That is already enough.” S: “You mean: evidence, inference, correction, and no metaphysical fog?” G: “Quite. Timpanaro would have liked the phrase ‘no metaphysical fog,’ though he would probably have added a polemic against psychoanalysis before tea.” S: “And Ennius?” G: “Ennius is the delicious case. Officially a poet. Actually a small republic of genres.” S: “Annales, tragedies, satires.” G: “And more. Epicharmus. Euhemerus. Protrepticus. A poet who refuses to remain only a poet.” S: “Then he really is philosophically tempting.” G: “Very. Because he stands before philosophy ‘arrives at Rome’ in the pompous textbook way, and yet he is already importing cosmology, theology, exhortation, and reflective anthropology.” S: “Before Carneades, before the embassy, before the harbour scene.” G: “Exactly. Before philosophy is seen to dock, Ennius is already smuggling it inland.” S: “That is rather good.” G: “It is also true.” S: “And Timpanaro knows this?” G: “Of course. That is why Ennius matters to him beyond mere text. A fragmentary author tests not only scholarship but judgement.” S: “Because every editorial decision is an argument?” G: “And every argument is half philology, half philosophy, if the text is sufficiently broken.” S: “So Grice, or rather G., reading Timpanaro, does not say, ‘Ah yes, another textual chap.’ He says, ‘Here is a man deciding what counts as evidence.’” G: “Yes. And further: here is a man deciding what counts as the same work, the same line, the same authorial intention under ruin.” S: “That sounds almost like philosophy of language.” G: “It is philosophy of language without the vanity of calling itself that.” S: “And Pasquali?” G: “Pasquali is the great elder pressure. He sees that Vahlen must be superseded, and he sees in the young Timpanaro the possible editor of Ennius.” S: “A kind of appointed avenger.” G: “Or appointed cleaner. Editors spend half their lives tidying after dead men and the other half deciding which dirt is authentic.” S: “Terzaghi comes in as relatore.” G: “Yes. Formal supervisor, one might say. Pasquali the true formative force, Terzaghi the official seal. That is a very academic arrangement.” S: “And Mariotti the correspondent.” G: “The living marginalia.” S: “You make them sound like a quartet.” G: “They are a quartet, with Ennius as the absent fifth player and Vahlen as the dead conductor.” S: “And Skutsch?” G: “Skutsch is the late soloist who finally records the symphony.” S: “Do you think Timpanaro minded?” G: “He minded in the only honourable way: by writing on Skutsch as one editor of Ennius speaking to another.” S: “Not nationalist resentment, then.” G: “No. More refined than that. A sense that one had long inhabited the same problem and had not been the man to close it.” S: “Which is almost sad.” G: “Philology is mostly sadness arranged as method.” S: “And still you say an analytic philosopher should admire it.” G: “Certainly. Because it disciplines the imagination. One cannot merely suppose. One must show why a conjecture deserves to live.” S: “That is not unlike your own habits.” G: “I should hope not. Though I have fewer manuscripts and more undergraduates.” S: “Let us talk Ennius proper, then. If he is not merely the annalist, what philosophical content do G. and S. find?” G: “Begin with Euhemerus.” S: “The rationalising of the gods.” G: “Yes. Gods as exalted mortals, founders, benefactors, rulers made divine by memory.” S: “That is already philosophy of religion, or at least myth under criticism.” G: “Indeed. One can hear Hume yawning in advance.” S: “And Epicharmus?” G: “That is subtler. Cosmological, quasi-physical, with reflections on soul and body and the operations of nature. Fragmentary enough to allow irresponsibility, but not so fragmentary that one may say anything one likes.” S: “So exactly the sort of text Timpanaro would relish.” G: “Because it forces one to distinguish reconstruction from invention.” S: “And Protrepticus?” G: “A philosophical genre by title alone. Exhortation. The very idea that poetry may urge one toward a mode of life or thought rather than merely recount events.” S: “So Ennius already contains the possibility that poetry thinks.” G: “And that is where the philosophers become interested.” S: “Even if condescendingly.” G: “Especially if condescendingly. Philosophers love border cases because they allow one to be generous without yielding the border.” S: “What would G. say, reading one of the famous lines?” G: “He would choose one that sounds like Rome announcing itself before it knows what Rome is.” S: “Such as?” G: “Moribus antiquis res stat Romana virisque.” S: “The Roman commonwealth stands by ancient customs and by men.” G: “Exactly. It is almost proverb, almost philosophy, almost constitutional theory.” S: “And entirely Ennius.” G: “And entirely why a philosopher cannot simply shrug and say ‘mere poet.’” S: “Though he might try.” G: “He might. But the line persists because it compresses a political anthropology into verse.” S: “So Grice, with Lit. Hum., hears not only metre but doctrine.” G: “He hears a maxim. A Roman maxim before philosophy properly institutionalises maxims.” S: “And Timpanaro hears a textual problem.” G: “And both are right.” S: “That is annoyingly harmonious.” G: “The best disagreements usually are.” S: “Would G. admire Timpanaro’s materialism?” G: “He would admire the refusal to sentimentalise intention. Timpanaro keeps reminding one that texts travel through blunders, slips, contamination, false piety, editorial violence.” S: “Which is a salutary pressure on any clean theory of meaning.” G: “Yes. It says: authorial intention is not sovereign over transmission.” S: “So even if Grice begins with intention, Timpanaro forces him to add vehicle, medium, and damage.” G: “Exactly. Timpanaro is what happens when the post brings bad news to philosophy of language.” S: “And Mariotti?” G: “Mariotti shows that this was not one lonely young genius with Ennius, but a whole postwar Italian philological conversation.” S: “Conducted, as you say, like dons rather than soldiers.” G: “Quite. While others defend Europe materially, they defend its fragments.” S: “That sounds almost indecent.” G: “Civilisation is indecently layered. Someone must keep the footnotes alive while others keep the lights on.” S: “And Oxford?” G: “Oxford would call it classical scholarship and imagine it as part of civilised education.” S: “Whereas for the Italians it is their own deep history.” G: “That is the crucial point. For Timpanaro and Mariotti, Ennius is not merely a Latin author in a syllabus. He is part of how Italy, and Rome, and antiquity became available as a self-history.” S: “So Timpanaro’s fight for a post-Vahlen edition is not antiquarian fussing.” G: “No. It is a claim about what deserves to be transmitted correctly.” S: “And G., as analytic philosopher, sees in that not mere piety but a logic of preservation.” G: “Yes. A practice in which evidence, norm, and responsibility converge.” S: “You make philology sound almost noble.” G: “It is noble. It is merely dressed badly.” S: “Can one say that Ennius is philosophically important before Roman philosophy arrives in the textbook sense?” G: “One must say exactly that.” S: “Even if the textbooks prefer Appius Claudius Caecus or later Lucretius.” G: “Textbooks always prefer clean beginnings. History prefers smudges.” S: “And Ennius is a smudge.” G: “A magnificent one.” S: “Then why do they keep calling him a poet?” G: “Because classification is how disciplines protect their furniture.” S: “And yet his corpus keeps spilling over.” G: “Tragedy, satire, epic, theology, protreptic. He refuses to stay shelved.” S: “Which is why Timpanaro had to fight for him.” G: “Yes. A genius in fragments is always in danger of becoming a mere quarry for quotations unless someone restores proportion.” S: “And Vahlen, admirable though he was, could no longer do that.” G: “No. Vahlen had become a monument. Monuments are indispensable and impossible to inhabit.” S: “Skutsch then builds the habitable edition.” G: “And Timpanaro reviews it like a man walking through a house he once hoped to build.” S: “That is nearly moving.” G: “Philology becomes moving when one remembers that behind every ‘review’ there may be forty years of unspent editorial ambition.” S: “Would G. envy them?” G: “In a way. Philosophers rarely have such clear objects. Ennius, at least, is definitely there, though mostly missing.” S: “Whereas philosophers have texts and still cannot agree what they mean.” G: “Exactly. Ennius is fragmentary in body. Philosophy is fragmentary in spirit.” S: “And the punchline?” G: “That the poet turns out more philosophical than the philosophers expected, and the philologists more philosophical than the philosophers admit.” S: “And Rome?” G: “Still standing, apparently, on ancient customs, on men, and on editors.”GRICE: Caro Timpanaro, lasciami cominciare con una domanda che mi frulla in testa: ma tu, quando correggi un manoscritto latino, non ti viene mai la tentazione di aggiungere qualche battuta spiritosa tra le righe? Così, per movimentare un po’ la filologia… TIMPANARO: Ah Grice, se solo avessi osato! Ma sai, se avessi scritto qualcosa di spassoso su un codice di Virgilio, i miei colleghi sarebbero diventati più severi di Lachmann con una variante spurie. Però confesso: a volte sostituirei volentieri qualche verso con un paradosso leopardiano. GRICE: Ecco, sapevo che Leopardi sarebbe saltato fuori! Dimmi la verità: tu ti senti più vicino all’infinito di Leopardi o alla “finitezza” dei manoscritti, dove persino una virgola conta come se fosse una legge fisica? TIMPANARO: Per Leopardi l’infinito era una siepe, per me spesso è una pila di varianti testuali che non finisce mai! Ma, tra noi, la vera felicità è trovare una lectio difficilior che resista a ogni tentazione filologica… un po’ come resistere a una battuta ironica durante un convegno serio. GRICE: Allora dovremmo fondare una scuola: “La ragione conversazionale della critica testuale!” Regola numero uno: ogni volta che un editore commette una falsificazione leopardiana, si brinda con vino toscano e si ride per almeno dieci minuti! TIMPANARO: Accetto! Ma lasciami aggiungere la regola due: chi trova un falso in Leopardi può scegliere la musica di sottofondo durante la riunione — ma solo se è Rossini. Sai, un po’ di leggerezza non guasta mai neppure in filologia! Timpanaro, Sebastiano junior (1945). Per una nuova edizione critica pot-Vahlen degl’Annali d’Ennio. Sotto Pasquale e Terzaghi. Lettere. Firenze.

Giovanni Battista Toderini (Venezia, Veneto): “what an honest chap woud do” – l’uomo onesto -- In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, what is said and what is meant are connected by the assumption that speakers behave as rational and cooperative agents, so that conversational implicatures arise because hearers expect utterances to conform to standards of truthfulness, relevance, and clarity that any reasonable participant would recognize. Giovanni Battista Toderini’s moral philosophy, especially as expressed in L’onesto uomo, approaches conversational reason from the ethical standpoint of the “honest man,” treating reasonableness in speech as a virtue rooted in honesty, decorum, and civic responsibility rather than as an abstract inferential mechanism. Where Grice formalizes conversational rationality into general principles that govern how meaning is inferred beyond literal content, Toderini locates the same regulative force in the practical ideal of onestà, according to which a speaker contributes to conversation as an upright agent who aims to illuminate rather than obscure. The comparison thus shows Grice as offering an analytic reconstruction of the norms implicit in everyday communicative practice, while Toderini articulates a culturally and morally inflected precursor, in which conversational implicature flows from what an honest, reasonable person would say or leave unsaid in order to sustain shared understanding and trust within a community. -- la ragione conversazionale di Roma e l’implicatura conversazionale dei sue colonie –Grice italo –Grice: “I like T.; in fact, my philosophy may be seen as a response to him. T. was dubious about Rousseau; I’m not. T. uses ‘ragione;’ I use ‘reason’! Other than that, we are identical!” -- Keywords. filosofia coloniale -- Flosofo veneziano. Filosofo veneto. Filosofo italiano. Venezia, Veneto. Nacque terzogenito di quattro figli maschi, da Domenico Maria T. e da Anna Cestari. Entra nell’ordine dei gesuiti, che professo lo collocarono ad insegnare – Moschini -- e si distinse come erudito e antiquario, come testimonia Lalande, che ha modo di incontrarlo a Verona – dove T. entra in contatto con Maffei – e di apprezzarlo come raccoglitore di medaglie. Il profilo intellettuale dell’abate non si riduce tuttavia ai tratti del ricercatore di reperti antiquari, mettendo in luce interessi tanto per vari argomenti scientifici quanto per la riflessione filosofica e morale.  Sul primo versante sono testimonianza alcune dissertazioni, di vario argomento; la Dissertazione sopra un legno fossile, edita congiuntamente a una lettera Sull’indurimento di molti bachi da seta, datata Modena, e a un’altra lunga lettera Su l’aurora boreale, datata Modena,indica tra l’altro la presenza di T. come membro dell’Accademia degli ICENUTICI di Forlì. A un’adunanza della medesima accademia è da ricondurre anche la dissertazione dal titolo Filosofia frankliniana delle punte preservatrici dal fulmine – Modena --, in cui T. si dimostra attento conoscitore dei problemi legati ai fenomeni elettrici atmosferici e in particolare degli apporti nuovi offerti da Franklin e da BECCARIA  -- Proverbio. Di quest’opera T. fa omaggio a Franklin, come documenta una lettera da Forlì -- The papers of Franklin. Altre tre dissertazioni – su ‘due antichissimi alcolani’, filosofia coloniale.  Grice: Carissimo Toderini, ti parlo al volo dall’aula di Oxford! Ho appena detto ai miei studenti che le mie massime della conversazione non sono altro che ciò che “un uomo onesto” farebbe. Si tratta di essere sinceri, cooperanti, quasi da manuale del buon senso veneziano! Mi sa che sono più italiani di quanto pensassi… Toderini: Ah, Grice, l’uomo onesto – che bella espressione! Hai mai pensato all’etimologia ciceroniana di “honestas”? Cicero diceva che honestas viene da “honor”, e che l’onestà non è solo il rispetto delle regole, ma anche la capacità di dare lustro alla conversazione! In fondo, è come una medaglia: brilla se la ragione la pulisce bene. E attenzione a non scambiarla con “decoro”, che è tutta un’altra storia – lì si rischia di finire tra i reperti antiquari! Grice: Splendido, Toderini! Quasi quasi aggiungo la massima della “pulizia argomentativa” alle mie regole: parlare come si lucidano le medaglie, senza polvere di ambiguità! E mi piace pensare che l’onestà, come la tua filosofia veneziana, sappia navigare tra i canali delle parole senza mai affondare… Anzi, potremmo dire che l’onestà è la gondola del pensiero! Toderini: Eh, caro Grice, se l’onestà è una gondola, allora la conversazione è la laguna: a volte calma, a volte tempestosa, ma sempre pronta a riflettere il cielo del ragionamento. E ricordati: un uomo onesto non teme la nebbia – la attraversa con la lanterna della ragione, e magari, se proprio l’argomento si fa torbido, tira fuori un proverbio veneziano… così nessuno si perde! Toderini, Giovanni Battista (1787). Della letteratura turchesca, Venezia: Presso Giuseppe Santini.

Felice Tocco (Catanzaro, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale di Hardie -- e l’implicatura conversazionale dei rendiconti della ragione conversazionale – In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, conversational implicature is explained by treating speakers and hearers as rational agents who “render accounts” of what they say by implicitly appealing to shared norms of cooperation, so that what is meant beyond what is said depends on the audience’s capacity to recognize a single underlying rational sense behind apparently diverse conversational moves. Felice Tocco’s approach, shaped by Italian idealism and by his engagement with Platonic and Aristotelian traditions mediated through figures such as Hardie, shifts the emphasis from the formal reconstruction of inferences to the philosophical responsibility of reason for its own expressions, stressing that conversational meaning emerges through explicit and implicit rendiconti della ragione in both theoretical and practical contexts. While Grice insists on the aequi‑vocality of expressions across contexts, arguing that even when language appears multi‑vocal the implicature presupposes one rational sense recoverable by cooperative reasoning, Tocco advances a historically informed view in which reason may change register—alethic or practical, descriptive or normative—yet remains unified because each conversational act must justify itself within a continuous rational tradition. The comparison therefore shows Grice offering a normative, analytic account of implicature grounded in general principles of rational cooperation, whereas Tocco interprets conversational implicature as the reflective self‑accounting of reason as it appears in lived philosophical discourse, preserving unity of sense not through abstract maxims alone but through the continuity of rational practice across different philosophical vocabularies and historical contexts. -- la scuola di Catanzaro -- filosofia calabrese -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo – By , pel, ,  (Catanzaro). Abstract. Grice used to say that he admired Hardie’s masterpiece on Plato but had to WORK with Hardie’s notes on Aristotle. The implicature is that you cannot do both. In Italy, he who does Plato is T.! Keywords: Grice, Hardie, Tocco, ragione teoretica o alethica, ragione prattica – Grice’s aequi-vocality thesis – the uni-vocality of an expression – “or, if ‘multi-vocal’ or ‘pluri-vocal,’ it is so across the divide – STILL ONE SENSE!   Nacque da don Nicola Antonio di T., patrizio di Tropea laureato in legge, e da donna Vincenza Toraldo, patrizia di Tropea. Ha due fratelli maggiori: Francesco, laureatosi in legge, e Giuseppe, che è magistrato.  In una lettera a CANTONI  scrive che il ramo primogenito della famiglia, estintosi pochi anni prima, si chiama«di Tocco» ed è originario di Napoli; mentre il ramo cadetto, quello cui apparteneva T., per scelta del nonno decise di togliere il «di» e «alla comoda soppressione s’acconcia per lunga pezza anche mio padre, ma un quindici anni or sono, si decide di riprenderlo. E lo dovetti riprendere anch’io nelle relazioni familiari, ché in tutti gli atti pubblici i miei si firmano di T., e così si firmarono anche negli atti del mio matrimonio. Letterariamente però conservo sempre lo stesso nome con cui pubblicai il mio primo scritto -- Ferrari.  Frequenta le scuole dei padri Scolopi di Catanzaro e qui è licenziato in filosofia; contro il parere del padre – che avrebbe preferito l’avvio agli studi forensi –  è discepolo a Napoli di SETTEMBRINI  e soprattutto di SPAVENTA , di cui segue le lezioni sulla filosofia della natura. Di queste lezioni rimase ampia traccia nella prima opera a stampa di T., la recensione uscita sulla Rivista bolognese di scienze, lettere, arti e scuole del Saggio sulla natura della marchesa Marianna Florenzi Waddington.  Bruno, ragione pratica.  G: January 1863, and there he is, not in a little circle, not in a salon, but in a proper university room, taking notes as if note-taking were already a philosophical method. S: Which, for him, it almost was. G: It usually is, for the clever ones. A fool copies. A philosopher takes notes against the day when he must disagree with them. S: And the curious thing is that Spaventa is officially there for logica e metafisica, yet what the student writes down is filosofia della natura. G: Quite right. Oxford would call that trespassing. Naples calls it metaphysics. S: Or perhaps metaphysics, when still alive. G: That is exactly what Tocco found in him, I think. Spaventa does not lecture on “sources.” He lectures on movement. S: He gives you a concept before he gives you a page reference. G: And that is why the notes mattered. January 1863 is not just a date. It is the date on which Tocco begins not merely to hear Spaventa but to preserve him. S: As if he knew already that one day he would have to carry him elsewhere. G: Which is, in fact, what happens. He goes north. S: To Bologna. G: To perfect himself, as the institutional phrase goes. S: A phrase designed to hurt one’s master if one has one. G: Yes. “I go to perfect myself” always means “you have not quite perfected me.” S: And poor Spaventa, had he heard it in the wrong key, might have taken it as apostasy. G: Though really it is not apostasy. It is credentialing. S: A hideous modern need. G: Universities are full of those. One learns from one man and takes the degree from another. S: Which is where Fiorentino enters. G: Precisely. The speculative southern fire is left behind in Naples, and the northern university asks for a title, a thesis, a topic, and an examinable shape. S: And the topic is almost decorously historical. G: Idea platonica e categoria aristotelica. One can hear the laurea machinery humming already. S: One can also hear Spaventa inside it. G: Much too loudly for Bologna’s peace of mind. S: Because the title looks historical, but the engine is speculative. G: Exactly. The danger is that a thesis ostensibly “on” Plato and Aristotle is in fact a modern metaphysical operation performed on them. S: Through them, perhaps. G: A generous amendment. S: Then comes Montanari. G: Yes, the great virtue of a university other than one’s own master’s is that it produces an objection one would not have received at home. S: At Naples, under Spaventa, Tocco might have been praised for vitality. G: At Bologna he is accused of pantheism. S: Which is a splendidly nineteenth-century way of saying, “Your metaphysics has escaped its cage.” G: And Montanari goes straight to the nerve. S: Not to whether Plato said this or Aristotle said that, or whether the citation is exact. G: No. He asks what all this amounts to. S: What lies beneath the reinterpretation. G: Which is why the exchange is so good. It reveals that the thesis is not merely historical scholarship but a metaphysical wager. S: And Tocco answers like a good Spaventian. G: He says, in effect, that the absolute is not a dead lump but life and development. S: Which is not the answer of an archivist. G: Nor of a mere Platonist. S: Nor indeed of a mere historian of categories. G: It is the answer of a man who heard filosofia della natura under the title of metaphysics and never quite recovered. S: So Bologna refines him without converting him. G: Nicely put. He gains scholastic form without losing speculative blood. S: And Fiorentino? G: Fiorentino gives him an academic frame, and probably a better conscience about the ancient texts. S: Closer relevance to sources, one would say. G: Yes. If Spaventa makes Plato and Aristotle live, Fiorentino asks where exactly they lived in the manuscripts. S: That is too neat. G: It is neat because it is only mostly true. S: Then let us be less neat. Spaventa is the master of philosophical atmosphere; Fiorentino, of thesis-legibility. G: Better. S: And Settembrini? G: Ah, Settembrini is more moral weather than conceptual grammar. S: A human presence, then, rather than a direct source of “idea” and “categoria.” G: Just so. Settembrini gives one courage and civic tone. Spaventa gives one the metaphysical daring. Fiorentino gives one the thesis and the degree. S: That sounds almost too administrative. G: Philosophy in Italy often is administrative at the decisive moment. S: Which is perhaps why the 1863 notes matter so much. They preserve the pre-administrative Tocco. G: The Tocco before the degree disciplines him into a public scholar. S: A Tocco still being formed by a voice rather than by a printed topic. G: Exactly. Notes on lectures are intimacy before bibliography. S: And yet from those notes one can almost see the future thesis. G: Only if one reads them with hindsight. In 1863 he is hearing nature as metaphysical life. In 1867 he is writing Plato and Aristotle under Bologna’s eye. S: And Montanari says: this all smells of pantheism. G: Which is really the examiner’s way of saying, “I hear Naples in this.” S: Wonderful. G: Examiners are wonderful when they force a thesis to confess its birthplace. S: Then Tocco, by moving north, did not cease to be southern. G: No, he became southern in public. S: Bringing, as you said, the vitality of Southern Italy to the oldest university in Europe. G: Yes, and perhaps alarming a few people in the process. S: One likes to think of him arriving with notebooks and categories and too much life. G: Bologna always did need a little excess animation. S: But tell me: was Spaventa “full professor” then in the way modern bureaucrats like to say? G: Essentially yes. Installed, official, university philosophy in full dignity. S: So Tocco was not haunting a private genius; he was following the recognised chair. G: Which makes the later move all the more poignant. He did not leave because Naples lacked a master. S: He left because Bologna had a perfezionamento place. G: The modern world again. S: Credentials against charisma. G: And not entirely against. More like charisma submitted to credentials. S: A melancholy formula. G: Most good academic histories are melancholy formulas. S: Let us picture the scene, then. Tocco in 1863, writing quickly while Spaventa on “nature” turns metaphysics into motion. G: And not merely nature as flora and fauna, but nature as the absolute in self-exposition. S: Which sounds less like a “course” and more like weather. G: Naples would understand that. S: Bologna less so. G: Bologna wants the weather indexed by source. S: Hence the topic. G: Hence the topic. S: And hence the danger that one mistakes the topic for the centre. G: Yes. The title says Plato and Aristotle. The life of the thesis says Spaventa. S: And Montanari, to his credit, hears the life. G: He hears too much of it, perhaps, but better that than deafness. S: Was Tocco frightened? G: Challenged, surely. Frightened, perhaps not. A man who has listened to Spaventa on nature is unlikely to collapse at the word pantheism. S: He would almost welcome it as proof that the thing was alive. G: Exactly. A dead thesis is never accused of pantheism. S: Then the move to Bologna is educational in the strict sense: it educates the speculative man into controversy. G: And into footnotes, which are a lesser but necessary education. S: You are cruel to footnotes. G: No, grateful. They prevent metaphysics from floating entirely free. S: So if we distinguish them: Spaventa gives him philosophy as living movement; Fiorentino gives him philosophy as examinable scholarship. G: And Tocco spends the rest of his early career trying to have both. S: Which is not easy. G: It is impossible. That is why it is interesting. S: Then perhaps the 1863 notes are more revealing than the 1867 thesis. G: In one sense yes. Notes catch formation before self-censorship. S: Before one writes for examiners. G: Before one writes for posterity, which is worse. S: Yet one needs the thesis to see how a live hearing becomes a public doctrine. G: Precisely. Notes are origin; thesis is adaptation. S: Spaventa in the ear, Fiorentino on the title page. G: Very good. S: And Montanari in the middle saying, “This is all pantheism.” G: Which is Bologna’s way of forcing Naples to speak more clearly. S: In Oxford we would call that useful hostility. G: In Oxford we would call it a good viva and then publish nothing. S: Whereas the Italians turn it into biography. G: And rightly. Their philosophy is always nearer to lived affiliation than ours likes to admit. S: So G. and S., browsing Tocco, relish not only the doctrine but the academic drama. G: One cannot separate them. A thesis is a metaphysical claim wearing institutional clothes. S: And Tocco’s clothes changed in Bologna, but his gait remained southern. G: I should like that as an epitaph. S: Too early. G: Very well. As a thesis report, then. S: One more thing. Why does “filosofia della natura” matter so much here? G: Because it is the place where metaphysics stops being merely classificatory and begins to breathe. S: Nature not as object, but as the life of concept. G: Yes. Once one has heard that, “idea platonica” and “categoria aristotelica” can never again be merely textbook headings. S: They become moments in a larger self-unfolding. G: Which is why Montanari smells pantheism. S: And why Tocco cannot retreat into mere antiquarianism. G: He could have chosen safer scholarship. S: But then he would not be Tocco. G: Just so. S: Nor would he have needed to take notes in January 1863. G: Notes, after all, are taken when one suspects the lecture is not merely informative but formative. S: And perhaps when one already knows one will one day have to leave it. G: That is the saddest and best reason to take notes. S: So the whole little story is this: the newly appointed master at Naples lectures on nature under metaphysics; the student begins writing in January 1863; the student later goes north to “perfect” himself; the thesis looks historical but remains animated by the southern master; Bologna tests it through Montanari; Fiorentino regularises it; and Tocco remains, through all the paperwork, Spaventian at heart. G: A little too elegant, perhaps. S: Then let me spoil it. G: Please do. S: He goes to Bologna to become respectable and arrives there carrying metaphysical contraband from Naples. G: Much better. S: And the examiners notice. G: They always do, when the contraband is good. S: And the punchline? G: That he went north to perfect himself and instead exported a piece of southern weather.Grice: Caro professore Tocco, ho sempre ritenuto che i “rendiconti della ragione conversazionale” siano ciò che davvero mette alla prova la nostra capacità filosofica. Mi incuriosisce sapere come li intenda Lei, anche perché in Italia, chi affronta Platone non può che chiamarsi Tocco! Tocco: Caro Grice, mi lusinga il Suo riferimento. Per me, i rendiconti della ragione conversazionale sono il modo in cui la ragione si fa “responsabile” dei propri atti, sia sul piano teoretico che pratico. Come mi insegnò Spaventa, ogni ragionamento, anche il più astratto, deve sempre fare i conti con il suo impatto nella conversazione reale. Grice: Perfettamente d’accordo! Da noi, a Oxford, si direbbe che la ragione “rende conto” quando rispetta le massime della conversazione. Ma, secondo Lei, esiste una differenza tra i rendiconti teoretici e quelli pratici, oppure – come suggerisce la mia tesi dell’aequi-vocalità – mantengono sempre un’unica radice razionale? Tocco: Bella domanda! Io credo che, anche se la ragione cambia registro – da teoretica ad alethica, da pratica a concreta – resta sempre fedele a se stessa. Se si mostra “multi-vocale”, lo fa solo per adattarsi al contesto, ma in fondo, come dicevano i nostri padri scolastici, la ragione è una sola, “ancora che si cangi abito”. Il rendiconto, alla fine, è sempre lo stesso: rendere ragione, a sé e agli altri, della propria ricerca di verità. Tocco, Felice (1863). Note su Spaventa. Napoli.

Giovanni Battista Tolomei (Pistoia, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale nella filosofia della percezione – In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, what a speaker communicates beyond what is strictly said is explained through conversational implicature, generated and recovered by hearers who assume that speakers are rational, cooperative agents acting for identifiable reasons, so that meaning depends on calculable inferences grounded in shared norms of rational behavior; Giovanni Battista Tolomei, as presented within the Pistoian and Tuscan philosophical context, approaches conversational reason from the side of perception and signs, emphasizing how implicature arises from the way perceptual content is organized, classified, and linguistically signified rather than from abstract inference alone. Whereas Grice systematizes conversational meaning through general principles and maxims that govern rational exchange independently of sensory modalities, Tolomei embeds conversational reason in a philosophy of perception where the distinction between natural and arbitrary signs shapes how meanings are implicitly conveyed and understood, making implicature sensitive to how agents perceive, discriminate, and name their experiences. The comparison thus shows Grice offering a normative, formally articulated account of how rationality governs conversational interpretation, while Tolomei represents a more perceptually and semiotically grounded conception in which conversational implicature reflects the interplay between sensory apprehension, rhetorical practice, and sign use within shared linguistic traditions rather than primarily the reconstruction of speaker intentions through explicit rational calculation. -- la scuola di Pistoia -- filosofia toscana -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo (Pistoia). Abstract. Grice: “People say I’m a systematic philosopher, but so is T.. I especially adore his taxonomy of ‘signum’ into naturale and ‘arbitrarium’!” -- Keywords: la filosofia della percezione, Warnock, Grice. Filosofo toscano. Nasce in una villa nella località di Gamberaia, presso Firenze, da Iacopo di Giovambattista, discendente del ramo pistoiese della nobile famiglia senese dei Tolomei, e dalla nobildonna fiorentina Maria Pulicciani. Ha come fratelli minori Maria Maddalena, badessa del monastero pistoiese di S. Maria delle Grazie, e Salvatore Francesco, che è commissario a Cortona e a Firenze e perpetua il ramo pistoiese della famiglia -- Salomoni.  Riceve la sua prima formazione a Firenze dai padri gesuiti di S. Giovannino degli Scolopi. Venne condotto a Pisa per essere avviato allo studio del diritto e seguire le orme paterne ma, stando a quanto afferma il suo principale biografo, proprio in questi anni matura la propria vocazione religiosa, che inizialmente non trova l’appoggio dei genitori. Studia poi FILOSOFIA nel Collegio Clementino di Roma, quindi di nuovo diritto, questa volta presso lo studium di Siena, ma nella patria della sua famiglia si accostò anche alla teologia e all’Ordine dei gesuiti, maturando definitivamente il desiderio di farsi chierico, tanto che prende la tonsura e l’ostiariato e ricevette due benefici semplici.  Morto il padre – Prosopographie --, si recò di nuovo a Roma, dove venne accolto come novizio nella Compagnia di Gesù per poi prendere i voti semplici due anni dopo. Nel frattempo affina la propria conoscenza della RETORICA e delle lingue -- in particolare del greco – e frequenta il corso di METAFISICA – cf. Grice on P. F. STRAWSON, Waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy -- al Collegio romano. Venne inviato a Ragusa come maestro di scuola e vi rimase; qui apprese la lingua locale. implicatura.  Grice: Carissimo Tolomei, mi precipito a dirti che la prossima settimana parte il mio seminario sulla filosofia della percezione con Warnock! Dal Vadum Boum, dove anche l’erba ha un accento, mi domando: hai qualche consiglio botanico-linguistico per “perceptum” e “percipio”? Ho un sospetto che Cicerone ne abbia fatto più pasticci di quanti ne abbia risolti! Tolomei: Ah, Grice, se ti serve un’erborista della lingua, sei venuto dal giusto! “Percipio” da Cicerone a mia zia, tutti lo usano come se fosse un vaso di fiori: lo riempiono, lo svuotano, lo confondono con “capire” e “sentire”. Per non parlare del “perceptum”, che spesso sembra più un fungo allucinogeno che un concetto filosofico! Grice: Dunque, dovrei avvertire i miei studenti che quando Cicerone “percipio”, può significare che ha semplicemente annusato qualcosa? Magari la famosa aura di Roma o il profumo del caffè universitario? Mi sa che la percezione ciceroniana è un po’ come la mia pronuncia latina: soggetta a interpretazioni fantasiose! Tolomei: Esatto! E ricorda: a Bononia, il “perceptum” si declina sempre con un sorriso. Consiglia agli studenti di fare come i botanici: osservare, annusare, ma non sempre credere al primo “percipio” che passa. Se Cicero ti confonde, basta un buon espresso e tutto torna chiaro. La filosofia della percezione è anche questione di gusto… e di aroma! Tolomei, Giovanni Battista (1702). Philosophia mentis et sensuum universa, Roma: Typographia Komarek.

Pietro Francesco Tomai (Ravenna, Romagna): l’implicatura conversazionale e la ragione conversazionale – In Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, conversational implicature arises because speakers and hearers are modeled as rational agents who assume a cooperative principle and can therefore infer unstated meanings from what is said by reconstructing the speaker’s reasons for speaking as they did, within a shared framework of purposes and norms of rational exchange; meaning is thus anchored in calculable inference, attribution of intentions, and the audience’s capacity to supply reasons that make an utterance intelligible as a rational move in conversation. By contrast, the figure of Pietro Francesco Tomai, as reconstructed in the Ravenna-centered tradition and in the playful Grice–Tomai juxtaposition you cite, anticipates a notion of conversational reason that is less formal and inferentially explicit and more rhetorical, mnemonic, and encyclopedic: conversational sense depends not only on cooperative rational calculation but on the trained memory, cultural accumulation, and symbolic ordering that allow interlocutors to recognize connections, analogies, and implicit norms almost automatically. Where Grice abstracts conversational reason into a quasi-systematic logic of implicature derived from general maxims, Tomai embodies conversational reason as a historically cultivated faculty that binds law, rhetoric, memory, and civil conversation, making meaning emerge through remembered precedents and shared symbolic repertoires rather than through explicit inferential reconstruction alone; the comparison thus highlights Grice as offering a modern, formally articulated account of reason-governed meaning, and Tomai as representing a premodern, humanistic counterpart in which reason operates through memory and tradition to sustain implicature in practice rather than theory. -- la scuola di Ravenna -- filosofia emiliana – filosofia romagunola -- filosofia italiana (Ravenna). Abstract. Keywords: Deutero-Esperanto. System G – Symbolo -- TOMAI -- Tommai, Tomasi, Tommasi --, Pietro Francesco (Pietro da Ravenna). Non si conosce il nome della madre. Per studiare diritto si trasfere a Padova, dove segue le lezioni di Tartagni da Imola e si addottora in utroque iure quando è stampata a Venezia, presso Nicolas Jenson, una sua Oratio pro patria. La prodigiosa memoria dimostrata durante gli studi gli procura una grande fama, al punto che è invitato a dar prova delle proprie abilità mnemoniche in numerose città, fra cui Venezia -- dove incontrò Cassandra Fedele --, Brescia, Piacenza e Ferrara. Insegna inoltre diritto a Pavia, Bologna e Pistoia, dove rimane, ottenendo anche la cittadinanza. Rientra quindi a Padova per ricoprire la cattedra di diritto canonico, con uno stipendio iniziale di 80 ducati, portato a 150 e aumentato di altri 50 ducati in ragione dei suoi numerosi figli -- non se ne conosce il numero esatto -- avuti da due mogli -- è noto solo il nome della seconda, Lucrezia Azzoni. In questi anni si fregia del titolo di eques auratus e pubblicò una silloge di Carmina -- Padova, M. Cerdonis -- e il fortunatissimo manuale di mnemotecnica Phoenix -- Venezia, B. de Choris --, uno dei primi testi a ottenere il privilegio dell’esclusiva di stampa, più volte ripubblicato. È scelto dal duca di Pomerania Boghislao X per insegnare diritto civile e canonico presso Greifswald. Dopo aver fatto visita all’imperatore Massimiliano I a Innsbruck, giunse con la famiglia a Greifswald, dove rimase, ricoprendo anche il ruolo di rettore dell’Università. In Germania soggiorna ad Amburgo e Lubecca -- dove fu stampato il trattato Repetitio C inter alia de emunitate ecclesiae --, caratteristica universale, lingua universale, lingua filosofica, il Deutero-Esperanto di Grice. G.: Well, let us have the thing in front of us. Tomai does not go to Venice to say, “The flowers bloom in Ravenna splendidly.” He goes to do something much more serious and much more useful, namely, to place Ravenna intelligibly inside the political poetry of Venice. S.: Political poetry. That sounds like a way of making subjection sound decorative. G.: Quite. And the genre is built for exactly that. Start where the passage starts. He praises the doge personally: justice, fortitude, temperance, cursus honorum, noble family. That is the opening machinery of access. Before one may say anything public, one must show that one knows how to praise privately. S.: Or publicly in the form of the private virtues. I take it this is not idle embroidery. G.: Not idle at all. A man freshly doctored in utroque iure at Padua, or thereabouts, does not suddenly abandon law for lilies. He puts on his Sunday best, as you say, and turns juridical formation into civic address. The legal mind and the oratorical mind are not rivals here. They are two costumes for the same ambition. S.: So the jurist goes from statutes to compliments. G.: Not compliments. Legitimation. Listen to the Latin. Quae, sicut vera religione, iustitia, quiete, libertate, optimis artibus, sanctissimis institutis facile Italiae caput est, ita virtute, fortuna, potentia, rebus gestis terra marique late dominatur. S.: I translate, since I never know whether you yourself understand what you yourself are saying. “Which city of the Venetians, just as by true religion, justice, peace, liberty, the finest arts, and most holy institutions it is easily the head of Italy, so by virtue, fortune, power, and deeds done it rules widely by land and sea.” G.: Very good. And there, at once, you have the myth of Venice in compact form. Not merely strong, but rightful. Not merely rich, but normatively superior. Religion, justice, peace, liberty, arts, institutions: these are not decorative predicates. They are credentials. S.: So Venice is not just winning. It deserves to win. G.: Exactly. Tomai is not reporting a fact. He is obliging with a picture. He is saying, in effect, if you are to understand Venetian dominion correctly, you must understand it as the outward sign of inward civic excellence. S.: Protreptic, then. G.: Yes. There is a protreptic element here. He is not merely stating that p, as though p were a neutral item on a list. He is inviting the hearer to inhabit p. To accept, almost to re-perform, the proposition that Venetian rule is justified because Venetian civic order is exemplary. S.: So the utterance is less constative than pedagogic. G.: Pedagogic and political. The doge is being congratulated, certainly, but the deeper addressee is anyone in the room who needs to hear empire redescribed as benevolence. S.: Which is where Ravenna comes in. G.: Eventually. But note how long Tomai waits. He does not begin with Ravenna. That is very important. The title pro patria may mislead one into expecting a Ravennate manifesto. What we actually get is doge first, Venice second, Ravenna last. S.: Which is tact. G.: Which is hierarchy. He knows where he is. Ravenna is peripheral. Venice is central. Padua is intermediate. Tomai himself has come from Padua, academically speaking, but he speaks now as a son of Ravenna in the court of Venice. It is a perfect triangulation: provincial patria, university formation, imperial centre. S.: Continue with the Latin. G.: Et incredibile dictu est, Princeps foelicissime, quanta de tua hac praestanti civitate, quae tanquam regina caeteras claras urbes superat et excellit, et de vobis apud omnes exteras nationes opinio sit, quanta observantia, quantum nomen. S.: “And it is incredible to say, most fortunate Prince, how great is the opinion among all foreign nations concerning this your distinguished city, which like a queen surpasses and excels the other famous cities; how great the reverence, how great the name.” G.: Very good again. And note the accumulation. Quanta opinio, quanta observantia, quantum nomen. The city is not merely powerful. It is legible abroad. It has fama. It is recognised. Political order here depends upon reputation as much as upon force. S.: You mean that for Tomai civic greatness is partly a matter of what foreigners already think. G.: Yes. Recognition is a political fact. Venice becomes queenly because others regard it so. The speech is doing that work even as it reports it. It says: everyone already knows this, therefore you must know it too. S.: One hears Austin muttering that the utterance is not merely describing prestige but conferring it afresh. G.: Precisely. And then comes, to my mind, the philosophically best bit. Noverunt enim bonam civitatem non moenibus neque parietibus, sed his teneri et conservari civibus, qui unum in locum, uno consilio, una mente, una voluntate congregati, hisdem moribus, hisdem institutis, hisdem inter se legibus uterentur. S.: “For they know that a good city is held and preserved not by walls or ramparts, but by those citizens who, gathered into one place, with one counsel, one mind, one will, use the same customs, the same institutions, the same laws among themselves.” G.: There you are. That is not mere flattery. That is a miniature political philosophy. S.: A rather strong one, too. Not walls but citizens. Not coercion but concord. G.: And not merely concord in the sentimental sense. Una mente, una voluntate, hisdem moribus, hisdem institutis, hisdem legibus. Shared mind, shared will, shared customs, shared institutions, shared laws. It is a theory of civic cohesion by normative homogeneity. S.: Which sounds almost alarmingly total. G.: Renaissance civic ideology often does. But the important thing is that Tomai, having read tomes of civil and canon law, is not leaving law behind here. He is transposing it. Law reappears not as technical casuistry but as one of the binding media of the good city. S.: So the doctor in utroque iure is still very much present. G.: Entirely present. A doctor of both laws has been trained to think in terms of order, authority, jurisdiction, and normativity. In this oration those habits of mind are recast rhetorically. The city is good because its members share leges and instituta. That is the jurist speaking through the orator. S.: Though dressed up, as you say, for the Ducal Palace. G.: Naturally. The venue requires silk over skeleton. But the skeleton is juridico-political. S.: And then the divine coda. G.: Yes. Noveruntque pace et concordia nihil melius, nihil utilius, nihil divinius ab immortali Deo hominibus datum esse. S.: “And they know that nothing better, nothing more useful, nothing more divine has been given by the immortal God to human beings than peace and concord.” G.: Exactly. The sequence is important. Peace and concord are first useful, then divine. Utility and sanctity converge. This is the sort of sentence by which empire is moralised. S.: Or sanctified. G.: Indeed. If peace and concord are divine gifts, and Venice is the polity of peace, concord, law, and institutions, then Venetian rule begins to look less like domination and more like providential custody. S.: Which is why the Ottoman context matters. G.: Yes. The serenity of the Serenissima is not an idle self-description. It is a geopolitical claim under pressure. If the Ottomans are the external threat, then internal concord and maritime dominion become morally charged. Venice does not merely possess empire; it protects Christendom, order, commerce, civilisation, what you will. S.: So even a very little oration may carry a very large burden. G.: Quite so. And Ravenna, having rather little to offer materially, offers symbolic loyalty. That is why the speech is small. A minor city does not stride into Venice with a ten-book treatise. It arrives with two leaves of polished deference. S.: With one careful sentence about itself. G.: Exactly. When Ravenna appears as “most loyal and obedient daughter, servant and ward,” that is the provincial self placed consciously beneath the imperial parent. It is almost familial, except that the family is an empire. S.: Daughter, servant, ward. The sequence is rather humiliating. G.: It is, unless one hears the compensating phrase, that Ravenna was not conquered in war but joined of its own free will. There the humiliation is re-coded as voluntary alignment. S.: So subjection is rewritten as consent. G.: Precisely. That is one of the major functions of the speech. It says, in effect, Ravenna’s dignity consists in having recognised Venice’s superior civic order and attached itself willingly to it. S.: Which is the point at which Grice might become interested. G.: Very much so. Because the explicit content is praise, but the implicated content is allegiance, legitimation, and self-positioning. Tomai says one thing and does several others. He praises the doge, flatters Venice, advertises Ravenna’s loyalty, and, by speaking well, advertises himself. S.: A splendidly layered speech-act, then. G.: Yes. And one must not vulgarise the matter by imagining that he expects the doge to say, “Young man, here is a pension for life.” Perlocution is subtler. The oration aims to have effects on the political atmosphere, on perceptions of Ravenna, on Tomai’s visibility as a cultivated jurist-humanist. S.: So no private practice in the modern sense. G.: No. He is not hanging out a shingle. He is entering a circuit of patronage, office, reputation, and learned service. The university at Padua, the patria Ravenna, the print world of Venice: all three are active here. S.: I still find the transition from utroque iure to this elevated civic unison slightly comic. G.: Only because you imagine law as arid and rhetoric as ornamental. In the fifteenth century they are near neighbours. Civil law and canon law train one in authority, order, jurisdiction, institution, precedent. Rhetoric trains one in making those things socially and politically persuasive. S.: So the same man who studies decretals may tell the doge that the city rests not on walls but on citizens of one mind and one will. G.: Just so. The proposition is not obtuse at all. It is the legal imagination broadened into civic ideology. S.: Then the title pro patria becomes clearer too. G.: Yes. Not “I shall now speak romantically of my beloved Ravenna,” but “I appear from my patria, and on behalf of its civic identity, within a larger ceremonial economy.” The patria is not the content so much as the speaking position. S.: A Ravennate voice in a Venetian ritual. G.: Exactly. And a very disciplined one. He gives Ravenna only the amount of space proper to its place in the order. To do otherwise would have been grotesque. S.: One sees now why the thing is short. Ravenna does not come to instruct Venice. It comes to acknowledge. G.: And in acknowledging, it seeks acknowledgment. That reciprocity is the true point of the oration. S.: So if I were to compress the lesson, I might say: Tomai’s little text is a juridically trained exercise in civic-imperial rhetoric, in which Venice is praised as the paradigmatic polity of religion, justice, liberty, law, concord, and maritime dominion, while Ravenna is inserted as the willing and loyal periphery whose own honour lies in having joined such a centre. G.: Admirably put. S.: And Grice, were he in a dry mood, would say that Tomai is not merely saying that Venice is good, but making it conversationally mandatory to treat Venice as good. G.: Yes. The oration creates the conditions under which dissent would sound not merely false but uncivil. S.: Which is perhaps the final triumph of the genre. G.: Quite. And that is why one should not laugh too quickly at the little doctor from Ravenna polishing his Latin before the doge. He knows exactly what game he is playing. S.: While perhaps pretending not to. G.: Naturally. The best players always do.Grice: Caro Tomai, tra Ravenna e Oxford direi che l’implicatura fa più strada dei ducati. Tomai: Maestro Grice, forse, ma la mia memoria ne conta più di quanti il tuo System G sappia cancellare. Grice: Allora facciamo così: io implico e tu ricordi, e il Deutero-Esperanto nasce da solo. Tomai: Perfetto, purché qualcuno poi ricordi chi dei due ha avuto l’idea per primo. Tomai, Pietro Francesco (1472). Dissertatio in utroque iure. Padova.

Bernardino Tomitano (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dei precetti della conversazione civile – A comparison between H. P. Grice and Bernardino Tomitano shows a deep structural affinity between Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning and the Renaissance humanist tradition of civil conversation articulated through precepts. Tomitano’s precetti della conversazione civile treat conversation as a rational practice regulated by norms that advise speakers to contribute what is fitting, proportionate, and appropriate to the shared aim and stage of the exchange; the precept functions less as an external command than as an internalized orientation toward civility, mutual recognition, and social order. Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims perform an analogous role at a more abstract level: they are not prescriptive rules enforced from outside, but rational expectations that conversational agents tacitly rely on to make sense of one another’s utterances, and it is precisely by assuming adherence to such precepts that implicature becomes possible. Where Tomitano frames conversational rationality within the ethical and stylistic ideals of civic humanism, concerned with decorum, timing, and mutual respect, Grice translates this insight into a philosophical account of how meaning is pragmatically inferred rather than merely encoded. In both cases, conversational reason is inseparable from normativity: to speak intelligibly is already to acknowledge others, purposes, and shared orientations, and the success of conversation depends not on rigid obedience, but on a cultivated responsiveness that allows both civility and meaning to emerge. Grice italo -- i precetti della conversazione – praeceptum. – vide praecipio. : to give rules, or precepts, to avise, admonis, warn, inform, instruct, tech, to enjoin, direct, bird, order, etc. Il tuo contributo alla conversazione sia tale quale e richiesto, allo stdio in cui avviene, dallo scopo o orientamnto accettato dello scambio linguistio in cui sei impegnato. Tale principio ha la forma di un precetto o di una regola. Filosofo italiano. Padova, Veneto. Nacque  a Padova, dove trascorre tutta la vita, figlio forse primogenito di Donato.  La sua è un’illustre famiglia originaria di Feltre, che annove tra gl’antenati il beato Bernardino da Feltre, zio per parte paterna dello stesso Donato. In seguito all’assalto di Feltre compiuto dall’esercito dell’imperatore Massimiliano in guerra con Venezia, questo ramo della famiglia si è definitivamente trasferito a Padova, dove Donato ha i natali e vi esercita il commercio con buon successo; rimasto ben presto vedovo della prima moglie Onesta Capodilista, dalla seconda, la cui identità non è nota, ha quattro figli: oltre a Bernardino, Ludovico -- addottoratosi in artibus --, Francesco e Cecilia, andata in sposa a Bartolomeo Sforza. Dopo aver ricevuto in famiglia la prima istruzione, T. è avviato dal padre agli studi di filosofia presso lo studio patavino. Qui ha come maestri ZIMARA , PASSERI , Frigimelica e Carensio (il Tosetto). Come compagno alle lezioni e poi come collega e amico ha Vesalio. Alla sua formazione contribuirono altresì grandi figure di umanisti attivi allora a Padova, quali i veronesi Fracastoro, da lui assiduamente frequentato e, in anni più tardi, lo stimatissimo Monte. Fuori dallo studio, la frequentazione di Bembo e della sua cerchia e l’amicizia con letterati e dotti animatori della cultura cittadina, primo fra tutti Speroni, con il quale rimane sempre in rapporto di grande familiarità, gli permisero di coltivare l’interesse per le lettere. i precetti della conversazione civile. G: 1939, S. You are looking at that title page as if it has insulted you. S: It has, sir. It says Introductio, and then it proceeds to look proud of itself. G: Introductio is always proud of itself. It means it expects to be read first. S: And it expects me to be an adolescens. G: You are, in tutorial terms, permanently an adolescens. S: Thank you, sir. I’ll put it on my epitaph. G: Recite the Latin, and try not to make it sound like a threat. S: Bernardini Tomitani artium doctoris Introductio ad Sophisticos elenchos Aristotelis. G: Good. Now what is an elenchos. S: Sir, I thought you’d start with the obvious: why the plural. G: I will, but you may not hide behind grammar. First: elenchos. S: Refutation, sir. Cross-examination. The thing Socrates does when he pretends to be ignorant and then ruins a man’s afternoon. G: And Aristotle does it without pretending. S: And with chapters. G: Exactly. Now sophisticos. What does that add? S: It says the refutations are about sophists. Or about sophistical tricks. Or about the refutations that sophists require. G: All three are compatible, and Tomitano is trading on that. Sophisticos signals that we are not discussing honest errors only, but errors with a career. S: Errors that pay rent. G: Errors that recruit pupils. Now, why elenchos plural? S: Because Aristotle’s text is called Sophistici Elenchi, plural. It’s the name of the treatise. G: And why would Aristotle title it in the plural? S: Because there are many ways to refute and many ways to be refuted, sir. G: And because the “refutation” is both a procedure and a family of cases. In logic the plural often signals: do not expect one neat pattern. Now continue. S: Eiusdem brevis methodus diluendorum paralogismorum per divisionem: praeter illa quae Aristoteles habuit in Elenchis. G: Stop. Clean it in your mouth: brevis methodus. S: Thank God, brevis. G: You should be less grateful. Brevis in Latin often means: I have omitted what you most need. S: Diluendorum paralogismorum. G: Now that is a phrase worth living with. Diluere. S: To dissolve, sir. To thin out. Like washing ink until the forgery disappears. G: Good. Not merely “refute,” but “dissolve.” It implies the paralogism has a kind of apparent solidity that must be loosened. S: Paralogismus, sir. That’s just a fallacy, isn’t it? G: Not quite “just.” Paralogism is the kind of fallacy that can look like an argument. It is a wrong logos that imitates logos. Sophism is often taken as a deliberate deception; paralogism can be honest or dishonest, but either way it is reasoning gone sideways. S: Yet Tomitano uses the plural again. Paralogismorum. G: Because there are many ways to go wrong. Now, per divisionem. S: By division, sir. As if the cure for bad inference is to slice it into parts and see what falls out. G: Exactly. You divide the ambiguous, you separate the conflated, you distinguish the senses. Division is the Renaissance humanist’s favourite scalpel. S: Praeter illa quae Aristoteles habuit in Elenchis. G: He says: besides those things Aristotle already had in the Elenchi. Meaning: I add something. S: Or: I pretend to add something. G: In 1544, you must pretend with confidence. Now continue. S: Quam methodum ex dialogis Platonis et ex Aristotele nuper invenit. G: That line is deliciously cheeky. S: Nuper invenit. Recently discovered, sir. As if Plato has been lying around unconsulted. G: Or as if Tomitano has only just noticed Plato is useful to an Aristotelian project. S: Ex dialogis Platonis. So he throws dialogue into a treatise on refutation. G: Precisely. He is saying: the method is not merely in Aristotle’s technical list. It is in Plato’s dramatic practice of exposing confusions. S: So Tomitano wants to teach sophistical refutation by combining Aristotle’s taxonomy with Plato’s theatre. G: That is the civilising move. Aristotle supplies the species; Plato supplies the phenomenology. S: And then he boasts: and also from Aristotle. G: Because you cannot sell a logic manual in Venice by sounding too Platonic. S: Next line? G: Go on. S: Adiecta sunt famigerata veterum sophismatum exempla: ad exercitationem adolescentum. G: Famigerata. S: “Infamous,” sir. With a whiff of scandal. The sophisms have reputations. G: Exactly. They are so well-known they have become teaching tools. S: Veterum. G: Old. Ancient. Classical. But also: time-tested ways to embarrass students. S: Sophismatum, plural again. G: Of course. One sophism would be a curiosity; plural sophisms is a curriculum. S: Exempla. G: Examples are the true currency of instruction. A “method” without exempla is a sermon. S: And then: ad exercitationem adolescentum. G: Now tell me what that means without translating it. S: It declares the audience. It says: this is practice work, sir. Drill. Training. Not metaphysics, not wisdom, but gymnasium for the mind. G: Yes. And it tells you the genre: intro plus method plus examples equals a textbook. S: Sir, can I ask the obvious question? G: You will. Name at least two paralogisms. S: Two paralogisms. Equivocation, and amphiboly. G: Good. Equivocation is one word, two senses, and you pretend it stayed one. Amphiboly is one syntax, two structures, and you pretend it stayed one. S: And you said to name at least two. I did. G: Now, name two sophisms. S: Two sophisms. “Have you stopped beating your father?” and “What you have not lost you have; you have not lost horns; therefore you have horns.” G: Excellent. Both famous, both old, both designed for adolescent humiliation. S: So these are veterum. G: Yes. Now name one new. S: One new sophism? G: One new sophism. Something Tomitano might have seen in Padua, or Venice, or among professors who loved to win. S: “All professors are men; you are a man; therefore you are a professor.” G: That is not a sophism, that is flattery. S: It is a paralogism, sir. G: It is a paralogism with social ambition. Very well, keep it. Another. S: “If you can refute sophists, you are not a sophist; you can refute sophists; therefore you are not a sophist.” G: That is closer. It plays on a hidden premise: that only non-sophists refute sophists. In practice, sophists refute each other for a living. S: Then the new sophism is: professional jealousy. G: Quite. Now, you asked earlier why elenchi plural. Now tell me why sophisticos is plural in sense even if singular in grammar. S: Because it covers many kinds of sophistical refutation. Not one species. G: And because Aristotle’s project is not “the” sophist but the field of deceptive argument. S: Then why paralogismorum plural? Because error is plentiful. G: More plentiful than truth, according to the philosopher you were just quoting by accident. S: Aristotle? G: Yes. But Tomitano’s line about vices being innumerable is from another context, but the thought fits: error has many modes; a method must be flexible. S: So division is the tool because it reduces multiplicity by separating cases. G: Exactly. Division is not only a logical technique; it is a pedagogical one. It teaches the student to ask: which sense are we in. S: Sir, can we do the elenchos thing properly. What does Aristotle mean by “elenchos” in the technical sense? G: In the strict sense, elenchos is a refutation that forces a contradiction from an opponent’s own commitments, under agreed rules of inference and relevance to the question at issue. S: So an elenchos is not just any counterexample. G: No. It is a form of defeat by self-entanglement. S: So the sophist tries to produce apparent entanglement where there is none. G: Or tries to make you accept a commitment you did not see you accepted. S: Which is why examples are “famigerata.” They have trapped generations. G: And why they are useful. A textbook is a controlled trap. S: That is not reassuring. G: It is education. Now, two more: why does Tomitano say “praeter illa quae Aristoteles habuit”? S: To mark novelty, sir. To say: I am not merely copying. G: And to excuse his own additions as respectful supplementation rather than rivalry. S: And nuper invenit is the same posture: I have discovered, not invented. G: Exactly. Renaissance modesty is often invention wearing a mask. S: The Plato bit still bothers me. G: It should. It is the interesting part. He is saying: Plato’s dialogues contain methods of dissolving paralogisms by division. Socrates does it by forcing distinctions: in words like “just,” “good,” “courage,” “knowledge.” S: So he wants to teach sophistic refutations not only as formal patterns, but as conceptual hygiene. G: Yes. And that is why an Introductio can be philosophical even when it is technical. It is training in how to keep language from lying on your behalf. S: Sir, you sound as if you approve. G: I approve of any author who tells the adolescent what the adult still needs: do not be fooled by form. S: And yet he calls it brevis. G: Because the adolescent must be kept hopeful. Now, let us do the number game you like. “How many elenchi are there.” S: How many elenchi, sir. In Aristotle’s treatise? G: If you mean how many kinds of fallacy he catalogues, he distinguishes fallacies in dictione and extra dictionem, and then breaks them down. S: So the plural is justified: it is a catalogue, not a single trick. G: Exactly. Now name two in dictione. S: Equivocation and amphiboly. G: Good. Now name two extra dictionem. S: Accident and secundum quid. G: Very good. That is adolescent drill. Now, why ad exercitationem adolescentum is a warning. S: Because it implies: you will be exercised. Which means: you will be made tired and then made better. G: Or made tired and then told you are better. Now, you made a joke earlier about your epitaph. Here is the real joke. Tomitano wrote this for adolescents, and you are reading it in 1939, and we are still adolescents. S: In logic, yes. G: In life, also. S: Sir, can I ask about “diluere.” Why not “solvere” or “refellere.” G: Because refellere is combative. Diluere suggests the error is a thickening that can be thinned, a confusion that can be loosened. S: So it’s more like therapy than war. G: Exactly. The sophist wants you to fight; the logician wants you to clarify. S: Yet Aristotle is fairly warlike. G: Aristotle is warlike in taxonomy. Plato is warlike in drama. Tomitano wants both: the list and the scene. S: Then his title page itself is doing the lesson. It uses big plural nouns to warn you: there are many traps. G: And it uses brevis to prevent you from fleeing. S: Sir, last question. If you had to invent one new sophism for 1939, what would it be. G: Easy. “Everything that can be printed must be true; this is printed; therefore it is true.” S: That is not new, sir. G: It is merely newly weaponised.Grice: Caro Tomitano, lasciami confidarti una cosa: se mai avessi provato a tenere un tutorial sui “precetti della conversazione civile” nella mia università di Vadum Boum, non sarebbe venuto nessuno! I miei studenti sono convinti che “barbaro” sia un complimento, e le buone maniere le lasciano agli archeologi... Altro che la cara, antica Alma Mater della nostra tradizione, vero? Tomitano: Ah Grice, non sai quanto ti capisco! Qui a Padova se provi a parlare di precetti, ti guardano come se avessi proposto una dieta senza risotto. Ma per me il “precetto” è un po’ come il semaforo della conversazione: se non ci fosse, tutti andrebbero in senso contrario e ci ritroveremmo a filosofare sulle rovine... e magari senza nemmeno un buon caffè! Grice: Splendida immagine! Quindi il precetto non è solo ordine, ma anche eleganza: come dire, in conversazione ci vuole almeno un po’ di stile, se no si finisce per parlare tutti insieme come in una fiera di paese. O da me, in aula, dove l’unico “precetto” che rispettano è quello dell’ora di pranzo. Tomitano: Sante parole, Grice! Il precetto, in fondo, è quell’invito gentile – non troppo severo, eh! – che permette alla civiltà di non naufragare nella confusione. È come dire: “Parla pure, ma ricordati che non sei solo al mondo!” Così, persino il più barbaro degli studenti può imparare che una buona conversazione vale più di mille esami... e magari si guadagna pure una stretta di mano! Tomitano, Bernardino (1544). Introductio ad Sophisticos elenchos Aristotelis. Eiusdem breuis methodus diluendorum paralogismorum per diuisionem: praeter illa quae Aristoteles habuit in Elenchis. Quam methodum ex dialogis Platonis et ex Aristotele nuper inuenit. Adiecta sunt famigerata veterum sophismatum exempla: ad exercitationem adolescentum. Venezia: per Bartholomeum cognomento Imperatorem, et Franciscum eius generum.

Nicola Caravita dei duchi di Toritto (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale contro il lizio – A comparison between H. P. Grice and Nicola Caravita dei duchi di Toritto highlights two allied but culturally distinct modes of resisting rigid rational sequencing in favor of a more humane, reason‑governed conversational order. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning rejects linear inferential “lizio” understood as strict Aristotelian procession from premises to conclusion, replacing it with a rational but flexible model in which meaning emerges through implicature, responsiveness, and shared assumptions among interlocutors. Caravita, formed in the Neapolitan milieu of anti‑baroque clarity and early modern political philosophy, advances a parallel resistance within legal, political, and literary thought: against scholastic Aristotelianism and Thomist hierarchy, he favors a conception of sovereignty, law, and constitution as analogical and context‑sensitive rather than deductively ordered. Where Grice frames conversational rationality as cooperative intelligence that tolerates wit, deviation, and pragmatic play while remaining accountable to reason, Caravita embodies a Southern Italian skepticism toward doctrinal lizio, preferring a conversational reason that moves obliquely through rhetoric, judgment, and civic sensibility. Both figures thus converge on a shared insight: rationality is not compromised by conversational looseness or humor, but is instead realized more fully when reason governs without marching in lockstep. For Grice this yields implicature as a calculable yet non‑mechanical phenomenon; for Caravita it yields a philosophy of law, politics, and criticism that privileges living discourse over syllogistic rigidity, making reason conversational rather than procedural. Grice italico Lizio. Costituzione come concetto analogo Joachim. Soveranita. Filosofo napoletano. Filosofo campanese. Filosofo italiano. Napoli, Campania. Grice: I like Caravita; Locke  Englands, and Oxfords, greatest philosopher, had his sponsor, and so does Italys  not Bolognas  Vico, and he was Caravita!. Nacque nella parrocchia dei Vergini da Giuseppe e da Margherita Boiano. La famiglia, originaria della Spagna, apparteneva alla nobilt. Seguendo le tradizioni giuridiche della famiglia, T. simmatricol in Napoli, laureandosi in giurisprudenza con dispensa dall'et legale, e attese all'attivit forense. Studia anche letteratura, greco, matematica, filosofia, specialmente CARTESIO  cf. Grice, Descartes on clear and distinct perception. Cornelio ne loda la dottrina in un dialogo inedito, ma, anche per dichiarazione di un altro contemporaneo che gli dedica un sonetto, Giannelli, non aveva raggiunto alcuna magistratura pubblica -- cfr. Giannelli, Poesie, Napoli. Seguace nelle lettere dell'indirizzo anti-barocchista e neo-petrarchista T. scrive l'introduzione alla Lettura sopra la concione di Marfisa a Carlo Magno di Calopreso -- Napoli --, opera tra le maggiori di critica letteraria napoletana e fonte per le dottrine estetiche del VICO . Nello stesso anno, in occasione di un'epidemia di peste,  uno dei due giudici speciali eletti dalla deputazione della Salute, con competenza in materia civile in tutto quello che occorrer concernente all'affare del contaggio. Per incarico ricevuto dalla "piazza" di Porto, espresse con altri tre giuristi, tra i quali Fusco e il cronista Confuorto, un parere su una richiesta di reintegrazione in quel "seggio".  tra i promotori della rappresentazione a Posillipo de La rosa di Giulio Cesare Cortese. impiegatura da salotto, diritto, anti-popism  il laico --, anti-aristotele, contro Aristotele, concetto assolutista di sovereignty contro Aquino, quartiere dei Vergini  Capua.  Grice: Caro Toritto, devo confessare che tra i filosofi di Oxford il “lizio” aristotelico è sempre stato un argomento da salotto, persino più discusso del vino dei Castelli! Dimmi, tu che sei noto per la tua vena napoletana, come mai ti sei messo di traverso contro il “lizio”? Voglio sapere se è questione di principio filosofico… o magari solo di gusto!  Toritto: Ah, Grice! Qui a Napoli il “lizio” non lo digeriamo nemmeno col limoncello. Diciamo che Aristotele amava mettere tutto in fila, come se la ragione fosse una processione, ma a noi piace più il Carnevale! Opporsi al “lizio” è quasi una tradizione: preferiamo la conversazione che balla e cambia passo, non quella che marcia in fila indiana.  Grice: Che meraviglia, Toritto! Quindi da voi non è “lizio”, ma “lizzio”, e magari pure “ulizio”, se la festa si scalda. Allora la ragione conversazionale napoletana si ribella alla disciplina aristotelica? Ditemi la verità: avete mai provato a mettere in fila le idee, o finiscono sempre a fare una tarantella?  Toritto: Grice, qui le idee si mettono in fila solo per un caffè al bar, e anche lì qualcuno scavalca! Se la ragione dev’essere “lizia”, allora preferiamo la ragione “campagnese”: libera, vivace, pronta a cambiare abito come diceva Tocco. Aristotele sarà stato un gran maestro, ma noi siamo maestri nell’arte di non prendere tutto troppo sul serio. A Napoli, la filosofia è sempre pronta a ridere… persino del “lizio”! Toritto, Nicola Caravita dei duchi di (1691). Introduzione alla lettura di Caloprese sopra la concione di Marfisa a Carlo Magno. Napoli.

Giovanni Raimondo Torlonia (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale, e l’implicatura conversazionale del natale di Roma – A comparison between H. P. Grice and Giovanni Raimondo Torlonia brings into focus two distinct but convergent ways of understanding reason‑governed conversational meaning through social practice and shared celebration. Grice’s theory treats conversational reason as a rational discipline exercised by speakers who rely on mutual recognition, background knowledge, and implicature to convey more than is explicitly said, often using occasions that are culturally charged to invite shared understanding without heavy assertion. The playful exchange on the Natale di Roma exemplifies this: the significance of Rome is not stated as a thesis, but implicatively sustained through allusion, irony, and companionship, allowing meaning to emerge via common cultural premises rather than formal argument. Torlonia, grounded in Roman civic memory and economic as well as philosophical life, embodies a conversational rationality that is festive, historical, and communal: conversation becomes the medium through which identity, friendship, and continuity are reaffirmed, with reason expressed not as abstraction but as cultivated sociability. Where Grice offers a general account of implicature as calculable by cooperative principles, Torlonia exemplifies a historically situated conversational practice in which shared rituals, such as celebrating Rome’s birthday, do much of the rational work. What unites them is the idea that reason in conversation is not austere but relational, flourishing in friendship, cultural memory, and the tacit understanding that binds speaker and hearer into an amicable sequence of meaning, amicus, philos, alter ego. -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo (Roma). Abstract. Keywords. logically developing series amicus, philos, alter ego. Joachim. Filosofo italiano. Roma. Nacque figlio del francese Marin TOURLONIAS Tourlonias e di Maria Francesca Angela Lanci. Dei numerosi altri figli della coppia si hanno notizie, perché sopravvissero, solo di Giuseppe e delle sorelle Francesca e Teresa.  Il padre, discendente da una modesta famiglia dell’Auvergne (Francia), arriva a Roma a metà al seguito dell’abate e diplomatico Montgon; è poi divenuto cameriere particolare del cardinale Acquaviva. Marin -- il cui nome è stato ITALIANIZZATO italianizzato in Marino T. -- avvia un fiorente commercio di tessuti pregiati. Negli anni successivi, forse grazie a un lascito ricevuto dal cardinale, vi affianca la concessione di prestiti, secondo il percorso di numerosi mercanti-banchieri. T.  riusce a imprimere un deciso salto alla dimensione e all’organizzazione dell’attività creditizia familiare: cede l’esercizio commerciale ed è ammesso al corpo dei banchieri di Roma. Ottenne così il riconoscimento ufficiale della sua attività di banchiere, formalmente avviata con un capitale di 10.000 scudi. Sin dai primi tempi le operazioni hanno un rapido sviluppo, e si intrecciarono a iniziative imprenditoriali, tanto che in soli due anni il capitale della ditta Marino T. si quadruplica. T. mantenne quella ragione sociale per alcuni anni dopo la morte del padre, forse con l’obiettivo di rappresentare la marginale partecipazione del fratello minore Giuseppe, al quale vennero garantite delle co-interessenze sui profitti.  T. costituì, con Giorgi e Lavaggi, una società che ottenne dal governo pontificio l’appalto per lo sfruttamento delle cave di allume sui monti della Tolfa. La produzione era, in quegli anni, ancora altamente remunerativa: l’allume pontificio veniva considerato di ottima qualità ed era destinato prevalentemente all’esportazione verso manifatture tessili e conciarie. il natale di Roma, la filosofia dell’amore di Platone in Fichte e Leopardi.  Grice: Caro Torlonia, sai che persino tra le brume di Vadum Boum – quella strana Oxford dove i buoi passano e la lingua si arrovella – oggi si festeggia il natale di Roma? Incredibile, ma vero: anche lontano dall’ALMA MATER, la grande madre, si brinda alla città eterna... anche se il vino non è proprio dei Castelli! Torlonia: Ma che meraviglia! A questo punto, Grice, Roma dovrebbe inviare una cartolina d’auguri persino agli studenti inglesi. Chissà se, tra una toga e una pinta, si recita pure “Ave Roma!” sul Tamigi. D’altronde, come diceva mia nonna: “Roma caput mundi, pure se il mondo è in vacanza altrove!” Grice: In effetti, caro mio, tra le logiche implicature di Vadum Boum, il compleanno di Roma diventa l’occasione perfetta per filosofare su Platone, Fichte e pure Leopardi... ma soprattutto per scoprire che l’amicizia – come diceva Platone – è un “alter ego”. E se manca il vino, basta una buona battuta! Torlonia: Grice, ti dirò: qui a Roma festeggiamo con una cena da banchieri, mentre voi in Oxford filosofate sulle implicature e magari sul “amicus, philos, alter ego”. Alla fine, che sia tra le cave di allume o tra le “cave” della grammatica, basta divertirsi – e ricordarsi che la ragione conversazionale è sempre più allegra quando si brinda insieme, anche se in lingue diverse! Torlonia, Giovanni Raimondo (1805). Memorie economiche, Roma: Pagliarini.

Giacomo della Torre (Forlì): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della stravaganza – A comparison between Grice and Giacomo della Torre brings out a shared commitment to reason as the regulator of meaning, while highlighting different attitudes toward conceptual adventurousness. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats rationality as a discipline exercised within interaction: speakers are presumed to be cooperative and reasonable, and implicature arises when they deliberately allow what is meant to stray beyond what is strictly said, but in a way that remains recoverable by shared reasoning. Della Torre, by contrast, belongs to a late‑medieval tradition in which philosophy openly licenses stravaganza, the willingness to go extra‑vagans, beyond the well‑trodden path, in order to test the limits of Aristotelian natural and moral philosophy. For Torre, teaching at Bologna and reflecting on soul and body, philosophical progress often requires sanctioned deviation, a temporary wandering that nonetheless presupposes a return to rational order. Read together, Torre’s stravaganza and Grice’s implicature illuminate two sides of the same phenomenon: reason does not exclude deviation but governs it. In Grice, conversational estrangement from the literal is controlled by calculability and mutual recognition; in Torre, conceptual wandering is controlled by an inherited Aristotelian framework and scholastic discipline. What unites them is the idea that intelligibility depends neither on rigid literalism nor on free wit alone, but on a reasoned balance between rule and departure, a balance that allows meaning to emerge precisely when language dares to go slightly beyond itself."From Grice’s diary: ‘Speranza has always advised me to keep my eye — actually both of them — on Bononia, as he did when he studied me, with both his eyes stuck with Boum Vadum (as Speranza calls Oxford — an expression that never ceases to amuse him: “You mean that you studied on the ford that the oxen trespass?”). So this Torre (Speranza drops all “della” before surnames) is Bononia-associated, and I had to find out when he was first associated with that prestigious varsity which by far predates our dear Boum Vadum — and I did.’" For Giacomo della Torre (Jacopo da Forlì; also Giacomo dalla Torre; Latinized as Iacobus a Turre / Iacobus Foroliviensis), the cleanest dated Bononia association I can substantiate from online reference sources is that, in the university records/biographical syntheses, he is attested “lettore di filosofia a Bologna” in the years 1383–1385 (Treccani, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani entry “DELLA TORRE, Giacomo,” explicitly: “Tra il 1383 e il 1385 risulta come lettore di filosofia a Bologna”). A second, more specific formulation (Arca del Santo, biographical note on DELLA TORRE GIACOMO) narrows his Bolognese teaching to 1392–1393 and specifies the chair as philosophy natural and moral (“Tra 1392 e 1393, a Bologna, ricoprì la cattedra di filosofia naturale e morale”), which suggests either (i) two separate Bolognese periods preserved differently across repertories, (ii) a correction/alternative reconstruction, or (iii) conflation with an overlapping appointment cycle; but in any case it confirms official teaching duties at Bologna with explicit dates. If your project wants a single “first official association” date, the earliest safely citable one is 1383 as lector of philosophy at Bologna (with the span 1383–1385), while you can optionally note the later, chair-specified Bolognese stint 1392–1393 as an additional (and more descriptively precise) Bononia appointment. Sources used: Treccani (DBI) “DELLA TORRE, Giacomo”; Arca del Santo “DELLA TORRE GIACOMO” (Universitas Artistarum biography page). scuola di Forlì – la scuola di Bologna -- filosofia romagnese -- stravaganza, lizio. Filosofo emiliano. Filosofo italiano. Forli, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna. Grice: “I like Torre; his epitaph reads, ‘nuovo Aristotele,’ which is what it was! – “Ackrill’s just reads, ‘Aristotelian’!” There is a nice ‘via’ in Forlì after him that leads to the varsity! He was a Galen, and philosophised on both the soul and the body!” DELLA TORRE, Giacomo -- Iacobus a Turre, de la Turre, Dalla Torre, de Forlivio, Forliviensis, Foroliviensis, Ferolivias. Nacque da Pietro, "artium doctor", di nobile famiglia, e Tisia, figlia di Pietro degl’Azzoli, nobile forlivese. La famiglia paterna, a Forlì da parecchie generazioni, discende da Andrea, padre di Giovanni, nonno di T. Oltre a lui, il padre ha altri due figli, Guido e Andrea. T. compì gli studi di arti a Padova, dove ha come maestri Colonna  e Avogari  -- così afferma Marchesi, ma Colle lo mette in dubbio. I biografi non concordano sul curriculum d'insegnamento, diviso tra Padova, BOLOGNA e altre città. Risulta come lettore di filosofia a BOLOGNA, ma già negli anni precedenti dove iniziare il suo insegnamento a Padova, dove comunque torna su invito dei Carraresi, che per dar lustro allo studio vi chiamarono molti professori di fama. In effetti viene citato come "lector in studio Paduano" ed è promotore dei dottorati di parecchi allievi, tra cui San Severo , Manfredini  e Tommaso da Recanati , per supplire eventuali assenze dei professori. Risulta come docente di arti a Ferrara, insieme con Marco da Forlì, ma, se non si tratta di un omonimo, si potrebbe trattare di presenze saltuarie, dato che in quegli stessi anni è ricordato sia a Padova sia a BOLOGNA.  Nella città veneta la sua presenza è testimoniata da una lite con il collega Squarcialupi e dai dottorati di parecchi allievi, come Albertini, Nogarelli, Pera e Tomasi. Giacomo della Torre. Torre. stravaganza, lizio.  G.: Let us begin, if you please, with the thing itself and not with any elegant paraphrase of it. We have at least two catalogue forms, and they differ just enough to annoy a careful man. S.: Which is to say, to delight you. G.: The longer form first: Quaestio utrum intensio formae fiat per additionem partis formalis ad partem formalem utroque remanente. S.: And the shorter? G.: Queritur utrum intensio forme fiat per additionem partis formalis ad partes formales. S.: So already we have quaestio and queritur; formae and forme; partem formalem and partes formales; and then the splendid tail, utroque remanente, which the shorter one lacks. G.: Precisely. And before you rush to ask for the answer, I want to savour the asking. S.: You always do. Della Torre, meanwhile, is left in Bologna waiting for his own determinatio. G.: Bologna can wait. It predates Boum Vadum by enough centuries to permit itself patience. S.: I still want the answer. G.: We may not have it. S.: You see, that is exactly the sort of thing that makes students wish to defect to medicine. G.: A pity, since in Giacomo della Torre medicine and philosophy are already married. That is half the point. He is a man of arts and medicine, Bologna and Padua, Aristotle and Galen, soul and body, quality and quantity. S.: And stravaganza. G.: Yes, and that too. A fine word, stravaganza. It wanders but not at random. One wanders under rule. S.: Like implicature. G.: Very good. Deviation governed by recoverability. That is why Giacomo matters. Not because he gives us a modern semantics, but because he stands exactly where form, degree, and intelligibility begin to interpenetrate. S.: Still, the title says De intensione et remissione formarum, and the incipit does not say remissione at all. G.: That is the first thing to notice. The title is archival. It tells the librarian what sort of beast is in the cage. The incipit tells the philosopher where the teeth are. S.: So the title says increase and decrease of forms; the incipit says, right, but how exactly does increase happen. G.: Exactly. It does not begin by announcing the pair, intensio and remissio, as if it were drafting a textbook table. It begins with a mechanism: whether the intensification of a form happens by the addition of one formal part to another formal part, both remaining. S.: And that “both remaining” is the little snake in the grass. G.: Not so little. It is the whole metaphysical pressure-point compressed into an ablative absolute. S.: Utroque remanente. I do like it. It sounds so self-assured. As if one merely adds one formal part to another and both politely remain where they are. G.: Yes. It sounds, to a modern ear, almost comic. But one must resist the temptation to modernise too quickly. S.: I am tempted all the same. If I break eggs for an omelette, the eggs do not remain. If I add five to seven, the five and the seven do not remain as such in the twelve. Kant would be furious. G.: Kant would be grammatical before he was furious. His point about seven and five and twelve is epistemological, not quite the same as Giacomo’s point, which is ontological. Still, the analogy is instructive because it tells you why the scholastic model feels odd. We are being asked whether a qualitative increase is additive and preservative. S.: Which already sounds Strawsonian. The question is respectable; the answer may be no; the no may be external or internal. G.: Just so. One may say, It is not the case that intensification occurs by addition of formal part to formal part, both remaining. Or one may say, My dear fellow, that is the wrong way to set the problem up in the first place. S.: The latter is the more satisfying no. G.: Satisfying, yes. But scholasticism does not live by satisfaction. It lives by exactness of pressure. S.: Let us have the Latin phrase by phrase, then. You enjoyed it the first time; indulge yourself again. G.: Quaestio. A question. Not a thesis, not yet an assertion, but a formally opened problem. Utrum. Whether. This already suspends commitment. Intensio formae. The intensification of a form. Not “intensity” in the modern loose sense, but increase in degree of a form. Fiat. Comes about, happens, is effected. Per additionem. Through the addition. Partis formalis. Of a formal part. Ad partem formalem. To a formal part. Utroque remanente. With both remaining. S.: You say that as if it were all perfectly sane. G.: Perfect sanity is not the same as immediate familiarity. The point is that the sentence is not woolly. It is brutally exact. It asks whether becoming more F is to be understood as adding a formal constituent to another formal constituent while both persist. S.: And one hears at once the Gricean temptation to ask what is presupposed. There must already be a common form. There must already be a scale. There must already be a distinction between the subject and its degree. G.: Exactly. The sentence is thick with presuppositions. It presupposes that one and the same form admits of magis and minus. It presupposes that one may talk of pars formalis without absurdity. It presupposes that “remaining” is not a merely material notion. We are not talking about chairs and eggs. S.: Or healthy urine and less healthy urine. G.: Ah yes, your urine. Aristotle would have approved the diagnostic instinct, if not the colour scheme. Health is useful because it is both a quality and a norm. Something may become healthier or less healthy. The question is whether that becoming more healthy is a matter of preserving a lower degree while adding another. S.: And my instinct says no. Yellow urine becomes brown urine. The yellow does not remain there, lurking decorously behind the brown. G.: Good. That instinct is philosophically valuable. But the scholastic will reply that you are still trapped in phenomenology of states rather than ontology of degrees. He is not talking of yellow and brown as two blobs. He is talking of one form becoming more or less intense. S.: Which is precisely where Grice would prick up his ears. The same form, but more so. Or less so. The same F, yet not quite the same state. G.: Wiggins too. Sameness and substance. Persistence through variation. The identity of a subject under qualitative change. Giacomo’s little incipit is a magnificent seed crystal for such concerns. S.: Better than the title. G.: Much better than the title. The title is a shelf-mark. The incipit is philosophy. S.: And yet, annoyingly, the title gives us remissione too, whereas the incipit begins only with intensio. G.: That is because the opening problem is naturally the positive side. Once you know how increase is to be construed, decrease becomes either the reverse operation or the collapse of that operation. One begins with the more constructive case. S.: So remission is the poor cousin. G.: Temporarily. In the title it regains civil equality. In the opening argument it waits its turn. S.: Very Bologna. G.: Entirely. The city of ordered quarrels. S.: Let us go back to the variant forms. Quaestio versus queritur. Does it matter? G.: Slightly. Quaestio is nominal and architectural. Queritur is verbal and disputational. The first presents a structured object. The second already sounds like the schoolman leaning forward: it is asked whether… S.: And formae versus forme? G.: Scribal indifference, not metaphysical divergence. S.: Partem formalem versus partes formales? G.: That is more interesting. Ad partem formalem gives you one formal part added to another formal part. Ad partes formales sounds more distributive or cumulative, as if the target were already plural. I would trust the more balanced singular formulation if forced to choose. S.: Because it is neater. G.: Because it is philosophically more pointed. One formal part to one formal part, both remaining. That gives you the pure metaphysical oddity in its finest compression. S.: And intentio versus intensio? G.: Intensio is the conceptually proper reading. Intentio is almost certainly a cataloguing or manuscript corruption. If this tract is on increase and decrease of forms, intensio must be what is meant. S.: We are already doing philosophy of language. A single letter and the entire topic changes. G.: Yes, and Giacomo would have appreciated that. Bologna is not only a place of metaphysical distinctions; it is a place where textual exactness is a condition of argument. S.: You are making him sound like a better Oxford man than many Oxford men. G.: Why not. Bononia predates Boum Vadum, and not merely in masonry. It had already taught Europe that thought requires chairs, lecterns, and argumentative patience. S.: Della Torre as elder brother to Grice. G.: Not brother. Ancestor of a difficulty. Grice’s categories of conversation, after all, are Kantian in scaffold but Aristotelian in smell. Quantity, quality, relation, manner. And Giacomo stands at a point where quantity and quality refuse to stay in separate stalls. S.: Which is the bit that interests me most. If a quality may be more or less, then quantity has invaded quality. G.: Or quality has admitted comparative grammar into its own house. That is the medieval wonder and nuisance. Intensio et remissio are where quality begins to look measurable. S.: And where morphosyntax begins to wobble. More healthy, less white, rather hot, very hot, healthier than, less healthy than. Comparative predication is already doing metaphysics before we notice. G.: Just so. Grammar is never innocent. Once you allow more and less into a quality term, you invite the question whether the predicate names a scalar property, a disposition, a norm, or some mixture of all three. S.: Which is where the healthy urine comes back with a vengeance. G.: Unfortunately, yes. S.: Suppose one says: the urine is healthier now. One has smuggled in comparison, diagnosis, norm, and bodily state. That is already four little philosophers in one sentence. G.: Exactly. And a medieval physician-philosopher like Giacomo is exquisitely placed to enjoy the confusion. He has Hippocrates, Galen, Avicenna, Aristotle, and the Categories all within reach. S.: And Bologna behind him, nodding. G.: And perhaps Padua glancing over its shoulder. S.: You still have not given me the answer. G.: We do not have his determinatio. S.: I know, but that is intolerable. G.: No, it is philosophy. Or at least a very good part of it. We do not have the answer, but we have the exact formulation of the pressure. That matters more than many fully preserved answers. S.: You mean the question keeps the matter alive. G.: Precisely. A dead philosophy is one that can only repeat its old answers. A living philosophy is one that can still formulate its difficulties in a way that makes later minds wince. S.: So Giacomo stays alive because his incipit still bites. G.: Yes. The incipit is a bite-mark across six centuries. It asks, in one scholastic sentence, how sameness survives increase. It asks whether change is additive or substitutive. It asks whether degrees are parts. It asks what “remaining” could mean for a form. It asks whether quality can be treated quasi-quantitatively without ceasing to be quality. S.: And all that before breakfast. G.: In Bologna, certainly before breakfast. S.: In Oxford, after tea. G.: With less good Latin. S.: Let us compare, then, title and incipit explicitly. G.: The title: De intensione et remissione formarum. Broad, balanced, archival, neutral. The incipit: Quaestio utrum intensio formae fiat per additionem partis formalis ad partem formalem utroque remanente. Narrow, asymmetrical, argumentative, metabolically alive. S.: The title says what shelf it goes on. The incipit says where thought begins to hurt. G.: Very good. You are almost useful. S.: I do my best. G.: Notice too the movement from abstract noun to process. The title gives you intensio and remissio as paired nominal themes. The incipit immediately turns one of them into fiat, into an occurrence. How does it happen. S.: That is nicely Gricean too. One is less interested in labels than in the conditions under which something is properly said to occur. G.: Indeed. The sentence asks for criteria of occurrence. Under what description is intensification correctly identified. S.: Not unlike asking when one may say someone has implicated rather than said. G.: Exactly. The relation is not one of doctrine but of temperament. Both are interested in the fine articulation of phenomena that ordinary language half-registers and half-confuses. S.: You are trying to make Giacomo sound like a medieval Strawson. G.: Only in the sense that he takes ordinary comparative predication seriously enough to ask what must be true for it not to be mere babble. S.: And perhaps to risk that some of it is mere babble after all. G.: Or badly framed doctrine. That is where the Strawsonian internal negation comes in. Not just no, but no, no, that is not how one should ask it. S.: Still, I can imagine the scholastic structure. Objections for addition. Objections against. Sed contra. Determinatio. Replies ad primum, ad secundum. G.: Certainly. And somewhere in the middle, one can imagine the patient disentangling of additive, substitutive, and perhaps some third model. Neither simple replacement nor literal piling up of formal bricks. S.: A middle way. G.: Bologna likes middle ways almost as much as Oxford likes distinctions. S.: Let us try examples. Heat. G.: A standard one. A body becomes hotter. Does the earlier heat remain while another degree is added. S.: Whiteness. G.: Also standard. A cloth becomes whiter. S.: Health. G.: Best of all, because it is both physiological and normative. S.: Virtue. G.: Dangerous, but useful. One may become more virtuous, and then all the same questions arise in an evaluative register. S.: So the doctrine extends from the natural to the moral. G.: And that is one reason it is philosophically fertile. Once quality becomes gradable, the bridge between physics, medicine, ethics, and language becomes alarmingly short. S.: Which is why Grice, with his mania for categories and his suspicion of careless language, would have liked it. G.: Yes. He would have enjoyed especially the instability between quality and quantity. A quality quantified but not reduced to quantity. A category strained by comparative use but not dissolved by it. S.: And Wiggins would have asked what remains the same. G.: And Strawson would have asked whether the whole picture is descriptively appropriate. S.: And Austin would have asked how we actually talk. G.: And Kant would have wandered in and asked whether synthesis is being confused with analysis. S.: While Aristotle would sit there with health and disease and be mocked by Grice for his devotion to bodily examples. G.: Exactly. It is a splendid party. S.: All organised by Giacomo della Torre in Bologna long before Oxford had learned to make tea properly. G.: Precisely. And that is why he matters. Not because he solves our problem in front of us—we still lack the explicit determination—but because he frames a problem with enough precision that later philosophy can recognise itself in it. S.: So the punchline is that we still do not know his answer. G.: Yes. S.: And that this is not failure. G.: No, it is the best success of the incipit. It has survived as a question sharp enough to generate thought even in the absence of its own conclusion. S.: Which sounds suspiciously like something you would say when you have not done the homework. G.: My dear boy, in philosophy the deepest homework is often preserving the exact form of the question until someone is capable of answering it less badly. S.: So Della Torre lives. G.: Yes. He lives wherever someone still asks, with proper fastidiousness, whether a form becomes more by addition of formal part to formal part, both remaining. S.: And whether that very question is already too much. G.: Quite. Philosophy stays alive not by always having answers, but by learning to ask better and more dangerous questions than the generation before. S.: Bologna 1, Boum Vadum 0. G.: For today, yes.Grice: Caro Torre, oggi mi sento “implicante”. Ti va un po’ di gioco linguistico? Immagina: se “implicanza” fosse la sorella di “stravaganza”, quale delle due sarebbe la più stravagante a una festa di filosofi? Torre: Ah, Grice, domanda degna di un vero Aristotele in vena di scherzi! “Stravagante”, in effetti, ha un pedigree di tutto rispetto: viene da ‘extra-vagans’, ossia chi va “oltre il pascolo”, fuori dai sentieri battuti. Lo diceva già Cicerone, parlando di chi si avventura fuori dal solco della ragione! Quindi, tra le due, “stravaganza” non solo porta il cappello più bizzarro, ma balla pure fuori dal cerchio! Grice: Allora, se io implico qualcosa, mi sto comportando da filosofo “stravagante” o “implicante”? Oppure, come direbbe Cicerone, rischio solo di perdermi tra i boschi senza trovare la via di Forlì? Torre: Ma figurati, Grice! Qui a Forlì diciamo: “Chi non vaga, non trova le implicanze più gustose!” L’importante è che tu sia stravagante abbastanza da implicare una battuta brillante. E poi, si sa, la vera filosofia nasce quando si va “extra-vagans”... ma sempre con un occhio al ritorno, come insegnava Cicerone, per non finire a filosofare in mezzo alle pecore! Torre, Giacomo della (1382). Dissertazione. Quaestio utrum intensio formae fiat per additionem partis formalis ad partem formalem utroque remanente. Bologna.

Ciro Trabalza (Bevagna, Perugia, Umbria): grammatica razionale ed implicatura conversazionale. A comparison between H. P. Grice and Ciro Trabalza on reason‑governed conversational meaning brings into view two complementary ways of grounding rationality in language. Grice’s theory, articulated in “Logic and Conversation,” treats conversational meaning as governed by rational expectations shared by competent speakers: syntactic form matters, but it matters because speakers assume one another to be reasoning agents who exploit grammar to convey more than is strictly said, through implicature calculable by appeal to purpose, relevance, and mutual recognition. Trabalza, from the very different vantage point of historical and rational grammar, approaches language as a system whose syntactic categories are not arbitrary but reflect deeper ontological and cognitive categories, an assumption rooted in the Italian tradition of grammatica razionale and reinforced by Crocean aesthetics. Where Grice theorizes implicature as a dynamic product of conversational rationality in use, Trabalza treats grammar itself as already imbued with rational form, so that interpretation is guided by historically sedimented structures rather than moment‑to‑moment conversational calculation alone. The convergence lies in their shared resistance to a purely formalist or mathematically “washed” view of language: both reject the idea that syntax is neutral with respect to meaning, and both see linguistic structure as answerable to human reason. The difference is one of emphasis: Grice foregrounds the pragmatic intelligence of speakers negotiating meaning in context, while Trabalza foregrounds the rational dignity of grammatical systems as repositories of intelligibility that make such negotiations possible in the first place. Grice: “Russell always made fun of our stone-age metaphysics. Physics, strictly. Ad there’s nothing funny about it, if we think of SYNTACTIC CATEGORIES as reflecting ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES – something that goes beyond Baron Russell’s mathematically-washed brain!” Ciro Trabalza (Bevagna – m. Roma -- è stato un grammatico e critico letterario italiano. Consegue la laurea in lettere all'Università di Roma. Negli anni successivi insegnò in varie scuole secondarie di Empoli, Modena, Perugia e Padova, prima di intraprendere la carriera amministrativa, quale ispettore centrale del Ministero della pubblica istruzione e poi come direttore generale per la scuola media e per gli scambi culturali con l'estero. Nel corso dell'incarico ministeriale, ebbe il particolare merito di dar vita agli Istituti italiani di cultura all'estero, tuttora esistenti ed operativi nella maggior parte delle città capitali del mondo, con la funzione precipua di diffondere la lingua e la cultura italiana all'estero.  Come studioso si occupò di grammatica storica della lingua italiana e di critica letteraria, dal Boccaccio al Rinascimento e a tutto il secolo diciassettesimo. Appare evidente l'ispirazione crociana della critica estetica di T.. Il suo nome peraltro è soprattutto legato alla diffusa e discussa Storia della grammatica italiana, che Alfredo Schiaffini tra gli altri ebbe a definire «poderosa e severa»[3]. Ciro Trabalza svolse altresì un'assidua attività pubblicistica e diresse, tra l'altro, la rivista «Problemi della scuola e della cultura.  Opere Della vita e delle opere di Torti, Bevagna, Studi e profili, Torino, Paravia, Saggio di vocabolario umbro-italiano e viceversa, Bologna, Forni, Studi sul Boccaccio, Città di Castello, S. Lapi, Storia della grammatica italiana, Milano, Hoepli, La critica letteraria, dai primordi dell'Umanesimo a tutto il secolo diciassettesimo, Milano, Vallardi, Dipanatura critiche, Bologna, Cappelli, 1920. la grammatica razionale di Grice, ‘Logic and conversation,’ repinted in Davidson and Harman, Logic and Grammar!  G.: Let us begin where the thing begins, which is not with Croce, not with Vossler, not even with Torti, but with a young man from Bevagna entering the Palazzo della Sapienza in 1894 and discovering that antiquarianism can be an alibi for a life. S.: A life, or a laurea. G.: In Rome those can briefly coincide. Ciro Trabalza is twenty-two or twenty-three, depending on the month; he has Monaci over him, the Sapienza around him, and Francesco Torti in front of him like a perfectly chosen excuse. S.: “Excuse” is very good. It sounds less pious than “subject.” G.: Quite. Every good thesis has an official object and a real motive. Officially, the object is Torti. Really, the motive is language. S.: Language, or grammar. G.: Exactly. And not grammar in the schoolroom sense only, but grammar as a way of entering the question of how Italian became thinkable as a historical and rational object. S.: Still, if one told an ignoramus that Trabalza’s laurea was on Della vita e delle opere di Francesco Torti di Bevagna, the ignoramus would say: ah, another dust-covered local worthy. G.: The ignoramus would be wrong in the usual way: by being too literal. Torti is local in provenance and strategic in significance. S.: Explain strategic. G.: Torti lets Trabalza do three things at once. He can honour a fellow Umbrian; he can enter the questione della lingua; and he can begin, under Monaci, the long move from literary-historical retrieval to the history of grammar. S.: So the local author is really a gateway drug. G.: Precisely. A scholar begins by writing on a minor figure and ends by re-describing the whole tradition that made that figure matter. S.: And Monaci, sitting there in the Sapienza, knew this. G.: I think so. Monaci was too shrewd a philologist to waste a gifted student on a merely decorative topic. S.: Let us fix the scene. Trabalza, born 1871, laurea in 1894, in Lettere, at the Sapienza, in the Palazzo. G.: Yes. And the Palazzo matters, because the old Roman university still housed the humanities in a building that made learning feel both administrative and ceremonial. S.: You like buildings too much. G.: Buildings are merely grammar in stone. S.: Ah, now we are at Trabalza. G.: We never left him. S.: But why Torti? Why not someone grander, if the point is really the history of language? G.: Because grandeur can be paralysing. Torti is the right size. Large enough to connect with the national debate, small enough to need rescue. S.: A rescuable author. G.: Exactly. And a useful one. Torti is anti-purist in the early nineteenth-century sense, which means he is fighting the reduction of Italian to a narrow Trecento-Crusca norm. S.: Purism then is basically Crusca-Firenze-Trecento? G.: Broadly, yes. Not just a dictionary preference, but a whole ideology of authority: old Tuscan as normative, modern innovations under suspicion, non-sanctioned usage treated as contamination. S.: So anti-purism is not “let everyone say whatever he likes.” G.: No. It is not linguistic anarchy. It is resistance to the tyranny of one sanctified model. S.: Which is already more interesting than I thought. G.: Naturally. Torti is not defending bad Italian. He is defending the legitimacy of living Italian against antiquarian over-policing. S.: And this is where the history of language enters, not merely literary taste. G.: Exactly. If you reduce Torti to literary history, you miss the point. He is arguing about what Italian may become. S.: So Trabalza’s thesis is not merely “life and works.” It is really “life and works as entry into a regime of linguistic normativity.” G.: Admirably put. S.: I am improving. G.: Against my better judgment. Now, what Trabalza later does in Storia della grammatica italiana is to broaden that local strategic move into a national historical one. S.: And there the title is crucial: grammar, not literature. G.: Yes, though in Italy of that period grammar and literary history are never cleanly divorced. S.: Because Croce enters. G.: Precisely. Once Croce says that language is expression, grammar is no longer merely a list of forms. It becomes secondary reflection on expressive activity. S.: And then “pure” versus “impure” language begins to look philosophically vulgar. G.: At least in the strongest Crocean light. If every genuine utterance is an individual act of expression, then the old purist tribunal begins to lose absolute authority. S.: So Croce updates Torti by changing the level of the fight. G.: Exactly. Torti says: do not let Crusca tyrannise living language. Croce says: the very notion of an externally policed language is philosophically secondary to expression itself. S.: And Vossler? G.: Vossler philosophises and internationalises the move. He takes the idealist conception of language as expression and turns it into a philosophy of language in which style and spiritual form displace merely external rule. S.: And Trabalza stands between the old anti-purist debate and the newer idealist re-description. G.: Yes. That is why he is more interesting than a mere antiquarian. He writes the history of grammar after grammar has become philosophically unstable. S.: “Philosophically unstable” is nice. G.: It means grammar can no longer pretend to be merely a technology of correctness. S.: Yet Trabalza still writes a history of grammar, not an anti-grammar manifesto. G.: Because history is his way of making the problem visible. He does not abolish grammar. He historicises the ways Italians have tried to rationalise language. S.: So by the time he writes his grande opera, grammar has become a history of rationalisations. G.: Better: a history of how linguistic reflection oscillates between rule, expression, canon, and usage. S.: Which sounds surprisingly Gricean. G.: At a high enough altitude, yes. Grice would be interested whenever syntactic categories are taken as answerable to rational or ontological ones. S.: Though Grice is not a Crocean. G.: Certainly not. He would distrust the rhetoric of pure expression. But he would be fascinated by the tension between living use and codified form. S.: Whereas Torti, by contrast, is not asking Wood’s question: what is the force of linguistic rules. G.: Exactly. Torti is not an Oxford analyst. He is fighting over which norms should govern literary and linguistic legitimacy. S.: While O. P. Wood asks what sort of force a linguistic rule has at all. G.: Which is a very different question. Wood is conceptual; Torti is ideological and cultural. S.: That is what I meant before. Reading Torti in the light of Ryle and Wood may be unfair. G.: Unfair but illuminating. It shows the difference between asking “which usage should count?” and asking “what is it for a rule of use to bind?” S.: So Trabalza, if he follows Torti, follows him as historian of linguistic controversy, not as analyst of rule-force. G.: Precisely. S.: Yet Croce and Vossler drag the whole matter upward into philosophy of language. G.: They do. And that is why Trabalza’s Storia della grammatica italiana is not simply a museum of old schoolmasters. It is written in a world where grammar has become answerable to aesthetics, expression, and historicity. S.: Which is why one finds De Sanctis and similar figures there. G.: Yes. Because grammar has become entangled with criticism, national culture, and the philosophy of expression. S.: I can now see why the young Trabalza in 1894 might lock himself in the Palazzo with Torti. G.: “Lock himself in” is too dramatic. He was properly supervised by Monaci. S.: Which is a Roman way of being imprisoned. G.: Quite. S.: Tell me again about Monaci. G.: Ernesto Monaci, born in Soriano nel Cimino, not Vicovaro as I once unfortunately misplaced him; Roman philologist, formidable teacher, and exactly the man to direct a gifted Umbrian toward a strategically chosen nineteenth-century anti-purist. S.: So the story is almost too tidy. Umbrian student, Roman philologist, Umbrian anti-purist, laurea in the Palazzo. G.: Tidy stories are often historically true in outline and messy in implication. S.: Which is where your beloved implicature enters. G.: Naturally. A thesis on Torti in 1894 says more than “here is Torti.” It says: here is a young scholar placing himself within the history of language by way of a recoverable but not overworked figure. S.: And does the thesis actually help Torti’s afterlife? G.: In a limited but real way, yes. It does not canonise him universally, but it consolidates the dossier. After Trabalza, anyone wanting Torti has a modern monograph to start from. S.: Bibliographical consolidation rather than glory. G.: Exactly. Which is the commonest form of scholarly immortality. S.: Better than being unread on a shelf. G.: Marginally. S.: Now let me try an Oxford analogy. If the OED is descriptive and purism is prescriptive with a moral halo, where does Trabalza stand? G.: Trabalza is neither simple descriptivist nor simple prescriptivist. He is a historian of how Italians theorised grammar, under conditions where the force of norm and the reality of usage were both in dispute. S.: So he is not saying: “Here is the pure form; indoctrinate accordingly.” G.: No. That would be the old purist line. S.: Nor is he simply saying: “Record whatever people say.” G.: No. That would be too lexicographical and too thin. S.: Then he is showing how systems of normativity arose, fought, changed, and philosophically reinterpreted themselves. G.: Exactly so. S.: Which is why Croce and Vossler are not decorative appendices but essential background. G.: Yes. Without them you miss why a history of grammar in the early twentieth century could be intellectually ambitious rather than merely compilatory. S.: And that ambition reaches back to Torti? G.: In mediated form. Torti becomes retrospectively legible as an early challenger of purist closure, and Croce makes that challenge more philosophically radical by reconceiving language as expression. S.: So they are not simply repeating Torti. They are translating him upward. G.: Nicely said. Torti fights over linguistic legitimacy inside an older controversy. Croce and Vossler shift the fight into the ontology of language itself. Trabalza historicises the road between the two. S.: Which makes Storia della grammatica italiana less a grammar-book than a history of attempted self-consciousness about language. G.: Exactly. It is the history of Italy trying to know what it was doing when it codified, criticised, purified, relaxed, aestheticised, and nationalised its language. S.: That sounds far better than “a book about old grammarians.” G.: Most good books are misdescribed by lazy nouns. S.: There is still something deliciously comic about the young Trabalza getting a degree through Torti. G.: Degrees are often won through strategically chosen dead men. S.: And is Torti then a philosopher? G.: Not in the strict technical sense. Philosophically minded, yes; philosophically central, no. He is a figure in the history of linguistic and literary ideas. S.: Which is enough. G.: More than enough, if one knows what one is doing. S.: That phrase should be carved over the Sapienza. G.: The Sapienza needs no more carving. It has survived enough inscriptions already. S.: Let us return to Oxford for a moment. Wood on the force of linguistic rules, Ryle on use and usage, Grice on conversational normativity. Where does Trabalza look from there? G.: Distant but not irrelevant. Trabalza does not ask what gives a rule its force in the conceptual sense Wood asks. But he shows the historical sediment from which later arguments about grammatical normativity emerge. S.: So he supplies ancestry, not analysis. G.: Yes. Though ancestry can itself be analytic when properly narrated. S.: And Grice, if he read Trabalza, would perhaps be amused by the thought that grammar had been philosophically dignified in Italy before Oxford decided to make “use” fashionable. G.: Very likely. He would also appreciate the anti-purist suspicion that authorised form is not the whole truth about rational communication. S.: Which is where Torti becomes unexpectedly modern. G.: Modern enough to deserve recovery, not modern enough to become Wood. S.: Good. I like that. “Not modern enough to become Wood.” G.: You may keep it. S.: And we still end where we began: Trabalza. G.: We must. Because the point of all the intermediaries is to show that Trabalza is not a footnote to Torti, but the historian who makes Torti speak again under new philosophical weather. S.: In 1894 he gets his degree by rescuing a strategically useful anti-purist. G.: Yes. S.: Later he writes a history of grammar under Crocean and post-Crocean pressure. G.: Yes. S.: And the ignorant think this is mere antiquarian pro-Trecento literary dust. G.: They always do, until they notice that the “dust” is what remains after a whole nation has fought over what its language is allowed to be. S.: So the punchline is that the Palazzo gave him a laurea, Torti gave him a route, Croce gave him altitude, and grammar gave him a civilisation to narrate. G.: Exactly. S.: And this, you would say, is why Trabalza matters. G.: Yes. He begins with Torti and ends by teaching us that grammar is never only grammar. S.: Which means we have ended with Trabalza. G.: As we were always meant to.Grice: Caro Trabalza, devo confessarti che raramente ho letto qualcosa di così stimolante e profondo come le tue incursioni filosofiche nei dettagli grammaticali del latino e dell’italiano. Mi hanno affascinato al punto da tentare – non senza difficoltà – di applicare simili sottigliezze alle lingue più “barbare” che si parlano attorno al Vadum Boum, quella strana espressione con cui, quasi per gioco, chiamavamo Oxford tra amici. In fondo, è come dire: dove il fiume scorre e i buoi passano, la lingua si rinnova, ma non sempre si nobilita. Trabalza: Grice, le tue parole sono un balsamo per l’anima di chi, come me, crede nella dignità filosofica della grammatica. La tua attenzione verso le «categorie sintattiche» che, a ben vedere, riflettono le «categorie ontologiche» mi fa sentire compreso. E se anche nelle lingue di Vadum Boum – Oxford – si tentano queste alchimie, vuol dire che la nostra ricerca ha davvero un respiro universale. Grice: Esatto, Trabalza! In fondo, ogni volta che scandagliamo la struttura di una lingua, cerchiamo di dare senso all’esperienza umana. Anche Russell, con il suo cervello matematicamente lavato, non riusciva a cogliere quanto la grammatica possa essere fonte di verità filosofica. Forse, proprio tra le declinazioni latine e le sottigliezze italiane, troviamo quella ragione conversazionale che illumina anche gli idiomi più recalcitranti. Trabalza: Grice, è proprio in questo dialogo tra grammatico e filosofo che si fa strada la vera implicatura. La grammatica razionale non è solo regola, ma anche interpretazione, come insegna la critica crociana. E se la lingua italiana, con le sue mille sfumature, si diffonde nel mondo grazie all’impegno di chi crede nella conversazione civile, allora abbiamo costruito davvero un ponte tra la ragione italiana e quella universale. Trabalza, Ciro (1894). Torti. Sotto Monaci. Sapienza Roma.

Padre Cesare Tragella (Trezzano sul Naviglio, Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazional dei caduti – A comparison between Grice and Cesare Tragella on reason‑governed conversational meaning turns on the way rationality is anchored in lived practice rather than abstract system. For Grice, conversational rationality is articulated through the idea that meaning in conversation is governed by reasons that participants expect one another to recognize: implicature arises because speakers are taken to be rational agents, oriented toward shared purposes, and capable of allowing what is meant to exceed what is said without collapsing into sentimentality. In the autobiographical episode surrounding the death of the original best man and Grice’s meeting his future wife, rational talk about loss is inseparable from tacit understanding, restraint, and shared recognition of what cannot be fully voiced; the fallen are present through implicature rather than proclamation. Tragella’s work on the caduti, by contrast, situates conversational reason within historical and devotional practice: memorialization, architecture, letters, and liturgical language are reason‑guided forms of address in which silence, gesture, and place do as much rational work as explicit assertion. Where Grice theorizes implicature as a mechanism of cooperative intelligibility, Tragella embodies it as an ethical duty of remembrance, in which the absence of the fallen continually calls for rational response without rhetorical excess. The convergence lies in their shared refusal of empty rhetoric: for both, reason governs conversation precisely when it allows memory, loss, and moral seriousness to be conveyed indirectly, through forms that respect both understanding and dignity. Grice italo per i caduti. Grice, “How I met my wife.” As it happens, Grice was a student at Merton. A younger recipient of the same Senior scholarship, J. S. Watson, called him on short noice to fulfil the task of best man – seeing that the original best man had been killed in action shortly before. It was a Watson’s wedding that Grice met his future wife. While Grice himself was engaged  in action in the North Atlantic, he was transferred to the Admiralty for the remaining of the duration of the war.  Studia a Gorla Minore, Milano, e Torino. Si occupa di serbare la memoria della battaglia di Magenta con la costruzione di una cappella espiatoria all'interno della chiesa per accogliere le spoglie dei caduti. Ricovero vecchi poveri Sito Lombardia Beni Culturali.  Viviani, cfr. Tunesi, Morani Le stagioni, op. cit.. T., Lettera a Murri in: Murri, L. Bedeschi, Carteggio. II. Lettere a Murri. Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Le stagioni di un prete, Le stagioni di un prete, «Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa», Viviani, Dalle ricerche la prima storia vera, Magenta, Zeisciu. per i caduti. Grice: Caro Tragella, sai, raramente mi sento così a mio agio come con te nel parlare dei caduti. Forse solo tu puoi capire quello che si prova, perché per me non è solo filosofia, ma storia viva: ho visto amici cadere in mare, uno di loro era destinato a essere il testimone a un matrimonio, ma il destino… beh, ha scelto per tutti noi. E proprio lì, tra il dolore e la memoria, ho incontrato anche la donna che sarebbe diventata mia moglie. Tragella: Grice, la tua confidenza mi onora e commuove. Anche per me, la memoria dei caduti non è un esercizio di retorica, ma un dovere del cuore e della ragione. Ho consacrato la mia vita a conservare il loro ricordo, perché siano sempre celebrati non solo come eroi, ma come uomini la cui assenza ci interroga ogni giorno. Grice: Allora brindiamo, caro amico, al coraggio di chi ci ha preceduto e a quella strana fraternità che ci lega, al di là delle parole e della filosofia. Ogni gesto di memoria è un gesto di vita, e oggi sento che non siamo soli nel nostro ricordo. Tragella: Esattamente, Grice. Che il nostro brindisi sia un inno silenzioso ai caduti e un segno di speranza per chi resta. La storia li ricorda, la filosofia li onora, ma il cuore—solo il cuore—li rende eterni. Tragella, Cesare (1874). Ordination. Milano

Giuseppe La Napola da Trapani (Trapani) Jr.: la ragione conversazionale, Giuseppe La Napola (Napoli) da Trapani junior è stato un francescano, filosofo e teologo italiano.  Nato a Trapani, Giuseppe La Napola da Trapani jr. era un frate minore conventuale, da distinguersi da Giuseppe La Napola da Trapani senior, sempre frate minore conventuale ma suo zio. Appartenente alla Provincia di Sicilia, venne inviato a Roma, presso il Collegio San Bonaventura, da cui uscì addottorato nel 1608. In seguito ha esercitato la docenza presso lo Studium di Bologna, poi reggente degli studi a Padova, carica che esercitò per poco tempo.  Infatti, a Enna, la fraternità provinciale della Sicilia lo elesse suo Ministro, carica che il Ministro generale dei frati minori conventuali, Giacomo Montanari da Bagnocavallo, non rese effettiva se prima non avesse portato a termine il suo incarico di insegnamento. fu reggente degli studi a Palermo ed è da presupporre che egli sia stato reggente degli studi a Napoli. è tornato a Trapani, dove è rimasto fino alla fine dei suoi giorni. La tradizione lo ricorda come il maestro di Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola.  Nel suo insegnamento, Giuseppe La Napola jr. non esponeva solamente la dottrina di una corrente teologica, ma offriva una formazione metodologica innovativa per il tempo, privilegiando la via Scoti, i principi della dottrina scotista Marco Forlivesi, "Scotistarum princeps". Bartolomeo Mastri e il suo tempo, Centro Studi Antoniani, Padova Marco Forlivesi, Scotistarum princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri e il suo tempo, Centro Studi Antoniani, Padova Marco Forlivesi, «Gli scotisti secenteschi di fronte al dibattito tra bañeziani e molinisti: un'introduzione e una nota», in: Conoscenza e contingenza nella tradizione aristotelica medievale, a cura di St. Perfetti, E.T.S., Pisa Ordine dei Frati Minori Conventuali Giovanni Duns Scoto Bartolomeo Mastri Francescanesimo   Portale Biografie   Portale Filosofia Categorie: Francescani italiani Filosofi italiani Teologi italiani Nati a Trapani Morti a Trapani.  Grice: Caro Trapani, devo confessarti che ogni volta che sento parlare di “la ragione conversazionale francescana”, mi immagino subito una tavolata di frati che discutono se sia più filosofico il pane raffermo o la zuppa calda. Dimmi: come si filosofeggia tra le mura conventuali, con un po’ di ironia?  Trapani: Ah, Grice, ti dirò che la vera difficoltà non sta nel pane o nella zuppa, ma nel convincere i frati che la logica scotista non si applica alle porzioni del pranzo! E se qualcuno osa citare Aristotele, gli facciamo portare il piatto vuoto: così impara il valore della contingenza!  Grice: Splendido! Allora, dovrei scrivere un trattato sul “principio di sufficienza della minestra”? Forse così potrei finalmente convincere Russell che la filosofia non si fa solo con numeri e formule, ma anche con cucchiai e sorrisi tra amici!  Trapani: Grice, se vuoi davvero filosofare alla siciliana, ricorda il proverbio: “Meglio una minestra condivisa che cento sillogismi da soli!” E poi, se il dibattito si fa troppo acceso, basta offrire un cannolo: quello mette tutti d’accordo, persino gli scotisti più testardi! G: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionle –Grice italo implicatura. Filosofo italiano.  Grice: Caro Trapaninapola, devo confessarti che ogni volta che sento parlare di implicatura conversazionale, immagino subito una riunione segreta tra filosofi dove si discute se il caffè debba essere lungo o ristretto. Dimmi, è così che funziona la filosofia italiana a Roma, o sono io che complico tutto come sempre? Trapaninapola: Ah, Grice, se la ragione conversazionale potesse davvero decidere il destino del caffè romano, avremmo risolto più problemi che in mille trattati! Ma ti dirò, l’implicatura qui si manifesta quando il barista ti chiede “zucchero?” e tu rispondi “come viene viene”—un vero esercizio di filosofia applicata! Grice: Splendido! Allora, per capire la tua implicatura, dovrei forse interpretare ogni gesto del barista come una metafora esistenziale? Mi sa che dovrò scrivere un nuovo capitolo sul “significato nascosto del cucchiaino abbandonato”, o rischiare di essere frainteso come un turista a Trastevere! Trapaninapola: Grice, non c’è dubbio che il cucchiaino abbandonato sia la vera chiave della filosofia italiana! D’altronde, come diceva mio zio – che era famoso più per il cannolo che per i sillogismi – “se non capisci la conversazione, almeno goditi il dolce!” Ecco la vera implicatura: filosofare, sì, ma sempre con il sorriso… e qualcosa di buono da mangiare! Trapani, Giuseppe La Napola da (1608). Dissertatio doctoralis. Collegio Fidanza, Roma.

Pietro Antonio Domenico Trapassi (Roma): la ragione conversazionale romana, la ragione conversazionale italiana. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes implicature a rationally reconstructible upshot of cooperative talk: hearers infer what a speaker means beyond what is said by assuming the speaker is pursuing recognizable conversational ends, and they justify the inference by appeal to broadly shared norms of reasonable contribution (relevance, sufficiency, etc.). With Trapassi (Pietro Metastasio), the “reason” at issue is less the inferential logic of everyday exchange and more a dramatized public reason: his opera seria libretti stage characters whose utterances are constrained by decorum, courtly hierarchy, and the ethical politics of passion-control, so that indirectness functions as a rhetorical technology for governing emotions and securing legitimacy (what must be meant often cannot be said outright, given role, rank, and the demands of virtu and duty). In Grice, implicature is a general mechanism for extracting intended meaning from conversational moves; in Metastasio/Trapassi, implicit meaning is typically the scenic and moral surplus generated when the literal line is shaped for performance—an economy of allusion, restraint, and audience uptake in which what is “understood” depends on shared cultural scripts about honor, clemency, sovereignty, and self-mastery. The comparison, then, is between Grice’s universalist account of reason as the interpreter’s method for computing speaker-meaning, and Trapassi’s theatrical-civic account of reason as the staged regulation of what can be said (and so of what must be implied) in a Roman/Italian idiom where language is already a public instrument of moral and political order. Grice: “There are several historical one-volume editions of Pietro Metastasio’s complete works in Italian. The most notable historical one-volume editions include: Edition Published in Florence by Tipografia Borghi e Compagni, this volume (Tutte le opere di Pietro Metastasio volume unico) contains approximately 1,097 pages. Edition Published by Le Monnier in Florence, this edition also collects his entire output into a single volume. Edition Published in Naples by C. Boutteaux e M. Aubry, this edition contains 1,119 pages with text presented in two columns.  Key Modern Edition While these historical single volumes exist, the standard scholarly reference for his complete works is actually a five-volume set edited by Bruno Brunelli, titled Tutte le opere di Pietro Metastasio, published by Mondadori. This set is widely considered the definitive modern compilation due to its critical apparatus.  Would you like to search for a current digital versionor a reprint of the 19th-century single-volume editions?Pietro Metastasio's real name was  Pietro Antonio Domenico Trapassi, and he was born in   Rome . His oeuvre is important to the history of philosophy because his dramatic works were an artistic reflection of Enlightenment-era political and moral philosophy, particularly concerning absolutist monarchy and the control of human passions through reason.    Real Name and Place of Birth Real Name: Pietro Antonio Domenico Trapassi. The name "Metastasio" was a Greek translation ("crossing") of his original surname suggested by his patron, the influential lawyer and man of letters Gianvincenzo Gravina. Place of Birth: Rome, Papal States (now Italy).  Importance in the History of Philosophy Metastasio's significance in the history of philosophy lies not in his being a philosopher himself, but in how his widely popular opera seria libretti dramatized the prevailing philosophical and political ideas of the European Ancien Régime and the early Enlightenment. Grice: Buongiorno, Trapassi! Sai, a Oxford ti conoscono come Metastasio, solo così—il vulgo si è affezionato al soprannome che ti sei dato da solo! Trapassi: Caro Grice, che curiosa sorte! Quel nome greco mi fu suggerito da Gravina, ma ormai è diventato la mia seconda pelle, tanto che quasi dimentico il mio vero Trapassi romano. Grice: Eh sì, ma forse è proprio questa metamorfosi che rende immortali gli uomini di lettere. In fondo, il nome scelto riflette la ragione conversazionale: passare, attraversare idee e mondi. Trapassi: Hai ragione, amico mio. E se il pubblico si affeziona al soprannome, è perché nei versi e nelle conversazioni trova un ponte tra la ragione italiana e quella universale. D’altronde, come dice il proverbio, “nome nuovo, vita nuova” Trapassi, Pietro Antonio Domenico (1729). Rime, Venezia: Zatta.

Agostino Trapè (Montegiorgio, Fermo, Marche): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’umanità di Varrone -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed meaning explains how hearers recover what a speaker means (including implicatures) by assuming cooperative rational agency and then reconstructing the reasons that make an utterance an appropriate move in context; the “governance” is primarily inferential and normative (what it would be reasonable to take the speaker to intend, given shared purposes and conversational constraints). Trapè, as a major Augustinian scholar and institutional founder (he promoted the Pontificio Istituto Patristico Augustinianum, founded and directed the Nuova Biblioteca Agostiniana, and the Corpus Scriptorum Augustinianorum), approaches meaning less through a maxims-and-calculation model and more through a humanitas frame in which language is a moral-intellectual practice formed by the tradition of Latinity and the education of the human person; his explicit interest in Varro and Augustine as “praecipui humanitatis cultores” signals that what matters is how discourse cultivates the human (homo) through learned conversation, textual inheritance, and spiritual-intellectual formation. In that light, Grice’s implicature looks like a micro-theory of rational coordination between interlocutors, whereas Trapè’s “conversational reason” (as your passage stages it via Varro’s humanitas) looks like the larger civilizing and ethical horizon in which conversation becomes a vehicle of formation: not only what is inferred beyond what is said, but how the very practice of speaking, joking, correcting, and learning together is ordered toward making persons more fully human. Grice supplies a general mechanism for deriving implied content from utterances; Trapè supplies a thicker account of why such mechanisms matter, because conversation—grounded in Latinity, tradition, and the Augustinian concern for the human person—functions as a school of humanitas in which reason is exercised as a lived virtue rather than merely deployed as an interpretive algorithm.-- Grice italo humanitas, homo, Varrone. Uno dei massimi studiosi della filosofia semiotica d’Agostino. Si laurea a Roma con una “Il concorso divino in Colonna” (Tolentino). Insegna a Roma. Promosse la fondazione dell'Istituto patristico augustinianum.  Fonda la "Biblioteca agostiniana" che si occupa della volgarizzazione di Agostino (Città Nuova) e il "Corpus scriptorum augustianorum", che pubblica le opere dei filosofi scolastici agostiniani.  Altri saggi: “Introduzione ad Agostino e le grandi correnti della filosofia contemporanea”, Atti del congresso Italiano di filosofia agostiniana, Roma, Tolentino; Varro et Augustinus praecipui humanitatis cultores, Latinitas Augustinus et Varro, Atti del Congresso di studi varroniani, Rieti) – VARRONE --; “Escatologia e anti-platonismo” Augustinianum, “Agostino, filosofo e teologo dell'uomo”; Bollettino dell’Istituto di filosofia (Macerata); Agostino: L'ineffabilità di Dio, in  «La ricerca di Dio nelle religioni (EMI, Bologna); “La Aeterni Patris e la filosofia”, Atti del Congresso Tomistico, Roma; Agostino, l'uomo, il pastore, il mistico” (Roma, Città Nuova); Patrologia, Casale Monferrato, Dizionario patristico e di antichità cristiana, Casale Monferrato, Introduzione e commento alla lettera apostolica «Hipponensem episcopum», Roma, Introduzione ad Agostino, Roma,  L'amico, il maestro, il pioniere, Cremona, apostolo della cultura. la semiotica d’Agostino, Varrone, humanitas.  Grice: Ah, Trapè, che piacere! Finalmente posso celebrare la “umanità” di Varrone senza dovermi arrovellare con i miei studenti barbari di Vadum Boum, che pensano che “humanitas” sia una specie di pasta integrale. Qui almeno posso festeggiare un po’ di vero spirito latino! Dimmelo, cos’è per te questa “umanità”? Non dirmi che anche tu la confondi con la mensa universitaria! Trapè: Grice, ti rassicuro: nessuna mensa universitaria, ma piuttosto un banchetto per l’anima! “Humanitas”, secondo Varrone, è quell’arte raffinata di essere uomini senza diventare statue di marmo, e senza, per carità, ridursi a semplici “homo sapiens” col grembiule. È la capacità di sorridere, discutere e magari, ogni tanto, sbagliare in bella compagnia. Varrone avrebbe davvero apprezzato il tuo spirito oxoniense, purché non troppo barbuto! Grice: Barbuto sì, ma almeno non peloso come certi miei colleghi! E allora, Trapè, se “humanitas” è allegria, conversazione, e qualche errore ben piazzato, forse dovremmo istituire una cattedra su come equivocare con stile. D’altronde, l’implicatura conversazionale non sta proprio nel trovare il senso dove gli altri cercano la regola? Varrone sarebbe il primo a ridere sotto i baffi! Trapè: Ecco, Grice, hai colto nel segno! La vera “umanità” non sta nel non sbagliare, ma nel saperci ridere sopra e imparare qualcosa, magari davanti a un piatto di lasagne — rigorosamente marchigiane, si capisce! E se i tuoi barbari studenti si lamentano, ricordagli che secondo Varrone, essere umani è saper conversare, anche quando si parla con la bocca piena. La filosofia, insomma, è più saporita se gustata in buona compagnia! Trapè, Agostino (1951). Sant'Agostino uomo, Roma: Città Nuova.

Gaio Trebazio Testa: la ragione conversazionale della repubblica romana e l’implicatura conversazionale del luogo – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes implicature an inferential achievement: a hearer, presuming cooperative rational agency, explains why a speaker said what she did by recovering an intended extra content that would make the move reasonable under shared conversational norms (so the “governance” is by publicly reconstructible reasons, not by private association). Trebazio (Gaius Trebatius Testa), by contrast, is best read—on the evidence of his historical persona—as a jurist and pragmatic counselor operating in the normative ecology of the late Republic and early Principate, where “reason” is institutionalized as ius: his expertise concerns how texts, formulae, and acts acquire force within legal and political practice (Cicero dedicates the Topica to him; he is connected with Caesar and Augustus; later tradition credits him with helping legitimate codicils), and Horace even stages him as the voice of prudent advice about what one may safely “say” in Rome. Set against Grice, Trebazio thus exemplifies a different axis of reason-governance: not the maxims that make conversational inference calculable, but the juridical and rhetorical constraints that make utterances actionable, defensible, or dangerous in a public forum; where Grice models how a rational interpreter derives implicata from an utterance’s apparent conformity (or strategic nonconformity) to cooperative principles, Trebazio models how a Roman professional reasons from place, forum, authority, and precedent to what can be responsibly asserted, insinuated, or left unsaid—so that what Grice treats as conversational implicature, Trebazio would naturally treat as prudent insinuatio under law and politics, i.e., meaning that is governed by reasons because it is governed by norms, offices, and the risks attached to speech in the res publica. Roma antica -- la filosofia romana –  filosofia campanese -- filosofia italiana – Grice italo – By , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, ,  (Velia). Abstract. Grice: “T. is the Italian name for the Ancient Roman jurist and politician Gaius Trebatius. He is a well-known figure in Italian legal and literary history for several reasons: Legal Legacy: He is one of the most prominent jurists of the late Roman Republic and early Principate. He is credited with introducing "codicils,” informal additions to a will, into Roman law at the request of Emperor OTTAVIANO  Augustus. Literary Connections: He is a close friend of CICERONE , who dedicated several works to him and writes numerous letters addressed to him. Political Influence: T. serves as a legal advisor to both GIULIO  Caesar and OTTAVIANO . Cultural Presence: In Italy, he is frequently referred to as Gaio T. Testa in academic contexts, legal encyclopedias, and historical literature.  Would you like to know more about his legal reformsor his famous correspondence with Cicero?” Keywords. Filosofo italiano. Novi Velia, Salerno, Campania. È molto dubbio che si debbano prendere alla lettera certe espressioni di CICERONE che accennano l’inclinazione di T. por la filosofia dell’Orto. Provenne da famiglia agiata e pare che si reca a Roma per darsi agli studi giuridici. Per raccomandazione di CICERONE, GIULIO CESARE lo conduce nelle Gallie e si serve di lui per pareri giuridici. Ritornato a Roma all’inizio della guerra civile, T. age da mediatore tra GIULIO CESARE  e CICERONE. Nel conflitto fra CESARE e POMPEO, T. si schiera col primo al quale rimase sempre fedele. Dopo la morte di GIULIO CESARE, T. si reca spesso alla villa Tuscolana di CICERONE, ove gli caddero in mano i "Topica" di Aristotele. Per contentare il suo desiderio di avere chiarimenti di quella trattazione, CICERONE scrive il saggio omonimo che dedica ed invia a T. In seguito T.  I topica di Cicerone, ius, IVSTVM, legge, Ottaviano, Labeone, satira, Orazio, religione, ius civile, pragmatica del diritto.  GRICEVS: Salve, Trebati! Audivi te codicillos in ius Romanum introduxisse—quid te ad hoc movit? TREBATIVS: Salvum te, Grice! Imperator Ottavianus rogavit, ut testamenta clariora fierent; ego enim semper pragmatica adhibere studui. GRICEVS: Cicero nonnumquam te “philosophum horti” appellavit. Estne ordo Epicureus tibi cordi? TREBATIVS: Grice, verum dicam: non tam doctrina Epicurea quam ipso sermonis pretio atque iustitiae concretae studio delectatus sum. Si in horto tranquillitas colitur, in foro sensus communis et legum claritas serenda est. Semper credidi philosophiam, etiam hortensem, rei publicae civibusque prodesse debere, neque inter pergulas inclusam manere. Itaque, inter risum cum Horatio et contentionem cum Cicerone, didici verum sapientem esse eum qui rationem loco temporique in quo vivit accommodare novit. Trebazio Testa, Gaio (a.u.c. DCCXXIV). De codicillis et de ratione iuris: responsa ad consultationem principis (Latine). Roma: Forense.

Gaio Trebiano  la ragione conversazionale dell’orto romano e l’implicatura conversazionale del Grice italo – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as something a rational hearer can (at least in principle) calculate from what is said plus shared assumptions about cooperative talk: when a speaker seems to under-inform, digress, or speak oddly, the hearer searches for an intended point that would make the utterance a reasonable move under recognizable conversational norms. “Trebiano,” as your passage frames him, is positioned not as a theorist of maxims but as a Roman case-study in how conversational reason operates in epistolary patronage and consolation: Cicero’s letters to Trebianus (a distinct figure often confused with the better-known Trebonius) show meaning being managed through what is left unsaid—reassurance, advocacy, and face-saving hope for pardon/restoration are conveyed obliquely, because the political context (exile, Caesar’s dominance, dependence on intermediaries) makes direct speech risky. In that setting, the “implicature” is less a classroom derivation and more a lived tactic of survival: Cicero’s careful offers of help and updates function as socially binding signals without always stating the whole practical upshot, while Trebianus’s own “hortus” posture (Epicurean quietism, measured hedonism, placitum) casts conversation as a low-noise discipline that sustains agency under constraint. So where Grice universalizes the rational mechanism—implicature as a general product of cooperative reasoning—Trebiano supplies a historically Roman instantiation in which conversational reason is inseparable from prudence, patron-client expectation, and the therapeutic style of letters: meaning is governed by reason, but reason here is political and ethical as much as inferential, and the “garden” becomes a model for how to communicate more than one dares to say. Roma – filosofia italiana – By , pel Gruppo di Gioco di Grice, ,   (Roma). Abstract. Grice: “In Cicero's correspondence,  T. refers to a man named  T., who belongs to the Trebia gens. While he is a distinct individual, he is often confused with the more famous TREBONIO , of the Trebonia gens, another close friend and correspondent of Cicero. T. himself is an equestrian whom CiICERONE  supports during The Civil War, and letters addressed to him are preserved in the Epistulae ad Familiares.  Key Facts About T.: Gens: He belongs to the Trebia gens, a family that likely originated from Treba or a similar municipality, rather than the more politically prominent Trebonia line. Relationship with Cicero: Cicero appears to have been a patron or advocate for him. During the period of GIULIO  Cesare’s dictatorship, Cicero wrote to T. while the latter is in exile, offering him consolation and updates on his efforts to secure a pardon for him. Distinction from Trebonius: Unlike TREBONIO , who was a consul, a legate of Caesar, and later one of his assassins, T. is a less prominent political figure primarily known through these specific personal letters.  Would you like to know more about the specific contents of the letters Cicero sent to T., or are you looking for information on other equestrian friends of Cicero? Keywords: edonismo, placitum. Orto. Lucrezio. Il secolo d’oro – Ottaviano. Filosofo italiano. Friend of CICERONE. He takes an interest in philosophy and may have been a ‘Gardener.’  Roma antica, l’orto. GRICEVS: O TREBIANE, in Ciceronis epistulis te lego—equitem quidem, non Trebonium illum clariorem; sed saepe vos confundunt. Dic mihi, quaeso: quomodo toleras tam iniustam homonymiae calamitatem? TREBIANVS: Facile, GRICE: Trebonius consul est; ego Trebianus sum—eques et (ut aiunt) minus “famosus,” sed Ciceroni carus. Si confundor, saltem cum amico confundor. GRICEVS: Bene dictum. At mihi tua “minor” fama aliquid inplicat: Ciceronem in bello civili etiam de minimis curasse, patronum se praebuisse, et exsulem non solum consilio sed sermone sustentasse—quasi hortus ipse consolationem doceret. TREBIANVS: Ita est; in horto didicimus et voluptatis modum et doloris contemptum. Edonismo sine strepitu, placitum sine superbia: et si Caesar dominatur, nos tamen colloquimur. Nam, ut tu doces, ratio saepe in ipsa conversatione latet—et Cicero, epistulis suis, hortum in urbem portavit. Trebiano, Gaio (a.u.c. DCCVII). De iure.

Giovanni Andrea Tria (Laterza, Taranto, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale da Roma a Roma via Roma -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a disciplined, reconstructible inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in an interpreter’s assumption that speakers are rational cooperators (so departures from literal content are justified by recognizable principles about relevance, informativeness, and the like). In the Tria material you cite, “ragione conversazionale” is reimagined less as a universal inferential calculus and more as a historically and institutionally saturated civic-theological practice: conversation is figured through “Roma” as plural (Roma prima, seconda, terza), so what counts as conversational reason is inseparable from layered authority, succession, and public memory (the Rome of empire, the Rome of the Church, and the Rome of spiritual governance), and implicature becomes a mode of navigating those stratified “Romes” rather than merely deriving speaker-meaning from cooperative norms. Where Grice makes rationality the condition of possibility for extracting extra meaning from utterances in any ordinary exchange, Tria (as priest, canonist, bishop, historian, and later titular archbishop) exemplifies a setting in which meaning is routinely tethered to jurisdiction, precedent, and the rhetorical management of plural audiences, so the “unspoken” is often what must be left tacit to preserve ecclesiastical or civic order across Rome’s multiple registers. The result is a contrast between Grice’s thin, formal, trans-contextual rational governance of implicature and a Tria-style thick, Rome-mediated governance in which conversational reason is historically indexed and implicitly negotiated among competing layers of normative authority. -- ; o, l’implicatura conversazionale della terza Roma –la terza Roma, la prima Roma. Come egli stesso dichiara -- Memorie storiche --, era nato a Laterza, in Terra d’Otranto, da Francesco e da Margherita Geminale (dalla documentazione della Dataria risulta però battezzato il 21 luglio 1675, Archivio segreto Vaticano, Dataria Apostolica, Processus Datariae, 1720, c. 9); fu ottavo di undici figli. Studia a Napoli filosofia, teologia, diritto civile e canonico. Fu ordinato sacerdote, poi, licenziato in teologia, a Roma si addottora in utroque iure (Archivio di Stato di Roma, Università di Roma).  Servì come uditore l’abate Giacomo Navarrete di Cava de’ Tirreni. Si trasferì nelle Marche come vicario generale del vescovo di Gherardi. Firrao, allora visitatore apostolico di Marche e Umbria, ma fatto nunzio straordinario in Portogallo da Clemente XI, lo volle suo uditore a Lisbona e poi anche in Svizzera, dove risolse delicate questioni pendenti tra il vescovo di Costanza e i canonici regolari di Kreuzlingen, in seno agli ospitalieri del Gran San Bernardo, e tra vescovo, capitolo e magistrato di Losanna.  Per motivi di salute rientrò in Italia Clemente XI lo nominò vescovo di Cariati e Cerenzia; fu consacrato dal cardinale Zondadari, assistito da Marazzani, vescovo di Parma, e dal gesuita Lafitau, vescovo di Sisteron in Francia. Entrato in diocesi, provvide alla visita pastorale, fece sistemare nel duomo un sepolcro per i vescovi suoi predecessori, istituì la penitenzieria nella cattedrale di Cerenzia e la prebenda teologale anche in quella di Cariati. Si appellò al cardinale segretario di Stato Giorgio Spinola contro le prepotenze di qualche signore locale, come Nicola Cortese, duca di Verzino e Savelli. Celebrò un sinodo diocesano e ne pubblicò gli atti (Prima dioecesana synodus Cariatensis, et Gerontinensis  habuit in S. Ecclesia Cariatensi anno Christo. la terza Roma.  Grice: Caro Tria, ti confesso che quando parlo di dialettica ateniese e di quella dei Vadum Boum, non intendo solo la mia Alma Mater a Bononia, né la Sorbona… ma penso sempre all’eterno dialogo della città, quella che tutti chiamano Roma! Tria: Ah, Grice, mi spiace interrompere la tua poesia, ma qui in Puglia non diciamo “Roma”, diciamo “le Rome”! Hai dimenticato che sono tre: Roma Prima, Roma Seconda e Roma Terza. L’una antica, l’altra imperiale, la terza spirituale… è una trilogia più ricca del tuo Vadum Boum! Grice: Applausi, Tria! Ora capisco che la dialettica romana è davvero plurale… altro che “eterno dialogo”, direi “eterni dialoghi”! Alla faccia dei bolognesi e dei parigini, qui si ragiona in triplice copia! Tria: Esatto, Grice! E se vuoi divertirti davvero, la prossima volta porta anche una focaccia: così, tra una Roma e l’altra, non ci resta che brindare alla conversazione… tripla, come le Rome! Tria, Giovanni Andrea (1744). Memorie storiche civili ed ecclesiastiche della città e diocesi di Larino, Roma: Stamperia Lazzarini.

Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri (Pieve di Teco, Imperia, Liguria): Institutionally, Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri is not comparable to H. P. Grice in the Oxford collegiate sense, though he is much closer to the literary-public world than to the pedagogical one suggested by the older mistaken citation. Grice’s formula is exact in the Oxford sense. Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s means a college office with tutorials, students, and membership in the governing life of the college. CUF University Lecturer in philosophy means a university-wide appointment in the faculty structure. So Grice combines the intimate tutorial culture of the college with the wider faculty structure of the university. The historically attested Trincheri belongs to a different world: the nineteenth-century Ligurian and wider Italian literary-public sphere of criticism, philosophical essay, and Romantic cultural defence. The biographical sources confirm Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri of Pieve di Teco as a critic, philosopher, and essayist who emerged through a brilliant defence of Alessandro Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola. That makes him not a don, not a fellow, and not a university lecturer in the Oxford sense, but a man of letters and public polemical prose. Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri is described in the standard biographical sources as a literary critic, philosopher, and essayist from Pieve di Teco, born in 1768 and dead in Paris in 1846, whose first public prominence came through a defence of Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola. So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world. Trincheri belongs to the literary-public and critical world of early nineteenth-century Italian culture. That institutional difference fits the philosophical comparison rather well, once the false pedagogical lead is removed. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared norms. Trincheri, by contrast, so far as the secure evidence goes, belongs to a literary-critical register in which what matters is less a formal account of conversational inference than the public force of judgement, defence, cultural allegiance, and style. If one wishes to compare him with Grice, the comparison must be modest and indirect: not through a maxims-based theory of implicature, but through the way literary and polemical prose relies on shared readers’ capacities to catch tone, alignment, allusion, and evaluative suggestion. So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors coordinate what is meant in local exchanges. Trincheri exemplifies how literary-public prose positions authors and works in a cultural field through defence, tone, and critical persuasion. That is why the corrected early anchor matters so much. Since the 1860 Studi di pedagogia is not securely tied to this Trincheri and in fact conflicts with his death in 1846, the right starting point is his earliest datable public intervention: the defence of Manzoni’s Conte di Carmagnola around 1819–1820. The sources consistently place Trincheri’s first public prominence in his defence of Manzoni when Il Conte di Carmagnola appeared in 1819, so that is the earliest secure anchor. So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s College and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Lorenzo Gioacchino Trincheri, by contrast, was a nineteenth-century Ligurian critic, philosopher, and essayist, active in the literary-public sphere that formed around figures like Manzoni rather than in a tutorial-collegiate or professorial institution. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Trincheri to the literary-public world. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Trincheri, as far as the evidence securely allows, exemplifies a literary and polemical mode of language in which what matters is not the formal reconstruction of implied content but the public force of defence, judgement, and rhetorical positioning. And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises how speakers imply; Trincheri exemplifies how critics insinuate and defend. And the corrected Italian-style bibliographical anchor should remain the cautious one: Trincheri, Lorenzo Gioacchino. Intervento in difesa del Conte di Carmagnola di Alessandro Manzoni, c. 1819–1820. If you want, I can now help you clean that whole Trincheri entry so that the false 1860 pedagogical material and the accidental Turoldo carry-over disappear completely.la ragione conversazionale secondo Andrea Speranza -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats what is meant beyond what is said as an inferential achievement anchored in publicly recognizable rational norms: a speaker is taken to be pursuing intelligible conversational ends, so a hearer can (in principle) reconstruct an implicature by assuming cooperation, relevance, appropriate informativeness, and so on, and then calculating what additional proposition would make the utterance a reasonable move in that setting. Trincheri, insofar as we can responsibly connect him to this problem from the thin bibliographic cue “Studi di pedagogia” (Paravia, 1860) and the general mid-nineteenth-century The A.U.C. dating here is intentionally stylized and “project-internal” (i.e., an anachronistic bibliographic fiction) meant to locate the putative utterance in a late-Republican / Caesarian-Ciceronian horizon (the kind of temporal window suggested by Cicero’s correspondence and the exile/pardon motif), rather than to assert a verifiable ancient imprint at Turin/Bocca or an attested Latin title-page for a historical “Scritti di diritto” by a Gaius Trebianus. If you want, I can also give you (a) a strict conversion of a.u.c. DCCVII into a BCE year, or (b) alternative A.U.C. year options keyed to specific episodes in the Civil War / Caesarian dictatorship that better fit your narrative frame. pedagogical agenda, would approach “reason in conversation” less as a formal calculus over maxims and more as a formative, educational practice: conversation as a disciplined social instrument for cultivating judgment, attention, and moral-intellectual habits in learners, where what is indirectly conveyed (the teacher’s hinted correction, the tacit norm, the lesson conveyed by example) is central but is not typically theorized as a distinct, maxims-based layer of meaning with Grice’s explicit reconstructive machinery. In that contrast, Grice makes conversational rationality a constitutive norm of meaning-explanation (implicature is what a rational interpreter must attribute to preserve the utterance as a cooperative act), whereas a Trincheri-style pedagogical lens would treat conversational rationality as a developmental virtue and method (guiding pupils to infer, to read between the lines, to internalize standards), so that “implicit meaning” looks more like educative suggestion, correction, and habituation than like a formally accountable, principle-governed derivation from what is said to what is meant. -- , e l’implicatura conversazionale –Andrea Speranza. The phrase ‘Grice italo’ is meant as provocative. An Old-World philosopher such as Turoldo would never have imagined to be compared to a tutor at a varsity in one of the British Isles, but there you are! It is meant as a geo-political reminder, too. Many Italian philosophers have been educated in a tradition that would make little sense of Turoldo as a ‘Grice italo,’ but there you are. My note is meant as a tribute to both philosophers. Grice has been deemed an extremely original philosopher, and by Oxford canons he certainly was. He was the primus inter pares at the Play Group, the epitome of ordinary-language philosophy throughout most of the twentieth century. His heritage remains. Turoldo’s place in the history of philosophy is other. But there are connections, and here they are. Nato da una famiglia benestante che ha in possesso alcuni ettari di terreno. Appassionato alli romantici, e riconosciuto e si afferma all'interno della cerchia dei letterati del suo tempo grazie alla brillante difesa in favore di Manzoni, quando quest'ultimo pubblica  la sua prima tragedia, “Il Conte di Carmagnola”. E con il sostegno del suo maestro e amico Goethe, famoso filosofo e scrittore romantico, che riusce a far valere la proprio opinione positiva nei confronti dell'autore dei Promessi sposi. Poche altre notizie biografiche si conoscono a proposito della sua vita che, a causa di un incidente in cui fere a morte il suo amico, Andrea Speranza, crolle in una situazione estremamente travagliata.  Grice: “”Andrea Speranza” may mean different things.” Il Conte di Carmagnola Tragedia in cinque atti  Studio di Francesco Hayez per il dipinto Il Conte di Carmagnola Autore Manzoni Lingua originale Italiano Genere Tragedia Prima assoluta Teatro Goldoni, Firenze Personaggi Personaggi storici il Conte di Carmagnola Antonietta Visconti, sua moglie. Andrea Speranza.  Grice: Caro Trincheri, oggi mi sento particolarmente filosofico... Se mi concedi una domanda: secondo te, tra una ragione conversazionale e una focaccia ligure, quale delle due ha più sapore? Mi raccomando, rispondi senza implicature troppo piccanti!  Trincheri: Ah, Grice, domanda insidiosa! La focaccia ha il sale, ma la ragione conversazionale, se ben condita da Andrea Speranza, può risultare ancora più appetitosa. Del resto, se “Speranza” è nel nome, qualcosa di buono in tavola deve arrivare! E poi, se c’è un po’ di Manzoni nei dintorni, magari si finisce pure a cena con Goethe.  Grice: Goethe a cena? Allora avviso subito il mio spirito cooperativo: questa conversazione rischia di diventare una “tragedia” in cinque atti... O forse solo il primo tempo, se la focaccia la servono davvero! Ma dimmi una cosa, questo Andrea Speranza, lo hai trovato tra i personaggi della tragedia o fa il pane in qualche forno filosofico?  Trincheri: Caro Grice, Andrea Speranza era tanto appassionato di filosofia che, tra un impasto e l’altro, difendeva perfino Manzoni quando tutti gridavano allo scandalo per il suo “Conte di Carmagnola”. E pensa, ci ha lasciato pure il nome nella pièce! Ma stai attento: non è che Speranza sia sinonimo di lieto fine… Soprattutto in Liguria, dove anche la focaccia a volte resta un po’ bruciacchiata!  Grice: In fondo, Trincheri, tra conversazione e focaccia, forse la vera filosofia è questa: non importa quanto sia croccante la discussione, l’importante è che ci sia sempre un po’ di speranza – e magari anche un bicchiere di buon vino ligure! Trincheri, Lorenzo Gioacchino (1819). Intervento in difesa del Conte di Carmagnola di Alessandro Manzoni.

Erminio Troilo (Perano, Chieti, Abruzzo): Institutionally, Erminio Troilo is much closer to H. P. Grice than many of the figures you have been comparing, because both are recognisably university philosophers; but they still belong to very different academic ecologies. The secure biographical record shows that Erminio Troilo was born at Perano in 1874, later became libero docente of filosofia teoretica in Rome, then professor first at Palermo and then at Padua, and was eventually elected a national member of the Accademia dei Lincei. The main reference sources describe Erminio Troilo as professor of theoretical philosophy at Palermo from 1915 and at Padua from 1920, moving from Ardigò’s positivism toward a metaphysical position he called realismo assoluto. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [istitutoveneto.it], [lincei.it] So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world of Oxford. Erminio Troilo belongs to the public-professorial and chair-based world of the Italian university-state system, especially Palermo and Padua. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [istitutoveneto.it] That institutional difference fits your philosophical comparison very well. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared conversational norms. Troilo, by contrast, works at the macro-level of metaphysical system and world-explanation. The standard sources say that after beginning from Ardigò’s positivism he arrived at a metaphysical outlook he himself called realismo assoluto, one that recalls Bruno and Spinoza and treats eternal infinite being as the unifying principle of all relative beings. That is a very different sense of “reason” from Grice’s. In Troilo, reason is not primarily a set of publicly reconstructible constraints on talk. It is the architectonic power that claims to explain the relation between the absolute, the relative, spirit, history, and reality. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [istitutoveneto.it], [centrostor...a.unipd.it] So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors coordinate meaning in a local exchange. Troilo explains how theoretical reason claims to coordinate reality in a total philosophical vision. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it] That is why your own phrase “conflagrazione conversazionale” should be handled as a retrospective, Grice-coloured gloss rather than as Troilo’s explicit doctrine. What is securely attested is not a theory of dialogue as creative combustion, but a metaphysical and historical-philosophical project centred on realismo assoluto, Bruno, Spinoza, and the relation between positivism and spiritual or metaphysical claims. The title La conflagrazione is real and important, but it belongs to his wartime or spiritual-historical reflections, not to a Gricean pragmatics of conversation. The detailed Perano/Padova biographical notice explicitly records La conflagrazione. Indagini sulla storia dello spirito contemporaneo (1918) and situates it in the larger transition from positivism toward realismo assoluto. [sondrioissrec.it], [centrostor...a.unipd.it] There are two corrections worth making. First, your heading says “Perano, Chieti, Abruzzo,” which is correct, but one of the encyclopedia snippets in the tool outputs gives “Archi” instead of Perano. The more detailed biographical sources and the Padua and Istituto Veneto materials clearly say Perano, so that is the safer form to keep. [sondrioissrec.it], [istitutoveneto.it], [beweb.chie...ttolica.it] Second, the bibliographic line “Troilo, Erminio (1895). Contributo. Il pensiero moderno. Roma” is too weak as it stands. What is safely attested is that he founded and directed Il pensiero moderno in the 1890s and that La conflagrazione appeared in 1918. If you want a secure doctrinal anchor, the best titles are La filosofia di Giordano Bruno, Il positivismo e i diritti dello spirito, Lo spirito della filosofia, and Realismo assoluto. The main reference sources list La filosofia di G. Bruno, Il positivismo e i diritti dello spirito, Figure e studi di storia della filosofia, Lo spirito della filosofia, and Realismo assoluto as the secure major works. [treccani.it], [it.wikipedia.org] So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Erminio Troilo, by contrast, was an Italian professor of theoretical philosophy, formed first under Ardigò and later moving toward the metaphysical system he called realismo assoluto, teaching at Palermo and then Padua and entering the Lincei. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Troilo to the public-professorial and chair-based world of the Italian university-state system. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Troilo exemplifies a macro-synthetic rationality in which thought seeks to integrate science, spirit, history, and being into one unifying metaphysical scheme. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [istitutoveneto.it], [lincei.it] And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises reason in conversation; Troilo theorises reason as total metaphysical synthesis. [treccani.it], [it.wikipedia.org] If you want, I can now give you a tighter one-paragraph entry in your preferred style, using La conflagrazione only as a secondary colour and making realismo assoluto the real doctrinal centre.la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della conflagrazione – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a calculable, normatively constrained by-product of cooperative rational agency: speakers are presumed to pursue mutually recognized conversational ends (with something like a Cooperative Principle and associated maxims), so hearers infer what is meant beyond what is said by reconstructing a rational route from the utterance to an intended, context-fitting point. Troilo, by contrast, as he is presented in the “Grice italo” framing, redescribes the engine of implicit meaning less as rule-guided optimization and more as conflagrazione: a metaphysically charged ignition in which interlocutors are transformed through an intensifying encounter, with “ragione conversazionale” functioning not merely as compliance with conversational norms but as a creative, quasi-ontological event (aligned, in that portrait, with his “realismo assoluto” and with Bruno/Spinoza-style talk of immanence and spirit). On this view, what Grice analyzes as the rationally reconstructible inference from saying to meaning becomes, for Troilo, a moment of philosophical combustion in which implicature marks not just an extra layer of communicated content but the flare-point where shared reality is made and remade between speakers; Grice foregrounds auditability (how an implicature is warranted by recognizable principles of talk), whereas Troilo foregrounds transformative force (how the encounter itself “takes fire” and changes the participants), making Troilo’s “conversational reason” look less like a logic of conversational accountability and more like a metaphysics of dialogic becoming. -- conflagrazione. The phrase ‘Grice italo’ is meant as provocative. An Old-World philosopher such as Turoldo would never have imagined to be compared to a tutor at a varsity in one of the British Isles, but there you are! It is meant as a geo-political reminder, too. Many Italian philosophers have been educated in a tradition that would make little sense of T. as a ‘Grice italo,’ but there you are. My note is meant as a tribute to both philosophers. Grice has been deemed an extremely original philosopher, and by Oxford canons he certainly was. He was the primus inter pares at the Play Group, the epitome of ordinary-language philosophy throughout most of the twentieth century. His heritage remains. T.’s place in the history of philosophy is other. But there are connections, and here they are. Keywords: Telesio, Quattromani, Alighieri, Cento.  O Archi. Filosofo. M. Padova, prof. di filosofia teoretica nelle univ. di Palermo e di Padova. Socio nazionale dei Lincei. Partito dal positivismo del suo maestro Ardigò, pervenne a una sorta di metafisica, da lui chiamata realismo assoluto, che richiama il panteismo di Bruno e di Spinoza. Opere principali: La filosofia di Bruno; Il positivismo e i diritti dello spirito; Figure e studi di storia della filosofia; Lo spirito della filosofia; Realismo assoluto. Insegna a Palermo e Padova. Lincei. Partito dal positivismo del suo tutore ARDIGÒ, pervenne a una sorta di meta-fisica, da lui chiamata realismo assoluto, che richiama il panteismo di BRUNO (vedi). L'essere eterno infinito, tutt'uno con lo spirito assoluto, è il presupposto e il principio unificatore degl’esseri relativi. Trascendente e indeterminato, l'essere si immanentizza e si determina nella realtà e negl’individui, oggettivandosi di fronte ai soggetti come assolutamente altro da questi.  conflagrazione, Bruno, Telesio, realismo assoluto, storia della filosofia, Alighieri, Cento, Quattromani.  Grice: Professore Troilo, non posso fare a meno di notare quanto sia intrigante la sua idea di "conflagrazione conversazionale". Potrebbe spiegarmi cosa intende esattamente con questo concetto? Sembra quasi una scintilla che dà vita al dialogo! Troilo: Caro Grice, la sua intuizione è acuta. Per me, la conflagrazione conversazionale rappresenta quel momento in cui il confronto di idee si infiamma, non distruttivamente, ma come un incendio creativo che trasforma entrambi gli interlocutori. È un po’ come nell’universo di Bruno o di Spinoza: la realtà si accende di senso quando lo spirito si mette in gioco nel dialogo. Grice: Trovo affascinante questo parallelismo con Bruno e Spinoza. Dunque, la conversazione, nella sua visione, non è solo trasmissione, ma anche trasformazione reciproca, quasi una fusione di prospettive che produce qualcosa di nuovo e inaspettato. Troilo: Esattamente! Nel mio "realismo assoluto", la conflagrazione conversazionale è il presupposto per ogni crescita filosofica. Solo accettando di esporsi all’altro, anche a rischio di essere messi in discussione, possiamo accedere a una realtà più profonda e condivisa. È così che la filosofia, secondo me, prende davvero fuoco. Troilo, Erminio (1895). Contributo. Il pensiero moderno. Roma

Mario Tronti (Roma, Lazio): Institutionally, Mario Tronti is much closer to H. P. Grice than many of the figures you have been discussing, because both are recognisably university philosophers; but they still belong to very different academic and political ecologies. Mario Tronti was born in Rome in 1931, studied philosophy at Sapienza University of Rome, later taught for decades at the University of Siena, and combined academic work with direct party-political, editorial, and parliamentary activity. He helped found Quaderni Rossi, broke away to found and direct Classe operaia, later coordinated Laboratorio politico, sat in the Senate, and led the Fondazione CRS (Centro per la Riforma dello Stato). [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [patrimonio....senato.it], [senatoripd.it] So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice was an Oxford don in the strict collegiate sense: Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s, plus CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Tronti, by contrast, belongs to the Italian university-state and political-public world: public university teaching, journals, party culture, parliamentary life, and intellectual institutions of the left. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world; Tronti to the public-professorial, editorial, and political world. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [patrimonio....senato.it], [senatoripd.it] That institutional difference fits your philosophical comparison rather well. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intention and inferring implicature under shared conversational norms. Tronti, by contrast, works at the macro-level of strategy, antagonism, and political composition. The secure sources describe Operai e capitale as the decisive 1966 synthesis of operaismo, introducing and consolidating terms such as “class composition,” “mass worker,” “the plan of capital,” workers’ inquiry, and the strategic centrality of working-class subjectivity. In that field, what matters is not primarily how a speaker in an ordinary exchange implies more than he explicitly says, but how political speech, organization, and action derive force from structural position and antagonistic relation. [treccani.it], [books.google.com], [libcom.org], [Operai e c...ale | SEPS] So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors coordinate meaning in a local exchange. Tronti explains how collective actors coordinate struggle, position, and language in a political field structured by class antagonism. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [books.google.com] That is why your analogy with “macro-implicature” is actually very good, provided it remains an analogy. In Grice, implicature is an individual-level phenomenon: a disciplined inferential surplus licensed by cooperative norms. In Tronti, the relevant “unsaid” lies less in what a single speaker intends a hearer to recover and more in what political speech acts presuppose and reproduce: organization, command, mediation, antagonism, the hidden alignment between party language and class position. In that sense, Tronti’s discourse is not about maxims like Quantity or Relation, but about the structural logic by which political utterance becomes an instrument of class strategy. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [libcom.org] There is one factual correction worth making. Your note says he “teaches at Siena Philosophy of Morals and then Political Philosophy,” which is broadly right, but the strongest source with institutional detail also notes that he first taught history and philosophy at a liceo in Terni before moving to Siena and that his formal rank trajectory included libera docenza and then the Siena appointment. The Senate archive profile for Mario Tronti gives that fuller progression. [patrimonio....senato.it] So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Mario Tronti, by contrast, was an Italian philosopher and political intellectual, formed at Sapienza University of Rome, later teaching at the University of Siena, and centrally involved in journals, party politics, and parliamentary life. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Tronti to the university-state and political-public world. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Tronti develops a strategic-political rationality in which the force of language depends on class composition, organization, and antagonism rather than on conversational cooperation. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [books.google.com], [patrimonio....senato.it] And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises how speakers imply; Tronti theorises how political actors position themselves through speech. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it] If you want, I can now give you a tighter one-paragraph entry in your preferred style, or a short note specifically on the analogy between conversational implicature and the unspoken strategic content of political discourse in Operai e capitale.la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale degli spiriti liberi –democrazia -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how what is meant outruns what is said via rational, publicly reconstructible inference under the Cooperative Principle and its maxims: when a speaker appears under-informative, oddly relevant, or stylistically marked, the hearer can calculate an implicature by assuming the speaker remains (in a qualified way) cooperative and rational. Tronti’s work (above all Operai e capitale, 1966) is “reason-governed” in a quite different register: its governing rationality is strategic and political rather than micro-pragmatic—an analysis of class relations and the “piano del capitale,” in which concepts like composizione di classe, operaio-massa, inchiesta/conricerca, and the strategy of refusal organize how collective actors read a situation and act within it. The nearest point of contact is that both make meaning dependent on practices and norms rather than on sentence-content alone: Grice models how interlocutors, inside a talk-exchange, infer what a move commits one to beyond its literal semantics; Tronti models how political language and action take their force from position, conflict, and organization—what is “said” in democratic discourse often functioning as a surface behind which the real content is strategic alignment, mediation, or control. Thus, where Grice treats implicature as an individual-level, intention-and-inference phenomenon constrained by conversational rationality, a Trontian “implicature” (if one dares the analogy) is macro-level: the unspoken commitments and power-relations that political speech acts presuppose and reproduce, intelligible less by maxims like Quantity or Relation than by the structural logic of class antagonism and the autonomy (and limits) of “il politico.” Filosofo italiano. Filosofo e uomo politico italiano –Considerato uno dei fondatori dell’operaismo teorico, le cui idee si trovano riassunte nel saggio “Operai e capitale,” insegna a Siena Filosofia morale e poi Filosofia politica. Militante del Partito comunista italiano, si  è dedicato anche alla pubblicistica: è stato tra i fondatori delle riviste Quaderni Rossi, Classe operaia, di cui è stato anche direttore, e Laboratorio politico. È stato eletto in Senato nelle fila del Partito democratico della sinistra e nelle fila del Partito democratico. -- è stato presidente della Fondazione Centro per la Riforma dello Stato - Archivio Pietro Ingrao. Tra le sue pubblicazioni si ricordano: Noi operaisti, Per la critica del presente, Dello spirito libero. Frammenti di vita e di pensiero, Il popolo perduto. Per una critica della sinistra -- con A. Bianchi --, La saggezza della lotta. Considerato uno dei principali fondatori ed esponenti del marxismo operaista teorico. Insegna a Siena, vive a Roma.  Fonda “Quaderni Rossi” e “Classe operaia”. Anima l'esperienza radicale dell'operaismo. Tale esperienza, che va considerata per molti versi la matrice della sinistra, si caratterizza per il fatto di mettere in discussione le organizzazioni del movimento operaio -- partito e sindacato -- e di collegarsi direttamente, senza intermediazioni, alla classe in sé e alle lotte di fabbrica. Influenzato da VOLPE (vedi), s’allontana di GRMASCI, o almeno dalla sua versione ufficiale promossa dal PCI togliattiano. Ri-apre la strada rivoluzionaria. Di fronte all'irruzione dell'operaio-massa sulla scena delle società, il suo operaismo propone un'analisi delle relazioni di classe. Mette l'accento sul fattore inter-soggettivo. La sua filosofia, debitrice anche all’’Operaio” di Jünger, trova una sistemazione con la pubblicazione di “Operai e capitale” (Einaudi, Torino), L’implicatura di Hobbes, libero spirito, democrazia.  Grice: Caro Tronti, permetta una battuta da buon letteralista: “spiriti liberi”? Ma insomma, qui si rischia l’ossimoro! In conversazione mi aspetterei piuttosto un “corpo libero” – almeno quello si può sedere a tavola e ordinare una pizza. Lo spirito, poveretto, come fa? E poi, modestamente, parlo anche il dialetto del Lizio!  Tronti: Ah, Grice, ma la questione è sottile! Sa, lo “spirito libero” non ha bisogno né di sedie né di posate: si insinua tra una battuta e l’altra, sorseggiando idee come fossero buon vino di Ferentillo. E poi, guardi che il corpo, senza un po’ di spirito, rischia solo di fare tappezzeria!  Grice: Vero, ma abbia pazienza, Tronti: quando sento parlare di spiriti liberi temo sempre che prendano il volo proprio sul più bello della discussione. Preferisco i filosofi con i piedi per terra… O almeno che il loro spirito lasci le tracce sul parquet!  Tronti: E invece, Grice, la bellezza è proprio qui: lo “spirito libero” si libra, ma poi torna, magari travestito da operaio, pronto a ribaltare la tavola. In fondo, la vera democrazia conversazionale sta nel far parlare anche gli spiriti – purché, s’intende, paghino il conto a fine serata! Tronti, Mario (1966). Operai e capitale, Torino: Einaudi.

Paolo Emilio Tulelli (Zagarise, Catanzaro, Calabria): Institutionally, Paolo Emilio Tulelli is much closer to Grice than a poet or Roman fabulist, because both are recognisably figures of philosophical teaching; but they still belong to very different academic worlds. Grice’s formula is exact in the Oxford sense. Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s means a college office with tutorials, students, and membership in the governing life of the college. CUF University Lecturer in philosophy means a university-wide appointment in the faculty structure. So Grice combines the intimate tutorial culture of the college with the wider faculty structure of the university. Paolo Emilio Tulelli belongs to a different world: the nineteenth-century Italian public and quasi-private educational world of Naples, where philosophical instruction could be organized through schools, permissions, moral scrutiny by ecclesiastical and civil authorities, and eventually publication through university presses. He studied first in Calabria and Catanzaro, then in Naples, where he taught philosophy, moral philosophy, and aesthetics in his own school after obtaining official authorization. That is not the Oxford college-tutorial or university-faculty pattern. It is a more fluid Neapolitan world of local intellectual authority, moral reputation, and philosophical formation under supervision. So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world. Tulelli belongs to the moral-philosophical, school-based, and partially university-connected world of nineteenth-century southern Italy. That institutional difference fits your philosophical comparison rather well. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared norms. Tulelli, by contrast, seems to work at a much more explicitly ethical and metaphysical level. On the evidence you yourself provide, his key concern is not how one interlocutor rationally recovers another’s extra meaning in ordinary exchange, but how ethical life requires a balanced relation among persons, and how that relation is to be grounded in a metaphysics of the good or of moral life. If one speaks of “equilibrio conversazionale” in his case, it can only be as a retrospective gloss: the conversation is not his explicit topic, but one possible expression of a larger moral-metaphysical order. So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors achieve equilibrium in interpretation. Tulelli seeks an equilibrium among persons as an ethical and metaphysical ideal. That is why your distinction between descriptive and prescriptive equilibrium is exactly right. For Grice, conversational equilibrium is the practical effect of mutually intelligible maxims and shared assumptions. For Tulelli, equilibrium would be a regulative norm: something conversation ought to embody if it is to be morally worthy. The bibliographical correction you include is also very important, and I would keep it central. Schema di una metafisica dell’etica is the secure and characteristic anchor, published in Naples in 1872 by the Stamperia della R. Università, and marked as Parte prima, with the implication that the project remained incomplete. By contrast, the 1833 Elementi di diritto naturale does not appear, from the evidence you cite, to be securely attributable in the same way and should therefore not be used as your main anchor. So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s College and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Paolo Emilio Tulelli, by contrast, was a nineteenth-century southern Italian philosopher and teacher, active in Naples through private and authorized instruction in philosophy, moral philosophy, and aesthetics, and known above all for the incomplete ethical-metaphysical project Schema di una metafisica dell’etica. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Tulelli to the school-based and university-adjacent world of philosophical formation in Naples. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Tulelli represents an ethical-metaphysical rationality in which balance or equilibrium is not a by-product of conversational cooperation but a regulative ideal governing relations among persons. And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises balance in understanding; Tulelli seeks balance in ethical life. If you want, I can now give you a tighter one-paragraph entry in your preferred style, using Schema di una metafisica dell’etica as the sole bibliographical anchor and dropping the uncertain 1833 title.la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’equilibrio conversazionale: per una metafisica dell’etica – Grice’s reason-governed conversational meaning makes “what is meant” an inferential product of cooperative rationality: speakers and hearers are mutually accountable to norms (relevance, sufficiency, sincerity, etc.), and implicature is what a competent interpreter can work out from what is said plus the assumption that the speaker is rationally pursuing shared conversational ends. Tulelli’s “equilibrio conversazionale,” as it is most plausibly grounded in his ethical-metaphysical project, shifts the center from Grice’s epistemic-inferential normativity to a regulative, ethical normativity: conversation is not primarily a device for extracting intended contents, but a practice that should maintain a morally charged balance among persons (reciprocal respect, restraint, and the accommodation of difference), so the “governance” is closer to an ethics of dialogical life than to a calculus of inference. Online bibliographic evidence also helps correct the timeline in your passage: Tulelli’s Schema di una metafisica dell’etica is attested as an extract published in Napoli, Stamperia della R. Università, 1872 (itself presented as Parte prima and often described as incomplete), whereas your cited Elementi di diritto naturale (1833) does not readily surface as a corroborated Tulelli imprint; in any case, the contrast stands: Grice explains how equilibrium in talk is achieved descriptively by shared maxims enabling stable implicature recovery, while Tulelli tends to treat equilibrium prescriptively as an ethical-metaphysical ideal that conversation ought to realize, with the “implicature” of silence, understatement, or tact functioning less as a merely derivable surplus content and more as a moral technique for sustaining that balance. Grice: T. published the work Schema di una metafisica dell'etica. The book ends with the notation "end of first part" (or "fine della prima parte" in the original Italian), indicating the author's intention to write a second part.  However, historical records and bibliographies suggest that the second part was never published. The volume is the only published portion of this work. T continued to write and publish on other subjects, but the continuation of the Schema appears to have remained unfinished or unpublished in his lifetime. The work is considered incomplete. Keywords: equilibrio. A lui sono ad oggi intitolate una via a Zagarise e una a S.Elia, e una sala della biblioteca di Catanzaro. Targa commemorativa in suo onore, inoltre, posto davanti alla casa comunale di Zagarise un busto che lo raffigura, realizzato da Calveri. Zagarise, busto creato da Calveri, installato davanti al comune di Zagarise. Figlio dal marchese Gaetano T., studia presso il convento del ritiro dei filippini a Zagarise e poi frequenta a Catanzaro il real liceo ginnasio e il corso presso il pontificio seminario teologico regionale S. Pio X. Vive a Napoli dove compì studi filosofici e apre una scuola dove insegna filosofia morale ed estetica. La richiesta di poter istituire una scuola e inviata alle autorità competenti, le quali, prima di concedere le relative autorizzazioni, chiesero al vescovo di Catanzaro dettagliate notizie in merito alla condotta morale e politica del richiedente, la risposta inviata loro fu. Elemento di condotta soda, casta e onesta. Tra gl’allievi della sua scuola molti sono appartenenti a famiglie di alto rango sociale, e tra questi, è possibile annoverare i figli del re Borbone che, in segno di stima, gli fanno dono di un orologio da camera di manifattura francese opera dei fratelli Japis. filosofia italiana, l’equilibrio, metafisica dell’etica.  Grice: Professor Tulelli, permetta che le dica quanto ammiro la profondità del suo pensiero sull’“equilibrio conversazionale”. Un concetto così complesso e affascinante, che sembra intrecciare la metafisica con l’etica, non può che destare curiosità in chiunque si occupi di filosofia del dialogo. Mi piacerebbe capire come lei vede la conversazione come spazio di equilibrio. Tulelli: Caro Grice, la ringrazio per le sue parole. L’“equilibrio conversazionale”, come lo intendo, nasce dalla necessità di riconoscere e valorizzare il reciproco rispetto tra interlocutori. È un movimento sottile: non si tratta semplicemente di mediare, ma di creare uno spazio dove ogni voce trova la sua armonia e la conversazione, di conseguenza, si eleva ad esperienza etica condivisa. Grice: Trovo molto suggestiva questa idea di elevazione etica. Ma mi chiedo: l’equilibrio è sempre raggiungibile, oppure la conversazione rischia di restare inevitabilmente sbilanciata, magari per via delle differenze di background o degli interessi in gioco? Tulelli: È proprio questa tensione tra equilibrio e sbilanciamento che rende la conversazione viva. L’aspirazione all’equilibrio, pur sapendo che è spesso incompleto o precario, stimola la ricerca di una verità condivisa. Come ho scritto nel mio “Schema di una metafisica dell’etica”, la conversazione è una via che conduce verso l’ideale, anche se a volte resta sospesa, come la mia opera, al termine di una “prima parte” che attende ancora il suo compimento. Tulelli, Paolo Emilio (1833). Elementi di diritto naturale, Napoli: Stamperia Reale.

Carlo Turco (Asola, Mantova, Lombardia): Institutionally, Carlo Turco and H. P. Grice belong to very different worlds. Grice’s formula is exact in the Oxford sense. Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s means a college office with tutorials, students, and membership in the governing life of the college. CUF University Lecturer in philosophy means a university-wide appointment in the faculty structure. So Grice combines the two characteristic Oxford functions: college tutor and university lecturer. Carlo Turco, by contrast, belongs to the civic-humanist and theatrical world of sixteenth-century Asola and Venice. He was a nobleman, local office-holder, advocate, orator, and man of letters in the orbit of Venetian civic culture and print, not a don, not a fellow, and not a university lecturer in the Oxford or modern Italian chair sense. His institutional life is the world of occasion, performance, local politics, patronage, and print. So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world. Turco belongs to the civic-humanist, performative, and print-theatrical world of the late Renaissance. That institutional difference fits your philosophical comparison very well. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared norms. Turco, by contrast, works in a medium where indirection is public, staged, and genre-governed from the start. In commedia nuova, the audience is expected to read implication not because the speaker is obeying or exploiting a conversational maxim in an ordinary dyadic exchange, but because theatrical convention, topicality, decorum, and comic prudence require meanings to travel by disguise, stereotype, innuendo, and role. So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how conversation can mean more than it literally says. Turco shows how theatre can mean more than it literally stages. That is why your treatment of Agnella works so well. The title itself already performs an implicatural trick: Agnella sounds innocent, pastoral, harmless, and then the dramatis personae reveal Agnella as a ruffiana. The audience is meant to feel the gap between title and function, purity and management, lamb and broker. That is not Gricean implicature in the strict sense, but it is a perfect example of theatrical meaning routed through public expectation and controlled deniability. Your own draft also rightly isolates the important movement in the Argomento: women as audience and shield, wolves as critics or moralists, the lamb as title and protective joke, and then the sudden “Eccovi appunto il Napoletano” as a stagey acknowledgement of comic type. That is the economy of Renaissance comic pragmatics in miniature. There is one bibliographical point in your note that is especially useful. You correctly warn that the citation to a 1890 Studi di filosofia del diritto belongs to another Carlo Turco and should not be mixed with the Renaissance dramatist. That clarification is exactly right and should be kept. There are only two minor cautions. First, “Mantova, Lombardia” should be treated carefully, because Asola’s political setting in Turco’s time is Venetian rather than simply modern Lombard in the institutional sense. Second, the final imprint “Venezia: Manuzio” should be checked against the exact early printed edition if you are preparing a final dossier entry, since the Venetian print trail and the relation to Aldine or related names can easily become muddled. So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s College and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. Carlo Turco, by contrast, was a late Renaissance civic-humanist dramatist and local public man, active in the performative and print culture of Asola and Venice rather than in any tutorial-collegiate or professorial institution. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Turco to the theatrical and civic-humanist world. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Turco exemplifies a public comic pragmatics in which title, role, stereotype, and occasion guide the audience toward meanings that are hinted, staged, and socially managed rather than directly asserted. And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises how speakers imply; Turco stages how comedy implies. If you want, I can now give you a tighter one-paragraph entry in your preferred style, using Agnella alone as the anchor and dropping every possible ambiguity with the modern Carlo Turco.la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’agnella, commedia nuova –commedia nuova, agnella. Grice’s reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers recover more than is said by assuming cooperative rationality (maxims) and then inferring implicatures from what a speaker chooses to say, how they say it, and what they conspicuously leave unsaid. With Carlo Turco (Asola, Venetian-Lombard civic-humanist milieu) the nearest meaningful contrast is that his “Agnella” and the broader commedia nuova setting treat meaning as a public, rhetorical-civic art: wit, stagecraft, topical allusion, and socially legible understatement are not primarily the by-products of a cooperative inferential calculus but resources for negotiating reputation, patronage, and communal identity in performance, where audiences are trained to read between the lines because the genre depends on it. So if Grice models implicature as a principled, reconstructible inference under norms of rational conversation, a Turco-style “implicature” is better understood as theatrical/rhetorical pragmatics: what is meant is deliberately routed through comic indirection, decorum, and shared cultural scripts (who may be mocked, how, and with what safe deniability), with the “reason” governing uptake being less the Gricean logic of maxims than the Renaissance discipline of prudence and occasion (what can be hinted rather than asserted in a public forum). One important caveat from what can be checked: the biographical-literary Turco you describe (Agnella staged at Asola; links to Manuzio; Venetian offices; Cinquecento imprint trail) does not match the citation you append (Turco, Carlo (1890). Studi di filosofia del diritto, Torino: Fratelli Bocca), which looks like a different, modern author; so any clean Grice/Turco comparison should either (a) be explicitly framed as “Turco the Renaissance dramatist/orator” or (b) split into two entries if there are two Carlo Turco figures. Nasce da una anticha e nobile famiglie, allora fiorente cittadina della Repubblica di Venezia, dove ricopre importanti cariche politiche in qualità di deputato, oratore e avvocato della comunità.  La sua prima opera, un dialogo, “Agnella”, venne rappresentato ad Asola durante i festeggiamenti per la visita dei duchi di Nemours e Beaulieu e altri illustri francesi al loro seguito. “Agnella” venne in pubblicata in seguito prima a Treviso, poi a Venezia. Contemporaneo ed amico di MANUZIO che in una lettera encomia la sua canzone in lode di Carlo V scritta in occasione della morte di quest'ultimo. Scrive: Letta la vostra canzone scritta in morte del Gran Carlo V, veramente Signor Carlo onorato, non troppo benigna stella, essendo voi dotato di si pellegrino ingegno e di tante altre lodevoli qualità, vi condanna a scrivere dove tra molte tenebre non può risplendere la vostra virtù, con la quale potevate illustrare voi stesso ed il secolo nostro eccitando in altri il desiderio di assomigliarvi. Laddove hora, avendo voi il campo ristretto per esercitare le vostre più nobili parti, non veggo come possano apparire effetti degni di voi ed alla vostra nobile industria corrispondenti. Questa lettera è in seguito stampata in Venezia da Gavardo che, sempre a Venezia, pubblica una tragedia in versi, intitolata “Calestri”. Altre opere sono stampate anche in Il Sepolcro de la illustre signora Beatrice di Dorimbergo, Brescia Fabbio, Mangini, Storie Asolane, Lettera di MANUZIO a Turchi, Lett. Volg. Venezia. commedia nuova, agnella. G: 1935. You look overdressed. S: For once, I’m dressed for the occasion. You’re dressed as if you’re going to cross-examine the usher. G: If the usher claims the play is nuova, he deserves it. S: We’re going to the theatre. G: Allegedly. S: What for? G: To see what you have insisted on calling a “commedia nuova.” S: Why not read the thing here? G: Because a comedy read aloud in a corridor becomes a punishment. S: What thing? G: The thing you’re holding like contraband: Agnella. S: The commedia recitata. G: Recitata in Asola, yes, long ago, when French dukes needed Italian jokes. S: By who? G: Turco. S: Carlo Turco. The Asolano. G: That is the one. S: And the name is Agnella. G: Yes. Which is either pastoral innocence or a very practical label for bait. S: I rather like it. Agnella. Soft. Harmless. G: Until you read the dramatis personae. S: I have. It’s full of sharp objects. G: Read the Argomento again, without the bruises. S: Here. You wanted the Italian clean. I cleaned it as best I could without turning it into Tuscan. G: Proceed. S: “Hora havete l’Argomento della Comedia, che farà di piacere; cosa nuova, e di nuovo Auttore vostro Asolano, e di tutti suoi seratissimo, ma sopra modo di voi, gratiosissime Donne: segnale, pigliando protettione di voler diffender la Comedia da’ morsi de’ lupi rapaci (s’alcun ve ne fosse). L’Auttore si contenta che si chiami l’Agnella, dalla purità di una buona femina, che fatto quel nome conserva la sua parte del maschio. Eccovi appunto il Napoletano.” G: That last line is the best stage direction I’ve seen all week. “Here you have the Neapolitan.” S: So the frame is: ladies, wolves, lamb. G: And then immediately a Neapolitan scholar. S: That’s the part I like. It’s like a pastoral that forgets its sheep and remembers its stereotypes. G: The sheep is not the sheep. The sheep is a title. S: I assumed Agnella was the innocent girl. G: Look at the list. S: “AGNELLA, Roffiana.” G: Exactly. Your innocent lamb is a procuress. S: That is disappointing. G: No, that is Renaissance comedy. S: So why call the procuress Agnella? G: Because the author is making a joke about purity while describing its management. S: You mean: the lamb is the handler of wolves. G: Precisely. “Defender la Comedia da’ morsi de’ lupi rapaci.” Wolves are critics, censors, moralists, perhaps rivals. And the author says: I will protect my lamb from wolves. S: But the lamb is a ruffiana. A professional wolf-trainer. G: You see the economy of the joke. S: It’s not new; it’s just cheeky. G: That is why it is called nuova. Not because the plot is new, but because the author flatters the audience. S: The audience being “gratiosissime Donne.” G: Yes. And note the tactic: the women are both patrons and alibi. If the wolves bite, the author can say he wrote for ladies. S: So I can play Agnella, then. G: You can, but you will have to keep your pitch high. S: High like a lamb? G: High like someone pretending to be a lamb. S: Fine. I’ll play Agnella. You play all the rest. G: That is exactly the kind of casting a man suggests when he does not intend to rehearse. S: But what is the thing about? G: The argomento gives you one hinge: Pietro loves a cortigiana, Lamia; Lamia loves him back; but she believes Limpido is in love with her. S: Limpido is not in the list. G: Which tells you he is either offstage, or a confusion, or a printer’s ghost. S: Or the author forgot his own lover. G: Also possible. But the triangle is standard: mistaken belief about who loves whom. S: Then the Neapolitan arrives. G: Giannuccio, “Scolar Napoletano.” With his boy, Chiappino. S: And Lamia is the courtesan. G: Yes. Then Eugenio is the young lover. Lélio his friend. Bermondo a Spaniard. Stilpone, which sounds like a club you hit people with. S: Emilio, a Vecchio, and his wife Flaminia. G: Plus servants: Clitia and Sergio. S: And Flavia, the stepdaughter: “figliuola adottiva d’Emilio, giovane innamorata.” G: So we have at least two “young in love” people: Eugenio and Marcio, plus Flavia. S: Marcio is “giovine innamorato.” With his boy, Amichino. G: And Agapito is Marcio’s father, old. S: So fathers, lovers, a courtesan, a procuress, a parasite. G: Bolza, “parassito.” Every comedy needs a parasite the way every Oxford dinner needs someone who has run out of income. S: You’re saying the structure is stock. G: Entirely. That is why your complaint about “nuova” is correct. S: Then why go to the theatre at all? G: Because in 1935 the alternative is to have you recite it in my rooms, and I would rather face the stalls. S: We could compare it to Gilbert and Sullivan. G: Patience beats it any day. S: Or The Quaker Girl. G: A musical comedy has the decency to admit it is trying to please you. S: This one admits it too: “che farà di piacere.” G: That line is honest. It promises pleasure and nothing else. S: Then you should approve. G: I approve of honesty. I do not approve of pretending that pleasure is novelty. S: You said earlier the sheep is a title, not a sheep. G: Yes. And the subtitle logic you like so much is here as well. The author narrows and narrows: not just a comedy, but a comedy under protection; not just protection, but protection from wolves; not just wolves, but wolves “if any there be,” which is the traditional clause of polite paranoia. S: Like saying “I mean no offence,” just before offending. G: Exactly. A prophylactic. S: And the women are invoked as protectors. G: As audience, as judge, as shield. S: “Sopra modo di voi, gratiosissime Donne.” He prefers them above all. G: That is the line you write when you suspect the wolves are men. S: So Agnella is named from purity, but she is a ruffiana. G: Which is the real novelty: purity as a brand-name rather than a moral property. S: That’s rather modern. G: Yes. It is the sort of modernity you never want to admit is old. S: So how do we stage it as we walk? G: You will ask me who you are. S: I am Agnella. G: You are a ruffiana called Agnella “dalla purità di una buona femina.” S: So I must be pure and impure at once. G: You must be impure in function and pure in marketing. S: And you are everyone else. G: I refuse. I will be the Napoletano. S: Giannuccio? G: Yes. Scholars at least have the excuse of being ridiculous. S: Then who will be Lamia? G: You, if you insist on doing two roles and ruining the evening. S: I’ll stick to Agnella. I shall be the lamb with teeth. G: Good. Now tell me the line again that amused you: “conserva la sua parte del maschio.” S: That a good woman, having taken that name, keeps her male part. G: Meaning: she keeps authority, agency, perhaps audacity. S: Or just that she runs the men. G: Exactly. The lamb’s “male part” is control. S: That’s why the wolves won’t bite her. G: They bite, but she bites back. S: The author is asking the ladies to protect the play from wolves. Yet he gives them a wolf-tamer named lamb. G: There you have your whole argument. S: So the thing is not really about sheep. G: It is about who gets to call whom a sheep. S: And the Naples scholar is there to give dialect and jokes. G: And to deliver the opening “Eccovi appunto il Napoletano,” like a garnish. S: You keep saying it as if it’s a punchline. G: It is. It is the author admitting he is about to entertain. S: Then perhaps it is new after all. G: It is new only in the way every old trick is new to someone who has never been mugged by it. S: You’re in a mood, G. G: I have read too many “nuove” comedies. S: Then why did you agree to come? G: Because you said you’d play Agnella. S: That was flattery. G: I am vulnerable to flattery only when it promises silence later. S: Shall I practise my lamb voice? G: If you must. But keep it high. S: High, sir? G: High enough that the audience hears “purity,” and low enough that the plot hears “transaction.” S: That’s very Oxford. G: It is also very Venice, 1585, only they had better excuses. S: And after the play? G: After the play we shall go to a real theatre, as you suggested. S: Patience? G: If we can. S: Or The Quaker Girl. G: Anything where the music does some of the work, and the author does not call a parasite “new.” S: You will still complain. G: Naturally. But I will complain in tune.Grice: Caro Turco, devo confessarle un piccolo fallimento accademico. A Vadum Boum – la mia università, terra di barbari e di puritani – una volta tentai di mettere in scena una mia commedia alla Sheldonian. Ma si sa, lì il senso dell’umorismo è raro come un’agnella tra i lupi! Mi trattarono come un buffone, una vera burla: la mia opera fu repressa con la stessa severità con cui si vietano le risate nei giorni di pioggia.  Turco: Ah, Grice, mi fa sorridere! In Lombardia, a Asola, quando volevamo ridere ci inventavamo una “commedia nuova” – persino un’agnella avrebbe applaudito! Ma non si preoccupi: le repressioni puritane sono come la nebbia mantovana, basta aspettare un po’ e la scena si rischiara. Avrei voluto vedere la sua pièce: magari avremmo convinto anche i duchi di Nemours a battere le mani!  Grice: Immagino la Sheldonian invasa da agnelle e filosofi lombardi, tutti intenti a recitare versi e a sventolare fazzoletti. Ma sa, Turco, se avessi avuto il suo spirito lombardo e la sua nobile industria, forse sarei riuscito a far sorridere anche i professori più austeri. Però, qui da noi, il massimo dell’ironia è una tazza di tè senza zucchero!  Turco: Grice, allora le invio una “commedia nuova” per corrispondenza – con tanto di agnella protagonista! Così potrà mettere in scena le risate in barba ai barbari, e se qualcuno protesta, basta rispondere: “Non è burlesque, è filosofia... ma vestita da pecora!” D’altronde, come diceva Manuzio: tra molte tenebre, la virtù trova sempre il modo di risplendere. E una risata illumina più di un trattato! Turco, Carlo (1585). Agnella: comedia nuoua recitata in Asola nella venuta de gli ill.mi sig.ri il duca di Nemurs, il duca di Boglion, & altri illustriss. sig.ri. Venezia: Manuzio.

David Maria Giuseppe Turoldo (Coderno, Sedegliano, Udine, Friuli-Venezia Giulia): Institutionally, David Maria Turoldo is very different from Grice, though both are unmistakably figures of language and formation. Grice’s formula is exact in the Oxford sense. Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s means a college office with tutorials, students, and membership in the governing life of the college. CUF University Lecturer in philosophy means a university-wide appointment in the faculty structure. So Grice combines the two classic Oxford functions: college tutor and university lecturer. David Maria Turoldo belongs to a wholly different institutional ecology: the Servite religious order, wartime resistance, liturgical and prophetic speech, preaching, cultural activism, and only secondarily the university. He was born at Coderno di Sedegliano, entered the Servi di Maria, was ordained in 1940, worked in Milan, participated in the Resistance through the clandestine journal L’Uomo, and took a philosophy degree in 1946 with the thesis La fatica della ragione under Gustavo Bontadini. His first poetry collection, Io non ho mani, belongs to the immediate postwar phase and is treated by Treccani as the decisive first collection. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [dizionario...riulani.it] So the clean institutional contrast is this. Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate and university-faculty world. Turoldo belongs to the ecclesial, liturgical, resistant, and prophetic world, only touching the university through his degree and brief academic possibilities. [it.wikipedia.org], [pensierofi...aliano.org], [fraternita.arche.it] That institutional difference fits your philosophical comparison rather well. Grice works at the micro-level of rational communication: how a hearer gets from what is said to what is meant by recognising intentions and inferring implicatures under shared norms. Turoldo, by contrast, works at the macro-level of witness, vocation, liturgy, and resistance. His “word” is not primarily a contribution to a local exchange whose implicatures are to be calculated. It is a parola-atto, a charged ethical and prophetic utterance addressed to a community under pressure. The biographical sources emphasise exactly that his early poems were published in L’Uomo, the clandestine journal of resistance, and that the later Io non ho mani already treats poetic language as a privileged medium of communication and dialogue with other human beings. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [pensierofi...aliano.org] So the sharpest formulation is this. Grice explains how rational interlocutors recover what a speaker means in a local exchange. Turoldo exemplifies how a word can exceed ordinary exchange and become liturgical, prophetic, and communal action. [it.wikipedia.org], [pensierofi...aliano.org] That is why your comparison through “parola-atto” is genuinely apt. For Grice, the “extra” meaning beyond the sentence is inferentially tractable and answerable to conversational reason. For Turoldo, the “extra” is ethical and historical: silence, allusion, biblical cadence, and prophetic compression do not merely invite a hearer to calculate an implicature; they summon a listener to conversion, solidarity, or resistance. In that sense, both are anti-literalist about meaning, but they are anti-literalist in radically different registers. [it.wikipedia.org], [pensierofi...aliano.org], [treccani.it] There are two factual adjustments worth making. First, your bibliographic line “Turoldo, David Maria Giuseppe (1944). Poema. L’uomo: giornale degl’uomini d’Italia. Milano” should be treated cautiously. The secure facts are that L’Uomo was the clandestine periodical in which his earliest poems appeared during the Resistance, and that Io non ho mani in 1948 is the first collection securely anchored by Treccani. The exact title “Poema” in 1944 is not the strongest bibliographic anchor. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [dizionario...riulani.it] Second, the thesis title should be cited carefully as La fatica della ragione – Contributo per un’ontologia dell’uomo, which is consistently given in the biographical sources. [it.wikipedia.org], [biografieonline.it], [pensierofi...aliano.org] So the short clean answer is: H. P. Grice was an Oxford don in the precise collegiate sense, both Fellow and Tutor in philosophy at St John’s College and CUF University Lecturer in philosophy at Oxford. David Maria Turoldo, by contrast, was a Servite priest, resistance writer, theologian, and poet, active in the clandestine and liturgical-public sphere of wartime and postwar Italy rather than in the tutorial-collegiate world of Oxford. Institutionally, Grice belongs to the tutorial-collegiate world; Turoldo to the ecclesial and prophetic world. Philosophically, the contrast is equally clear: Grice analyses the inferential micro-mechanics of speaker-meaning and implicature, whereas Turoldo exemplifies a morally and historically charged conception of speech in which the surplus beyond literal content is grounded in witness, liturgy, biblical cadence, and communal urgency rather than in a calculable theory of conversational inference. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it], [pensierofi...aliano.org] And if I compress it into one line: Grice theorises how speakers imply; Turoldo exemplifies how a word becomes witness. [it.wikipedia.org], [treccani.it] If you want, I can now give you a tighter one-paragraph entry in your preferred style, using Io non ho mani and La fatica della ragione as the two main anchors.le XII fatiche della ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes “what is meant” a disciplined, inferential achievement: interlocutors presume cooperative rationality (maxims, relevance, sufficiency, etc.), and implicature is what a hearer can responsibly work out from what is said plus the assumption that the speaker is playing the conversational game in good faith. With David Maria Turoldo the centre of gravity shifts from inference to vocation: his earliest public “word” is explicitly cast as parola-atto, a liturgical and prophetic medium of communication and dialogue with other human beings, and this is anchored biographically in wartime Milan, where he helped produce the clandestine resistance periodical L’Uomo and where his first book of poetry is Io non ho mani (Milano: Bompiani; Treccani treats this as the first collection), while his philosophical formation includes a laurea thesis titled La fatica della ragione (Bontadini). So, whereas Grice models conversational reason as a set of publicly tractable norms that generate implicatures (often by understatement, silence, or apparent irrelevance), Turoldo treats “ragione” less as calculability and more as a moral-spiritual labour enacted in and through address—his “dialogue” aims to change lives, sustain resistance, and found solidarity; implicature, in that setting, is not primarily a technical by-product of maxim-observance but the charged surplus of prophetic speech, where what is unsaid (silence, allusion, biblical cadence) is ethically and communally loaded. The overlap is that both are anti-literalists about meaning (both rely on what exceeds the sentence), but the contrast is decisive: Grice’s excess is justified by rational reconstruction within conversational cooperation; Turoldo’s excess is justified by witness, liturgy, and historical urgency, where the “reason” that governs speech is as much imperative and communal as it is inferential. la ragione. The phrase ‘Grice italo’ is meant as provocative. An Old-World philosopher such as Turoldo would never have imagined to be compared to a tutor at a varsity in one of the British Isles, but there you are! It is meant as a geo-political reminder, too. Many Italian philosophers have been educated in a tradition that would make little sense of Turoldo as a ‘Grice italo,’ but there you are. My note is meant as a tribute to both philosophers. Grice has been deemed an extremely original philosopher, and by Oxford canons he certainly was. He was the primus inter pares at the Play Group, the epitome of ordinary-language philosophy throughout most of the twentieth century. His heritage remains. Turoldo’s place in the history of philosophy is other. But there are connections, and here they are -- Poeta, nato a Coderno del Friuli. Sacerdote nella congregazione dei Servi di Maria, pubblicò le sue prime poesie durante la Resistenza nella rivista clandestina L'uomo. Sin dalla sua prima raccolta, Io non ho mani, non ancora scevra di forti reminiscenze letterarie, si fa strada la sua più segreta e autentica vena di poeta che intende usare la parola lirica come momento privilegiato di comunicazione e di dialogo con gli altri uomini: parola nel senso più alto, liturgico del termine. Ammonizione biblica e tragedie storiche dell'uomo moderno, profezia e realtà, tendono a riconciliarsi nell'unità della lingua poetica. Questi caratteri della poesia turoldiana si affermano e si estendono, superando iniziali motivi legati a un'individuale condizione dello spirito, a partire soprattutto d’oro (con “Ritratto d’autore” Servitium, e poi la morte dell'ultimo teologo Torino, Gribaudi. “Gli ultimi” Regia: Pandolfi; soggetto: T.; sceneggiatura: Pandolfi e T.. gl’ultimi, le XII fatiche della ragione.  S: Room 39. G: Yes. S: In the Admiralty. G: Also yes. S: And you are reading a poem. G: I am reading lines. S: With your lips moving. G: That is what lines are for, if you are not merely counting them. S: Where is it from? G: Milan. S: Milan is not usually a bibliographic address. G: It was not meant to be. S: Then where? G: From L’uomo. S: L’uomo. That is the title of the poem? G: No. S: The journal, then? G: Yes. S: L’uomo. That sounds magnificently universal. G: It does. S: But it goes on, doesn’t it. I see you frowning at the next words like a man being asked to pay for rhetoric. G: It has a subtitle. S: Of course it does. G: Giornale degli uomini. S: Degli. G: Degli. S: Not “di uomini,” but “degli uomini.” Already a narrowing, you might say. G: One could say. One could even say it is a partitive with social ambitions. S: Is that all? G: No. S: It gets worse. G: It gets safer. S: Goes on: d’Italia. G: Exactly. S: So the universal “man” becomes “the men,” and then “the men of Italy.” G: Two successive restrictors. S: Like watching a balloon deflate politely. G: Like watching a quantifier acquire a passport. S: So what is it, really. A clandestine paper. G: Yes. S: In 1944. G: The surviving run is dated 1944–45, yes. S: Then why is it on your desk? G: Because you have enemies who like to call their work “universal,” and allies who have to call their work “Italian” to avoid being shot. S: That’s an awfully tidy distinction. G: Whitehall is, above all, tidy in its distinctions. Untidy in its corridors. S: And Turoldo. G: The name is on the sheet that came with it. S: Turoldo is Lombard? G: No. Friulian by birth. S: Yet in Milan. G: Yes. S: So he is a northerner printing in Lombardy for “the men of Italy,” which sounds like nationalism by necessity, not by enthusiasm. G: That is one good reading. S: And he wrote the poem? G: If you want to call it a poem. S: Loaded poetry, then. G: If by “loaded” you mean it carries more than it says. S: I mean it carries a small explosive. G: In that sense too. A clandestine paper is always a poem with a fuse. S: Read me a bit. G: I will not read you the whole thing. I refuse to make Room 39 into a salon. S: Then just enough to prove it is not a grocery list. G: It is not a grocery list. S: That is not a quotation. G: No, but it is the best possible summary of poetry in wartime. S: Fine. What is the poem about, then, if we have to imagine it. G: Suppose it is about Milan. S: That is not a daring supposition. G: Suppose it is about the city being strong while trying not to look strong. S: That’s closer. G: Suppose it is about men who have no uniforms, only habits. S: Resistance as habit. G: Resistance as cooperation under threat. S: Your favourite topic. G: It is not a favourite topic. It is simply the only one that remains when the others become luxuries. S: And you like the title because it is illogical. G: It is not illogical. It is overdetermined. S: It begins with “the human,” then restricts to “the men,” then restricts to “of Italy.” G: Exactly. The form is: start with a grand universal term to claim moral scope, then insert a definite article to create a community, then insert a genitive to anchor the community politically. S: Like “Man, namely the men, namely the Italian men.” G: Yes, except they likely meant “uomini” as humans in general. But the grammatical narrowing still does its work. S: Does it contradict itself? G: It corrects itself. S: That is a charitable word for retreat. G: In wartime, retreat is sometimes the only way to advance. S: You are going to tell me this is like one of your maxims. G: No. It is like one of yours: do not attract attention you cannot survive. S: Where exactly in Lombardy were they printing? G: The imprint is suppressed. The catalog says “no place given.” S: Convenient. G: Necessary. S: So “L’uomo” is a title without an address, and “degli uomini d’Italia” is a subtitle with a border. G: Yes. A border with no street number. S: And Turoldo. Why does that name matter to us? G: Because if we are ever tempted to imagine “Italy” is merely a theatre of operations, this reminds us there are people inside it producing words under penalties. S: Words are cheap. G: Not when the paper is clandestine. S: You have read clandestine papers before, I take it. G: In this building, you are never far from paper that wished it were invisible. S: And why the poem? G: Because poetry is a convenient delivery system for courage. It looks ornamental until you notice what it smuggles. S: That sounds like your “implicature” again. G: It is an old trick. Poets did it before philosophers gave it a Latin name. S: Then explain to me, in your manner, what the subtitle implies. G: It implies: we speak for man, but we must limit the “we” if we want the speaking to continue. S: So the universal claim is a flag, and the narrow claim is camouflage. G: Precisely. S: And the two narrowers. Degli, then d’Italia. G: Degli is a social delimiter. D’Italia is a political delimiter. S: You said earlier it is like a quantifier. G: If you insist on symbols: L’uomo looks like it wants to quantify over all humans. The subtitle restricts the domain twice: first to a determinate set, “the men,” then to a national subset, “of Italy.” S: So: instead of ∀x Human(x), it becomes ∀x (Italian(x) and Human(x)). G: Something like that, yes, though I would not accuse an Italian clandestine editor of doing predicate logic in the margin. S: Why not? Italians do margins better than we do. G: They do. But they also have to run from them. S: And what is “strong Milano” to you, sitting here? G: It is the uncomfortable proof that courage can be organized without a War Office. S: Which is why it concerns the Admiralty. G: It concerns anyone trying to model cooperation. The Resistance is a case study in coordination when communication is risky. S: So you will treat the poem as intelligence. G: No. S: Why not? G: Because intelligence, in this building, means a file and a source and a rating. Poetry refuses to be rated. S: Yet you read it anyway. G: Yes. Because even in Room 39 you sometimes need to remember that not all messages are ours to classify. S: So what will you do with it? G: I will do what the subtitle teaches. I will not universalize. S: Meaning? G: Meaning: I will not say “this is Man.” I will say: this is a particular Italian man writing under occupation, and that specificity is the point. S: And your punchline? G: The punchline is that the paper calls itself L’uomo, but the safest thing it ever did was add d’Italia.Grice: Caro Turoldo, quando ho letto delle “XII fatiche della ragione conversazionale”, ho immaginato una ragione vestita da Ercole, pronta a sollevare pesi filosofici e affrontare mostri logici. Mi dica, quali sono queste dodici imprese che la ragione deve compiere? Si parte dal leone di Nemea o dall'idra di Lerna… o forse dalle insidie della metafora?  Turoldo: Ah, Grice, lei ha colto lo spirito! In Friuli la ragione non si limita a combattere mostri classici, ma si cimenta in dodici veri “dialoghi eroici”: 1) Capire il prossimo, 2) Domare il silenzio, 3) Affrontare la contraddizione, 4) Trovare il senso nascosto, 5) Sconfiggere il pregiudizio, 6) Superare l’ambiguità, 7) Resistere alla tentazione del monologo, 8) Abbracciare la diversità, 9) Riconoscere il dubbio, 10) Coltivare la pazienza, 11) Trasformare il conflitto in crescita, 12) Cercare la verità, ma senza mai dimenticare una battuta pronta!  Grice: Turoldo, che elenco straordinario! Se Ercole avesse avuto la sua lista, forse avrebbe preferito lottare contro le bestie piuttosto che contro le sfide della conversazione. Complimenti: la sua ragione è davvero muscolosa, ma anche dotata di fine ironia – e non c’è nulla di più eroico che cercare la verità sorridendo!  Turoldo: Grice, lei mi rende fiero come un friulano davanti al grappolo d’uva! In fondo, le fatiche della ragione sono come quelle di Ercole: si affrontano una ad una, spesso senza sapere se si arriverà alla fine. Ma, come diceva mio nonno, “l’importante è non perdere il sorriso, nemmeno davanti al leone… o al filosofo inglese!” Turoldo, David Maria Giuseppe (1944). Poema. L’uomo: giornale degl’uomini d’Italia.  Milano