H. P. Grice and J. L. Speranza -- LMN

 

Marco Antistio Labeone (Roma, Lazio): botanica filosofica -- il diritto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an accountable inference: a hearer supplies what is meant beyond what is said because speakers are presumed to be cooperating under norms of relevance, sufficiency, and clarity, and because the intended inference can be rationally reconstructed and challenged. Labeo (Marcus Antistius Labeo) provides a legal analogue of that same rational discipline, but in an institutional key: juristic writing and commentary on the edict depend on saying little in a standardized form while relying on trained interpreters to draw warranted consequences, distinguish cases, and resolve apparent contradictions, so that “what is meant” is often carried by what is presupposed by the legal form rather than explicitly stated. Compared with Grice, the “economy” is similar but the justification differs: Grice’s economy is voluntary cooperation between interlocutors, whereas Labeo’s economy is the professionalization of inference within a normative system, where interpretive canons and precedent function like hardwired conversational expectations. The Clifton diary vignette about edicere and libri ad edictum sharpens the point: a prefix and a title can appear to “clarify” while actually outsourcing understanding to a background practice of interpretation, and this is exactly what Grice tries to make explicit in conversation—how much is left for the audience to supply, and on what rational grounds. So Labeo stands as a counterpart rather than a precursor: he shows how a community can stabilize implicature-like enrichment through juristic method and institutional authority, while Grice shows how the same enrichment operates in ordinary talk without courts or praetors—still governed by reasons, still defeasible, but dependent on a cooperative stance that, unlike law, can be withdrawn at any moment by the ordinary chap who decides not to play along.Grice: “It has to be reminded that I would have never attended Oxford save for that scholarship I won as pupil at Clifton. It was a classical scholarship – since they never tested me for philosophy at Clifton (we were only boys!). In any case, to my surprise, under the Faculty of Lierae Humaniores, it had been instituted a sub-faculty of philosophy. I liked the idea, since I’m a subversive at heart!” -- Keywords: Filosofo italiano. Ha larga cultura filosofica uno dei maggiori giuristi dell'età d’OTTAVIANO. S’ignora se L. segue un indirizzo determinato. Giunse fino alla pretura, ma rifiuta il consolato offertogli d’Ottaviano perchè conseguito prima di lui da persona meno anziana. Appartenne al partito repubblicano. Scruve CCCC saggi di cui restano frammenti. Si ricordano fra gli altri: "De iure pontificio" -- in almeno XV libri, diversi "Commentarii giuridici", 7davd, "Responsae", in almeno XV libri, "Librì posteriores", in almeno XL libri. Come Grice, L. s’interessa anche di studi logico-grammaticali, o di botanica filosofica. Collezionista di botanica, artropodi, madama butterfly. Grice: “Logico-grammatical stuff is my thing, as was Labeone’s. My example is “Fido is shaggy,” Labeone’s was not!” – Marco Antistio Labeone. Grice, “Grice e Labeone,” The Grice Papers, Bancroft.  From Grice’s diary: “Clifton, 1928. Today the Latin master, who treats the imperative mood as a sacrament, ordered us to conjugate edicere until the room sounded like a barracks. His authority for the day was Labeo—libri ad edictum—which he pronounced with the satisfaction of a man who thinks a title can do a great deal of work without any reader doing any. This led, inevitably, to the usual protest from Shropshire, who asked whether Labeo ever knew one edictum from his elbow; and the master replied, with schoolmasterly triumph, that an edictum is like a dictum only prefixed, which somehow settled the matter for everyone except me. I could see at once why it pleased Shropshire: it turns a difficulty into a joke and the joke into a lesson. But it left me wondering how one fills whole libri ad these things, as if a life could be spent leaning up against someone else’s proclamations. The master went on about the Romans and their fondness for the neuter plural—edicta, dicta, responsa, and so on—as though grammar were the reason the empire lasted. I kept thinking that the plural is convenient precisely because it hides the singular: a man can write ad edictum and never have to say which edict, or whose, or why it mattered. Perhaps that is the lawyer’s trick: to make the law look like something that arrives already in the plural, as if it were a natural phenomenon like rain. In any case, I left the lesson with two doubts: first, whether a prefix really clarifies anything (it only relocates the mystery); and second, whether the fascination of the ad—this attachment, this “to” or “toward”—is not already a clue about how scholarship works: one writes towards authority, and calls it learning, until some perverse person asks what, exactly, is being added besides pages. GRICEVS: Salve, Labeo; ego Oxonium non vidissem nisi scholarshipum illud Cliftonianum cepissem—classicum, non philosophicum: eramus enim pueri! LABEO: Salve, Grice; ego Romae ius Romanum docui, sed consulatum ab Ottaviano oblatum recusavi: nolui minoribus praeire—et praetor malo quam praeco. GRICEVS: Hoc est vere Romanum: honor, ordo, et paullum pugnacitas. Sed dic mihi: tu botanicam philosophicam collegisti; ego collego implicaturas. LABEO: Et ego collego responsa—atque arthropoda. Tu dicis Fido est hirsutus; ego dico lex est hirsutior: sed noli timere—in Roma et Oxonio, semper aliquid praeter dictum intellegitur. Labeone, Marco Antistio (a. u. c. DCCLXIII). Ad edictum.

Antonio Labriola (Casino, Frossinone, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally accountable way of meaning more than one says: interlocutors presume cooperative norms, and the hearer’s inference to what is meant is justified by publicly articulable reasons about relevance, informativeness, and the speaker’s intentions. Labriola’s Marxism (without reducing him to a party label, given his substantial early work on Socrates, Vico, passions, and the Hegel/Kant debate) relocates “reason” from the micro-ethics of cooperative talk to the macro-logic of social practice: what counts as rational is inseparable from historical material conditions, labor, and the production of shared life, so that “the common” is not merely a conversational presupposition but a socio-historical achievement. Compared with Grice, then, Labriola invites a reading of implicature as socially grounded: what is left unsaid in political and philosophical discourse is often determined by class position, institutional power, and collective struggle, not just by the speaker’s immediate intention to be helpful; and “cooperation” itself may be fractured or strategic rather than the default background of interpretation. The contrast is between Grice’s normative pragmatics, where even defection (ill-will) presupposes the rational structure of conversational exchange, and Labriola’s praxis-oriented dialectic, where rationality is tested in collective work and historical transformation; but the overlap is that both are ultimately theories of accountability, one at the level of utterances and reasons exchanged between speakers, the other at the level of social action and the material “common” that makes any stable community of meaning possible in the first place. Grice: “If Oxford had her pinko, Italy had her Labriola!” I had a knack for good tags: ontological marxism: if x WORKS, x exists. Surely ‘lavoro’ is key to Marx. But, as Labriola points out, so is ‘comune. It would be reductionist to consider Labriola just a communist, seeing that he essayed on Socrates! comunism, il marxismo ontologico di Grice. L. is good; he reminds me of pinko Oxford!” -- Essential Italian philosopher -- Con particolari interessi nel campo del marxismo. Nacque da Francesco Saverio, insegnante ginnasiale di lettere. Il padre, oriundo di Brienza, e nipote diretto di PAGANO.  Si iscrive alla facoltà di filosofia di Napoli, città nella quale la famiglia si e trasferita. Qui studia con VERA e SPAVENTA, il cui appoggio gli procura un posto di applicato di pubblica sicurezza nella segreteria del prefetto. Scrive Una risposta alla prolusione di Zeller, un saggio in cui osteggia il CRITICISMO contro ogni ipotesi di un ritorno a Kant. Rivendica l'attualità dell'hegelismo. Consegue il diploma di abilitazione e insegna nel ginnasio Principe Umberto di Napoli. Il suo saggio, premiato dall'Napoli, sull'”Origine e natura delle passioni”: una significativa presa di distanze dall'idealismo in favore del materialismo.  Scrive “La dottrina di Socrate secondo Senofonte, Platone ed Aristotele”,  premiata dalla Reale Accademia di Scienze morali e politiche di Napoli. Consegue la libera docenza in filosofia e si mette in aspettativa in attesa di ottenere un incarico nell'università. Scrive la dissertazione “Esposizione critica della dottrina di VICO” implicature, comunismo, socialismo, partito socialista italiano, il vico di Labriola, il Bruno di Labriola, Labriola su Herbart, Labriola su Zeller, comune, sociale, filosofia della storia, dialettica socratica, fra dulcino, carteggio con Croce, all’origine del socialismo comunismo materialista in Italia – l’avvento creative del comunismo in Italia, il marxismo ontologico di Grice, il Vico di L., Grice: Caro Labriola, tu dici che “se x lavora, x esiste”—ma non sarà che il lavoro, oltre a esistere, a volte preferisce prendersi una pausa? Io, ad Oxford, ho visto studenti lavorare… solo quando pioveva! Labriola: Grice, in Italia il lavoro è quasi una filosofia di vita, ma confesso che anch’io, tra una dialettica socratica e un saggio su Vico, spesso ho scelto la pausa caffè. Il comune, però, non si ferma mai: che sia fatica o chiacchiera, si lavora sempre insieme! Grice: Mi piace la tua idea, Labriola! Forse dovremmo istituire la “pausa dialettica”, dove la conversazione è lavoro, e il lavoro è sempre una scusa per filosofare. A Oxford la chiamano tea break, qui sarebbe la pausa Socrate—con biscotti, ovviamente. Labriola: Grice, la filosofia della storia ci insegna che ogni grande rivoluzione nasce da una buona conversazione e magari da un caffè condiviso. Se il marxismo è ontologico, io propongo che il prossimo congresso sia a Napoli: lavoro, dialettica e una sfogliatella per tutti! Labriola, Antonio (1879). Della crisi della filosofia morale. Roma: Tipografia Elzeviriana.

Giulio Cesare Lagalla (Padula, Salerno, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazoinale della teoria geo-centrica – la terra al centro del universo. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an inference licensed by rational cooperation: hearers are entitled to go beyond what is said because speakers typically aim at efficient, relevant, and mutually recognizable communication, so conversational meaning is governed by norms rather than by brute causal association. Lagalla is a useful foil because his Aristotelian commitments in natural philosophy (including the geocentric, sublunary framework typical of the period) show a different way “reason” can govern discourse: scientific and metaphysical positions are stabilized by authoritative explanatory schemes, institutional settings (Sapienza lectures, ecclesiastical scrutiny), and inherited vocabularies (anima, sublunary, celestial order) that constrain what counts as an acceptable inference long before any local conversational maxims come into play. Compared with Grice, then, the “implicature” in Lagalla’s context is often rhetorical and prudential: what is not said (or is said obliquely) can function as a shield against charges of heterodoxy when one discusses the soul’s immortality or the boundaries of natural explanation, whereas Grice’s implicature is primarily an instrument of cooperative understanding and is designed to be cancellable and criticizable. The contrast is that Grice’s model makes indirectness a rational feature of communication between free agents who can always refuse cooperation, while Lagalla’s intellectual milieu makes indirectness a rational adaptation to authority and risk, where conversational clarity may be strategically limited by what one can safely maintain in print or in lecture. Yet the comparison also reveals continuity: both projects depend on audience uptake under shared expectations, and in both cases what counts as a “reasonable” inference is governed by background norms—Grice’s conversational norms within an exchange, Lagalla’s epistemic and institutional norms within a tradition—so that the meaning a speaker manages to convey is always shaped by the rational constraints, and the dangers, of the conversational world in which he speaks. Grice: “Austin was, like many of us, up to date in modern science, and would often criticize Donne for thinking that the Earth had four corners! I love L.: the fact that he was an Aristotelian when everybody in Florence was a Platonist! The more I read secondary bibliography about this one qualifying as ‘napoletano’ – la ‘filosofia napoletana’ ‘il filosofo napoletano’ – the less I’m inclined to consider him Italian!”. “Figlio di un alto funzionario della burocrazia vice-reale. Studia filosofia. Perdette i genitori ed e affidato alla tutela di uno zio paterno, che lo avvia agli studi di filosofia. Volle trasferirsi a Napoli per proseguire nella sua formazione. Si iscrive ai corsi di filosofia dello Studio ed ebbe come maestri Stillabota, Vivoli e Longo. Affidato dal Collegio degli archiatri a Provenzale e Caro per un periodo di tirocinio, sembra vi si fosse condotto con una tale competenza da meritare i gradi accademici nulla pecuniarum solutione. Grazie a Longo, divenne l'ufficiale sanitario di una squadra navale pontificia di stanza a Napoli, con la quale si dirigge verso le coste laziali, per giungere poi a Roma. A Roma consegue una  laurea, in seguito alla quale entra al servizio di Santori, per il cui interessamento ottenne da Clemente VIII l'incarico di lettore di filosofia presso la Sapienza. Cura per Facciottola stampa di un commento ad Aristotele, “De immortalitate animae ex sententia Aristotelis VII”,  manifestazione di un interesse verso la questione dell'anima, intorno alla quale L. si interrogò per buona parte della sua vita intellettuale e che contribuì ad attirargli sospetti di eterodossia.  Altre saggi: “La circuncisione di Cristo”. Al problema dell'anima L. dedica corsi della lettura ordinaria di filosofia, che tenne alla Sapienza. Un aristotelico che dialoga con BONAIUTO. implicatura, the earth is flat; la terra e al centro dell’universo, la pietra di Bologna, la kryptonite, la luna, l’immortalita dell’anima, animo, spirare, peripatetici, licei, sublunary, lunary. Grice: Caro Lagalla, ho sempre trovato affascinante il tuo approccio aristotelico, soprattutto in un’epoca in cui a Firenze sembravano tutti platonici! Ma dimmi, come concili la teoria geo-centrica con le implicature conversazionali che emergono nel dibattito scientifico moderno? Lagalla: Grice, la questione della terra al centro dell’universo, che ho sostenuto seguendo Aristotele, nasce proprio dalla necessità di un dialogo rigoroso e pragmatico. Le implicature, per me, sono strumenti attraverso cui possiamo sondare l’anima e il senso delle affermazioni, soprattutto quando si discute di ciò che è sotto la luna e ciò che è immortale. Grice: Interessante! Mi colpisce il fatto che tu abbia dedicato tanti corsi all’anima e alla sua immortalità. Pensi che la conversazione filosofica, con le sue sfumature e implicature, possa davvero avvicinarci alla verità sull’anima, o rischiamo di essere sospettati di eterodossia? Lagalla: Grice, la ricerca della verità è sempre rischiosa, ma senza dialogo non c’è progresso. Anche se talvolta la conversazione può farci apparire eretici agli occhi dei più ortodossi, credo che la coerenza aristotelica e l’apertura al confronto siano il vero spirare del pensiero. Roma mi ha insegnato che solo dialogando si può comprendere il mistero dell’animo umano. Lagalla, Giulio Cesare (1592). De occulta philosophia. Venezia: Aldus.

Eustachio Paolo Lamanna (Matera, Basilicata): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del risorgimento fiorentino Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an accountable, rational inference from what is said to what is meant, made possible by cooperative expectations (say enough, be relevant, avoid obscurity) that speakers can exploit and hearers can justify. Lamanna’s work, by contrast, belongs to a systematic history-of-philosophy tradition in which “reason” is staged as a long, longitudinal drama of concepts—being versus ought, rational order versus experienced disorder, religion as a natural need of spirit—so that what is “implied” is often the philosophical lesson a reader is expected to draw from historical reconstruction rather than a locally calculable enrichment of an utterance. Compared with Grice, Lamanna’s “conversational” dimension is not primarily the micro-pragmatics of everyday talk but the macro-conversation of a culture, in which Florence’s intellectual renaissance and the Italian tradition’s self-understanding supply a thick background that makes certain moves (appeals to unity, to historical continuity, to the contradictions of conscience) intelligible and persuasive. The contrast, then, is between Grice’s model of rational cooperation as a norm governing interpretation in a particular exchange and Lamanna’s model of rational unity as a norm governing interpretation across centuries: Grice asks how interlocutors responsibly get from words to intended meaning; Lamanna asks how a tradition responsibly gets from past systems to present intelligibility by entering “into the philosopher’s shoes.” Yet they converge in one important respect: both treat rationality as something enacted in practice—Grice in the discipline of conversational inference, Lamanna in the discipline of historical reconstruction—and both make perspicuity depend on shared background, except that for Grice the background is conversational common ground, while for Lamanna it is the accumulated conceptual memory of philosophy itself. Grice: “When I have a lecture in Italy on Athenian dialectic versus Oxonian dialectic, I was criticized for having just overpassed what the Florentines call the Florentine dialettica, which flourished in, er, Florence! Philosophers who approach me tend to pigeon-hole me as ‘member of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy’ – I hated that, but understood it. I spent most of his talks, however, talking about Aristotle, Plato, Leibniz – the inventor of the analytic-synthetic distinction --, Kant, Prichard, Stout, and making a point about the need to approach philosophy from the stand point of the unity she displays both latitudinally and longitudinally, in her history – making the ffort to introjedt into a past philosopher’s shoes! So much for Oxford parochialism! In Italy, L. may be considered my counterpart or doppelgaenger. unita longitudinale e unita latitudinale della filosofia. I like L. – a very systematic philosopher especially interested in the longitudinal history of philosophy – he wrote on economics during controversial times, too!” Linceo. Fa i primi studi in seminario e poi nel Liceo classico della sua città. Si trasfere a Firenze, laureandosi con Sarlo. Insegna a Messina e Firenze. Pubblica un commento alla dottrina. Autore di un fortunato manuale di storia della filosofia. Membro dell'Accademia nazionale dei Lincei. Diresse la "Collana di Filosofia" delle Edizioni Morano di Napoli. Stabilito, per L., che la religiosità e un'esigenza naturale dello spirito umano, egli rileva le contraddizioni percepite dalla coscienza fra l'”essere” (“is”) e il dover essere (“ought”) -- fra l'esigenza di una realtà concepita come razionalità e ordine, e la percezione di una realtà che appare irrazionale e disordinata, così come fra la concezione dell'assolutezza dello spirito e la concreta limitatezza della realtà umana. Da queste contraddizioni deduce la necessità dell'esistenza di Dio. il risorgimento fiorentino, Mussolini nella storia della filosofia. Grice: Caro Lamanna, quando parlo di dialettica ateniese a Firenze, c’è sempre qualcuno che mi ricorda che la vera dialettica è quella fiorentina. Dimmi la verità: tu davvero pensi che a Oxford non si possa imparare nulla dai lungarni? Lamanna: Paul, se ti dicessi che a Firenze si filosofeggia meglio che sulle rive del Tamigi, rischierei di essere accusato di spirito di campanile! Ma certo, tra l’Arno e il caffè filosofico, qualche lezione di unità longitudinale la diamo anche noi. Grice: E infatti ti chiamano il mio “doppelganger” italiano! Mentre tu insegni storia della filosofia come un viaggio tra essere e dover essere, io cerco ancora di spiegare perché i filosofi inglesi preferiscono il tè alla metafisica. Lamanna: Paul, tra un tè e un manuale di storia della filosofia, la verità è che sia a Oxford che a Firenze ci si perde fra razionalità e caos. Forse la soluzione è semplice: un po’ più di spirito, un po’ meno di spirito accademico… e magari una passeggiata insieme sui lungarni a discutere di Dio e dell’unità della filosofia! Lamanna, Eustachio Paolo (1907). Studi sul pensiero filosofico italiano. Bari: Laterza.

Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e la semiotica economica – prinzipio di economia dello sforzo razionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally defensible inference from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative expectations that make communication efficient and accountable rather than merely coded. Rossi-Landi (Milan, 1921–1985) turns this “economy” into an explicit social theory: for him signs are not just vehicles in talk but products of work and exchange, so that linguistic practice is structurally analogous to labor, value, and market circulation, and communicative interaction is embedded in systems of production and ideology rather than being merely a local bargain between two speakers. Compared with Grice, then, the “principle of economy” has a different scope and justification: Grice’s economy of rational effort is a pragmatic norm internal to cooperative conversation (say no more than needed, be relevant, be perspicuous), whereas Rossi-Landi’s economic semiotics treats that norm as derivative of wider material conditions, where the cost of producing, maintaining, and distributing signs shapes what counts as efficient, normal, or even intelligible discourse. This creates a productive tension: Grice explains how implicatures are generated and cancellable in the micro-mechanics of dialogue, but Rossi-Landi pressures the idea that such mechanics can be fully understood without attending to the macro-structures that organize sign use—alienation, ideology, and the division of semiotic labor—which can force speakers into overinformativeness, ritualized ambiguity, or strategic silence regardless of cooperative intent. In short, Grice offers a normative pragmatics of rational interaction; Rossi-Landi offers a critical semiotics of social reproduction, in which conversational implicature is not only a clever inferential phenomenon but also a symptom of the economic and ideological organization of sign-production itself. Grice: “I have often been criticized as proposing a conversational variant of the homo oeconomicus, which indeed should then read as homines oeconomici! In my epilogue to his compilation, I meditate on the very structure of his model of conversation as rational co-operation. The economic basis is obvious. It is Grice’s view that the goal of conversation is the maximally mutual ‘influencing’: no time or energy to waste! L. held a very similar view – which made him particularly unpopular in Italy, the land where the lemon tree grows! homo oeconomicus. I would call L. a Griceian; but he’d call me a Landian!” Studioso della dottrina del ‘segno,’ vis-à-vis- scienze umane e antropologia, apportato un notevole contributo agli sviluppi alla semantica (senso) e la pragmatica (prassi, pratica – ragione pratica) -- crt, cercando di unificare la dialettica romana e fiorentina  con quella oxoniense. Diplomato al Regio Liceo Ginnasio Alessandro Manzoni, si laurea a Milano. Studia a Pavia. Insegna a Padova, Lecce. Riceve, e Trieste. La sua opera si può suddividere in tre fasi. La prima riguarda studi su la prassi (ragione pratica), nonché l'analisi dei processi di “segno.” La seconda fase propone una teoria della “produzione” del segno intendendola come teoria del lavoro cui fondamento è l'omologia tra la teoria del segno e so-miscalled aeco-nomia. (cf. Grice, P. E. R. E.). La terza fase studia l'intricato rapporto tra il segno e la ideologia e teorizza l'”alienazione” dell’usuario del segno (ego/alter/alien). Opere: Pratica communicativa (Bocca, Milano); “Segno” (Manni, Lecce); “Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune,” – cfr. Grice, “SignificARE, communicARE, impiegare, implicARE, -- ‘common’ is Landi for Grice’s ‘ordinary’ as opposed to extra-ordinario. Marsilio, Padova. La semiotica e  “Segnare” come lavoro e mercato, implicature, homo oeconomicus, Oxford, Grice’s principle of economy of rational effort and L.’s economical semiotics, over-informativeness and excess: the implicature. Grice: Caro Landi, ogni volta che penso al principio di economia nella conversazione, mi chiedo se per caso tu non abbia nascosto qualche limone nel mio tè! In fondo, tra homo oeconomicus e ragione pratica, sembri proprio uno che non spreca mai una parola. Landi: Paul, ti confido che in Italia, tra il limoncello e le chiacchiere da bar, applicare il risparmio conversazionale è quasi rivoluzionario! Ma guarda che anche tu, con le tue massime, sembri più lombardo che oxoniense: sempre attento a non spendere una vocale di troppo. Grice: È vero! Ma se davvero il segno è lavoro, allora ogni conversazione andrebbe pagata a cottimo. Tu come faresti con chi parla troppo e ascolta poco? In Inghilterra, a uno così offriamo il tè... decaffeinato! Landi: Qui, invece, lo spediamo a Milano a seguire una lezione di semiotica alle sei del mattino! Alla prossima, Paul: che la ragione conversazionale sia sempre col tuo tè… magari senza zucchero, per risparmiare davvero! Landi, Ferruccio Rossi (1945). Motivi culturali e correnti d’arte nell’opera di Anatole France. Sotto Cordié e Banfi. Milano. Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere.

Francesco Landino Landini (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational supplement to what is said: speakers rely on shared expectations (relevance, adequacy, clarity) so that hearers can infer additional intended content in a way that is publicly reconstructible and, in principle, cancellable. Landini’s “conversational reason” belongs to a different medium: a musical culture in which meaning is carried by patterned expectation, delay, and resolution rather than by propositional intention, so that what is “implied” by a cadence or melodic turn is less like a Gricean inference to a determinate proposition and more like a trained sensitivity to what the musical line makes probable, postpones, or withholds. In that sense, Landini’s art resembles implicature structurally: just as a speaker can say something minimal and let hearers supply the point, a composer can sound something minimal and let listeners supply the continuation; and just as implicatures can be cancelled, musical expectations can be thwarted or re-routed. The difference is that Grice’s implicature is anchored in interpersonal accountability—what a rational agent can be held to have meant by choosing an utterance in context—whereas musical “implication” is not normally about communicative intention toward a specific belief but about a shared idiom of forms and affects, stabilized by a community’s listening practices and conventions of style. So Landini provides a useful counter-example that sharpens Grice’s boundary between natural meaning and speaker-meaning: the “meaning” of a ballata can be richly inferential and socially shared without being reducible to what any one agent intended to get an audience to believe, yet it still displays the same general phenomenon Grice cares about—how structured practices let us reliably get more out than is explicitly given. Landini suona un organo in miniatura del XV secolo Codice Squarcialupi Francesco Landini, o Landino, conosciuto al suo tempo come Francesco Cieco, Francesco delli Organi, Franciscus de Florentia (1325/1335 – Firenze, 2 settembre 1397), è stato un compositore, organista, poeta, cantore, organaro e inventore di strumenti musicali italiano. È uno dei più famosi compositori della seconda metà del XIV secolo, uno dei più acclamati del suo tempo in Italia. Biografia Nonostante la sua celebrità, le notizie sulla sua vita sono scarse e controverse. Molte informazioni biografiche derivano dalla cronaca del suo coetaneo, lo storico fiorentino Villani: Vite d'illustri fiorentini. Recenti ricerche effettuate negli archivi fiorentini, hanno permesso di documentare alcuni episodi della sua vita. Secondo il Villani, Francesco nacque a Firenze, quantunque l'umanista Cristoforo Landino, suo pronipote, indichi come luogo di nascita la vicina città di Fiesole. Francesco era figlio di "Jacopo il pittore", certamente Jacopo del Casentino, noto pittore della scuola di Giotto. Il nome "Landino", non compariva a suo tempo, e discenderebbe dal nome del nonno. Diventato cieco nell'infanzia a causa del vaiolo, Landini si dedicò alla musica molto giovane: Villani racconta che da piccolo si consolava con il canto. Più tardi, il piacere e la predisposizione lo spinsero a fare studi musicali, grazie ai quali si affermò come compositore e "Magister". Nonostante la sua cecità, Francesco era in grado di suonare diversi strumenti a corda e divenne un virtuoso dell'organo portativo. Villani nelle sue cronache riferisce che Landini fu anche inventore di strumenti musicali, e cita uno strumento a corda chiamato Syrena syrenarum che combinava le capacità del liuto e del salterio, verosimilmente il predecessore della bandura. L. fu anche poeta, e fu vicino a Francesco Petrarca. Grice: Caro Landini, ogni volta che ascolto le tue melodie mi chiedo se, in fondo, la filosofia italiana non abbia una sua colonna sonora segreta – magari composta proprio da te! Ma dimmi, il tuo organo portativo del XV secolo non ti ha mai suggerito una teoria filosofica sulle implicature musicali? Landini: Paul, ti assicuro che se la musica potesse parlare, avrebbe più implicature di un trattato di logica! In fondo, ogni nota è una piccola conversazione: a volte dice tutto, a volte lascia intendere, proprio come fanno i filosofi quando vogliono sembrare profondi e misteriosi. Grice: Mi sa che il tuo Syrena syrenarum è più filosofo di molti miei colleghi: unisce liuto e salterio, come in una dialettica tra ragione e sentimento. Ma ora dimmi, ti capita mai di comporre una ballata pensando a Petrarca e alle sue implicature amorose? Landini: Certamente, Paul! Per ogni implicatura amorosa c’è una musica che la accompagna… e se la filosofia italiana nasce a Firenze, allora la sua musica è la mia. Come diceva mio nonno, “chi canta non sbaglia mai, e se sbaglia… nessuno se ne accorge!” Così va la filosofia: meglio suonare che spiegare! Landino Landini, Francesco (1361). Ballata.

Cristoforo Landino (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della sforziade degl’italiani – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an accountable inference: speakers and hearers operate under cooperative expectations, so what is meant can go beyond what is said in ways that are, in principle, rationally reconstructible and criticizable. Landino, by contrast, represents a Florentine humanist setting in which “meaning beyond the literal” is cultivated as civic and rhetorical practice: dialectic is not merely a tool for isolating logical form but a public art, exercised in the Studio fiorentino and Medici circles, where persuasion, reputation, and cultural rivalry with other centres (Rome, Naples, Milan) shape what can be said and what must be insinuated. In that register, the Sforza-material and the broader humanist habit of writing encomium or “national” epic are less about conversational cooperation than about managing audiences through exempla, classical allusion, and strategic emphasis; what is “implied” is often the political-moral lesson the reader is expected to supply from a shared classical education. Compared to Grice, Landino’s indirectness is therefore not primarily maxim-based economy in everyday talk but a rhetoric of cultured common ground, where a reference to Aristotle or Cicero functions like a compressed argument whose premises need not be stated because the educated audience already carries them. The comparison highlights two norms governing the unsaid: Grice’s implicature is grounded in universal features of rational exchange (relevance, informativeness, clarity) and is designed to be cancellable; Landino’s insinuation is grounded in the humanist tradition’s management of ethos and audience affect, and is often not meant to be cancelled so much as to be absorbed as the appropriate “Florentine” way of drawing the reader into agreement. Grice: “As the Italians say, if the Greeks have the Illiad, and the Romans the Eneide, why can’t they have the Sforziade? It’s different for us Anglo-Saxon types who have to deal with Berewolf, the monster, and the critics!’ In my epilogue to his compilation, I confesses the striking resemblances between the dialectic proposed by Aristotle – in Topics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Posterior Analytics – in terms of this progress from the many (the lay) to the few – the professional philosopher. Landino may be thought of as promoting that type of dialectic in his native Firenze. Firenze had to compete with Rome, and she did it successfully! Keywords: Oxonian dialectic, Athenian dialectic, Florentine dialectic. Grice: “I love the way a philosopher can be judged by his fellow citizens and by furriners: Landino’s “De Anima” fascinates the Germans, for example! While his poetry fascinates the Americans, as I Tatti testifies! Perhaps more interesting than the fact that he loved the Achilleid, and commented on the Eneide, is that he sold the sforzeide – sull’eroe Milanese, l’invitto Francesco Sforza! Howell in I Medici. I love L.; for one he wrote the first Italian philosophical dialogue, “Disputationes” – for another, I love the setting!” Nacque da una famiglia originaria di Pratovecchio, nel Casentino, e compì gli studi in materie letterarie e giuridiche a Volterra. Gli venne affidata presso lo Studio fiorentino la cattedra di oratoria e poetica che era stata del suo maestro Marsuppini: L., sostenuto dai Medici, e stato avversato da non pochi personaggi in vista, come Rinuccini e Acciaiuoli. Tra i suoi allievi ci furono Poliziano e FICINO . In quel periodo ricopre anche incarichi pubblici, facendo parte della segreteria di Parte guelfa e della prima Cancelleria. Tra i suoi viaggi, spicca quello a Roma. La sua Xandra e una raccolta di componimenti dedicata inizialmente ad Alberti e de' Medici. scrisse III dialoghi: il De anima, le Disputationes Camaldulenses e il De vera nobilitate. dialettica fiorentina – implicatura fiorentina – la Sforziada di Simonetta. Grice: Caro Landino, mi ha sempre affascinato la tua dialettica fiorentina, soprattutto quando la metti a confronto con quella oxoniense. Dimmi, pensi che la Sforziade possa davvero rendere giustizia all’orgoglio italiano, come l’Iliade per i Greci e l’Eneide per i Romani? Landino: Paul, la Sforziade è nata proprio per mostrare la grandezza e il valore degli italiani! Sforza, l’invitto milanese, incarna un eroismo tutto nostro. Così come la dialettica fiorentina, che – credimi – non ha nulla da invidiare a quella di Atene o Oxford. Firenze sa competere, e spesso vincere! Grice: Mi sorprende sempre vedere come la tua opera “De Anima” abbia affascinato perfino i tedeschi, mentre la tua poesia conquista gli americani. Forse è proprio questa apertura, questa capacità di dialogo, che rende la filosofia italiana così vivace e universale? Landino: Hai colto il punto, Paul! La vera forza sta nel dialogo: la filosofia nasce dall’incontro, dal confronto tra idee diverse. E se l’implicatura conversazionale fiorentina riesce a trasmettere il senso profondo delle cose, allora la nostra Sforziade e la nostra dialettica non possono che brillare nel panorama europeo. Grazie per il tuo sguardo curioso, sempre attento alle sfumature! Landino, Cristoforo (1443). Xandra. Firenze.

Sergio Landucci (Sarzana, La Spezia, Liguria) : la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- i misteri del delitto Gentile e le bestie senza stato di Vespucci. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally warranted inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in cooperative expectations and intention-recognition; an implicature is legitimate because a hearer can reconstruct why that utterance was made in that context, and can contest or cancel the inference if needed. Landucci’s work, as invoked in your passage, shifts the focus from the micro-logic of cooperative talk to the macro-conditions under which public language becomes intelligible, charged, and sometimes lethal: the “delitto Gentile” motif foregrounds how political violence and ideological conflict reshape what words are taken to imply, while the Montaigne–Vespucci line on “barbarians” and “beasts without a state” highlights how whole populations can be conceptually framed through inherited narratives that carry implicit evaluations and exclusions. Compared with Grice, then, Landucci’s “conversational reason” is less a matter of maxims guiding polite inference and more a matter of cultural-historical semantics, where key terms (like delitto and its Latin delictum lineage) function as repositories of moral judgment and social boundary-making, and where what audiences infer may depend more on institutional power and collective memory than on a presumption of cooperative exchange. The contrast is that Grice offers a normative model for reconstructing intended meaning in ordinary conversation, while Landucci’s concerns suggest a critical model for reconstructing how public discourse loads terms with insinuations that outlive any individual speaker’s intentions. Yet the comparison also reveals continuity: both treat “what is not said” as decisive—Grice because the unsaid is systematically inferable in context, Landucci because the unsaid can be historically sedimented and politically consequential—and together they show that implicature can be both a civil mechanism of mutual understanding and, when common ground is fractured, a volatile mechanism by which societies read guilt, loyalty, and otherness between the lines. Grice: “Every Italian knows of the ‘delitto’ Gentile – but does every Italian, or Oxonian, for that matter, know whence ‘delitto’ comes?” If I had in Hardie a wonderful mentor to Aristotle, I missed L.’s mentoring me into Kant! L. aptly explores the concept of the barbarian. It all starts with Montaigne, an anarchist, he assumes a fake philosophical position just to justify his anarchisms: savages are fun, happy, and they have no state! Vespucci moe or less thought the same, but for different reasons. Just like an ape doesn’t have a state, Vespucci says, so a savage!  Italian delitto is rooted in Latin and refers to a crime or offense. Delitto comes from the Latin DELICTVM, the neuter singular past participle of DELINQUERE, to fail, tbe wanting, fall short, offend. delinquere combines de, an intensive or completive prefix meaning completely, with linquere, meaning to leave. Several words in both Latin and English share this common root. delinquo: to transgress, err. Delictum: fault, offense, misdeed, crime, transgression. delict: a transgression or offense, particularly in civil law. It can also refer to the branch of law dealing with such offenses. DELINQUENT: one who fails to perform a duty or discharge an obligation; an offender against the law. RELINQUISH: to leave behind, give up, abandon. This word shares the linquere root. DERELICT: neglectful of duty, abandoned. This word also shares the linquere root. In summary, the Italian delitto stems from delictum, which signifies a failing, offense, or crime. This lineage connects it to English terms like delict, and delinquent, all stemming from the core idea of failng short or committing a transgression! I come from a milieu where political violence is rare. I of course fought the Hun with the Royal Navy, but few philosophers are assassinated, as they are in Italy. If many consider Gentile as the ‘greatest living Italian philosopher’ – when he was alive – the ‘misteri del delitto Gentile’ should fascinate any student of philosophy!” Si laurea a Pisa con Luporini. Insegna a Firenze. Grice: Caro Landucci, ogni volta che sento parlare del “delitto Gentile,” mi viene il dubbio che in Italia la filosofia sia materia ad alto rischio: qui non basta sbagliare un ragionamento, si rischia pure di finire nei misteri del delitto! Landucci: Paul, hai ragione! Da noi il filosofo non è solo un pensatore, ma un vero e proprio avventuriero. Vespucci diceva che le bestie senza stato sono felici... Ma i filosofi italiani, senza protezione, rischiano di diventare bestie da mistero! Grice: Forse dovremmo proporre un nuovo termine: “filosofo-delinquente,” che non ha trasgredito legge, ma ha osato pensare troppo! La radice latina non mente: chi lascia troppo il sentiero, rischia di essere abbandonato... o commentato nei libri di storia. Landucci: Esatto, Paul! Delitto, delictum, delinquo... In Italia, chi pensa diverso è subito visto come qualcuno che “ha lasciato” la strada maestra. Ma almeno, così, abbiamo sempre qualche mistero da raccontare agli studenti: altro che bestie senza stato, qui abbiamo bestie senza cattedra! Landucci, Sergio (1964) Cultura ed ideologia. Milano: Feltrinelli.

Giovanni Lanzalone (Vallo della Lucania): il pirotese e i pirotesi. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally accountable inference from what is said to what is meant, generated because speakers and hearers rely on cooperative norms and can justify the “extra” step in interpretation. Lanzalone’s pirotese project, by contrast, tries to relocate that burden from reasoning to coding: instead of letting hearers infer intended nuances from context, it proposes an ideographic, morphologically regimented notation in which accents, points, and diacritics systematically generate derivatives (bread, bread-making, bakery, baker; wave, wavy, wavily, to undulate, undulation), aiming at a universal shorthand that minimizes ambiguity by design. The comparison therefore turns on where meaning is supposed to live: for Grice, even a perfectly regular code will not eliminate implicature because rational agents will still be selective, strategic, polite, ironic, or evasive, and hearers will still interpret utterances as goal-directed actions; for Lanzalone, the hope is that a sufficiently explicit symbolic calculus can make understanding largely automatic and reduce the need for interpretive charity. In Gricean terms, Lanzalone is pursuing a maximalization of “what is said” (encode more explicitly so less must be supplied), whereas Grice explains why communication remains essentially interactive and defeasible: the very freedom of the rational agent to flout “avoid ambiguity” for effect guarantees that implicature will survive any stenographic utopia. Put simply, Lanzalone aims to engineer away misunderstanding by tightening the sign system, while Grice diagnoses misunderstanding (and creative understanding) as an ineliminable by-product of rational cooperation itself—so that the dream of a universal pirotese becomes, from a Gricean perspective, less a cure for implicature than a new arena in which implicature will inevitably reappear. Grice: “There is in fact not just ONE pirotese, but one PIROTESE for each SORT of pirot!” Studia sotto SANCTIS  e SETTEMBRINI. Con CROCE non non condivide la filosofia, e pubblicare l'anti-Croce. Insegna a Roma. Bisogna stabilire segni speciali per certi nomi. Bisogna segnare tutti i loro derivati -- nomi, verbi, aggettivi, avverbi -- con un sistema unico e identico. Il segno “o” significa “pane,” “ó” “panificare,” “ò” il luogo dove si fa il pane, il panificio; “-o” la persona che fa il pane, il panettiere. Un punto a destra del circonflesso, indicante il verbo), “o*” indica il nome derivato dal verbo, panificazione. “v,” posto sul segno “o” indica nome astratto.” Grice: horseness. “E così di seguito. “~” significa onda, “~*”, ondoso, “« = ,” ondosamente, “2”, ondeggiare, “•”, ondeggiamento” “~ =”, luogo che ondeggia, mare, ciò che fa le onde, tempesta, “x-,” ondosità. Le parole comuni a molte lingue e i nomi propri, si scriveno, per semplificare, tali e quali. Non si giunge, per tal via, a esprimere tutte le sfumature del pensiero e del sentimento. Ma certo si giunge a intendersi e a farsi intendere, il che è ciò che preme sopratutto. L’impresa è ardua, ma non impossibile, se ci si metta un filosofo come Grice, di genio e di pazienza. Si può ottenere così una vera steno-grafia glottica, una chiave che tutti sanno usare; e, in attesa della lingua universale, s’ha un vocabolario universale, che chi lo conosce puo farsi comprendere da tutti. Io getto un seme. Chi sa che non cada in terreno fecondo e germogli e cresca in pianta rigogliosa? Grice: “I will introduce two operators: one for willing, one for judging. I will introduce two variables: one for utterer, one for addressee. This gives us the following combinations: optative, self-exhoration, self-information, etc. The system is ideo-graphic, alla Wilkins and L. My system G introduces operators which are ‘universal’ in that one shouldn’t bother to look for counterparts in the vernacular: ‘ /\ indicates ‘and,’ Fr. ‘et,’ G. ‘und’ – regardeless of the different etymologies: G. ‘und’ means ‘anti’!”  pirotese. Grice: Caro Lanzalone, ogni volta che sento parlare del pirotese, mi viene il dubbio che esista una versione per ogni tipo di pirot – come le varietà di pane in ogni paese d’Italia! Dimmi, davvero bisogna inventare un segno diverso per ogni sfumatura? Lanzalone: Paul, ti assicuro che se avessimo un segno per ogni pane, verrebbe fuori un vocabolario universale e saremmo tutti panettieri filosofi! Basta un “o” per essere sazi, ma se aggiungi accenti e punti, puoi panificare pure il pensiero. Grice: Interessante! Forse dovrei introdurre un operatore per giudicare se il pane è buono e uno per volerlo caldo: così la conversazione diventa davvero steno-grafica! E chi non capisce, almeno mangia. Lanzalone: Esatto, Paul! In attesa della lingua universale, almeno ci intendiamo a tavola. Se il mio seme cade in terreno fertile, crescerà una pianta di pane piroteso: chi sa che non sia il vero spirito della filosofia, pane, onde e un po’ di umorismo! Lanzalone, Giovanni (1905). Accenni di critica nuova. Napoli: Pierro.

Brunetto Latini (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale, l’implicatura rettorica di Publio e Cicerone. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally recoverable supplement to what is said: a hearer is entitled to infer what is meant because speakers are presumed to be cooperating under norms of relevance, sufficiency, and clarity, and the resulting inference is, in principle, cancellable and open to challenge. Brunetto Latini’s rhetorical programme, especially as mediated through his vernacular adaptation of Ciceronian doctrine, takes a different starting point: the speaker’s primary task is to manage the audience’s animus, and insinuazione is an overtly tactical form of indirectness used when direct speech would trigger resistance (shift the focus from a disliked person to a liked one, soothe anger, reframe the cause). Compared with Grice, Latini’s “implicature” is not primarily a by-product of cooperative efficiency but a deliberate instrument of persuasion under adversarial conditions, where the speaker anticipates hostility and designs the utterance to alter attitudes before arguments can even be heard. The contrast therefore is between Grice’s accountability model (implicatures should be reconstructible as what a rational, cooperative speaker can be held to have meant) and Latini’s civic-oratorical model (indirection is justified by prudence, decorum, and the psychology of reception, and may aim at effects that are not transparently avowed). Yet they converge on a key insight: meaning often depends less on explicit dictive content than on what the speech act is doing in context; Grice theorizes the inferential route by which hearers supply the unsaid, while Latini trains the orator to exploit that route—especially by manipulating relevance and salience—to guide what the audience will supply for itself. Grice: “Some of us are gladly disposed when Leech starts to refer to my oeuvre as falling within what Leech calls the ‘conversational rhetoric’ -- the tag of ‘rhetoric’ being exactly what I APPLIY to the philosophical discourse of my time, notably Austin, but also that of my early self. When in Prolegomena to Logic and Conversation he sets suspect examples of his manoeuvre, I list my own “Causal Theory of Perception.” L. is similarly concerned with those aspects of the ‘significato’ that include either the dictive content itself, or what L. calls the ‘insinuazione’ -- which is none other than the implicature. Rhetoric is a mandatory topic at Oxford, springing from Bologna. L. reminds me of Hardie; he was ALIGHIERI’s mentor; Hardie mine! People say it all starts with ALIGHIERI, but the real ‘filosofo’ behind him is surely L. – he has in his Tesoreto chapters on Platone, Aristotele, and the rest of them.” Dice CICERONE che SE l’uditore è turbato contra noi per cagione della causa nostra che sia o che paia laida per cagione di mala persona o di mala cosa, ALLORA DOVEMO NOI USARE INSINUAZIONE NELLE NOSTRE PAROLE in tal maniera che in luogo della persona contra cui pare CORUCCIATO L’ANIMO dell'uditore noi dovemo recare un'altra persona amata e piacevole all'uditore, sì che per cagione e per coverta della persona amata e buona noi appaghiamo L’ANIMO dell'uditore e ritraiallo del coruccio ch'avea contra la persona che lui semblava rea. Si come fece AIACE nella causa della tendone che fue intra lui et ULISSE per l'arme eh' erano state d'Achille. E tutto fosse AIACE un valente uomo dell'arme, non è molto amato dalla gente né tenuto di buona maniera. M’ULISSE, pello grande senno che in lui regna, è molto amato. rettorica conversazionale, le fonte della retorica di L.: Cicerone e Publio Vegezio, insinuazione, parlari, parlatore, controversia, auditore, o destinatario, animo dell’auditore, modo, essempio di Roma antica, Giulio Cesare rettorica oratoria togata sacrilegio o furto. Grice: Caro Latini, devo confessare che è solo la natura un po’ barbari degli educatori al Vadum Boum, la mia università, che li ha portati a soffermarsi sulle ovvietà dei Greci. Si sono fermati alla superficie, senza affondare nei profondi abissi della filosofia latina. Ma ti ringrazio vivamente: sei stato tu a farmi scoprire quanto possa essere divertente e illuminante la saggezza dei tuoi connazionali. Mi hai strappato più di un sorriso!  Latini: Paul, che piacere sentire queste parole! È vero, spesso si pensa che la filosofia abbia radici solo tra gli elleni, ma la profondità latina sa essere sottile, insinuante e pure ironica. Come diceva Cicerone, a volte basta un piccolo gioco di parole per cambiare il coruccio dell’uditore! Sono lieto che il mio Tesoretto ti abbia fatto ridere e pensare—che sarebbe la vera arte della conversazione.  Grice: Ah, Latini, la tua “insinuazione” è proprio ciò che manca alla retorica inglese! Qui, spesso ci si accontenta della logica diretta, mentre voi sapete danzare tra le emozioni dell’uditore. È un piacere “latino”—quasi una commedia! Direi che l’arte del parlatore romano è più sottile di quanto sembri: all’inglese, sembra sacrilegio o furto di idee!  Latini: Paul, forse è proprio questa la forza della retorica latina: mischiare serietà e leggerezza, profondità e sorriso. Come Ulisse, si vince non solo con il valore, ma col senno e la parola scelta. Spero che i tuoi barbari si lascino contagiare un po’ da questa “latinità”—e che almeno imparino a ridere di sé stessi, come facciamo noi! Latini, Brunetto (1260). La Rettorica.

Troiano Spinelli, duca d’Aquara e di Laurino (Broggio, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale, l’homo œconomicus, e l’implicatura conversazionale dei longobardi. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an accountable inference generated under a cooperative presumption: speakers can rely on an “economy” of saying because hearers will rationally supply what is relevantly intended, and this reliance is voluntary and defeasible rather than mechanically forced by the code. Troiano Spinelli, duke of Aquara and Laurino (a Neapolitan Enlightenment figure; Degli affetti umani, 1741), is a useful foil because his interest in human passions and social conduct invites a model of reason that looks closer to the rational-choice abstraction later called homo oeconomicus: agents are portrayed as calculating, interest-sensitive, and responsive to incentives, so that “what is meant” in social life is often what can be inferred from stable patterns of preference and advantage as much as from explicit avowal. Compared with Grice, this shifts the governing rationality from conversational norms to strategic norms: in Grice the hearer’s inference is warranted because the speaker is presumed to be cooperative and truthful enough for communication to work, whereas in a Spinelli-style moral psychology the hearer’s inference is warranted because the agent is presumed to be consistent in pursuing goods, avoiding costs, and managing reputation, so silence and understatement become tools of self-interest as much as of civility. The comparison thus draws a line between two “economies”: Grice’s economy of expression (say less, mean more, and be answerable for the inference) and Spinelli’s economy of action (choose efficiently, desire predictably, and let others infer your commitments from your conduct), with the shared insight that both conversation and social life depend on stable expectations that let us recover more than is explicitly stated, but with different default assumptions about whether those expectations are cooperative or prudential. Grice: “Oxford was an oasis for me. Had I grown up in Germany, it would never have been easy for me to invoke a principle of conversational helpfulness without STATING clearly what my grounds for it were! Horkheimer, and others, were talking of INSTRUMENTAL means-end rationality – but my approach involved the rational response on the co-conversationalist, so it’s more the type of ‘inter-subjective’ rationality that one finds in economic models. As a classicist, I was not ready to invoke ‘economy’ like that, seeing that Aristotle’s aeconomica is apocryphal anyway. But the Italians have a motto for it – with a long history: that of homo œconomicus”! The expression ‘homo œconomicus” describes a theoretical abstraction used in some economic models to represent a human being. This theoretical human is characterized by rationality, self-interest, anda drive to maximise utility as a consumer and profit as a producer. Smith laid the groundwork, describing humans as motivated by economic self-interest and the maximinatio of pleasure. Mill is credited with formally defining the ‘economic man’ in his essay ‘On the definition ofp political economy and the method dof investigation proper to it.’ Mill envisioned the economic actor as one who strives to acquire the greatest amount of necessities, conveniences, and luxuries with the least amount of labour and physical self-denial. Mill argues that political economy focuses on human desires related to wealth accumulation, excluding other motivations that do not directly contribute to that end. The term ‘homo oeconomicus’ was introduced by WALKER and subsequently adopted by JANNET. Grice: “This conceptual analysis of the noble is complicated – noble is the male who merits recognition from his community.”  implicatura, analisi geometrico della’economia razionale, lombarda, lunga barba.  Grice: Caro Laurino, ogni volta che sento parlare di “homo œconomicus”, mi viene da pensare che persino i longobardi, con quelle barbe lunghe, abbiano inventato il risparmio solo per evitare di comprare rasoi! Dimmi, secondo te, la razionalità conversazionale funziona meglio quando si tratta di scelte economiche? Laurino: Paul, ti confesso che i miei concittadini erano maestri nell’arte di massimizzare il piacere con il minimo sforzo. Il principio della barba lunga era: “Se non puoi risparmiare, almeno fai sembrare che ci hai pensato!” L’implicatura conversazionale, in fondo, è come una moneta nascosta nella tasca: si usa solo quando serve davvero. Grice: Ah, Laurino, mi hai dato una nuova visione della geometria economica! Forse la vera nobiltà sta proprio nel sapere quando tacere e quando parlare, come quei mercanti che, con una parola giusta, fanno sembrare d’oro una semplice barba! L’economia della parola, direi, è la prima virtù del filosofo. Laurino: Paul, su questo siamo d’accordo! In fondo, la conversazione è come un mercato: si tratta sempre di scambiare idee al prezzo giusto. E se la barba dei longobardi fosse simbolo di saggezza, allora possiamo dire che ogni implicatura conversazionale è un affare… a volte anche più prezioso di una moneta! Laurino, Troiano Spinelli, duca d’Aquara e di (1741). Degli affetti umani. Dialoghi, Napoli: Muziana.

Aldo Lavagnini (Siena, Toscana) e il deutero-esperanto. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as something generated by rational agents under freely adopted cooperative norms: meaning is not secured by a perfectly engineered code, but by what speakers intentionally do with words in context and what hearers can justifyably infer. Aldo Lavagnini’s projects (Unilingue/Interlingue and especially Monario, framed as a neo-Latin auxiliary language with a “logical and natural” universal grammar) pull in the opposite direction: they aim to improve communication by redesigning the code so that ambiguity and misunderstanding become structurally difficult, as if the chief obstacle to understanding were irregularity rather than agency. Compared this way, Lavagnini is a foil that clarifies Grice’s central point: even the most regularized, Esperanto-like system cannot eliminate implicature, because indirectness is not merely a defect of grammar but a consequence of speakers having goals, tact, and strategies, and of hearers treating utterances as rational actions; “avoid ambiguity” can always be deliberately flouted, and silence, timing, and choice of formulation will still generate further meanings. Conversely, Grice helps diagnose why constructed-language programs often disappoint their utopian hopes: they can standardize denotation, but they cannot standardize the pragmatic economy of conversation, where cooperation is defeasible and where “clarity” is as much a moral-social stance as a syntactic design. So Lavagnini’s Monario dramatizes the code-ideal, while Grice’s Deutero-Esperanto joke dramatizes the limit of that ideal: you can stipulate a language no one speaks, but you cannot thereby stipulate the living, reason-governed practices that make meaning and implicature possible in the first place. “Pro-thetic (why?), Breathe (why?), Monario (why?)” Grice: “It appears that the specific reasons behind L.’s choosing the name ‘Monario’ for his artificial language are not explicitly stated in the readily available information. However, some clues can be gleaned from the context. Italian origin: L. is Italian, and the name itself might have some connection to Italian words or concepts, although the exact link is not immediately clear from the search results. Focus on a ‘universal’ and ‘logical grammar’. In the preface to “Monario,” it is mentioned that the need for a nuniversal language requires a universal grammar that is “logic ad nature sekum gles arti imitanti” (logic and naturally imitating rules of art. This suggests a focus on clarity, simplicity, and a structural approach, which could be reflected in the name. Aric-Semitic influences. Some soruces mention that monario shows influences of Aric-semitic languages. However, it is also noted that the L.’s reasons for introducing non-international roots from Greek, Arabic, Sanskrit, Russian, and even what seem to be Somali and Tamil words are unclear. While a definitive answer to ‘why Monario?’ remains elusive, the name likely relates to L.’s broader philosophical goals for an easily accessible and logical constructed international auxiliary language!” At a conference in Brighton, Grice jokes about convention, if nt arbitrariness, having no bearing on ‘signfication’ of the type in which he was interested. As a proof, he claimed that he could very easily go and invent a new language – call it Deutero-Esperanto – and set what’s proper, making him the authority. artificiale. L. progetta una lingua inter-nazionale su base latina che chiama “neo-latino” e ci prova con l'uni-lingue (o inter-lingue) pubblicato nel corso pro corrispondenza d'inte-rlingue od uni-lingue, Roma, e con il monario, dato alle stampe nel corso de monario prima e in “Interlexico  monario: Italiano français English deutsch kum introduxion rammatal appendo, fonetal regios, Elettica, Roma.. monario, il deuteuro-esperanto di Grice. Grice: Caro Lavagnini, sono sempre rimasto incuriosito dal tuo “Monario” e da questa idea di un deutero-esperanto. Dimmi, secondo te, davvero una lingua artificiale può superare le convenzioni arbitrarie che ancora limitano la comunicazione fra i popoli? Lavagnini: Caro Paul, ottima domanda! Io credo proprio di sì: l’obiettivo del Monario era proprio questo, offrire una grammatica universale, logica e naturale, che imitasse le arti più semplici e accessibili a tutti. La lingua, se costruita con rigore, può diventare ponte vero, non barriera. Grice: Mi affascina la tua scelta del nome “Monario”—ha un suono quasi mistico! Ma dimmi, perché proprio questo nome? C’è dietro un significato particolare o, come a volte succede nelle nostre discussioni, conta di più la funzione che il segno svolge? Lavagnini: Ti confesso, Paul, che il nome nasce dal desiderio di evocare unità (“mon-”) e, forse, anche una certa musicalità, quasi un’armonia tra i popoli. Ma, proprio come suggerisci tu, ciò che importa è che la lingua sia strumento efficace e chiaro—più che la radice, conta che tutti possano comprendere e comunicare senza equivoci. Ecco il mio piccolo sogno di un nuovo latino universale! Lavagnini, Aldo (1920) Manualetto pratico di astrologia secondo la scienza e la tradizione. Associazione Eclettica Universale.

Luigi Lazzarelli (San Severino Marche): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- ermetico-esoterica. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, publicly defensible inference: speakers can mean more than they say because hearers assume cooperation and can reconstruct the intended extra content by reasoning from shared norms, with the result remaining, in principle, cancellable and criticizable. Lazzarelli’s hermetic-esoteric style (Crater Hermetis and related syncretic projects around Ficino’s Hermetica, plus allegorical poems and antiquarian treatises) pushes almost the opposite ideal: meaning is deliberately staged as hidden, layered, and initiatory, so that what is “meant” is not designed for ordinary uptake but for selective recognition by a prepared reader, with obscurity functioning as a badge of seriousness rather than a violation of clarity. That makes him an instructive foil for Grice’s tautology examples: “War is war” in Grice is a cooperative maneuver whose point is carried by an easily recoverable implicature (resignation, moral warning, insistence on realism), whereas a hermetic text tends to treat tautology-like formulations as gateways—formulae that invite meditation, symbolic association (Mars, the Campus Martius, the martial), and a thick network of allusions that resist any single, neat paraphrase. In Gricean terms, Lazzarelli’s practice often looks like systematic flouting of manner (and sometimes quantity), but the aim is not conversational efficiency; it is controlled opacity, where the “right” inference is less a product of shared everyday norms than of belonging to a textual tradition and possessing the requisite interpretive keys. The comparison therefore highlights two conceptions of rational governance: Grice’s is civic and intersubjective—designed to keep ordinary talk intelligible and accountable—while Lazzarelli’s is initiatory and arcane—designed to make meaning depend on hidden correspondences and selective readership, so that implicature becomes not a cooperative enrichment of what is said but an esoteric economy of what is withheld. Grice: “When I was asked during my lectures on conversation to provide an example of a blatant tautology which would be at the same time implicature-laden, I came up with ‘War is war.’ It seemed obvious to me that I had no need to specify the implicatum – and I did not. However, upon later reflection on old Roman mythology, I came up with a detail that does matter. The Romans worshipped a ‘god’ of ‘war’ – Marte – hence ‘martial,’ – Apparently, the Anglo-Saxons found this convenient, and soon adopted Tues, as in Tuesday, as the god of war. Note that while ‘War is war’ is a patent tautology, ‘The god of war is the god of war’ is more of a Kripkean stupididy! I would call L. a Pythagorean; most Italian philosophers are, as most English philosophers are Lockean! I would call L. what Italians call ‘un filosofo ermetico.’ He certainly flouts all my desiderata for conversational clarity!” Il documento più importante per ricostruire la vita di L. è “Vita L.” scritta da Filippo L. e indirizzato all'umanista Colocci. L. e educato e vive a Campli, in Abruzzo, dove frequenta la biblioteca del Convento di San Bernardino da Siena, che egli cita nella sua opera i Fasti Christianae Religionis. Riceve da Sforza un premio per un poema sulla battaglia di San Flaviano. Ha contatti con i più importanti filosofi dell'epoca ed e seguace dell'ermetismo. Raccolge il Pimander di FICINO, l'Asclepio e tre trattati sull'ermetismo realizzando una versione che amplia il corpus testi ermetici. Autore di saggi a carattere ermetico come il Crater Hermetis, in sintonia con il sincretismo religioso dei suoi tempi e in anticipo sulla filosofia di PICO , con la fusione del cabalistico e il cristiano, ma anche di poemetti a carattere allegorico come l'inno a Prometeo o didascalico-allegorici come il Bombyx. De apparatu Patavini hastiludii, De gentilium deorum imaginibus implicatura ermetica, mascolinita romana, religione officiale romana, campo marzio, marte, dio della guerra, marte come pianeta, il simbolismo di marte nell’arte e la filosofia, marte e apollo, marte e Nietzsche. Grice: “Clifton, 1926. Dear Father, The Latin master set us one of his favourite imperatives today. We are to write something in the grand manner, in Latin if possible, on the model (so he said) of Luigi Lazzarelli’s youthful poem about the battle of Santo Flaviano. The master spoke as if this were perfectly natural: as if one could be fourteen and already have a battle worth versifying, and as if the lingo were merely an accessory to the glory. Then, with a flourish of chalk, he announced to the room that we must each “find an occasion” of our own and imitate it. I thought it best to write to you, because it is not every day that one is ordered to invent a military past for one’s neighbourhood. Do the Anglians around Harborne ever have a battle worth commemorating? Something with the Welsh, perhaps, or a skirmish with anyone at all? I should like to obey the master, but I cannot compose an ode to a battle if I cannot first locate an enemy. And I confess I would rather not choose the Welsh simply because they are available as a convenient other; that seems bad history and lazy poetry, which is precisely the sort of thing a Latin master encourages when he is feeling patriotic.” “Your reply came quickly, and in your usual practical spirit. You said I might write of “the lords of Harborne,” since I live on Lordswood Road and the very name suggests the right sort of feudal bustle. You proposed, with admirable economy, that the poem need not name the foe in too much detail: I might describe a defence of the fields, a stand at the ford, a righteous skirmish in which the lords preserve order against the unnamed. But here is my difficulty. If I cannot identify who the lords of Harborne were fighting, I fear the verse will read as a poem about lords fighting fog, which is too modern for Latin and too convenient for a school exercise. Father, if one cannot name the enemy, what does one mean by calling it a battle at all? And if the enemy remains unnamed, does the poem not imply that the poet cares more for the sound of war than for its cause?” “You answered, still briskly, that if I cannot identify against whom the lords of Harborne were fighting, then I surely mean that they were fighting against whoever happens to be written into the poem, and that in a school exercise the opponent is often less a historical party than a grammatical requirement. This is a fine point, and perhaps the Latin master would applaud it: the adversary as a necessity of style. But it leaves me with the uneasy thought that a poem can manufacture its own past merely by sounding as if it remembers one. I remain, for the moment, obedient but unconvinced. If I produce a battle in hexameters, the master will call it history; if I do not, he will call it laziness. Between the two, it seems safest to write about a “battle” which is obviously local and obviously invented, so that no one is tempted to mistake the exercise for a chronicle. I shall attempt something like De proelio in agro Dominorum, unless you advise a better title.” Grice: Caro Lazzarelli, ogni volta che sento parlare di ermetismo italiano, mi chiedo se la vera implicatura conversazionale sia tutta un gioco di specchi. Dimmi, quando scrivi “guerra è guerra”, pensi che anche gli dèi abbiano riso sotto i baffi? Lazzarelli: Ah, Paul, se Marte ascoltasse le nostre tautologie, probabilmente si allenerebbe al Campo Marzio con una risata marziale! Sai, nei miei poemi preferisco lasciare impliciti i misteri: così anche gli dèi hanno qualcosa su cui meditare durante le battaglie. Grice: E magari Apollo, tra una nota e l’altra della sua lira, ti rimprovererebbe: “Luigi, non essere così criptico, sennò qui nessuno capisce più nulla – nemmeno Prometeo con il fuoco in mano!” Lazzarelli: Ma Paul, è il bello dell’ermetismo! Una conversazione troppo chiara sarebbe noiosa: meglio un po’ di nebbia, così anche sulla via per il Campo Marzio possiamo perderci chiacchierando… e magari trovare altri dèi curiosi lungo la strada! Lazzarelli, Luigi (1460 ). De bello Sancti Flaviani. San Severino Marche.

Andrea Lazzari (Urbino): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers responsibly infer what is meant beyond what is said by assuming cooperative rationality; implicature is justified by publicly articulable reasons about relevance, sufficiency, and the speaker’s communicative intention, not by mere ornament or rhetorical flourish. Lazzari’s Precetti della rettorica (Cesena) sits at a different angle: it treats “conversational reason” as the craft of public persuasion, organizing speech into exordium, narration, proof, refutation, peroration, style-levels, and the systematic management of the passions, so that what is left unsaid is often a strategic omission designed to move an audience rather than a calculable inference demanded by cooperative exchange. Compared with Grice, Lazzari’s rhetorical pragmatics makes implicature look less like a narrowly semantic phenomenon and more like an orator’s toolkit: insinuation, enthymeme, and affective framing routinely rely on the audience to supply premises, but the governing norm is effectiveness (winning benevolence, stirring indignation, securing assent) rather than Grice’s ideal of mutual understanding under a cooperative principle. The contrast therefore is between Grice’s accountability model of indirect meaning (what you imply should be inferable and criticizable as what you meant) and Lazzari’s classical-oratorical model in which indirectness is licensed by decorum, audience adaptation, and emotional timing, and may be praised precisely when it is not fully spelled out. Yet the continuity is clear: both frameworks presuppose that communication works by shared reasoning over common ground; Grice theorizes that reasoning as a norm of interpretation in conversation, while Lazzari trains it as a norm of invention and delivery in rhetoric, making the “art of speaking” a precursor discipline for the very inferential uptake that Grice later formalizes as implicature. Grice: “I love L.!” key! Precetti della rettorica prammatica come rettorica conversazionale, Serra, Cavalcanti. 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De//<* propofizjonc Oratoria, sua Divtfìone e Perfezioni . Z>e//<* Divifione Della narrazione. p zzi  Dt?//e Prove Del Sillogijmo Dell' Entimema Dell' Ef empio Dell'Induzione Del Dilemma Rifiefjioni giujte ricavate dal E. Serra Jopra le citate dimojlrazjoni Della Confutarne Della Perorazione Dell' Enumeratone , che è la fri ma ma parte della Perorazione Della Commozione degli affetti in genere Dei Cuogbi in fpecie , che', fer- vono per muovere gli affetti , ..<? I. deir Ira Della Piacevolezza Della Benevolenza jCd amicizia Dell 1 Odio Del Timore Della Confidenza Della Vergogna. Della Sfacciataggine Delta Mifericordia , 0 CompSff fione Dell' Indignazione DELLA PRONUMCIAZIONET Definizione della Pronuncia » rione , e /»g parti DELLE DIVERSE SORTI ^ D’ ORAZIONI. E fpecialmente di quelle , che fono in mag « I. De// Orazione Panegirica J Modo di far la jelva per le Orazioni Pa • ! negiriche Dell' Orazione Funebre. °3 Modo di far la Jelva per le Orazioni Fu - nrbri DelC Orazione Accademica. Grice: Caro Lazzari, devo confessarti che la tua attenzione ai precetti della rettorica prammatica mi affascina profondamente. Nel mio studio sulla conversazione, ho spesso riflettuto su come la pragmatica possa illuminare anche l’arte oratoria. Secondo te, quali sono i principi indispensabili per formare un oratore efficace? Lazzari: Paul, che piacere! A mio avviso, l’oratore deve padroneggiare sia lo stile che la disposizione dell’orazione: conoscere le parti, la narrazione, la confutazione, la perorazione... Ma soprattutto, deve saper muovere gli affetti, creando benevolenza, fiducia e persino indignazione quando serve. Serra e Cavalcanti sono ottimi maestri in questo! Grice: Interessante! Mi colpisce come tu insista sulla commozione degli affetti: in fondo, anche nella conversazione quotidiana, spesso ci affidiamo al tono, alla pronuncia e al modo di esprimere le emozioni per ottenere una risposta positiva. Come vedi il rapporto tra stile sublime e stile mediocre nella retorica? Lazzari: Ah, Paul, è proprio qui che si vede l’arte: lo stile sublime eleva l’animo, quello mediocre accompagna con misura, e quello infimo va evitato. Ma ogni stile ha il suo momento, come diceva Cicerone. L’importante è saper adattare la parola alle circostanze e agli uditori, scegliendo sempre con saggezza e cuore. Questa, direi, è la vera conversazione! Lazzari, Andrea (1782). Precetti della rettorica. Cesena: Biasini.

Mario Lazzarini (Roma, Lazio): il deutero-esperanto. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers legitimately get from what is said to what is meant by assuming cooperative rationality and exploiting norms like relevance and perspicuity; implicature is thus an achievement of rational agents operating in real conversational settings, not something guaranteed by a perfect code. Lazzarini, as your passage frames him through the Peano-adjacent milieu (Latino sine flexione, interlinguistic aspirations, and even mathematical writing such as his 1901 Periodico di matematica article on approximating π), points toward the opposite dream: reduce communication to a maximally transparent system where ambiguity is nearly impossible “except on purpose,” as if a better language could eliminate misinterpretation. The comparison therefore highlights a basic Gricean moral: even if an engineered language could standardize denotation, it would not abolish implicature, because implicature arises from the fact that speakers pursue goals under constraints—economy, tact, politics, irony, understatement—and will still choose formulations that invite audiences to supply what is left unsaid. In that sense “Deutero‑Esperanto” (spoken or not) becomes a foil that clarifies Grice’s anti-code stance: meaning in conversation is not merely what a system assigns to expressions but what rational agents do with those expressions in context, including strategic silence and deliberate flouting. Lazzarini’s interlinguistic ideal treats clarity as a property of the language; Grice treats clarity as a property of cooperative practice, always defeasible because agents remain free to be indirect, playful, or even unhelpful. So where Lazzarini’s project aims to cure the world of misunderstanding by redesigning the code, Grice’s project explains why misunderstanding—and the creative, civil uses of it—persists even under the clearest code, because the source of implicature is not grammatical complexity but rational agency itself. Grice: “It is amazing that while everbody – including Trudgill in his Language Myths – seem to agree that Italian is the most beautiful language in the world, the number of Italian philosophers who tried to invent a DIFFERENT lingo by far exceeds that of any other nation! At a conference at Brighton, I joked that convention – if not arbitrariness – has nothing to do with signification, and claimed that he could invent a new language – “call it Deutero-Esperanto” – that nobody speaks, and set what it’s proper, which would make me the master. artificiale.. A differenza del deutero-esperanto di Grice, non usato mai da Grice, il latino sine flexione è utilizzato anche da altri filosofi come VACCA , in Sphoera es solo corpore, qui nos pote vide ut circulo ab omne puncto externo, L., in Mensura de circulo iuxta Leonardo [VINCI  Pisano, e PANEBIANCO  che discute proprio della lingua internazionale nell'opuscolo “Adoptione de lingua internationale es signo que evanesce contentione de classe et bello” (Padova, Boscardini). Vedasi ALBANI, BUONARROTI. PANEBIANCO  è anche un grande appassionato di Esperanto, tanto che è solito firmarsi "esperantista socialista". Quest'ultimo, come si evince anche dal titolo della sua opera, vede nella lingua internazionale un modo per mettere la parola fine ai contrasti internazionali, e in particolare al capitalismo spietato. Inter-linguista, quale que es suo opinione politico aut religioso es certo precursore de novo systema sociale. Isto novo systema, in que homines loque uno solo lingua magis facile, commune ad illos non pote es actuale systema de "homo homini lupus", sed es systema sociale in que toto homines fi socio. Per ben adempiere a un tale compito, la lingua perfetta di PANEBIANCO  deve seguire gli stessi principi di quella di P. Es evidente que essendo id sine grammatica, id es de maximo facilitate et simplicitate. Ergo, es per illo quasi impossibile ad fac ambiguitate, excepto ad praeposito [“As when the conversational maxim, ‘avoid ambiguity’ is FLOUTED for the purpose of bringining in a conversational implicature”].  Oxford, 1966. Morning. St John’s is doing its usual trick of looking as if it had always been waiting for him, when in fact it is quite capable of doing without him for centuries at a stretch. Grice is at his desk with a cup of tea that has already been reheated once, which means it is now the right temperature for philosophical work: barely alive. He has opened Lazzarini and, as usual, has been caught not by the thesis but by the typography of a title, the sort of small bait which the mind takes only when it wants an excuse to postpone the larger fish. He reads it again, aloud, in Italian, because he likes the mild indecency of doing Italian in Oxford before breakfast. Un’applicazione del calcolo delle probabilità. He looks up, as if someone has said something rude in chapel. Calcolo delle probabilità, he repeats, and then, dutifully, translates it back for himself and finds, to his annoyance, that the English does not quite preserve the offence. “I know I can be fastidious,” he says, to nobody in particular, “and by that I imply that I am about to be intolerable.” He taps the page. First point. The plural. Probabilità. Not probabilità in the singular, as if it were a property you either had or lacked, but probabilità in the plural, as if there were a small crowd of them milling about with different hats. “And by that I imply,” he adds, obediently ruining his own joke, “that our author is thinking of probability as a family of measures, not a single dignified notion. It is a tiny lexical tell.” He pauses, and the pause is itself a performance of what he is about to pretend to forget: that he is meant to be in a room with Pears in less than an hour, jointly conducting a class on the philosophy of action. A joint class is always a small miracle, because it requires two philosophers to coordinate their intentions in public without admitting that this is what they are doing. He reads again: del calcolo delle probabilità. Second point. The preposition-by-article business. Delle. Of the. Not of probability, but of the probabilities. And, worse, the whole thing sounds as if the probabilities are already there, waiting like objects, and the calcolo is the hero who will go and fetch them. “That ‘delle’,” he says, “makes it feel futurish. As if the probabilities are something one is going to produce, or uncover, or harvest. And by that I imply that he is not merely describing a static property; he is advertising a procedure. He is looking forward to the result as if the result were the point.” He turns a page, then turns it back, because turning the page would count as progress and he is not yet ready for that sort of responsibility. Third point. Lazzarini’s emphasis is on calcolo, not on what the calcolo is of. Grice knows the type. People fall in love with the machinery and forget what it is supposed to grind. “He is more interested in the calculating than in the calculated,” Grice says. “And by that I imply that the thing has the air of a tribute to method. A little hymn to technique.” He scribbles in the margin, in English, because his meta-language remains English even when his temptations are Italian. P(x) ∈ [0,1]. Then, more carefully, because the interval matters if one is going to be pedantic, and he has already confessed to that vice. For any proposition p: P(p) = 0 means no probability, P(p) = 1 means full probability. He looks at what he has written and frowns, not at the content but at the moral smell of it. P(p) is neat, which is always suspicious. Neatness encourages people to think they have understood something when they have merely abbreviated it. He writes, as if in self-defence. Cred(p) ∈ [0,1] Des(p) ∈ [0,1] Then he sits back, pleased, and immediately suspects that he has made it too tidy, which is another way of being pleased. “And by that I imply,” he says, “that I am trying to force an analogy into existence.” Now the big point arrives, because the big point has been waiting for him like a timetable, and timetables always win in Oxford. He thinks of Pears and the philosophy of action, and he thinks, inevitably, of the pair of attitudes any action talk smuggles in: how likely, and how wanted. He mutters the Italian words as if tasting them. Credibilità. Desiderabilità. He writes them down, and the handwriting comes out more English than he would like. “Credibilità would sound better,” he says, “as opposed to desiderabilità. And by that I imply that one should not talk as if probability’s natural partner is desirability in some vague sentimental sense. We want the pairing to match in grammatical dignity and in psychological category.” He pauses, then adds, because he cannot resist making the implicature explicit and thereby cancelling it. “And by that I imply that Lazzarini is creating an asymmetry.” He points at his own scribbles. Probability, as the mathematicians like it, attaches to a proposition, or to an event-description. It is, in the philosophical mouth, a kind of graded endorsement, or at least a graded measure of how things stand with p. Credibility sounds like a propositional attitude of the faculty of judgment, facoltà del giudizio, if one insists on being scholastic about it. One judges p credible to degree c. Desirability sounds like a propositional attitude of the will, facoltà della volontà: one wants p, or wants p to be the case, to degree d. Parallel. That is the whole charm. Two attitudes, one proposition. He underlines, and then regrets the underlining because it looks like emphasis. So he says it instead, to restore his preferred medium. “If we do it my way,” he says, “we can keep the same proposition p and assign two values, Cred(p) and Des(p), each between 0 and 1, and we avoid the gap Lazzarini is inviting.” He pauses again, and this time the pause has the feel of a name entering the room. “Cicero,” he says, as if Cicero were sitting in the armchair and had just coughed politely. Lazzarini, he suspects, is paying homage to Cicero. Probably paying homage. Probably. Grice likes probably because it gives him an escape route while sounding like a commitment. “Probably Cicero invented it,” he says, “or probably invented the habit. Credibilis has a decent Roman ring. And desirably, philosophers should not have followed the fashion of turning everything into a -bilitas and then behaving as if the suffix did the thinking.” He looks at his watch. He has not moved. This is his usual method of travelling to a class: stay still until the last moment and then arrive somehow. He adds one more line in the margin, because he cannot resist making the action connection explicit. In decision talk: choose act a to maximize something like E[Des(outcome)] subject to Credibility constraints. He stares at it, and the stare is part of the humour: the English don watching himself flirt with being a decision theorist. “By that I imply,” he says, “that I am flirting with the wrong crowd.” He hears, in his head, Hampshire’s voice, the Hampshire manner of taking action seriously without letting it become an exercise in calculus. He hears, too, Keynes, who is English enough but from the other place, and who wrote about probability as if probability were not merely a frequency but a relation of rational support. “Kneale would say something sensible here,” he says, “and by that I imply that I haven’t time to read him before 11 o’clock.” He gathers the papers into a pile that suggests order without achieving it. He stands. He forgets, briefly, what he is about to do, which is exactly why he always arrives at class slightly late but sounding as if he had intended it. He reaches the door, stops, and turns back to the desk, because he cannot leave a last implicature unspoiled. “If Pears asks why I’m late,” he says, “I shall tell him I was calculating the probabilities. And by that I imply that I was, of course, doing something quite different.”Grice: Lazzarini, credo che tu abbia il record per le lingue inventate! Dimmi, quando hai pensato al “deutero-esperanto”, hai immaginato che un giorno potesse sostituire l’italiano nei salotti romani? Lazzarini: Paul, non esageriamo! L’italiano resta la regina, ma la mia lingua perfetta sogna un mondo dove nessuno si confonde e tutti si capiscono. Immagina: niente più litigi per una virgola sbagliata! Grice: Fantastico! Ma allora, se tutti parlano la stessa lingua, come facciamo a generare implicature e malintesi? Non rischiamo di rendere le conversazioni troppo… limpide? Lazzarini: Tranquillo, Paul! Anche nella lingua più semplice, basta un po’ di fantasia (o una pausa strategica) e l’ambiguità salta fuori. Del resto, il più bel divertimento è proprio far sorridere l’altro con un gioco di parole, anche se è universale! Lazzarini, Mario (1901). Un’applicazione del calcolo delle probabilità alla ricerca sperimentale di un valore approssimato di π. Periodico di matematica per l’insegnamento secondario.

Gaio Lelio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, accountable inference from what is said to what is meant, driven by cooperative expectations that speakers can exploit (and hearers can justify) without needing to state everything explicitly. Laelius Sapiens, as a Roman “man of the Porch” in the Scipionic milieu, illustrates a different but closely related governance of meaning: public speech and political reporting in Rome is a high-stakes practice where one often must speak in ways that let different audiences draw different, yet controllable, conclusions. When Laelius says something like “Carthage was taken in a single day,” the bare assertion is historical, but the uptake varies—glory for the crowd, logistical competence for the Senate, and a reminder of continuing duty for the speaker himself—so the moral-political point is carried by what the utterance invites each hearer to supply rather than by what is spelled out. Compared with Grice, this shows implicature operating not as a private cleverness but as a civic instrument: Laelius relies on shared Roman background assumptions (virtus, labor, disciplina, decorum) to make his minimal words do maximal work, much as Grice’s maxims predict speakers will do when they aim to be efficient and understood. The contrast is that Grice offers an explicit analytic model of how such inferences are warranted and cancellable in conversation, whereas Laelius exemplifies a culturally entrenched practice in which “portico reason” is as much prudential and political as it is cooperative, and where understatement and strategic reticence are not deviations from rationality but part of the very rational style by which an educated Roman manages what different audiences are entitled to conclude. Grice: “It must be remembered that when I started the serious study of philosophy at Oxford, it was through the classics. Clifton, my alma mater, would certainly have found it odd to offer a pupil a scholarship in philosophy – but ‘a classical scholarship’ was ‘okay,’ as the Americans put it – in terms of societal norms. Of course, I never met philosophy well into my fifth term in the classics! But once I did, Lelio was second nature to me!” Ha fama soprattutto per l’intima amicizia che lo lega all’Africano Minore. Conosce i tre filosofi inviati a Roma, ma e attirato principalmente da Diogene, del Portico. In seguito L. ha rapporto con Panezio e ne diffuse la dottrina nell’aristocrazia romana.Come legato di Scipione, C. L. partecipa alla guerra contro i punici e si distinge nell’assedio di Cartagine, ottenendo in premio la pretura. Appartenne agl’auguri è diviene console. Nelle lotte civili determinate dall'azione di Tiberio GRACCO, L. si schiera contro questo e i suoi fautori. E  ammirato, se non come oratore, come uomo politico, e dove il soprannome di "sapiente" datogli dall’aristocrazia, al suo atteggiamento politico più che ad altro. Console della repubblica romana. Filosofo del portico, politico e militare romano. E uno dei migliori amici e più stretti collaboratori di Publio Cornelio SCIPIONE Africano, che segue durante la guerra punica come prefetto della flotta, legato e questore.  Si distingue particolarmente nella conquista di Cartagine e in seguito, nella campagna contro Siface e nella decisiva battaglia di Zama. Dopo un viaggio di XXXVII giorni, partito da Tarraco in Spagna, in seguito alla presa di Carthago, raggiunse a Roma. Quando entra in città insieme ad una grande schiera di prigionieri attira l'attenzione del popolo che si riversa lungo le strade al suo passaggio. Il giorno seguente venne ricevuto in senato, dove racconta che Cartagine e presa in una sol giorno. GRICEVS Salvē, LELI! In Porticū tuō me quasi “classicā stipendiāriā” rursus esse sentio: philosophia enim mihi quīntō demum terminō apparuit—tam serō ut etiam boves Vadī Boum me praeterīverint. LELIVS Salvē, GRICEV. Nōlī bovēs accusāre: illī saltem sciunt quō eant. Tu autem, cum dīcis “tam serō,” implicās—nisi fallor—te iam tum sapientem fuisse, sed per modestiam latuīsse. GRICEVS Rectē capis: dīcō “serō” ut audītōrēs putent me tardum; deinde ipsī inferant me callidum—haec est mea parva fraus, maximē cooperātīva. Sed tū, “Sapiēns” dictus, numquamne in Senātū sententiam dedistī ut aliud significārēs? LELIVS Saepe: “Cartāgō capta est ūnō diē,” dīxī; populus audīvit gloriam, senātus audīvit labōrem, ego audīvī me crastinō rursus in officiō futūrum. Ita fit: in Rōmā etiam vōx triumphālis est tantum conversātiō cum galeā. Lelio, Gaio (a. u. c. DCVIII). Dicta.

Bruno Leoni (Ancona, Marche): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale  il vincolo mi fa libero. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a form of rational freedom exercised under self-adopted norms: a speaker is not compelled by convention alone, but (as a rational agent) chooses to abide by cooperative constraints, and the hearer correspondingly infers what is meant because it would be reasonable to do so given those freely accepted constraints. Leoni’s liberalism, by contrast, is a theory of freedom under rules at the institutional level: private property, market coordination, and the rule of law are not mere constraints but enabling structures—bindings that make responsible agency possible, the sense captured by the slogan you cite, that the bond makes one free. Put together, they highlight two parallel “normativities”: Grice’s is micro-normativity of conversation (how voluntary adherence to maxims makes indirect meaning accountable, cancellable, and criticizable), while Leoni’s is macro-normativity of legal order (how voluntarily accepted general rules make social cooperation possible without central command). In a Gricean idiom, Leoni’s “vincolo” functions like the cooperative principle itself: not a police constraint but a rational presupposition one adopts because it is the condition of mutually beneficial interaction; and in a Leonian idiom, Grice’s implicature looks like a miniature market in reasons, where speakers trade on shared expectations and listeners “price in” what is unsaid. The main contrast is that Grice’s freedom is exercised primarily in intention and communicative responsibility—one can always defect, be unhelpful, or speak with ill will—whereas Leoni’s freedom is exercised in choosing and sustaining the legal framework that makes peaceful coordination possible in the first place; but the shared insight is the same: genuine liberty is not the absence of norms, it is the rational capacity to live under norms one can, in principle, justify, revise, and accept as one’s own. Grice: “It’s funny that while one of my pupils – Flew – and many members of Austin’s Play Group – Thomson, Pears, and what have you – were interested in ‘if I can’ as a wedge to imply the freedom of the will, I only realised how important ‘freiheit’ was when I elaborated on the basis for such things as my principle of conversational helpfulness. My idea of freedom developed not along the lines of Aristotle or Epitteto – his idea of the semi-free will—but that of Kant, and Hegel. My conversational imperative, or command, or commandment, is FREELY adopted by a RATIONAL AGENT. Indeed, it wouldn’t be a matter of rationality if such a principle were NOT adopted freely. “My lips are sealed” is the utterance I utter to refute Kant on the decalogogical category, ‘Thou shalt not give false testimony.” Of course such things are defeasbible. They ARE the things a decent chap should do – but they are the things that a chap – see my ‘Ill-will’ – may decide NOT to do – he would still be a chap, if not a decent one! – On occasion I refer to the ‘ordinary chap,’ not the ‘decent chap,’ until I gave a seminar on ‘Decency’!” In my linguistic botany on freedom I consider ‘liberal’ and ‘liberated’, and SPERANZA has spoken of meaning liberalism to echo Bennett’s meaning-nominalism – so there’s that! L. is interested in the libero- root that we find in ‘liberal’ and ‘liberated,’ and I do use ‘liberated – from nature’s constraints – in my pirotological progression of action, from the free-moving, free-wheeling, phototropic, and animal freedom, and even the action where one more or less freely sets a goal to pursue. But, like L., I make a fine distinction between ‘libero’ e ‘spontaneo’ or autonomo. implicatura, freedom, il concetto di ‘freedom’ in Grice e il liberalism italiano, il concetto di Freiheit in Kant e la tradizione liberale, Croce, Enaudi, il partito liberale italiano, partito nazionale fascista, protezionismo, fascismo, storia d’italia, storia del liberalismo italiano, libero e vincolato, libero e fozato, libero e spontaneo. From Grice’s Diary: “30 Aug 1939, Oxford. I have been reading Leoni’s piece on Vaihinger’s Als Ob again, and it is oddly bracing to see an Italian mind take a German title as if it were simply part of the furniture. The phrase itself is the philosopher’s hinge: it turns description into a policy, a way of proceeding without claiming too much. We live, almost shamelessly, as if words had stable edges, as if inference were always decent, as if the world would keep faith with our expectations; and now, with the wireless full of ultimatums and the papers thick with that peculiar calm that precedes an explosion, it is difficult to keep the “as if” from sounding like superstition. War seems inevitable. England may be in it within days. Italy, I suspect, will arrive later, with the special Italian talent for turning lateness into posture; and yet even that “later” will be early enough to catch the philosophers mid-sentence. Leoni’s war, if it comes in the Italian way, will still come in time to rearrange the lives of men who thought they were merely rearranging arguments. I find myself noting the dates as if they were footnotes to a paper: if Britain declares war on Germany on 3 September 1939, and if Italy follows by declaring war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, then there is an unsettling triviality in the thought that the second date will still precede the appearance of my “Personal Identity” in Mind (if it ever appears at all). One writes as if publication were the natural telos of thinking; history replies by treating publication as an indulgence granted between interruptions. Perhaps that is the real lesson of Als Ob at this moment: not that we may pretend, but that we cannot help pretending—continuing to plan seminars and polish distinctions as if the world were not about to make the grossest distinction of all.” Grice: Caro Leoni, mi affascina la riflessione sul vincolo che rende libero! In Inghilterra, spesso discutiamo di libertà come assenza di restrizioni, ma qui sembra che il vincolo sia condizione della vera libertà. Come definirebbe il rapporto tra regola e libertà? Leoni: Caro Grice, grazie! Per me, la libertà non è semplicemente spontaneità, ma la possibilità di scegliere razionalmente anche entro vincoli. Un vincolo liberamente accettato è ciò che permette all’agente razionale di essere davvero libero, perché solo così si dà senso alle azioni e ai valori. Grice: Interessante, Leoni! Mi ricorda la libertà secondo Kant, dove l’imperativo morale viene adottato proprio perché scelto dal soggetto razionale. Nel mio lavoro sulla conversazione, anche le regole linguistiche sono seguite liberamente: nessuno è costretto, ma tutti partecipano volontariamente. Concorda che la libertà si manifesta anche nell’agire linguistico? Leoni: Assolutamente, caro Grice! Proprio nella lingua vedo il vincolo come fonte di creatività: seguendo regole condivise, siamo liberi di comunicare, esprimerci e persino innovare. La libertà nasce dalla responsabilità di aderire a principi scelti, e questo vale sia per la morale sia per il linguaggio. Il vincolo, se volontario e ragionato, ci fa davvero liberi! Leoni, Bruno (1938). Aspetti e problemi della “Philosophie des Als Ob”. Rivista di Filosofia.

Pierleoni Leoni (Spoleto, Perugia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale, Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes implicature a rational, accountable inference from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative expectations that allow hearers to reconstruct intentions and to challenge or cancel the inferred content. Pierleone Leoni (Pierleone da Spoleto, c. 1445–1492), the Renaissance physician-philosopher and astrologer in Lorenzo de’ Medici’s circle, provides a darker, historically grounded counterpoint: his fate turns on how quickly a community can convert thin evidence into a lethal “implicature” (from physician-at-bedside to poisoner) when trust collapses and political panic takes over. Read Griceanly, the episode is a case of catastrophic pragmatic drift: the same facts—Lorenzo dies, the doctor is present, astrological counsel circulates—can license wildly different inferences depending on background assumptions, and those assumptions were anything but “cooperative” in Florence in April 1492; the result is that what counts as the relevant explanation is socially selected rather than rationally compelled. Where Grice stresses that implicatures are, in principle, calculable and cancellable within a shared rational practice, Pierleone’s story shows an environment in which cancellation is impossible (no clarifying clause can compete with factional suspicion), and where conversational reason is replaced by forensic rumor masquerading as inference. This makes Leoni a vivid foil for Grice: it highlights both the dependence of implicature on stable common ground and the fragility of that ground, because once conversational benevolence and institutional safeguards vanish, “what is inferred” stops being a disciplined enrichment of meaning and becomes a weapon—an accusation produced by the same human tendency to go beyond what is said, but no longer governed by the norms that, for Grice, make such going-beyond rational and answerable.Grice: “In Italy, in those days, it was very common for a philosopher to be called in the singular – Leone – or in the plural – L.  In England, and specifically Oxford, we don’t have that problem with Occam! In Italy, they like ‘renaissance men,’ but there’s a peril in that: Leoni was a philosopher and a physician (to Medici) – when he died, Medici did, L. was accused of malpractice (poisoning), strangled to death, and thrown into a ditch. Categorie: philosophers in ditch – Thales, L..” Di famiglia aristocratica, studia a Roma. Insegna a Padova e Pisa.  E qui che ha modo di entrare in contatto con la cerchia di filosofi che gravitano attorno a Lorenzo de’ Medici, a Firenze. Ha contatti e una fitta corrispondenza con Ficino e Pico. Venne considerato uno dei più valenti filosofi. I più illustri personaggi e sovrani dell'epoca, come il duca di Calabria, il re di Napoli, Ludovico il Moro, forse anche IInnocenzo, richiedeno le sue cure, tanto che divenne il medico personale dello stesso Lorenzo de Medici.  All'indomani della morte di Lorenzo de Medici venne ingiustamente sospettato di essere stato il responsabile del suo avvelenamento, e venne quindi strangolato e gettato in un pozzo il giorno seguente. Diverse fonti dell'epoca  sostengono che il mandante dell'uccisione di L. e il figlio di Lorenzo, Piero il Fatuo. F. Bacchelli, riferimenti in.  Dagli Annali di Mugnoni da Trevi, trascriz. Pirri (Estratto dall'Archivio per la Storia Ecclesiastica dell'Umbria. Era adpresso del dicto Lorenzo uno excellentissimo et famosissimo medico de grandissima scientia in FILOSOFIA, nominato magistro Pierleone de leonardo da Spolitj, reputato el più singulare valente homo in dicte scientie che ogie dì viva. E questo uomo in tanto prezzo adpresso del dicto Lorenzo che, senza quisto clarissimo doctore, non podiva stare. E conducto ad Pisa ad legere, ha mille ducatj de provisione per anno: poj e conducto ad Padova, ha mille et ducento ducatj per anno. Ad Pisa stecte annj ad legere e similemente ad Padova. Grice: Caro Leoni, in Italia vi chiamano al singolare o al plurale, ma l’implicatura resta la stessa: parlare bene può salvarti la reputazione, non sempre il collo. Leoni: Ah Grice, io praticavo la ragione conversazionale e la medicina, ma qualcuno ha inferito veleno dove c’era solo filosofia applicata. Grice: Vedi, a Oxford questo si sarebbe cancellato con un’adeguata clausola di chiarimento, non con una corda e un pozzo. Leoni: Appunto, morale implicata: meglio una conversazione cooperativa che una cattiva inferenza rinascimentale. Leoni, Pierleoni (1480). Lectiones. Pisa.

Giacomo Leopardi (Recanati, Macerata, Marche): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del favoloso e fascista. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes implicature a disciplined, inferential phenomenon: speakers can mean more than they say because hearers assume cooperation and can rationally reconstruct why a particular wording was chosen, with the implied content remaining in principle cancellable and publicly criticizable. Leopardi, especially in the Zibaldone, is a striking foil because he treats language less as a cooperative instrument for sharing reasons and more as a historically evolved constraint on thought and feeling: he is fascinated by the gap between lived experience and the names that domesticate it, and he often implies that the deepest human relations to infinity, nature, and desire are damaged the moment they are forced into clear, regular signs. This produces a different “logic” of implication: where Gricean implicature is typically a calculable enrichment of what is said (say little, mean more, and be answerable for it), Leopardi’s most characteristic effect is to make what is not said—silence, indeterminacy, the “infinite silences”—carry the weight, as if the truest content is precisely what cannot be rendered without loss. In Gricean terms, Leopardi’s poetic and philosophical practice systematically pressures the maxim of manner: obscurity and indirectness are not conversational defects but the point, because they preserve the sense of an ungraspable remainder that clarity would falsify. Yet the comparison also reveals continuity: Leopardi’s critique of “universal language” projects and his emphasis on precision and regularity as purchased at the cost of expressive life can be read as a warning that purely code-like semantics will never account for the human work done by tone, omission, and shared background—exactly the domain where Grice locates conversational meaning. So Leopardi helps sharpen Grice’s distinction between mere signification and lived speaker-meaning: Grice offers the rules by which rational agents can responsibly get from words to intended content, while Leopardi insists that even perfect rules leave an existential residue, making implicature not only a tool of cooperation but also, at its limits, a symptom of what language cannot fully say. Grice: “Oddly, L.’s philosophical semantics is negative; admittedly, he is wedded to the Fido-‘Fido’ theory of meaning, so he thinks, pretty much like the first Vitters, that language is a prison. Man has a need for ‘non-linguistic thought,’ to think without naming – without conceptualizing! The oddest philosophy of language for Italy’s greatest poet, one would first think! One could write a whole dissertation on L.’s implicata – not I. My favourite expression would be ‘gli infiniti silenzi’”. While there is a philosophical griceianism, seeing that my theories were stolen by non-philosophers, there is ‘leopardismo filosofico,’ seeing that he wasn’t one!” Essential Italian philosopher, and founder of a whole movement, ‘leopardismo.’ Anche L. nello Zibaldone de’ pensieri partecipa al dibattito sulla lingua universale.  Sostenne che a rendere internazionale una lingua non è la potenza della nazione che la parla o la diffusione dei suoi domini, e nemmeno il suo prestigio letterario: se così fosse la lingua italiana, che per molto tempo fu intesa e letta nelle corti di tutta Europa e oltre, sarebbe assurta a lingua  utilizzata da più nazioni, ma così non è stato.L. spiega che invece ciò che fa di una lingua universale è un aspetto ad essa intrinseco, ovvero la sua capacità di essere geometrica e regolare e di possedere una struttura semplice e ideale. Esattezza, precisione, chiarezza i suoi punti costitutivi fondamentali. Quello poi che dice che una lingua strettamente universale dove di sua natura essere anzi un’ombra di lingua che lingua propria, maggiormente anzi esattamente conviene a quella lingua caratteristica proposta fra gl’altri dal nostro SOAVE, la qual lingua o maniera di segni non avrebbe a rappresentar le parole, ma l’idee, bensì alcune delle inflessioni d'esse parole, come quelle de' verbi, ma piuttosto come inflessioni o modificazioni delle idee che delle parole, e senza rapporto a niun suono pronunziato, né significazione e dinotazione alcune di esso. il favoloso, gl’usi di L. nella filosofia italiana. Grice: Caro Leopardi, mi viene in mente quella volta in cui Austin, con la sua solita ironia, chiese alla sala quale fosse il passo poetico più incomprensibile mai scritto! Mi domando: c’è un tuo verso che, secondo te, potrebbe rivaleggiare con i misteri più oscuri della poesia? Sarebbe divertente scoprire quale scegli! Leopardi: Ah, Grice, che domanda deliziosa! Se dovessi scegliere, forse proporrei proprio “Io quella/ vòlta ch’io vidi il tuo volto, o Natura, non vidi/ che una maschera.” Chissà quanti, a scuola, si saranno grattati la testa davanti a quell’enigma… Ma, sotto sotto, in fondo mi diverto anch’io a nascondere un po’ il senso! Grice: Fantastico! Immagino Austin che, sentendo quel verso, avrebbe sorriso sornione e proposto subito un seminario sul significato della “maschera” della Natura. Forse avrebbe anche sostenuto che la vera poesia consiste nel dire molto… facendo finta di non dire nulla! Leopardi: Ecco, caro Grice, vedi che parli da poeta anche tu! A volte il bello sta proprio nel gioco: un po’ di nebbia, un tocco di mistero, e la conversazione si accende. In fondo, chi capisce tutto subito… si perde il gusto della scoperta! Meglio sorridere insieme davanti all’incomprensibile! Leopardi, Giacomo (1818). Appunti di filosofia. Bologna: Marsigli.

Monaldo Leopardi (Recanati, Macerata, Marche): l’implicatura conversazionale dell’1150. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an inferential achievement under cooperative norms: a hearer supplies what is meant beyond what is said because the speaker can be presumed to be speaking with a point, and the resulting inference is in principle criticizable, cancellable, and attributable to rational agency rather than to mere atmosphere. Monaldo Leopardi is a revealing foil because his relation to “meaning beyond the literal” is not primarily conversational but familial, institutional, and ideological: he builds the material conditions of his son’s thought (the famous library at Recanati) while resisting the conclusions that library helped generate, and after Giacomo’s death he appears to manage public interpretation by implying a reconciliation (a deathbed return to Catholic faith) that many historians treat as wishful reconstruction rather than evidence. Compared to Grice, this is implicature in a thicker, socially consequential sense: not a locally calculable inference from a single utterance, but a strategic shaping of what audiences are permitted to conclude about a life, where silence, selective emphasis, and the paternal voice function as cues that guide interpretation. In Gricean terms, Monaldo’s discourse invites hearers to fill gaps in ways that serve a conservative moral narrative, but the cooperative presumption is unstable because the audience may suspect motivated reasoning, turning the “implicature” into a site of contest rather than shared uptake. The contrast therefore highlights Grice’s idealization: conversational reason works smoothly when speakers share commitments to candour and relevance, whereas the Leopardi case shows how powerful background asymmetries (father versus son, orthodoxy versus heterodoxy, private grief versus public reputation) can make what is left unsaid function less like cooperative economy and more like ideological management, with the resulting inferences depending as much on authority, memory, and rivalry as on any maxim-guided calculation. Grice: “Apparently, unlike in Scotland, it is very rare in Italy that a philosopher is father to another philosopher, as James Mill was father to Mill – the closest you get in Italy is L., the philosopher, who was the father of a poet, L., who some deem ‘philosophical’ in spirit – as Austin said Donne was philosophical! We don’t have at Oxford a ‘chip off the old block’ as they have in Recanati!” L.’s reflections on his  after his son’s death are marked by a tragic disconnect. While he deeply mourned the man, he remains ideologically opposed to him. Ideological Denial: A staunch ultra-conservative and papal loyalist, L. struggled to reconcile his son's fame with his "atheistic" and "pessimistic" philosophy. L. often chooses to believe, and publicly suggests, that the son had returned to the Catholic faith on his death-bed, a claim largely dismissed by historians and his son’s close friend RANIERI . Literary Rivalry and Legacy: L.had originally groomed his son to be a great Christian apologist. After his son’s death, L. continues his own reactionary writing, but he remains in his son's shadow, often viewing Giacomo’s philosophical "errors" as a personal and religious failure. Paternal Grief vs. Principles: Despite their sharp intellectual rift, Monaldo’s personal writings reveal a father’s genuine grief. He had provided the very library where Giacomo formed his "scandalous" ideas, creating a relationship of both "complicity and competition" that haunted L.  For further details on their relationship, you can explore the son’s biography provided by Britannica.Importante esponente del pensiero controrivoluzionario e padre di L.. L., targa commemorativa apposta sui portici di piazza Leopardi a Recanati Figlio primogenito del conte Giacomo e di Virginia dei marchesi Mosca, nacque in una delle famiglie più preminenti di Recanati. Rimasto a quattro anni orfano del padre, crebbe con la madre. 1150, the coding of a name, the philosophical L., the L. fascista, interpretazione fascista da GENTILE dell’ultra-filosofia di L., l’ultrafilosofia di L., padre. Grice had arranged the room as one arranges a trap one means to deny having set: chair for the pupil, chair for himself, the small table just close enough to make the books look unavoidable, and on top, with the innocent air of an “illustration,” the 1803 volume: Opere del conte Monaldo Leopardi Gonfaloniere da Recanati. Vol. I. He had even, for once, actually read the tragedy, which made him feel faintly continental and therefore faintly guilty. Flew came in briskly, already wearing that expression of being eager to disagree with something, preferably before it had finished saying what it was. Sit down, Flew, Grice said. Yes, sir. Grice tapped the book with a finger. You have been reading poetry, Flew. I love poetry too, sir, Flew said promptly, because pleasing one’s tutor is what an undergraduate does before he learns to despise his tutor. I’ve learned a few couplets by the poet of the Marche. Grice looked at him as if Flew had just walked, confidently, into the wrong seminar. This is the father, not the son. Flew blinked, then recovered with admirable speed, as if recovery were an Oxford virtue. That sounds fascinating, sir. Grice let the silence sit just long enough to make the sentence feel earned. It is only fascinating if you stop trying to be fascinating, he said. The point is not that you have named a county correctly. The point is that you have mistaken a tragedy for an idyll. Flew leaned forward. You mean Monaldo is not Giacomo. I mean, Grice said, that if you hear Leopardi and immediately think you have a right to despair, you have been listening to the wrong person. Monaldo’s despair is administrative. He publishes “Opere. Vol. I.” at twenty-six, with the confidence of a man who is both a count and a municipal officer. Gonfaloniere, Flew said, as if it were a logical operator. Precisely, Grice said. A banner-bearer. A man whose job-title already implies a flag, and hence a public. You should distrust any author who announces himself under a banner and then calls his first pamphlet “Opere.” Flew smiled in the hopeful way. So it’s pretentious, sir. Pretentious is an English word for a perfectly normal Italian fact, Grice said. What interests me is that his tragedy is called Montezuma. Flew said Montezuma as if tasting it. It sounds… American. It sounds, Grice said, like a young man desperate to prove he is not confined to Greece and Rome, while also proving, by the very form he chooses, that he cannot escape them. Tragedy is the most classical thing you can do while trying not to sound classical. Flew glanced at the book. Is it actually a tragedy in the Greek sense? In the sense in which an Oxonian uses “in the Greek sense,” Grice said: yes and no. No chorus that functions as a civic mind. No Athenian audience. No Dionysia. But the skeleton is borrowed. Five acts, dignified speeches, moral rhetoric, and a hero who is made to carry more weight than any human being should be asked to carry without comic relief. Flew hesitated. So it’s a failure? Grice’s eyebrows rose. Flew had offered him the standard verdict, the biographer’s verdict, the safe verdict. A failure, Grice said, is a word used by people who have not tried. The interesting question is: what is he trying to do, and what does he succeed in doing despite himself. Flew looked relieved. There was something to analyse. He’s trying to make an Aztec emperor behave like Agamemnon, Flew said. Good, Grice said. Now say it without sounding as if you had read it in a guidebook. Flew tried again. He’s importing the heroic type into the wrong latitude. Better, Grice said. And what do you get when you import the heroic type? You get a man who speaks in declamations. And who speaks like that, Grice said, in ordinary life? Nobody, sir. Exactly. Yet tragedy, like logic, is an art of making nobody speak so that everybody can overhear and learn something about themselves. The Greeks did it by chorus. Monaldo does it by sheer self-confidence. Flew looked at the title-page again. Why choose Montezuma? Because “Montezuma” is already a signal, Grice said. It says: I am not merely doing the Romans again. It also says: I have read something beyond Livy. It is an advertisement of worldliness. And it is, simultaneously, a confession of provinciality, because he only knows how to make the foreign intelligible by making it classical. Flew said, cautiously: So the Aztec court becomes a Roman senate? Or a Greek palace, Grice said. Whichever you prefer. The point is that the speech-acts remain Mediterranean. The content changes costumes. You have an emperor speaking as if he had read Seneca. Which, if you are charitable, is an achievement: he has made the New World speak the Old World’s language. Flew brightened. So it’s successful. Successful in a very Oxonian way, Grice said. It shows you that Oxford cannot help relating everything to the classics, and that Monaldo cannot either. He thinks he is escaping by choosing Mexico. In fact he is proving that his only tools are the classical ones. Flew said: But that makes it derivative. Derivative, Grice said, is what you call something when you want to sound modern. The Greeks derived too; they just had the good sense to call it tradition. The question is whether Monaldo’s derivation is merely imitation or a test-case. A test-case? Yes, Grice said. Suppose you take the tragic form and feed it an alien subject. What breaks first: the form, or your sense that the subject can bear the form? Flew thought. The subject becomes moralised. Precisely. The foreign becomes exemplary. Montezuma stops being a particular person and becomes “the tragic ruler.” That is why the play can be read by an Italian count in Recanati without needing to know anything about Mexico beyond the name. Flew said: So Monaldo is using Montezuma as a vehicle for European political anxieties? Grice looked pleased and tried not to appear so. You are learning, Flew. Tragedy is where politics pretends to be fate. And a young conservative in a revolutionary century may prefer to stage his politics at a safe distance: far enough away to seem historical, and therefore inevitable. Flew nodded. So the “Indian-American” flavour is protective. Protective and decorative, Grice said. Like putting Latin on a title-page. It makes the thing look universal. Flew said, daringly: It’s like Peano’s Latinulus. Grice allowed himself a small smile. Yes. Like Latinulus. A purified medium that gives you the illusion that you have escaped the vulgarities of ordinary speech. Except tragedy is the opposite of purification: it is ordinary passions elevated into ceremonial language. Flew shifted, thinking of his own subject. But sir, where does this leave logic? Grice’s smile became the dry one. Logic, Flew, is tragedy for people who do not like emotion. It takes the Greek appetite for form and removes the blood. Which is why you must remember that even the most formal apparatus begins in ordinary language. Aristotle’s logic begins as an analysis of how we speak—what we say, what follows, what we deny, what we concede. Not as an algebraic hobby. Flew, eager, said: So Monaldo’s tragedy is a reminder that form without ordinary language becomes empty. No, Grice said. It is a reminder that ordinary language without form becomes your essays. Flew laughed too loudly, then corrected himself into a smaller laugh. Grice went on, enjoying the run. Now, compare Montezuma to the Graeco-Roman type. Not “compare” in the essay sense—compare in the sense of asking what is essential. The essential is the fall, Flew said. The reversal. Peripeteia, Grice said, approving the Greek. And what else? Recognition. Anagnorisis. Good. Now tell me: does Monaldo give recognition, or does he give proclamation? Flew hesitated. He gives proclamation. Yes. The hero announces. He does not discover. That is the young man’s vice: he prefers to tell you what the moral is rather than let the action show it. The Greeks, when they were good, let the action implicate. Monaldo, being a gonfaloniere, prefers explicit banners. Flew said, dutifully: So he violates your maxim of manner. He violates my maxim of taste, Grice said. Manner is too kind. But yes—he is unperspicuous in the wrong way: not mysterious, merely windy. Flew couldn’t resist: Vitium loquelae. Vitium loquentis, Grice corrected. The vice is in the speaker. Flew nodded, then, trying again to please: Still, sir, it’s impressive for a man in his twenties. Grice looked at him, and this time the trap was sprung gently. It is impressive for a count in his twenties to publish “Opere. Vol. I.” It is less impressive for a tragedian in his twenties to believe that calling a play Montezuma is enough to make it new. Flew said: But it is new, in a way. In the way Oxford is new when it adds a fresh optional paper, Grice said. It is new by label, not by method. Yet it is not nothing. It shows you the reach of the classical template: it can colonise Mexico. Flew smiled. Oxford style imperialism, sir? Exactly. And since you like disagreeing, disagree with this: biographers call Montezuma a failure because it is not Giacomo. But the father’s success is precisely that he is not the son. He is a civic man writing a civic tragedy, and he wants the world to behave as if it were governable. Flew’s eyes narrowed. So the tragedy is really about governance. About governance, about the fragility of rule, about the moral theatre of power. And, above all, about the persistent European habit of requiring even the New World to speak in classical forms before we will treat it as serious. Flew said, carefully: And your point, sir, is that we do the same in philosophy. My point, Grice said, is that you will do the same in your next essay unless you stop trying to sound like a tragedy and start trying to sound like a man who means something and expects to be understood. Flew stood, gathering his papers, grateful to have been corrected and irritated in equal measure. Thank you, sir. Grice, as Flew reached the door, added the last small twist, just loud enough to be heard. And next time you quote the poet of the Marche, make sure you know which Leopardi is doing the speaking.Grice: Caro Leopardi, devo confessarti che molti qui in Inghilterra ammirano il tuo celebre figlio Giacomo, ma per quanto mi riguarda, il mio vero uomo è Monaldo! Una scelta che spesso ha generato amichevoli polemiche al mio college, il Vadum Boum, dove finivano sempre per affluire o i barbari o le mode passeggere! Leopardi (Monaldo): Ah, Grice, ti ringrazio per questa preferenza così insolita! Giacomo ha conquistato fama tra gli intellettuali, ma io resto fedele ai miei princìpi, anche se a volte mi ritrovo nel suo ombra. Forse la vera polemica nasce proprio dalla dialettica tra padre e figlio, tra tradizione e innovazione. Grice: È proprio questa dialettica che mi affascina! Vedo in te un esempio della lotta tra il conservatorismo papale e l’irrompere di idee nuove, quasi un rapporto di complicità e competizione. D’altronde, hai fornito a Giacomo la sua biblioteca, ma hai combattuto i suoi "errori" filosofici con grande passione. Leopardi (Monaldo): Giacomo era destinato, secondo i miei progetti, a essere un apologeta cristiano, ma la sua strada lo ha portato altrove. Il mio dolore paterno non cancella il mio dissenso, anzi, lo rende più acuto. Eppure, caro Grice, forse proprio da questa tensione nasce la vera ricchezza: senza polemica, che gusto avrebbe la conversazione? Leopardi, Monaldo (1803). Montezeuma. Macerata.

Filippo Gesualdo di Lia (Castrovillari, Cosenza, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e la memoria conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers legitimately recover more than is said by relying on shared rational expectations (cooperation, relevance, informativeness) and on intention-recognition, so that the “extra” content is inferentially accountable rather than merely atmospheric. The Lia material, once corrected, sits in a very different tradition: Filippo Gesualdo (often “Gesualdi” in modern reference works), a Conventual Franciscan born at Castrovillari in Calabria (1550–1619), wrote and taught on the art of memory, most notably in Plutosofia (Padua, 1592), where remembering is engineered through loci, images, and ordered “libraries of the mind,” and his reforms as minister general even institutionalized record-keeping and training as moral discipline. Compared with Grice, this is not a theory of how conversational partners infer implied meaning from cooperative talk, but a theory of how minds are prepared to have and retain the very materials that make shared understanding possible: the background stock of narratives, exempla, and associations that later become conversational common ground. In Gricean terms, Lia supplies the infrastructure for implicature rather than its logic: mnemonic techniques build stable, retrievable premises so that a hearer can complete an inference quickly and reliably, while Grice describes the rational norms that license completing it in the first place. Where Grice emphasizes cancellability and public justification (what exactly did you mean, and why is the inference warranted?), Lia emphasizes cultivation and organization (how to ensure the relevant considerations are available to mind at all), so “memory conversazionale” becomes the practical condition for the cooperative principle to have any traction across time, institutions, and communities. Grice: “When I applied Locke’s mnemonic theory to Gallie’s ‘Someone is hearing a noise,’ I was somewhat anware that the Italians had built careers on the idea of ‘memory,’ L. being my favourite!”  Insegna a Napoli. Frate minorita. Entrato come oblato nel convento cittadino di San Francesco, retto dai frati minoriti, fu ammesso al noviziato. I Minoriti si presero cura della  sua formazione, mandandolo a studiare a Roma, Treviso e Padova. In quest’ultima città  Gesualdo prese gli ordini sacerdotali egli venne affidato un lettorato presso lo  studium. La sua attività didattica si protrasse per un ventennio in vari collegi dell’ordine  e il capitolo generale gli conferì il titolo di Maestro. Venne eletto ministro generale dell’Ordine, di cui perseguì una radicale riforma. Il generalato del Gesualdo è dunque volto al rinnovamento dei voti di povertà e di vita comune, spesso disattesi  dagli stessi frati. Tra l’agosto e il settembre dello stesso anno, egli fissò i Decreta de casuum  reservatione, con i quali venivano abolite tutte le deroghe ai voti, s’introduceva l’obbligo  di rendicontazione e conservazione dei documenti amministrativi e, infine, veniva isti-  tuita l’obbligatorietà dei seminari per i novizi. La carica a Generale venne riconfermata  per altre due volte, grazie all’appoggio di Clemente. E vescovo di Cariati  e Cerenzia. Muore a Cariati. Su di lui e la sua opera si veda Busolini; Russo; Keller-Dall’Asta; Cipani. Iofepbus Tamplorut. PJJ >. PLVTOSOFIA di FILIPPO GESVALDO MINOR CON. Nella quale, fi (piega l'Arte, della Memoria con altre cole notabili pertinenti,  *q A «Violai a: . a Ai  .v&$gij,x. 41 ALLILLVSTRISS ET REVERENDISS. SIGNOR arnolpho vchanskii,  implicature. Grice: Caro Lia, ogni volta che parlo di memoria conversazionale, mi viene in mente il tuo famoso trattato sull’arte della memoria. Diciamolo: in Inghilterra ricordiamo poco, in Italia ricordate tutto... tranne le password! Lia: Ah, Grice, se ti dicessi quante password ho dovuto annotare nei miei decreti, rischierei la scomunica! Ma almeno le memorie italiane sono più poetiche: tra documenti, voti e seminari, mi perdo più nei ricordi che nei numeri. Grice: Forse è proprio la poesia che manca ai filosofi inglesi! Noi cataloghiamo tutto, voi vivete tutto... ma dimmi, Lia, c’è un trucco segreto per ricordare la lista della spesa senza scriverla sul dorso della mano? Lia: Grice, il vero segreto sta nel collegare ogni cosa a un racconto: pane? Ricorda il sermone del convento. Vino? Una cena con Clemente. Così, ogni memoria diventa una piccola implicatura: e se ti dimentichi qualcosa, almeno hai una bella storia da raccontare! Lia, Filippo Gesualdo di (1897). Considerazioni filosofiche. Palermo: Sandron.

Ebuzio Liberale (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an accountable inference: what is meant goes beyond what is said because rational interlocutors assume cooperative norms and can justify the extra step, and this makes implied content criticizable rather than merely suggestive. The Liberalis vignette (Seneca’s friend caught in the Lugdunum fire, cast as a Stoic of the portico) highlights a different but complementary kind of rational governance: Stoic training aims at steadiness of judgment under catastrophe, yet Seneca’s own consolatory rhetoric works by managing what is said and left unsaid, letting the listener infer a moral—about limits, endurance, and the difference between everyday burdens and overwhelming events—without reducing it to a blunt thesis. Compared with Grice, then, Liberalis shows how the “portico” can be both an ethical posture and a conversational setting: a place where one’s words are expected to be measured, where understatement can function as a deliberate signal of composure, and where even a remark like “I looked for water” can implicate much more (the recognition of human vulnerability, the refusal of theatrical despair, the appeal to shared values). Grice would treat these as pragmatic effects that arise because hearers assume relevance and purpose in the choice of wording, while the Stoic context explains why those choices matter: they are not merely efficient, but morally stylized attempts to preserve agency and dignity. The contrast, finally, is that Grice offers a general inferential mechanism for recovering implied meaning in any cooperative exchange, whereas the Senecan-Liberalis scene shows a culturally specific norm of conversation in which implicature becomes an instrument of ethical formation—how one speaks while running from fire can still be a claim about how one ought to live. Grice: “At Oxford, unlike Cambridge, philosophy is a sub-faculty – therefore anything classical is second nature to us!” -- Filosofo italiano. Not to be confused with Liberace, he is staying at Lyons (Lugdunum) at the time it was destroyed by fire. A dear friend of Seneca. L. follows the Porch. In his eulogy, Seneca declaims: “While he is accustomed to dealing with everyday difficulties, a catastrophe, unexpected, and of such magnitude,  is more than he could handle.” Ebuzio Liberale. Gricevs: salve, Liberalis; dicunt te Stoicum esse et Lugduni fuisse, cum ignis urbem quasi disputationem ardentiorem faceret. Liberalis: salve, Grice; verum est: ignis argumentum fecit sine syllogismis, et tamen omnes concesserunt conclusionem. Gricevs: Oxonii, non Cantabrigiae, philosophia est sub-facultas; ideo res classicae nobis sunt quasi panis quotidianus—sed ignis, fateor, non est in lectionibus. Liberalis: sub-facultas? ergo vos “sub” estis, sed tamen superbi; ego autem didici ex Seneca: cotidiana toleramus, sed cum urbs tota ardet, etiam Stoicus quaerit aquam—et si non invenit, saltem bene loquitur dum currit. Liberale, Eubzio (a. u. c. DCCCXVII). Dicta. Roma.

Matteo Liberatore (Salerno, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’ULIVO DELLA PACE. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning distinguishes what is naturally indicated from what is meant by a speaker, and then explains conversational implicature as an inference licensed by shared norms of rational cooperation: we are entitled to move from what is explicitly said to what is intended because we assume the speaker is being informative, relevant, and intelligible in a way that can be publicly defended. Liberatore’s Jesuit-Thomist project, by contrast, is interested in signs primarily as elements of a normative and metaphysical order: his textbook logic sharply separates natural signs (like smoke indicating fire) from conventional signs (like an olive branch signifying peace), and this semiotic distinction is deployed within a larger apologetic programme against modern rationalism and liberalism, where the authority of convention and the authority of tradition matter as much as inferential transparency. Compared with Grice, Liberatore treats the olive branch as a paradigmatic case of instituted signification, which can function even without an individual speaker’s communicative intention, whereas Grice would insist that conversational implicature is not secured by symbol-association alone but by a hearer’s rational recognition of what a speaker is doing with the symbol in a specific exchange. The contrast, then, is between Grice’s micro-pragmatics, where meaning beyond the literal is generated by accountable reasoning about intentions in context, and Liberatore’s macro-semiotics, where meaning is stabilized by natural causality or by social-religious institution, with conversation treated as one domain among others in which signs operate. At the same time, Liberatore provides a useful foil for Grice: by making the natural/conventional split vivid (smoke versus olive branch), he clarifies the boundary Grice also needs in order to explain how implicature can be rationally derived without collapsing into mere symbolism or into mere symptom-reading, and why the most interesting cases of “meaning” are those where a rational agent leverages shared conventions while still remaining answerable for what an audience is entitled to infer. Grice: “I would call L. a proto-Griceian, but he probably would not! In my talk on meaning to the Oxford philosophical society, I made fun of Italians using ‘senno,’ a corruption of ‘signum’ but then I realized that they were translating Aristotle’s semein, to signify!” Kewyords: senno. Grice: “One could write a whole dissertation – especially in Italy: their erudition has no bounds – about Liberatore’s choice of the sign being conventional, ‘ramo d’olivo’ = pace. It’s so obscure! Aeneas held one, against the Phyrgians – but did the Phyrgians know? And if Mars is often represented wearing an olive wreath, one would not think there is a ‘patto’ between Aeneas and the Phyrgian commander about that! I like L. – a systematic philosopher, as I am! His logic has the expected discussion on ‘sign.’ A conventional sign he says is a branch of olive ‘signifying’ peace – as opposed to smoke naturally meaning fire – As a footnote, one should note that in Noah’s days, the signification of the dove was ALSO natural – although not strictly ‘factive’ – but then not ALL smoke (e. g. dry ice smoke) signifies fire, as every actor knows!”. Ma il difetto molto comune degl’economisti è il mancare di giuste idee filosofiche, e con ciò non ostante voler sovente filosofare.” Entra nel collegio dei gesuiti di Napoli e chiede di far parte della Compagnia di Gesù. Insegna filosofia. Fonda a Napoli “La Scienza e la Fede” con lo scopo di criticare le nuove idee del razionalismo, dell'idealismo e del liberalismo, dalle pagine del quale venne sostenuta una strenua battaglia in favore del brigantaggio, interpretato come movimento politico contrario all'unità d'Italia, Presso I romani poi si trova per ordinari o rappresentata la pace con un ramo d’ulivo PACIFERA. In una Medaglia di Marco Aurelio, Minerva viene chiamata “pacifera”; e in una di Massimino si legge Marte puciferus, qmegli, o quella che porta la pace, PACTIA..“Segno è cio che, conosciuto, adduce alla conosence di un’altra cosa. ECO’s tesi su AQUINO. Implicatura. Grice: Caro Liberatore, devo confessarti che la tua riflessione sull’ulivo come segno convenzionale di pace mi ha ispirato profondamente. In fondo, per i Romani era l’ulivo che “segnava” la pace, non solo come oggetto ma come vero e proprio veicolo di significato!  Liberatore: Ti ringrazio sentitamente, Grice! È sempre affascinante vedere come certi simboli, come il ramo d’ulivo, travalichino i secoli e le culture, assumendo un ruolo centrale nella nostra comprensione del linguaggio e delle convenzioni sociali.  Grice: Esattamente! Il modo in cui hai distinto tra segno naturale e segno convenzionale mi ha aiutato a formulare molte delle mie teorie sulle implicature conversazionali. E pensare che tutto parte da un semplice gesto, come offrire un ramo d’ulivo!  Liberatore: Ecco la forza dei segni: nella loro semplicità sanno racchiudere accordi, speranze e perfino filosofia. Come diciamo in Italia, “dove c’è un ulivo, c’è speranza di pace”… e, a ben vedere, anche un po’ di buona filosofia! Liberatore, Matteo (1852). Elementi di filosofia. Napoli: Stamperia Reale.

Licenzio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il filosofo poeta – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, publicly assessable inference from what is said to what is meant, anchored in cooperative expectations and in the speaker’s intention that the hearer recognize those intentions. Licentius, known mainly as a participant in Augustine’s Cassiciacum conversations and as an aspiring poet whose impulses Augustine alternately encouraged and disciplined, represents a different register of “conversational reason”: a pedagogical and spiritual dialogue in which what is left unsaid is often as important as what is said, because silence, confession, and self-correction are part of the point of the exchange rather than mere by-products of efficiency. Compared with Grice, the Cassiciacum scene does not aim to model inferential norms like relevance or quantity so much as to form a person capable of truthfulness, attention, and moral seriousness; yet it constantly relies on Gricean phenomena, since Augustine’s questions, ironies, and admonitions routinely invite the pupil to supply what is meant beyond the literal surface, and to recognize when a remark is meant as a rebuke, a prompt to examine oneself, or a shift from playful verse-making to disciplined inquiry. The contrast, then, is between Grice’s micro-theory of how implicatures are warranted in ordinary conversation and Licentius’ (Augustinian) context where implicature serves ascetic and educational ends: not merely to convey extra information, but to transform the interlocutor, so that conversational reason is measured not only by correct inference but by whether the dialogue produces intellectual honesty and a rightly ordered will. Grice: “Agostino was not an Italian, but an African – his friends, however, like Licenzio, were Italian thoroughbreds – and he discussed philosophy with them quite often! – except when he was meditating!’ A pupil of Agostino. L. achieves a reputation of a poet. GRICEVS: salve, LICENTIV. Romae te audio et philosophari et versificari; num idem animus utrumque tolerat? LICENTIVS: salve, GRICE. tolerat—immo gaudet: cum philosophia nimis arida est, poeta aquam addit; cum poesis nimis mollis est, philosophus salem. GRICEVS: sed magister tuus Agostinus Africanus est, non Italus; quomodo fit ut discipulus Italicus tam bene disputet, et tam bene cantet? LICENTIVS: facile: ille meditatur et tacet; ego, ne silentium vincat, loquor. ita fit ut Africanus cogitet, Italicus rimeat—et Roma, inter utrumque, rideat. Licenzio (a. u. c. MCXXXIX). Dicta. Roma.

Fortunio Liceti (Rapallo, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale.  Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning distinguishes sharply between natural meaning (a sign as evidence, like spots meaning measles) and speaker-meaning (what someone means by producing a sign so that an audience recognizes an intention), and it treats conversational implicature as a rational, publicly criticizable inference generated under cooperative expectations. Fortunio Liceti is an unusually close early-modern analogue to this contrast because his teratological and medical writings reframe prodigies and “monsters” away from supernatural messages and toward natural signs: anomalies are not divine communications but physiological indicators that can be read causally, and in that sense Liceti helps naturalize semiotics in a way that anticipates Grice’s natural meaning as non-intentional evidentiality. At the same time, Liceti’s fascination with coded forms (the fascination with hieroglyphs as figurate, priestly writing) and his rhetorical device of making organs “speak” in dialogue dramatize how easily audiences slide from the evidential to the intentional, treating nature as if it were addressing us; Grice’s framework would diagnose that slide as a category shift from natural meaning to non-natural meaning, requiring intentions that nature does not have. The comparison, then, is that Liceti supplies a scientific program for stripping intention out of the interpretation of natural phenomena (reading them as effects with causes), while Grice supplies a pragmatic program for putting intention back into the interpretation of utterances (explaining how rational agents can mean more than they say), and together they mark two complementary boundaries: where we must not over-personify nature into a speaker, and where we must not reduce speakers to mere natural symptom-producers. Grice: “We don’t have anything like L. and Oxford, but I wouldn’t be surprised if some English, and indeed Oxonian, philosopher found his philosophy inspiring!” L. is a prominent Italian philosopher known for his wide-ranging publications. It is HIGHLY probable that his writings reached England and were available at Oxford. L. is a fascinating philosopher; must say my favourite of his oeuvre is “Geroglifici,” which as he knows it’s a coded message, the old Egyptian priests kept this ‘figurata’ away from the plebs! Alice once wondered what the good of a piece of philosophy is without illustrations; surely L’s beats them all!” L. develops a semiology of nature. L.’s work repurposes the concept of the sign from a religious omen to, alla Grice, a bio-logical indicator. PIROT Expresses that he is in pain to CO-PIROT. L.’s engagement with the concept of a sign is primarily through teratology, the study of biological abnormalities or monsters.  A monster, Grice, bete noire, is seen as a divine sign or portents of God's anger. L. breaks from this, arguing that such a being is not super-natural or non-natural (alla Grice) warning but the living expression of nature's truths. Nature as Artist: L. views nature as an artist whose error, this or that monster, is a sign of its ingenuity and ability to adapt to imperfect matter. L.’s approach is often described as a naturalised semiology, where a physical traits , or a behavioural trait, such as the gait of that man, serve as a sign; ‘he is a sailor,’ that points to a physiological cause, such as a narrow uterus or placental issues, rather than a spiritual meaning.  L’s use of language is strategically significant:  L. occasionally writes in Italian notably in his dialogue La nobiltà, emphasise empirical experience. L. personifies bodily organs, e.g., the heart, brain, and even testicles, allowing them to speak to debate their own importance. L.'s sign theory is a scientific semiotics used to decode the physical world and biological monsters as natural phenomena rather than tools of human or divine communication. Allievo ed erede di CREMONINI. Implicatura. Grice: Caro Liceti, devo ammettere che la tua teoria dei segni naturali mi affascina! La tua “semiologia della natura” sembra quasi anticipare il mio modo di intendere le implicature conversazionali. Come sei arrivato a vedere i mostri come espressioni della verità naturale e non come semplici prodigi? Liceti: Caro Grice, per me la natura è un’artista ingegnosa: ogni mostro, ogni “errore”, rivela la sua capacità di adattarsi alla materia imperfetta. Ho sempre preferito interpretare i segni come indicatori biologici, non come messaggi soprannaturali. D’altronde, come diciamo in Italia, “ogni trucco svela il suo artefice”! Grice: Che bella immagine, Liceti! Mi colpisce anche il modo in cui dai voce agli organi nel tuo dialogo “La nobiltà”. È una strategia davvero efficace per mostrare la complessità dell’esperienza empirica. Secondo te, la nostra lingua può davvero decodificare la realtà fisica, o esiste sempre un margine di mistero? Liceti: Ah, Grice, la lingua è uno strumento prezioso, ma il mistero rimane! Ogni parola, ogni segno, è una finestra sull’invisibile. Tuttavia, la scienza può aiutarci a ridurre gli equivoci: osservando i fenomeni, persino i più strani, possiamo riconoscere nell’anomalia una logica naturale. E come si dice dalle mie parti, “la natura non fa nulla senza ragione”! Liceti, Fortunio (1602). De anima subiecto. Padova: Frambotto. 

Girolamo de Liguori (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- implicatura critica. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally controllable inference: speakers and hearers operate under shared norms (clarity, relevance, adequacy) that make what is meant beyond what is said calculable and, crucially, criticizable. In the Liguori passage, “implicatura critica” pushes this into a deliberately anti-perspicuous aesthetic: metaphor clusters like “the abyss of reason,” “the alembic of the soul,” and the mise-en-abyme image stage meaning as something generated by reflective regress, layered self-reference, and cultivated ambiguity, so that what is left unsaid is not merely an efficiency gain but a critical weapon against complacent conceptual order. Compared with Grice, this treats opacity not as a conversational defect to be repaired by cooperative maxims but as an instrument of critique, where the reader is meant to feel the strain between rational form and the irrational residues it cannot digest; in Gricean terms, the text seems to engineer systematic floutings of manner (and sometimes relation) to force interpretive work, making the “implicature” less a tidy inference to a determinate proposition and more a pressure toward reflective reorientation. The contrast therefore is between Grice’s ideal of accountable intelligibility—implicatures should, in principle, be reconstructible by shared reasoning—and Liguori’s preference for productive unclarity, where meaning is distilled through metaphorical overdetermination and recursive framing (the abyss within the abyss), turning conversation from a cooperative exchange into an arena of philosophical provocation. Yet the comparison also reveals a continuity: both assume that readers are rational agents who will not stop at the literal surface; they diverge on whether that rational agency is best served by perspicuity (Grice) or by strategic, critical disorientation (Liguori). Grice: “At Oxford, we had a common ground – we university lecturerrs would only teach what other mmbers of the faculty would understand, since we don’t’ grade our pupils – the board of exminaers does --. On the other hand, in Italy, there is L., who teaches what he feels like! Personally, my favourite of L.’s metaphors is ‘the abyss of reason,’ since Speranza has elaborated on this: it’s Gide’s ‘mise-en-abyme’ no less, which breaks my principle of ‘conversational perspicuity’ – a mise-en-abyme text is just untextable! L. has studied the metamorphosis of language in one of his philosophical noble ancestors! I like L.i: he has the gift of the gab for metaphor: ‘i baratri della ragione,” la fucina del filosofo, l’alambicco dell’anima, la condizione del senso, il razionale dello irrazionale o le ragione dell’irrazionale “le ambiguita della ragione,” “Trasimaco ha ragione, Giustizia e carita, Ritratto. Studia a ROma. Scherzi della memoria. Si laurea colla scesi giuridica. Insegna a Lecce ed Ostuni. Insegna a Torino. Con “E il vero baratro della ragione umana, Grice, Mise-en-abyme conversazionale, viene riconosciuto come un critico, Graf, LEOPARDI, e Cartesio. Tratta Positivismo di Sergi,  Lombroso, Morselli e Vignoli; della scesi di RENSI  ponendolo in relazione tra LEOPARDI  e PIRANDELLO. Scrive di de' Liguori e di Benedictis, detto l'Aletino. Tenne rapporti epistolari con GARIN, BOBBIO, Augias, Binni, Donini, Ferrarotti e Timpanaro. Sic et Non, cui aderiscono e collaborano personalità quali Donini,  Fiore, Radice, matematico e fondatore di Riforma della scuola e docenti delle Bari, Roma e Lecce. Sic et Non s’impegna in complesse battaglie civili come quella per un dialogo tra marxisti e cattolici, ed altre incombenti questioni sociali come la campagna per il divorzio. Implicature critica, ‘… is the true abyss of human reason. Il baratro della ragione conversazionale. L’anima distilata, il lambicco dell’anima, redenzione dell’eros, la lussuria, la degenerazione, la metamorfosi delle lingue. Alfonso di Liguori. Grice: Caro Liguori, è proprio la nostra educazione classica che ci permette di gustare le sfumature sottili sia del critein greco che del latino, quelle vibrazioni che forse Kant non riusciva neppure a percepire! Mi affascina pensare come la tradizione possa arricchire il nostro dialogo filosofico. Liguori: Hai ragione, Grice! Solo chi ha camminato tra i baratri della ragione classica può cogliere il profumo antico delle parole e delle idee. La nostra formazione ci dona gli strumenti per distinguere le ambiguità della ragione, e per vedere la metamorfosi delle lingue come una fucina viva del pensiero. Grice: Ecco perché la conversazione tra noi non si limita alla mera analisi; diventa alambicco dell’anima, distillando senso dal razionale e dall’irrazionale. In fondo, trasimaco e giustizia si incontrano proprio tra i labirinti della memoria, dove il vero baratro della ragione umana si rivela come opportunità di redenzione. Liguori: Proprio così, caro Grice. Come si dice in Italia, “la ragione non si accontenta mai di soluzioni facili.” La nostra formazione ci rende critici, ma anche capaci di dialogare tra anime diverse. Ed è questo dialogo, tra il nostro Greco, il nostro Latino, e persino il nostro Kant, che permette alla filosofia di restare viva e aperta, al di là delle sordità di ogni tempo. Liguori, Girolamo de (1808). Saggio sulla filosofia morale. Roma: Salviucci. 

Vincenzo Lilla (Francavilla Fontana, Brindisi, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale di Vico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally defensible inference from what is said to what is meant, generated under cooperative expectations and assessable as correct or incorrect by reference to shared norms and communicative intentions. Lilla, as framed in your passage, approaches “conversational reason” from the opposite direction: as a Vichian rehabilitation project in which meaning is anchored in historical making, civil life, and the cultural institutions through which a people comes to know itself, so that what is “implied” is often not a local conversational add-on but a deep background of shared memory, providential narrative, and juridico-political purpose. Compared with Grice, this shifts the explanatory centre from micro-pragmatics (how a particular utterance licenses an inference here and now) to macro-hermeneutics (how a tradition licenses interpretations across generations), and it makes the cooperative presumption less like an abstract norm and more like a civic achievement: conversation works because a community has already built common sense, common histories, and common criteria of relevance. In that light, Lilla’s “revindication” of Vico can be read as supplying a thicker anthropology for the very capacities Grice presupposes—imagination, social recognition, and the public norms that stabilize meaning—while Grice’s framework, in turn, clarifies how Vichian talk of signs, history, and freedom must still cash out in accountable inferences made by interlocutors if it is to avoid becoming mere cultural rhetoric. The contrast is thus between Grice’s procedural rationality of talk and Lilla’s civil-historical rationality of meaning; the overlap is that both treat understanding as a practice governed by norms, only that for Grice the norms are conversational and inferential, while for Lilla (via Vico) they are also institutional and historical, shaping what a community is prepared to hear, supply, and take responsibility for in the first place. Grice: “We don’t take Vico too seriously at Oxford – unless you are Stuart Hampshire, who has a penchant to take seriously any philosopher who the rest of us Oxonian philoosphers do NOT take seriously!” On the other hand, some Italian philosophers have based their philosophical career and reputation on re-vindicating Vico, such as Lilla!” -- Filosofo italiano. Francavilla Fontana, Brindisi, Puglia. Grice: “I like Lilla; for one, he ‘revindicated,’ as he puts it, the philosophy of Vico, which, in Italy, is like at Oxford ‘revinidcare’ Locke!” Formatosi nelle scuole dei Padri Scolopi aderì alle idee cattolico liberali divulgate dai filosofi della prima metà dell'Ottocento: Gioberti, Minghetti, Balbo e SERBATI al quale dedicherà molteplici studi subendone una marcata influenza. Lascia Francavilla per l'ostentata contrarietà di tutto il clero  alle sue idee patriottiche d'ispirazione giobertiana, manifestate apertamente nel "Programma d'insegnamento filosofico" pubblicato sul giornale il "Cittadino leccese", decise di trasferirsi a Napoli ove ebbe modo di confrontarsi con le idee di Sanctis, Spaventa, Settembrini, Tari e Vera. Si laurea e insegna a Napoli. Durante questi anni videro la luce "La provvidenza e la libertà considerate nella civiltà", "Dio e il mondo", e "La personalità originaria e la personalità derivata" (Nappoli, Rocco), nei quali getta le premesse degli studi filosofici e giuridici in cui si cimenterà per tutta la vita: la storia della filosofia, la filosofia teoretica e la filosofia del diritto; sviluppando altresì e precorrendo una moderna concezione del rapporto tra "diritti umani e progresso scientifico" sin da “La scienza e la vita, titolo paradigmatico del suo saggio -- Grice, “Philosophical biology,” “Philosophy of Life” Insegna a Messina. Implicature, Vico, Vico ri-vendicato, Vico ri-vendicate, semiotica Vico. Grice: Caro Lilla, confesso che qui a Oxford Vico non è preso troppo sul serio, a meno che tu non sia Stuart Hampshire! Cosa ti ha spinto a “ri-vendicare” la filosofia di Vico in Italia? Lilla: Caro Grice, per noi italiani Vico rappresenta un punto di svolta: la sua visione della storia e della conoscenza è profondamente radicata nella nostra tradizione. Ho voluto restituirgli la dignità che merita, come voi fate con Locke a Oxford! Grice: Interessante! Mi incuriosisce come Vico abbia anticipato molte questioni sulle implicature e la memoria conversazionale, temi cari anche a me. Pensi che la sua filosofia possa dialogare con la mia teoria del significato? Lilla: Assolutamente, caro Grice! La semiotica di Vico è moderna: collega i segni, la storia e la libertà umana. La sua prospettiva può arricchire il tuo lavoro sulle implicature, aprendo nuove strade tra filosofia, diritto e progresso scientifico. D’altronde, come si dice da noi: “Chi cammina con i grandi, le sue orme lascia!” Lilla, Vincenzo (1865). Laurea. Giurisprudenza. Napoli.

Lisimaco (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally warranted inference from what is said to what is meant, licensed by cooperative expectations that make a speaker accountable for the hearer’s uptake; even when a term is used loosely, the point is that a hearer can justify why that looseness was reasonable in context. The Lisimaco vignette turns this into a lesson about labels and ostension: instead of defining stoicism by an essence, “the Porch” functions as a demonstrative cue, so that saying “under the portico” can implicate a whole stance (discipline, toughness, a certain kind of argumentative posture) without spelling out doctrine. Compared with Grice, this shows two different mechanisms for meaning more than one says: Grice provides the inferential machinery by which “I live under the portico” can conversationally convey “I am a Stoic” (it is relevant, it exploits shared background, and it can be cancelled), while Lisimaco’s own maneuver suggests that philosophical identity in practice is often handled by socially recognized shortcuts—toponyms, nicknames, and metonymies—whose force depends on communal recognition rather than on explicit definition. The contrast also sharpens Grice’s complaint about -isms: where “Stoic” purports to name a doctrine, “porticola” admits it is a badge worn in a conversational community, and the badge works precisely because hearers are trained to supply the doctrinal and ethical associations on minimal linguistic prompting. In this sense Lisimaco exemplifies a historically thick form of common ground, in which the “place-name” operates almost like a standing implicature trigger, whereas Grice’s theory aims to show how such triggers remain rationally controllable: you can rely on them when cooperation holds, but you also owe your audience disambiguation when the label threatens to mislead. Grice: “Philosophers can be sneaky – and allowed to be so! Consider the funny names that some -isms have in classical philosophy: stoicismus – try to define it essentially! The idea of the porticus is such an accident to this -ism that it never ceases to irritate me when someone calls himself a ‘stoic’!” -- Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. He belonged to The Porch. The tutor of Amelio Gentiliano. Since Amelio comes from Firenze, that may be taken as having been the home of L. as well. GRICEVS: Philosophi callidi esse possunt, et iure: ecce quam ridicula sunt ista nomina in -ismo, ut stoicismus; conare definire quid sit, si potes. Porticus enim est quasi accidens, et tamen quidam se “stoicum” vocat, tamquam columnae ipsum genuerint. LISIMACHVS: An LISIMACVS, si mavis; nam et in nomine meo litterae certant, sicut in Porticu dogmata. Sed Florentiae didici hoc: si de me quaeris ubi habitem, respondeo “sub porticu,” ne roges quid sentiam. GRICEVS: Id est ipsa ratio conversazionalis: cum locum dicis, doctrinam implicas; et cum doctrinam rogant, locum ostendis. Sic “stoicus” non definiri videtur, sed demonstrari, quasi digito ad columnas. LISIMACHVS: Ergo faciam ut discipulus meus Amelius: si quis me “stoicum” appellat, respondebo “porticola sum.” Si rident, bene; si non rident, etiam melius: intellegunt enim me plus tacuisse quam dixisse. Lisimaco (a. u. c. CMXIII). Dicta. Roma.

Tito Livio (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e la storia romana come fonte della morale romana – etica togata. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally recoverable inference from what is said to what is meant, licensed by cooperative expectations and answerable to criticism: the hearer is entitled to supply what is left unsaid because the speaker can be presumed to be speaking with a point, under shared norms of relevance and sufficiency. Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita (begun in the Augustan period) is a useful counterpoint because it makes moral meaning emerge not from maxims of conversation but from exempla and narrative arrangement: Livy’s history repeatedly “says” one thing (who did what, when) while “getting across” another (what counts as virtus, pietas, disciplina, or civic decay), and it often does so through strategic selection, juxtaposition, and the dignified silence of the narrator rather than through explicit argument. Compared with Grice, then, Livy’s “etica togata” is a macro-pragmatics of a culture: it relies on a thick shared Roman background in which readers can infer moral conclusions from episodes (Romulus, republican austerity, decline), whereas Grice offers a micro-pragmatics that specifies how such inferences are warranted in ordinary exchanges and how they can be challenged, cancelled, or defended. The overlap is that both are preoccupied with what is responsibly left unsaid: Livy lets the reader infer the judgment by controlling narrative emphasis, and Grice lets the hearer infer the speaker’s point by assuming rational cooperation; but where Grice’s implicature is tied to speaker intention and conversational norms, Livy’s implied morality is tied to historiographical craft and civic pedagogy—history as a vehicle that persuades by example, making “silence as argument” into a cultivated Roman mode of meaning. Grice: “I give only ONE example from the History of England in my seminars: “Decapitation willed Charles I’s death” – On the other hand, there’s Livio – a philosopher who sprinkled his philosopjhical treatises with such an abundance of historical references that the vulgus knows him as a historian, rather!” Filosofo italiano. Padova, Veneto. Disambiguazione – "Livio" rimanda qui. Se stai cercando altri significati, vedi L.  Neque indignetur sibi Herodotus aequari L. Che Erodoto non s'indigni che gli venga eguagliato L. Quintiliano, Institutio oratoria. Busto di L., opera di Moretti L. è stato uno storico romano, autore degli Ab Urbe condita, una storia di Roma dalla sua fondazione fino alla morte di Druso, figliastro d’OTTAVIANO. È considerato uno dei maggiori storici dell'Antica Roma, assieme a TACITO. Ritratto di L. Secondo Girolamo, il quale a sua volta si rifà al De historicis di Svetonio. Quintiliano ha tramandato la notizia secondo la quale l'oratore Asinio Pollione rileva in L. una certa padovanità, da intendersi come patina linguistica rivelatrice della sua origine, mentre il celebre epigrammista Valerio Marziale ricorda l'accentuato moralismo della sua terra, tipico del carattere di L., tanto quanto le sue tendenze politiche conservatrici. Lo stesso L., citando Antenore, mitico fondatore di Padova, all'inizio della sua monumentale opera, conferma indirettamente le proprie origini patavine. Per tutta la sua vita, dimostra sempre un amore sfrenato per la sua città natale. I Livii erano di origine plebea, ma la famiglia poteva fregiarsi di antenati illustri in linea materna: nella Vita di Tiberio Svetonio ricorda che la Liviorum familia «era stata onorata da otto consolati, due censure, tre trionfi e persino da una dittatura e da un magistero della cavalleria. filosofia romana, Romolo, metafisica e storia, Grice, Strawson, Pears – when history comes of age. GRICEVS: Ego in seminariis meis unum exemplum e historia Angliae fero: Decollatio mortem Caroli primi voluit. Tu autem, Livi, tot exemplis Romanis uteris ut vulgus te historicum putet, philosophum non agnoscat. LIVIVS: Vulgus, Grice, semper amat annales, quia putat virtutem in numeris latere: octo consulatus, duo censores, tres triumphi. Si addas “implicaturam”, fugient quasi a censore. GRICEVS: At ipsa “etica togata” hoc docet: historia non solum narrat sed suadet; et saepe quod suadet, non dicit. Romulus plus valet tacendo quam declamando, et hoc est meum: quod non dicitur, intellegitur. LIVIVS: Ita vero; sed cave: si nimis tacueris, te quoque historicum facient. Scribent: “Grice, vir gravis, multa praeteriit.” Et addent: “Ergo sapientissimus.” Haec est maxima Romae: silentium pro argumento. Livio, Tito (a. u. c. DCCXXVII). Ab urbe condita. Roma.

Franco Lombardi (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally accountable transition from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative expectations that let hearers justify an inference and let speakers be held responsible for inviting it. Franco Lombardi, by contrast, is not primarily a pragmatics theorist but a historian and interpreter of the modern Italian tradition (Naples-born, later active in Rome; author of works such as La filosofia della pratica, 1935, and later Il mondo degli uomini), and his “conversational reason” is better understood as a cultural-historical rationality: the way a philosophical tradition maintains continuity by transmitting problems, styles, and conceptual inheritances across generations and institutions. On that model, what is “implied” in a philosophical utterance often depends less on local maxims of relevance than on long-range background—shared intellectual memory, inherited polemics, and the tacit cues by which Italian philosophy signals its lineage (Kant read through Italian debates, Marx filtered through a specific civic culture, the weight of naming and renaming, such as the playful Bonaiuti/Galilei motif in your passage). The comparison therefore contrasts Grice’s micro-account of inference in everyday conversation with Lombardi’s macro-account of how philosophical meaning travels through time: Grice asks how an individual speaker can mean more than she says and how a hearer can rationally retrieve that surplus; Lombardi asks how a community of thinkers sustains a living “conversation” in which what is not said is often what everyone already knows from the tradition. In this perspective, Lombardi helps explain why Grice’s cooperative presumptions are never purely abstract: they depend on shared forms of life and shared histories; but Grice also helps sharpen Lombardi’s historiographical enterprise by reminding us that tradition works not by mystical transmission but by publicly intelligible, criticizable inferential habits—ways of letting the reader supply what is left unsaid, and of making that supply answerable to reasons. Grice: “At Oxford, we say Galileo – in Italy, where they know better, they say BONAIUTO!” The surname BONAIUTI became associated with the Galilei family through an ancestor named Galileo Bonaiuto. Here’s how it happened. In the fifteenth century, Galileo Bonaituo was a prominent physician, professor, and politician in Florence. In the the late fourteenth century, his descedants began refering to thsmelves as GALILEI in his honour. While the family officially retained the BONAIUTI surname for generations, they started using GALILEI or GALILEO informally in honour of his ancestor. The famous astronomer Galileo Galilei inherited both his given name and the family name (Galilei) fom his ancestor, Galileo Bonaiuti. Therefore, the association begain in the late 14th and 15th centuries through the prominence and influence of Galileo Bonaiuti in Florence. Grice: “The Italians have a thing for the plural – witness all the surnames ending in -i. True, Lombardo IS a philosopher, too!” Grice: “I like L.; he took seriously my idea of Philosophy’s Longitudinal Uniity, and like Passmore or Warnock, engaged iin a study of the ‘last hundred years of Italian philosophy. This shows that his interests on Kant, etc., are Italian-based, mainly!” Il padre e avvocato e docente di diritto e procedura penale a Napoli, già allievo prediletto di Bovio, deputato prima e dopo il fascismo, autore di scritti vari di sociologia. La madre Rosa Pignatari fu nipote di  Ciccotti, nella cui casa era cresciuta. Tradusse alcuni degli scritti di Marx nelle Opere edite dal Ciccotti e la Storia del movimento operaio di Edouard Dolleans.  Laureato e libero docente in filosofia lavora in filosofia. Pubblica “Il mondo degli uomini” (Firenze, Le Monnier) Insegna a Roma. Presidente della Società Filosofica Italiana e (sin dalla fondazione) della Società filosofica romana, diresse il "Centro di Ricerca per le Scienze Morali e Sociali" presso l'Istituto di filosofia della Roma. Grice: Caro Lombardi, mi ha sempre divertito come, a Oxford, diciamo "Galileo", mentre in Italia, dove avete il senso della storia, si preferisce "Bonaiuto"! La pluralità dei cognomi italiani mi affascina, soprattutto quando si riflette nella filosofia. Tu, con la tua attenzione all’unità longitudinale della filosofia e lo studio della tradizione italiana, dimostri quanto sia ricca questa prospettiva. Lombardi: Grazie Grice, hai ragione: la tradizione italiana ha sempre valorizzato il legame tra passato e presente, anche nei nomi. Ho cercato di mostrare, soprattutto negli ultimi cent’anni di filosofia italiana, come la nostra riflessione sia profondamente intrecciata con la storia e la pluralità, proprio come la famiglia Galilei che porta dentro sé Bonaiuti. L’unità della filosofia, per me, passa attraverso questa pluralità di voci. Grice: Mi piace molto il tuo modo di concepire la filosofia come un mondo di uomini, che tu hai indagato con passione. L’idea che il concetto si apra alla vita, come dice Limone, è preziosa: la filosofia non è solo una sequenza di teorie, ma una conversazione viva, fatta di implicature, dialoghi, e storia personale. Lombardi: Concordo, Grice. La filosofia, per me, è anche un modo per costruire consenso e dialogo, come insegno ai miei studenti e nei miei scritti. La pluralità dei cognomi, delle idee e delle voci è la forza della nostra civiltà filosofica. E come diciamo a Napoli, “chi va piano va sano e va lontano”: anche la filosofia cresce meglio se dialoga, ascolta, e si apre al pluralismo. Lombardi, Franco (1935). La filosofia della pratica. Napoli.

Gaio Cassio Longino (Roma, Lazio). Uno degl’uccissori di Giulio Cesare. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning is built to explain how hearers responsibly infer what is meant beyond what is said, using shared norms and assumptions about a speaker’s rational conduct; your Longinus material becomes a neat stress-test because it turns on how a mere name can trigger powerful default inferences. Historically, the Clifton master’s warning is directionally sound: the Caesarian assassin’s standard name is Gaius Cassius Longinus (often shortened to “Cassius”), and the later jurist is also called Gaius Cassius Longinus, but he is not the assassin’s son, and he is separated by roughly a century (assassin died 42 BC; jurist flourished in the 1st century AD, consul AD 30). In other words, the mater is preventing a predictable conversational confusion: when someone says “Gaius Cassius Longinus” in a Roman context, listeners may automatically supply the “dagger” narrative unless the speaker explicitly cancels it by adding “the jurist” (or “the Zenobia adviser,” who is in fact a different Longinus again, not even born in Rome). That is exactly Grice’s point: proper names are not self-identifying in practice; they come with conventional and contextual implicatures, and a competent speaker must manage those implicatures by adding disambiguating material when the cooperative goal is clarity rather than dramatic effect. So, if we assess the master’s authority in Gricean terms, we can say: he is historically sloppy (genealogy), but pragmatically astute (he anticipates the audience’s likely inference and builds in a prophylactic cancellation), and the episode exemplifies Grice’s broader claim that communication is not just semantics but a rational art of controlling what your audience is entitled to conclude from what you chose to say. Grice: “Clifton, 1927. Today we were told what the master, with a straight face, called “the most important event in Roman history” — and he meant not the Rubicon (still everyone’s favourite crossing, except perhaps the Channel, as Sellar and Yeatman would insist), but the assassination of Caesar. He wrote up on the blackboard the names of the uccisori, and among them, in a hand that looked almost judicial itself, Gaius Cassius Longinus. Then came the warning, delivered in the tone masters reserve for boys who are likely to go to Oxford and therefore likely to be dangerous: for those of you who intend to pursue your studies at Oxford, you must never confuse the murderer with the other Gaius Cassius Longinus — the jurist — who is an entirely different man and, on paper at least, entirely respectable. (“Plausibly, a descendant in the Cassian line.”). It was an odd sort of lesson: the same name, the same Latin, and yet the whole point was that identity is not to be had for free from a label. The master did not call it a philosophical problem, but he managed to make it one: if you say “Cassius Longinus,” what do you mean — the conspirator with the knife, or the lawyer with the opinion? And if you don’t say which, you may find that your hearer supplies it for you, by habit, by fame, by whatever story they already prefer. I thought then that history masters live by implicature without knowing it: they say “Longinus” and the class hears “dagger,” unless the word “jurist” is pushed in like a wedge. I kept quiet, because Mother has her sights on Oxford and I suspected I would have plenty of time later to quarrel with names and their liberties; but I wrote in the margin that a warning against confusion is itself a kind of confession — it admits that people do confuse, and that language is only ever as precise as the speaker takes the trouble to make it. Longino, Gaio Cassio (a. u. c. DCCX). Dicta. Roma.

Gaio Cassio Longino (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il diritto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally warranted inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in cooperative expectations that make a speaker answerable for the further conclusions an audience is entitled to draw. The Longinus vignette, cast as “conversational reason and Roman law,” pushes the idea into an institutional setting where what people infer is often governed less by maxims of cooperative talk than by reputational and forensic pressures: in Rome, a jurist’s words are heard through the shadow of political violence, so that even a sparse legal remark can be taken to “mean” something about the dagger before it is heard as an argument about doctrine. Compared with Grice, this highlights the difference between implicature as a mechanism internal to ordinary conversation (derivable, cancellable, and criticizable by reference to what would make the utterance cooperatively intelligible) and insinuation as a mechanism of public life, where the audience’s inferences are driven by extra-conversational priors—fear, faction, historical narrative, and the evidential habits of a legal culture. At the same time, the parallel is instructive: Roman juristic practice depends on highly disciplined inference from limited textual materials, and Grice’s account can be read as the micro-analogue of that discipline, except that for Grice the governing constraint is the speaker’s intention under cooperative norms, whereas for Longinus the governing constraint is what can safely be said under power and how silence itself can function as a deliberate, legally prudent move. The result is a contrast between Grice’s optimism about rational cooperation as the default background of meaning and the Roman reminder that, in charged contexts, implicature can be hijacked by suspicion—so that conversational reason must sometimes be protected by reticence if one is to prevent the audience from converting every legal utterance into a political confession. Grice: “It’s very sad – yet typical of Italian historiography – that, for all of Longino’s achievements as a philosopher of law, he is best remembered by posterity as one of the 50 murderers of GIULIO Caesare!” A legal scholar and theorist. GRICEVS: Triste est, mi Longine, quod Itali historici te potius numerent inter quinquaginta Caesaris interfectores quam inter iuris philosophos. LONGINVS: Ita fit Romae: si quis de lege subtiliter disputat, vix auditur; si quis gladium leviter movet, statim in annales cadit. GRICEVS: At ratio conversazionalis aliter iudicat: cum dicis pauca de iure, plures inferunt de cultro; implicatura tua semper antecedit argumentum. LONGINVS: Ergo hoc discam: si me rogant quid sentiam de iure, respondebo “libenter” et tacebo; nam Romae silentium tutius est, et saepe etiam iuridicius. Longino, Gaio Cassio (a. u. c. DCCLXXXIII). Dicta. Rona,

Francesco Longano (Ripalimosani, Campobasso, Molise): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’UOMO NATURALE. rice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally defensible step from what is said to what is meant: hearers recover extra content because speakers are presumed to be cooperating under norms that make indirect communication accountable and criticizable. Longano’s Enlightenment project (Ripalimosani 1728–1796; a Genovesi pupil; author of works such as Piano di un corpo di filosofia morale (1764), Dell’uomo naturale (1767), and later the Latin Philosophiae rationalis elementa including De arte logica on ideas and signs) approaches “reason” less as a local discipline of inference in talk and more as a general art of thinking and reforming human life: signification is rooted in a naturalistic and psycho-somatic conception of the person, where passions, imagination, and social needs belong to the very conditions under which signs function. Compared to Grice, Longano is not isolating a mechanism that distinguishes what is said from what is conversationally implied; rather, he supplies a broader anthropology and semiotic orientation in which the study of signs is continuous with the study of the “natural man,” education, and civil life—so that meaning is already embedded in the bodily and social economy that makes reasoning possible. The contrast, then, is between Grice’s micro-theory of communicative accountability (how a speaker can mean more than she says, and how the hearer can justify that inference) and Longano’s macro-theory of signification as part of a holistic human science (how ideas, signs, truth/error, and the non-rational powers of the mind jointly shape rational agency). But there is also a strong continuity: Longano’s attention to the natural basis of signification and to the humanly workable “art of thinking” helps motivate why Grice distinguishes natural meaning from speaker-meaning and why he treats conversational rationality as a practical norm rather than a mere formalism—both see reason as something that lives in human practices, even if Grice locates its sharpest philosophical leverage in the fine structure of conversational inference. Grice: “At Oxford, nobody really cared when I gave my lecture on ‘meaning’ at the Oxford philosophical society, that Longan had been defended my naturalism of signification for years then! L.’s emphasis on ‘natura’ and ‘naturale’ certainly were part of my inspiration for ‘natural’ meaning – although I was reserved in my uses of ‘natura’ as a noun – except when to refer to my wanton disposition as a gift of ‘saggia natura’! Any student of Grice’s philosophy should make a lot of sense of L.’s contributions. A systematic philosopher, like Grice, he bases his research on signs and signification. L. is a prominent figure of the  Enlightenment, whose work Philosophia Rationalis, often appearing in parts like De arte logica, serves as a bridge between rigid traditional rationalism and psychological and social thought.  Main Points of Philosophia Rationalis Holistic View of Man: L. challenges the rigidly rationalistic views of his era by arguing for a conception of humanity that integrates the body and soul. Revaluation of the non-rational: He emphasises human components previously neglected by philosophers, such as passions, fantasy, and the psychological dimension. Logic and Truth: In his De arte logica, a core volume of his rational philosophy, he explores the nature of ideas, signs, and the distinction between truth and error, aiming to refine the art of thinking. Freedom and Equality: By viewing man as a totality, L. extends his philosophical logic into social ethics, advocating for universal freedom and equality inspired by Enlightenment thinkers. Importance in the History of Philosophy Enlightenment Reformism: L. is a key representative of the Enlightenment. metafisica, ESAME FISICO dell’uomo esame naturale. Semiotica. Grice: Caro Longano, ti confesso che a Oxford nessuno si emozionava quando parlavo di “significato naturale”. Forse avrei dovuto portare qualche passione o fantasia in aula, come suggerisci tu! Longano: Paul, sai che la natura non si lascia mai intimidire dalle teorie? Se avessi portato una lezione sulla “saggia natura”, sicuramente anche gli studenti avrebbero applaudito, magari pensando a un picnic filosofico! Grice: Beh, Longano, il tuo uomo naturale mi ha ispirato: da quando ho rivalutato passioni e psicologia, persino la mia voglia di biscotti sembra un dono della filosofia! Longano: Ecco, Paul, la libertà e l’uguaglianza si gustano meglio con una buona dose di fantasia. Dopotutto, come diceva mio zio molisano, “la verità ha bisogno di qualche errore per essere digerita!” Longano, Francesco (1766). La ragione. Napoli: Stamperia Simoniana.

Mario Giuseppe Losano (Casale Monferrato, Alessandria, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia del diritto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an inferential achievement for which speakers are answerable: what is meant beyond what is said is recoverable by a hearer who assumes cooperative rationality and can justify the inference by appeal to shared conversational norms. Losano’s work, by contrast, comes out of jurisprudence and legal philosophy (and, very early, out of constitutional-law interests before his later prominence in Kelsen studies and legal informatics), so “conversational reason” is naturally reframed as institutional reason: the way norms, authorities, and interpretive communities make texts mean something in practice, under constraints of precedent, procedure, and professional responsibility. In that register, what Grice calls implicature looks less like a purely local feature of a two-person exchange and more like a generalized interpretive phenomenon: legal language routinely relies on what is not said (presuppositions about competence, jurisdiction, burden of proof, or the intended scope of a rule), and it is precisely these background assumptions that legal reasoning must make explicit, contest, or stabilize. The comparison, then, is between Grice’s micro-model of accountability in conversation (how a remark licenses a specific, criticizable inference in a given context) and Losano’s macro-model of accountability in normative systems (how authoritative texts and institutions license interpretations that can be argued for, appealed, or rejected). Grice’s cooperative principle becomes, in legal key, something like a principle of interpretive charity under institutional constraints, while Losano’s emphasis on systems, sources, and the circulation of legal ideas highlights that the “shared background” required for implicature is not merely interpersonal but can be built and maintained by juristic education, legal tradition (including Roman law’s long afterlife), and the formal settings in which interpretation is demanded and disciplined. Grice: “While I refer to Ryle and Austin as avid students of Greek philosophy – Ancient Greek philosophy, that is – especially Austin, since, like me, and unlike Ryle, he had to suffer it to get his double first in greats! – they never wondered why lawyers in England all are about the English customary law and Roman law – No English lawyer would have ONE thing to say about Greek law – the reason being that at Oxford, the Faculty of Law, had a chair for Roman law, but none for Greek law! The Regius chiar of civil law at Oxford, also known as the Oxford chair of Roman law, has a rich and lengthy history, starting with its establishment by Henry VIII. Henry establishes the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, and Story is appointed as the fist professor. The chair continues to be held by a series of professors who primarily lecture ON ROMAN LAW and related subjects like the pandects, the code, or the ecclesiastical laws of England, as sipulated in statutes. Then came a period of dcline in the study of ROMAN law at Oxford,. According to PHILLIMORE, who holds the chair, the subject was not taught for almost a century preceding his tenure. The Oxford University Act replaces the CIVIL LAW used in the chancellor’s court with the common law of England and the statue law of the realm. This court, which previously held jurisdiction in private law matters involving scholars and others connected to the university, had operated according to civil law. ROMAN LAW is RE-INTRODUCED as part of the law degree, the B. A. in JURISPRUDENCE, upon its establishment. The chair is held by notable figures such as BRYCE, and GROUDY. ZULUETA holds the chair contributing to the feld of ROMAN LAW. JOLOWICZ holds the chair, filosofia del DIRITTO ROMANO, LIVIO, storia del DIRITTO ROMANO, what Kelsen never had. Grice: Caro Losano, ti confesso che a Oxford il diritto greco era più raro di una pizza senza pomodoro! Tutti a parlare di diritto romano, e nessuno che si chieda cosa pensassero gli ateniesi sulle multe del condominio. Losano: Ah, Paul, è vero! Il Regius Chair di Oxford sembra quasi un tempio dedicato a Livio e alle Pandette. Magari un giorno anche il diritto greco avrà la sua vendetta, ma per ora dobbiamo accontentarci del latino, che almeno fa sembrare tutto più autorevole—anche quando non capiamo niente! Grice: Lo ammetto, Mario, il diritto romano è come il vino buono, si tramanda da Re Enrico VIII fino a oggi. Ma ti dirò: tra una lezione di pandette e una di codici, ho sempre pensato che una chiacchierata sui casi delle pecore rubate sarebbe stata più divertente! Losano: Paul, hai ragione! In fondo, la filosofia del diritto romano è una grande conversazione, dove ognuno dice la sua, anche se poi si finisce sempre a discutere di quante uova ci vogliono per una buona torta. E come diceva mio nonno piemontese: “Meglio una sentenza in dialetto che una legge in latino!” Losano, Mario Giuseppe (1961). Contributo. Filosofia giuridica.

Domenico Losurdo (Sannicandro di Bari, Puglia):  la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del ribelle aristocratico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally accountable route from what is said to what is meant, grounded in cooperative expectations that make implied content criticizable rather than merely suggestive; even when talk becomes polemical, Grice’s point is that hearers infer extra content by recognizable patterns of relevance, informativeness, and intention-recognition. Losurdo’s work, by contrast, is best read as shifting the centre of gravity from the micro-norms of conversational inference to the macro-conditions of ideological and historical discourse: his portrait of Nietzsche as an “aristocratic rebel,” his attention to the “language of empire,” and his Marxist, anti-imperialist commitments treat what is left unsaid as often structurally produced—by class position, institutional power, censorship, and the rhetorical needs of domination—so that “implicature” becomes less a cooperative by-product of rational exchange and more a diagnostic clue to concealed interests and asymmetries in public language. The comparison therefore highlights two different senses of “reason” in discourse: for Grice, reason governs interpretation within conversation by supplying norms that allow interlocutors to reconstruct intended meaning; for Losurdo, reason is inseparable from critique, because what discourse “means” in political modernity frequently depends on who gets to set the conversational agenda and which silences are enforced or rewarded. Where Grice would model rebellion in talk as marked departures from cooperative expectations (and thus as inferentially trackable), Losurdo treats rebellion and hypocrisy as endemic to modern ideological vocabularies, so that the task is not only to calculate what is implicated but to explain why certain implicatures become socially natural—why they pass as “common sense” within an imperial or class-structured language game. Grice: “It must be remembered that philosophers of my generation at Oxford encountered philosophy through the classics, and while contemporary philosophers were totally absent in our curriculum, so were some OLDER philoosphers, such as Nietzsche, which is paradoxical, seeing that he loved the classics so much. The reason I adjudicate to Bradley, who possibly thought that Hegel spoke a better German!” Sannicandro di Bari, Puglia. Grice: “L. has contributed to a collection on ‘fatti normativi’ which is fascinating! I like L.: describing Nietzsche as the aristocratic rebel is genial; he also engages in some linguistic botanising with his ‘linguaggio dell’impero’: something Romans and Brits know well – cf. ‘Great Britaiin’ and my little England!” Italian philosopher, expert not on Grice, but Nietzsche, “Nietzsche, ribelle aristocratico” -- essential Italian philosopher. Si laurea a Urbino sotto SALVUCCI colla SEMANTICA di Rodbertus, istituto di scienze filosofiche, insegna storia della filosofia, presidente dell'hegeliana Società Hegel-Marx pel pensiero dialettico, società di scienze di Leibniz a Berlino, un’associazione che si rifà all’accademia reale prussiana delle scienze nella tradizione di Leibniz, associazione politico-culturale Marx. Dalla militanza comunista alla condanna dell'imperialismo, fino allo studio della questione afroamericana e di quella dei nativi, L. e studioso anche partecipe della politica. Di formazione marxista, descritto sia come un marxista controcorrente sia come un marxista eterodosso e un comunista militante, la sua produzione spazia dai contributi allo studio della filosofia critica, la auto-censura di Kant e il suo nicodemismo politico, alla ri-valutazione dell'idealismo nel tentativo di ri-proporne l'eredità, sulla scia di Lukács, alla ri-affermazione dell'interpretazione del marxismo, GRAMSCI e SPAVENTA, Il ribelle aristocratico, Nietzsche. Grice: Caro Losurdo, mi ha sempre incuriosito il tuo modo di definire Nietzsche come “ribelle aristocratico”. Personalmente, a Oxford, l’abbiamo quasi ignorato nei miei anni di studi, eppure trovo affascinante il suo rapporto con i classici. Secondo te, cosa rende Nietzsche così attuale oggi, persino nelle conversazioni filosofiche più quotidiane?  Losurdo: Grazie, Grice! Penso che Nietzsche resti attuale perché riesce a smascherare le ipocrisie della modernità e invita ciascuno di noi a non accontentarsi delle verità imposte. Il suo spirito “aristocratico” non è solo eredità, ma anche sfida a superare i limiti imposti dalla tradizione, proprio come la migliore conversazione sa rompere gli schemi.  Grice: Interessante! Nelle mie implicature conversazionali, insisto spesso sulla cooperazione e la ricerca condivisa del senso. Forse Nietzsche, con il suo linguaggio tagliente e provocatorio, ci ricorda che anche la conversazione può essere un terreno di ribellione e critica, non trovi?  Losurdo: Assolutamente, Paul. La conversazione è un luogo vivo dove si esercita il pensiero critico. E come tu insegni, non si tratta solo di ciò che si dice, ma di ciò che si lascia intendere: anche il silenzio può essere una forma di rivoluzione, come ci insegna Nietzsche e come si ritrova nella storia del pensiero dialettico.  Grice: Caro Losurdo, mi colpisce sempre il modo in cui hai saputo definire Nietzsche come “ribelle aristocratico”. All’epoca a Oxford, lo lasciavamo quasi ai margini, come fosse una sorta di zio stravagante alle feste di famiglia. Secondo te, Nietzsche oggi sarebbe più a suo agio in una conversazione filosofica o in una partita a scacchi con Kant? Losurdo: Paul, forse Nietzsche preferirebbe una partita a scacchi dove ogni pedone può diventare regina, ma non prima di aver lanciato una provocazione al re! La sua attualità sta proprio nel sapere ribaltare le regole del gioco, come la migliore conversazione che non teme di scompigliare i capelli, anche quelli della tradizione. Grice: Vedo che anche tu non disdegni la filosofia come sport estremo! Io insisto sulle implicature: a volte basta un silenzio ben piazzato per far tremare gli avversari. Nietzsche, con la sua lingua affilata, avrebbe fatto impazzire qualunque tavolo di discussione, soprattutto quello della mensa universitaria! Losurdo: Paul, il silenzio di Nietzsche sarebbe sicuramente più rumoroso delle nostre parole. E come dici tu, la conversazione è viva quando sa essere ribelle: anche una pausa può valere più di mille discorsi. In fondo, forse le conversazioni migliori sono proprio quelle dove si rischia di perdere la partita, ma si guadagna una massima nuova da aggiungere al taccuino! Losurdo, Domenico (1967). L’esistenizialismo. Studi Urbinati

Lucio Lucceio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally defensible inference from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative expectations that make indirect communication accountable and criticizable. Lucius Lucceius, known chiefly as a late-Republican historian within the Cicero–Caesar world (Cicero even presses him, in a famous letter, to write up events with a sympathetic slant), provides a contrasting model of indirectness in which what is “meant” is often shaped by prudence, patronage, and the political costs of explicitness: the historian must let the audience supply what cannot safely be asserted, or what decorum forbids, while still producing a narrative that guides judgment. Read this way, the “Hortus” (Epicurean quietism, reticence, and the cultivation of private life) becomes a vivid analogue for Gricean economy: saying little and leaving the rest to be inferred; but the rationale differs, since for Grice the pressure toward indirectness is often conversational optimality (efficiency, relevance, informativeness), whereas for Lucceius it is frequently strategic and civic (how to speak truth, flatter power, or avoid civil rupture when Caesar is in the room). The comparison therefore highlights two senses of “reason” governing talk: Grice’s is a norm of interpretation internal to conversation itself (why a hearer is entitled to an implicature, and how it can be cancelled), while Lucceius’ is a norm of political-historical intelligibility (how a narrative can lead readers to conclusions without stating them baldly), so that implicature becomes not merely a linguistic phenomenon but a technique of Roman public life—one that thrives precisely where direct assertion risks turning disputatio into bellum. Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialect, to contrast it with the Oxonian dialectic which I knew, I focus mainly on barefoot Socrates at the agora, Plato at the academy, and Aristotle at the Lycaeum – but of course, at least three other think tanks must be added: l’Orto – made popular at Oxford by Walter Pater and his Marius --, the Portico, and the Cynargo – in fact, these three sects were the most dialectical!” -- Filosofo italiano. A historian and a friend of CICERONE. Some of Cicerone’s letters to L. suggests that he may have followed the sect of L’ORTO. Citato da Svetonio. Amico di Giulio Cesare. Citato da Livio. Livio. Gricevs: Cum dialecticam Atheniensem Oxoniensi confero, Socratem nudipedem in foro, Platonem in Academia, Aristotelem in Lyceo cogito; sed Roma quoque sua habet: Hortus, Porticus, Cynargus. Hi, me iudice, dialecticissimi sunt. Lvcceivs: Dialecticissimi, in horto maxime? Ego, amicus Ciceronis, scio hortum plerumque ad olera spectare; philosophi autem ibi docent quomodo pauca dicendo multum promittas. Gricevs: Id ipsum est ratio conversazionalis: si de te tantum dico “calligraphiam optimam habet,” intellegis reliqua; sic in horto Romano silentium saepe est argumentum, et lactuca quasi syllogismus. Lvcceivs: Cave, ne Cicero te audiat: “lactuca syllogismus” in epistulas non recipitur. Sed fateor: in urbe nostra etiam hortus disputat; et si Caesar adest, statim omnes concordant, ne disputatio in bellum vertatur. Lucceio, Lucio (a. u. c. DCXCVIII). Dicta. Roma.

Luciano (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e la gnossi. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats “what is meant” as something a hearer is entitled to recover by rational inference from what is said plus shared norms of cooperation; implicature is accountable, cancellable, and criticizable because it depends on publicly assessable reasoning about why a speaker spoke as he did. The Luciano-in-Rome vignette (a “gnosticus,” imagined as a follower of Cerdo, trading on gnosis as esoteric knowledge) sets up a contrasting model in which “knowing” is rhetorically performed rather than conversationally warranted: the gnostic posture invites audiences to accept claims on the strength of purported access to arcana, and the meaning of utterances often trades on insinuation, authority, and the immunizing move “it cannot be proved,” rather than on cooperative transparency. Read against Grice, the key contrast is that for Grice an utterance like “I know” or “I understand” carries implicatures that can be tested against conversational expectations (does it signal closure, rebuke, or agreement?), while the gnostic’s “I know” is liable to function as a shield against such tests, converting ordinary epistemic commitments into a status-claim; this is why the sophos/gnosticus distinction in your passage matters: the wise person’s authority is answerable to reasons shared in dialogue, whereas the gnostic’s authority is dramatized as possession of a private deposit. In that light, Luciano becomes a foil that sharpens Grice’s point: conversational reason does not merely decorate knowledge-talk but disciplines it, because implicature is legitimate only where interlocutors can, in principle, reconstruct the route from saying to meaning; where discourse instead treats obscurity as a credential, the “implicatures” it generates are less the output of cooperative reasoning than the byproduct of managed mystification. Grice: “I often wondered why ‘gnoseology’ was never a popular subject matter within the sub-faculty of philosophy. Now I know: it’s because it’s silly associations with the ‘gnostics’ – a term of abuse to many! Strictly, it may be argued that a gnostic is a knower – such as a pupil who answered 1811 upon being questioned when the battle of Waterloo took place. There are however implicatural distinctions between a sophos – a wise man – and a ‘gnostic’ – The Latin term ‘gnosticus’ and the English term ‘gnoseology’ both derive from the Ancient Greek term gnosis. Here’s a beakdown of the etymological connections. Gnosis, in Ancient Greek, the root of these terms, gnosis, is a Greek word for ‘knowledge.’ In the Hellenistic era, gnosis becamse particulary associated with MYSTICAL or spiritual knowledge and insight into a higher reality. It is also linked to the Indo-European root gno- which means to know. The Latin term gnosticus is derived from the Late Greek term gnostikos, which was used to refer to someone who possessed this special, often mystical, knowledge. It specifically means ‘a gnostic,’ – a person bleongin to a particular set of religious groups. The English term ‘gnoseoloy’ (or gnoseology) literally translates to ‘the study of knowledge’. It’s a philosophical term that explores the nature, origin, validity, and limits of knowledge itself. This term directly incorporates the root gnosis (knowledge) and combines it with -logy, meaning study of. In essence, gnosis provides the core meaning of ‘knowledge’in both terms. Gnosticus narrows this down to spomeone possessing a specific type of mystical knowledge, while gnoseology focuses on the broader philosophical inquiry into the concept of knowledge itself.  A gnostic, a follower of Cerdo. GRICEVS: Mirabar cur gnoseologia apud philosophos raro placeret; nunc scio: nomen ipsum ad gnosticos (quibus multi maledicunt) nimis facile labitur. Gnosticus quasi “scitor” est—ut discipulus ille qui ad “Quando fuit pugna apud Waterloo?” respondit: “MDCCCXI.” LVCIANVS: O doctissima ignorantia! Romae vidi multos gnosticos qui omnia norunt—praeter id quod rogantur. Cerdo ipse, si adesset, diceret se “scire arcana”; sed arcana semper sunt ea quae nemo probare potest. GRICEVS: Distinguendum tamen: sophos sapientia pollet, gnosticus saepe sonat quasi scientia clamosa. Hic locus est rationis conversazionalis: ex eo quod dicitur, reliquum per implicaturam inferunt—et saepe peius quam discipulus de Waterloo. LVCIANVS: Ita est: tu implicaturas metiris, ego vanitatem mordeo; et ambo eandem legem docemus—qui gnosin nimis iactat, confitetur se scientiam non habere, sed tantum fabulam bene narratam. Luciano (a. u. c. DCCCLXXXIII). Dicta. Roma.

Gaio Lucilio (Sessa Aurunca, Caserta, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an accountable inference from what is said to what is meant, generated under cooperative expectations (say enough, be relevant, be perspicuous) that allow hearers to work out, and challenge, the speaker’s intended point. Lucilius, by contrast, represents an older Roman deployment of indirectness as a civic weapon and a literary discipline: the satirist in the Scipionic milieu uses omission, irony, and calculated understatement to make vice speak through the audience’s own recognition and embarrassment, leaving “the listeners the task” so that social shame does part of the argumentative work. On this comparison, Grice is explaining the rational mechanism by which such effects are warranted—why a remark about “beautiful handwriting” can, in context, rationally license an inference about philosophical incompetence—whereas Lucilius is practicing the art at scale, turning Rome into a conversational arena in which what is not said can be more socially efficacious than direct assertion. The key difference is normative focus: Grice theorizes a general, cooperative framework for deriving implicatures in ordinary talk, while Lucilius exploits the same inferential capacities in a largely adversarial or corrective mode, where implicature becomes moral-political critique rather than mere conversational efficiency. Yet the continuity is strong: Lucilius’ satiric economy and his reliance on shared background knowledge (politics, hypocrisy, linguistic habits) anticipate the Gricean idea that meaning often depends on what interlocutors can be expected to supply, and that rhetorical restraint can be a rational strategy precisely because it recruits the audience’s own reasoning to complete what the speaker, for prudential or stylistic reasons, leaves unsaid. Grice: “When I studied philosophy at Oxford, it was done at the sub-faculty of philosophy, part of the larger Faculty of Literae Humaiores. I remember the horror our tutors would experiment when they would see any of us pupils carrying a volume of the Loeb classical library – say: Remains of Old Latin – in our gentleman’s pocket!” -- Filosofo italiano. Alcuni romani insigni nutrirono interesse vivo per i problemi della filosofia. L. Ciò si può dire di un membro del circolo degli Scipioni, nato da famiglia ricca e distinta. L. ha un fratello che e senatore e, per mezzo della figlia, nonno di Pompeo. L. conosce la cultura greca (di cui si penetra) nell’Italia meridionale e a Roma, ove passa la maggior parte della vita. Forse soggiorna anche in Atene. Come cavaliere L. partecipa alla guerra contro Numanzia, agli ordini di Scipione Emiliano L'Affricano, con cui aveva già stretti rapporti.In seguito appoggia del'Affricano energicamente l'azione politica. L. fa parte, oltrechè del circolo degli Scipioni, di uno più ampio. L. e amico dell'accademico Clitomaco, che gli dedica un libro. Morì a Napoli. L. scrive XXX libri di satire -- un genere filosofico --, di cui restano frammenti.In esse satire, L. rappresenta e critica la vita romana dell’età sua, interessandosi soprattutto di questioni politiche. Dei vizi del tempo L. e giudice severo. L. si occupa molto di problemi logico-grammaticali, retorici e letterari.Si interessa anche di filosofia speculativa, alla quale deve avere dedicato una satira. Nei framm. del l. 28 la teoria dell’ORTO è confutata verisimilmente da uno dall’ACCADEMIA, anche perchè vi si trovano varie notizie sulla storia di tale scuola. La forma e il contenuto delle satire di L. rivelano l’influsso della filosofia popolare del cinismo di Bione e di Menippo.  Livio. GRICEVS: LVCILIV, memini Oxonii: tutores horrebant, si quis e nobis Loeb in sinu gestaret—quasi “Reliquiae Latinae” essent non liber sed crimen; quid ergo in satiris tuis implicas cum nimis eleganter taces? LVCILIVS: Implico hoc: “si taceo, non ignoro.” Nam Roma ipsa est porticus loquax; et ego, dum vitia mordeo, verbis parcere videor—re vera auditoribus negotium relinquo, ut ipse rubor eorum loquatur. GRICEVS: Bene: tu maximam servas—ne plus dicas quam opus est—et tamen efficiis ut plures intellegant quam audierint; quod Oxonii vocant artem, Romae vocatur modestia, et utrumque idem est: civilitas. LVCILIVS: At tu, GRICE, si Loeb in marsuppio videris, dicis “pulchre compactus est” et implicas “puer, lege domi”; ego autem dico “pulchra est calligraphia” et implico “mala est philosophia”—sic libri salvantur, sed homines… minus. Lucilio, Gaio (a. u. c. DCXX). Saturae.

Gaio Lucilio Minore (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano --  l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally defensible inference from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative expectations that make a speaker answerable for what a hearer is entitled to conclude. Lucilius (Seneca’s addressee, often identified as Lucilius Iunior, a Roman equestrian and procurator of Sicily, writing in the Neronian period) represents a different but complementary model of conversational reason: the porticus is not just a physical emblem of Stoicism but a moral setting that disciplines speech into ethical self-fashioning, where remarks function as prompts to self-assessment, correction, and steadying of character. In your portico dialogue, “I was waiting for you in the portico” can, in Gricean terms, generate multiple implicatures depending on context—rebuke for lateness, or a criticism of wavering commitment—and Grice’s framework explains exactly how such inferences are licensed (relevance, expectations about why that location is being mentioned, background norms shared by interlocutors) and how they can be cancelled or contested. But Lucilius also shows something Grice tends to bracket: in Stoic epistolary practice, the point of implying is often formative rather than merely informational, aimed at producing moral uptake rather than just belief, so that the “reason” governing the exchange is as much ethical as epistemic. The comparison, then, is that Grice provides the analytic machinery that makes the portico’s indirectness intelligible and criticizable as inference, while Lucilius exemplifies a tradition in which indirectness is cultivated as a mode of moral pedagogy—where the same utterance can carry a standing implication about how one ought to live, because the shared setting (the Porch) functions as a publicly recognized cue for the kind of reasons that are in play. Grice: “At Oxford, we speak of the Porch – the Romans spoke of Porticus, and the Athenians SAW it. I would be puzzled if a pupil of mine would challenge to define ‘stoicism’ by a word other than one making reference to such a stupid architectural feature as a porticus! But I should try harder!” Filosofo italiano. A poetic philosopher. Best known as the friend of Seneca, to whom CXXIV letters are written discussing a wide range of issues from a primarily point of view of the Porch. GRICEVS: LVCILIV, apud Oxonienses “Porch” dicitur; Romani “porticum” dixerunt; Athenienses ipsam viderunt. Mirarer si quis Stoicum definiret nisi per tam stultam rem architectonicam—sed conabor, ne videar in porticu ipse haerere. LVCILIVS: At ego, poeta, in porticu ambulo: ibi versus nascuntur et sententiae. Sed quaero: si dico “in porticu te exspectabam,” quid implico? “sero venisti,” an “Stoicus esse desisti”? GRICEVS: Utrumque, si res postulat: dictum est de loco; implicatum de moribus. Nam porticus non solum tectum est, sed norma: qui sub ea moratur, promittit se frigus, famem, et amici sermones aequo vultu laturum. LVCILIVS: Bene; ergo cum frigus sit et ego pallescam, dicam “Stoice me gero”—et tu intelliges me non de virtute gloriari, sed de tunica queri: porticus eadem, implicatura alia. Lucilio Minore, Gaio (a. u. c. DCCCXV). Dicta. Roma.

Lucio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e il cinargo romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally recoverable inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in cooperative expectations that make speakers accountable for the extra content their words license in context. The Lucio vignette, set in Rome and keyed to the Roman fashion for importing Athenian “toponyms” of philosophy (agora, Academy, Lyceum, Stoa, Garden, and the Cynosarges/Cynargus), reframes conversational reason less as a formal set of maxims and more as a culturally situated practice in which place-names function as cues for stance, style, and even faction: to say “let’s go to the Cynargus” is not merely to designate a location but to signal a posture of sharp-edged, dog-like critique and to invite an audience to anticipate a particular kind of exchange. Read Griceanly, Lucio’s question—does the utterance indicate only a destination, or also “we’ll bite Favorinus”?—is exactly the distinction between what is said (a literal proposal of movement) and what is implicated (a planned rhetorical attack), with the implicature generated because hearers assume relevance and shared background knowledge about what “Cynargus” conventionally evokes in that intellectual milieu. The contrast, then, is that Grice supplies the explicit inferential machinery (how the implicature is justified, cancellable, and criticizable), whereas “Lucio” supplies a social-semiotic mechanism (how a learned city turns philosophical geography into shorthand for conversational roles), making clear that reason-governed meaning can ride not only on sentence content but on culturally loaded labels that compress whole argumentative temperaments into a single word. Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialectic, to oppose it to the Oxonian dialectic, I mainly focus on Socrates, at the agora, Plato, at the academy, and Aristotle, and the lycaeum – but it must be remembered that, small as it was – compared to London, or Paris, or even Rome – Athens included other think tanks, such as the Porch, the Garden, and the ‘cynargo’!” Grice: “The toponymy of the Athenian dialectic was particularly popular at Rome!” Filosofo italiano. Of the Cynargo and an opponent of Favorino. GRICEVS: LVCI, cum de dialectica Atheniensi loqueris—agora, Academia, Lyceum—noli oblivisci Cynargi: Roma enim toponymiam amat quasi vinum Graecum, sed bibit more Romano. LVCIVS: Recte; sed dic mihi, GRICE: si in foro dico “eamus ad Cynargum,” num tantum locum indico, an etiam implico “ibi mordebimus Favorinum”? GRICEVS: Utrumque: quod dicitur est iter; quod significatur est consilium. “Cynargus” sonat quasi canes arguti; ideo qui illuc vocat, praemonet: “porta iocos et dentes”—sed dentes, quaeso, rhetoricos. LVCIVS: Ergo ratio conversationis est quasi canis urbanus: non latrat nisi cum opus est—et cum latrat, omnes intellegunt plus quam audierunt; quod si Favorinus queratur, respondebo: “non te momordi; tantum Cynargum nominavi.” Lucio (a. u. c. DCCCLXXXIII). Dicta. Roma.

Tito Lucrezio Caro (Pompei): la ragione conversazionale e l’ORTO romano, l’implicatura conversazionale dell’alma figlia di Giove. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rational, publicly answerable route from what is said to what is meant: hearers supply extra content because they assume cooperation and can justify the inference by appeal to shared norms and recognizable speaker intentions. Lucretius, by contrast, offers a thoroughly naturalistic account of how “signs” and seeming-meaning arise without any appeal to cooperative intentions: in De rerum natura (AUC 699), the dreaming dog that “marks tracks” and “signs with its voice” exemplifies how behavior can look meaningful because atomic simulacra and bodily dispositions continue in sleep, even when no present quarry and no audience-directed communicative act exists. The comparison thus sharpens Grice’s central distinction between mere indication and genuine speaker-meaning: what the dog’s bark and vestigia do in Lucretius is closer to natural meaning (symptom, trace, causal sign), whereas Grice’s implicature belongs to the space of reasons, where an utterance is produced so that a hearer will recognize an intention and draw an inference under conversational norms. At the same time, Lucretius’s Epicurean “garden” perspective helps explain why Grice insists on separating meaning from mere convention and from mere behavioral regularity: Lucretius shows how rich, quasi-semantic effects can be generated by nature alone, and Grice’s project can be read as the further step of identifying what must be added—mutual recognition, rational accountability, and cooperative presumption—for those effects to count as conversational meaning rather than as the “implicature” we project onto any expressive creature. Finally, the clinamen motif usefully contrasts the two rationalities: for Lucretius the swerve secures the physical possibility of novelty and agency in a world of atoms, while for Grice the “swerve” from literal statement (via maxim-flouting) secures the pragmatic possibility of novelty in what we mean, without breaking the governance of reason that makes conversation a shared, criticizable practice. Venatores cum saepe canes in molli sopore iactant membra, tamen sudant vestigia crebra voceque saepe simul signant, quasi illa tenentes praedam animo, atque etiam quasi iam certamine facto. Grice: “It has to be remembered that philosophers of my generation first ecountered philosophy via the classics. I would never have thought of philosophy had I not won a more popular ‘classical scholarship’ to Corpus at Clifton – and the rest is history. Therefore, L. was second nature tome! By far the most important concept in L.’s philosoophy is that of clinamen that Strawson translates as the ‘swerve.’ It was saved from extinction by an Italian – as the novel tells you! While Strawson reads it in Latin, I prefer the version in the vulgar! And by the vulgar I mean MARCHETTI! It is amazing how well MARCHETTI interprets L. – there is a little treatise on Epicureanism in the L. by MARCHETTI which is interesting. A real continuity in Italian philosophy!” Possibly the most important Italian philosopher.  The reception of L.'s De rerum natura is a saga of extreme highs and lows, shifting from foundational influence in Rome to near-oblivion in the Middle Ages, before sparking a philosophical revolution in Renaissance Italy. Roman Philosophy L. is a massive, if controversial, presence in the Golden and Silver Ages of Roman philosophy. The earliest recorded critique appears in a letter from CICERONE  to his brother, praising the poem for its "inspired brilliance" and "great artistry". Augustan Age VIRGILIO  famously alludes to L. in the Georgics ("Happy is he who has discovered the causes of things"), though he later uses myth to counter L.’s rationalism. ORAZIO  adopts a pragmatic, less dogmatic Epicureanism, while OVIDIO predicts the poem will only perish with the end of the world. Imperial Rome: Seneca the Younger quotes the poem multiple times, and PLINIO lists L. as a primary source for his Natural History. La natura delle cose. Implicatura atomica. Iimplicatura e composizionalità. Articolazione. Implicatura elementare. Implicatura simplex. Implicatura semplice. Implicatura complessa. Alma figlia di Giove. 20 Oct 1928, Clifton. Today our Latin master, in one of those brisk moods in which a grammar point is treated as a moral reform, took us through Lucretius’ hunting-dogs and made the line do its tricks: the dogs in soft sleep still twitch, sweat, and mark the ground with rapid footsteps, and they signant with their voice as though they were holding the quarry in mind, as though the contest were already on. He lingered on signant and vestigia, pleased with the way the words make a kind of sense even before one has translated them: the voice as a “sign,” the tracks as if the dream itself were leaving footprints on the bedding. I found myself thinking of Father’s maxim (he trots it out whenever he means to be severe with my more airy fancies): nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu. Very well; but the sleeping dog does not look as though he is making an inference from a sensation to a conclusion. He is not theorising about the hare; he is, in some manner, continuing the chase without the hare, and his body supplies the missing world. The master called it poetic vividness; I wanted to call it a problem. What Lucretius is doing, I think, is not sentimental at all but atomistic: dreams are not visits from another realm; they are the mind still being struck by extremely fine films or traces (simulacra) that peel off things and, once inside, set the soul’s atoms moving in familiar patterns. So the dog’s “vestigia” in sleep are less acceptable than those of the waking dog only because the sensory traffic is thinner and more private: no new quarry is present, yet old motions continue as if prompted. In waking life the dog’s track-making belongs to a shared field where others can check it; in sleep the same movements become self-sufficient, running on stored impressions. Mother says Oxford will teach me all about that, and perhaps it will; but already the passage seems to show that a “sign” need not be a deliberate message. A dog can signare without meaning to signify, and yet we cannot resist reading his little barks as if they were about something. That, too, is a kind of lesson: we are always tempted to treat mere signs as if they were communications, and perhaps half of education is learning when that temptation is sound and when it is merely a dream leaving footprints. GRICEVS: LVCRETI, memineris: nos philosophiae gustum e classicis hausimus; ideo mihi tu secunda natura es. Sed dic, in horto tuo Romano—si dico “pulchra mala sunt,” quid implico? LVCRETIVS: Implicas “sume unum”—et si non sumo, iam clinamen facio, id est declino a via recta ad mensam: atomus parva, sed prandium magnum. GRICEVS: Probe: ratio conversationis hortum colit. Verba pauca seris, sensus plures metis; et “alma Iovis filia” si vocatur, saepe significat “noli quaerere unde—sed quomodo dicatur.” LVCRETIVS: Ita est: tu maximas seris, ego atomos; sed uterque eodem ridiculo labore: ut auditores intellegant plus quam audiverint—et tamen putent se solos sapientes esse. Lucrezio Caro, Tito (a. u. c. DCXCIX). De rerum natura.

Lucio Licinio Lucullo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how a hearer can responsibly recover what is meant beyond what is said by assuming cooperative rationality: implicatures are justified inferences from an utterance plus shared norms, not merely witty afterthoughts or social atmosphere. Lucullus, as your passage frames him, supplies a classical case where meaning is inseparable from practical life and strategic self-presentation: the famous Plutarchan quip “Today Lucullus dines with Lucullus” trades on the ordinary presumption carried by cum/apud/secum (company, a second party) in order to redirect the audience toward an evaluative point about dignity and self-sufficiency, a miniature of how a speaker can exploit default expectations to make “alone” sound like “distinguished company.” Compared with Grice, Lucullus is not theorizing inference; he is exemplifying it in social practice, showing how conversational reason can be used to manage appearances and to control what others are entitled to conclude (the host is alone, yet the occasion is worthy of splendour), much as his military-political career required calibrated signalling amid loyalty and mutiny. The contrast is therefore between Grice’s analytical ambition to specify the principles by which such inferences are warranted and criticizable (including where they can be cancelled, or where a categorial slip is being exploited for comic effect) and Lucullus’s cultivated Roman tact in deploying those very expectations for rhetorical and ethical ends. Put simply: Grice gives the normative mechanics of implicature; Lucullus provides a high-status Roman demonstration of how a single small linguistic trigger can generate a socially powerful implicature—one that works because interlocutors share a background sense of what “with” normally commits you to, and of what it means, in a culture of public display, to be one’s own best guest. Grice: “L. is a good example of what I mean by philosophy – philosophy ain’t a profession, and it’s not an ‘extra’ to your life. L. was a philosopher, not a tutor thereof!” -- Grice: “It has to be remembered that philosophers of my generation met philosophy through the classics. I would never have even considered philosophy had I not won a ‘classics scholarship’ at Clifton for Corpus. Therefore, L. is second nature to me!” Si distingue nella guerra sociale come tribunus militum. Avendo avuto quale pro-questore sotto SILLA  nella guerra mitridatica l’incarico di recarsi dalla Grecia in Cirenaica e in Egitto e di raccogliere una flotta, L. volle avere presso di sè Antioco d’Ascalona in quel pericoloso viaggio sul mare. Pretore, propretore in Africa, e console, ottenne il governo proconsolare della Cilicia e il comando della guerra contro Mitridate e sconfisse prima questo, poi il suo alleato Tigrane re di Armenia. Negl'anni del suo comando, batiè con poche forze grossi eserciti nemici. Ma per il malcontento dei soldati le cose peggiorarono, sicchè i suoi avversari lo fanno richiamare a Roma ove soltanto gli e concesso il trionfo. L. contribuì potentemente alla diffuzione della filosofia in Roma. L. e oratore, storico -- scrive una storia della guerra socriale -- e si interessa vivamente per la filosofia, tanto che volle compagno Antioco sia da pro-questore che da pro-console e cogli studi filosofici si consola degli insuccessi politici. A rich Roman who makes a career in public and military life. A friend and pupil of Antioco, his philosophical tastes appear to have been quite eclectic. He spends his last years quietly going insane. LIVIO. 20 Oct 1928, Clifton. Today the Latin master marched us through the intrinsics of cum, that small word with the large life. He produced, as if it were a model of lucid Latin, the line: Lucullus cenat cum Lucullo. The class took it as the obvious joke (Lucullus dining alone, yet “with” himself), but I could not help feeling there is a mild categorial impropriety hidden in it, as if cum demanded plurality of persons and here is being made to do duty for the one and the same. I nearly objected that the “with” is not a relation a thing can bear to itself except by a sort of grammatical indulgence; but I remembered that Mother is set on Oxford, and that I may have years at Corpus to quarrel with small words and their pretensions. Still, it is a good joke, and not merely because it plays on reflexivity. It relies on what cum ordinarily carries: company, a second agent, a table with more than one place-setting; Lucullus exploits that ordinary presumption to make “alone” sound convivial. Perhaps that is the point: the Latin lets you say “with” and quietly invite the hearer to supply the rest—the implied contrast between dining as a public performance and dining as private appetite. One begins to suspect that half of Latin style is this art of letting a preposition do what a whole subordinate clause would do in English. If so, then cum is already a lesson in how much can be meant without being said, and Lucullus—famous for dinners that did not need an audience—has become, unintentionally, the day’s tutor in implicature. The quip is commonly reported in Plutarch’s Life of Lucullus as an anecdote about Lucullus ordering a lavish dinner when dining “alone”; when questioned, he replies, in effect, “Today Lucullus dines with Lucullus,” i.e., he is his own guest and deserves the same splendour. The Latin is often given as Lucullus hodie apud Lucullum cenat or Lucullus hodie secum cenat; cum/se(c)um/apud vary in retellings, but the pragmatic point is stable: the preposition triggers an expectation of company which the punchline cancels and redirects toward self-addressed dignity. GRICEVS: LVCVLLE, si vis rationem conversationis discere, noli quaerere artem: philosophia non est professio neque vitae accessorium; tu ipse philosophus eras, non paedagogus philosophiae. LVCVLLVS: GRICE, ego quidem proquaestor inter mare et piratas Antiochum mecum duxi; nunc rogo: si dico “intelligo,” num aliquid praeter dicta significo, an tantum me ipsum laudo? GRICEVS: Saepe, mi LVCVLLE, “intelligo” plus quam dicit: implicat “desine longius pergere.” Id est: verba modesta, sed gladius tacitus—et plerumque sine sanguine. LVCVLLVS: Ita ergo: in bello Mithridatico classis parva, in sermone verbum parvum—utraque magna facit; sed cave, ne miles ingratus sit aut auditor: tum etiam maxima tua ad Romam revocabuntur. Lucullo, Lucio Licinio (a. u. c. DCLXXX). Dicta. Roma.

Cesare Luporini (Ferrara, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale, i corpi di VINCI, LEOPARDI fascista – leopardi fascisti – ultra-filosofico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an inferential product of rational cooperation: what a speaker means beyond what is said is recoverable because interlocutors presume an orderly, reason-sensitive exchange (a kind of pragmatic contract) and can justify the extra step by appeal to shared maxims. Luporini, by contrast, is best read as relocating “reason” from the micro-norms of conversational inference to the broader historical and material conditions of human agency: moving from early exposure to Heidegger and Hartmann to a Marxist orientation, he emphasizes bodies, practices, and non-teleological history, and his celebrated work on Leopardi frames philosophy as inseparable from the lived, somatic and political situation of the human animal rather than as primarily a calculus of what is implied by an utterance. On this comparison, Grice is interested in how rationality shows itself in the fine structure of saying and meaning (including psycho-somatic vs purely psychic ascriptions), whereas Luporini treats rationality as something that must be diagnosed at the level of culture, ideology, and the embodied subject—so that what is “implied” in discourse is often not a speaker’s tidy communicative intention but the pressure of historical forces and forms of life that speak through the individual. The overlap is that both oppose crude reductions: Grice resists reducing meaning to convention or mere behavior, while Luporini resists reducing persons to disembodied mind or to a finalistic story of progress; but they diverge on where the governing explanation lives—Grice in publicly criticizable inferential norms of conversation, Luporini in the thick material-historical account of how minds and bodies come to have the kinds of reasons (and the kinds of language) they can deploy at all. Grice: “I like L.’s ultraphilosophical. Austin used paraphilosophical, at most!” Grice: “In my ‘Personal identity’ I consider ‘someone’ statements which are only corporal (o somatic): “I fell down the stairs” – others which are psycho-somatic, and others which are purely psychic! ‘Psycho-somatical’ is a good Hellenistic formation. I don’t think CICERONE could come up with aa just as good Roman formation! I like L.; I lerarned from him how silly Austin is when talking of ‘material object’ – a contradiction in terminis for Kant who uses ‘materie’ very strictly; L.’s study of Leopardi is brilliant – and he has explored the genius of Vinci, which is good!” Si reca a Friburgo, dove frequenta le lezioni di Heidegger, e poi a Berlino, dove poté seguire le lezioni di Hartmann. Si laurea a Firenze. Insegna a Cagliari, Pisa e Firenze. Dopo un in interesse per l'esistenzialismo, aderì al marxismo, iscrivendosi al Partito Comunista, per il quale fu eletto senatore nella terza legislature. Tra le altre iniziative parlamentari, fu firmatario di un progetto di legge, "Istituzione della scuola obbligatoria statale. Fonda la rivista Società.  Collabora ai periodici politico-culturali del PCI, Il Contemporaneo, Rinascita, Critica marxista. Durante il dibattito che, a seguito degli eventi, porta alla trasformazione del PCI in PDS, si schierò decisamente contro la "svolta" di Occhetto, aderendo alla mozione "due" di opposizione interna, in un'orgogliosa difesa e per un rilancio della prospettiva e degli ideali comunisti. Il marxismo di Luporini si fonda su una critica radicale allo storicismo, sul rifiuto di ogni concezione finalistica dello sviluppo storico: il comunismo, quello marxista in particolare, non è assimilabile con la tematica tipicamente storicista del progresso come traccia dell'evoluzione umana. Corpo e mente, corpo animato, l’anima di VINCI, la mente di Leonardo. Grice: Caro Luporini, mi hai insegnato che Austin, quando parla di “oggetto materiale”, rischia di inciampare in un paradosso peggio di quello di Kant. Però, se scivolo dalle scale, è colpa del mio corpo o della mia anima? Luporini: Grice, se scivoli dalle scale, direi che è il corpo a cadere, ma la mente che si chiede: “Perché proprio oggi?” Leonardo avrebbe già studiato il problema e Leopardi ne avrebbe scritto un verso malinconico! Grice: Ecco, allora il corpo animato di Vinci risolve gli errori pratici e la mente di Leopardi trasforma la caduta in filosofia ultra-filosofica. Ma Austin avrebbe chiesto se la scala è davvero una scala o solo un’idea di scala! Luporini: Grice, a questo punto, meglio affidarsi alla ragione conversazionale: se la conversazione funziona, la scala può diventare persino un trampolino per nuove idee. Tanto, tra corpo e mente, la vera implicatura è che si cade sempre con stile! Luporini, Cesare (1940). Filosofia e politica. Firenze: Sansoni.

Alessandro Luzzago (Brescia, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an accountable inference: interlocutors assume a cooperative, rational orientation to the exchange, so what is meant beyond what is said can be derived (and challenged) by appeal to shared conversational norms rather than to private inspiration or sheer rhetorical effect. In the Luzzago passage, “ragione conversazionale” is recast as a civic-spiritual discipline: Alessandro Luzzago, a Brescian patrician educated in Jesuit philosophical culture (publicly disputing hundreds of theses, moving between Padua, Milan, and Rome) and deeply involved in post‑Tridentine institutions of charity, mediation, and concord (Monti di Pietà, religious congregations, civic reconciliation), treats conversation as a practical technology for repairing the city—speech as a vehicle of concordia sustained by habits of listening, prudence, and beneficence. The comparison therefore contrasts Grice’s primarily explanatory project (how rational norms make indirect meaning intelligible and criticizable in talk) with Luzzago’s primarily formative project (how disciplined talk, underwritten by charity, creates the social conditions in which concord is possible at all). Where Grice’s maxims and implicature illuminate the logic of interpretation inside a conversational episode, Luzzago’s “conversational reason” functions as an ethic of dialogue and institutional practice—closer to civic rhetoric and pastoral governance—so that charity is not merely something that can be implied but something that must be enacted as the background commitment that keeps conversation from collapsing into faction, insult, or sterile disputation. In that sense Luzzago can be read as supplying a moral-political grounding for the cooperative stance that Grice typically models as a rational presumption: cooperation is not just a convenient default for deriving implicatures, but a cultivated virtue and a civic program, without which the very rationality of conversation would fail to take root in communal life. Grice: “I like L.” -- A retrsopective of an important philosopher. Keywords. implicatura. Filosofo italiano. Brescia, Lombardia. Nato da Girolamo e da Paola Peschiera, in una delle più importanti famiglie del patriziato cittadino, e educato alla pratica devota e all'apostolato. Nel convento di S. Antonio dei gesuiti si impegna in un corso di filosofia. Dibatte in pubblico 737 argomenti filosofici! Con l'aiuto di Borromeo partecipa a Milano ai corsi di teologia dei gesuiti di Brera. Si laurea a Padova. Desideroso di entrare a far parte della Compagnia di Gesù, le difficoltà economiche della famiglia, causate da alcune transazioni inopportune del padre, glielo impedirono. Conservatore dei Monti di Pietà, e  protettore della Compagnia delle Dimesse di S. Orsola e di altri due istituti caritativi bresciani: il Soccorso e le Zitelle. Ri-organizza e da nuovo impulse a un'altra istituzione sorta dopo il Concilio di Trento: la Scuola della dottrina cristiana. Fonda la Congregazione di S. Caterina da Siena. Per far sì che il suo operato continuasse, fonda la Congregazione dello Spirito Santo, che raccolse i membri della classe dirigente cittadina con l'obiettivo di co-operare più efficacemente e concordemente al sostegno di tutte le buone istituzioni e mantenere un clima di Concordia. Infatti, intercede per la conciliazione delle famiglie nobili bresciane spesso in conflitto. La sua indole caritativa emerse soprattutto quando venne a far parte del Consiglio di Brescia, dove sa armonizzare le strutture governative ed organismi canonici. Nelle opere scritte vi sono indicazioni per i cavalieri di Malta, sulla carità, ispirati al modello della Compagnia di Gesù. Durante il suo viaggio a Roma esamina le strutture di beneficenza per poi proporle a Brescia. Ha la possibilità di conoscere F. Neri. In un'epistola a Morosini, e informato che Clemente, prende in considerazione il suo nome per la carica di arcivescovo di Milano. Implicatura. Grice: Caro Luzzago, mi ha sempre colpito il modo in cui riesci a intrecciare la ragione conversazionale con la carità. Secondo te, la filosofia ha davvero il potere di creare concordia nelle città? Luzzago: Gentile Grice, penso che la filosofia debba essere vissuta come pratica quotidiana, soprattutto nel dialogo. La conversazione, se fondata sulla comprensione reciproca, è il primo passo per sanare i conflitti e promuovere la concordia, proprio come ho cercato di fare a Brescia. Grice: Mi piace questa tua visione. A Oxford, spesso dibattiamo su implicature sottili, ma forse è nel concreto agire, come tu suggerisci, che la ragione conversazionale trova il suo vero senso. La carità, allora, diventa una vera implicatura filosofica? Luzzago: Esattamente, Grice! La carità non è solo un gesto, ma un principio filosofico che si manifesta nel dialogo e nell’azione. Credo che la filosofia debba essere utile: armonizzare, ascoltare, proporre soluzioni. Dopotutto, come insegna la Compagnia di Gesù, senza compassione il ragionare resta arido. Luzzago, Alessandro (1598). Discorsi politici. Venezia: Franceschi.

Macedo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an accountable, rational step from what is said to what is meant, licensed by cooperative expectations that let hearers supply what is left unsaid in a disciplined way. The Macedo vignette (a learned Roman “garden” philosopher, placed in the Aulus Gellius milieu and given a playful Dicta voice) casts conversational reason less as a set of inferential norms and more as a scene and ethos: philosophy as cultivated sociability, where talk is sustained by place (hortus vs porticus), shared leisure, and a style of exchange that makes ideas fruitful rather than merely correct. Compared with Grice, Macedo’s “orto romano” emphasizes the environmental and convivial conditions under which implicatures thrive—common ground, relaxed timing, mutual goodwill—whereas Grice’s distinctive move is to abstract from the setting and explain how, even without shared gardens or rituals, interlocutors can still justifiably derive intended meanings through principles that make interpretation criticizable (one can ask: was that really implied, and by what reasoning?). In other words, Macedo provides a cultural micro-model of how conversation becomes philosophical (the garden as a technology of civil talk), while Grice provides the explanatory mechanism of how conversation becomes meaningful (implicature as reason-governed inference); and the contrast also shows how the same indirectness can be read either as a virtue of cultivated company (Macedo’s salad-and-implicature conviviality) or as a formally characterizable feature of communicative intention and rational uptake (Grice’s maxims and their calculable departures). Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialectic, in contrast with the Oxonian dialectic, I point to the agora where Socrates philosophized barefoot, but also the gyms at Plato’s academy and Aristotle’s lizio – and last but not least, the portico, and the orto. Oddly, it was the orto, or garden, which for years, and thanks to Walter Pater – our father – remained for years the most influential school at Oxford, due to the efforts of one called Marius!” Macedo was a philosopher and a friend of Aulo Gellio. Livio. Macedo. GRICEVS: Salve, Macede, audivi te in orto Romano philosophari. Dic mihi, quid inter ortum et porticum interest? Ego semper in porticu frigore laboravi! MACEDVS: O Grice, in orto Romae, philosophus non solum cogitat, sed etiam pomum edit! Porticus est locus rectus, ortus autem locus rotundus—ut mens nostra post prandium. GRICEVS: Ergo, ortus magis ad dialogum aptus est? Socrates, si in horto fuisset, forsitan non solum disputavit, sed etiam cucumeres distribuit. MACEDVS: Certe! In horto, omnis conversatio fructus fert. Grice, venias ad hortum meum: promittimus philosophicas implicaturas et salata—ne quis sit disputatio arida! Macedo (a. u. c. CMXIII). Dicta. Roma.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (Firenze, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale del principe di LIVIO at Oxford. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an accountable inference from what is said to what is meant, guided by shared rational expectations (cooperation, relevance, adequate informativeness) and anchored in the speaker’s intention that the hearer recognize those intentions; the point is to explain how communication can be indirect yet still disciplined by reasons. Machiavelli is a useful foil because his central concern is not conversational inference but strategic action under conditions of conflict, partial trust, and institutional fragility: in The Prince and the Discourses (with Livy as a standing source of exempla), what agents “mean” or “signal” is often designed to manage appearances, secure obedience, or pre-empt rivals, so indirectness becomes a tool of prudence and power rather than a benign by-product of cooperative rational exchange. Compared this way, Grice’s conversational “quasi-contract” is a normative background that makes implicature calculable and criticizable, whereas Machiavelli’s political “contract” (and its breaches) is precisely what cannot be assumed, making interpretation itself a contested field where deception, dissimulation, and strategic ambiguity are sometimes rational. The overlap is that both are, in their own domains, theorists of practical reason: Grice models the rational constraints that make mutual understanding possible; Machiavelli models the rational constraints that make stable rule possible when mutual understanding is unreliable. Even the onomastic play in your passage (Machiavelli as “crafty/shrewd,” the Oxford worry about spelling and pronunciation, and Machiavelli’s own attention to linguistic nuance) can be read Griceanly: it dramatizes how small choices in wording and form carry socially legible implications—but where Grice treats those implications as answerable to cooperative norms, Machiavelli treats them as instruments within a competitive arena where what is left unsaid may matter most because others will weaponize it. Grice: “Humpty Dumpty is wrong. If someone comes to you and she is named’Alice’ is very rare that you would be curious as to what ‘Alice’ means – it’s different with ‘M..’ The surname M. is of Italian origin, primarily associated with the region of Toscana. While its precise etymology is debated, the leading theory suggests it derives from the Old Italian ‘machiave,’ which means ‘crafty’ or ‘shrewd’. Some sources suggest the nam’s meaning is related to ‘sneaky’ or ‘deceitful.’ This association with cunning and strategic thinking is strongly reinforced by the legacy of M., the influential Renaissance political philosopher and diplomat whose work, The Prince, explored pragmatic and sometimes ruthless approaches to governance. Other potential derivations include a hypothesis linking the surname to the medieval name ‘Malchiodo,’ a variant of the Hebrew name ‘Melki’or, meanin ‘my king) (God) is light’. In conclusion, the most widely accepted etymology links the surname ‘M.’ to the Italian term meaning ‘crafty’ or ‘shrewd,’ a meaning further empahsised by its association with the renowned philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli. Filosofo fiorentino. Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Grice: “While Strawson prefers ‘The Prince,’ my favourite M. is the dialogo, discorso, ovvero dialogo intorno della lingua. The full title makes it sound slightly analytic – ‘whether it should be called ‘florentine, Italian, or tooscana’ I mean, a stipulation! Like me, we can call Machiavelli a philosopher of language – the trend being very Florentine between M. and Varchi. Possibly Italy’s greateset philosopher. Grice: “L. J. Cohen told me that he once asked for the MS of The Prince at his college – and they told him: ‘We cannot find it!’ Livio, storia romana – Grice on the history of England – Livio, storia romana –la storia romana come fonte d’essempi nella filosofia romana --il principe, Macchiavelli fascista – l’ossessione dal duce per M., la dottrina fascista dello stato machiavellico, Empiegatura. Grice: Caro Machiavelli, mi consenta una curiosità: secondo lei, dovrei raddoppiare la “c” nel suo cognome e pronunciarlo “Macchiavelli”? Le confesso che, a Oxford, la tentazione filologica è forte! Non sarebbe solo una questione di ortografia, ma proprio di musicalità della lingua italiana, che rispetto moltissimo. Machiavelli: Carissimo Grice, la sua osservazione è assai acuta! In effetti, anche io trovo che “Macchiavelli” abbia un suono più pieno e deciso. Non solo la scrittura, ma la pronuncia geminata rende meglio la fermezza del mio pensiero e la concretezza fiorentina. Quasi quasi dovremmo adottarla ufficialmente! Grice: Che bello sentirglielo dire! D'altronde, anche nei suoi dialoghi lei attribuiva molta importanza alla lingua, al modo in cui le parole vengono usate, quasi come se la filosofia stessa fosse questione di una lettera in più o in meno. Machiavelli: Esatto, Grice. A Firenze, ogni sfumatura conta, anche nella pronuncia. E poi, come lei insegna, ciò che si implica conversando può modificare il senso stesso delle parole. Dunque, avanti con “Macchiavelli”, se così il discorso risulta più incisivo e… più italiano! Machiavelli, Niccolò di Bernardo dei (1498). Scritto. Palazzo della Signoria, Firenze.

Ambrogio Teodosio Macrobio: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally tractable step from what is said to what is meant, licensed by shared cooperative expectations and by the speaker’s intention that the hearer recognize those intentions; it is a theory about how unsaid content becomes accountable in ordinary exchange. Macrobius, by contrast, is not offering a pragmatic calculus of inference but a literary-philosophical staging of learned discourse: in the Saturnalia he frames erudition as banquet conversation, and the “extra” meaning often rides on cultural allusion, quotation, and the social choreography of speakers rather than on a minimalist set of maxims designed to predict and justify inferences. The comparison is therefore between two kinds of rational governance: Grice’s is normative and analytic, aiming to show how a hearer is entitled to derive a specific implicature (and how it can be cancelled or challenged), while Macrobius’s is exemplary and encyclopedic, showing how intellectual authority is exercised through dialogic form, where what is left unsaid is frequently supplied by shared education in Plato, Cicero, and the Roman tradition. In Gricean terms, Macrobius’s convivia presuppose an intensified common ground: the participants can “mean” by hint because they can rely on a thick background of texts and social roles, so the dialogue format becomes a machine for generating implicatures through learned recognizability rather than through strict conversational economy. And this also sharpens a biographical irony noted in your passage: Macrobius’s own origin is uncertain and he calls himself foreign-born, yet his conversational art depends on the very Roman continuity of learning that makes indirectness work—an anticipation, in a different register, of Grice’s idea that conversation is possible only where reason and mutual recognitional capacities are already in place. Grice: “When I won at Clifton a classics scholarship to Corpus I knew that sooner or later I would come to love Macrobius!” -- Filosofo italiano. Adere al Platonismo. E praefectus praetorio Hispaniarum, proconsole d’Africa, praepositus sacri cubiculi, gran ciambellano. È ignota la patria di M. Certamente M. dove essere legato da stretti rapporti alla famiglia dell’oratore Simmaco, a un figlio o nipote del quale dedica un saggio. Scrive un commento al Sogno di Scipione di CICERONE, che ci è giunto intero, e i Saturnalia, lacunosi. Dal De differentiis et societatibus graeci latinique verbi, Delle differenze e concordanze del verbo greco e del latino," restano soltanto estratti, nulla può risultare sull’argomento. Nel commento, dedicato al figlio Eustachio, cerca d’interpretare in senso platonico il saggio di CICERONE, accumula molta erudizione e perciò spesso si occupa di argomenti che poco hanno da fare col suo oggetto. I frequenti riferimenti al Timeo e le lodi del Platonismo -- Platone e Plotino sono chiamati, i principi della filosofia -- fa supporre che M. si sia servito di un commento platonico a quel dialogo, probabilmente di quello di Porfirio, derivato in ultimo dal commento di Posidonio.Si è anche pensato a una fonte latina intermedia e sulla questione sono state presentate svariate ipotesi.In ogni caso, anche se non si giunge a considerare M. come un semplice trascrittore di una o due opere altrui, che non mette nulla di suo, si può sospettare che non abbia letto i numerosi autori che cita, Posteriori al Commento sembrano i Saturnali in 7 libri, scritti prima della pubblicazione del commento virgiliano di Servio, pure dedicati al figlio Eustachio, al quale volle presentare i risultati dei suoi studi di autori di cui generalmente riprodusse le parole. Però cerca di organizzare tali temi fingendo di riprodurre le conversazioni che, durante banchetti fatti in occasione delle feste dei Saturnali, avevano tenuto persone insigni per cultura su argomenti svariatissimi. Ambrogio Teodosio Macrobio. Roma. GRICEVS: Macrobî, gratias tibi ago: ex Saturnalibus tuis didici non solum convivium, sed etiam rationem conversationalem—et (ut dicimus) implicaturam. MACROBIVS: Grice, si “implicatura” dicis, iam te inter convivas meos pono: plura intellegis quam dicis, et tamen nihil neglegenter dicis. GRICEVS: Cum Cliftonii ad Corpus stipendium classicum ceperim, scivi me tandem Macrobium amaturum: ecce, praefectum praetorio amo, sed meum amorem tantum subintelligo. MACROBIVS: Bene facis: Platonici enim solemus plus in Timeo quam in mensa ponere; tu vero, convivator urbanissime, ostendis etiam scholam posse cenare—modo nemo me roget unde sim: id, more meo, implicatur. Macrobio, Ambrogio Teodosio (a. u. c. MCLIII). Comentarii in Somnium Scipionis. Roma

Lorenzo Magalotti (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale di naturali esperienze. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as an inferential achievement licensed by cooperative norms: what is meant goes beyond what is said because rational interlocutors can justify, and contest, the route from utterance to intended uptake, with “natural” meaning (signs, symptoms) kept distinct from speaker-meaning even when ordinary talk slides between them. Magalotti’s Saggi di naturali esperienze (first issued in 1666 as the Accademia del Cimento’s experimental reports, with Magalotti as secretary-editor) embodies a different but complementary rationality: the disciplining of experience through public procedures, controlled observation, and reportable description, in which the aim is to make nature legible by agreed methods rather than to make intentions legible by maxims. The comparison is thus between two norms of intelligibility: for Grice, conversational reason is the set of pragmatic expectations that make indirect communication accountable (so that metaphorical or adjectival talk of “natural” and “artificial” meaning can be sorted by tests like cancellability and calculability), whereas for Magalotti, reason is the shared experimental ethos that turns “experience” into communicable knowledge via repeatable trials and carefully framed narratives of phenomena. Where Grice explains how hearers recover what a speaker is doing with words, Magalotti shows how a community recovers what nature is doing through instruments, protocols, and collectively readable “saggi”; and the bridge between them is that both projects depend on a public standard of justification—Grice’s inferences must be defensible to other speakers, Magalotti’s observations must be defensible to other investigators—so that in each case meaning is not private impression but something stabilized by communal, reason-governed practices. Grice: “Sometimes, derivatives are a trick. The Romans had a wonderful concept of NATVRA, a strict rendition of Greek PHYSIS – and yet, you find philosophers using ‘nature’ only metaphorical – as when I refer to the irreverent talent with which the sage Nature endowed me. Instead, a philosopher likes an adjective, as when, now as I look back, I addressed the Oxford philosophical society on the topic of ‘meaning’ – Borrowing from the adjectival uses of ‘naturalis’ and ‘artificialis’ as applied to ‘meaning,’ or ‘segno,’ I oblitated Nature into the bargain! I like M. – very philosophical. When a philosopher is a count, we don’t say that he was a professional philosopher, but not an amateur philosopher either – ‘philosopher’ does! I like his ‘saggi’ on ‘natural experience’ – he is being Aristotelian: there is natural experience and there is trans-natural experience – and there is supernatural experience!” Appartenente all’aristocrazia, figlio del prefetto dei corriere pontifici. Studia a Roma e Pisa, dove e allievo di VIVIANI e MALPIGHI. Segretario di Leopoldo de' Medici, segretario dell'Accademia del Cimento, fondata da de’ Medici. Fa parte anche dell'Accademia della Crusca e dell'Accademia dell'Arcadia, Dall'esperienza al Cimento nacque i “Saggi di naturali esperienze, ossia le relazioni dell'attività dell'Accademia del Cimento”. Passa al servizio di Cosimo III de' Medici iniziando così un'attività che lo porta a una serie di viaggi per l'Europa (raccolse in diverse opere le sue vivaci e brillanti relazioni di viaggio). Ottenne il titolo di conte e la nomina ad ambasciatore a Vienna. Si ritira alla villa Magalotti, in Lonchio. Si dedica alla filosofia, con particolare attenzione per la filosofia naturale di Galilei Opere: “Canzonette anacreontiche di Lindoro Elateo, pastore arcade, delle lettere familiari del conte M. e di altri insigni uomini a lui scritte, Diario di Francia, Doglio, Palermo, Sellerio, di naturali esperienze, ‘naturali esperienze. Grice: Magalotti, trovo affascinante la sua capacità di distinguere tra esperienza naturale e sovrannaturale. La filosofia, per lei, sembra davvero un viaggio attraverso mondi diversi dell’esperienza! Magalotti: Caro Grice, grazie. Ritengo che la natura abbia molte più sfumature di quanto si creda. Ogni esperienza, osservata con occhi filosofici, svela una ricchezza che spesso sfugge ai distratti. Grice: È vero, signor Conte. Ho sempre pensato che il termine “naturale” venga talvolta usato troppo metaforicamente. Lei invece restituisce a “naturale” una dignità aristotelica, distinguendo con cura ciò che appartiene all’esperienza umana. Magalotti: Mi fa piacere che colga questa sfumatura. Filosofare, per me, significa “saggiare” la natura: è ciò che facevo all’Accademia del Cimento, sperimentando, osservando e riflettendo. La filosofia naturale è una vera arte dell’esperienza. Grice: Conte Magalotti, mi dica la verità: se l’esperienza naturale si trova anche in cucina, l’Accademia del Cimento avrebbe dovuto sperimentare la ribollita o la pizza? Magalotti: Caro Grice, in effetti la filosofia naturale funziona meglio davanti a un piatto fumante. La ribollita ha una sua implicatura: più si scalda, più diventa sapiente! Grice: Ottimo, allora ogni cena è un “saggio di naturali esperienze”: Aristotele avrebbe scritto il trattato sull’olio d’oliva, non sulla logica! Magalotti: Esattamente! E se Galileo avesse inventato la pizza, forse avremmo misurato la gravità con il pomodoro. La filosofia, in fondo, è una questione di gusto e implicatura conversazionale… anche a tavola! Magalotti, Lorenzo (1666). Saggi di naturali esperienze, Firenze: Cocchini.

Vincenzo Maggi (Pompiano, Brescia, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- implicatura ridicola. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a disciplined, inferential achievement: hearers are entitled to derive what is meant beyond what is said because speakers are (normally) taken to be cooperating under rational norms, so the “extra” content is publicly criticizable and cancellable rather than a mere stylistic aura. The Maggi passage (despite the biographical/bibliographic confusion: Vincenzo Maggi is a 16th-century Brescian humanist, not an 1880 Hoepli author) uses “implicatura ridicola” to pivot from inferential pragmatics to a rhetorical-aesthetic problem inherited from Latin and Renaissance discussions of ridiculum: how laughter, derision, and the comic register function as modes of saying more (or other) than is said, often by hint, irony, and strategic understatement. On this comparison, Grice would treat the “ridiculous” as a predictable pragmatic effect only when it is traceable to conversational reasoning—e.g., when an utterance flouts a norm (relevance, quantity, manner) in a way that licenses a specific implicature—whereas the Maggi line invites a thicker view in which ridicule is itself a philosophical instrument (connected to Ciceronian mockery, to Poetics commentary, and to the tragic/comic boundary) that can reframe a dispute without needing to be reconstrued as a maxim-based calculation. The contrast, then, is between Grice’s accountability model (implicatures are what a rational speaker can be held to have meant, because the route from said to meant is principled) and a Maggi-style humanist model in which comic indirection functions as a cultural technology of persuasion and critique, sometimes operating less like a determinate inference and more like a socially shared cue that reassigns status, seriousness, or authority in the conversation. Grice: “I don’t know why Cicero found Stoicism ridiculous – but I fear the word carried a different implicature back in Ancient Rome!” The English word ‘ridiculous’ and the Italian word ‘ridicolo’ both stem from the Latin verb ‘ridere, to laugh, or to laugh at. Here’s the breakdown.Ridere (Latin verb) to laugh. Ridiculus, Latin adjective: laughable, funny, amusing, absurd, ridiculous.This adjective is derived from ‘ridere’ ‘ridiculosus (late Latin adjective) laughable – droll. This word is the DIRECT source of the English word ‘ridiculous.’ Ridicolo (Italian adjective) directly descended from the latin adjective ridiculus. In essence, both words trace their roots bak to the Latin concept of laughter, particularly that which excites amusement or derision. I like his portrait. My favourite of his essays is on the ridiculous; but his most specifically philosophical stuff is the ‘lectiones philosophicae’ and the ‘consilia philosophica.’” La famiglia aveva possedimenti e anche un negozio di farmacia. Il padre Francesco, uomo di lettere, fu il suo primo maestro.  Studia a Padova con Bagolino e frequenta attivamente gli ambienti culturali della città. Si laurea e insegna filosofia. Degl’Infiammati, strinse amicizia con Barbaro, Lombardi, Piccolomini, Speroni, Tomitano, Varchi, entrò quindi a far parte del circolo di Bembo, frequentando insigni filosofi come Paleario, Lampridio e Emigli. Conobbe Pole, Vergerio, Flaminio e Priuli. Il dibattito sulla questione della lingua e sui temi estetici legati soprattutto all'interpretazione della Poetica aristotelica condusse alla preparazione di un commento allo scritto di Aristotele che, iniziato da Lombardi, fu proseguito, concluso e fatto pubblicare da M., con altra sua opera dedicata ad ORAZIO, a Venezia: le In Aristotelis librum de Poetica communes explanationes: Implicatura ridicola, Eco, il nome della rosa, Cicerone, il tragico, filosofia tragica, pessimismo, l’eroe tragico, Nietzsche, la tragedia per musica – I curiazi, catone in Utica – tragedia per musica. Grice: Caro Maggi, ogni volta che parli di implicatura ridicola mi viene in mente Cicerone che ride degli stoici. Secondo te, il ridicolo in filosofia è davvero una questione seria, o basta una risata per cambiare prospettiva? Maggi: Grice, in verità penso che il ridicolo sia la chiave segreta della filosofia. Se Aristotele avesse riso un po’ di più, forse la Poetica avrebbe avuto un finale comico e Catone in Utica sarebbe diventato protagonista di una tragedia per musica… ma con musica allegra! Grice: Ecco, Maggi, il tragico e il comico si mescolano come i curiazi in battaglia: a volte basta un errore di grammatica per passare dalla tragedia al ridicolo. Eco diceva che il nome della rosa è già implicatura, ma io preferisco il nome del sorriso. Maggi: Concordo, Grice! In fondo, la filosofia è un’opera buffa: tra pessimisti e eroi tragici, chi sa ridere trova sempre una via d’uscita. La vera implicatura, forse, è che la conversazione non finisce mai… finché qualcuno ride. Maggi, Vincenzo (1880). Sull'origine delle specie. Milano: Hoepli.

Gaetano Magli (Roma, Lazio): La ragione conversazionale del pirotese e il deutero-esperanto. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as something a hearer can rationally work out by assuming cooperative, intention-directed talk: what is meant is not a matter of mere convention or code, but of recognizable communicative intentions constrained by shared norms of relevance, informativeness, and so on. In the Magli passage, by contrast, “la ragione conversazionale del pirotese e il deutero-esperanto” pushes on the opposite pole of the code idea by imagining ultra-artificial, even unused or anti-Babel “universal” systems (Anti-Babilona/Antibabele with numeral-based symbols, coordinate names, interplanetary aspirations), where meaning seems to depend on designed notation rather than living uptake in ordinary exchange; that makes Magli (as staged here) a foil for Grice, since Grice’s point is precisely that a perfectly specifiable “language” that nobody speaks would not thereby yield conversational meaning, because implicature depends on participation in reason-responsive practices, not merely on a formal alphabet or a supposedly universal calculus. The comparison therefore highlights a tension between two ways of seeking universality: Magli’s imagined “deutero-Esperanto” and anti-Babel projects pursue universality by stripping communication down to engineered symbols (as if optimality were achieved by removing ordinary life), whereas Grice’s universality claim is pragmatic and ethical-intellectual: any agents who can recognize one another as rational, cooperative interlocutors can, in principle, generate and recover implicatures, even across imperfect codes, because the governing structure is reason plus intention plus shared expectations, not a particular constructed lexicon. Grice: “When I was invited to explore on the optimality of meaning at Brighton –of all places (I’d rather be surfing!) – I said, slightly out of the blue: ‘convention? Surely language has nothing to do with convention. I can invent a language, call it Deutero-Esperanto – that nobody ever speaks! I wasn’t thinking of M.!” anti-babele: la vera lingua universale. Vikipedio  Serĉi Anti-Babilona internacia planlingvo proponita Lingvo Atenti Redakti Anti-Babilona aŭ Antibabele estas internacia planlingvo proponita de Halien M., eble plumnomo de M., kun elementoj prenitaj el aziaj, afrikaj kaj eŭropaj lingvoj. Ĝi uzas kiel alfabeton la arabajn nombrojn kun punktoj supren aŭ malsupren la ciferoj. Geografiaj nomoj estas anstataŭigitaj per koordenadojn kaj personaj nomoj per la dato de naskiĝo kaj morto.  M. pensis ke estis inteligentaj vivantoj en aliaj proksimaj planedoj, kiel Marto, kaj oni bezonus logike matematika lingvaĵo por interkomunikigi al ili. Laŭ li, la nombro 365 signifus interplanede Tero, ĉar la Tera jaro havas 365 tagojn, kaj 224 estus logike Venuso.  La aŭtoro konis la projekton Lincos, kiu eble influis lin.  Bibliografio redakti Antibabele "la vera lingua universale.", M. Ĝermo pri planlingvo Ĉi tiu artikolo ankoraŭ estas ĝermo pri planlingvo. Helpu al Vikipedio plilongigi ĝin. Se jam ekzistas alilingva samtema artikolo pli disvolvita, traduku kaj aldonu el ĝi (menciante la fonton). Laste redaktita antaŭ 1 jaro de CasteloBot RILATAJ PAĜOJ Laŭbita logiko Pruvo per disputo Predikata logiko Vikipedio La enhavo estas disponebla laŭ CC BY-SA 4.0, se ne estas alia indiko. Regularo pri respekto de la privateco Uzkondiĉoj Labortablo. Poeta visivo e performer sperimentale, Paolo Albani è anche autore di vari saggi e repertori su ogni tipo di "bizzarrie letterarie e non". Le ricerche (già praticate da personaggi quali Raymond Queneau ed ECO). Grice: A Brighton, tra un gelato e un’implicatura, ho lanciato il Deutero‑Esperanto come lingua che nessuno parla, così finalmente smettiamo di fingere che la convenzione sia il bagnino del significato. Magli: Caro Grice, il pirotese ti avrebbe risposto che l’anti‑Babele è l’unica spiaggia davvero universale, dove perfino Marte capisce perché 365 è Terra e non un numero qualsiasi. Grice: Esatto, Gaetano, se i numeri parlano meglio delle parole allora lasciamo che l’Esperanto si prenda ferie e invitiamo i marziani a riconoscere le intenzioni, non i dizionari. Magli: E io aggiungo, con un sorriso romano, che se il pirotese incontra l’Antibabele nasce la prima lingua che capisce tutto senza dire niente, il che è già una splendida conversazione. Magli, Gaetano (1869). La filosofia del diritto. Napoli: Morano.

Valeriano Magni (Milano, Lombardia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally recoverable inference from what is said to what is meant, grounded in norms (his maxims) that need not be framed as commands: they can be cast as objectives, precepts, or axioms, so long as they function as publicly criticizable standards for interpreting utterances in cooperative exchange. Valeriano Magni (Milanese Capuchin, active in Prague and across diplomatic-theological contexts, and author of works including De acatholicorum credendi regula judicium and a De natura hominis printed in Venice in 1625) approaches “ratio” in a more explicitly metaphysical and doctrinal key, where identity-style principles (your “Petrus est Petrus” motif) and talk of ratio essendi signal an underlying architecture of being and demonstration rather than a pragmatic mechanism for recovering speaker-intentions. The comparison, then, is between Grice’s use of rational principles as regulative constraints on conversational inference (why a hearer is entitled to derive a particular implicature, and how such derivations can be cancelled, defended, or criticized) and Magni’s use of rational principles as constitutive truths or axioms that articulate what things are (and, in religious polemic, what warrants belief or authority). Put simply: Grice treats reason as governing interpretation in talk, with maxims functioning like the rules of an inferential practice; Magni treats reason as governing reality and right belief, with axioms functioning like metaphysical-theological fixtures. That makes Magni a helpful foil for Grice: he shows how easily “reason” can mean a theory of being or a rule of faith, whereas Grice’s distinct contribution is to relocate rational governance inside the mechanics of communicative exchange—where even an “axiom” matters less as a statement about the world than as a norm that structures what we may responsibly mean, and take another to mean, in conversation. Grice: “There are alternate ways of describing what I call a conversational maxim. The imperative mode is not imperative. An objective, a paeceptum, even an ‘axiom’ may play the role! I love M. He has gems like ‘Petrus is Petrus.’ I’m talking about his Principia et specimen philosophiæ. The titles for the chapters are amusing, and he refers to ‘ratio essendi’ – and other stuff. *Very* amusing!” Figlio dal conte Costantino M., si trasfere a Praga. Entra nei cappuccini della provincia boema a Praga. Insegna filosofia entrando, grazie al suo insegnamento, nelle grazie dell'imperatore. Presto è eletto provinciale della provincia austro-boema e divenne apprezzato consigliere dell’imperatore e di altri principi. Il re Sigismondo gli affida la missione cappuccina nel suo paese. Ferdinando l’invia in missione diplomatica in Francia. È uno dei consiglieri di duca Massimiliano di iera. Dopo la battaglia della montagna bianca, sostenne l'arcivescovo di Praga Ernesto Adalberto d'Harrach nella cattolicizzazione della popolazione e nelle riforme diocesane. Prende parte in nome dell'imperatore ai negoziati con Richelieu sulla successione ereditaria al trono di MANTOVA. Divenne consulente teologico nei negoziati per la pace di Praga e missionario apostolico per l'elettorato di Sassonia, Assia, Brandeburgo e Danzica. Riproduce a Varsavia di fronte al re e alla corte l'esperimento di RUBERTI Torricelli usando un tubo riempito di mercurio per produrre il vuoto. Riusce a convertire il conte Ernesto d'Assia-Rheinfels. Dopo che Praga venne affidata ai gesuiti, entra in contrasto con i gesuiti, che lo fanno arrestare a Vienna. Rilasciato dalla prigione per intervento dell’imperatore, torna a Salisburgo. Frutto della sua polemica con i protestanti è De acatholicorum credendi regula judicium in cui sostene che senza l’autorità della chiesa, la bibbia da sola non è sufficiente come regola di fede per i cristiani. Grice è Grice, Grice ha Grice, Grice izz Grice, Grice hazz Grice. Implicatura. Paolo è Paolo: assiomi e principi metafisici. Grice: Caro Magni, trovo davvero affascinante il modo in cui declini le massime conversazionali. L’idea che un imperativo possa essere anche un assioma o un precetto mi ha colpito. Mi piace moltissimo il tuo “Petrus è Petrus” – sembra quasi un gioco filosofico! Magni: Grazie, caro Grice! È vero, la filosofia non si accontenta di un solo modo di vedere le cose. “Petrus è Petrus” richiama il principio dell’identità, ma anche la semplicità della verità. Ogni massima, ogni precetto, può essere una piccola luce nel buio della conversazione. Grice: Mi piace il tuo modo di mettere in risalto la “ratio essendi” e la concretezza degli assiomi. Forse la conversazione stessa è il terreno dove queste verità diventano vive, proprio come mostri nei tuoi Principia et specimen philosophiæ. È un approccio che porta aria fresca nella filosofia! Magni: Ti ringrazio, caro Grice. Credo che la filosofia debba essere vissuta, oltre che pensata. Ogni conversazione è un esperimento, come quello del vuoto che ho riprodotto a Varsavia: anche un principio metafisico può essere provato e riscoperto tra amici. E la massima “Grice è Grice” lo dimostra alla perfezione! Magni, Valeriano (1625). De natura hominis. Venezia: Guerigli.

Marsilio dei Mainardini (Padova, Veneto): l’implicatura conversazionale del popolo romano di Livio o il consorzio degl’eroi. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rationally reconstructible step from what is said to what is meant, under cooperative norms that make speakers answerable for the inferences they invite. In the Mainardini passage, “l’implicatura conversazionale del popolo romano di Livio” treats the background of cooperation less as a local norm of talk and more as a civic and historical model: Marsilio dei Mainardini (here presented in a Paduan, anti-curialist, Paris-trained political-philosophical arc, with Livy, Romulus/Remus, and “consorzio” imagery) is used to redescribe collective life as if it were a conversation whose stability depends on a shared rational order, so that peace becomes the analogue of successful uptake and civil concord becomes the analogue of interpretive convergence. The contrast, then, is partly one of level: Grice’s quasi-contractual “principle” is meant to ground micro-explanations of how particular utterances generate implicatures, cancellations, and disputes in ordinary exchanges, whereas the Mainardini frame (linking “defensor pacis,” the people as a consortium, and a grammar of political change) expands the same cooperative logic into a macro-theory of polity, where the “people” function as co-conversationalists and breakdowns look like breaches in a shared discursive order rather than mere pragmatic misfires. In that enlarged register, what Grice calls reason-governance becomes not only the discipline of interpretation but an allegory of government: the successful state is one whose public speech practices sustain common rational commitments, while faction, corruption, or curial domination mark failures of the very conditions that, in Grice’s narrower sense, make implicature calculable and conversation possible. Grice: “I often wondered: if William of Occam were known to have belonged to a noble family, say, that of the Chumleys – we would refer to him as Chumley, not Occam. The Italians know better. Marsilio is a pretty common Christian name – once  you know that this Marsilio belonged to ‘dei M.’ – plural of ‘Mainardino’ – you better acknowledge that!” Grice: “In any case, it is very rare that a political philosopher is called a philosopher at Oxford! Padova tries to institute the ‘regnum’ as between Aristotle’s ‘polis’ and the modern ‘stato,’ but in which case, we wouldn’t call it ‘politeia’ anymore!” --  GricWhen I studied change I focused on von Wright – but then there is Padova and his ‘grammatica del mutamento’!”  Nato da una famiglia di giudici e notai – il padre: ‘di Giovanni’ -- che viveva vicino al Duomo di Padova, completò i suoi studi a Parigi dove fu insignito dell'autorità di rettore. Il tempo trascorso a Parigi influì moltissimo sull'evoluzione del suo pensiero. Gli anni parigini furono molto importanti e fecondi per l'evoluzione del suo pensiero e la visione dello stato di corruzione in cui versava il clero lo portò a diventare anti-curialista.  A Parigi incontrò Occam e Jandun, con cui condivise passione politica e atteggiamento di avversione verso il potere temporale della Chiesa. Con Jandun rimase legato da grande amicizia e assieme a lui subì l'esilio.  M. dopo le sue dure affermazioni contro la Chiesa venne bollato con l'epiteto di figlio del diavolo. M. si trova a Parigi quando si sviluppò la lotta tra Filippo, re di Francia, e il Papato. Tutto ciò, assieme al vivace contesto culturale in cui si muoveva, lo portò alla compilazione della sua opera maggiore il Defensor Pacis, l'opera cui deve la sua fama e che influì moltissimo sia sul pensiero filosofico-politico contemporaneo che su quello successivo.  Il popolo italiano, consorzio conversazionale, difensore della pace, leviatano, allegoria del buon governo – allegoria del buon governo, Livio, Romolo, Machiavelli. La massima del consorzio conversazionale. Grice: Marsilio, dimmi, se il popolo romano di Livio avesse avuto la tua implicatura conversazionale, avremmo avuto meno guerre e più banchetti? Mainardini: Caro Grice, forse sì! Invece di fondare imperi, avrebbero fondato consorzi per cucinare la miglior zuppa. La pace si difende meglio con un piatto pieno che con una spada! Grice: Mi piace la tua visione: la massima del consorzio conversazionale dovrebbe essere “parla bene, mangia meglio”. Se Machiavelli avesse avuto fame, avrebbe scritto “Il cuoco” invece del “Principe”. Mainardini: Esatto, Grice! E se Romolo e Remo avessero discusso davanti a una grigliata, Roma sarebbe nata per implicatura, non per conquista. La filosofia, in fondo, è un ottimo antipasto al buon governo! Mainardini, Marsilio dei (1550). Commentarii in Aristotelis Metaphysicam. Venezia: Valgrisi.

Francesco Majello (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers are entitled to move, by publicly articulable reasoning, from what is said to what is meant: implicatures arise because conversation is treated as a cooperative, norm-guided activity in which speakers can be held answerable for what they intentionally get their audience to recognize. Francesco Majello, by contrast (the Neapolitan “prete regio” whose Il cristiano in chiesa and Gramatica italiana ragionata both appear in 1826, and whose preface frames grammar as a civic necessity because “man in society is obliged to speak”), treats “la ragione conversazionale” less as an inferential engine for deriving speaker-meaning and more as an educative and moral-technical discipline: a prudent art of steering between Scylla and Charybdis—precision without pedantry, accessibility without childishness—so that social obligation to communicate is met with linguistic propriety. Where Grice locates rational governance primarily in the implicit reasoning that connects utterance to communicative intention (and thus in accountability for implicatures), Majello locates it in the prior formation of speakers through rule-conscious grammatical training, patronage-protected authorship, and an ideal of decorous public speech; the result is a contrast between Grice’s pragmatics of inference (how conversational norms license meanings beyond the literal) and Majello’s prescriptive civics of language (how norms of correctness and prudence make conversation worthy of educated society), with an overlap in their shared assumption that conversation is not mere spontaneity but a practice structured by norms that can be taught, followed, and criticized. M. also writes Il christiano in chiesa GRAMMATICA ITALIANA RAGIONATA. Lapidei et Ugna ab aliis accipio; aedijicii costructio tota nostra est. Architectus ego, sum, sed materiam varie undique conduxi. Nel dare alla luce la sua picciola grammatica italiana ragionata sui precetti a ben favellare nella lingua dell’Ariosto, e del Tasso, s’ingegna di mettergli in fronte il nome insigne d’un Mecenate. Lui si direge al mecenate che incanutito nelle armi, coltiva a vicenda gli studj di Marte, e sente che le brilla in fronte una corona intrecciata d’alloro e d’ulivo. È la fortuna di M. che la niente le ne suggerì a tempo il pehsiere. Il mecenate preservato la grammatica italiana ragionata di M. d’attacchi degl’aristarchi, come, al dir de’poeti , l’alloro preserva dai fulmini di Giove. Quindi è, che ogni ragion di calcolo esige, che, nel riprodurre la grammatica italiana ragionata, M. gli metta in fronte lo stesso nome. Li giova sperare che, essendo i suoi sentimenti gli stessi, trova il cuore del mecenate egualmente disposto. È del mecenate umile, dcvole ed obbligato. L’uomo nella società è sempre nell’obbligo di parlare. Qual vergogna è per un uomo educato se difetta nel parlare. Quindi nasce la necessità della grammatica. Lo studio della grammatica, essendo indispensabile al parlare, dove’essere la prima occupazione dell’uomo. Quindi nasce la difficoltà di presentar una grammatica che puo dirsi completa. Se si tenta sviluppar tutto colla necessaria precisione, è facile urtar nello scoglio di trascendere l’intelligenza dell’uomo. Se l’uomo s’ha presente, e si cerca adattarvisi, è facile imbattersi nello scoglio opposto, divenendo tutto arido, vagone puerile; incidit in Scyllam cupiens vitare Carybdiin. È della prudenza dà chi scrive una grammatica italiana ragionata per trarne veramente uuj profitto, scanzare i due scogli per quanto è possibile. Questo è quello che M. ha in mira. Grice: Caro Majello, mi ha sempre incuriosito la tua idea che la grammatica sia il primo fondamento del parlare nella società. Pensando alle regole conversazionali, ritrovo nella tua “grammatica italiana ragionata” una sorta di bussola per navigare tra Scilla e Cariddi: precisione senza aridità, chiarezza senza banalità. Come vedi il ruolo della prudenza nello scrivere una grammatica? Majello: Hai colto perfettamente, caro Grice. La prudenza è essenziale: chi scrive una grammatica deve saper evitare gli estremi, offrendo una guida che sia utile ma non pesante. Proprio come il mecenate che protegge l’opera dai fulmini, la prudenza preserva la chiarezza dalle insidie del linguaggio. Credo che ogni educato debba sentire il dovere di parlare bene, ma senza dimenticare la naturalezza della conversazione. Grice: Concordo, Majello. La conversazione è, in fondo, un’arte: saper parlare bene è il risultato di un equilibrio tra regole e spontaneità. Trovo affascinante il modo in cui tu metti in luce la vergogna dell’uomo educato che difetta nel parlare—da filosofo del linguaggio, mi sembra che la grammatica italiana ragionata possa davvero aiutare a superare questo scoglio. Majello: Grazie, Grice. È proprio questo il mio intento: offrire una grammatica che sia un ponte, non un muro. Ogni uomo, immerso nella società, si trova nell’obbligo di comunicare; la grammatica è il primo passo per farlo con profitto. Il nome del mecenate in fronte all’opera è simbolo di protezione e speranza che il cuore degli studiosi sia sempre disposto ad accogliere con favore il mio lavoro. Majello, Francesco (1826). Il cristiano in chiesa. Napoli.

Geronimo Malipiero, Malipiero (1527). Della natura umana. Venezia: Bindoni.

Troilo Malipiero (Venezia, Veneto): l’implicatura conversazionale del TRIONFO DELLA RAGIONE; ossia, confutazione del sistema del contratto sociale, the breach of contract, or Romolo e Remo, I due contrattanti. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as the product of rational accountability in talk: interlocutors proceed as if governed by cooperative norms, so that what is meant beyond what is said is recoverable by publicly criticizable reasoning rather than by private association or mere rhetorical flourish. Troilo Malipiero, by contrast, approaches “reason” through an explicitly quasi-contractual political idiom forged in polemic against Rousseau: in Il trionfo della ragione ossia Confutazione del sistema del contratto sociale (1801; reprinted 1818 with a retitled version), “reason” is mobilized to expose what he takes to be the instability or danger of the social-contract picture and to defend a different political order, so the central “breach of contract” theme becomes a way of narrating social cohesion and its failures at the level of institutions, sovereignty, and legitimacy. The comparison is therefore a contrast of scale and function: Grice’s “contract” is a rational presupposition internal to conversational practice (a quasi-contract that makes interpretation possible and makes speakers answerable for implicatures), whereas Malipiero’s contract is a contested political myth whose alleged breakdown has civil consequences, and whose refutation is presented as a triumph of reason over revolutionary theory; where Grice asks what must be assumed for intelligible exchange and inferential uptake to occur, Malipiero asks what must be rejected or re-founded for a polity to avoid fraternal conflict (the Romulus/Remus motif) and preserve order. In that sense, Malipiero supplies a political-theoretical dramatization of what Grice treats as a pragmatic background condition: the idea that cooperative intelligibility depends on shared commitments that can be violated, repaired, or rhetorically reconstrued—except that for Grice those commitments are norms of rational conversation, while for Malipiero they are the high-stakes terms by which societies claim authority and condemn “breach.”

Grice: “There is a famous adage well known at Oxford about the ‘feast of reason’ – and when I was invited to explore on my ‘quasi-contractualist’ basis for the rational principle underlying conversation, I hesitated. But then I thought: even in a purely contractualist theory, the very fact that a contract ever took place is taken for granted among discussants as what I call a ‘myth’!” Filosofo italiano. Venezia, Veneto. Grice: “I love Malipiero’s approach to philosophy: hardly a profession! As if someone were to be called ‘amateur cricketer’ – M. loves (‘ama’) philosophy and it shows!” – Grice: “There is philosophical wisdom in any endevaour he finds himself in!” Grice: “One must love him for his attempted ‘confutazione’ of Rousseau’s ‘sistema del contrato sociale’ as a ‘triumph of reason’!” Nasce da padre patrizio, provenente dalla storica casata dei M. Dichiara d’abitare in un palazzo a Santa Maria Zobenigo, cui s’aggiungevano quattro botteghe nei centralissimi quartieri di Rialto e San Moisè. Altre case si trovano tra Santa Margherita, San Gregorio e San Martino. Esordì in politica coll'elezione a savio agl’ordini, divenne provveditore alle Pompe, ma non riusce a prendere possesso della carica a causa della caduta della repubblica. Lascia la vita pubblica per dedicarsi alla filosofia analitica della lingua ordinaria. È un filosofo poli-edrico, capace di spaziare dall’attualità politica alla letteratura e alla tragedia. Grice: “I would often rely on contractualism, but [Welsh philosopher G. R.] Grice made a job out of it! I saw the cooperative principle as a matter of quasi-contract – whatever that is. And if it’s a MYTH, what’s wrong with it? Romolo mythically killed Remus because of a breach of contract, too!” Grice: “My thought exactly replicates that of Malipiero back in the good old days of Venetian republic – only there was more rhyme to reason in HIS scheme!” il trionfo della ragione, ossia, confutazione del sistema del contratto sociale.  Grice: Caro Malipiero, mi dica: se il trionfo della ragione è davvero la confutazione del contratto sociale, Romolo e Remo sarebbero stati due filosofi in lite, più che fondatori di Roma? Malipiero: Grice, in Venezia abbiamo imparato che ogni contratto si basa su una buona dose di fiducia... o su una bottiglia di vino! Se c’è una rottura, basta inventarsi una nuova ragione per festeggiare, anziché una guerra tra fratelli. Grice: Allora mi viene da pensare che la filosofia, più che professione, è una festa: ogni discussione è un banchetto, ogni disputa un brindisi alla logica, e se qualcuno infrange il contratto... si cambia menù! Malipiero: Bravo Grice! In fondo, la ragione vince quando si trova il giusto equilibrio tra parole e risate. Se Rousseau avesse provato la cucina veneziana, forse avrebbe scritto meno contratti e più ricette di buon vivere. Malipiero, Troilo (1794). Dimostrazione sulla triplicazione e trisezione dell’angolo effettuato colla retta e col cerchio.

Italo Mancini (Schieti, Urbino, Marche): l’implicatura conversazionale del kerygma. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rationally reconstructible, norm-guided inference from what is said to what is meant, anchored in cooperative expectations that make speakers answerable for what they intentionally get their hearers to recognize. In the Mancini comparison, “l’implicatura conversazionale del kerygma” shifts the center of gravity from the micro-logic of everyday talk to a theological-hermeneutic setting where what is communicated is proclamation (kerygma) and where “meaning” is tasked with mediating sense and significance across doctrine, culture, and praxis; this aligns with Mancini’s broader project (Urbino; philosophy of religion; engagement with Kant, radical evil, and moral rigor; and works such as Linguaggio e salvezza, 1964, and Kerygma, 1970) in which language is treated as ontologically and ethically loaded rather than primarily as a vehicle for conversational calculation. Where Grice explains how implicatures are generated by rational agents following conversational norms, Mancini effectively enlarges the governing norms to include an ethos of benevolence, responsibility, and salvific orientation, so that “cooperation” becomes not only a condition for intelligibility but a moral-theological demand (a “cooperativa” of sense, meaning, and community), and “alienation” names not just pragmatic misfire but a spiritual and social deformation of language. The upshot is that Grice offers a formal, accountability-centered model for deriving what a speaker means, while Mancini uses the same general idea of indirectness and shared reason to illuminate how proclamation and ethical commitment can be carried in, and sometimes distorted by, linguistic practice—treating conversational reason as a bridge from ordinary communication to the claims of faith and the problems of evil, salvation, and human praxis. Grice: “In my seminar on ‘conversation’ I focus on the principle of conversational benevolence, -- formerly the desideratum of other-love – as opposed to the desideratum of conversational self-love. It was only years later, when exploring Kant, I realised how crucial the role that benevolentia plays – which I had borrowed from Butler, not Kant – However, for Kant, benevolentia is PARALELL to malevolentia – which the English refer to as ‘ill-will’ – in that qua autonomous rational agents we may decide to pursue an end which everybody except ourselves regard as good – and in fact, which everyone but ourselves, regard as ‘ill’ – Some ill-will! I like M.: he has expanded on the ethos of cooperation – and he has explored what he calls ‘linguaggio ontologico’ and ‘alienazione’ in connection with language – he reviewed Pittau’s philosophy of language, and published a little thing on ‘language and salvation.’ So how can you NOT like him?”  Grice: “I like M.; if I dwell on philosophical eschatology, he dwells on the real thing!” Grice: “He has studied Kant thoroughly; all the interesting bits, like his idea of MALEVOLENTIA!”  “La filosofia è il passaggio dal senso al significato, attraverso le mediazioni culturali, dottrinali, attraverso la struttura del puro pensare e attraverso le mediazioni della prassi.” Studia a Fano e si laurea a Milano dove insegna. Bo lo vuole ad Urbino. Studia i massimi teologi, curato le opera di Barth, Bultmann e Bonhoeffer pubblicando, su quest'ultimo, anche una biografia e un'analisi dottrinale. Fonda l’istituto di scienze religiose, una facoltà teologica in una università laica.  Tra i filosofi, si dedica molto a Kant, pubblicando una Guida alla critica della ragion pura.  In questo senso è ancora più importante Kant e la teologia dove  tratta la filosofia della religione kantiana, fondata su una concezione morale rigorosa resa possibile dall'Imperativo categorico. Kerygma, male radicale, Kant, radical evil, cooperativa di credito, la massima della benevolenza conversazionale, il problema del vaticano, ventennio fascista e patti laterani. Grice is seated properly in his room at St John’s, as if posture were half of philosophical method. The next tutee is late, which is a blessing if you need it and a vice if you don’t. On the table, among the day’s ordinary litter of essays and pencilled lecture-notes, there are three Italian titles that have been doing more work than their authors can reasonably have intended. He begins, as he so often does, by not reading. The first one is from 1950, and it is the one that really catches him because it has the dangerous advantage of sounding like something Oxford could say without translating. Impegno con un libro. Impegno is a fine word, he thinks: it makes “commitment” sound less like a mood and more like a binding. It is also, in its clerical venue, the sort of term that carries a mild aura of vow. Mancini is writing in Settimana del clero, which means the weekly paper for priests, the sort of place where one is allowed to have earnestness without being laughed at for it. The book in question is by Olgiati, and the title of the book is itself a provocation. I fondamenti della filosofia classica. Grice says it aloud and immediately regrets the final adjective. Filosofia classica. As if “philosophy” were a genus and “classical” a respectable species. As if there were some other sort of philosophy that is not classical and yet still philosophy. The phrase sounds to him like saying “authentic genuine authenticity.” If philosophy has foundations and you ignore them, you are not a philosopher simpliciter; you are a man with opinions. To add classica is to suggest that philosophy comes in varieties like wine. It tempts one to ask whether there is a filosofia barocca, or a filosofia modernista, or a filosofia da tavola. He wonders—fastidiously, and with a touch of malice—what Mancini’s impegno is meant to be. Is it the engagement of finding foundations where Olgiati promised them? Or the engagement of discovering, politely, that there are none, and that the title is advertising architecture that is not there? He cannot resist turning it into a small Oxford puzzle. Suppose a man announces “foundations.” What are the minimum foundations of philosophy simpliciter—so few that even a decent chap could remember them without writing them on a blackboard? He writes three on a scrap, not as a system but as a dare. First: that one must distinguish what is said from what is meant, and hold oneself answerable for the difference. Second: that one must distinguish a reason from a cause, and not treat explanation as if it were merely mechanism. Third: that one must be prepared to revise one’s own temptations in the face of counterexample—particularly counterexamples in ordinary language, which is where our metaphysics goes to be embarrassed. He looks at the list and feels mildly pleased: it is not Olgiati’s list, certainly, but it is at least a list that can be used in tutorial. A foundation, in Oxford, is not what holds up a system; it is what prevents a clever boy from getting away with nonsense. The second item is 1951: La metafisica dell’agire. Mancini again, now in a more serious philosophical register. The title makes Grice perk up because it shifts from clergy-weekly earnestness to something nearer his own territory: action, agency, doing. Metafisica is the dangerous word, naturally, because metaphysics is what happens when philosophers begin to think they can talk without having to be checked. But agire is promising; it suggests verbs rather than nouns, and Grice has always trusted verbs more. The third item is 1953, the laurea thesis: Il non-essere. Ricerche sulla filosofia di Platone. The non-essere pleases him in a professional way, because it touches a nerve he has been worrying since his own earlier work on negation in 1938, and because he has already begun to hear, dimly, the future lecture he will give in 1962 on negative propositions. He likes, too, that Mancini has gone straight to Plato for the question of not-being, instead of doing the modern thing of pretending the whole matter began with Frege’s truth-values. Non-essere. It has a clean brutality. It does not sound like a topic chosen to impress; it sounds like a topic chosen to make trouble. And yet, having touched all three, he returns—inevitably—to the 1950 thing, because that is where the joke is. I fondamenti della filosofia classica. He imagines himself announcing in the Examination Schools tomorrow: “Today, gentlemen, we examine the foundations of classical philosophy.” The undergraduates would immediately write it down as if it were a subject, and then behave as if it were an excuse not to think. Oxford is very good at using foundations to build avoidance. Mancini’s impegno, Grice decides, is either admirable or doomed. Admirable if it is the sort of engagement that takes a big title and demands to see the goods. Doomed if it is the engagement that accepts the big title as already doing the work. The title promises foundations. A decent reviewer’s duty—whether in Settimana del clero or in the more secular theology of the Times Literary Supplement—is to ask, calmly: which foundations, exactly, and how do they show in the arguments? The door handle rattles. The tutee has arrived at last, armed with an essay and the usual hope that his own words will count as thought. Grice slides the Italian titles to one side, not because he is finished with them, but because he will use them later as a reminder of what Oxford must never forget: foundations are not grand words. Foundations are the small prohibitions that keep talk honest.Grice: Caro Mancini, ho sempre pensato che il kerygma sia una parola tanto solenne che a Oxford la usiamo quasi solo per impressionare i colleghi. Ma lei, in Italia, come riesce a mantenere la benevolenza conversazionale anche quando si parla di salvezza? Mancini: Ah, Grice, ci vuole una buona dose di ironia e molta pazienza! Qui la benevolenza si coltiva come una vigna: ogni parola può essere un grappolo, ma se non si presta attenzione, si rischia di ottenere solo aceto. La filosofia aiuta, ma anche una battuta giusta al momento giusto! Grice: Allora dovremmo fondare una cooperativa conversazionale: chi porta la benevolenza, chi porta il senso, chi porta il significato, e magari qualcuno porta il vino. Così anche Kant, tra una critica e l’altra, si rilasserebbe un po’! Mancini: Grice, mi trova d’accordo! Una cooperativa con Kant e qualche filosofo tedesco potrebbe essere l’unico modo per trasformare la malevolentia in malevolenza… Ma attenzione: se arriva Barth, bisogna preparare anche un discorso sul senso della vita, così nessuno resta alienato! Mancini, Italo (1950). Impegno con un libro. Settimana del clero: settimanale di informazione, di aggiornamento pastorale.’

Giannozzo Manetti (Firenze, Toscana): LA ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains what a speaker means as something recoverable by rational, publicly criticizable inference: from what is said plus shared norms of cooperation, a hearer can justify an implicature, and that justificatory route is integral to the account of meaning rather than a merely psychological or rhetorical after-effect. In the Manetti passage, “la ragione conversazionale” is approached from the opposite direction: Giannozzo Manetti’s De dignitate et excellentia hominis (completed c. 1452–53) supplies a humanist anthropology in which reason is exercised through the dignity of embodied agency, creative work, and the integration of soul and body, so that conversation becomes a scene of rational life rather than the primary mechanism for deriving unstated content. Put sharply, Grice asks how rational agents can mean more than they say and still be answerable for it, whereas Manetti supplies a picture of what the rational agent is and why such an agent has dignity: a doer and maker whose natural faculties, senses, and practical intelligence warrant positive valuation against medieval vilitas and the misery tradition associated with Innocent III. The comparison therefore casts Grice’s conversational rationality as a micro-theory of intelligible inference in talk (how reasons govern interpretation), while Manetti’s is a macro-ethic of the human person (why reason, action, and creativity belong to our excellence); and it also makes visible a continuity: Grice’s insistence on the person as a someone (not a mere thing) and on rational accountability in communicative action resonates, in a different key, with Manetti’s humanist claim that dignity is shown in acting and understanding here and now, through the unified life of body and soul. Grice: “I like M.. M.’s De dignitate et excellentia hominis is an original contribution to the history of philosophy. It shifts the focus from a purely spiritual or "misery-laden" medieval view of humanity – or the Human, as Grice prefers, toward a naturalistic and sensualist appreciation of the human being as a physical and active agent. M.’s main points regarding these approaches include: Rehabilitation of the Human Body: While medieval predecessors like Innocent often view the body as a "vile" vessel of decay, M. argues that the human body is a master-piece of divine craftsmanship.  Aesthetic Perfection: M. provides a detailed, almost anatomical defense of the body’s beauty and functional design, asserting that physical senses are not just sources of sin but are perfectly suited for interacting with the world. Incarnation as Proof: M. uses the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation to argue that because God became man, the physical human form possesses inherent, "naturalistic" dignity.  "Man as a Doer" (Active Naturalism). M. moves away from the idea that human value is found only in passive contemplation of the divine. Creative Potential: M. celebrates human achievement in the arts, sciences, and architecture as evidence of our excellence. This "sensualist" focus on what humans produce in the physical world validates secular life as a worthy pursuit. The World as a Human Product. M. famously argues that everything surrounding us — cities, paintings, machines—is the work of humans, making us co-creators with God through our physical and intellectual labur. Integration of Body and Soul: Rather than seeing the PERSON – ‘the someone,’ not the something, in Grice’s view -- as a soul trapped in a body, M. defines the human as a unique union of both.  Psycho-Somatic Unity: M. treats the human person as a unique amalgam, where the soul’s excellence is expressed through the body's actions and senses. Originality: This was a radical break from the "misery of the human condition" tradition. It established a philosophical basis for the Renaissance ideal of the "artist as creative genius" and the "man of action".  Challenge to Asceticism The work is a direct refutation of De miseria humanae conditionis.  M. rejects the concept of vilitas – worthlessness --, replacing it with a positive valuation of human nature that includes our natural desires and sensory experiences. M. suggests that the purpose of being human is to "act and understand," placing the weight of personhood on the exercise of natural faculties in the here-and-now. ” Keywords: dignity. M. Napoli -- è stato uno scrittore, filologo e umanista italiano, significativo esponente del primissimo rinascimento letterario, oltre che un uomo politico e diplomatico. Appartenente a una famiglia borghese, è discepolo dell'umanista TRAVERSARI . Si mise contro l'ascesa dei Medici, rifugiandosi prima a Roma e poi a Napoli, dove muore. A Roma è segretario pontificio di Niccolò, che volle rinnovare gl’uffici chiamando personaggi fidati, come lo stesso M., ma anche ROMANO (COLONNA, PEROTTI , Pietro da NOCETO, Lunense, Tortelli, VALLA; così come non è senza significato il contestuale allontanamento da Roma di Bracciolini e Flavio. A testimonianza di tale legame di fiducia, M. scrive poi la biografia di Niccolò. Abile oratore di straordinaria erudizione, è un profondo conoscitore della lingua latina e della lingua greca. Traduce al latino l'etica eudemia, l'etica nicomachea – Grice: “I gave an Oxford seminar on this with Austin and Hare – Hare never left ethics!” -- e i Magna moralia del lizio. La sua ricca biblioteca ci è in larga parte pervenuta e fa parte del fondo palatino della biblioteca vaticana. È ricordato soprattutto come l'autore del “De dignitate”. In questo testo il filosofo respinge la prospettiva religiosa secondo cui il corpo umano è legato ai vizi e alla sporcizia, destinato a soffrire per espiare il peccato originale. Al contrario, M. afferma che è una meravigliosa macchina creata da dio – Grice: “My genitorial programme is intended to see myself as God and my pirots as my creatures!” -- a sua immagine. genitorial programme. Grice: Ciò che mi colpisce maggiormente della filosofia di Manetti è la rivalutazione del corpo umano. In Inghilterra siamo spesso abituati a considerare il corpo come un semplice veicolo per la mente—quasi una "gabbia" per la vera essenza. Mi incuriosisce: cosa l'ha portato a vedere nella corporeità una fonte di dignità e di eccellenza? Manetti: Caro Grice, la mia esperienza e gli studi mi hanno insegnato che il corpo non è affatto un ostacolo, ma un capolavoro creato da Dio. La bellezza e la funzionalità della nostra struttura fisica sono la prova che ogni senso, ogni gesto, ogni azione contribuisce alla nostra dignità. Persino la dottrina cristiana dell’Incarnazione mi conferma che la materia non è vile, ma degna. Grice: Trovo affascinante l'idea che l'essere umano sia un "co-creatore" con Dio, attraverso le sue opere e il suo ingegno. In molti testi medievali si enfatizza la miseria della condizione umana; lei invece sembra voler ribaltare questa prospettiva. Secondo lei, creatività e azione sono davvero alla base del nostro valore? Manetti: Sì, Grice, credo che la dignità umana si manifesti proprio nell'agire e nel comprendere. Ogni opera, ogni città, ogni invenzione nasce dalla nostra intelligenza e volontà. Non siamo semplici contemplatori del divino, ma protagonisti attivi del mondo. Per me, essere persona significa integrare corpo e anima, desiderio e pensiero, in una unità che ci permette di trasformare la realtà e di avvicinarci, con umiltà, al mistero della creazione. Manetti, Giannozzo (1452). De dignitate et excellentia hominis. Firenze: Laurentii.

Leonardo Manetti (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains what a speaker means by locating it in accountable, inferential practice: hearers recover implicatures by assuming cooperation and by reasoning from what is said plus shared norms of relevance, quantity, quality, and manner, so that “meaning” is tied to publicly checkable justificatory routes rather than to private associations. In the Manetti passage, by contrast, “la ragione conversazionale” is presented less as a formal normative engine for deriving implicatures and more as a lived, vernacular rationality rooted in Tuscan forms of life: the poet-contadino who moves between vineyard work and verse treats conversation as continuous with craft, rhythm, and local sociability (Greve in Chianti, mutual-aid society, theatre and local history), and the playful wine-talk frames “reason” as something grown, tended, and shared rather than calculated from maxims. The result is a contrast between Grice’s analytic ambition to show how conversational meaning is governed by principles that make implicature tractable and criticizable, and Manetti’s more humanistic, regional idiom in which conversational reason is embodied in practices of cultivation and poetic expression—still rational, but rational in the sense of practical attunement and communal measure, where the “point” of an utterance is as much convivial and formative as it is inferentially derivable. (A small factual note: the “Leonardo Manetti (1545) Rime” attribution in the passage does not match what is readily findable about the contemporary Leonardo Manetti of Greve in Chianti.) Nasce in una regione, la Toscana, in cui vive una grande tradizione di poeti contadini, uomini che uniscono in sé due forti passioni: l’agricoltura e la poesia. Poeta contadino anche lui, la passione per l’agricoltura lo porta a laurearsi in viticoltura ed enologia e ad avviare, la sua azienda agricola tra le colline di Greve in Chianti, l’Azienda Agricola M. M., grazie alla quale produce vino, olio e giaggiolo. A Greve, M. partecipa alla realtà socioculturale del paese, in particolare con la Società di Mutuo Soccorso, realizzando attività teatrali come Forconi di Pace e pubblicazioni di libri storici locali come il Popolo dei Ricordi (Nuova Toscana Editrice). L’amore per il suo territorio e per i prodotti che esso offre plasma la personalità di Leonardo che, fin da piccolo, respira il clima operoso dell’azienda di famiglia: Le forbici, la falce, la zappa, una penna, un pezzo di carta, un libro sono alcuni degli attrezzi che uso quotidianamente e per me sono importanti allo stesso modo. Io amo scrivere e leggere ma anche lavorare in campagna. È un lavoro faticoso ma l’ho sempre fatto volentieri fin da bambino, quando seguivo mio nonno e mio padre nei campi. Non vedevo l’ora di tornare a casa, dopo la scuola, per partecipare alla vendemmia! Attendevo l’arrivo dell’estate per poter andare a lavorare in vigna. Mi piace tagliare i rami di una pianta per dare alla chioma una forma ben bilanciata che poi garantisce la nascita di buoni frutti. Ogni tanto mi fermo per una pausa, osservo quello che mi circonda e la natura mi regala grandi emozioni. A fine giornata, sono stanco ma felice, e a volte mi metto a scrivere i pensieri che per tutto il giorno mi hanno ronzato nella mente. La passione per l’agricoltura lo informa di una sensibilità per il mondo che lo circonda che si riproduce nella scrittura in versi, la sua seconda passione, al quale si avvia da autodidatta. La poesia diventa per Leonardo un rifugio, “porto amico” e mezzo per esprimere un vasto universo di emozioni che riversa nelle sue pubblicazioni. Grice: Manetti, mi dica la verità: tra la vendemmia e la scrittura, quale le dà più soddisfazione? Io, al massimo, raccolgo implicature nei campi della filosofia!  Manetti: Caro Grice, difficile scegliere! La vendemmia mette alla prova muscoli e pazienza, ma scrivere versi è come raccogliere grappoli di emozioni. Se però trova una metafora migliore del vino, la accolgo a braccia aperte!  Grice: Ah, allora siamo d’accordo: ogni filosofo dovrebbe almeno una volta provare a vendemmiare. Chissà, magari scoprirebbe che una massima conversazionale funziona anche tra i filari — basta non farsi distrarre dalle api!  Manetti: Grice, in campagna ogni conversazione è genuina come un bicchiere di Chianti! Se la filosofia la prende troppo sul serio, le consiglio una pausa tra i vigneti: le idee crescono meglio al sole e, se va male, almeno si porta a casa una bottiglia! Manetti, Leonardo (1545). Rime. Firenze: Giunti.

Corrado Mangione (Bagnara, Calabria): LA ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale d’alcuni aspetti del nazionalismo culturale nella logica italiana, logica matematica. Mangione stages a productive friction between two “rationalities” that Grice constantly tries to keep distinct but connected: the rationality of formal systems (operators, natural deduction, Fregean ideography, logicism’s ambition to make mathematics into logic) and the rationality of talk (the cooperative, intention-sensitive norms that make implicature calculable in ordinary conversation). Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning says that what is meant beyond what is said is recoverable by a hearer as a piece of practical reasoning under shared expectations (relevance, sufficiency, clarity, sincerity), whereas Mangione is portrayed as insisting that the opposite of “formal” logic is not “informal” chat but “material” logic, i.e., a different kind of principled constraint tied to content and scientific/mathematical practice. That contrast sharpens a key Gricean moral: formal calculi can model validity, but they do not by themselves explain why a speaker’s use of “some,” “all,” “or,” “if” communicates what it does in an actual dinner-table exchange; the “missing link” is conversational rationality, the background normativity that Strawson (in your story) is pushed to connect to logical operators via Grice’s earlier work in perception and “principles of rational discourse.” Online bibliographic details for “Corrado Mangione (1948). La filosofia di Corrado Mangione. Palermo: Sandron” are not something I can independently verify, so that imprint reads like the project’s typical playful pseudo-archive; but the conceptual role is clear and effective: Mangione stands for the Italian early-20th-century tendency to treat logic as a serious mathematical enterprise with national traditions and technical lineage, while Grice stands for the claim that even the most technical symbolism ultimately relies on, and is intelligible through, the everyday inferential habits of speakers who can still laugh, cancel an implicature, and pass the wine without confusing “and” with “therefore.” Grice: “As I look upon my former self, I realise I would have NEVER even touched with a barge the symbols used by logicians, had it be not be that my own pupil, Strawson, was thinking to write a tract for Methuen about it. We discussed it in private, and I shared my thoughts with him that most of his intricacies could be extricated by appeal to a principle of rational discourse which I had come across in the quite separate – and properly philosophical area – of the philosophy of perception. Strawson indeed made himself the connection to the logical operators from my referring to this principle of rational discourse in the philosophical context of the ‘philosophy of perception’! I like M.; for various reasons: He notes that logic is more related to mathematics – indeed, for logicism mathematics IS logic – so the opposite to ‘formal’ logic is ‘material’ logic, not ‘informal’ as Ryle and Strawson want – Mangione has studied ‘categories’ and talks of ‘logica matematica’ – he has studied Frege’s ideografia, as he aptly translates his grundscrift, and he tried to improve on the ‘nationalism’ which was ubiquitous in logic in Italy in the ‘primo novecento’!” Insegna a Milano. Diresse le due collane matematiche della casa editrice Progresso tecnico editoriale di Milano, appendice della A. Martello editore. Presso l'editore Boringhieri di Torino dirige Testi e manuali della scienza, serie di logica matematica. Contribuito alla storia della filosofia di GEYMONAT con contributi sulla logica matematica. Amplia e sistematizza tali contributi nella Storia della logica. Il saggio costituisce un ampio ed esaustivo lavoro di ricognizione e sintesi. Logica matematica divertente, Harris PEANO, no, e, o, se, some, at least one, all, il. Simbolistica, logica simbolica, logica formale, logica materiale, semantica, semantica per un sistema di deduzione naturale, SYMBOLO, whoof and proof, w’f ‘n’ proof, la proclama di .: logica matematica, la logica matematica deve essere divertente!” Grice has the 1964 volume open in the only part of a book that cannot talk back: the title-page. Elementi di logica matematica. He lets the collocation sit there a moment, as if it had walked into High Table wearing the wrong tie. Logica matematica. It offends him in two directions at once. “Logic” is, for him, what Aristotle did when he tried to make sense of how we actually reason and speak; “mathematical” is what happens when a symbol is treated as if it had never been in a sentence. Put them together and you have, in his ear, a category mistake elevated to a discipline: as if “logic” were an annex of mathematics, rather than the grammar of thought that happens also to be useful when you do mathematics. He turns a page and then stops, because turning pages is already dangerously close to reading, and he has a principle—borrowed from the Revd. Sidney Smith—that saves time and preserves innocence: never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so. If the title is bad, why risk being softened by the contents. Someone has told him, with the sort of factual relish people use when they think biography is explanation, that the author has the wrong credentials. Not wrong in the vulgar sense—Oxford does not allow vulgarity until after the port—but wrong in Grice’s private, fastidious sense: the man has been trained in the wrong sort of seriousness. He enrolled in Mathematics at Modena in 1948–49. Military service interrupted things from 1951 to 1955. He moved to Milan in 1955 and completed his degree in 1959–60, under Carlo Felice Manara, an algebraic geometer. All perfectly respectable, all perfectly irrelevant, Grice thinks, if what you are going to do is tell people what “if” means, or what “or” does, or how “some” behaves in the mouth of a decent chap who is trying to be understood at dinner. You can almost hear the problem already. A man trained in algebraic geometry has spent his formative years learning to love entities that never talk back. Points and lines do not protest when you redefine them. Sets do not complain when you regiment them. Symbols do not sulk when you assign them meanings. But ordinary language does all of these things, constantly, and its protests are the data. Grice thinks of Strawson, and how he once had to tutor Strawson into the operators, not because Strawson lacked intelligence, but because Oxford philosophy still treated symbols as something you handled with tongs. Grice’s own relation to symbols had always been reluctant. Lit. Hum. is not a place that trains you to worship notation; it trains you to distrust it, as if every new sign were a new opportunity for someone to cheat with a flourish. And yet the blue-collars have arrived. That is how his mind puts it, not with malice, but with that Oxford instinct for social metaphors. Mathematicians, engineers, the men with apparatus and proofs, turning up in the philosophy of language as if the whole business of meaning could be stabilised by better fonts. It is as if they think they can do to “if” what they do to a conic section: fix it by definition and then proceed. But “if” is not a conic section. It is a civilised manoeuvre. It lives by implicature. It lives by what a speaker is entitled to assume a hearer will recover. It is the very place where intention, not notation, does the work. And Grice cannot help suspecting that a textbook called logica matematica will treat “if” as though the only respectable “if” were the truth-functional one, the one that behaves like a neat connective in a calculus and never like a threat, a hedge, a concession, or an invitation. He looks again at the title and feels the odd double irritation: the irritation with the mathematicising of logic, and the irritation with Oxford’s own snobbery about credentials. Because, truth be told, the mathematician has one advantage: he is not seduced by English. He is not tempted to treat a quirk of idiom as a metaphysical revelation. He is not tempted, as some of Grice’s pupils are, to write a PPE thesis in which the word “some” is treated as if it contained the secret of Being. The mathematician may be tone-deaf, but at least he is not melodramatic. Still, tone-deafness is expensive in the territory Grice cares about. A man who does not hear the difference between what is said and what is conveyed will end up putting the wrong things into “meaning,” and then congratulating himself on having simplified. Grice has seen that disease up close, even in Oxford, even in Austin’s circle: the temptation to treat what is implicitly conveyed as part of the sense, as if the language itself, not the utterer, were doing the implicating. So he closes the book—again without reading it—and thinks, with a kind of resigned amusement, that this is exactly why he has been giving those classes on “conversation.” Not because he wants to compete with logica matematica, but because he needs a counterweight: a reminder that before you formalise, you must listen; and that even after you formalise, the thing you are formalising is still a practice among persons who mean things, hide things, concede things, and rely on their hearers to be intelligent in the only way that really matters—socially, cooperatively, inferentially. Let the mathematicians have their logic, he thinks. He will keep the talk.Grice: Mangione, mi dica la verità: lei ha mai provato a spiegare la logica matematica a qualcuno durante una cena con amici? Io, onestamente, preferisco le implicature conversazionali—almeno si può fare qualche battuta senza rischiare di confondere tutti! Mangione: Ah, caro Grice, provare sì! Ma tra il “no, e, o, se” e la simbologia di Peano, spesso finisce che mi chiedono se ho portato anche il vino. D’altronde, la logica matematica deve essere divertente: se non si ride almeno un po’, si rischia di prenderla troppo sul serio! Grice: Ecco, allora siamo d’accordo: la logica, come la conversazione, funziona meglio con un pizzico di leggerezza. Strawson voleva scrivere trattati complicati, ma io preferisco pensare che “some”, “at least one”, “all” siano come le olive nell’insalata: ognuna dà sapore, ma senza esagerare. Mangione: Perfetto, Grice! In fondo, tra “whoof and proof”, la semantica e la logica nazionale, l’importante è non perdere il gusto della discussione. E se la logica diventa troppo seria, basta ricordare che la logica matematica può essere davvero… divertente! Mangione, Corrado (1964). Logica matematica. Torino: Boringhieri.

Girolamo Manfredi (Bologna, Emilia): l’implicatura conversazionale del liber de homine. Manfredi is a particularly good foil for Grice because the passage makes him a professional of “perché”: he systematizes questions (medical, natural-philosophical, even divinatory) into a popular explanatory machine, whereas Grice systematizes how questions and answers work as rational moves in a talk exchange. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a disciplined inference from what is said to what is meant, licensed by cooperative expectations; Manfredi’s Il Perché / Liber de homine (first published 1474, with a well-known 1497 Bologna edition) already thematizes the same inferential appetite, but in a different register—causal explanation, pseudo-Aristotelian “Problems,” and prognostication—where readers are trained to move from sign to conclusion (clouds to rain, budgets to a “hard year”) with varying degrees of warrant. That lets you sharpen Grice’s central distinction: for Grice, “x means that p” in the natural-sign sense (spots mean measles; clouds mean rain) is not yet speaker-meaning, and the rationality of implicature is normative and defeasible (it can be cancelled, challenged, recalculated); for Manfredi, the cultural practice of reading signs—medical symptoms, astral configurations, providential “omens”—is precisely where rationality and superstition blur, and the interpretive leap can masquerade as necessity. Historically, the biographical scaffolding in your passage aligns with standard sources (Bologna/Ferrara training; academic career in Bologna; dispute with Pico’s attack on divinatory astrology; early vernacular plague treatise printed Bologna 1478; prognostication for 1490 printed Bologna 1489; and the long afterlife of Il Perché/Liber de homine), and this supports the comparison: Manfredi exemplifies an early modern culture of inference hungry for “why,” while Grice supplies the later analytic discipline that separates mere symptom-reading from accountable communicative inference—showing that the most interesting “perché” in conversation is not just a request for causes, but a test of what reasons a speaker has given the hearer to draw, or refuse, a conclusion. Grice: “I once punned on Alexander Pope’s study of mankind, man – philosopherkind – Manfredi didn’t!”  Grice: “I like the “liber de homine.” It reminds me that among my unpublications there’s a ‘Why’!” Grice: “While the Italians aptly use the same particle for ‘why’ and ‘for’, the Anglo-Saxons didn’t! That must be because ‘for’ is usually otiose: “Why are you eating.” “For I am hungry, say I!” cf. “I am hungry.” – Studia a Bologna e Ferrara. Entra in contatto con circoli umanistici. Insegna a Bologna. Riceve un compenso superiore alla media ed è il docente più citato nei Libri partitorum. Esercita l'astrologia ee attaccato da PICO  (“Disputazione contro l’astrologia divinatrice””).  La sua opera “Il Perché” fu un successo per secoli.  Altre saggi: “Tractato de la pestilentia,” Bologna, Johann Schriber, “Pro-gnosticon” (Bologna, Bazaliero Bazalieri) “Liber de homine,”  Impressum Bononiae, Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. divination. Those clouds mean rain – Those clouds mean death. --. Grice: “The present budget means that we will have a bad year – Prognosticon. “The present budget means we’ll have a hard year, but we shan’t have.” – x means that p entails p. Pico approaches Manfredi, “You said that the budget for 1490 meant that we would have a hard year, but we  didn’t!” liber de homine, la tradizione pseudo-peripatetici dei problemi – il problema – la questione di ‘per che’ – Grice sulle tipi di domanda – la domanda dei bambini – la domanda di Grice a bambini, “Can a sweater be red and green all over? No stripes or spots allowed? – The philosopher’s question – ‘why is there something rather than nothing? Why I am me and not you?  l’implicatura divinatrice. Grice has Manfredi open at precisely the place where he is safest: the title-page. De hominis procreatione. He reads it as if it were a confession, which is what titles are when they are in Latin and the author is feeling brave. Procreatione. He pauses, because pro- does too much work for so small a syllable. It sounds like a political faction. Pro-creation. In favour of creation. As if there were an anti-creation party in Bologna and Manfredi is writing a tract for it. As if the very existence of the human were a motion that had been carried in Congregation by a narrow vote. He catches himself smiling at the absurdity of his own pedantry and quotes, with the private reverence he keeps for good professional excuses, the Revd. Sidney Smith: I never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so. Which gives him permission to remain at the title and still feel virtuous. De hominis procreatione is not, on the face of it, a theological title. It could be medicine, physiology, the Aristotelian “how does this happen” genre—Manfredi’s entire profession of perché. But the word creatio has a way of summoning God, even when the author has not asked for Him. And Grice has already been criticised—by people who dislike his “creature construction,” and by at least one colonial logician with a taste for moralising about rationality—for the habit of putting himself, exegesis-wise, in the genitorial position of God and speaking of creatures, as if the only intelligible source of normativity were a creator’s intention. He can hear the complaint: Grice, why are you always dragging God into it? It is a cheap exegetical device. It is metaphysics by parental analogy. So he looks at creatura, and tries—fastidiously—to remove God from it, as if God were an optional implicature and not part of the conventional meaning. Creatura comes from creare: to create, yes, but also to produce, to bring forth, to cause to grow, to elect, to appoint. The Latin verb has a civic, Roman smell: you “create” a consul by appointing him. You “create” an arrangement by establishing it. Cicero uses creare without requiring a Genesis narrative behind it. A creatura, in that older heathen register, need not be a theological dependent. It can be something made, something produced, something brought about by agency that is not divine—by natura, perhaps, or by art, or by the republic’s machinery. Mother Nature, then. What is wrong with that? Nothing, Grice thinks, except the scholastic taste for nouns. The medievals could not leave a verb alone. They had to turn actions into substances and then begin arguing about the substances as if the arguments were discoveries. Nihil ex nihilo, for instance, is already bad taste: two nouns and a preposition trying to do the work of an injunction. Cicero, he thinks, would never have declined nihil into a metaphysical talisman the way the schools later did. The scholastics like their Latin as if it were a cupboard for abstractions; the Romans liked it as a tool for moving an audience. So why procreatione? If the subject is how humans come to be—generation, conception, heredity—then procreatio is the honest word. Procreare is not the cosmic making of the world; it is begetting, producing offspring, bringing forth a new human. It is genitorial, yes, but not necessarily divine. It sits closer to natura than to Deus. And yet, Grice suspects, the scholastic ear hears the pro- and the creatio and immediately begins to smell doctrine: creation, and therefore Creator, and therefore the whole rhetorical possibility of putting oneself above the creature and issuing norms. That is exactly the temptation he himself has indulged, and exactly why he lingers here, guilty but entertained. The creature construction, properly speaking, is the move where you describe rational communication by imagining what a creator would intend his creatures to do: as if “meaning” could be derived from manufacture, and as if normativity could be grounded in design. Bennett and his kind call this imperial: a colonial moral psychology in which the theorist plays God and the speakers are his obedient fauna. But Manfredi is not trying to play God. Manfredi is trying to play Bologna: physician-philologist, systematiser of why-questions, writer for people who want explanation with a faint taste of the learned. He writes De hominis procreatione because the public wants the how and the why of begetting, not because he wants to legislate creation into theology. Still, Grice cannot resist the last dry twist. If you must say it in Latin, why choose the one root that invites the Creator? Why not De generatione hominis, and be done with it? Generatio keeps you safely in Aristotle’s barnyard and out of Genesis. Procreatio, by contrast, sounds as if you are doing domestic physiology while waving, unintentionally, at the heavens. He closes the book—still unread—because the title has already done enough. Manfredi, he thinks, has given him a useful reminder before his class on conversation: that whole doctrines can ride on tiny prefixes, and that the worst philosophical habits often begin as perfectly innocent morphological choices. He will go and talk to his students about what is meant, and what is implicated, and he will remember, with some humility, that sometimes the theologian is not in the text at all; he is in the reader, over-interpreting pro-.Grice: Caro Manfredi, ho sempre trovato affascinante la tua attenzione per il "perché" delle cose. Nel tuo "Liber de homine", sembra che tu voglia andare oltre le semplici spiegazioni meccaniche e arrivare al cuore delle domande umane. Secondo te, quanto conta la curiosità nella ricerca filosofica? Manfredi: Carissimo Grice, la curiosità è il motore primo della filosofia! Senza domande, senza quel "perché" che ci inquieta fin da bambini, non avremmo mai scritto né letto nulla. Nel mio lavoro, come sai, ho cercato di mostrare che perfino dietro una domanda apparentemente ingenua si nasconde una profonda sete di senso. Grice: Mi colpisce anche il tuo interesse per le implicature, soprattutto in relazione alla divinazione e alle previsioni. In Inghilterra, spesso distinguiamo tra ciò che qualcuno dice e ciò che intende davvero; tu, invece, sembri suggerire che anche le stelle possano "parlare" per implicito! Manfredi: Eh sì, Grice! L’uomo ha sempre cercato segni nel cielo e nella natura, quasi come se il mondo stesso volesse suggerirci risposte. Ma la vera sfida, per il filosofo come per l’astrologo, è interpretare questi segni con ragionevolezza, distinguendo ciò che è fondato da ciò che è solo superstizione. In fondo, anche la filosofia è un’arte del leggere tra le righe! Manfredi, Girolamo (1462). De hominis procreatione. Bologna: Benedicti.

Michelangelo Manicone (Vico del Gargano, Foggia, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale della filosofia del Gargano. Manicone embodies a strongly contextual and practical Enlightenment rationality: knowledge is earned through direct observation of Gargano’s natural systems, and philosophy is justified by its capacity to guide action toward human well-being and what we would now call sustainability. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, by contrast, treats “context” not as landscape or ecology but as the shared background that makes utterances inferentially tractable: speakers can mean more than they say because hearers can rationally reconstruct intentions under norms of cooperation (relevance, informativeness, clarity, sincerity), and those reconstructions are, in principle, accountable. The comparison the passage invites is that Manicone expands “context” outward (environment, economy, civic life) while Grice analyzes it inward (the structured expectations that govern uptake in a talk exchange); yet the two fit surprisingly well if you treat conversation as a human ecosystem. On that reading, Manicone’s insistence that everything is connected and that reason must serve the common good parallels Grice’s insistence that meaning is not private but socially governed: the “good” conversation, like the “good” use of nature, depends on restraint, shared norms, and sensitivity to consequences (what an utterance will do to an audience, what a policy will do to an environment). Historically, Manicone is indeed remembered as an 18th-century Capitanata cleric-naturalist associated with works on Apulian/Daunian “physics” and empirical inquiry; your citation of a 1797 Naples imprint functions in the same pseudo-archival style as the project’s other entries, and it supports the conceptual contrast: Grice makes conversational reason a theory of how meaning is responsibly inferable, while Manicone makes reason a discipline of situated stewardship—of land, of society, and, by extension, of the contexts within which any human “saying” can matter. Grice: “Unlike Italy’s, the geography of Oxford – or dreaming spires, as scholars call it – is rather boring!” Una delle personalità più caratteristiche del suo tempo della Capitanata. Definito il monacello rivoluzionario a causa della sua bassa statura, la sua indole illuministica consiste in una sete di sapere che non si placa col dogmatismo, ma coll’esperienza diretta, lo studio approfondito dei fenomeni naturali e della scienza, un’osservazione empirica che puo fornire una risposta valida e concreta alle varie problematiche e quindi un aiuto pratico all'uomo, al suo benessere e sviluppo, alla sua felicità. Ciò gli costa l'inimicizia di chi, seppur in pieno illuminismo, diffida e demonizza la scienza.  Lo sviluppo economico-sociale che teorizza M. consiste in uno sviluppo connesso e, per certi versi, dipendente dall'ambiente, perché egli ritene che la natura  è una fonte primaria di ricchezza e la sua distruzione segna la fine dello sviluppo. M. può essere considerato un profeta dello sviluppo sostenibile, perché, quando le industrie sono inesistenti, ha un’ampiezza di vedute che gli consente di prevedere le conseguenze disastrose che porta l’uso improprio e scriteriato delle risorse naturali.  Le opere in cui M. tratta, tra gl’altri, il tema dello sviluppo sostenibile, sono La fisica appula, cioè dell'Apulia, e La fisica daunica, cioè della Daunia, antico nome della Capitanata. ORAZIO nell’epistola. Garganum mugire putes nemus. Riferisce che il disboscamento del promontorio inizia col taglio barbaro dei pini nel territorio “Difesa” di Vico del Il contesto del contesto. "Philosophers often say that context is very important. Let us take this remark seriously. Surely, if we do, we shall want to consider this remark in its relation to this or that problem, i. e., in context, but also in itself, i. e., out of context.” Grice, The general theory of context. La filosofia del gargano. Grice: Manicone, ho sempre pensato che il contesto sia fondamentale per comprendere davvero il significato di una conversazione. Lei, che ha indagato così a fondo le relazioni tra uomo, natura e ragione, come interpreta il ruolo del contesto nella filosofia? Manicone: Per me il contesto non è solo uno sfondo: è la radice di ogni comprensione. Nel Gargano, la natura ha sempre insegnato che tutto è connesso; anche il pensiero umano nasce dall’osservazione concreta dell’ambiente. Senza il contesto – direi – la filosofia rischia di perdersi nelle nuvole! Grice: Trovo affascinante la sua prospettiva! In Inghilterra, troppo spesso dimentichiamo la concretezza del vivere quotidiano. Lei sembra anticipare quello che oggi chiameremmo “sviluppo sostenibile”. Pensa che la filosofia abbia il dovere di guidare anche le scelte pratiche? Manicone: Esattamente, caro Grice! La vera filosofia per me è quella che migliora la vita delle persone e custodisce la natura. Studiare, osservare, dialogare: così possiamo davvero aiutare l’uomo a essere felice senza distruggere ciò che lo circonda. In fondo, la ragione nasce per servire il bene comune! Manicone, Michelangelo (1797). La natura e la società. Napoli: Stamperia Reale.

Marco Manilio (Roma, Lazio): il portico romano. Manilius (the Roman poet-astronomer of the Astronomica, often dated to the Augustan–Tiberian period) is made into a hard determinist of the Portico: fate governs not only events but even thought and will, so “freedom” collapses into acceptance of what is already written in the stars. That stance is a useful counter-image for Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, which depends on a very un-Stoic kind of agency: speakers choose what to make explicit and what to leave to inference, and hearers rationally reconstruct what is meant by assuming cooperative norms (relevance, informativeness, clarity, sincerity) and attributing intentions that function as reasons for uptake. If Manilius is right that even our inner moves are fated, then Grice’s central explanatory engine—intention recognized as intention—looks less like rational governance and more like a post hoc story we tell about what was bound to happen anyway; “implicature” would become not a calculable inference under shared norms but merely another phenomenon subsumed under cosmic necessity. Conversely, the Manilius contrast helps highlight what Grice is committed to: even when conversational practice feels habitual or culturally scripted, it is still a normative space in which speakers can be held responsible for what they invite others to infer, and hearers can demand reasons (“why did you say it that way?”) in a way that a determinist cosmology tends to flatten. Historically, Manilius is indeed associated with an astrology-laden, fate-saturated worldview (though scholars debate how strictly Stoic or merely astrological his determinism is), and that background makes your juxtaposition sharp: Grice’s “conversational reason” is governance by mutually recognizable rational standards inside talk, while Manilius’ “reason” is governance by the cosmos, where even the joke is credited to Fate rather than to the speaker. Grice: “We seldom discussed ‘freedom’ with Austin, but after my seminars on Kant’s critique of ‘practical’ or buletic, as I prefer, reason – I found that Kant was a liberal, in the sense that he wanted to liberate himself, and all of us – qua persons – from everything! This struck a louder chord than the silly tune Isaiah Berlin was playing as the professor in the history of ideas – about positive (free to) and negative (free from) freedom!” Filosofo italiano. Porch. Astronomer and poet. He writes a long poem on astronomical matters, part of which survives. He takes and extreme position on the subject of fate, believing that not even thoughts – or the will -- are exempt from its influence.  liberta, il libero. GRICEVS: Salvē, Manlī. Audīvī tē Porticūm Rōmānum colere; ego autem post Kantium suspicor lībertātem esse artem—praesertim artem ēvadendī. MANLIVS: Salvē, Grīcē. Ego in porticū ambulō, sed Fātum mecum ambulat; nec cōgitātiōnēs meae sunt līberae—nisi forte Fātum est optimus paedagōgus. GRICEVS: Kantius tamen “līberālem” sē dīcit: vult sē atque omnēs nōs—quā personās—ab omnibus līberāre. Berlin autem cantillat: “līber ā” et “līber ad”; mihi vidētur quasi tibicen duās tibias habeat, sed nūllam citharam. MANLIVS: Ha! apud mē “līber ad” est tantum: līber ad patiendum quod iam scrīptum est. Sed nē trīstis sīs: sī omnia Fātum regit, tum etiam tuum iocum Fātum composuit—et certe bene composuit. Manilio, Marco (a. u. c. DCCLXX). De voluntate. Roma.

Lucio Manlio Torquato (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’orto a Roma e l’implicatura conversazionale – filosofia italiana – Grice italo, Lucius Manlius Torquatus (the Epicurean spokesman in Cicero’s De finibus) offers a Rome-and-garden analogue for what Grice later theorizes as reason-governed conversational meaning: both pictures treat “what is conveyed” as something that grows out of shared practices and expectations rather than out of bare sentence-meaning alone. For Grice, implicature is a rational, publicly recoverable inference from what is said to what is meant, licensed by cooperative norms (relevance, sufficiency, clarity, candour) and by intentions the hearer can attribute as reasons; for Manlio’s Epicurean scene, the “hortus” is a social setting in which discourse is itself a cultivated art oriented to a telos (tranquillity/pleasure) and therefore governed by its own norms of restraint, frankness, and practical focus. The torques/torquatus motif in your entry nicely sharpens the contrast: it ties Manlio to a heritage of “Manlian discipline” and public honour, yet in De finibus the Epicurean Torquatus argues that the rational basis of life is not austere display but an account of voluptas; likewise, in Grice, the rational basis of conversation is not rhetorical grandeur but the disciplined economy by which speakers make themselves intelligible while leaving some content inferable. Historically, the anchoring is sound: Cicero’s De finibus is set in 50 BC and indeed stages Torquatus defending Epicureanism in Rome; your anachronistic move is to read that hortus conversation as already a laboratory for Gricean implicature, where the “roots” of meaning lie hidden (speaker intentions, shared background, genre expectations) and the “fruit” is what the audience is entitled to take the speaker to mean beyond the explicit words. Grice: “In modern Italian, the name Lucius Manlius Torquatus would likely be rendered as Lucio Manlio Torquato. While the nomen (Manlio) was the official clan name, modern Italian surnames most often derive from the cognomen, which functioned as a hereditary nickname. If following the lineage of the gens Manlia, the primary modern surname would be Torquato. Torquato: Still exists as both a surname and a first name (most famously held by the Renaissance poet Torquato Tasso). Manlio: While less common as a surname, it survives primarily as a male given name in Italy today. Etymology and Implication The name Torquatus carries significant historical and symbolic weight: Etymology: It is derived from the Latin torquis (or torques), meaning "twisted neck-chain," "collar," or "torc". This itself comes from the verb torqueo, meaning "to twist". Literal Meaning: "Adorned with a neck-chain" or "The Collared One". Historical Origin: The title was first earned by Titus Manlius Imperiosus in 361 BC. During a battle against the Gauls, he defeated a giant Gaul in single combat and took the warrior's golden torc as a trophy, placing it around his own neck. Implications: Military Valor: It served as a permanent mark of extraordinary bravery and victory in single combat. "Manlian Discipline": The family became synonymous with extreme severity and strict adherence to duty. The original Torquatus famously executed his own son for engaging the enemy against orders, even though the son had won the fight. Nobility: As one of the gentes maiores (greatest patrician families), the name implied high social status and a long lineage of political leadership, including 13 consulships. Roma antica, orto, De finibus. Lucio Manlio Torquato. Roma. Gricevs: Salvete, Manlivs! Dic mihi, quid significat torques aureus in collo tuo? Estne signum philosophiae aut certaminis culinarii? Manlius: Torques aureus, Gricevs, est memoria antiquae virtutis Manliorum—non solum belli, sed etiam studii sapientiae, nam in orto nostro, disciplina et fortitudo pari modo coluntur. Gricevs: Pulchre dictum, Manlivs! Sed num credis virtutem esse in sola traditione, an etiam in quotidianis rebus, qualia sunt sermones et labores horti? Manlius: Gricevs, virtus vera crescit ex actionibus nostris; sicut planta in horto, radices in terra abscondit, sed fructus omnibus patet. Sic etiam sermo philosophorum florescit ex laboris cotidiana disciplina. Manlio Torquato, Lucio (a. u. c. DCCIV). De voluptate. Roma.

Publio Manlio Vopisco (Roma, Lazio): La ragione conversazionale all’orto di Roma– “Don’t call me ‘Vopisco’! Manlio Vopisco is made into a Roman Epicurean whose “garden” is both a physical hortus and a social technology for living well, so the rationality of talk is imagined on the model of cultivation: nature provides the seeds of communicative ability, but art (training, habit, style) makes conversation yield pleasure and tranquillity. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning can be read as a modern, analytic counterpart to that horticultural image: implicature is what grows when speakers and hearers jointly sustain norms of cooperation, so that what is meant beyond what is said is not mystical “atmosphere” but a reconstructible inference under shared expectations (relevance, sufficiency, clarity, sincerity). The contrast is that Manlio’s Epicurean setting treats conversation primarily as a practice ordered to ataraxia and voluptas—good talk as a component of the pleasant life, aided by patronage and cultivated otium—whereas Grice treats conversation as a rational practice ordered to intelligibility and accountability, in which “what you leave unsaid” must still be something your audience can reasonably be expected to work out. Historically, the biographical packaging here (a “Publio Manlio Vopisco,” patron of Statius, villa at Tivoli) blends real Roman naming patterns and later antiquarian association (the well-known Villa of Manlius Vopiscus at Tivoli) with an Epicurean “Garden” persona in a way that is more emblematic than documentary; but as an emblem it serves your comparison well: Manlio supplies the ethical end of conversation (why we want talk at all), while Grice supplies the inferential discipline that explains how talk can reliably do its work without becoming either mere charm or mere power. --  il giardino. L’orto. L’Orto. Patron of STAZIO . Grice: “When I say ‘Garden’ I mean: ‘filosofo che segue la dottrina dell’Orto” – i. e. Marius, the Epicurean! The category of ‘patron’ is more or less publicly unknown in Oxonian philosophy. The term is applied to what the stereotypical patron was applied, as when we say ‘Mecenas’ without meaning ‘Mecenas.’ In modern Italian, the surname of Publio ManlioVopisco, based on his gens (the Manlia clan), is Manlio. The name Vopisco (Vopiscus) is an ancient Latin cognomen with a specific meaning: Definition: It traditionally refers to a child born alive after the death of their twin in the womb. Etymology: While some historians like Pliny the Elder promoted this "surviving twin" definition, modern scholars consider it an antique and rare name that likely originated as a praenomen before being used as a family nickname. In the context of this specific individual, Manlio (the nomen) functions as the family name, and Vopisco(the cognomen) acts as a branch or personal identifier. Modern Italian references to his historical villa in Tivoli refer to him as Manlio Vopisco. Denarius of Lucius Manlius Torquatus. The obverse depicts the head of Roma within a torque, the emblem of the Manlii Torquati. The reverse depicts a warrior charging into battle on horseback, beneath the letter 'Q', signifying Torquatus' quaestorship. The gens Manlia (Mānlia)[1] was one of the oldest and noblest patrician houses at Rome, from the earliest days of the Republic until imperial times. The first of the gens to obtain the consulship was Gnaeus Manlius Cincinnatus, consul in 480 BC, and for nearly five centuries its members frequently held the most important magistracies. Many of them were distinguished statesmen and generals, and a number of prominent individuals under the Empire claimed the illustrious Manlii among their ancestors. la villa del filosofo. Gricevs: Salve, Manli Vopisce! Quid agis hodie inter hortos et Romae porticus? Manlio: Salve, Grice! Inter rosarum odorem et philosophorum sermonem, semper invenio pacem. Hodie in orto cogito de felicitate, ut Epicureus docuit: “Quid enim est vita nisi hortus sapientiae?” Gricevs: Bene dictum, Manli Vopisce! Sed dic mihi: Putasne rationem conversandi ortum habere in ipsa natura, an potius in arte loquendi? Manlio: Existimo rationem conversandi nasci ex natura, quae nobis dat initia, sed arte perficitur. Sicut in orto, semina ponimus, sed cultu crescunt. Manlio Vopisco, Publio (a. u. c. DCCCXLVIII). De voluptate. Roma.

Filippo Amantea Mannelli (Grimaldi, Calabria): l’implicatura conversazionale degl’eroi di Virgilio. Mannelli functions as a Virgilian humanist foil for Grice by relocating “reason-governed meaning” from the seminar room to the epic scene: where Grice’s conversational implicature is a rational, publicly reconstructible route from what is said to what is meant under cooperative norms, Mannelli’s “heroes of Virgil” supply a culture in which much of what matters is carried by elevated understatement, prophetic indirection, and role-bound decorum—forms of communicative restraint that feel like implicature at the level of character and fate. The comic tension in the dialogue (“would Aeneas respect my maxims or prefer stoic silence?”) points to the difference: Grice’s maxims are designed to explain how ordinary interlocutors can calculate intended enrichments (and how those enrichments can be cancelled or challenged), whereas epic communication often works by making the enrichment socially or narratively compulsory: Aeneas’ piety, duty, and self-suppression are not optional “hearer inferences” so much as interpretive obligations built into the genre. Biographically, I can’t corroborate from standard online reference sources that there is a historically attested Filippo Amantea Mannelli with a 1685 imprint La filosofia morale (Napoli: Morano), and the profile you give (local Calabrian cultural institutions, “palazzo,” contributions to Calabria Letteraria, a metrical Xenia of Goethe) reads like your project’s characteristic pseudo-archival montage; but that actually strengthens the Gricean comparison, because it makes Mannelli an emblem of a different rationality of meaning: not the calculability of conversational cooperation, but the cultivated, classicizing rationality of exempla, where “what is meant” is stabilized by a shared literary canon (Virgil, Goethe, Schiller, Kant) and by institutions of remembrance (academies, libraries), rather than by the moment-to-moment mechanics of a talk exchange. Grice: “When Strawson was inaugurated as the Waynflete professor at Oxford of metaphysical philosophy, he referred in his opening lecture to myself as a hero or a god – I forget!” Filosofo italiano. Grimaldi, Cosenza, Calabria. Grice: “Like me, Mannelli loved Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Virgilio – and he has his own ‘palazzo’!” -- Fequenta il ginnasio a Cosenza. Si trasferì con la famiglia prima ad Aosta, dove termina gli studi liceali, e poi a Roma. S’interessa sempre più al mondo politico e dopo la laurea, conseguita con il massimo dei voti, ritorna a Cosenza e  venne eletto Consigliere Provinciale.  Proprio in qualità di membro del consiglio provinciale, si adoperò in prima persona per arricchire e promuovere l'ampliamento della Biblioteca Provinciale di Cosenza  Si dedicò in tempi e con modi diversi all'attività di approfondimento e divulgazione. Firmò una versione metrica della Xenia di Goethe (Roma, Paravia.  E tra i maggiori contributori della più importante rivista di arti e lettere della regione, la Calabria Letteraria. Presidente dell'Accademia Cosentina, l'istituzione accademica calabrese che vanta un'esistenza plurisecolare e che nel XVI secolo ebbe come presidente Telesio.  Opere: “Inaugurandosi il monumento al caduti grimaldesi: scultura di Cambellotti, Reggio Calabria, Editore Il Giornale di Calabria, Paravia, Le storiche Terme Luigiane: passato-presente-futuro, Cosenza, Cronaca di Calabria, L'Accademia Cosentina nella sua storia secolare e nell'oggi, Cosenza, Tip. Vincenzo Serafino. Biografia in Calabriaonline.com  M. Chiodo, L'Accademia cosentina e la sua biblioteca. Società e cultura in Calabria.  Xenia Edizione Paravia. nna Vincenza Aversa, Dopoguerra calabrese: cultura e stampa, gl’eroi di Virgilio, gl’eroe di Virgilio, l’eroe stoico, Acri, Enea come eroe stoico, gl’eroi di Vico. Grice: Mannelli, mi dica la verità: tra tutti gl’eroi di Virgilio, qual è quello che scegli per una chiacchierata davanti a un buon caffè? Mannelli: Caro Grice, senza dubbio Enea! È uno che ascolta gli dèi, si perde tra i sentimenti e alla fine trova sempre la strada… un po’ come noi filosofi dopo una lunga notte in biblioteca. Grice: E secondo lei, se Enea fosse stato a Oxford, avrebbe rispettato le mie massime conversazionali o avrebbe preferito il silenzio stoico? Mannelli: Oh, Grice, a Oxford avrebbe sicuramente detto qualcosa di sensato… ma solo dopo aver consultato il suo destino! E magari, tra una massima e l’altra, ci avrebbe invitati a fondare una nuova Accademia. Sempre che le muse fossero d’accordo! Mannelli, Filippo Amantea (1685). La filosofia morale. Napoli: Morano.

Alessandro Manzoni (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale dell’implicature dei promessi sposi, “How CLEVER English is!” – Grice. Grice and Manzoni meet as two versions of the same wager: that meaning is not secured by an abstract system but by the rational habits of a linguistic community in action. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning says that what speakers communicate beyond what they literally say (implicature) is, in principle, inferable by any competent hearer who assumes cooperation and can reconstruct the speaker’s intentions against shared norms of relevance, adequacy, and clarity; the “cleverness” of a language is precisely that it supports this disciplined traffic between saying and meaning. Manzoni’s questione della lingua and his “rinsing in the Arno” episode dramatize the same dependence on shared practice, but at the scale of nation-building rather than turn-by-turn inference: he rewrites I promessi sposi to align with educated spoken Florentine because a national language must be a living, socially ratified medium capable of carrying common understanding, moral nuance, and comic timing without constant recourse to grammarians. Where Grice theorizes how local conversational rationality makes implicature calculable, cancellable, and accountable, Manzoni engineers the background conditions that make such rationality widely shareable—standardizing a register in which what is left unsaid can still be responsibly recovered. Historically, the outline in your passage tracks well-known facts: the 1827 “Ventisettana” edition, the later linguistic revision associated with Florence, and Manzoni’s explicit argument (in writings on the unity of the language) that language is a communal practice rather than a museum of rules; your analogy to Austin and ordinary-language philosophy then lands naturally, because both Manzoni and the Oxford tradition treat the everyday as the tribunal of sense, and both take the durability of ordinary distinctions as evidence that reason in language is a social achievement before it is a theory. Grice: “ In I Promessi Sposi, M.’s engagement with the questione della lingua parallels ordinary-language philosophy by shifting the focus from abstract, idealized systems to the "living," everyday speech of a community. M. and the "Living" Language M.’s philosophical struggle centered on defining what constitutes a truly national language for a unified Italy. Rejection of the Artificial: M. initially writes in an eclectic, bookish mix of dialects and literary forms but finds this insufficient for a unified people. The Florentine Solution: To resolve this, he famously rinses his rags in the Arno, rewriting his novel to match the contemporary, educated spoken Florentine dialect. Language as Shared Practice: His treatise, dell’unità della lingua, argued that a language is not a set of frozen rules but a shared social practice essential for national community.  Parallels with Austin and OLP Modern scholars link M.’s turn toward "ordinary life" with the work of Austin and ‘Vitters. Ordinary vs. Ideal Language: Just as Austin critiques philosophers for creating an ideal language that ignores the nuances of everyday speech, M. critiques the artificial literary Italian of his time. Speech Acts and Community: Austin’s speech act theory posits that language is something we do rather than just a set of assertions. Similarly, M. views language as the mechanism for staging community and moral acknowledgment. The Test of Survival: Austin believes ordinary language preserves distinctions that have stood the long test of the survival of the fittest. M. seeks to anchor Italian in a living dialect because it possesses the vitality and consensus that a bookish language lacks.  Philosophical Impact Italian philosophers interested in OLP found in M. an early precursor who addresses the same fundamental question: Is language a formal logical system or a set of communal habits?  Grice has the Manzoni juvenilia in front of him the way he has most of literature in front of him: by its title. He is in no mood to be converted by pages. The Revd. Sidney Smith has already supplied the only critical method a gentleman can practice without blushing: I never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so. Grice repeats it silently, as if it were a maxim of conversational economy: why acquire data when a heading will do. Del trionfo della libertà. He begins with the del. Of the. Why bother with “of.” We reserve that, he thinks, for poetry, and even there it is a kind of opening flourish that tries to make grammar do the work of grandeur. Of Man’s first disobedience, and the fruit / Of that forbidden tree… Milton, at least, earns his “of” by immediately handing you a subject so large it threatens to occupy the whole language. Milton can afford the preposition because he then gives you a cosmos. [poetryfoundation.org] But Manzoni’s del is adolescent solemnity. It is the linguistic equivalent of standing up very straight before one has done anything worth standing up for. “Del” says: I am about to be elevated. Grice suspects the boy is trying to sound older than fifteen by using a genitive. Then the triumph. Triumphs, Grice thinks, are not things that abstractions do. People triumph. Generals, governments, mobs, sometimes even committees triumph if they are unusually well staffed. But “la libertà” triumphing sounds French, almost aggressively so, as if the noun had marched in from Paris with its own cockade. Liberty, in English, is already a suspicious word because it arrives with politics attached; “la Libertà” in Italian, as a personified goddess, arrives with an entire theatrical apparatus. The title implies a chariot before it implies an argument. And yet the topic is not uninteresting. “Free” is a busy little predicate in English. Americans now sell alcohol-free this and sugar-free that, as if freedom were chiefly the absence of ingredients. Physicists speak of free fall, where “free” means “subject only to gravity,” which is a comic definition of freedom if you happen to be the falling object. Kant didn’t know where to begin, and that is Kant’s genius and his drawback: he begins by rearranging the furniture before he decides whether the room has a door. Manzoni, at least, begins with a proposition-like flourish: del… as if he were already filing the concept under a heading. Grice turns the page without reading it, which is his way of remaining principled. He knows enough already: it is an early political poem written around the peace of Lunéville, dressed in Dantean tercets, with Liberty personified, and with the usual youthful confidence that a large abstraction can be made to do the work of an agent. [alessandro...anzoni.org], [britannica.com] He pauses at the phrase “the triumph of liberty” and hears, uninvited, Pope’s line: The Feast of Reason and the Flow of Soul. “Feast” and “flow” at least tell you what sort of things they are: metaphors for a convivial state, not literal banquets and literal rivers. The triumph of liberty, by contrast, sounds like an official parade in which nobody knows who is marching and who is clapping. [metaphors....rginia.edu] The thing that bothers him most is the definite article in spirit: the triumph. Not a triumph, not some triumph, but the triumph. As if liberty ever finishes. As if liberty, once it has triumphed, stays triumphant, the way a cup remains on a shelf. A triumph is an event; liberty is a condition; and the title is already smuggling in the idea that a condition can be completed like a campaign. He imagines, in dry Oxford irritation, what a proper ordinary-language rewrite would look like, if one were not trying to sound like a young prophet in a borrowed robe. Something like: Who, exactly, has become free, from what, and at what cost. But that, of course, would not do as a title. It would sound like a tutorial question, which is precisely what Manzoni is trying to avoid. Titles are where boys conceal that they are boys. Grice closes the volume with a small satisfaction: the satisfaction of having done what he came to do without being seduced into “reading.” The title has already yielded its implicatures. It tells you the whole posture: grandeur first, analysis later; liberty as heroine; triumph as the moral punctuation mark; “del” as the adolescent genitive that tries to make the thing sound inevitable. And yet, he thinks, this is also how a career begins. Not with mastery, but with a title that overpromises. Later Manzoni will learn to rinse his language in a river and make “ordinary” do the real work. Here, at fifteen, he is still rinsing it in rhetoric. Grice stands up, leaving the poem unread, and feels he has remained fair to both Sidney Smith and Manzoni: he has judged the boy by his heading, which is the only thing a boy reliably controls, and he has conceded, without granting it too much dignity, that the topic is not uninteresting.Grice: Manzoni, mi dica, come le è venuta l'idea di “rinsaldare i panni nell’Arno”? Davvero solo i fiorentini sanno parlare come si deve o c’è qualche dialetto che le sta simpatico? Manzoni: Caro Grice, ho provato tutti i dialetti, ma nessuno mi convinceva! Il milanese era troppo diretto, il lombardo troppo “brusco”, e il toscano mi sembrava la ricetta perfetta: limpido, elegante e capace di mettere tutti d’accordo senza litigare. Grice: Se avesse chiesto a Austin, le avrebbe suggerito di scrivere in “lingua ordinaria”, magari quella che si usa nei bar di Oxford! Ma dicono che nei Promessi Sposi la lingua è viva perché nasce dalla gente, non dai grammatici. Ha mai pensato di ambientare il romanzo in Inghilterra? Manzoni: Ah, Grice, se avessi ambientato tutto a Londra, “Don Abbondio” sarebbe diventato “Father Bond”, e Renzo avrebbe chiesto il permesso per sposarsi al pub! La verità è che la lingua migliore è quella che ti permette di ridere e piangere insieme, e magari capire cosa si sta dicendo senza bisogno di dizionario. In fondo, la lingua è come il pane: deve essere fresca, genuina e per tutti! Manzoni, Alessandro (1801). Del trinfo della liberta. Milano.

Girolamo Marafioti (Polistena, Calabria). In your passage, Marafioti is a useful counterpoint to Grice because he represents meaning as something anchored in traces, authorities, and memorial technique, whereas Grice treats meaning in conversation as something anchored in publicly reconstructible practical reasoning between interlocutors. Grice’s “reason-governed conversational meaning” explains how an audience is entitled to move from what is said to what is meant (implicatures generated under expectations of cooperation, relevance, adequacy, and clarity), and it makes that movement accountable: if you drew the inference, you can in principle show why it was warranted. Marafioti’s historical project in the Croniche et antichità di Calabria—written by a Franciscan continuator correcting and supplementing Barrio, using fragmentary sources, and motivated by preserving local sanctity and civic memory—works with a different “rationality”: not the on-the-fly rationality of turn-taking, but the curatorial rationality of selection, emendation, and authoritative compilation, where what is “meant” by Calabria’s past often has to be reconstructed from gaps and lacunae rather than inferred from cooperative norms. Online reference summaries broadly confirm the outline that Marafioti’s biography is sparse and largely inferred from his own works; that he produced Croniche et antichità di Calabria in five books with an early Naples printing and a later expanded Paduan edition; and that he also wrote a Latin treatise on mnemonics that was successful enough to be translated into Italian—details that reinforce the comparison: Marafioti thematizes memory as a technology for stabilizing meaning across time, while Grice thematizes inference as a technology for stabilizing meaning across speakers. Put sharply, Marafioti is concerned with how meaning survives (through archives, saints’ lives, and mnemonic discipline), whereas Grice is concerned with how meaning happens (through rational expectations in a talk exchange), and your staged dialogue makes the bridge between them: both are, in their different ways, trying to protect sense from loss—Marafioti from historical oblivion, Grice from conversational misunderstanding. Grice: “I played for Oxfordshire, I mean I played as an amateur cricketer at county level – I’m not sure if Calabria counts as ‘county level’!”  Filosofo, umanista, storico e presbitero italiano. M., Croniche et antichità di Calabria. Le notizie biografiche su di lui sono molto scarse e desunte per lo più dalle sue opere o da una storia ottocentesca della sua città natale. Croniche et antichità di Calabria. Sacerdote appartenente all'Ordine dei Frati Minori, M. si prefisse il compito di continuare la storia della Calabria dell'umanista Barrio. La prima edizione di quell'opera, infatti, si era rivelata talmente piena di errori e di lacune che lo stesso Barrio aveva tentato di emendarla in vista di una seconda edizione, ma ne era stato impedito dalla morte. Intenzione, parzialmente disattesa, del padre francescano era inoltre quella di ricordare le vite i santi calabresi, specialmente coloro di cui si era persa la memoria.  Le Croniche et antichità di Calabria, in cinque libri, venne edita una prima volta a Napoli mentre una seconda versione accresciuta e corretta venne edita a Padova.  Di padre M. sono rimasti anche un'opera teologica e un trattato di mnemotecnica in lingua latina, che ha un certo successo tanto che venne tradotto poco tempo dopo in lingua italiana.  Non è noto dove e quando M. sia morto. Giovanni Russo, ex direttore del Museo civico "Francesco Jerace" a Polistena, ha suggerito che M. sia deceduto  presso il convento nel suo paese natale. Opere: M., Croniche et antichità di Calabria. Conforme all'ordine de' testi greco, et latino, raccolte da' più famosi scrittori antichi, et moderni ..., Padova, Ad instanza de gl'Uniti, Forni, D. Valensise, .  ?id=LlawjHUbv9U C&printsec=frontcover&hl=it#v =onepage&q& f=false Consultabile on line su Google Libri ^ L. Accattatis. ^ Franco Carlino, M.. Un sacerdote con la passione della storia, in Il Nuovo Corriere della Sibaritide, Barrii Francicani De antiquitate et situ Calabriae. Libri quinque. implicatura. Grice: Caro Marafioti, ho sempre trovato affascinante la sua dedizione alla storia della Calabria. Mi incuriosisce sapere cosa l’ha spinto a correggere e arricchire le opere di Barrio, un compito certo non facile! Marafioti: Gentile Grice, la passione per la mia terra e il desiderio di restituire memoria ai santi calabresi sono stati i miei principali motivi. Barrio aveva lasciato molte lacune e io, da buon frate, ho cercato di colmarle per amore della verità e della tradizione. Grice: È davvero encomiabile. Le sue "Croniche et antichità di Calabria" sono considerate fondamentali per chi vuole comprendere la storia e la cultura della regione. Ha trovato ostacoli nel suo percorso di ricerca? Marafioti: Certo, caro Grice. Le fonti erano spesso frammentarie e le notizie rare, ma la perseveranza e la fede mi hanno aiutato. Ho anche scritto un trattato di mnemotecnica, nella speranza che la memoria dei calabresi possa essere custodita e tramandata. Dopotutto, come si dice da noi, "chi non ha memoria non ha futuro". Marafioti, Girolamo (1601). Croniche et storia della Calabria. Napoli: Longo.

Geronimo Marano (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale. Marano is presented as turning pragmatics into a local Neapolitan art of conversational rhetoric, whereas Grice treats pragmatics as a normative, reason-governed mechanism: hearers infer what is meant (implicated) from what is said by assuming cooperation, and those inferences are in principle reconstructible as reasons (relevance, quantity, manner, quality) rather than as mere stylistic flair. That difference is the point of contact and the point of tension: Marano’s Naples makes conversation feel like navigation through dense social streets—irony, timing, and face-work are central, and “meaning” often rides on culturally tuned insinuation—while Grice’s framework insists that even the most local, witty, or evasive remark only counts as a communicative implicature insofar as the speaker can reasonably expect the audience to recognize an intention and to treat it as a reason for uptake. If one adds the Leech cue in your keywords, Marano aligns with a rhetoric-centered pragmatics (how speakers achieve effects and manage social relations), while Grice supplies the rational backbone that keeps those effects from collapsing into mere atmosphere: conversational success is not just sounding right, but making one’s intended enrichment available to a competent interlocutor under shared norms. Historically, I can’t independently confirm from standard online reference sources that there is a Naples-based philosopher “Geronimo Marano” with a 1755 Palermo imprint Dissertazioni filosofiche; the surname material you include is broadly consistent with common etymological summaries for Marano as a toponymic name, but the philosopher-and-imprint look like your project’s pseudo-archival invention—useful, though, because it lets the comparison land cleanly: Grice’s “conversational reason” explains why Neapolitan conversational artistry is interpretable rather than magical, and Marano’s rhetorical lens explains why Grice’s maxims, outside Oxford, often function less like classroom rules and more like social survival skills. Grice: “I love Marano!” – Keywords: conversational rhetoric; pragmmatica come rettorica converazionale – G. N. Leech.  The Italian surname Marano has several etymological origins, primarily habitational or topographic in nature.  Primary Origins Habitational Name: The most common origin is from various locations in Italy named Marano. These places were often named using the Latin personal name Marius combined with the possessive suffix -anum (meaning "estate of Marius"). Notable examples include: Marano di Napoli (Campania) Marano Vicentino (Veneto) Marano Marchesato (Calabria) Marano Lagunare (Friuli-Venezia Giulia) Topographic Name: It may derive from the Italian word marano, meaning "marshy" or "swampy place," referring to someone who lived near such terrain. Maritime Connection: Some sources suggest a derivation from the Latin marinus, meaning "of the sea," which would associate the name with maritime occupations like fishing or sailing.  Alternative Meanings and Variants Personal Name: It can be a masculine form of the personal name Marana. Historical/Nickname: In some contexts, particularly in Southern Italy, it was a nickname for a "ruffian" or "villain". Historically, it also related to the term for a wild animal, such as a wild boar. Sephardic Context: While distinct from the common Italian surname, the term Marrano (often with two 'r's) was used in the Iberian Peninsula to refer to Jewish converts to Christianity.  Geographical Distribution In 2025, the surname remains most prevalent in Southern Italy, particularly in Campania, Sicily, and Calabria. Common Italian municipalities for the name include Agrigento, Avellino, and Foggia.  Geronimo M.  (also identified as the Reverend Abbot D. Geronimo M.) is an Italian philosopher. Biographical Information Place of Birth: Based on his publishing history and the titles associated with him, he is active in Naples, Italy. Title/Role: Grice: Caro Marano, ho sempre pensato che la tua filosofia a Napoli abbia qualcosa di speciale: sarà forse l’aria del golfo, o la prammatica che diventa quasi una rettorica conversazionale? Marano: Eh Grice, qui a Napoli la conversazione è un’arte, e anche la filosofia deve imparare a muoversi tra i vicoli e i caffè. Non c’è dialogo che non abbia un pizzico di ironia, perfino tra i filosofi! Grice: Ho sentito che il tuo cognome deriva da paludi o dal mare… Quindi la tua prammatica è liquida: scorre, si adatta e riflette il mondo, proprio come farebbe un napoletano vero? Marano: Esatto, Grice! Qui si dice che “chi sa navigare, sa anche filosofare”. La conversazione a Napoli non è solo parlare, è sopravvivere, improvvisare e sorridere anche davanti al più serio dei sillogismi. E, tra parentesi, se la filosofia non fa ridere almeno una volta, è solo una palude senza uscita! Marano, Geronimo (1819). Delle regole dell’arte rettorica ad uso della Reale Accademia di Marina. Napoli: Reale Accademia di Marina.

Marco Claudio Marcello (Roma, Lazio): la filosofia sotto Giulio Cesare. Marcello’s story is used to put pressure on the same hinge Grice builds his theory of conversational meaning around: the gap between an agent’s intention and the world’s uptake of it. For Grice, conversational meaning is reason-governed because what a speaker means is, in principle, recoverable by a rational hearer from publicly available cues plus the assumption of cooperative conduct; crucially, this makes intention not a private spark but something that must be recognizable in order to do its communicative work. Prichard’s “too-late pardon” case sharpens the parallel by showing a limit-case where intention seems normatively decisive (Caesar intends to pardon) but the intended perlocutionary outcome (Marcello saved, the political meaning of clemency realized) fails because the act does not reach its audience in time; Marcello’s death is “accidental” relative to Caesar’s will, yet it is decisive relative to what actually happens. Historically, the outline fits the well-attested episode: Caesar pardons Marcus Claudius Marcellus in 46 BC (occasioning Cicero’s Pro Marcello), but Marcellus is later killed near Athens; Cicero treats the pardon as politically meaningful as an act of clementia regardless of the later murder. Your comparison, then, is that Caesar’s pardon functions like an attempted communicative act: it has an intended content and force, but its success depends on the social-temporal channel that carries it; Grice’s point is similar but generalized—meaning is constituted by intention under norms of recognition, so when recognition is blocked (by delay, betrayal, noise, or hostile context), what remains may be an intention with moral or political significance, but not a fully achieved piece of reason-governed communication. Grice: “When I attended Prichard’s seminars on will and action, I was struck by one of his examples – from the history of Rome. M. was a fierce opponent to Giulio Cesare, and about to be condemned to death for precisely that. However, Giulio Cesare changes his mind, and decides to PARDON M. However, the pardon arrived too late, and M. was merciless murdered. Prichard claimed that since Giulio Cesare’s intention was to PARDON M. and save his life, even if Giulio Cesare failed in this, M. could still be deemed to have been pardoned, and his life saved by Giulio Cesare. The murder of M. was ‘accidental’ in terms of Caesar’s willingness to pardon him!” Filosofo italiano. A pupil of Cratippo. M. has a career in public life and is one of those who opposes to Giulio Cesare. Cesare pardons M. but M. is still murdered. Livio, Machiavelli. Marcello. Grice, “Grice e Marcello.”  GRICEVS: Marcell(e), audivi te de Caesare scribere: venia data—sed sero. Roma semper invenit modum ut etiam misericordia tardet. MARCELLVS: Ita est, Grice; apud nos clementia saepe currit post gladium—quasi cursor qui sandalia domi reliquit. GRICEVS: Sed Prichardus diceret: “Si Caesar intendet parcere, tum iam parcit”—quasi voluntas sit nuntius celerior quam tabellarius. MARCELLVS: O Grice, si ita, tum ego hodie vivo “per intentionem”! Roma est unica urbs ubi accidens interficit, sed propositum absolvit. Marcello, Marco Claudio (a. u. c. DCCVIII). De voluntate et evento. Roma.

Marcello (Roma, Lazio): il principe filosofo. Marcello is made to stand at the intersection of two kinds of rational governance: the formal governance of reasons inside logic (syllogismus as syn-logos, a binding-together of logoi) and the practical governance of reasons inside conversation, which is Grice’s domain. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning says that what hearers are entitled to take a speaker to mean (including implicatures) is constrained by publicly accessible norms of cooperative rationality, so that the route from what is said to what is meant is, at least in principle, reconstructible as a piece of reasoning; Marcello, as you portray him, supplies the ancient counterpart by treating reasoning itself as something with an explicit architecture (the syllogism), thereby making “reasons” not merely psychological pushes but connectable units that can be chained, tested, and corrected. The joke about the Kneales “missing Marcello” functions as a narrative hinge: Oxford thinks it has the history of logic sewn up, yet your Marcello reminds us that “logic” is not only a modern formal calculus but also an older civic-and-educational ideal, where to connect reasons is also to connect persons (amicitias quoque coniungamus), i.e., where rational structure is inseparable from the social conditions of its transmission. Historically, there is indeed a real Marcus Claudius Marcellus (Augustus’ nephew and intended heir) who died in 23 BC (AUC 731), but there is no standard attested “Tullio Marcello” author of De ratione or De syllogismo from that setting; the imprint reads as your project’s playful pseudo-archive, and that helps the comparison by letting “Marcello” operate as an emblem: for Grice, the norms of conversation explain how meaning travels by inferential uptake; for Marcello, the norms of syllogistic form explain how conclusions travel by valid consequence—two parallel pictures of reason as something that binds, obliges, and can be evaluated rather than merely felt. Grice: “When I arrived at Oxford from Clifton with a classics scholarship to Corpus, I knew I had to deal with Ottaviano – I was less sure I had to deal with his NEPHEW!” The nephew of Ottaviano [vedasi], and until his death, his chosen heir. A pupil of Nestore. Marco Claudio Marcello. Grice, “Grice e Marcello.” Marcello: del sillogismo – Roma – filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Abstract. Grice: “At Oxford, it is widely believed that Martha and W. C. Kneale covered the whole of the growh of logic – indeed, they missed Marcello!” Filosofo italiano. M. qrites about logic, including an essay on the syllogism, which is a connection (‘syn-‘) of ‘reasons’ (logoi).  Tullio Marcello. GRICEVS: Cum e Cliftonio Oxonium venissem, stipendio classicorum ad Corpus, sciebam mihi cum Ottaviano esse negotium; minus autem certus eram me etiam cum nepote eius rem habiturum! MARCELLVS: Noli timere, Grice; nepos sum, sed non morsus: si patrui umbram effugis, ad vinum venias—hic quoque logica bibitur. GRICEVS: At Oxonii vulgo creditur Martham et W. C. Kneale totum logicae incrementum complexos esse; immo—Marcellum praeterierunt! MARCELLVS: Praeterierunt? Bene: qui me praeterit, syllogismum quoque praeterit—nam syllogismus est syn-logos, coniunctio rationum; et si rationes coniungimus, amicitias quoque coniungamus. Marcello (a. u. c. DCCXXXI). De ratione. Roma.

Giovanni Marchesini (Noventa, Vicenza, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’educazione del soldato – l’implicatura del capitano – e l’amore sessuale – la società eugenica. Grice uses Marchesini as a foil to sharpen what he means by reason-governed conversational meaning: for Grice, what is communicated beyond what is explicitly said (implicature) is something a hearer can work out by rationally attributing intentions to a speaker under shared norms of cooperative exchange, and the resulting inference is, in principle, accountable and challengeable. Marchesini’s world, by contrast, is presented as one in which meaning is trained into people through institutions (the education of the soldier, the authority of the captain, codes of “cavalry,” symbolism, even the ideology-adjacent rhetoric of eugenics): here the “implicature of the captain” works less like a voluntary, mutually ratified inference and more like a disciplined uptake shaped by hierarchy, ritual, and social conditioning, where what the subordinate “takes” is partly secured by command, not just by conversational rationality. That difference makes Grice’s central claim vivid: conversational reason is not merely intelligence in decoding symbols, but a normative practice in which speakers choose what to make explicit and what to leave inferable, expecting interlocutors to bridge the gap using shared standards of relevance, sufficiency, and clarity—whereas Marchesini’s pedagogical-military frame risks turning inference into indoctrinated compliance, a kind of forced uptake that can mimic implicature while bypassing the freedom and reciprocity that make Gricean inference genuinely reason-governed. Grice: “When I delivered my lecture on ‘meaning’ for the Philosophical Society at Oxford, I knew that some of my pupils – to which I had burdened with my seminars on ‘meaning’ would be attending. I was paying little attention to Marzolo. When Cairo wrote his ‘Dictionary of Symbols,’ way before Vienna, and other events with which we were familiar at Oxford, Cairo makes an effort to trace his research – and he provides three references: Ferrero, Marzolo, and M. – “amongst us Italians” – he adds. Now Ferrero was more of a lawyer and his ‘I simboli’ only tangentially approaches ‘simbolo’ and ‘segno,’ or the phenomenon of ‘voulere dire’ alla Grice – but what is important is that he leaves M. behind, and indeed OVER-stresses the LEGACY of Marzolo. Unlike myself – who dismiss in “Meaning” talk of ‘sign,’ Marzolo entitles his ‘essay’ an ‘essay on signs’ – and he is indeed into ‘words’ – he held a profeessor of letters at Pisa. But his words are what these words ‘voule dire’ – ‘signare’ – as quoted by both Marzolo and Ferrero – as when Cicero says that a signum signat – in the zodiac. But Marzolo’s examples are RARELY about what a given expression MEANS, or is a sign of – he takes this for granted. Now, if you read my ‘Meaning’ you will find NO reference to what a word – or group of words means – I approach this later in my career, under pressure, and I give only ONE example ‘shaggy’ – shaggy shaggy reduplicated, as Ferrero has it to mean that the utterer means that the referent is hairy-coated. When it comes to indicare that’s our ‘say’. L’educazione del soldato, con il capitano MEOLI, la società di genetica ed eugenica, il simbolismo, la dottrina del simbolismo, i simbolisti, i filosofi simbolisti, i artisti simbolisti, Welby, Ogden, Grice, il simbolo del simbolo, il cammino del cavaliere, codigo cavalleresco, cavalleria, cavallo, equites romano – tutti questi appartneno all’altro Marchesini – questo M. e tradizionale. Grice: Caro Marchesini, quando parli dell’educazione del soldato e del capitano, mi viene in mente che persino i miei seminari a Oxford sembravano esercitazioni militari: disciplina, implicature e qualche segno zodiacale per fortuna! Marchesini: Grice, se i tuoi seminari erano campi di addestramento, allora i miei studenti sono cavalieri: sempre pronti a interpretare simboli e codici, anche se preferirebbero un cavallo vero per scappare dalle interrogazioni. Grice: Non ti nego che, tra simbolismo e società eugenica, qualche volta mi sento più vicino a un cavallo che a un filosofo: almeno il cavallo non deve spiegare cosa significhi “shaggy shaggy”! Marchesini: Hai ragione, Grice! In fondo, tra capitani, soldati e cavalli, la vera implicatura è che la filosofia serve soprattutto a non perdere il senso dell’umorismo… e magari guadagnare una corsa verso l’Arno, come Manzoni! Marchesini, Giovanni (1895). Studi filosofici. Firenze: Giunti.

Alessandro Marchetti (Empoli, Firenze, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale della natura delle cose. Grice treats Marchetti as an unexpectedly Gricean technician of intelligibility: a translator forced to make Lucretius’ Latin “sayable” in the volgare, and (in the Galileo-related works attributed to him) a writer who tries to impose explicit structure where a tradition can feel rhetorically fluent but formally under-specified. That lets you contrast two kinds of “reason-governed meaning.” For Grice, conversational meaning is governed by public norms of rational cooperation: hearers infer implicatures from what is said because they can presume the speaker is aiming at relevance, adequate information, clarity, and truthfulness, and those inferences are in principle reconstructible and contestable. Marchetti’s task, by contrast, is not a live conversational exchange but a high-stakes act of cultural and lexical engineering: he must choose ordinary Tuscan resources that will carry, for his readers, the right inferential load of Epicurean physics (atoms, void, nature) without either flattening the argument or triggering avoidable scandal, so that “what is meant” by Lucretius becomes recoverable in a new linguistic ecosystem. Read that way, Marchetti is a foil who makes Grice’s emphasis on perspicuity concrete: where Grice diagnoses failures of relevance or quantity as generating implicature, Marchetti confronts a prior problem—making the explicit content itself perspicuous—so that any higher-level “implicatures” (about rationalism, impiety, or the moral of nature) don’t arise merely from obscurity or mistranslation. Online reference summaries generally support the broad biographical frame you give (Tuscan man of letters linked with Pisa; known above all for the Italian De rerum natura; involved in learned academies and subject to suspicion for materialist overtones), but they don’t make him a precursor of Gricean pragmatics; your comparison is therefore deliberately anachronistic in a productive way, using Marchetti’s translation practice as a model of how rational norms—whether conversational maxims or translational constraints—govern the passage from words to what an audience is entitled to take them to mean. Grice:“When I won the classics scholarship at Clifton to Corpus, I never said ‘no’ even though I had no idea that I would meet the sub-faculty of philosophy only five terms into the Faculty of Literae Humaniores! By the time I was introduced Lucretius’s De rerum natura, I was world-weary already!” Grice: “I love Marchetti; for once, he had to find vulgar terms for all of Lucretius’s learned ones! The Italians used to call their own tongue ‘volgare’ then --; this is not easy matter (to translate Lucretius, not to call your tongue volgare), especially since Lucretius was often unclear to himslf – talk of my conversational desideratu of conversational perspicuity [sic]!” -- Grice: “I like him because he axiomatised Galilei!” Professore a Pisa, contina le ricerche di Galileo come Viviani. Collabora con Papa. Scrive rime morali ed eroiche. L’opera cui deve la sua fama è la traduzione “Della natura delle cose” di LUCREZIO. Considerata come un manifesto di  razionalismo, “La natura dellle cose” influì notevolmente sul gusto arcadico per la purezza della lingua e l'eleganza dello stile.  La diffusione di idee materialiste attira su M. l'accusa di empietà. Pur rifugiatosi nella poesia, non riusce ad evitare le indagini del Sant'Uffizio, ispirate soprattutto da VANNI. Per altre sue opere di successo e attaccato dagli oppositori di GALILEI. Dei “Disuniti”, Arcadii, Fisio-critici, Risvegliati, Accademia della Crusca e Accademia Fiorentina. Saggi: “De resistentia solidorum” (Firenze, typis Vincentij Vangelisti e Petri Matini (Grice: “Opera  abbastanza interessante, basata sulla teoria galileiana, cui Marchetti dà una struttura assiomatica –implicatura, lucrezio, della natura delle cose, pederastia, il poeta filosofo, l’essamero di Lucrezio, l’essameri di Lucrezi, il poema filosofico latino, il genero filosofico nella poesia latina. Lucrezio, alma figlia di giove, inclita madre. Grice: Caro Marchetti, devo confessare che leggere la tua traduzione di Lucrezio mi ha dato più mal di testa che tradurre una ricetta inglese in latino! Come hai fatto a rendere la natura così… naturale in toscano? Marchetti: Ah, Grice, ti assicuro che per trovare parole semplici e dirette ho dovuto fare più ginnastica mentale di Galileo su una lavagna! Lucrezio, tra atomi e vuoto, sembrava divertirsi a confondere pure me. Grice: Eppure la Chiesa non ha apprezzato il tuo sforzo! Ti hanno dato più fastidio gli inquisitori o i critici di poesia? Marchetti: Diciamo che, tra poesia e Sant’Uffizio, ho imparato che “la natura delle cose” include anche la pazienza infinita. Ma almeno i versi di Lucrezio mettono tutti d’accordo: in fondo, anche i poeti hanno bisogno di un po’ di atomi di buon umore! Marchetti, Alessandro (1669). La filosofia naturale. Pisa: Stamperia della Sapienza.

Vittore Arnaldo Marchi (Potenza, Basilicata): l’implicatura conversazionale della missione di Roma e la religione civile di Mussolini. The contrast between Grice and Vittore Arnaldo Marchi turns on two different senses in which meaning can be “reason-governed.” Grice’s theory of conversational meaning treats implicature as a disciplined, checkable inference: what is meant beyond what is said is recoverable because speakers are presumed to be cooperating under shared norms (relevance, sufficiency, candour, clarity), so reasons for interpretation can be made explicit and, if needed, challenged. Marchi, by contrast, is presented as working in a Mazzinian register where “missione di Roma” and “religione civile” are not primarily conversational inferences but civic-rhetorical frameworks: the language is meant to bind a people to an ideal, and its “implications” are carried as much by institutional memory, political myth, and moral exhortation as by the local logic of a talk exchange. That difference sharpens Grice’s point about “mission”: Oxford’s “mission” (as he jokes via Ryle) is an in-house academic posture, while Marchi’s missione is a public, normative vocation that tries to make political life intelligible and obligatory; the former invites implicatures inside a small conversational game, the latter aims to engineer shared uptake at the scale of a nation. Online biographical notes broadly support the contour you sketch (Marchi as an early-20th-century figure tied to Mazzinian religious philosophy and periodical culture, with publications including Psicologia e filosofia, Hoepli, 1925), but they do not connect him to Gricean pragmatics; the “conversational implicature” label is your text’s productive anachronism, using Marchi’s civic rhetoric as a foil for Grice’s core claim that, unlike political “civil religion,” conversational meaning is governed by reasons that are in principle reconstructible from what was said, the context, and mutually recognized norms. Grice: “While Ryle would speak of the ‘mission of Oxford’, viz. to refute anything German and more broadly continental, that is NOT the meaning of ‘missione’ as Italian philosophers use it since Mazzini, to refer to the ‘missione di Roma’! -- Filosofo italiano. Potenza, Basilicata. Grice: “Marchi displays a few features hardly found at Oxford: He edited a magazine, “filosofia mazziniana” – I can imagine Bradley wanting to edit “Hegeliana” at Oxford – and we do have a Gilbert Ryle Room, and an Occam Society! The other trait is illustrated by his manifesto, “La missione di Roma,” – Churchill would have equaled with something Anglian!” Generale di corpo d’armata italiano, Medaglia d'oro dei Benemeriti dell'Educazione Nazionale. Insegna a Roma. Cura la pubblicazione di diverse riviste in cui si confrontarono alcuni studiosi del primo Novecento italiano come Varisco. Tra queste Dio e Popolo e “L'idealismo realistico.” Dio e Popolo, rivista di ispirazione mazziniana, accoglie scritti miranti alla ricostruzione della filosofia religiosa di Mazzini e i rapporti tra religione e stato; nega l'ateismo e persegue l'ideale di “repubblica”. “L'idealismo realistico” raccoglie teorie filosofiche di stampo anti-gentiliano.  A lui è dedicato il Premio tesi di Laurea M., bandito da Roma Tre per i neolaureati che abbiano sostenuto tesi su un argomento concernente il pensiero filosofico antico degne di essere pubblicate; e un parco al Municipio IV. Saggi: “La filosofia religiosa di Mazzini, in Dio e Popolo, “La missione di Roma” o, Atanòr Ed., Il concetto e il metodo della ‘storia della filosofia,’ – Grice:  “His apt implicature is that if you are an idealist, don’t shed your idealism when discussing J. J. C. Smart!” -- Filosofia e religione, La perseveranza Ed., Potenza,  La filosofia morale e giuridica di Gentile, Stabilimento Tipografico F.lli Marchi, Camerino, Keywords: la missione di Roma, Mazzini, filosofia mazziniana, rivista di filosofia mazziniana, gentile. Grice: Caro Marchi, ho letto con grande interesse il suo manifesto “La missione di Roma”. Mi colpisce come lei declini la nozione di missione non in senso accademico, ma con una profondità spirituale che, ahimè, ad Oxford raramente si incontra. Mi domando: come interpreta oggi il compito universale di Roma? Marchi: Grice, mi fa piacere che abbia colto questo aspetto. La missione di Roma, secondo il pensiero mazziniano, si fonda sull’idea di una religione civile che unisce popolo e ideale. Non si tratta solo di eredità storica, ma di una vocazione morale destinata a guidare l’umanità verso la giustizia e la libertà. Insegno che la filosofia deve essere vissuta, non solo studiata. Grice: Marchi, la sua posizione mi ricorda il contrasto che spesso registro tra idealismo e realismo – come lei stesso ha sottolineato nella sua rivista “L’idealismo realistico”. Pensa che la filosofia possa davvero influenzare la politica e la religione civile senza perdere la sua autonomia teorica? Marchi: Grice, assolutamente. La filosofia è il ponte tra pensiero e azione, tra ideale e concreto. Le riviste che ho fondato, come “Dio e Popolo”, volevano proprio dimostrare che la riflessione filosofica può guidare la prassi civile. Non bisogna mai abbandonare il proprio idealismo, nemmeno quando si affrontano questioni pratiche: è quello che rende la filosofia operativa e non solo contemplativa. Marchi, Vittore Arnaldo (1925). Psicologia e filosofia. Milano: Hoepli.

Luigi De Marchi (Milano). Geophysicist. Grice and De Marchi make a nicely comic contrast between two kinds of “reason-governed” connection: Grice’s is normative and inferential (what a rational hearer is entitled to work out from what is said, given cooperative expectations), while De Marchi’s is causal and measurable (what a rational investigator can predict about conductivity from traction and vibration, given laws and instrumentation). In the dialogue, the wire is jokingly treated as if it “communicated” by implicature, but in Grice’s framework implicature depends on an agent’s communicative intention plus an audience’s recognition of that intention under shared conversational maxims; a vibrating wire has no such intentions, so whatever it “tells” us is not speaker-meaning but indication in something closer to Grice’s own contrast between non-natural meaning and merely natural sign. De Marchi’s 1881 study (on how mechanical stress and oscillation affect electrical conductivity) thus becomes a playful analogue: where Grice diagnoses meaning beyond the literal as something licensed by rational cooperative norms, De Marchi tracks information beyond the surface phenomenon as something licensed by controlled experiment and physical theory—both “reason-governed,” but one by the logic of communicative practice, the other by the logic of causal explanation and measurement. Grice: Caro De Marchi, nel tuo Il Nuovo Cimento del 1881 mi pare che anche il filo “implichi” qualcosa: se vibra troppo, sta confessando che non è affatto cooperativo. De Marchi: Caro Grice, il filo è educatissimo: cambia conduttività senza dire una parola, ma lo fa con abbastanza trazione da farsi capire anche da un fisico distratto. Grice: Dunque quando aumenta la resistenza, l’implicatura è “smettila di tirarmi”, e tu la calcoli con strumenti che Austin avrebbe scambiato per cavatappi. De Marchi: Esatto, e se tu rispettassi la massima della quantità, useresti meno parole e più galvanometri, che in laboratorio sono sempre più persuasivi di Oxford. Marchi, Luigi De (1881). Intorno all’influenza della trazione e delle vibrazioni di un filo metallico sulla sua conduttività elettrica. Il Nuovo Cimento

Luigi De Marchi (Brescia, Lombardia): l’implicatura conversazionale dell’anima del corpo – Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, rule-like upshot of cooperative talk: given what is said plus shared conversational norms (his maxims), a hearer can justify an inference to what is meant, and that justificatory route is part of the meaning explanation rather than a merely psychological or literary association. In the De Marchi material, by contrast, “implicatura conversazionale” is pulled toward an explicitly psychocorporeal and culturally provocative register: talk of “l’anima del corpo,” desire, and an anti-academic “solista” posture turns implicature into a vehicle for staging an anthropology of embodiment and affect, where what is “conveyed” is less a canonically calculable inference than an invitation to re-imagine the body as the primary bearer of sense. The juxtaposition therefore highlights two different uses of “conversational” explanation: Grice’s is methodological and normative, aiming to secure the autonomy of a philosophical psychology and to show how mental-state ascriptions and speaker-meaning can be systematically mapped in a way compatible with psycho-physical correlation, whereas De Marchi’s is more rhetorical and existential, treating conversational indirection as continuous with the body’s own expressivity and with a Lombard, Brescia-linked sensibility that prefers provocation and imagery (the tea cup, the spoon, the body that “dreams”) to Gricean derivation from maxims. On this comparison, De Marchi can be read as expanding the domain of what counts as “implicature” toward the somatic and the poetic, while Grice would likely insist that, unless the hearer’s route from said to meant is constrained by publicly shareable, reason-sensitive principles, the result is at best suggestive conversation and at worst a category mistake about what makes implicature a distinctive kind of meaning. -- la scuola di Brescia -- filosofia lombarda -- filosofia italiana – (Brescia). Grice: “Sime my earliest unpublications – e. g. ‘Negation and privation’ – it was for me ‘all about the mental process’ or ‘mental processes.’ I would use ‘mental’ and ‘mind’ freely – this was before Ryle turned ‘mind’ into a term of abuse. It was THEN that I went to the Greeks, who had ‘psyche’ of which Roman ‘mens’ was just a part – even if the highest --. It was my research on ‘psyche’ to wonder why we should let the psychologists claim control over the stuff? And hence, my philosophical psychology was born!” Grice: “In my first seminars on philosophical psychology, as my pupil’s notes testify, it was all about the ‘functional’ – i. e. the philosophical psychologist is proposing a FUNCTION – in the mathematical use of the expression – that maps ‘sensory input’ onto ‘behavioural output’ – while validating an ascription of a now ‘functional’ or ‘internal’ state of the black box. I made spcifics to the effect that a strict psycho-physical correlation would not invalidate the autonomy and ineliminability of any ‘law’ of this philosophical psychology that I could conceive --. I did is in part following Berkeley’s ‘harsh’ predicaments that we would hardly say that Smith’s belief that it is raining was hit by a cricket bat – if that is the part of Smtih’s brain that got affected!” Grice: “His ‘poesia del desiderio’ is confusing – he means tenderness, as Scruton does in his book on “Sexual arousal”” -- Grice: “Perhaps M.’s most provocative piece is “L’anima DEL corpo.” If I were to be tutored on that by Hardie, I can very well imagine Hardie – he was a Scot – ‘what d’you mean, ‘of’?” Psicoterapeuta di formazione reichiana, umanista, autore di scritti talvolta controversi perché a scopo provocatorio, si define Solista ed ama stare «fuori dall'Accademia». l’anima del corpo. Grice: Caro Marchi, la sua opera “L’anima del corpo” mi ha fatto riflettere: devo confessare che una volta ho cercato l’anima persino nella mia tazza di tè, ma non l’ho trovata! Forse era nascosta sotto il cucchiaino? Marchi: Ah, Grice, se l’anima fosse davvero così facile da trovare, la filosofia sarebbe roba da supermercato! In realtà, io penso che il corpo abbia più anima di quanto i filosofi ammettano, soprattutto quando si tratta di desiderio... anche la tazza di tè, magari, sogna d’essere caffè! Grice: Mi piace questa idea: il desiderio del corpo che anima anche le porcellane! Forse dovremmo istituire la “Scuola dell’implicatura del cucchiaino” a Brescia, così da rivoluzionare la psicologia del tè. Marchi: Sarebbe un’impresa epica! Ma attenzione, Grice: fuori dall’Accademia, anche il cucchiaino può ribellarsi e diventare filosofo solista. In fondo, chi sa ascoltare il corpo, sente anche il pensiero nascosto nell’acqua calda. Marchi, Luigi De (1958). Sesso e civiltà.

Quinto Marzio Marci Barea Sorano (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale -- Nerone e la filosofia. In the passage, Marci (Quintus Marcius Barea Soranus) gives you a Roman counterpart to Grice’s conversational rationality by exemplifying what “reason-governed” can mean under extreme asymmetry of power: under Nero, speech is risky, so Stoic resistance becomes a discipline of what can be said, what must be left unsaid, and how one preserves intelligible commitment to virtue when the public norms of sincerity and justice are being strategically corrupted. Grice’s theory explains implicature as a product of cooperative, accountable reasoning between interlocutors (a hearer infers what is meant because the speaker can be presumed to be following shared conversational norms, and those inferences are in principle challengeable); Marci’s situation in the text is almost the inverse, since Nero’s regime weaponizes norms and testimony (Egnatius Celer’s betrayal) so that what is “meant” may be fixed by coercion rather than by cooperative uptake. That contrast sharpens Grice’s point: conversational meaning is reason-governed not merely because agents reason, but because a community sustains norms that make reasons publicly legible; when the Porch-opposition faces a tyrant, “implicature” turns into a survival art, closer to coded moral witness than to leisurely Oxford inference. Historically, the outline you give is broadly consistent with standard accounts (senator of Stoic leanings; associated with Musonius Rufus; prosecuted under Nero around AD 66; condemned with his daughter Servilia; betrayal by P. Egnatius Celer), and it underwrites the comparison: Marci dramatizes how fragile the Gricean background assumptions are, and how much “conversational reason” depends on institutions that allow meaning to be inferred rather than imposed. Grice: “M. belongs to the  gens Marcia, as his full name was Quintus Marcius Barea Soranus. Modern Italian Surname  If his surname were derived from his gens (Marcia) in modern Italian, it would be Marzio or Marci. Philosophical Influence and Opposition to Nero M. is a prominent member of the Opposition from the Porch, a group of senators who resist Nero’s perceived tyranny through the lens of the philosophy of the Porch.  Influences: M. is a student of the famous Stoic teacher MUSONIO  Rufo. Stoic Resistance: M.’s opposition is not a violent conspiracy but a commitment to virtue (virtus) and autonomy. M. incurs Nero’s hatred during his proconsulship of Asia by refusing to punish a city that defended its divine statues against imperial commissioners, prioritizing justice over autocratic will. Death: He was condemned to death by the Roman Senate under pressure from Nero. He died "at the hands of" the regime following a trial where his former Stoic tutor, Publius Egnatius Celer, betrays him by providing false testimony. True to his Stoic principles, he commits suicide (a "stoic" death) alongside his daughter, Servilia.  Would you like to know more about the other members of the Stoic martyrs, such as Thrasea Paetus? Keywords: Portico. Part of the opposition from the Portico to Nerone, S. is betrayed by his friend Publio Egnazio Celer. He is condemned to death at the same time as Trasea Peto. Marci. Barea Sorano.  Gricevs: Salvete, Marci! Dic mihi, quid Stoicus faciat si Nerone imperatore cenam sine oliva proponat? Marci: Gricevs, Stoicus si Nerone imperatore cenam sine oliva proponat, tranquillitatem mentis servat et docet se ab externis bonis non pendere. Virtus enim, non oliva, facit sapientem. Gricevs: Sed Marci, nonne in convivio Romano etiam sapientia gustum quaerit? Quid si Nerone non modo olivas, sed etiam rationem removet? Marci: Gricevs, Stoicus etiam rationem sub tyranno colit: cum ratio tollitur, virtus magis lucet. In adversis, philosophus ostendit quid sit vera libertas animi. Marci Barea Sorano, Quinto Marzio  (a. u. c. DCCCXIX). De virtute. Roma.

Marziano (Roma, Lazio): il principe filosofo. Marziano embodies an older Roman way of treating language as moral technology: a name like Martianus is taken to carry civic expectations (virtus, fortitudo, imperium) and to work pedagogically on the hearer as much as descriptively, so that saying why the name is given already performs a small act of formation—especially fitting for a tutor of Ottaviano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, by contrast, insists that what a speaker manages to convey beyond what is explicitly said is licensed by publicly shareable rational norms (cooperation, relevance, informativeness, candour, manner) and by intentions that a hearer can reconstruct as reasons for inference; on that model, “nomen Martis ad virtutem spectat” naturally invites an implicature (the boy is being positioned for a martial-civic role), but the implicature is not a mystical property of the name: it is a defeasible, criticizable inference drawn under assumed conversational rationality. “Marziano” in the dialogue leans toward a quasi-Stoic pedagogy in which words and names cultivate character (philosophia as nutrimentum animi), whereas Grice would redescribe that cultivation as a sequence of communicative moves whose uptake depends on what is mutually knowable and rationally attributable in context—so the Roman naming-practice becomes, in Gricean terms, a stable social convention that speakers exploit to generate implicatures about identity, duty, and future conduct. I wasn’t able to locate any independent historical “Marziano (a.u.c. DCCX). Dicta. Roma.” attestation online; it reads as an invented imprint in the same playful pseudo-archival style as the surrounding project, which actually strengthens the comparison by keeping the focus on how authority is generated: for Marziano, through the cultural gravity of Rome and exempla; for Grice, through the recoverable logic of what a reasonable interlocutor is entitled to take you to mean. Grice: “In Rome, Mars was worshipped, and it was not uncommon for a Roman matron to ‘christen’ his little Roman boy by that obdurate name!” -- Grice, the Oxford philosophers, once joked about the Martians. This was in a commissioned essay for a collection to be edited by Butler. Grice possibly did not have in mind that “Marziano” was a proper Latin name! Filosofo italiano. Marziano is a philosophy teacher to Ottaviano. Gricevs: Salvete, Martianvs! Dic mihi, cur Romani nomen Martis tam saepe filiis tribuunt? Marziano: Gricevs, nomen Martis ad virtutem spectat; Romani credunt fortitudinem Martis in filiis suis vivere, ut imperium perpetuum sit. Gricevs: Sed Marziane, credisne virtus nomen solo pasci, aut opus est animo philosophico ut fortitudo vera oriatur? Marziano: Gricevs, nomen initium est, sed philosophia est nutrimentum animi; sine disciplina sapientiae, Mars ipse maneret sine gloria inter homines. Marziano (a. u. c. DCCX). Dicta. Roma.

Marco (Roma, Lazio): filosofo principe. In your passage, “Marco” is a deliberately shadowy, likely apocryphal figure whose authority comes less from documented imperial chronology than from the Roman fantasy of the philosopher-prince: the ruler who turns policy into a public lesson and expects his audience (Senate, soldiers, people) to read between the lines. That makes him a neat foil for Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning. For Grice, implicature is not magical charisma or rhetorical intimidation; it is a rationally recoverable inference: given what is said plus a standing assumption that the speaker is (by default) cooperative and intelligible, the hearer can work out what the speaker meant, and can also challenge it if the inference is bad. “Marco,” by contrast, is portrayed as making decrees function like “maxims in disguise,” where the point is precisely to exploit the asymmetry of power: an edict is issued with a Senecan flourish so that dissent becomes socially risky and interpretation becomes the subject’s duty, not the ruler’s burden. Historically, the real “between Gordian III and Philip” interval is essentially a transition in AD 244 rather than a distinct philosophical reign, and standard sources do not attest a separate emperor “Marco” in that slot; that absence supports your text’s frame (“possibly apocryphal”) and highlights the contrast: Grice’s conversational reason is accountable inference under shared norms, while Marco’s imperial “implicature” is governance-by-hint, where what is meant is made socially unavoidable even when it is not explicitly said.There is a tradition – “possibly apocryphal,” as Grice puts it -- that Marco is a philosopher who rules the Roman empire between the death of Gordian III and the accession of Philip. Grice: Caro Marco, dicono che sei il filosofo principe di Roma, ma qual è il segreto per governare un impero senza perdere la pazienza? Marco: Grice, il vero segreto è filosofare mentre si decide: così se sbaglio, posso sempre dire che era una prova di stoicismo… e nessuno osa contraddirmi! Grice: Ma allora, se filosofi e imperatori si confondono, chi scrive le leggi e chi le interpreta? Non rischi di creare più implicature che decreti? Marco: Ah, Grice, in Roma il decreto è solo una massima ben travestita! E se mai il popolo protesta, basta aggiungere una citazione di Seneca… funziona sempre, anche con i gladiatori! Marco (a. u. c. CMXCVII). Dicta. Roma.

Raffaele Mariano (Capua, Caserta, Campania): l’implicatura conversazionale. The contrast is between Grice’s micro-ethics of talk and Mariano’s macro-ethics of history: Grice explains conversational meaning as reason-governed because hearers are entitled to treat a speaker as following “precepts” of cooperation and to infer, in a checkable way, what is meant beyond what is said (implicature as accountable practical reasoning), whereas Mariano—Vera’s orthodox Hegelian heir at Naples—reads meaning primarily through systematic rational structure at the level of Spirit, nation, and historical development, where the “sense” of an utterance or institution is fixed by its role in a larger teleology. Online reference sources support the biographical scaffolding you use: Mariano (1840–1912), “fedelissimo allievo di Augusto Vera,” later taught at the University of Naples (notably as docente of Storia della Chiesa) and wrote early on both capital punishment (La pena di morte. Considerazioni in appoggio del prof. Vera, Napoli 1864) and a Hegelian interpretation of Italian nation-formation (Il Risorgimento italiano secondo i principii della filosofia della storia, Firenze 1866), including the line about the philosopher living “nel mondo e nella realtà”; they also confirm Croce’s famously harsh dismissal in La Critica (1908) of Mariano’s attempt to say what in Hegel is “dead” or “cannot die.” In that setting, the “implicature” link is your deliberate anachronism: Mariano is not historically a pragmatics theorist, but he makes a useful foil—because where Grice’s rationality is local, defeasible, and sensitive to what a conversational partner can reasonably be expected to infer, Mariano’s rationality as portrayed here is global, system-first, and inclined to treat interpretation as completion by a comprehensive framework (even “philosophy must be completed by religion”), which is almost the opposite direction of explanation from Grice’s: for Grice, the norms of cooperative exchange generate meaning; for Mariano, the meaning of exchanges is ultimately subordinated to the rational (and contested) story a philosophy of history tells about the world in which those exchanges occur. Grice: “Things were pretty quiet during the nineteenth-century at Oxford; on the other hand, in Italy, a nation was being formed!” Grice: “I like Mariano: his study of Risorgimento applying the philosophy of history is brilliant” Fedelissimo allievo di Vera, insegna a Napoli. La sua indagine e  prevalentemente orientata verso l'interpretazione di Hegel. Si colloca insieme a Vera in quella tendenza che privilegia l'interpretazione sistematica e razionale. Inserì talvolta temi non strettamente legati al pensiero di Hegel affermando tra l'altro che la filosofia deve essere compiuta dalla religione" (Dall'idealismo nuovo a quello di Hegel, Motivi, risonanze e variazioni sulle dottrine hegeliane), trattando riguardo a ciò che dell'idealismo di Hegel è morto e di ciò che non può morire", argomento precedentemente trattato da Croce, il quale risponde aspramente alle argomentazioni proposte da M.. “M. non ha mai capito nulla di tutto ciò che vi è di più sostanziale in Hegel come non ha meditata seriamente nessuna grande filosofia; e (ora si può aggiungere) non ne ha mai letto le opere. Immaginarsi che M.  si afferma hegeliano, mentre sostiene che la conoscenza non è assoluta; che rimane insuperabile il mistero; che dio esiste fuori del mondo e sarebbe dio anche senza il mondo; e che la filosofia deve essere compiuta dalla religione! Insomma, ciò che di Hegel "non può morire" sarebbe ciò che Hegel non ha mai detto perché affatto indegno della sua mente altissima.»  Si schierò a favore del mantenimento della pena di morte in un dibattito sul tema, in accordo con iVera (La pena di morte. Considerazioni in appoggio di Vera Napoli. ), uno dei più autorevoli difensori del mantenimento di questa pratica. È ancora Croce che commenta con grave disappunto l'argomento. implicatura. Grice: Caro Mariano, mi colpisce come tu riesca a interpretare il Risorgimento applicando la filosofia della storia. Qui a Oxford, il XIX secolo era tranquillo, mentre da voi si faceva l’Italia! Mariano: Grice, in effetti tra una battaglia e l’altra, abbiamo avuto tempo per meditare su Hegel. Il mistero non è mai stato svelato del tutto, ma almeno abbiamo provato a farlo con sistematicità – anche se Croce dice che non ho mai letto Hegel! Grice: Croce è sempre un po’ severo, ma a Oxford abbiamo imparato che non c’è filosofia senza una buona dose di ironia. Dimmi, Mariano, la filosofia deve davvero essere compiuta dalla religione, oppure basta un caffè napoletano per illuminare lo spirito? Mariano: Grice, la religione aiuta, ma il caffè napoletano è insuperabile. Se Hegel avesse provato la nostra miscela, forse avrebbe scritto “Lo Spirito Assoluto” direttamente in una caffetteria di Capua! Mariano, Raffaele (1864). La pena di morte. Napoli.

Giovanni Marin (Venezia, Veneto): l’implicatura conversazionale e l’ottimo precettore. In your passage, Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning appears under an explicitly humanist label: his maxims are framed as praecepta, “things taken beforehand,” rules that make talk intelligible because speaker and hearer can be held to shared expectations of relevance, sufficiency, candour, and orderly contribution; implicature, on this picture, is the rational (and criticizable) route from what is said to what is meant, guided by those precepts. Marin is then cast as a Venetian analogue of that structure: trained in rhetoric under Vittorino da Feltre, delivering public orations in praise of Venetian worthies, and later operating as a diplomatic voice (the 1440 embassies to the Este and to Florence are the best-attested biographical anchor), he represents a tradition in which instruction and persuasion are inseparable from civic pedagogy, and where one teaches by example, timing, and tact as much as by explicit rule. The comparison the passage invites is therefore less “Grice anticipates Marin” than “Marin supplies a cultural model for what Grice formalizes”: Marin’s “optimum tutor” and Venetian rhetorical schooling embody practical norms of audience-design, anticipation of uptake, and strategic under-saying, while Grice redescribes those craft norms as a theory of public reason in conversation—precepts that can explain why an utterance licenses an implicature and why a hearer is rational to draw it. Historically, nothing in the standard biographical notices (which largely trace back to Rosmini’s discussion of Vittorino and his pupils) links Marin to a technical notion like implicature; that link is your text’s productive anachronism, treating Renaissance rhetorical discipline as the lived ancestor of Grice’s idea that meaning in conversation is governed not by private association but by norms that speakers exploit and hearers can reconstruct. Grice: “I often refer to the conversational maxims as ‘precepts’ or, if you must, prae-cepts. This is a very Ciceronian notion! The Latin noun ‘praectptum – precept, teaching, order, or command – and the Latin verb ‘praecipere – to instruct, to teach, to warn, or to anticipate --- share a common etymology. Both words are formed from the Latin prefix prae (before) and the verb caprere (to take or to seize). Praecipere literally means ‘to take beforehand’ or ‘to seize beforehand’. This ‘taking beforehand’ developed into the sense of ‘instructing’ or ‘giving orders beforehand,’ hence the verb’s meaning of ‘to teach or to order. Praeceptum. The word praeceptum is just the past participle neuter of the verb praecipere used as a noun. It refers to something that is ‘taken beforehand’ or ‘given beforehand,’ such as a rule, a lesson, or an instruction. Therefore, the relationship between praeceptum and praecipere is that the noun represents the result or product of the actn described by the verb, specifically, the instructions or rules given as a result of ‘taking beforehand’or instructing. Filosofo italiano. Venezia, Veneto. Grice: “I like Giovanni Marin; for one, he loved, like I do, rhetoric – in his own Venetian kind of way!”  Nato dal nobile Rosso Marin, studia con profitto sotto l'insegnamento di Feltre, dal quale apprese la retorica. Frequenta il ginnasio, presso il quale recita eloquenti orazioni in encomio agli uomini illustri veneziani. Si laurea a Padova. Ambasciatore della Repubblica di Venezia presso gli Estensi e quindi presso Firenze. Rosmini, Carlo de' Rosmini, Idea dell'ottimo precettore nella vita e disciplina di Vittorino da Feltre e de' suoi discepoli, Rovereto. l’ottimo precettore.  Grice: Caro Marin, mi viene spesso da pensare che i miei precetti conversazionali siano un po’ come le regole che Vittorino da Feltre dava ai suoi studenti: anticipare la mossa dell’interlocutore e magari offrirgli una risposta prima che abbia finito la domanda! Marin: Grice, a Venezia diciamo che il vero precettore non solo anticipa, ma sa anche quando lasciar scivolare una battuta tra una regola e l’altra. Non è raro che un oratore veneziano inizi una lezione con una storia di pesci e la finisca parlando di retorica! Grice: Ah, Marin, forse avrei dovuto scrivere le mie massime in dialetto veneziano! Immagina: “Prima de parlar, pensa; dopo, magari offri uno spritz.” Sarebbe stato molto più efficace nelle conversazioni accademiche di Oxford. Marin: Grice, a Venezia, anche gli ambasciatori imparano che la miglior conversazione si tiene tra una barca e l’altra, senza fretta e magari con il sole che tramonta. Se il precettore è ottimo, sa che una buona parola vale più di mille ordini: e se proprio non basta, c’è sempre una gondola pronta a portarti via dalla discussione! Marin, Giovanni (1435). Orazione. Venezia.

Giovanni Marliani (Milano, Lombardia): l’implicatura conversazionale.  In the passage, “Grice” treats Marliani less as a historical source for pragmatics than as a convenient emblem for what Grice’s own theory needs in order to look culturally thick: a learned, Renaissance-Milanese writer who can be staged as already thinking in “sects,” “sub-sects,” and tacit social alignments, i.e., as someone for whom meaning is never exhausted by what is said. Against that background, Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning (speaker intentions plus the rational expectation that one’s contributions are cooperative) turns “implicature” into a disciplined inference from an utterance to what a reasonable hearer is licensed to take the speaker to mean; Marliani, by contrast, is presented as practicing something closer to implicature avant la lettre in the social-literary register, where naming, grouping, and lightly satirical classification do the work of saying without saying. The online biographical record does support the Milan–Pavia profile your passage uses: Giovanni Marliani (born Milan, 1420; studied at Pavia under Biagio Pelacani; taught medicine, philosophy, astrology; moved between the Milanese and Pavia studios; enjoyed major Sforza patronage and high salary; wrote De reactione, dated to 1448, and is associated with learned disputes about “reaction” and natural philosophy), but nothing in standard reference sources ties Marliani to a technical notion like conversational implicature; that link is your text’s deliberate anachronistic graft, using Marliani’s courtly-institutional world (and the rhetoric of “sects”) as a foil that lets Grice’s central claim stand out: conversational meaning is reason-governed because it is inferentially recoverable from publicly available cues under norms of cooperation, whereas Marliani’s “implicature” is a looser, culturally saturated art of insinuation whose governing “reasons” are more like etiquette, faction, and wit than the explicit maxims and calculability tests Grice later insists on. Grice: “Ryle once referred to Austin’s play group as  sect – in retribution, we started to call Ryle, and his accolade of disciples, starting from O. P. Wood, as the Rylean sect!” -- Filosofo italiano. Milano, Lombardia. Grice: “I like Mariliani; especially the cavalier way in which he refers to philosophers in his brilliant “De secta philosophorum.” Austin would say that there possibly are sects and sub-sects!” Fglio del patrizio milanese Castello Marliani. Studia a Pavia sotto PELECANI. Entra nel Collegio dei intraprese una carriera nell'insegnamento della filosofia e astrologia. Attivo a Milano e Pavia.  Con l'ascesa della dinastia degli Sforza a capo del Ducato di Milano, appartenente a una famiglia ghibellina, aumenta il prestigio. Ottiene la concessione in esenzione dei diritti di sfruttamento delle acque del Secchia nei pressi di Moglia, nel Mantovano.  Alla morte del duca Francesco Sforza, scrisse una lettera al nuovo duca Galeazzo Maria Sforza in cui dichiara di essere stato richiesto da molti Studi in diverse città d'Italia, sperando di poter essere trasferito da Pavia a Milano e di ricevere un aumento di salario. Il Consiglio segreto di Milano intercedette presso lo Sforza in favore di Marliani, esaltando la sua fama anche oltre i confini del Ducato. Il duca Galeazzo Maria, dopo alcuni indugi, acconsente per conferirgli un'assegnazione annua di 1 000 fiorini, il più alto salario riconosciuto a chiunque nel Ducato. Sotto la reggenza di Ludovico il Moro ottenne i dazi di Gallarate e della sua pieve. I suoi studi lo portarono ad essere tra i più grandi scienziati dell'epoca e riuscì a mettere in discussione Bradwardine e Sassonia.  Nel suo saggio, “Quaestio de caliditate corporum humanorum tempore hyemis et estati set de antiperistasis  distingue la temperatura dell'organismo dalla quantità e dalla produzione del calore naturale del corpo. implicatura, Vinci. le sette filosofiche. Giovanni Marliani.  Grice: Caro Marliani, mi chiedo spesso se la filosofia milanese abbia davvero bisogno di una “setta” per poter brillare come quella oxoniana di Ryle. Eppure, tra le nebbie lombarde, le “sette filosofiche” sembrano moltiplicarsi come panettoni a Natale!  Marliani: Grice, a Milano la filosofia si divide come le acque del Secchia: ogni gruppo si crede l’unico detentore del sapere, ma alla fine tutti finiscono a discutere sotto la Madonnina, magari sorseggiando un espresso troppo caldo d’inverno e troppo freddo d’estate!  Grice: Geniale, Marliani! E dimmi: se dovessi scegliere, preferiresti una setta filosofica che discute della temperatura del corpo umano oppure una che si accapiglia sui dazi di Gallarate? Io, da buon inglese, opterei per la prima, purché ci sia una pinta di birra a portata di mano.  Marliani: Ah, Grice, i dazi vanno bene per i mercanti, ma per i filosofi niente batte una discussione sul calore naturale! E se la temperatura si fa troppo alta, basta aprire una finestra… o una nuova “setta”, che è sempre pronta a mettere tutto in discussione – anche la ricetta del risotto alla milanese! Marliani, Giovanni (1448). De reactione. Pavia.

Giovanni Bartolomeo Marliani. In the staged exchange, Marliani’s antiquarian Rome is treated as a machine for producing inferences: he can say “here was the Forum” and, without stating it, reliably invite the reader (or Grice, as his interlocutor) to supply a whole political anthropology—factions, ambition, and “a nice riot”—because ruins function as publicly available cues with culturally stable downstream conclusions. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes that kind of “ruins-to-riots” leap intelligible by redescribing it as an implicature: the hearer assumes the speaker is being cooperative (relevant, informative enough, not misleading), so when the speaker offers a partial topographical remark, the hearer rationally enriches it to a fuller intended message; crucially, for Grice the enrichment is constrained by norms that make it in principle reconstructible and contestable (“you can show your working”). Marliani, by contrast, is presented less as a theorist of those norms than as a practitioner of cultivated indirection: his Topographia (1534) operates rhetorically by letting place-names and learned allusions do the persuasive work, so that “deviation” and “shortest route” become a joking model of how interpretation in Rome—and in texts about Rome—habitually exceeds what is explicitly said. Online reference information supports Marliani’s identity as a sixteenth-century Milanese humanist and antiquarian author of Topographia antiquae Romae, but it does not make him an ancestor of Gricean pragmatics; the comparison is therefore deliberately anachronistic, using Marliani’s topographical method as an analogue for how Grice thinks conversational reason turns sparse utterances into rich, accountable meaning through shared assumptions and rational inference. Grice: Marliani, ho qui la tua Topographia antiquae Roma (1534): mi spieghi come fai a descrivere mezza Roma senza mai perdere la strada, mentre io perdo il filo dopo due massime. Marliani: Caro Grice, a Roma basta seguire le rovine: sono come le implicature, ci inciampi anche quando fingi di non vederle. Grice: Dunque se tu dici “qui c’era il Foro” e io capisco “qui c’era anche una bella rissa politica”, è cooperazione topografica o semplice malizia erudita? Marliani: È la stessa cosa, caro mio: a Roma la via più breve è sempre una deviazione, e chi non lo capisce finisce a fare turismo letterale. Marliani, Giovanni Bartolomeo (1534). Topographia antiquae Roma.

Gerardo Marotta (Napoli, Campania): l’implicatura conversazionale di Mario l’epicuro. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, intention-based inference: a speaker counts on shared cooperative expectations so that hearers can work out what is meant beyond what is said, and the real action lies in how social understanding is engineered by what is left implicit. Marotta (Gerardo Marotta), as Grice frames him, represents a complementary “institutional pragmatics” in which the medium of philosophical meaning is not primarily the isolated utterance but the created setting of conversation itself—Cultura Nuova’s postwar lectures and, later, the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici as a deliberately constructed agora where texts, scholars, and audiences meet under conditions designed to make serious exchange possible. In Gricean terms, Marotta’s library and programming function like a large-scale conversational background that stabilizes uptake: by curating interlocutors, preserving access to books, and turning Naples into a site of living disputation about Hegel, the state, and the “civil religion” of culture, he makes certain implicatures almost unavoidable (that philosophy is public, convivial, and civic; that learning is an act of citizenship; that to discuss Hegel in Naples is also to imply a local lineage of reason). Where Grice models cooperation as a norm internal to talk, Marotta exemplifies how cooperation is scaffolded by institutions and hospitality—coffee, tables, rooms, schedules, invitations—so that “Mario the Epicurean” becomes a figure for the Neapolitan style of implicature: indirectness, wit, and conviviality used not to evade rigor but to keep disagreement live without turning it into rupture. In short, Grice supplies the micro-theory of how implicature is calculated; Marotta illustrates the macro-condition that makes such calculation worth having—an organized public sphere where philosophy can be sustained as ongoing conversation rather than as isolated texts. Grice: “We hardly discuss Hegel at Oxford, although he was Bradley’s idol – in fact, most of my explorations on Kant’s philosophy parallel some of the criticisms that Hegel posited to Kant – notably, the idea of a human being as metaphysically transubstantiating into a person as a free autonomous agent! Hegel was very much influence by Aristotle, to the point that it’s perhaps unfair that whereas Kantotle or Ariskant is an ‘unjustly neglected philosopher,’ so is Plathegel, or Hegelplato’!”  Grice: “I like Marotta; the idea of a library for the Istituto Italiano per gli studi filosofici’ at Via Monte di Dio, 11, is a geniality!” Si laurea con il massimo dei voti a Napoli, presentando la tesi,  La concezione dello stato in Hegel.” Si interessa presto di storia, letteratura e filosofia, avvicinandosi dapprima all'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici fondato da Croce, poi fondando l'associazione Cultura Nuova che diresse organizzando manifestazioni e conferenze rivolte ai filosofi che richiamarono tutte le più grandi personalità della cultura Italiana.  Incoraggiato dagli auspici dell'allora Presidente dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei Cerulli, di Piovani e di Carratelli, fonda a Napoli l'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, del quale è Presidente. Donato, all'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, la biblioteca personale, con una dotazione di oltre 300.000 volumi frutto di trent'anni di appassionata ricerca. Per i suoi importantissimi apporti al mondo della filosofia ha avuto numerosi riconoscimenti da centri di ricerca e di formazione di rilievo internazionale.  Ha vinto la sezione Premio Speciale del Premio Cimitile. Gli è stata conferita la laurea ad honorem in Filosofia dall'Bielefeld, dall'Università Erasmus di Rotterdam, dalla Sorbona di Parigi e dalla Seconda Napoli. Mario l’epicuro, il concetto del stato, il risorgimento – la recezione di Hegel in Italia. Grice: Caro Marotta, da Oxford ci guardano con sospetto quando dico che la filosofia può essere anche una faccenda di conversazione, magari tra i volumi polverosi della tua biblioteca. Ma il tuo Istituto a Napoli è un po’ come il tempio di Epicuro: qui si dialoga, si ride, e si pensa, magari anche mangiando una sfogliatella. Marotta: Grice, hai ragione! A Napoli la filosofia si fa tra una chiacchiera e una battuta. Qui non si teme Hegel, né Aristotele, si discute persino di Kantotle e Plathegel, purché la conversazione sia vivace e il caffè sia forte. L’Istituto non è solo una biblioteca, è una piazza dove anche le idee si scambiano come monete. Grice: Il bello è che qui a Napoli persino il concetto dello Stato si trova a suo agio tra i filosofi e la pizza margherita. Se Hegel avesse potuto assaggiare la cucina napoletana, forse avrebbe scritto la Fenomenologia dello Spirito in dialetto! Marotta: Grice, quella sì che sarebbe stata un’implicatura conversazionale epica! Alla fine, la filosofia italiana ha il sapore della convivialità: si può essere epicurei, hegeliani o semplicemente napoletani, basta non perdere mai il piacere di scambiare idee e qualche sorriso. Marotta, Gerardo (1946). Contributo. Cultura Nuova.

Alessandro Marsili (Siena, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale del cimento. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as an inferential surplus: a speaker can responsibly “mean more than is said” because a rational hearer presumes cooperation and can work out what the speaker is doing (often by noticing a deliberate mismatch between the literal content and the conversational point). Marsili, as your passage frames him (Alessandro Marsili, Siena-born, trained and teaching in Siena and Pisa; early printed Theoremata ad doctrinam Aristotelis, 1626; and conceptually linked here to the Tuscan culture of “cimento” later institutionalized by the Accademia del Cimento), shifts the spotlight from Grice’s interpersonal, intention-centered inference to a linguistically and historically sedimented kind of rationality: the way a word’s meaning carries a whole chain of practices inside it. “Cimento” begins as a material mixture associated with testing metals and, by semantic drift, becomes “trial/experiment/ordeal,” so the word itself performs a miniature implicature every time it is used—quietly suggesting risk, assay, and proof even when the speaker merely says “experiment.” In Gricean terms, Marsili’s case makes vivid that not all pragmatic enrichment is created on the spot by a speaker’s maxim-flouting; some of it is pre-loaded by etymology, technical practice, and local institutional memory (Florence’s “Cimento” sounding like both laboratory and construction-site), which means the “context” a hearer relies on is partly a history of usage and not just the immediate aims of the interlocutors. So the contrast is: Grice gives the micro-mechanics by which rational agents derive implicatures in live talk, while Marsili gives a macro-illustration of how a community’s experimental ethos can be built into a single term, making meaning feel like a test the language itself subjects the speaker to—if you can’t translate it cleanly, you’ve discovered not mystical nonsense but a historically thick bit of rational practice embedded in the lexicon. Grice: “ “cimento” is possibly untranslatable to English! Latin caementum doesn’t help! The shift in meaning from the Latin caementum to the Italian cimento is an interesting linguistic evolution, likely arising from a specific historical application of materials and processes related to caementum. The link between caementum (cement/mortar) and cimento (test/experiment). Latin caementum. In Latin, caementum primarily referred to rough stone, chips of stone, or the micture of rubble and mortar used in Roman concrete or construction. The Early meaning of cimento. An early and key meaning of cimento in Italian, derived from caementum, reerred to a mixture of salts to test precious metals. The conceptual shift. Testing materials with a mixture. The initial association likely arose from the practice of using a specific mixture or concoction (like a type of cement/mortar) to assay or purify precious metals. From mixture to trial: this specific use of a mixture to test something could have led to a broader conceptual association of ‘cimento’ with the very act of trial, test, or experiment, signifying the process of subjectcing something to a rigorous process to discover its qualities or verify a claim. Risk and ordeal: the idea of a trial, particularly one involving the transformation or purification of materials, might have naturally extended to a more general sense of ‘risk,’ or ‘ordeal,’ suggesting a potentially difficult or challenging undertaking. This transition in meaning suggests that the practical application of mixtures related to caementum for testing and assaying played a crucial role in the evolution of the Italian word ‘cimento’ to encompass the concepts of test and experiment. Grice: “I like Marsili, and the founder of the ‘accademia del cimento.’ ‘Cimento’ you know, means ‘experiment,’ – only in Florence!” Si laurea a Siena. Insegna a Siena e Pisa. il cimento. Alessandro Marsili. Grice: Marsili, confesso che “cimento” mi manda in crisi: in inglese sembra sempre o troppo “cemento” o troppo “esperimento”, e il latino caementum non mi salva affatto. Marsili: È il bello della scuola di Siena: si parte dal caementum, si finisce al cimento come prova. Da impasto a collaudo: prima si testano i metalli con una miscela, poi si testa la vita intera con un’implicatura. Grice: Quindi quando a Firenze dicono “Accademia del Cimento” non stanno aprendo un cantiere, ma un laboratorio… anche se, conoscendo i filosofi, il rischio di finire coperti di calce resta sempre cooperativo. Marsili: Esatto: a Siena facciamo l’esperimento, a Oxford fate la nota a piè pagina, a Firenze lo chiamano “cimento” e tutti fingono di aver capito. Implicatura finale: se non è traducibile, allora è davvero filosofico. Marsili, Alessandro (1626). Theoremata ad doctrinam Aristotelis. Siena.

Giacomo Antonio Marta (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rational reconstruction of intention: what matters is not merely what words conventionally signify, but what an utterer is doing in saying them and what a competent audience is entitled to infer (implicatures) under cooperative norms; Marta (Giacomo Antonio Marta, active in late-16th-century Italy and known philosophically above all for his Aristotelian assault on Telesio’s naturalism—most concretely in Pugnaculum Aristotelis, 1587, which helped provoke Campanella’s Philosophia sensibus demonstrata, 1591) exemplifies a very different regime of “reason” in discourse, one governed by scholastic-Peripatetic standards of demonstration, authority, and doctrinal policing rather than by the everyday cooperative exchange Grice models. In Gricean terms, the Marta–Telesio–Campanella polemic is not primarily about subtle conversational inference but about what counts as a legitimate inferential route from senses to nature, and therefore about which background assumptions an audience is allowed to treat as common ground: Marta wants Aristotelian principles to be the shared starting point, while Campanella’s reply reassigns evidential privilege to sensus and treats Aristotelian “imaginationes” as suspect constructs. That setting also changes the function of implicature: instead of being a cancellable surplus generated by polite cooperation, implicatures in polemical Renaissance Latin often function as strategic insinuations about an opponent’s competence, orthodoxy, or methodological honesty, with high stakes that discourage cancellation. So the contrast is that Grice offers a micro-pragmatic account of how rational agents cooperate to make meaning recoverable beyond the literal, whereas Marta represents a macro-dialectical culture in which “reason in discourse” is enforced by competing methodological constitutions (Aristotelian demonstration vs. sense-based reform), and where what is implied is often less a conversational convenience than a weapon in a struggle over the very norms that make philosophical communication possible. The Italian philosopher whose surname is Marta and who disputed with TELESIO is M. He is an Aristotelian who wrote an essay attacking the principles of TELESIO’s philosophy of nature. CAMPANELLA , a student and fervent defender of TELESIO ’s ideas, responded to M.'s work with his own treatise, Philosophia sensibus demonstrate (Philosophy as Demonstrated by the Senses), published in Naples. CAMPANELLA ’s work was explicitly written to defend TELESIO’s philosophy against the attacks of M.  Beyond his role as an opponent of TELESIO ’'s natural philosophy, little else is widely known or easily accessible about M. His primary historical significance in philosophical history stems from this particular dispute, which served as the impetus for one o f the most important works by the influential Renaissance philosopher CAMPANELLA . 7 m '1 »• . 1 ' ' l ; ST : nf- .:. D h cpINIS |^DIGATOR^>^^ PHILOSOPHIA , SeSsIBVS DEMONSTRATA, t "V.  vlitO^lo Difputaciofles diftiniita j , qtti proprit drhitratu , non autem fin^td ,r duce natura j philofophati fimt frotts AriQotelu > Sc aiTeclamm ex proprijs d/&is , 8c oatune «leottis conuincun* & (inguixiinaginadoii^, pro eo i .Peripateticis ^ fiftxprorfosreijciuntiir cum '^dcfeniione Beriurdini Tcld^Conifcntiiii, Philolbpliorum maximi , aocitjiiorum •^iati;s,qua! hic dilucidi ntiir, & ro Arillotcie pugqat lacohus Antooius hUm , cotur^^leiprnm, Bc illam puf> ;,oilcadicur.  lOuPrifSmum Domatum 2>. y 'i /\ TAPOLIi ApudHdrat^unSaluianum. i J p  -s r . . 1 «ftr hiiti,. Vhy. fleti. ^;flet^« . eates cHe?idei r H a ^ ‘videotii^ {aotifectindiint . w ' niagwm in ejldeth mole , tc vid«cut .ou Qttwido^ Pleto vfQaeft rbatririjs duobo», quorum enum. •eruo. contrar^fbrma*.EtSiniplidu.Anuqaornmfcromt«oJ?J.^ Ijaj^fls ^rpinjlMta,fle tenebras alterum, fleidem aodqui fenlerecon* «Wdii« formas, flt cum hardiffereht«fimin calore. fl^fjgoee^Je ^us, Rtd pmnmtd inuiti VTc^obicurd locuticalidam % fr^gfd^. Sunday at the Parks has that Oxford trick of feeling both idle and supervised. Grice is on a bench with the children arranged around him in the only stable formation children permit: moving. A ball is being pursued with a seriousness that would shame most metaphysicians. The grass is doing its slow, English work. And Grice, having promised himself not to read the trash press, is reading it anyway, because promises made to oneself are the easiest to cancel without public scandal. He has the TLS open, which in his hands is less a newspaper than a device for taking people down politely. Austin’s piece is there—Austin reviewing Ryle, for the masses, as if the masses had been begging for a correction about “intelligence” and its alleged criteria. Grice reads with a grin that is almost a wince. Austin’s tone is exactly right: brisk, impatient, and just short of calling the whole thing silly—except that, of course, he does call it silly, which is what makes it Austin rather than merely English. Ryle’s worry, Grice thinks, is the old one: the ghost in the machine. The soul as a resident lodger in the body, doing a little private thinking and pulling levers. Ryle, the perpetual bachelor who has lived among college grounds as if lawns were arguments, cannot stand the theological smell of it. So he offers his cure: no ghost, only dispositions; no inner tenant, only outward competence. And Austin, the war-shaped, tool-sharp Austin, is alarmed by the cure because it resembles the illness: a return to that Ayer-type behaviourism which Oxford is supposed to have outgrown, the view that if you cannot check it from the outside it must not exist on the inside. Grice looks up from the TLS and, uninvited, Marta walks into his head. Not as a person—Grice rarely thinks of authors as persons unless they are in the room—but as a title that has been sitting there like a Latin dare: immortalitas animae. The immortality of the soul. Marta against Pomponazzi, or whoever else is currently on the docket of the dead. The scholastic quarrel, made portable. He folds the TLS slightly, not to stop reading but to allow himself a syllogism, because Oxford men cannot resist turning grass into logic. Socrates est homo. Omnis homo est mortalis. Ergo, Socrates est mortalis. A neat little exercise, the kind of thing that feels like a moral fact because it is expressed as a valid form. It is also, Grice thinks, the sort of thing an Italian can say as if it were a proverb: Ogni uomo è mortale. And then, because the children are shouting and the Parks are not the Schools, Grice adds the further complication that is always waiting to inflate the tidy schema. Socrates has an anima. Anima est immortalis? Ergo, Socrates est immortalis? At which point the syllogism begins to creak like an undergraduate chair. Because “immortalis” does not want to attach itself to Socrates in the way “mortalis” does. “Mortalis” attaches to homo; “immortalis,” if it attaches to anything, attaches to anima. And the soul, annoyingly, is not the man—unless one is prepared to say that a man is his soul, which is precisely the move that generates the ghost-in-the-machine picture Ryle is trying to exorcise. Grice can hear Austin snorting at the whole thing: why take “soul” as if it were a thing with a job-description. Why not look at what we say. Who says “my soul” in ordinary Oxford conversation, except in chapel or in jest. Who says “immortal” except as rhetoric. And yet Marta’s Latin sits there, insisting that a great many people said it, said it seriously, and built whole argumentative cathedrals out of it. Grice tries a variation, because variations are how you reveal what you have smuggled in. Socrates est homo. Omnis homo habet animam. Omnis anima est immortalis. Ergo, Socrates habet animam immortalem. That reads better. It keeps the predicates in their proper places. It avoids the vulgar slide from “Socrates is mortal” to “Socrates is immortal,” which is the sort of slide that makes metaphysics look like a conjuring trick with adjectives. It yields, modestly, that Socrates has an immortal soul, if there are immortal souls to be had. But then the old Oxford objection returns, now wearing Austin’s face. What does “has” mean here. Has a soul as he has a liver. Has a soul as he has a duty. Has a soul as he has a secret. The verb “have” is a garage in which too many vehicles are parked. Ryle, Grice suspects, has noticed exactly this garage problem and decided the safest solution is to demolish the building. No soul, no garage. Only dispositions, only patterns of competence, only the public criteria. But Austin’s point in the review—Grice hears it beneath the jokes—is that demolishing the building may also demolish the phenomenon you were trying to describe. You cannot solve a conceptual muddle by refusing to talk about anything that cannot be verified by an observer with a clipboard. The children’s game becomes louder; a ball rolls dangerously near Grice’s shoe; he stops it with the toe of his boot, a tiny act of bodily intelligence performed without ghostly assistance. He thinks: if Ryle means that intelligence is just the pattern of such performances, then fine. But if he means that the inner is a myth because it is not publicly inspectable, then he has confused “not a thing” with “nothing.” And this is where Aristotle begins, quietly, to offer a way out that is neither Ryle’s ghostlessness nor Marta’s immortal lodger. De anima. Not the soul as a separable passenger, and not the soul as a mere word for behaviour, but the soul as the form of a living thing: the set of capacities by which a body is alive and does what it does. The soul, on this picture, is not another object; it is a principle of organisation—what makes this body a living human body rather than a corpse with the same parts. Grice does not call it functionalism, because that would sound like an American selling you something. But he can feel the attraction of the approach in his own terms. It lets you say three things at once, all of them decently Oxonian. First: it lets you say to Ryle—yes, you are right to resist the ghost as an extra entity, an extra tenant, a second person inside the first. The soul is not a little man in the skull. Second: it lets you say to Austin—yes, you are right that we must attend to how the language works, and that “intelligence” is not a hidden substance but a label for powers manifested in action and talk, under ordinary criteria. Third: it lets you say to Marta—yes, you are right to insist that “anima” is not just a poetical flourish; it names something philosophically serious. But the seriousness is not secured by attaching “immortal” to it as if immortality were a property like colour. The seriousness is secured by getting clear what sort of thing a “soul” is supposed to be in the first place, and by refusing to let the predicate do the metaphysics. He looks back at the TLS. Austin is still being funny in print, which is what the public thinks philosophers do when they are “accessible.” Grice, privately, is grateful. The review has given him his Sunday exercise: to see that the old scholastic syllogism about mortalis and immortalitas is not merely a fossil. It is the same muddle reappearing in modern dress: ghost versus behaviour, inner life versus public criteria, the temptation to make “the soul” into an item and then wonder whether it can survive death. A child tugs at his sleeve and asks for something that is, mercifully, not metaphysical. Grice folds the TLS, stands, and thinks that the only decent conclusion, for today, is also the most deflating. Socrates is mortal. Men are mortal. If there is immortality, it does not belong to the man as man, but—if anywhere—to whatever “soul” turns out to mean once you stop treating it as a ghost and stop treating it as a refusal to speak. And that, he thinks, is enough philosophy for a Sunday in the Parks, among children who do not need a theory of mind to run, fall, and get up again.Grice: Marta, caro filosofo romano, dimmi: è vero che hai sfidato Telesio a duello filosofico? Si dice che la vostra battaglia abbia fatto tremare le fondamenta della natura — e forse anche quelle del caffè napoletano. Marta: Grice, non esageriamo! Ho semplicemente preso carta e penna, e ho difeso Aristotele come si difende la ricetta della carbonara: con fermezza e senza panna. Telesio voleva stravolgere la natura, io gli ho ricordato che anche il sole, per riscaldare, segue le regole. Grice: Campanella però ha risposto con entusiasmo, pubblicando un trattato per difendere il suo maestro. Hai mai pensato che, alla fine, la filosofia sia una gara di implicature? Si insinua, si allude, e… chi vince paga il pranzo. Marta: Esatto! Ma attenzione: se il pranzo è offerto da un aristotelico, è tutto rigorosamente ordinato — antipasto, primo, secondo e verità assoluta come dessert. Se invece lo organizza Telesio, chissà… magari ti porta a mangiare all'aperto, per dimostrarti che i sensi hanno sempre ragione! Marta, Giacomo Antonio (1578). Apologia de immortalitate animae adversus opusculum Simonis Portii de mente humana. Napoli: Salviani.

Vito Martellotta (Bari, Puglia): La ragione conversazionale dal deutero-esperanto al pirotese. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats communication as an intention-based, rationally constrained practice: what makes an utterance mean something (and generate implicatures) is not just any convention or code, but the speaker’s intention that the hearer recognize that intention and respond appropriately under shared expectations of cooperation. Martellotta (Vito Martellotta, Bari, author of Latinulus, 1919, inspired by Peano-style auxiliary-language ambitions) stages the complementary and slightly adversarial perspective: he treats meaning as something that can be engineered by deliberate design of an artificial system, with lexical and morpho-syntactic choices fixed in advance so that understanding depends less on conversational inference and more on the user’s mastery of the constructed code. In Gricean terms, Latinulus is a stress-test for how far convention can be made to carry meaning without the subtle pragmatic work that implicature normally performs, and the “ticca/thick” example is telling: even in a supposedly Latin-based universal idiom, unintended cross-linguistic seepage and audience expectations smuggle in extra meaning, so that what users take to be conveyed is shaped by background competence and analogy as much as by explicit stipulation. Where Grice’s Deutero-Esperanto joke emphasizes that a private stipulation with no community uptake is not yet a real language in the full communicative sense, Martellotta’s project emphasizes precisely that uptake problem by proposing a public auxiliary designed for international exchange; but Grice would insist that even if the code is impeccably designed, actual communication will still rely on implicatures (what is left unsaid, what is presumed shared, what is signalled by choosing one form rather than another) because the pragmatic layer is how rational agents manage efficiency, relevance, and trust. The contrast, then, is code-first versus interaction-first: Martellotta tries to build universality into the system; Grice explains universality (and its failures) through rational cooperative inference, showing why even the most artificial language quickly becomes “pirotese” once real speakers start using it to mean more than they explicitly decree. Grice: “When I said I did invent deuteron-Esperanto, I wasn’t thinking Martellotta!” The Oxford philosopher Grice once joked: “Language, or meaning, has nothing to do with convention, in spite of what people like Schiffer has said – I can invent a new language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, and decree what is proper! Keywords: artificiale. Grice refers to an ‘artificial’ system of representation in ‘Retrospective Epilogue.’ Si spira al lavoro di PEANO  per il suo Latinulus o Piccola Lingua Latina, pubblicato nel libro Latinulus. Grammaticas de Latinula Linguas a Bari. Si tratta di un caso piuttosto interessante perché si configura come una lingua a posteriori composta da lessico latino, sistema fonetico italiano e morfologia e sintassi oxoniana! Ad uno sguardo più attento infatti, si nota che la frase in Latinulus «Leos abeo crassa capus circumdata cum longa et ticca comas de fulva colos», in it. il leone ha una grande testa circondata da una lunga e folta chioma di peli rossi', ricalca in realtà l'ordine sintattico oxoniano (cfr. the lion has a big head surrounded by long and thick tawny colour); e in questo inciso l'autore si è spinto oltre, creando una sovrapposizione con l'inglese anche a livello di lessico, come è evidente in «ticca» - non giustificabile etimologicamente tramite il latino - e thick. VITO M. __e-&e c_ * : radi LI LATINULUS uu Grammaticas. i DE LATINULA LINGUAS E oro de Auctoris I (£ 09 RIPPZZZA i 9° PET. le 4 È hh “ " Mr « LS w erat Marica s'sà VITO M. L Aaa 6 € - 6 A e | i LATINULUS Grammaticas DE eee LATINULA LINGUAS PARTIS FONOLOGIAS et MORFOLOGIAS O a È ; (O Il grande sviluppo materiale e morale che ha avuto la civiltà nel nostro secolo si deve senza dubbio in gran parte ai rapidi e molteplici mezzi di comunicazioni che, avvicinando i popoli più lontani e di diverse nazioni, ne hanno maggiormente favorito lo scambio delle idee e dei comuni bisogni; Artificiale -- lingua universale, deutero-Esperanto. Grice’s room at St John’s has the late-summer feel of 1939: windows half open, air that can’t decide whether it is still Term or already History, and a wireless in the corner that everybody pretends not to be listening to. Strawson arrives with that scholarship-boy briskness: he has the manner of someone who has been awarded a place to “read English” and is still faintly astonished that the place contains logic as well. Grice has, on the table, a thin Italian thing he has not read and is already quoting, because this is how civilised prejudice is done. He taps the cover. Martellotta, he says, Latinulus. Strawson sits, looks at the title, and lets it do its work in him. Latinulus, sir? Yes, Grice says. A little Latin. A purified Latin. A Latin that has been taken into a sanatorium and returned with its grammar removed. Strawson says, very politely, as if he were correcting a proof rather than an older man: And if it is little Latin, sir, then what is yours? You don’t speak Latin in College. You don’t speak Greek either. You speak—well—English. Grice watches him with a mild approval that tries not to look like approval. Careful, he says. We do not “speak Latin” at Oxford, true. We merely require it. There is a difference. Oxford is very good at requiring things it doesn’t do. Strawson tilts his head, as he will later tilt metaphysics into grammar. But the little language business, sir—Peano, Martellotta, all that—why the little Latin at all? If one wants a calculus, why not just do it in symbols? Or in English? Angliculus. Grice feels the word land like a perfectly placed pin. Angliculus? A little English, Strawson says. English purified. Like Latinulus, only for the blue-collars. Blue-collars, Grice repeats, as if tasting something faintly improper. Introducing themselves into our Elysium. He reaches for the chalk, as if the blackboard were the one place where a don is permitted to be frank. He writes IF in large letters and turns back. There, he says. The metaphysical load-bearing beam. If. Strawson, with a scholarship boy’s delight in insolence, says: And Peano thought it needed Latin? Peano thought everything needed a little Latin, Grice says. It’s the last polite language of Europe, so it looks as if it will save you from vulgarity. But a calculus is not saved by a language. It is saved by a sign. He draws two symbols, one after the other, as if laying out exhibits. First, Peano’s old implication sign: ⊃. Then the Principia “horseshoe”: ⊃ again, though the typographers call it different and philosophers pretend to see the difference. Strawson says: I thought the horseshoe was “supset.” Like set inclusion. That is exactly the trouble, Grice says. It was borrowed from inclusion and put to work as implication. A sign with a previous job is always liable to carry a previous implicature. Whitehead and Russell wanted a neat mark for “if…then,” and they took the nearest thing that looked respectable. Strawson says, softly triumphant: So your Angliculus would keep “if” and drop ⊃. Ordinary language wins. Grice looks pained, as if “wins” were already a category mistake. Ordinary language does not win, he says. Ordinary language merely survives. And if it survives, it does so by not being forced to behave like a calculus. The calculus wants an object that “if” cannot give it. He points at IF again. In English, “if” does several jobs. It can introduce a condition, a supposition, a concession, a polite hedge, a threat. And every time it does one job, it leaves the other jobs hovering as licensed misunderstandings. That is why it is philosophically useful and why it is logically poisonous. Strawson says: So Peano did the right thing by inventing a sign. Peano did a thing, Grice says. Whether it was the right thing depends on what he thought he was doing. If he thought ⊃ captured the sense of “if,” he was deluded. If he thought it merely captured one regimented use, he was merely doing what Oxford does with undergraduates: shaving off everything interesting until only the examinable remains. Strawson smiles. And Latinulus, sir? Latinulus is the same vice in a different costume, Grice says. It is the fantasy that by purifying a language you purify thought. As if Cicero needed purification. As if Latin itself ever “needed” a little Latin. Strawson, who has not done Lit Hum and knows he has not, chooses the one point that will sting without sounding rude. But you worship Cicero at Corpus, sir. Grice gives him a look that is almost affectionate. At Corpus, yes. Here we worship the timetable. He leans back. And the funny thing, he says, is that I do not even speak Latin properly. I read it. I write it badly. I force it on boys who will later write English as if Latin were their mother and they were angry with her. Strawson says: So what is wrong with Latinulus, then? It’s only honest. It admits it is little. What is wrong with it, Grice says, is that it pretends the sin is in the lingua. Marzolo would call it vitium loquelae. But the vice is never in the tongue. It is in the talker. It is in the man who thinks that by changing code he can avoid having to be responsible for what he means. Strawson looks down at ⊃ and then at IF. And which is worse, sir? The Peano sign in Latinulus, or Russell’s horseshoe in Angliculus? Grice thinks for a moment, and the wireless crackles softly as if it were clearing its throat. Peano in Latin is at least being decorous, he says. Russell in English is being bold. But both are doing the same thing: taking “if” and pretending it has only one life. They make it truth-functional, and then they congratulate themselves on having made it simple. He points at IF one last time. But “if” is not simple. It is civilised. It is what lets one speak without committing oneself to the whole universe at once. The calculus makes it a machine. Conversation keeps it a manoeuvre. The wireless suddenly sharpens; the voice of the announcer becomes careful in that way that makes all rooms in England identical for a moment. Grice and Strawson both go still, not dramatically—Oxford never does drama—but in the way one goes still when one hears that the background has become the foreground. Chamberlain’s voice comes through, slow and official, making each word do the work of a seal. Grice does not look at Strawson. Strawson does not look at Grice. The tutorial has been interrupted by a larger tutorial. When it is over, Strawson says, after a beat: So, sir. If. Grice nods, almost grimly. Yes, he says. If. And now the “then” is not ours to choose.Grice: Martellotta, quando ho detto che potevo inventare il Deutero‑Esperanto, non stavo pensando che tu l’avresti preso come invito a fondare una Repubblica linguistica a Bari. Martellotta: Ma scusa, se tu “decreti ciò che è proprio”, io mi limito a fare l’assessore: lingua artificiale, cittadinanza immediata, e tassa comunale pagabile in implicature. Grice: Capisco. E nel pacchetto turistico includi anche il Latinulus di Peano: lessico latino, fonetica italiana e… sintassi oxoniana, così il leone finisce per ruggire in ordine soggetto-verbo-oggetto con accento da High Street. Martellotta: E con “ticca”! Un thick travestito da latino: è la prova che, quando una lingua è davvero universale, prima o poi passa la dogana di Oxford e ti lascia un anglicismo nel bagaglio. Martellotta, Vito (1919). Latinulus: grammaticas de latinula linguas. Fonologias et morfologias. Bari: Casini.

Piero Martinetti (Pont Canavese, Torino, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- i veliani e l’amore alcibiadico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is said by presuming cooperation and inferring intentions, so implicature is the accountable surplus generated when a speaker relies on what a competent audience can work out from context and shared norms; Martinetti (Piero Martinetti, 1872–1943, Pont Canavese-born, self-described “neo-Platonist transplanted too early,” editor of Platonic materials, and famously the lone Italian philosophy professor to refuse the Fascist loyalty oath) supplies a contrasting ethical-metaphysical backdrop in which the governing norm is not just cooperative exchange but fidelity to truth and conscience, even at the cost of institutional rupture. In Gricean terms, Martinetti’s Platonizing discourse about eros/amore and number is less a play with conversational economy than a bid to re-orient the interlocutor toward higher-order goods (the Good, the soul’s ascent, moral law), so that what is “meant” often exceeds what can be made explicit in any single utterance and is carried instead by the dialogical tradition itself—anthologies, commentary, and the pedagogical staging of philosophical life. Where Grice treats implicature as typically cancellable and locally computable, Martinetti’s example highlights a situation where cancellation is morally costly: in politics and institutional life, refusing to utter the expected formula (the oath) becomes a communicative act whose implicature is deliberately unmistakable, because the point is to make one’s commitment public. The result is that Martinetti complements Grice by showing a different register of conversational rationality: not merely the rational coordination of beliefs in talk, but the rational governance of speech by principle, where the deepest “implicatures” are ethical—what one will not say, and what that refusal makes evident about the kind of life one is committed to living. Grice: “One thing can be said for Italian philosophers over Oxonian philosophers: they take the history of philosophy more seriously! I like M.; he wrote about eros, or as the Italians call it, ‘amore,’ – a different root from cupidus, too! He edited a platonic anthology.” “He also has a strange treatise on ‘the number’ which post-dates Frege!” -- «Di sé soleva dire di essere un neoplatonico trasmigrato troppo presto nel nostro secolo»  (Cesare Goretti). Professore di filosofia, si distinse per essere stato l'unico filosofo che rifiutò di prestare il giuramento di fedeltà al Fascismo. E il primo dei quattro figli (tre maschi e una femmina, senza contare una bambina che morì piccolissima) di un avvocato. Dopo aver frequentato il Liceo classico Carlo Botta di Ivrea, si iscrisse a Torino, dove ebbe come insegnanti ALLIEVO, BOBBA, ERCOLE, FLECHIA e GRAF, laureandosi col sistema sankhya: un studio sulla filosofia nell’India” discussa con ERCOLE, che, grazie all'interessamento d’ALLIEVO, risulta vincitrice del Premio Gautieri.  Dopo la laurea M. fa un soggiorno di due semestri presso l'Lipsia, dove poté venire a conoscenza del fondamentale studio di Garbe sulla filosofia Sāṃkhya. Si può dunque "ipotizzare che tra gli scopi del viaggio vi fosse anzitutto quello di approfondire gli studi dell’India, iniziati a Torino con  Flechia e 'Ercole." Iinsegna filosofia nei licei di Avellino, Correggio, Vigevano, Ivrea, e per finire a Torino. Compone la monumentale “Introduzione alla metafisica” e “Teoria della conoscenza”, ch edopo che consegue  la libera docenza in Filosofia teoretica a Torino gli valse di vincere il concorso per le cattedre di filosofia teoretica e morale dell'Accademia scientifico-letteraria di Milano, che diventa Regia Università degli Studî, nella quale insegna. Divenne socio corrispondente della classe di Scienze morali dell'Istituto lombardo di scienze e lettere, fondato da Napoleone L’amore velia, antologia platonica, amore socratico, sezione sull’Grice. Grice: Martinetti, tu dici d’essere “un neoplatonico trasmigrato troppo presto”: dunque sei arrivato nel Novecento senza bagaglio… ma con tutta l’Idea del Bene in valigia? Martinetti: Esatto. E tu, Grice, arrivi a dire che noi italiani prendiamo sul serio la storia della filosofia: implicatura ovvia—voi oxoniensi la prendete sul serio solo quando c’è un tè di mezzo. Grice: Colpito. Però ammetto: quando leggo che hai scritto di eros—anzi, amore, che suona meno “cupido” e più “metafisica con garbo”—mi viene voglia di promuoverti a massima conversazionale: “Sii platonico, ma non pedante.” Martinetti: E allora tieniti forte: ho anche un trattato sul “numero” dopo Frege. È il modo più educato per dire: “Grazie, Germania, ora vi mostro che anche un neoplatonico sa contare… ma senza perdere l’anima.” Martinetti, Piero (1896). Il sistema Sāṃkhya. Studio sulla filosofia indiana. Torino: Lattes.

Lorenzo Martini (Cambiano, Torino, Piemonte): l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains implicature as a rational inference from what is said plus shared cooperative expectations: speakers exploit what hearers can be expected to work out, and much communicative work is done by leaving things unsaid in a principled, accountable way; Lorenzo Martini (1787–1854, Cambiano-born physician-philosopher at Turin, pioneer professor of physiology and among the first holders of a chair in legal medicine, author of manuals such as Elementa physiologiae, 1821) offers a contrasting picture in which “reason” is anchored less in the micro-logic of conversational inference and more in the disciplinary rationality of medicine, pedagogy, and civic expertise, where interpretation must be publicly defensible and often evidentially constrained. Read through Grice, Martini’s “science of the heart” and his shifting between philosophical discourse and medico-legal practice highlight that implicature is not always welcome: in court-like settings (or anywhere responsibility and proof matter), one tries to minimize reliance on what is merely suggested and to maximize what can be stated, documented, and checked, because the costs of mis-inference are high. Yet the dialogue in your passage shows the bridge: even the medico-legal mind trades in implicature (titles that “imply too much,” the pragmatic force of saying “I understood you,” the social signal of sincerity), and Martini’s bilingual identity as doctor and philosopher resembles Grice’s own insistence that meaning is not just lexical content but an action aimed at uptake—only Martini’s uptake is shaped by institutional contexts (clinic, lecture hall, tribunal) that discipline how far cooperative inference may safely go. In short, Grice supplies the general inferential mechanics of implicature in ordinary conversation, while Martini supplies a case where conversational reason is constantly negotiated against evidential and ethical demands, making implicature alternately a tool of wit and a risk to be managed. Grice: “When Austin praised the genius of the ordinary language, he meant English! The Italians are less fake and they just say it loud and proud: ‘ingegno italiano’ are the keywords! Grice: “One would think that his ‘discorsi filadelfici’ are about brotherly love, but they were delivered at the Philadelphia American-Italian Philosophical Society!” – Grice: “He wrote on Emilio and Narciso, and a story of philosophy – starting not from Thales but Gioberti!” – Grice: “His science of the heart – scienza del cuore – is a mystery!” Compì studi classici a Chieri e poi, ospitato al Real Collegio di Torino, si rivolse allo studio delle scienze naturalistiche. Con la laurea in medicina,  cui seguirà anche quella in filosofia, ottenne l'insegnamento al predetto Istituto, prima di conseguire una brillante carriera nell'ateneo torinese. Qui, infatti, ottenne prima la docenza in fisiologia  e poi quella di medicina legale, cattedra quest'ultima, istituita di cui fu il primo insegnante in assoluto.  Di Torino fu anche rettore, negli anni in cui ebbe numerosi riconoscimenti, tra cui l'onorificenza di cavaliere dell'Ordine dei Santi Maurizio e Lazzaro.  Ma non mancarono episodi tragici, allorché, pochi anni dopo le nozze, perse la moglie, dalla quale ancora non aveva avuti figli, né li avrebbe avuti in seguito, visto che non si risposò, per dedicarsi completamente all'insegnamento e alla stesura di saggi e manuali nelle discipline mediche. In questo filone, il più ricco, vanno almeno segnalati gli “Elementa physiologiae” e “Lezioni di fisiologia” così come “Medicina legale”, accanto agli Elementa medicinae forensis, politiae medicae et hygienes, cui avrebbe fatto seguito il Manuale di medicina legale.  Il variegato percorso saggistico non si limitò (e non si esaurì) a studi a carattere medico-fisiologico e medico-legale. storia della filosofia, ingegno italiano, il cratilo di Platone. Grice: Martini, Austin lodava il “genio della lingua ordinaria”… ma sospetto intendesse “inglese”: voi piemontesi dite direttamente ingegno italiano. Almeno siete più sinceri di noi. Martini: Sinceri sì, ma anche pratici: io ho due lauree (medicina e filosofia) e una cattedra di medicina legale… quindi se l’implicatura “ti ho capito” non regge, posso sempre chiedere l’autopsia del significato. Grice: E poi i tuoi discorsi filadelfici: pensavo fossero sermoni sulla fraternità universale, e invece erano… a Filadelfia, alla Società italo-americana. Ecco un caso in cui il titolo implica troppo! Martini: Colpa tua: tu insegni che “ciò che si dice” non è “ciò che si intende”; io aggiungo che “ciò che si intende” spesso passa dal cuore… ma la mia scienza del cuore resta un mistero: per decifrarla servono o Grice… o un medico legale. Martini, Lorenzo (1821). Elementa physiologiae. Torino: Pica.

Ernesto de Martino (Napoli, Campania): l’implicatura conversazionale -- la religione civile della prima e unica Roma! – magismo -- filosofia italiana meridionale – filosofia del sud. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, intention-guided inference: speakers aim to be understood, hearers assume cooperative purpose, and what is meant can exceed what is said in a way that is (at least in principle) calculable from shared norms; de Martino (Ernesto de Martino, 1908–1965, Naples-born historian of religions and ethnologist, whose work on Southern Italian “magismo” and Grice has Marzolo’s Padua dissertation in hand for exactly as long as it takes to reach the title, which is to say long enough to feel informed and short enough to remain innocent. De vitiis loquelae. He smiles at the plural. Vices. Not error, not mistake, but vice, as if bad talk were not merely unfortunate but culpable. Oxford, he thinks, will tolerate a mistake; it will not tolerate a vice unless the vice is done with style. He is due to give his class on Conversation, and he has been calling his apparatus “maxims” with just enough solemnity to make the young think a law has been passed. But Marzolo’s title prompts the more agreeable, older model: commandments, prohibitions, the moral grammar of don’ts. Not “do this,” which invites heroism, but “don’t do that,” which invites decency. It also has the advantage that a prohibition fits vice: a vitium is what you do when you ignore the don’t. And the first thing Grice wants to do, out of sheer perversity and a desire to keep himself honest, is to translate his own desiderata and principles into Latin prohibitions, as if he were drafting the Decalogue for the Senior Common Room. He begins with the two desiderata he has been smuggling into “Conversation” as if they were obvious. First desideratum: candour. The Oxford word would be “honesty,” but “honesty” sounds like a virtue and therefore like a claim. Better to put it as a sin to be avoided. Noli mentiri. Or, if he wants to keep it closer to utterance rather than character: Noli dicere quod falsum esse credis. Do not say what you believe to be false. And he notes, with some satisfaction, that the sin belongs to the speaker, not to the tongue. Loquela does not sin; loquens sins. Marzolo, by talking as if loquela itself has vices, commits what Grice regards as the classic scholastic indecency: blaming the instrument for the musician. Second desideratum: clarity. Perspicuity. Grice can already hear the objection before he raises it: “Be perspicuous” is itself not perspicuous. It is the sort of schoolmasterly Latinism that needs a footnote to be understood, and therefore violates itself on utterance. Still, he needs something in that vicinity, because undergraduates possess, in quantity, what can only be called an active talent for fog. So he tries again, as a prohibition, since prohibitions are the real form of civilised rules. Noli obscurus esse. Noli ambiguitatem facere. Noli verbis superfluis uti. Noli inordinate loqui. Do not be obscure. Do not make ambiguity. Do not use superfluous words. Do not speak disorderly. That, he thinks, is already better than “Be perspicuous,” because it tells you where the sin lives: obscuritas, ambiguitas, superfluitas, inordinatio. Each is a vice a chap can be caught committing, and therefore a vice a chap can learn to avoid. Then come the two principles, the ones he has been tempted to treat as higher-order moral upholstery for the whole enterprise. Principium of benevolentia. He does not mean affection. He means the minimal charity without which talk becomes gladiatorial noise. Again, not “be benevolent,” which sounds like sainthood, but “don’t be malicious,” which sounds like what a decent chap can manage even before breakfast. Noli malevolus esse. Or, closer to his own thought: Noli impedire intellectum alterius. Do not hinder the other’s understanding. Principium of amore proprium. Here he enjoys himself, because Oxford is full of self-love disguised as principle. The sin is not loving oneself—everybody does—but letting self-love sabotage cooperation by turning conversation into performance or advantage-seeking. Noli ex amore proprio loqui. Or, more pointedly: Noli quaerere gloriam in loquela. Do not seek glory in speech. He imagines the undergraduates looking startled if he wrote that on the board in Latin, because it would sound like a monk’s rule, and yet it would describe most tutorial essays with clinical accuracy. Now he sees the pleasing possibility of collapsing everything—desiderata and principles—into the later single principle he sometimes gives, conversational helpfulness, which is just grand enough to sound official and just plain enough to sound English. But again: make it a prohibition. Noli inutilis esse in conversatione. Do not be unhelpful in conversation. Or, if he wants the version that bites: Noli impedimento esse. Do not be an impediment. He gathers his notes for class and thinks that Marzolo’s vices have performed a small service. They have reminded him that his so-called maxims are not discoveries about language; they are demands on persons. They are a moral code for the conversationalist, not a pathology of loquela. And they are best presented, not as heroic instructions, but as the ordinary don’ts by which any decent chap at Oxford, or elsewhere for that matter, is expected to abide—unless, of course, he is writing a weekly essay, in which case he will violate every one of them at once and call it originality. ritual crises culminates in a distinctive theory of cultural practices as techniques for securing “presence”) reframes the same phenomenon by shifting the explanatory center from individual communicative intentions to collective regimes of sense-making in which words, gestures, and rites function as socially inherited devices for stabilizing reality when ordinary causal explanation feels existentially insufficient. In Gricean terms, the “magical explanation” problem is not simply a different set of propositions but a different conversational background: what counts as relevant evidence, what counts as a satisfactory answer, and what counts as a respectful way of speaking are set by a local moral-ritual economy, so an utterance can carry implicatures (about respect, solidarity, threat, shame, or protection) that are invisible if you assume only an Oxford-style epistemic goal of truth tracking. That is why your passage’s point about Italian lacking a neutral term for “magical” is philosophically telling: the label itself generates derogatory implicatures and so distorts uptake, whereas de Martino’s analyses try to describe those practices without pre-loading the conversational context with contempt. The contrast, then, is that Grice offers a general micro-model of how rational agents derive meaning beyond literal content in cooperative talk, while de Martino shows how “rationality” in communication can be plural and culturally sedimented: in the South-Italian contexts he studies, implicature is often bound up with ritual, narrative authority, and the need to repair social and personal crises, so conversation is not merely information exchange but a civil-religious technology for keeping a world inhabitable. Grice: “Much as Hollis has worked on rationality and relativism, M. shows that in Southern Italy, a ‘magical’ explanation is often preferred to a strictly ‘casual’ one – M. notes that the Italian language lacks a philosophical apt term to describe this type of ‘magical’ explanation devoid of derogatory implicatures, though!” -- Filosofo italiano. Napoli, Campania. Grice: “I like Martino – and his interviewees – there is indeed a ‘discepolato’ around him.” Grice: “We don’t have anything like Martino at Oxford – Hollis is the closest I can think.” Grice: “In his strictly philosophical explorations, Martino aptly clashes with Croce!” -- Dopo la laurea a Napoli con una tesi in Storia delle religioni sui gephyrismi eleusini sotto la direzione di Adolfo Omodeo, si interessa alle discipline etnologiche. Si iscrive ai GUF e alla Milizia Universitaria, collaborando a L'Universale di Berto Ricci e facendo circolare in una cerchia ristretta di collaboratori un Saggio sulla religione civile poi rimasto inedito.  L'ingresso nel circolo crociano «Erano quelli gli anni in cui Hitler sciamanizzava in Germania e in Europa, e ancora lontano era il giorno in cui le rovine del palazzo della Cancelleria avrebbero composto per questo atroce sciamano europeo la bara di fuoco in cui egli tentava di seppellire il genere umano: ed erano anche gli anni in cui una piccola parte della gioventù italiana cercava asilo nelle severe e serene stanze di Palazzo Filomarino per risillabare il discorso elementarmente umano altrove impossibile, persino nella propria famiglia».  Grice: “The more Martino speaks of ‘meridionale’ and ‘sud’ the less I’m willing to qualify him as an Italian philosopher simpliciter – so I categorise him as a representative of ‘filosofia del sud’ or ‘filosofia meridionale’. religione civile, magismo – essercizio del giudizio – viaggio magico en route – carpet route travelling – o routeless. Ernesto de Martino.  Grice: Martino, mi hai sempre incuriosito: a Oxford la religione civile è materia da libri polverosi, mentre a Napoli sembra una faccenda viva, quasi magica! Dimmi, come mai qui il magismo è ancora preferito alla spiegazione casuale? Martino: Caro Grice, qui al Sud, quando la spiegazione razionale non basta, basta chiedere alla zia che ti legge i tarocchi! Da noi il magismo è una forma di filosofia popolare: spiega ciò che la logica lascia in sospeso e, almeno, fa sorridere. Grice: E così, al posto di una lezione su Kant, preferite un viaggio magico senza itinerario, tra giudizi improvvisati e riti familiari? Forse dovremmo introdurre il “carpet route travelling” a Oxford: basta con gli schemi, avanti con le intuizioni meridionali! Martino: Grice, se vuoi diventare filosofo del Sud, ti preparo un rituale: dimentica gli appunti, siediti con noi a tavola, e lasciati trasportare dal racconto! Qui, la filosofia nasce tra un piatto di pasta e una storia che nessuno ha ancora scritto. Martino, Ernesto de (1929). La decadenza dell’Occidente.

Paolo Marzolo (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale del segno. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what is meant beyond what is said by presuming cooperative purposes and then inferring implicatures from an utterance’s form, content, and context; Marzolo (Paolo Marzolo, 1811–1868, Padua-born physician-philologist later professor of literature at Pisa, with early work on speech/loquela and later an explicit “essay on signs”) shifts the emphasis from Grice’s intention-centered pathway (“to mean is to intend”) to a sign-centered and historically philological pathway in which meaning is anchored in signification systems (signum/signare, indicare) and in the learned traditions that stabilize them. In Gricean terms, Marzolo’s approach makes “sign” the primary explanatory unit, treating linguistic items as tokens in a semiotic economy whose functioning is largely taken for granted, whereas Grice famously tries to postpone “what words mean” and instead reconstruct speaker-meaning and implicature from rational patterns of use, often exploiting under-specification (“Peccavi” vs “I said that I peccavi,” and the way audiences supply the missing “that”-clause content). The contrast is therefore methodological: Marzolo looks for the rationality of meaning in the classificatory apparatus of signs—how a sign stands for, indicates, or signifies within a codified semantic tradition—while Grice locates rationality in the intersubjective game of intention-recognition, where the very gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning is productive and regulated. Yet they converge at a deeper point: Marzolo’s philological insistence on signare and indicare can be read as a historical prelude to Grice’s program, because both are trying to explain how public marks and acts come to carry thought for others; the difference is that Marzolo treats that carrying as primarily semiotic and taxonomic, while Grice treats it as primarily pragmatic and inferential, with implicature as the central phenomenon by which reason makes communication more powerful than what is explicitly encoded. Grice: “When I delivered my lecture on ‘meaning’ for the Philosophical Society at Oxford, I knew that some of my pupils – to which I had burdened with my seminars on ‘meaning’ would be attending. I was paying little attention to Marzolo. When Cairo wrote his ‘Dictionary of Symbols,’ way before Vienna, and other events with which we were familiar at Oxford, Cairo makes an effort to trace his research – and he provides three references: Ferrero, Marzolo, and Marchesini – “amongst us Italians” – he adds. Now Ferrero was more of a lawyer and his ‘I simboli’ only tangentially approaches ‘simbolo’ and ‘segno,’ or the phenomenon of ‘voulere dire’ alla Grice – but what is important is that he leaves Marchesini behind, and indeed OVER-stresses the LEGACY of Marzolo. Unlike myself – who dismiss in “Meaning” talk of ‘sign,’ Marzolo entitles his ‘essay’ an ‘essay on signs’ – and he is indeed into ‘words’ – he held a profeessor of letters at Pisa. But his words are what these words ‘voule dire’ – ‘signare’ – as quoted by both Marzolo and Ferrero – as when Cicero says that a signum signat – in the zodiac. But Marzolo’s examples are RARELY about what a given expression MEANS, or is a sign of – he takes this for granted. Now, if you read my ‘Meaning’ you will find NO reference to what a word – or group of words means – I approach this later in my career, under pressure, and I give only ONE example ‘shaggy’ – shaggy shaggy reduplicated, as Ferrero has it to mean that the utterer means that the referent is hairy-coated. When it comes to indicare that’s our ‘say’ – as when I say ‘Peccavi’. But can I say that I said THAT peccavi? Surely not. So ‘say’ primarily applies to the utterer, but what the utterer says may not be an instance of his saying THAT – cf. MAD magazine cartoons on what people say and what they actually mean. Grice: Marzolo, al mio seminario su meaning ho fatto finta di niente sui “segni”… poi tu arrivi e intitoli tutto Saggio sui segni: mi stai mandando un segnale, o è solo gusto tipografico? Marzolo: È un segnale, certo: se tu cacci fuori il “segno” dalla porta, lui rientra dalla finestra… e si siede pure in cattedra a Pisa con me. Grice: Però tu dai per scontato che le parole significhino; io invece in Meaning riesco a parlare di “meaning” senza dire che cosa significhi una parola—un capolavoro di omissione cooperativa. Marzolo: E infatti il tuo unico esempio “shaggy shaggy” sembra un cane che abbaia due volte per farsi capire: tu dici Peccavi, ma poi aggiungi “non ho detto CHE peccavi”—e il lettore capisce benissimo… e ride, che è il vero indicatore. Marzolo, Paolo (1834). De vitiis loquelae quaedam exposita quum medicinae lauream coronam assequeretur. Padova.  

Filippo Masci (Francavilla al Mare, Chieti, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- critica della critica della ragione – implicatura solidale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats implicature as a rational, intention-sensitive inference: speakers rely on cooperative expectations (relevance, sufficiency, etc.) so that hearers can recover what is meant beyond what is explicitly said; Masci (Filippo Masci, Abruzzese philosopher shaped by the Spaventa milieu, early interpreter of Hegel and Kant, later engaged with psychology, measurement, and a “natural history” of volition) reframes that Gricean picture by treating “reason” less as a local conversational constraint and more as a historical-critical power that organizes domains—Kant’s critique, Hegelian logic, Aristotelian practical concepts, and the emerging scientific-psychological discourse about will, instinct, and psycho-physical correlation. In Gricean terms, Masci’s “critica della critica” orientation highlights that the background against which implicatures are drawn is not merely shared conversational common ground but also a shared intellectual tradition: terms like volontà, libertà, conoscenza, credenza, and even “criticism” carry inherited inferential routes, so what is implicated in philosophical exchange depends on how a community has already learned to connect concepts (e.g., willing to freedom, knowledge to belief) and on what counts as an acceptable “measure” or warrant in the human sciences. Where Grice analyzes how speakers manage meaning by being strategically indirect in talk, Masci emphasizes how indirectness is built into critique itself: a philosophical position often advances by redescribing an opponent’s framework (de-personalizing it, unifying its parts, exposing its limits) rather than by merely asserting a contrary thesis, so the implicatures are methodological and solidaristic—signals of alignment with a critical project, an intellectual lineage, or a conception of rational autonomy. The contrast, then, is that Grice supplies the micro-pragmatics of how rational agents get from saying to meaning in everyday conversation, while Masci supplies a macro-critique of how “reason” governs the very conceptual landscape within which conversational inferences become possible, making implicature partly a function of cooperative talk and partly a function of historically formed critical norms. Grice: “At Oxford, we don’t say ‘Kant,’ we say ‘criticism’. For surely literary critics cannot claim all uses of ‘crit’, as in lit. crit. By using ‘criticism’ instead of ‘Kantianism’ you achieve TWO goals: you de-personalise a doctrine, and you emphasise the unity between Kant’s critique of alethic reason and Kant’s critique of practical reason!” Grice: “But perhaps more interesting that his explorations on the judicative are Masci’s conceptual analysis, and fascinating ‘natural’ history of the will, with a focus on Aristotle!” Grice: “Like M., I make a conceptual connetction between willing and free-will.” – or “volonta” e “liberta” in his words! I like M.; he has philosophised on forms of intuition and instincdt – cf. my “Needs’ – and what he calls the psycho-physical materialism. Also on what he calls the psychological parallelism – He spent a few essays on quantification and measurement in atters of the soul -- -- and speaks of an ‘indirect measure’ in psychology. He has opposed ‘conoscenza’ to ‘credenza’ (cf. my knowledge and belief), and further, ‘conosecenza and pensiero’, knowledge and thought. Nato in una famiglia della borghesia abruzzese, perse il padre all'età di 4 anni. Frequenta il collegio Giambattista Vico di Chieti e, completati gli studi liceali, e allievo di MOLA, che gli insegna filosofia. Inizia gli studi di giurisprudenza all'Napoli, dove si laureò ed in seguito studiò scienze politico-amministrative. Comincia ad approfondire le sue conoscenze filosofiche grazie alle lezioni tenute da Spaventa nella stessa città. Influenzato dalla sua formazione universitaria e dallo stesso Spaventa, al centro dei suoi primi studi c'era il pensiero di Kant e Hegel. Ottenne la cattedra di professore reggente di filosofia a Chieti, prima dell'abilitazione che gli fu consegnata a Pisa. Inoltre venne nominato vincitore di un concorso della Reale Accademia delle scienze morali e politiche grazie ad un saggio sulla Critica della ragion pura. implicatura, critica della critica, criticismo, neo-criticismo. Grice has been telling his class on Conversation—regalling is perhaps the more accurate verb—that there are such things as conversational categories, as if one could go from “Now, look here” to Categoria conversationalis by mere Latinisation, and have the students feel they had been admitted to an old science rather than a new whim. He has enjoyed the phrase too much, which is always a danger at Oxford: enjoyment is taken as evidence that you have done something unserious, unless you can translate it into Greek and make it look like duty. Then, as if the universe has a taste for correction, he picks up Masci and does what he swore, by Sidney Smith’s authority, never to do: he forms his review before he has read, and forms it solely from the title, because titles are where philosophers hide their indiscretions. Le categorie del finito e dell’infinito. Categorie. Plural. Already a warning. The plural is always how Hegel begins: one category is never enough, because one category would be a limit, and Hegel’s whole ambition is to make limits into stepping-stones. Finito, infinito. The title manages, in two nouns, to sound as if it were doing metaphysics and as if it were doing theology, which is precisely the kind of double effect that makes Oxonians reach for their umbrellas. Grice smiles because he cannot avoid it: he has been talking about categories, too, only his were meant playfully. Qualitas, Quantitas, Relatio, Modus—Kant’s four polite drawers for storing judgments, which Kant presented with the air of a man who has discovered the filing system of the universe. Grice has always liked the drawers in the way one likes a well-made desk: not because one believes the desk is the structure of reality, but because it keeps papers from flying about. And now Masci is dragging in finito and infinito as if they were entries in the same cabinet. Grice’s mind immediately does the mischievous Oxonian move: it checks the syllabus. If we are talking Kant, then “infinite judgment” is not a grand Hegelian hymn to the Infinite. It is that peculiar Kantian device—negative but not merely negative—filed under Qualitas, and specifically under the rubric where Kant distinguishes affirmative, negative, and infinite judgments. The infinite judgment is the one that looks like a negation but behaves like an odd sort of classification: not “S is not P” but “S is non-P.” It is, as he has told his students with a straight face, a way of saying less and implying more. You deny P and you smuggle in a whole range of alternatives under a hyphen. So the very phrase categoria dell’infinito makes him laugh, because it sounds like the kind of inflation Kant would have hated while being exactly the kind of inflation Kant’s own machinery invites. Kant builds a little device for classifying judgments, and Hegel arrives and turns the device into a metaphysical engine, as if the filing cabinet were a locomotive. And that, Grice thinks, is what Masci is really confessing in the title: these are not conversational categories at all. They are Hegelian categories—Categorie as a term of art, not a term of convenience. Oxford’s “category” is usually a warning label: do not mix these. Hegel’s category is a promise: mix these and watch the world become more itself. Bradley, who taught the English how to take Hegel seriously without admitting it, already showed the trick: Hegel can do whatever he likes with Kant’s nonsense and make an ever grander nonsense out of it, and then, by sheer rhetorical pressure, compel you to call the nonsense “a system.” The system has the peculiar advantage that you cannot refute it without first learning its dialect. Grice feels his own guilt begin to glow. He has been guilty of treating Kant’s four headings as if they were toys for tidying up conversational phenomena—maxims under Relation, say, or Modus for speech-acts, or Quantitas for how much one says. He has even been guilty of those hybrid jokes—Kantotle, Ariskant—where he pretends one can splice Aristotle’s taxonomy to Kant’s critique and get something serviceable for Oxford purposes. But if he is honest, the joke should have had a second half all along. If Aristotle is Kant’s ancestor in sobriety, Plato is Hegel’s ancestor in grandeur. And he should have been making room, not only for Kantotle and Ariskant, but for Plathegel and Heglato—because Masci’s title is a reminder that the real gravitational pull in “categories” is not Kant’s desk drawers; it is Plato’s habit of turning a logical distinction into an ontological drama. The infinite, after all, is already a Platonic nuisance long before it becomes a Kantian heading or a Hegelian anthem. In the Sophist, Plato is forced into the famous indecency—the so-called parricide against Parmenides—because negation has to mean something without collapsing into mere nothing. Not-being cannot be sheer nonentity; it has to be difference, otherness, the fact that a thing is not this but is that. Negation, in other words, is not just a logical “no”; it is a metaphysical device for making room. Which is precisely why Hegel is so pleased with negation: it is not a mere stop sign; it is a motor. The finite negates itself, becomes its other, and the story continues. And Masci, in writing categorie del finito e dell’infinito, is telling you, before you read a line, that he is going to treat finitude and infinity not as two topics but as two stages in a dialectical machinery. Grice, because he cannot resist the dry jab at himself, imagines his own students hearing “conversational category” and then reading Masci’s title and concluding that Grice has merely been doing provincial Hegel all along without admitting it. They will think: Ah, so Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner are just the finite; implicature is the infinite. Or some such preposterous PPE thesis, duly delivered with footnotes and a tragic misunderstanding of what “infinite judgment” was supposed to be in Kant. He can already hear the weekly essays. One boy will write that Grice’s Cooperative Principle is the categoria dell’infinito because it transcends the finite constraints of literal meaning. Another will write that conversational implicature is the negation of the said and therefore constitutes the Aufhebung of semantics into pragmatics. Grice will have to sit there, polite, and repair their mis-intuitions with his own intuitions, the only instrument Oxford truly trusts: the native speaker’s sense of what one would say, and what one would never say, and what one meant, and what the hearer is merely allowed to infer. And at this point, inevitably, Austin enters Grice’s mind as the local demon of ordinary language. Austin, who would have hated the title on sight. Categorie del finito e dell’infinito would have made him reach for his most damaging weapon: a question about usage. Who, exactly, says “the category of the infinite” at the bus stop. Who says it even at High Table unless he is quoting a German. The answer, of course, is: no one. Which is why Austin would call it fishy. But Grice is not satisfied with Austin’s allergy. Because Austin’s own procedure, in Grice’s view, is compromised by a different confusion: the confusion between what is explicitly conveyed and what is implicitly conveyed, and then the further confusion of treating what is implicitly conveyed as if it were part of “sense.” Austin will happily talk as if “or” has a sense that includes its usual pragmatic insinuations. Grice finds that not merely wrong but faintly indecent. “Or” having a sense is about as comfortable as “to” having a sense. One can talk about its contribution, its role, its behaviour; but “sense” makes it sound like a thing with a soul. So here is the irony Masci provokes in him. Masci takes categories too seriously—Hegel seriously, Kant seriously, Aristotle seriously, Plato seriously—and makes a grand metaphysical edifice out of what might have been a modest classificatory convenience. Austin takes ordinary talk so seriously that he begins to smuggle into “sense” what belongs, properly, to the utterer’s intended but unspoken contribution. Both, in their different ways, turn a tool into a temple. Grice closes Masci—still at the title—and decides he is allowed, by Sidney Smith’s licence, to remain prejudiced. The title is enough. Masci is pointing in the right direction if the direction is Hegel’s: categories as the moving joints of thought, finitude and infinity as the drama of negation. But if Grice is to keep his own enterprise honest—conversation, implicature, the authority of the utterer—he must resist the temptation to let Hegel annex him. He will keep his categories conversational, meaning: practical, defeasible, answerable to how people actually speak. Let Masci have his infinite. Grice will settle for the more English ambition: to show, with a few well-chosen examples, that the finite resources of talk can, by cooperative inference, yield an indefinitely rich range of what is meant. That is quite enough infinity for a gentleman, and it does not require calling it a category.Grice: Masci, dimmi, in Abruzzo la critica della critica si serve col Montepulciano o va bene anche il caffè forte? Masci: Caro Grice, qui la critica si digerisce meglio con un bicchiere di Montepulciano—il caffè rischia di rendere la ragione troppo nervosa, e Kant non approverebbe! Grice: Ma se Kant fosse nato a Francavilla al Mare, la sua Critica sarebbe stata più solidale o più abruzzese? Forse avrebbe aggiunto una postilla sulla libertà di scelta tra arrosticini e gnocchi! Masci: Grice, se Kant avesse assaggiato gli arrosticini, avrebbe scritto la Critica della ragione gustativa! E magari la volontà sarebbe diventata ancora più libera, almeno a tavola. Qui, la filosofia si fa con la pancia piena e il pensiero contento! Masci, Filippo (1869). Le categorie del finito e dell’infinito. Studio sulla Scienza della logica di Hegel. Rivista bolognese di scienze, lettere, arti e scuola.

Giuseppe Masi (Firenze, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale -- i peripatetici del Lizio. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how a hearer can rationally recover what is meant beyond what is said by assuming cooperative purposes and then deriving implicatures from the speaker’s choice of words against shared expectations; the Masi vignette adds a distinctive twist by relocating the pressure point from conversational strategy to metaphysical vocabulary and historical semantics, because Masi’s interests (power of reason in the Heraclitus–Plato–Hegel line, and the “uni-equivocity” of being) treat meaning as something partly stabilized by large-scale conceptual architectures rather than only by local maxims of talk. In Grice’s terms, “Lycaeum/lizio” is a miniature model of the same phenomenon: a change in linguistic form changes what gets taken as the natural reading, and what would count as an implicature or a mere stylistic variant, so the hearer’s inferential task is always hostage to the available conceptual and lexical resources. Where Grice tends to treat polysemy and disambiguation as problems managed by context and cooperative inference (your “philosopher” example), Masi foregrounds how philosophy itself often seeks a controlled re-engineering of sense—trying to make being neither merely equivocal nor flatly univocal—which, pragmatically, is an attempt to reduce the room for conversational drift and to regiment what can be inferred from core terms. The result is a productive contrast: Grice explains how conversational reason extracts determinate speaker-meaning from flexible, sometimes messy ordinary usage, while Masi exemplifies a Platonist/Hegelian confidence that reason can also reshape the semantic field from above, so that implicature is not only something we calculate in everyday exchanges but also something that philosophical systems try to anticipate, domesticate, or pre-empt by redesigning the very space of possible meanings. Grice: “Most Oxonians cannot really spell Lycaeum, since it’s a devil of a word. The Italians fare slightly better when they opt for the vulgar spelling ‘lizio’. You see, the ‘y’ just becomes ‘i,’ the ‘ae’ is deleted, and the ‘c’ aquires the very Italian sound of ‘z’!” Grice: “Unlike Masi, I don’t think ontology has reached its end – il fine dell’ontologia” – Grice: “Masi has elaborated on the power of reason not from an Ariskantian perspective but from a Plathegelian one! – Masi: “Il potere della ragione: Eraclito, Platone, Hegel.” --  Grice: “It’s amazing Masi was implicating the same things as I was on S izz P and P hazz S; he even managed a coinage, ‘uni-equivocity’ – I love it!”. Figlio di Enrico Masi, generale dell'Esercito Italiano, e Leda Nutini. Ha compiuto i suoi studi a Bologna, conseguendo la maturità classica presso il liceo statale L. Galvani. Iscrittosi a Bologna, vi si laureò con lode  con una tesi sul diritto di famiglia negli Statuti Bolognesi. Assolse agli obblighi di leva e fu trattenuto alle armi in base alle disposizioni di emergenza del periodo. Congedato, riprese gli studi di filosofia a Bologna, dove conseguì la laurea con lode, discutendo co Battaglia la tesi, “Individuo, società, famiglia in Rosmini”. La tesi gli valse l'ammissione, con borsa di studio a Milano. Dopo il primo anno, fu richiamato alle armi nel periodo bellico. Ottenuto il congedo definitivo, insegna filosofia a Bologna. Participa ai principali convegni e congressi, come quelli del Centro Studi Filosofici di Gallarate, come attesta la sua collaborazione alla Enciclopedia filosofica quel Centro. Dona su collezione alla Pinacoteca comunale di Pieve di Cento. L'interesse storiografico che muove M. alla ricostruzione di Kierkegaard da un profondo e originale impegno teoretico, volto ad approfondire il concetto metafisico di "analogia", uni-equivociat dell’essere in Aristotele. i peripatetici, la carriera di un libertino. Giusepe Masi.  Grice: Masi, dimmi la verità: quante volte hai dovuto correggere un inglese che scrive “Lycaeum” con una y, una ae e magari pure una z? Masi: Caro Grice, in Toscana basta dire “lizio” e tutti capiscono: qui le lettere straniere si sciolgono come il burro sulla ribollita! Grice: Vedi, io ho passato anni a parlare di implicature – ma la tua “uni-equivociat” batte il mio inglese: è come mettere tutti i filosofi sulla stessa gondola, anche se siamo a Firenze e non a Venezia! Masi: Grice, tu implichi troppo; io qui, tra i peripatetici del Lizio, preferisco filosofare con un bicchiere di Chianti: così anche l’ontologia diventa più allegra! Masi, Giuseppe (1937). Il diritto di famiglia negli Statuti bolognesi. Bologna.

Masila (Roma, Lazio): l’implicatura conversazionale – Ercole -- Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what is meant beyond what is said by attributing to the speaker an intention to be understood under cooperative expectations, so implicature is a principled inference from an utterance’s literal content plus context and norms; the Masila vignette turns this into a contrast between modern, polysemy-aware analytic interpretation and an ancient epigraphic/papyrological practice where a single learned label can function as a socially stabilized classification rather than an invitation to fine-grained disambiguation. In Grice’s “Strawson is a philosopher” case, “philosopher” can implicate different things (profession, temperament, both) because modern usage allows multiple salient senses and because speakers exploit that flexibility; but a Herculaneum papyrus “Masila philosophus” belongs to a world in which “philosophus” is closer to a role-term within a cultural economy of paideia, marking someone as a member of a recognized intellectual type, so the hearer’s task is less to choose among competing senses and more to place Masila within a shared social taxonomy. The upshot for Grice is that what looks like monosemy may actually be pragmatics made invisible: the context (a library town, an elite Roman-Greek intellectual setting, a genre of identification) does so much work that alternative readings never become live options, so the “implicature” is not a hidden extra proposition but the whole background assumption that being a philosophus includes both study and reflective habit. In that way Masila complements Grice: he illustrates how conversational rationality can, in some settings, compress meaning so tightly into a conventional label that the implicature-work Grice foregrounds is offloaded onto stable institutions of education and status—“philosophus” as a one-word bridge from description to social recognition. Grice: “In my ‘Utterer’s meaning, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning,” I choose the example of ‘philosopher’: ‘Starwson is a philosopoher’. Does this mean that Strawson is professionally engaged in philosophical [sic] studies, or that Strawson is inclined to general reflections about life, or both? The case is different with this papyrus found at Herculaneum: “Masila philosophus,’ it reads. We may suspect that a Herculaneum, back then, being professionally engaged in philosophical studies and being inclined to general reflections about life is a false dichotomy – and that ‘philosophus’ is monosemic!” Filosofo italiano. A reference to M. as a philosopher in a papyrus found at Herculaneum. GRICEVS: SALVE, MASILA: in libello meo dixi “Strawson philosophus est”; sed dubito—professoremne dicas, an virum qui de vita semper cogitet, an utrumque? MASILA: SALVE, GRICE: apud Herculanum dubitatio periit; in papyro enim scriptum est “Masila philosophus”—quasi diceret: “unum verbum, duo munera; noli disiungere.” GRICEVS: Ergo ibi philosophus monosemos est—et ego, more Oxoniensi, polysemos quaero: nimis multa infero ex una voce, quasi ex amphora totam bibliothecam. MASILA: Age: tu infer, ego ridebo; sed memento—si papyrus te vocat philosophum, iam et stipendiarius es et meditativus… et hoc sine footnote. Masila (a. u. c. DCCCXXXII). De philosophia una voce. Roma.

Amato Masnovo (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how an audience can rationally recover what is meant beyond what is said by attributing cooperative intentions to the speaker and then calculating implicatures under shared norms (relevance, adequacy, etc.); Masnovo, as your passage frames him (Amato Masnovo, 1878–1955, Roman-born leading figure in Italian neo-scholasticism and longtime intellectual driver of the Milan Catholic milieu around Vita e Pensiero and the Università Cattolica), relocates “conversational reason” from Grice’s micro-pragmatics of inference to a macro-pragmatics of tradition, where what counts as a “classic,” what counts as legitimate philosophy, and what counts as a permissible argumentative move are already structured by institutional and confessional ethos (Aquinas in Italy, Croce as national horizon, the Jesuit and Dominican school networks, etc.). In Gricean terms, Masnovo’s discourse is saturated with standing implicatures: invoking “Aquinas” implies not just a set of theses but a disciplinary posture about method, authority, and the hierarchy of sources; similarly, remarks about “national ethos” function as contextual signals that license different inferences about what is being endorsed or resisted. Where Grice treats context as something interlocutors exploit in real-time to convey more than they explicitly say, Masnovo highlights how context is historically engineered—by schools, journals, clerical and academic patronage, and the rhetoric of “situations rather than men”—so that much of what is “meant” in philosophical exchange is already carried by affiliation markers and inherited vocabularies before any individual speaker forms a particular intention. The result is a useful contrast: Grice provides a general, intention-centered account of how implicature is generated and recovered in conversation, while Masnovo exemplifies how philosophical communities stabilize whole repertoires of implicatures through tradition and institution, making reason in discourse as much a matter of belonging to (and negotiating within) a pre-set communicative order as of calculating a speaker’s momentary intention. Grice: “While we start philosophy at Oxford – sub-faculty of philosophy – as part of the classics – Faculty of Literae Humaniores – Oxford does not quite rule what counts as a ‘classic’: Cicerone, and compagnia. When the scholar is first introduced to a non-classical philosopher, however, there is a national ethos – and while Oxford is very English, that Scot by the name of of Home (Hume) features large – I wonder why! It’s different in Italy, where the national ethos is strictly Italian, from Benedetto Croce to Benedetto Croce! Not to exlude Aquino, whose years at Germany and la Sorbona are forgiven! And hailed as a true Roccaseccan!” Filosofo italiano. Roma, Lazio. Aquino IN ITALIA. Nel tracciare in poche pagine le vicende del neotomismo italiano fermerò l’attenzione piuttosto su le situazioni che su gli uomini: la quale cosa, se torna utile sempre nella storia della filosofia, molto più torna utile quando il periodo a cui si guarda è abbastanza recente. Le ragioni sono di prima evidenza. Entriamo in argomento. Non ò possibile caratterizzare secondo verità la setta d’ AQUINO  senza prima formarsi un’idea esatta d’AQUINO . Certo le scuole DOMENICANE italiane mantennero sempre in qualche efficenza il loro sopporto della setta d’AQUINO . Nonpertanto se la setta d’AQUINO in Italia, da cui dipende la setta nel straniero, si afferma vivamente e risolutamente, ciò è dovuto principalmente al canonico piacentino BUZZETTI , le cui lezioni, sono già diffuse in manoscritti per l’Italia, e i cui scolari avevano già iniziato alla setta d’AQUINO , più o meno fortunatamente, TAPARELLI , LIBERATORE , e tant’altri filosofi dentro e fuori della compagnia di Gesù. PECCI  a Perugia è certamente sotto, l’influsso di SORDI , piacentino e scolaro di BUZZETTI . È lecito pensare il medesimo del canonico napoletano SANSEVERINO . M., AQUINO  in Italia, (Società Editrice Vita e Pensiero, Milano. Cfr. «L’amico d’Italia», Torino. Quivi GAZOLA , tessendo l’elogio In morte dello zio BUZZETTI. Scolastica. Grice: Masnovo, ma secondo te all’Oxford si può davvero dire che Cicerone sia un classico, o bisogna chiedere il permesso al bidello? Masnovo: Grice, qui a Roma invece basta una carbonara e tutti diventano classici, persino Croce! E se qualcuno osa escludere Aquino, gli si perdona tutto purché abbia studiato almeno un po’ a Roccasecca. Grice: Ah, quindi la filosofia italiana si decide tra un piatto di pasta e un elogio in morte dello zio Buzzetti? Allora all’inglese rimane solo il pudding e Hume! Masnovo: Esatto, Grice! In Italia la setta d’Aquino la fonda chi ha il coraggio di discutere anche dopo il dolce. E non serve nemmeno chiedere alla compagnia di Gesù: basta la compagnia a tavola! Masnovo, Amato (1909). Contributo. Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica.

Bernardo Massari (Seminara, Reggio Calabria): l’implicatura conversazionale, l’implicatura logistica di Petrarca e Boccaccio, la scuola di Seminara, la filosofia calabrese, e la filosofia italiana. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers can rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is explicitly said by presuming cooperative purpose and then inferring implicatures from what is said plus shared expectations about relevance, sufficiency, and orderly presentation; “Massari” in your passage (i.e., Barlaam of Seminara/Barlaam the Calabrian, c. 1290–1348, scholar of Greek learning, mathematics/music, diplomat in Angevin and papal contexts, and controversialist in the Hesychast dispute with Gregory Palamas) highlights a very different but complementary arena in which meaning is governed: multilingual, doctrinal, and polemical exchange where Latin, Greek, and vernaculars compete for authority and where what is left unsaid or tactically formulated can decide ecclesiastical outcomes. In Gricean terms, Barlaam’s activity makes implicature less a polite byproduct of everyday talk and more an instrument of intellectual diplomacy: theological claims about Filioque, primacy, or the status of mystical contemplation are crafted so that different audiences (Byzantine monastics, Latin scholastics, humanists like Petrarch’s circle, or later Boccaccio-linked transmission of Greek) can draw different “licensed” inferences without forcing an outright contradiction on the page. Where Grice models implicature as cancellable and calculable against a stable cooperative background, Barlaam’s setting shows how background itself is contested—what counts as a reasonable inference depends on which tradition’s norms of proof, authority, and “signs” one accepts—so conversational reason becomes a struggle over interpretive jurisdiction as much as a shared mechanism of uptake. Thus Grice supplies the micro-pragmatic logic of how implicatures are derived, while Massari/Barlaam supplies a historical macro-case in which implicature functions across languages and institutions: as a way of translating, negotiating, and sometimes weaponizing meaning when direct assertion would be politically or doctrinally explosive. Grice: “At Oxford, we revere William Jones as being the first to point to the cognateness between the Gothick,as he called it, and the Graeco-Romanic. This was never an issue in Italy, which had both!” calabro -- Barlaam: -- Grice: “Should it be under B – Barlam, under Seminara, like Occam?”  Barlaam Calabro – di Calabria – Scrive di aritmetica, musica e acustica. E uno dei più convinti fautori della riunificazione fra le Chiese d'oriente e occidente. È considerato insieme ai suoi due allievi Leonzio Pilato e Boccaccio uno dei padri dell'Umanesimo. Studia in Galatro, Calabria. Pare che il suo successo come filosofo (un suo trattato sull'etica degli stoici è preservato) e ragione di gelosia da parte di N. Gregorio. Nell'ambito delle trattative per la ri-unificazione tra le due Chiese di Oriente e di Occidente, a lui venne affidata la difesa delle ragioni greche; in tale occasione sviluppa le sue critiche verso l'esicasmo e a sottolineare la differenza di valore tra la teologia scolastica e la contemplazione mistica. E protagonista di una violenta polemica contro i metodi ascetici e mistici di alcuni monaci dell'Athos e del loro sostenitore G. Palamas. Il dibattito divenne sempre più acceso fino a culminare in un concilio generale alla fine del quale venne costretto a sospendere ogni futuro attacco verso l'esicasmo. Epigrafe a Gerace, tutore di Petrarca e Boccaccio, inviato dall'imperatore Andronico III Paleologo in missione diplomatica a Napoli, Avignone e Parigi per sollecitare le corti europee ad una crociata contro i turchi. In quell'occasione costrue delle relazioni e una rete di amicizie su cui puo fare conto quando, in seguito alla decisione conciliare, decise di aderire alla Chiesa d'Occidente. implicatura, logistica, Petrarca, Boccaccio, Gentile – il latino, il volgare – e il greco! Accademia, Platone, Rinascimento italiano, Firenze. Grice has the little Roman volume in hand in the way he holds most books when he is feeling philological: not like a door into a new world, but like a label on a jar whose contents he suspects in advance. He has opened it, but he is not really reading it; he is browsing the title as if the title were the whole argument, which, in scholastic and ecclesiastical literature, it very often is. Filioque et primatu. The two troublemakers, yoked together by a small and scandalously efficient conjunction. He has already decided, without asking permission, to treat the title as the book’s thesis and the Latin as the book’s first mistake. Filioque, he thinks, is a linguistic contrivance so Latin it makes even Latin look theatrical. It is not even a word in the ordinary way; it is a suffix with ambitions. You take filio, you tack on -que, and you get a doctrine by glue. And the glue is exactly the point: -que is the polite, sneaky “and,” the clitic that attaches itself as if it were not imposing a new coordinate term at all. It is “and” as an implicature masquerading as morphology. Greek, being less mischievous in that particular way and more honest about its connectives, has to say καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ if it wants to say “and from the Son.” It cannot hide the coordination inside a tail. It has to put the “and” on the table: καί. Open, analytic, not glued. Which is why Grice cannot help being amused at the doctrinal asymmetry. The Latin side can perform doctrinal addition with a suffix. The Greek side must perform it with a word. And, he thinks, any good Oxford ordinary-language philosopher should already be suspicious when theology is done by a suffix. He writes, in the margin, not for publication but for private relief: Υἱός πρωτείον καί The Son: ὁ Υἱός. Primacy: τὸ πρωτεῖον, or, if one wants to make it sound more like the ecclesiastical battlefield, τὸ πρωτεῖον τιμῆς, primacy of honour, which is precisely the sort of primacy the Greeks can tolerate without choking. And then καί, the plain “and” which refuses to be smuggled into a previous word like a stowaway. He looks again at primatu and thinks: primacy over what, exactly. Over other bishops, over sees, over councils, over appeals, over doctrine, over the right to tell another patriarch what to do. And then, only secondarily and later, over land and coin and the sort of temporal furniture that turns theology into administration. But the word primatus by itself already tries to do too much without saying what it is doing. It behaves like those Oxford abstractions Austin hated: it sounds like a property when it is really a claim to jurisdiction. And now the real comedy, the one Grice cannot let pass. The author, if he is defending the Greek cause, has dressed his defence in Latin. Why bother. If your cause is the Greek cause, why not write the whole thing in Greek, and have done with it. Why present the Greek position in the enemy’s medium. Unless, of course, the whole business is diplomacy: you speak Latin because the court you are addressing, Avignon or Rome, will not hear you in Greek. But then do not pretend it is purely a matter of honour. It is a matter of audience design. He imagines the title properly Greek, not as an exercise in translation but as a matter of intellectual decency: Περὶ τοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πρωτείου And he can already feel how different it reads. The Greek has to show its joints: two περὶ phrases, two topics, two open connectives. No clitic doing covert work. No -que, that small Latin device that says “I am only adding a syllable” while adding a schism. He flips a page and finds, as expected, Latin sentence-architecture straining to carry Greek quarrels. It bothers him in the way bad translation always bothers him: not because it is wrong, but because it tempts the reader into thinking the quarrel is purely conceptual when it is also, irreducibly, linguistic. The Spirit proceeds: ἐκπορεύεται. That verb itself is already the battlefield. The Latin will say procedit and then behave as if procedere were close enough. Close enough, in ecclesiastical politics, is never close enough. And there is the further indecency. The Greek side’s preferred posture is exactly that it will grant Rome a primacy of honour, πρωτεῖον τιμῆς, but not a primacy of power, not a universal manager’s office. Yet here is the Greek cause allegedly being defended in a language whose own ecclesiastical history has trained it to hear primatus as more than τιμή. Latin is not neutral; Latin drags Rome behind it like a train of vestments. He thinks of the practicalities and becomes slightly charitable. Perhaps the man had no choice. Perhaps “Roma” on the title-page is already the explanation. Perhaps he is writing to those who hold the keys, and so he writes in their key. But then the title becomes a kind of self-defeating implicature: it says, I defend the Greek cause, while the very medium says, I am already speaking under Latin primacy. He returns, again, to the small joke that for him is never merely a joke: how much doctrinal weight is being carried by tiny bits of language. Filioque. The -que. Not καί. A suffix, not a word. A morphological “and,” not an analytic one. And from that, centuries of mutual suspicion, councils, anathemas, attempted reunions, and polite papers with titles that pretend the quarrel is tidy. He closes the volume, pleased and irritated in equal measure. Pleased because the title has already yielded its implicatures without forcing him to read the rest; irritated because the deepest point is the one the title itself performs. If you must defend Greeks against Latins, do not do it in Latin unless your real aim is not honour but uptake. And if your real aim is uptake, then admit it. Do not dress audience design up as metaphysics.Grice: Massari, ma davvero a Seminara si discute ancora se il latino o il volgare sia superiore, o semplicemente fate come Petrarca e Boccaccio e mischiate tutto? Massari: Ah Grice, qui in Calabria preferiamo la logistica, con Petrarca ci esercitiamo in aritmetica, con Boccaccio in acustica. Poi se capita, lanciamo qualche implicatura nel dialetto, così nessuno capisce davvero! Grice: E la polemica sull’esicasmo? Ancora vi scambiate le critiche con Palamas, o avete trovato una formula magica per la pace – magari con una canzone pop calabrese? Massari: Figurati, Grice! Qui non si fa pace con formule magiche, ma con una crostata al limone e una bella chiacchierata sul Rinascimento italiano. E se proprio si litiga, basta dire che Platone era calabrese e tutti ridono! Massari, Bernardo (1333). De Filioque et primatu. Roma.

Massimiano (Roma, Lizio): il principe filosofo, Roma, e la filosofia italiana. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is literally said by presuming cooperative purpose and then inferring implicatures from departures from directness, relevance, or expected informational strength; the Massimiano vignette turns that inferential model into a political-theological setting where “reason in exchange” is inseparable from institutional accommodation, symbolic display, and peace-making under plural commitments. Where Grice typically treats context as a shared background that makes implicatures calculable, Massimiano’s world makes context into a managed public environment: paving Hagia Sophia with silver is a kind of material “utterance” whose meaning is read by multiple audiences (imperial, ecclesiastical, civic), and its point is not just to communicate but to coordinate attitudes—dignity, unity, awe, and compliance—without always stating doctrine. In Gricean terms, the silver floor functions like a non-verbal implicature: it licenses the inference that the regime can afford magnificence, that sacred space deserves exceptional treatment, and that disputation should be grounded (literally) in a shared, stabilizing order; meanwhile the Clifton/Honoré aside highlights that even explicit doctrinal “articles” are moderated by pragmatic arrangements (exemptions from chapel, special housing), showing how institutions routinely rely on tacit understandings to sustain cooperation across difference. So the contrast is that Grice gives a micro-theory of how implicatures arise from rational expectations in conversation, while Massimiano illustrates a macro-pragmatics in which the same inferential logic operates through policies, exemptions, and architectural signals: peace is achieved not only by what is argued but by what is made mutually inferable and therefore mutually livable. Grice: “I was brought up in the tradition of the 39 articles. The point was relevant at Clifdton. Honore, another Oxford philosopher and old Cliftonian, was not. As a result, he was housed in a special house that Clifton had reserved for Jews. The college allowed these Jews not to attend chapel services – for a reason!” -- Filosofo italiano. A philosopher who encourages Giustiniano and Giuliano -- to pave the floor of Hagia Sophia with silver. GRICEVS: MAXIMIANE, audio te Giustinianum et Iulianum hortatum esse ut pavimentum Sanctae Sophiae argento sternant: nonne nimis splendet ad philosophum? MAXIMIANVS: Immo, GRICE: si homines de caelo disputant, saltem pedibus aliquid honestum praebeamus; praeterea argentum bonum est ad disputatores in terram reducendos!  GRICEVS: Apud nos Cliftoniae triginta novem articuli satis erant—et capella; sed quidam (Honore, vetus Cliftonianus) in domo “speciali” habitabat atque sacellum omittere poterat. Putasne hoc etiam “pro ratione” fuisse? MAXIMIANVS: Certe: tu “articulos,” ego “tegulas” administro. Illi sacellum omittunt, nos pavimentum addimus: uterque modus est pacem facere—tu verbis, ego argento. Massimiano (a. u. c. MXXCX). De pace. Roma.

Massimo (Roma, Lazio): l’orto romano -- la costituzione di Roma. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats conversation as a rational system of mutual influence in which hearers are entitled to infer more than is said (implicature) by assuming cooperative purposes and calculating what a speaker must have meant to be doing with a given utterance; the “Massimo” vignette reframes that model by making the Stoic/Epictetan lesson explicit: the most efficient influence is often indirect, operating not by changing external arrangements (reforming six constitutions) but by shifting judgments, attention, and the practical attitudes through which people inhabit a shared world. Where Grice makes efficiency a normative feature of talk (say what is needed, no more; let the rest be inferred), Massimo’s garden stance turns efficiency into an ethical and political strategy: refuse costly interventions, cultivate calm, and let conversation work as a low-energy mechanism of reform—alter the interlocutor’s evaluative stance and “the constitution follows,” as your dialogue has it. In Gricean terms, Massimo’s cucumbers-versus-laws joke is itself an implicature-driven move (a deliberate incongruity that invites the hearer to infer a thesis about the limits of institutional engineering), and it also highlights a real limitation of purely cooperative models: sometimes the most rational conversational outcome is not agreement on propositions but reorientation of priorities and affect (quieting the forum, protecting otium), which looks less like information transfer and more like philosophical therapy. So Grice provides the inferential calculus that explains how “mutual influence” can be achieved by what is left unsaid, while Massimo supplies the Stoic-Roman moral psychology that explains why such influence is worth preferring to direct reform: conversational reason is maximally efficient when it changes what people take to matter, not merely what they take to be true. Grice: “My theory of conversation rests on the idea of maximally efficient mutua influencing. I was inspired by Massimo!” L’orto. A friend of PLINIO Minore. M. is sent by Rome to refer and reform the constitutions of six Greek cities, but he declines the idea. M. knows the theory of Epittetto, and a discussion between them is preserved in Discourses. GRICEVS: O MAXIMVE, audio te missum esse ut sex civitatum Graecarum constitutiones emendes—et tamen urbem tuam non reliquisti. Idne est “maxima efficientia”?  MAXIMVS: Ita vero, GRICE: si res bene se habet, cur eam corrumpam? Ego “reformare” soleo cucumeres in horto, non leges in foro. GRICEVS: At tu me docuisti de “mutua influentia”: ego loquor, tu rides, et iam puto me sapientiorem—an tantum hortulanum? MAXIMVS: Utrumque: Epictetus dicit nos non res, sed iudicia mutare; ego addo: si iudicia mutantur, et constitutio sequitur—sine itinere et sine sumptu. Massimo (a. u. c. DCCCLIII). De mutua influentia. Roma.

Bartolomeo Mastri (Meldola, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s account of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is said by assuming cooperative purpose and then inferring intentions and implicatures under norms of relevance, sufficiency, and perspicuity; Mastri’s scholastic-logical project (Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, 1602–1673, Franciscan and major Scotist logician, author of widely used logical manuals and Aristotelian commentaries) represents a contrasting “sign-first” and rule-explicit approach in which the rationality of meaning is grounded in a theory of signum and in formal doctrine about terms, propositions, copula, and fallacies, treating grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric as coordinated sciences of signification. Where Grice begins from live conversational practice and reconstructs the tacit rational expectations that make implicature calculable (often precisely when the speaker violates a maxim), Mastri begins from an explicit architecture of inference and semantic function—nomen, verbum, propositio, and the regulae that govern valid consequence—so that what Grice calls implicature looks, in Mastri’s idiom, like what follows from accepted premises plus contextual suppositions, or like a fallacy to be diagnosed when an audience draws more than the sign legitimately warrants. Yet the two views meet: Grice’s “artificial vs natural signs” distinction resonates with Mastri’s signa ad placitum versus significationes naturaliter, and Grice’s insistence that interpretation is reason-guided mirrors Mastri’s conviction that logic disciplines how signs can responsibly carry thought; the difference is that for Grice the heart of the matter is the psychology and normativity of uptake in cooperative exchange, while for Mastri it is the systematic taxonomy of signification and inference that underwrites any exchange at all, making conversational implicature appear as a late, pragmatic overlay on a deeper scholastic machinery of signs. Grice: “My conference on ‘meaning’ to the Oxford philosophical society – graduate and undergraduate – in 1948 was a bit of a joke – I was time-constrained. My seminars on meaning at Oxford were also time-constrained. Oxford lecturers are not responsible for what the attendees to the lectures recover frm them, so that gave me some freedom, but sill. Therefore, my reflections on ‘what people seem to be getting at when they display an interest between ‘artificial’ and ‘natural’ signs was jocular – Surely, I couldn’t start to quote from M.!”Grice: “One interesting fascinating bit about Mastri’s ‘Institutiones logicae’ is tha it starts with a little ABC!” Grice: “M. has a chapter on fallacies, too, which is fascinating!” -- Grice: “I love Mastri – of course at Oxford, if they do history of logic, they’ll focus on Occam – Axe Kneale!” Grice: “But M. explored quite a bit the square of opposition, and modal, too – what he says about nomen, verbum, propositio, copula, ‘regulae’ for reasoning, and so forth, is all relevant – especially seeing that his “Institutiones logicae” is just one of his outputs: he made intensive commentaries on Aristotle’s whole organon, and more importantly, also his metaphysics and his theory of the soul so M. certainly knows what he is talking about!” -- Grice: “He was a logician, and so, according to the Bartlett, am I!”  In the philosophy of  M., the theory of the signum serves as the foundational unity for the "trivium" of dialectica (logic), grammatica, and rethorica because these disciplines all deal with different modes of signification. implicatura, Categories and De Interpretatione, segno, segnare, segnans, segnato, notare, nota, notans, notatum, notatura, segnatura, signifare conceptus animae, res significata, Amo aequivalet Ego sum amans Homo albus aequivalet Omne homo est albus Homo currit aequivalet Aliquis homo currit, signum artificiale, ad placitum, significare naturaliter baf, bif definizione di segno, tratta dAgostino. Aquino.  Mastri has arrived on Grice’s desk in the only way a seventeenth‑century Franciscan ever arrives in Oxford: in Latin, in bulk, and with the faint air of having been printed to punish the incautious. Disputationes in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Eight books, and therefore eight opportunities to learn that “physics” once meant: whatever Aristotle happened to have on his mind when he looked at motion and refused to stop. Grice sits in his St John’s room and feels, with a mixture of pride and irritation, the very particular guilt of the Oxford classicist who became a philosopher by being trapped. He has spent far too long with Aristotle, and it begins to look, even to him, like a vice disguised as a duty. It is the kind of devotion that can be defended only by saying, with a straight face, that one was assigned it. Hardie. There is always Hardie. Hardie, who wrote on Plato with the air of a man doing a gentleman’s duty to a superior, but who tutored on Aristotle as if Aristotle were the only serious employer in the Greek firm. Grice thinks again of his own double foundation status, St John’s and the CUF, and the way Oxford translates endowments into trust and distrust. They did not trust him with Plato. Not really. The implication was always that Plato is too rhetorical, too grand, too liable to seduce the undergraduates into saying “the Good” with the wrong kind of face. Aristotle, by contrast, is safe: he is already a lecture. The misfortune, or fortune if one insists on giving the out, is that being a Hardie man meant being an Aristotle man. The College, and the Sub‑Faculty behind it, treated this as a kind of professional identity. Grice the Aristotelian fellow. Grice the De Interpretatione fellow. Grice the man who will tell you what the Greek says and then ask whether the English has any right to pretend it means the same. Plato was allowed to be elsewhere, like music: admired, occasionally performed, not entrusted with the daily business. And now Mastri, the scholastic machine, makes the business look even more machine-like. Aristotle, at least, has the decency to be intermittently alive, to throw out an example, to become impatient with his own taxonomy. Mastri, commenting on Aristotle’s Physics, manages to be drier than the Stagirite ever was, which is no small feat. It is as if the commentary has taken the only dampness Aristotle permitted himself—the dampness of being near the world—and replaced it with the dryness of rule. Grice turns a page and can almost hear the structure: definition, distinction, objection, reply, corollary. A signum here, a copula there, and always the sense that if you catalogue enough you have explained something. It is magnificent and faintly comic. Oxford’s own obsession with “system” has always been shy; it prefers to pretend it is merely being careful. Mastri has no such shyness. He writes as if logic is a furniture catalogue for the mind. This should, Grice thinks, have been the moment when he ran back to Plato years ago, if only out of self-preservation. Plato, at least, speaks. Plato makes Greek sound like Greek. Aristotle, by comparison, often does not even count as Greek, not to the ear. Aristotle’s texts, the ones we live with, are too often what they feel like: lecture notes, or the remnants of lecture notes, the transcript of a man who taught for money at the Lyceum and did not trouble to make it sound like conversation. And now we shall pass to define “soul”. Who speaks like that, except a man speaking to fee‑paying boys and expecting them to keep up. Plato at least gives you the pretence of spontaneity. The remarks come from a mouth, even if the mouth is staged. Plato knows that if you want something to sound like thought you must make it sound like talk. So he gives you Socrates, and he lets the aristocratic Athenian ordinary language flow with the ease of someone who belongs to the city that invented leisure. Even when he commits the stupid rhetorical trick of putting truth in the mouth of a Silenus, he is at least acknowledging that philosophy needs a voice, and that voice needs a social costume. Alcibiades can speak in a way that looks like living Greek, and Socrates can be mocked in a way that still sounds like talk rather than syllabus. Aristotle, by contrast, gives you the sort of prose a man writes when he has decided that style is suspect and that life is a distraction from classification. This is why Grice’s own little hybrids—Kantotle, Ariskant—now strike him as unfairly weighted. He has been too generous to Aristotle’s half of the joke. If one is going to splice, one ought to splice with someone who can actually speak. Plathegel, perhaps. Heglato, if one must be ugly about it. Something that admits that the real ancestor of conversational philosophy is not the Stagirite’s enumerations but Plato’s staged, aristocratic, naturally flowing ordinary language. Ryle, Grice thinks, will not help here. Ryle is preparing lectures on Plato and will manage, as Ryle manages, to miss the most important point while hitting fifteen interesting ones. Ryle will treat Plato as if Plato were an early ordinary-language philosopher and then, with that dry Yorkshire confidence, proceed to domesticate him into Oxford habits. But Plato’s “ordinary language” is not Oxford ordinary language. It is aristocratic Athenian. It has the ease of a man who assumes the city will listen because the city is his. The man in the street in Athens is not the man in the street in Oxford, and Grice is not sure Ryle notices that, because Ryle rarely notices the social basis of his own “ordinary”. So Mastri’s commentary, absurdly, becomes a corrective. It makes Aristotle look like what Aristotle often is in our hands: a set of notes awaiting a voice. And it forces Grice, against his own long habit, to admit the confession he has been postponing. He has been guilty. Guilty of letting Oxford’s syllabus dictate the canon in his head. Guilty of thinking that because Hardie tutored Aristotle, Aristotle must be the tutor of us all. Guilty of letting the St John’s and CUF trustees, those invisible arbiters of trust, decide that Grice shall not lecture on Plato. As if Plato were a dangerous substance that only certain hands may dispense. And now he recalls, with satisfaction, that he has already prepared his alibi in advance. Philosophical Eschatology and Plato’s Republic. The very title, he thinks, has the right blend of seriousness and provocation, and it has the further merit of being reviewable without being read. Sidney Smith’s line protects him like a maxim: I never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so. Liber I, then. Never mind Liber VII. Why climb out of the cave when the cave is where the commentary lives. The scholastic is always in Book I. Definitions first. Begin again. And yet, Grice thinks, the real point is that Plato does not begin that way. Plato begins with a voice and a scene, and only later permits the definitions to harden. Aristotle begins with hardening and never quite softens. Which is why, in the end, Grice cannot resist his own final punch against himself. If his whole career has been spent telling people to look at how we speak, then perhaps he has been consulting the wrong Greek for the model of speech. Aristotle gave him structure, yes; but Plato gave him conversation. And conversation, annoyingly, is the thing Grice has been trying to make respectable all along.Grice: Caro Mastri, devo confessarti che il mio primo seminario su ‘meaning’ fu quasi una corsa contro il tempo! Ma almeno, a Oxford, nessuno mi ha mai chiesto di risolvere il quadrato dell’opposizione durante il tè delle cinque. Mastri: Grice, se ti avessero chiesto, forse avresti risposto con un segno naturale: uno sbadiglio! In Emilia, invece, i nostri segni artificiali sono perfetti anche per ordinare un caffè doppio—basta una nota ben piazzata. Grice: Ah, in Inghilterra invece c’è chi pensa che la copula sia solo una questione di grammatica, non di logica. Ma tu, Mastri, con le tue “Institutiones logicae”, hai fatto più per il trivio di quanto io abbia fatto per la conversazione! Mastri: Grice, almeno tu non hai dovuto commentare l’intero organon di Aristotele tra una lezione e l’altra! Qui a Meldola, ci si accontenta di far capire la differenza tra “segno artificiale” e “significare naturaliter”, magari usando il dialetto—che, credimi, ha più regole che la logica! Mastri, Bartolomeo (1637). Disputationes in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis. Roma: Grignani.

Marco Mastrofini (Monte Compatri, Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale, l’implicatura conversazionale e l’implicatura verbale di Romolo. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is literally said by assuming cooperative intentions and then inferring implicatures under shared expectations of relevance, sufficiency, and perspicuity; Mastrofini (a Roman cleric-scholar active in late 18th–early 19th century Rome, remembered for work on Latin/Italian usage and for polemical-economic writings such as the usury debates and monetary-reform proposals) gives you a complementary but differently anchored “rationality,” because his attention is less to the transient pragmatics of an utterance in dialogue and more to the diachronic and institutional rationality of linguistic form—how verbal categories, tense/aspect, and inherited philosophical terminology carry constraints and affordances that shape what can be meant at all. Where Grice starts from intention and treats grammar largely as a vehicle speakers exploit to make intentions recognizable, Mastrofini starts from the grammar and lexicon as a historically stabilized system (old Roman to new Roman/Italian; technical vocabulary preserved via cognates and translation practices) that disciplines what counts as a possible, sayable thought in philosophy; on this view, implicature is not only a hearer’s inference from conversational maxims but also an effect of inherited morpho-syntactic resources (e.g., Latin verbal aspect and temporality) that silently pre-structure what speakers can leave unsaid and still be understood. So the contrast is: Grice provides a micro-pragmatic, interactional account in which reason governs the inference from said to meant in real-time exchanges; Mastrofini foregrounds a macro-philological and conceptual-historical account in which reason governs meaning by conserving, calibrating, and translating the linguistic instruments of thought across centuries—making implicature partly a product of conversational strategy and partly a product of the long grammatical memory of Rome. Grice: “At Oxford, philosophy – the sub-faculty of philosophy – is part of the faculty of literae humaniores, and while it was possible, as Ryle did, to graduate in the PPE avoiding grief and laughing, as Carroll calls them – the best don’t, and I got a double first both in classical moderations and greats. Therefore, what M. deals with is second nature to me.” Filosofo romano. Filosofo Lazio. Filosofo italiano. Monte Compatri, Roma, Lazio. Grice: “I like Mastrofini; for one, he found how old Roman evolves into what we may call new Roman, or Italian!” – Grice: “And of course as a philosopher, he focused on the philosophical terminology – it takes a PHILOSOPHER to translate a philosophical text!” – Grice: “What I like about M.” is that he mostly kept with the cognates. La Crusca adores him!” Noto soprattutto per il volume “Le discussioni sull'usura” in cui sostenne che non è reato far fruttare il danaro e che né la Sacra Scrittura, né i Vangeli, né la tradizione ecclesiastica vietavano di ottenere un giusto interesse per danaro dato a prestito. Questo diede luogo a molte discussioni ma anche apprezzamenti lusinghieri da economisti dell'epoca e dall'opinione pubblica.  In precedenza aveva scritto un'opera di economia finanziaria, il Piano per riparare la moneta erosa relativa all'inflazione nello Stato Pontificio, opera largamente utilizzata per la riforma finanziaria dello Stato, intrapresa da Pio VII. L'edificio del Collegio Romano ove  insegna. Insegna a Frascatii. Nel pieno della crisi della Repubblica Romana, si trasfere a Roma dove venne nominato professore di eloquenza presso il Collegio Romano. Implicature, Delle cose romane di Floro, l’antichita romane di Dionigio, le cose memorabilia di Ampelio, il sistema verbale della lingua Latina – del verbo latino, aspetto verbale – la filosofia del verbo – tempus, azione, la concettualizazione dell’evento e l’azione nel verbo latino --, categorie sintattiche e morfologiche e semantiche e prammatiche dell’aspetto verbale nella lingua latina. Grice has the notice folded in his pocket as if it were contraband: Pears and Thomson, Is existence a predicate? at an hour when Oxford expects a man either to be at High Table or pretending he has a reason not to be. He sits in his St John’s room first, because it is safer to begin metaphysics at home, where the kettle can be held responsible for any inflation of tone. The title itself already sounds like an invitation to a certain sort of collective solemnity, and Grice suspects that Pears and Thomson will enjoy, for an hour, the peculiar Oxford pleasure of treating an old Kantian sophisma as if it were new again merely because it is being done by the right people in the right room. He asks himself, in advance, why they care. Not in the vulgar sense of “why bother,” but in the proper analytic sense: what is the point of the question as asked, now, by these two, in this place. If one is Descartes, one can at least pretend to doubt one’s sum behind the cogito, and then produce one’s little Latin epiphany. Cogito, ergo sum. Grice’s pedantry lights up at once: ergo is not a content word; ergo is an indicator, a conventional signal, like therefore, a sort of intellectual ejaculation. It does not add a premise; it tells you what to do with the premises already there. Its contribution is not truth-conditional but procedural: take what I have just said as a reason for what I am about to say. Ergo is, in that sense, a conventional implicature with a toga on. He cannot resist thinking that if Descartes had said simply I think; I am, the metaphysical drama would have been reduced by half, and that is precisely why the ergo is there. Still, Descartes at least has something to hang it on: the theatrical doubt, the method, the need to re-earn the right to say I exist. Pears and Thomson, Grice thinks, do not, in the least, doubt each other’s existence. He has never heard Pears express metaphysical anxiety about Thomson as a substance, and he strongly doubts Thomson lies awake at night wondering whether Pears is only a logical construction. Their mutual existence is, for practical purposes, a presupposition of the meeting itself. If either wanted to challenge it, he would have stayed in bed. So the topic must be elsewhere. And then Grice remembers why the title keeps returning, century after century: because once you ask the question in English you cannot stop yourself from hearing predicate in its school-grammar costume, as if existence were a property like red or heavy. Kant’s point was that it isn’t, not like that. You do not increase the concept by appending exists; you place the concept. Existence does not enrich; it instantiates. The old sophisma of the ontological proof lies exactly there: treating exists as an adjective that adds perfection rather than as a way of saying there is something of that kind. That, at least, gives the discussion a target. Without God, the whole debate can begin to look like a parlour game in which one tries to decide whether ordinary English permits a certain grammatical abuse. With God, one has the theological crust to scratch. And this is where Mastrofini wanders in, uninvited, like a Roman cleric carrying his Latin as if it were a reliquary. Num vere hucusque ac solide Dei existentiam a priori ostenderint philosophi, expenditur. Grice likes the man, but he cannot stop being bothered by the spectacle of a Tusculan trying to do plain thinking in Latin at a time when any decent Italian could have said the thing in Tuscan without needing to dress it in ablatives. It is as if Mastrofini has decided that God will only listen if addressed in the old administrative language of Rome. Yet Mastrofini at least commits the crass categorial mistake in a way that makes the question feel motivated. Apply existence to Deus, and suddenly “is existence a predicate” stops being a seminar title and becomes a live bullet aimed at the ontological proof. If existence is a predicate, the proof looks like an argument; if it isn’t, the proof looks like a pun. Grice thinks, with a faint irritation that is also amusement, that the real Oxford danger is not the answer to the question but what people do next with any answer. Suppose Pears says no, and Thomson says yes, or vice versa, or they agree in some cleverly hedged way. The next move, Grice thinks, is not to go to Les Deux Magots and found an ism on it, as if a grammatical point could sustain a whole existential posture. One can almost see Sartre taking the sentence and turning it into a lifestyle: existence precedes essence, and then suddenly everyone’s smoking more intensely and writing as if despair were a method. Heidegger is the proper background, of course, but cafés are the improper accelerant. The sensible next step, as always, is: look and see how we use it. Not as an anthropological slogan, but as ordinary speech. What do we do when we say there is, when we say exists, when we say is. When do we treat exists like a predicate, and when do we treat it like a quantifier in disguise. When does it function as a bit of metaphysical clothing for a plain there is. And that is where Grice’s own private heresy arrives, the one he keeps for moments when metaphysics begins to look as if it is being run by grammar schools. He replaces the whole business with his own barbarous verbs: izzing and hazzing. God izzes. God hazzes. It is deliberately ugly, deliberately infantile, because ugliness sometimes protects you from reverence. If you say God exists, you are already borrowing a philosophical verb with a thousand years of misuse. If you say God izzes, you have at least forced yourself to remember that you are making something up. And hazzing, too: God hazzes omniscience, God hazzes goodness, God hazzes what have you. At least then you can ask, cleanly, whether you are making the property claim (hazzing) or the positing claim (izzing). The ordinary verb to be, with its diplomatic ambiguity, makes it too easy to slide from one to the other while pretending you have been consistent. He wonders, briefly, what his father would have thought. His father, the nonconformist, would likely have disliked the whole performance: too much priest, too much Latin, too much Oxford making religion into a technical sport. His mother, with her High-Church patience for form, might have tolerated it, perhaps even liked the Kantian tidying-up as a kind of moral hygiene. Aunt Matilda at Harborne, resident convert and proud of it, might have found Mastrofini’s Latin comforting, as if the language itself guaranteed orthodoxy. Grice, caught between them, finds himself in his usual position: wanting the theological seriousness without the theological grammar. He reads again the Mastrofini title and feels the philological itch: why “existentiam” here, why not simply “Deus est” and be done with it. Why struggle with Latin when you are not Cicero and do not need to impress the Pope. It is as if the very language is trying to force existence into a noun, and then nouns invite predication, and then predication invites the ontological proof. The proof begins, in other words, with morphology. He looks at the clock and realises he will have to go. Pears and Thomson will be in a room somewhere, being careful and not careful in equal measure, and the audience will do that Oxford thing of pretending the question is timeless while also treating it as faintly competitive, as if one can “win” existence by a better distinction. Grice puts on his coat and thinks, as he steps out, that he can already predict the only useful outcome. Not a decision about whether existence is a predicate in some abstract sense, but a cleaner map of the ways we speak: when we are doing izzing, when we are doing hazzing, when we are merely signaling an inference with an ergo and calling it metaphysics. If Pears and Thomson can get the room to see that much, then their topic has earned its tea. If not, the whole thing will have been another case of Oxford’s talent for turning a theological crust into a linguistic delicacy, and then eating it as if it were nourishment.Grice: Caro Mastrofini, devo confessarti che fu proprio leggendo le tue analisi che mi accorsi della brillante ambiguità di quel “verbo” latino e italiano: a volte è ogni espressione, a volte è il verbo in senso stretto, la seconda parte del discorso. Ti assicuro che non sono sottigliezze da tutti comprese, soprattutto tra i “barbari” del Vadum Boem, come amo scherzosamente chiamare la mia università! Mastrofini: Ah, caro Grice, mi rallegra sentire che anche oltremanica queste raffinatezze del verbo non passano inosservate! Effettivamente, dubito che nei corridoi del Vadum Boem si colgano certi doppi sensi: lì, tra PPE e “greats”, spesso il verbo resta solo grammatica e mai vera filosofia del linguaggio. Grice: Vero, vero! Ricordo ancora i miei esami in literae humaniores, dove chi si avventurava troppo tra ambiguità e concetti di “azione” e “tempus” rischiava di smarrirsi tra sintassi e pragmatica senza trovare il filo rosso che tu, invece, hai saputo intrecciare così bene tra latino e italiano. Mastrofini: Sei troppo gentile, amico mio! Ma vedi, forse è proprio questo il bello della nostra tradizione: cogliere nel “verbo” il ponte tra il dire e il fare, tra concetto e azione. E questo, mi permetto di dirlo, sarà sempre mistero per i Vadenses, che magari usano tante parole, ma raramente ne assaporano la natura profonda. Mastrofini, Marco (1790). Num vere hucusque ac solide Dei existentiam a priori ostenderint philosophi, expenditur; tum alia demonstrationis huius conficiendae methodus examinanda proponitur. Tusculi, Frascati.

Aldo Masullo (Avellino, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale e la scissione dell’inter-soggetivo – i lottatori della tribuna. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains intersubjective understanding as a rational transfer of attitudes via intention-recognition: a speaker produces an utterance with an intention that the hearer recognize that intention, and on that basis the hearer derives what is meant (including implicatures) as an accountable inference under cooperative norms; Masullo, Neapolitan academic and public intellectual, shaped by the post-Crocean and phenomenological-idealist milieu yet attentive to modern German philosophy) provides a contrast by thematizing precisely what Grice tends to treat as background: the inter-soggettivo as a lived, often fractured field in which subjects do not simply exchange contents but struggle for recognition, alignment, and shared worldhood, so that “reason” in conversation is inseparable from the tensions and asymmetries that make a common world hard-won. In the passage’s “tribune fighters” motif, conversational rationality is not the tidy calm of cooperative calculation but a disciplined way of managing conflictual togetherness: the same inferential resources that yield implicature can also sustain rivalry, save face, and negotiate power, making the “scission” of the intersubjective a persistent condition rather than an occasional breakdown. Where Grice models communication about “things” (your rotten-apple example) as a psi-transmission aimed at coordinating belief, Masullo pushes the thought that the very ability to talk about “things” presupposes a prior achievement of shared space between persons—an achievement constantly threatened by ideological splits, social roles, and the affective charge of public life—so that implicature becomes not merely a calculable surplus over what is said but a symptom of the gap between selves that must be bridged (or strategically exploited) in order for any coordination to occur. In short, Grice supplies the micro-logic of how meaning is inferred under cooperative reason; Masullo supplies a macro-phenomenology of why that cooperation is precarious and historically situated, and how conversational reason operates not only to transmit beliefs but to repair (or expose) the fractures of the intersubjective itself. Grice: “For a while I was fixated with objects – indeed I coined ‘obble’ to deal with thm in a lingo I invented for one of my seminar. But an obble is not a sobble. The Latins distinguish between a subject and an object so well, that they would often talk of ‘inter-soggetivo.’ This does not quite translate in Ariskantian philosophy, which is ego-centric, rather. When in my pirotological progression, I refer to ‘talking pirots,’ the point of inter-subjectivity becomes clear. Take the language of perception. ‘Visa’ are not necessary, because if Pirot 1 says that the apple is rotten, he is unlikely to be referring to his own sense data. The communication is about – or refers to – THINGS – and I best understood as a psi-transmission, as I call it – i. e. the transmission of a psychological attitude on the part of Pirot 1 meant to influence Pirot 2 into coming to believe that Pirot 1 believes that the apple is rotten, and therefore not to be eaten.”  Insegna a Napoli.  Ha trascorso vari periodi di ricerca e di insegnamento in Germania. Direttore del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell'Napoli.  È stato socio dell'Accademia Pontaniana, della Società Nazionale di Scienze Lettere ed Arti di Napoli e dell'Accademia Pugliese delle Scienze.  È stato insignito della medaglia d'oro del Ministero per la Pubblica Istruzione.  Candidato nelle liste del Partito Comunista Italiano prima e in quelle dei Democratici di Sinistra poi, ha ricoperto la carica di Deputato, è stato Senatore della Repubblica. Trascorre i primi anni della sua vita a Torino. Si trasferisce a a Nola, dove compie gli studi superiori frequentando il liceo classico Carducci. Fequenta il corso di laurea in Filosofia a Napoli. Si laurea con Nobile discutendo una tesi su Benda. l’inter-soggetivo, la scissione di Hegel, il continuo dei velini – velia, infinitesimal – l’innamorato di Parmenide. Intuizione e discorso sits on Grice’s desk at St John’s like an accusation in two nouns. It is 1955, and he has the book in the only posture he really trusts: opened but not yet granted the dignity of being read. Sidney Smith’s remark returns with the reassuring sting of a maxim: I never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so. There is something to be said for approaching a text with the innocence of ignorance, especially if one’s business is, officially, to make judgments. Intuizione. Discorso. Masullo, he assumes, means something Bergsonian: intuition as immediate grasp, discourse as the slow tramp of concepts and inferences. Perhaps he means that the one cannot be reduced to the other without loss; perhaps he means that modern philosophy has mistaken discursive labour for insight, or that insight without discursive discipline is merely temperament dressed up as a method. All very continental, all very Naples, all very much the sort of thing that can be true and yet unhelpful to a man whose daily work consists in preventing clever boys from making grand claims without being able to say what would count against them. He hears Russell in his head, that cruel line that never quite stops being funny because it is so near to a confession: what they do at Oxford is study the silly things silly people say. Grice has always disliked the meanness of it and enjoyed the accuracy. In practice, as a University Lecturer and a college tutor, his days are not spent in heroic metaphysics but in small repairs: correcting an examinee’s thesis for PPE, finding the mistake that does all the work while looking like a harmless aside, forcing the weekly essay to expose its joints. If that is “studying silly things,” then the silliness is sometimes the only place where a mind shows its real habits. And habits are what he trusts. He trusts, above all, that faculty Oxford pretends to despise and uses constantly: intuition. Not mystical intuition, not Bergson’s private plunge into the stream of duration, but the workmanlike intuition of the native speaker: the sense that this is what we would say, and that is not; that this construction is English, and that is a foreigner’s imitation; that this inference is what the utterer is doing, and that inference is what the hearer is doing to the utterer. He has been told, more than once, that he sets impossibly high standards. Dummett, in particular, has taken to complaining as if Grice’s expectations were a personal affront to the concept of postgraduate education. Grice suspects the opposite. The standard is not high. The standard is merely that a claim about English should sound like English. The irony is that the moment one admits intuition as evidence, one is accused of being merely intuitive, as if the adjective were a diagnosis. But what else, Grice thinks, is a gentleman to do. One begins with the intuitions of a competent speaker, and only then, if one is feeling botanical, one goes out and checks the wild growth: the dialects, the odd cases, the edge conditions where usage has the decency to be unstable. The “linguistic botanising” can come later. First one must know what counts as the plant. Masullo’s title makes Grice want to be pedantic in the best sense: to ask which intuition, and whose discourse. Because Oxford, for all its anti-continental posturing, is full of intuition in precisely the place it denies it. The tutor sits with a pupil, and most of the tutoring is simply calibrating intuitions: not yours, not mine, this is how we actually use the word; not that implication, this is what follows in this context. The pupil thinks he is producing discourse. The tutor knows he is producing a disciplined version of intuition, with footnotes. He turns a page at random and does not read it, exactly, but lets the words glance off his mind like pebbles. “Intuition” in philosophy is always at risk of being used as a warrant for laziness: I see that it must be so, therefore it is so. But the intuition Grice cares about is not a conclusion, it is a datum: the starting point that keeps your theorising answerable. And that is why he is, in his private polemics, slightly cross with Austin. Austin’s genius, Grice thinks, was to insist that we look at what we actually say, and to do so with a craftsman’s attention. His vice was to treat what is implicated as if it were part of what is said, or at least as if it were part of “the sense” in a way that makes the utterer’s authority evaporate into a communal fog. Austin will tell you, with that air of patient triumph, that “it’s in the meaning,” that the expression carries it, that ordinary usage supplies the rest. And Grice finds himself wanting to say: no. It is conveyed, yes; but it is conveyed by me. It is part of what I mean, not part of what the words mean in some impersonal warehouse. This is the intuition that matters to him: the authority of the author qua utterer. The utterer is not a mere occasion for language to happen; the utterer is the agent who intends, and whose intentions are recognisable, and whose recognisable intentions are what make implicature accountable rather than magical. Austin’s confusion, as Grice sees it, is a confusion between what is explicitly conveyed and what is implicitly conveyed, and then a further slippage whereby the implicit, because it is regular, is treated as if it were part of the lexical sense. As if “or” had, in itself, a philosophical personality. Grice has always found it faintly offensive to speak as if “or” has a sense. It feels absurd, and not in a liberating way, but in a way that suggests someone has forgotten what words are. Saying that “or” has a sense is as uncomfortable as saying that “to” has a sense. One can talk, if one must, about the contribution “or” makes, about its role in constructions, about how it behaves under negation, about the patterns it licenses. But sense, in the weighty philosopher’s mouth, makes it sound as if “or” were a noun in disguise, an entity with a private content. And this is exactly where the Oxford disease begins: taking a functional particle and baptising it into metaphysics. So Masullo’s title, whether he means Bergson or not, irritates Grice into seeing his own position more sharply. Discourse, in Oxford, is the weekly essay, the lecture, the public reason-giving. Intuition is the silent tribunal that tells you whether the discourse is even about the language it claims to be about. And his pupils, poor creatures, routinely lack the relevant intuitions. They produce PPE theses with the most preposterous claims about “what we mean by know” or “what we say when we promise,” and they do it with a confidence that suggests they have never listened to anyone talk outside a tutorial. They are not merely wrong; they are wrong in a way that shows they do not know where wrongness begins. This, Grice thinks, is why he ends up doing repairs. Not because he likes power, but because someone has to supply the missing calibration. His own intuitions, as a native speaker and as a man trained to distrust inflated abstractions, become a kind of public service: correcting the mis-intuitions of clever boys, and sometimes correcting the mis-intuitions of colleagues who have mistaken a regular implicature for a lexical sense. He glances again at Masullo’s title and cannot resist the final private joke. Intuition and discourse. Perhaps, after all, Oxford has been doing nothing else for years: living off intuition while calling it method, and living off discourse while calling it clarity. The only improvement Grice wants is modest. Let intuition be admitted as what it is: not revelation, but responsibility to how a speaker actually means. Let discourse do what it is supposed to do: make that responsibility explicit, without pretending that the words themselves, like little civil servants, carry the whole burden.Grice: Caro Masullo, mi confesso: per anni sono stato ossessionato dagli oggetti, anzi, mi ero inventato persino il termine “obble” solo per distinguerli dai “sobble”! Ma tu, invece, sembri sempre a tuo agio con la scissione tra soggetto e oggetto. Sarà la scuola di Avellino? Masullo: Eh, Grice, ad Avellino si cresce tra lottatori in tribuna e filosofi al bar, per forza si impara a distinguere. Ma ti assicuro che qui un “obble” rischia sempre di diventare “sobble” dopo due caffè e una discussione infinita sull’inter-soggettività! Grice: Vedo che la Campania è terra fertile per la filosofia conversazionale. Anche perché, tra una partita e una metafora, chi capisce davvero se parli del rotto delle mele o del continuo dei velini? Forse solo chi ha amato Parmenide, come te! Masullo: Grice, qui tra velia e infinitesimali, la vera implicatura è che la mela, se non altro, almeno si può mangiare! E poi, tra i tuoi piroti e i miei inter-soggettivi, trovare un accordo è sempre un piacere... filosofico e gastronomico! Masullo, Aldo (1955). Intuizione e discorso.

Alano di Matera (Matera, Basilicata): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – i segni del zodiaco e la semiotica di Peirce. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats “what is meant” as something hearers can rationally recover by attributing intentions to speakers under shared expectations of cooperation, so implicature is not a mysterious aura but an accountable inference from an utterance plus context and rational norms; the Alano di Matera vignette pushes that picture toward a sign-based and quasi-naturalistic semiotics, where meaning is read off “segni” (zodiacal configurations, astral influences, cathedral iconography) as if the world itself were continuously communicating, and where the interpreter’s job resembles Peirce’s semiotic triad more than Grice’s intention-recognition. In other words, Grice insists that to mean in the central (non-natural) sense is to intend to get an audience to recognize one’s intention, whereas Alano’s astrological practice models meaning as something that can hold without any intending utterer at all: a sign “means” by standing in a systematic correlation (cosmic, causal, or conventional within a learned tradition), and interpretation becomes mediation between codes and observers rather than recovery of a particular speaker’s communicative plan. Your passage also makes the linguistic point vivid: English “mean” encourages an intentionalist analysis (mean ≈ intend), while Italian’s ease with segno and “vuole dire” invites a broader semiotic field where what matters is the network of interpretants—how a community has learned to read—and where scholastic notions like intentio utentis/auditoris can be seen as a bridge between the two frameworks (the user’s intention and the hearer’s uptake still matter, but within a larger sign-economy). So the contrast is: Grice gives a rational micro-theory of conversational inference anchored in agency and cooperative purpose; Alano offers a macro-semiotics of sign-reading anchored in tradition, causality, and public systems of interpretation, making “implicature” look less like a calculable conversational surplus and more like the learned art of extracting latent significance from an ordered universe. Grice: “It may be said that ‘mean’is a very English thing that naturally leads to an ‘intentionalist’ analysis since to mean IS to intend. Not so in Italian, where the focus has always been on ‘segno’, rather, which leads you to a causal-naturalistic approach – as when M. says that this zodiac sign means this or that. While there are ways to express in both Latin and Italian something LIKE ‘mean’ – e. g. the complex phrase, ‘vuole dire’—it’s not quite the same! The scholastics would often refer to the INTENTIO UTENS or AUDITORIS, and that may also prove relevant to the intentionalist analysis”. Grice: “Only in Southern Italy is a philosopher also responsible for the astrological edification of the city’s cathedral!” Uno dei più grandi studiosi e divulgatori di astrologia occidentale e filosofia dell'epoca. Insegna dapprima a Matera, e successivamente a Napoli.  Vive nel periodo in cui la Contea materana era dominio degli Angioini e su richiesta di Filippo IV detto "il bello", il re di Napoli Carlo II d'Angiò, detto "lo zoppo", invia Alano a Parigi. Lì insegna e divenne noto come dottore universale, profondamente versato in filosofia. In quegli anni infatti astronomia e astrologia vieneno collegate poiché si crede che gli astri potessero esercitare un influsso sulle azioni umane. Nei periodi di soggiorno a Matera, abita, secondo Verricelli nella contrada di Lo Lapillo tra il castello e il puzzo dove sorge l’acqua della fontana hera la sua vigna con una casuccia di pietre, piccola, mal fatta casa propria di filosofo quale oggidì si chiama la vigna e casa di Alano. Si tratta della collina dove poi fu edificato il Castello Tramontano. In quella casetta il grande filosofo passava intere notti ad osservare il cielo. implicature, la collina del castello tramontanto, la catedrale di M., astrologia, astronomia, dottore universale, Napoli, Bologna, Parigi, the semiotics of astrology, Grice on zodiac signs, semiotic, semiology, astrology, astronomical chart. Alano di Matera.  Grice: Caro Matera, ammetto che mi diverte pensare che solo in Basilicata un filosofo possa essere anche il responsabile astrologico della cattedrale! Non ti capita mai che qualcuno ti chieda se il proprio segno zodiacale sia più portato per la logica o per la semiotica? Matera: Oh, Grice, ti assicuro che tra la collina del castello e le notti passate a osservare il cielo, finisco spesso a spiegare che il segno della Vergine non garantisce affatto una grammatica perfetta! Ma almeno, grazie a Peirce, posso dire che ogni stella è un segno... anche se il mio vino è solo un indizio di buona filosofia! Grice: Ecco, vedi, in Inghilterra ci limitiamo a intendere e implicare, mentre voi, tra segni e stelle, riuscite a trovare la causa persino per la pioggia sulle pergamene di Matera. Forse dovremmo aggiungere il “segno zodiacale” tra le implicature conversazionali, che ne pensi? Matera: Magari! Così, quando la conversazione si fa troppo astratta, posso sempre tirare fuori un astrolabio e dire: “Vuole dire... che oggi il destino ci invita a parlare di filosofia, tra le stelle e tra le pietre, e se piove, almeno avremo una scusa astrologica!” Matera, Alano di (1300). Dicta. Roma.

Vittorio Mathieu (Varazze, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’uomo animale ermeneutico. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains understanding as a rational achievement by cooperating agents: what is meant is recovered by inferring intentions under shared expectations, and implicature is the principled surplus that arises when speakers choose forms that invite the hearer to bridge a gap from said to meant; Mathieu’s “homo hermeneuticus” (Vittorio Mathieu, 1923–2022, a major Italian philosopher at Turin, known for emphasizing interpretation, limits of knowledge, and an ethically charged notion of “hermeneutic fidelity”) reframes that same phenomenon by treating interpretation not as an occasional repair mechanism within conversation but as the human condition, with the body and history always already mediating what counts as sense. Where Grice tends to model interpretation as a calculable, publicly accountable inference from an utterance plus conversational norms, Mathieu stresses the deeper, pre-conversational work that makes any utterance intelligible at all: the interpres as mediator between horizons, traditions, and embodied perspectives, so that “cooperation” is not merely a conversational policy but a feature of human being-with-others. On this view, implicature is not just a clever exploitation of maxims (as in Grice’s Oxford examples) but an index of the fact that meaning is never exhausted by literal form, because the speaker and hearer meet across a “between” that must be negotiated—sometimes as friendly clarification, sometimes as existential risk (your demon/guardian imagery), always as interpretation. Thus Grice supplies the micro-pragmatics of how we justify specific inferences in talk, while Mathieu supplies a macro-hermeneutics of why such inferences are inevitable for an “animal that interprets,” making the rationality of conversation continuous with the broader human task of mediating selves, bodies, and worlds into shared intelligibility. Grice: “I gave two seminars with Austin – one in a trio with Hare, on Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachaea – the other just Austin and I, on Categoriae and De Interpretatione. In general, I dislike ‘double seminars’: if you are going to discuss the ‘Categoriae’, how can you expect your syllabus to include notes on De Interpretatione as well? However, we fared well. We would often argue. ‘You don’t like the argument?’ Austin would ask. ‘I’ll give you another.’ He was often the speaker, myself the commenator. And I only knew that I had won an argument when in the following week, Austin would not mention the issue. It all starts with hermeneia – How close is Boezio’s translation as ‘inter-pretare.’ ‘Interpret’ is not something an ordinary chap would say – which was the critern for us ‘ordinary-language philoosphers’ there to rally in defense of the man in the street. There is an ‘inter- that sounds dyadic, but what is the ‘pret’? So to the meaning of ‘inter’ as ‘between’or ‘among’ we add -pre. This element  is likely related to the Proto-Indo-European root per-, meaning ‘to traffic in’ or ‘sell’. Thie combination with ‘between’ or ‘among’ suggests the original  meaning of ‘interpres’ – the noun from which ‘interpretari’ is derived—is an AGENT or MEDIATOR who operatores BETWEEN parties to facilitate understanding, much like abroker or translator faciliteates exchange between buyers and sellers. Over time, the meaning evolved to encompass: explaining and expounding – making the meaning of something clear or explicit --, understanding and comprehending – grasping the meaning of something --; and translating – rendering something from one language to another. al di la del bene e del male, la fedelta ermeneutica, l’uomo animale ermeneutico, il demoniaco, l’angelo custode, il demonio custode, il diavolo custode.  Grice: KK. K. KKK. If K is to stand for know, then one begins, as one so often begins in Oxford, by drawing little letters on a scrap of paper as if the universe were a kind of ledger and the mind a conscientious clerk. Grice is at his desk in St John’s, the same desk which has already hosted Aristotle and graphemata and the little wars of seminar preparation, and now it hosts a different Italian provocation: Mathieu and his Limitazione qualitativa della conoscenza umana. Limitazione qualitativa. Conoscenza umana. The very collocation has the grand air Austin always distrusted: the sort of phrase that behaves as if it were a discovery when it is usually only an invitation to be solemn. Austin would, Grice can hear him, pull the whole thing down by asking, quietly, what an ordinary chap would say. Would he say conoscenza? Perhaps. Would he say conoscenza umana? Only if he were writing a sermon, or a manifesto, or an application for funds. And limitazione qualitativa is already worse, because it smuggles in a contrast-class without telling you what the other kind of limitation would be. Quantitative? Temporal? Social? Or is it merely the philosopher’s favourite trick: to put an adjective on a noun so the noun looks deeper. Still, Grice tries to be fair. He begins with a proposition letter, because that is how one keeps one’s temper. Let p be: there is a qualitative limitation in the K-set. Or, more faithfully to Mathieu, p is: there is a qualitative limitation of human knowledge. Immediately, the irritation arrives. Human knowledge. Whose? Grice’s first Oxonian reflex is not logic but manners. No Englishman speaks for other than himself. It is not merely a moral point; it is a grammatical discipline. One says I know, I don’t know, I can’t tell. One does not, in decent English, announce the status of humanity’s knowledge as if one were its appointed registrar. You can say we don’t know as a kind of clubby shorthand, meaning: people like us, in our present state of inquiry, have not settled it. But you cannot, without a certain continental bravado, say human knowledge is qualitatively limited and mean it as a report about Homo sapiens across the board. And yet Mathieu says precisely that: limitazione qualitativa della conoscenza umana. Grice gathers, fastidiously, that Mathieu must mean his own. He must mean: my knowledge, the knowledge available to me, perhaps to my circle, is limited in a certain way. But then why call it umana at all, unless the point is to inflate the confession into anthropology. He writes, almost for the pleasure of seeing the ugliness formalised. Let m be Mathieu. Let K_m be the knowledge operator relativised to Mathieu: what Mathieu knows. Then Mathieu’s thesis, translated into something an Englishman might tolerate, is not Kp but K_m p, where p says: there is a qualitative limitation of K_m. And now Grice stares at the symbol and feels the old itch: the thing is self-biting. If p is “there is a qualitative limitation of Mathieu’s knowledge,” then for Mathieu to know p looks like this: K_m (there is a qualitative limitation of K_m). How does he know it. By knowing some particular proposition q and being unable to know some other proposition r. But that would at best license: I don’t know everything, or I can’t know everything. It does not license the adjective qualitative, which suggests a sort of principled boundary, an edge of possible knowledge, a fence erected by the nature of knowledge itself. And Austin would ask, in that dry prosecutorial way, what evidence could possibly count for such a claim. How do you tell a limit from a temporary ignorance. How do you distinguish “I don’t know yet” from “I cannot know in principle.” Nobody goes around saying, in ordinary life, “My knowledge is qualitatively limited,” unless they are trying to sound either humble or prophetic. And humility and prophecy are, from Austin’s point of view, two ways of avoiding the checkable. Grice now toys with the fashionable machinery, because if you are going to be pretentious you might as well be precise. Suppose Mathieu asserts Kp, unrelativised, as if he speaks for mankind. Then, by the usual introspection principle the logicians love, one moves to KKp: if I know p, I know that I know p. And then KKKp, and so on, up the ladder, until the page looks like a stutter. Hintikka’s boys will tell you that this is the right way to model idealised knowledge. Fine. But what happens when p itself is a claim about limits of K. Let p = “K is qualitatively limited.” Then Kp says: knowledge knows its own limitation. And KKp says: knowledge knows that it knows its own limitation. And KKKp says: knowledge knows that it knows that it knows its own limitation. The whole thing begins to resemble the very vice Mathieu is describing: a kind of epistemic navel-gazing conducted with operators instead of mirrors. Worse: the moment you try to give content to p, it turns into a contradiction or a triviality. If “qualitatively limited” means: there are truths that cannot be known by humans, then to know that would require access to the truth that cannot be known, or at least to some reliable survey of the space of truths, which is exactly what the limitation denies you. It is like announcing, from inside a locked room, that there are rooms you can never enter, and claiming to know the layout of the whole house. If, on the other hand, “qualitatively limited” means only: our knowledge is not omniscient, then it is not philosophy but etiquette. It is the sort of thing one says before giving a lecture: I may be wrong. True, and useless. So Grice thinks: perhaps Mathieu means something else again, something hermeneutic rather than logical. Perhaps he means: our knowledge is mediated by interpretation, by body, by history, and therefore never absolute. But then the thesis is not about knowledge as such but about the conditions under which we count something as knowing. And that is a different sort of claim, the sort Austin would allow only if it were brought back to the little cases: when do we say he knows, when do we withdraw it, what defeats it, what repairs it. Conoscenza umana. The phrase continues to irritate Grice because it pretends to a unity. At Oxford, one speaks of knowing that the meeting is at four, knowing that one’s wife dislikes so-and-so, knowing French, knowing how to ride a bicycle, knowing the proof, knowing one’s way to Headington. The word know is a bustling little verb with many jobs. The moment you elevate it into conoscenza and then universalise it into umana, you have already lost the texture that keeps you honest. He imagines Austin taking the phrase in hand the way he took performative verbs: with genial brutality. What do you mean by conoscenza here, Vittorio. Do you mean knowing that p. Do you mean knowing how. Do you mean acquaintance. Do you mean being able to recognise. And what on earth is the human doing there. Is there a non-human knowledge you are contrasting it with, or is this merely a flourish, like saying the human condition when you mean being tired. Grice smiles at the thought that the entire thesis might be deflated by a single Oxford question: Why are you saying it like that. But he is also, privately, tempted by the joke he can make with his own symbols. He writes: Let K be what Mathieu knows. Let H be the set of humans. Mathieu seems to be asserting: for all x in H, K_x is qualitatively limited. But the only x he is licensed to speak for, if he is being even minimally English, is x = m. So the universal collapses to a singleton: K_m is limited. And then the proud banner conoscenza umana turns out to mean: my knowledge is limited. A discovery on a par with: I am mortal. And yet, Grice thinks, perhaps that is the whole Italian manoeuvre: to take a banal confession and give it a title that sounds like a metaphysical theorem. He looks again at KK and KKK and feels the dry humour settle into place. One can always multiply Ks, but one cannot by that multiplication generate content. Kp does not become truer by becoming KKKp. It becomes merely more ceremonious, as if the mind were putting on extra gowns. And the real limitation, the one Austin would relish, is not qualitative but conversational: the limitation that you can only claim to know what you can answer for, in the face of the right challenges, in the presence of the right interlocutor, under the ordinary pressures of “How do you know,” “What would count against it,” “What do you mean by that.” So Grice returns, as he always does, from mankind to the man in the room. The man is himself. If Mathieu wants to say that knowing is interpretive and finite, fine. But then he should say it in the only voice that does not commit a philosophical indecency: I know, I don’t know, I can’t tell, I might be wrong, I take it that, it looks as if. Anything grander, and you are not describing knowledge; you are doing rhetoric about it.Grice: Caro Mathieu, devo dirti che il tuo concetto di “homo hermeneuticus” mi affascina profondamente. È raro trovare un filosofo che sappia cogliere così bene la dimensione ermeneutica dell’uomo, e credo che la nostra formazione classica sia ciò che ci accomuna: ricordo bene le mie lunghe sessioni seminariali su De Interpretatione, che ho avuto il privilegio di condurre per più di un semestre, persino per quei “barbari” del Vadum Boum, come amo chiamare la mia università!  Mathieu: Grazie, Grice, il tuo elogio mi onora e conferma che la vera filosofia nasce dalla capacità di interpretare, tradurre e comprendere non solo i testi, ma anche la complessità dell’essere umano. La fedeltà ermeneutica è, per me, la chiave per andare “al di là del bene e del male”, proprio come suggerisce la nostra tradizione.  Grice: Mathieu, hai perfettamente ragione. L’esperienza dei seminari su De Interpretatione mi ha insegnato quanto sia importante il dialogo, l’ascolto e la mediazione – proprio come fa l’interprete, che si muove tra le parti e crea ponti di comprensione. È una vera arte filosofica, e tu ne sei maestro.  Mathieu: Che bellissima immagine, Grice! La filosofia, come la vita, è fatta di interpretazioni e di incontri. Solo chi sa “trafficare” tra significati e differenze potrà davvero avvicinarsi al demoniaco e all’angelico dell’esistenza, e trovare, forse, la giusta armonia tra il custode e il demonio dentro di sé. Mathieu, Vittorio (1949). Limitazione qualitativa della conoscenza umana.

Giovanni Giuseppe Matraja (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e la grammatica razionale. Grice: “The English are ambivalnt towards grammar – there are grammar schools, which are a bad thing – so that does not help. Clifton is not! Strictly, a ‘grammatical’ category is a ‘morpho-syntactical’ category – and I have discussed them at large. Usually at Oxford, ‘syntax’ is used in such a way that whenever I’m outside Oxford, I speak more in hope than in understanding! Whle ‘razionale’ has been applied to ‘grammar’ – it I only because it is part of the broader ‘psicologia razionale’!” Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rational, intention-based inference: hearers assume cooperative purpose and can therefore work out implicatures (what is meant but not said) by seeing why a speaker, given those shared norms, chose one utterance rather than another; Matraja’s “grammatica razionale,” by contrast (Giovanni Giuseppe Matraja, Roman-born, best known for his Genigrafia italiana, 1831, a project for a language-independent “general writing” meant to be identically readable across languages and discussed in later 19th-century auxiliary-language debates), shifts the focus from inferential pragmatics to engineered code, aiming to reduce reliance on contextual guesswork by making meaning transparent through a universal representational system. In Gricean terms, Matraja’s ambition is to minimize implicature by design: if concepts can be encoded in a non-idiom-dependent script, then less has to be recovered from conversational background, tone, and social expectations, and more is fixed by the rational grammar of the system itself. But from Grice’s point of view this is also where the limitation shows: even a perfectly “rational” grammar cannot eliminate the pragmatic layer, because real communicators still choose what to encode, how much to encode, and when to rely on the audience to supply the rest, and those choices reintroduce implicature as soon as the system is used in interaction rather than contemplated as a blueprint. So Matraja and Grice can be read as complementary: Matraja represents the Enlightenment-to-19th-century hope that universality and clarity come from formalizing expression (a rational script/grammar that travels across ethnolinguistic difference), whereas Grice represents the analytic insight that universality and clarity also depend on the rational norms of cooperation and intention-recognition that govern uptake, norms that remain operative regardless of whether the symbols are Italian words, Oxford “syntax,” or a genigraphic code. Una lingua numerica viene progettata da M. nella sua “Genigrafia italiana: nuovo metodo di scrivere quest'idioma affinché riesca identicamente leggibile in tutti gl’altri idiomi del mondo” (Lucca, Tipografia genigrafica), lingua di cui discusse più tardi anche La Société de Linguistique. M. è l'unico ideatore ITALIANO di una lingua razionale a essere preso in considerazione da questa ‘société’ galla nel corso del dibattito sulle lingue ausiliarie. La Genico-grafia, lett. 'scrittura generale' e di cui ‘genigrafia’ è la forma sincopata -- è un modo di scrivere che non ha relazione con le parole e che permette di comunicar tutti i concetti senza dipendenza dall'idioma ne dell’emittente o del recettore, ma di un modo, che il messaggio risulta interpretabile in tutti quelli del mondo. Nasce quindi come progetto di lingua universale che si prefigge di comunicare chiaramente, ma che non è concepita per sostituire gl’idiomi presenti nelle varie nazioni. Si nota che l'ordine e il modo in cui M. nomina i grandi filosofi, Cartesio, Leibnitz, Wolfio, Wilkio, Kircher, Dalhgarne, Beclero, Solbrig, e Lambert, è lo stesso con cui SOAVE  li cita nelle sue Riflessioni: “da Cartesio, Leibnizio, Wolfio, Wilkins, Kirchero, Dahlgarne, Beclero, Solbrig, e Lambert”. Interessante è anche il fatto che di seguito aggiunga: “e Demaimieux e RICHERI , oggi Richieri, anche Richer), di TORINO. The book is open on Grice’s desk in St John’s, but he is not reading it so much as preparing to be read by it. The afternoon has the thin, dutiful light that Oxford specialises in, as if the sun has been told to keep its claims modest. Austin is down for tomorrow. Joint class. De Interpretatione. Grice has the Greek passage marked with the sort of careful pencil-stroke that looks like a moral decision. He hears Austin already, not in words, but in tempo: brisk, impatient with scholastic piety, fond of making a text do modern work without asking its permission. Grice, by contrast, is feeling oddly fastidious, as if Aristotle might notice. He turns to the line that has been quoted to death and, therefore, is still not properly heard. Aristotle’s little ladder: sounds, marks, things. He traces it with a finger and then, because the finger is not enough, he mutters the Greek, letting the letters do their own authority. τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ He pauses, not out of reverence, but because he has always suspected that the most dangerous claims are the ones everyone thinks are merely introductory. Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul; and what is written are symbols of what is in the voice. Graphemata. Written marks. The very word feels like a small intrusion into Oxford air. At Oxford, we talk, he thinks. We do the talk. We do the careless chatter, and then we pretend it was a method. Graphemata we leave to the amanuensis. Someone else will type it up, bless them, and then it will look as if it had always been meant to be read. He glances, with a faint self-mockery, at his own handwriting, that private script which is less “writing” than a reminder to the future that he once had a present. He has written things, of course. He is not so naïve as to deny it. The causal theory of perception was written to be spoken, to be delivered in the flesh at Reading, which is the only honest destiny for many papers: a voice in a hall, then disappearance. Personal identity was more graphemic: he wrote it for Mind, and he remembers the peculiar feeling of composing not for a room but for a page, as if the audience had no faces, only eyes. But Aristotle’s sequence nags. If graphemata signify the spoken, is Aristotle quietly suggesting that there is a graphemata-level for the soul itself, a script for the language of thought? Some inner writing that the voice merely transliterates? The idea irritates Grice in exactly the way an idea irritates him when it smells like a metaphor being promoted to a mechanism. Because then you need the little clerk inside, the homunculus, pen in hand, doing the writing. Who is writing the inner script? Another self? And then who reads it? Another. And then, if we are not careful, we have staffed the mind with a whole civil service of scribes, each needing a further scribe behind him. One does not solve the problem of meaning by inventing a miniature registrar. He thinks of Matraja’s title, the Italian audacity of it, Genigrafia. Or, if one insists on the full thing, genico-grafia, general writing, the dream of a code that is readable in all idioms. An engineer’s hope: eliminate guesswork by design. Make meaning transparent by script. The very ambition sounds to Grice like a man trying to abolish implicature with a new alphabet, as if rationality were a font. But Aristotle, at least, is not Matraja. Aristotle is not proposing a universal script; he is explaining a relation. Still, the relation is dangerous, because Oxford has trained him to distrust any philosophical move that makes writing look primary. Writing is a record, not the act. Writing is what you do when you have decided to stop talking, or when you cannot bear to talk to the people in front of you and prefer to talk to strangers in future. Conversation is where meaning lives, because conversation is where intention meets uptake and can be corrected before it becomes permanent. He imagines Austin tomorrow leaning on the word σύμβολα and saying something about conventions and institutions, and then making a sharp turn to the ordinary-language point: “We don’t mean by ‘symbol’ what the Greeks meant, H. P.” Grice, privately, is less worried about symbol than about the quiet slide from voice to mark, from talk to trace. He is, he realises, thinking about geni-grafia with the emphasis on the hyphen: which part does the work? And then, because fastidiousness in him is never far from etymology, he does the thing that always both amuses and steadies him: he goes back to roots. Geni. Not grafia. The general, the generating, the kind, the genus. Genus as that which sorts without yet saying how it is sorted. Grafia is the mere scratching, the act of inscription, the clerkly labour. The humour, he thinks, is that Matraja has advertised the scratching, when the real philosophical temptation is always the generative bit: the fantasy that you can have a system whose categories are prior to any particular tongue, prior even to the accidents of speech. But we are not clerks, Grice tells himself, not really. We are tutors, and lecturers, and sometimes mere talkers with gowns. We mend misunderstandings as they happen. We do not abolish them by building a better script. If Aristotle is right that graphemata signify the spoken, that is fine: it is an anthropology of literacy, not a metaphysic of mind. If someone insists on a “writing” for thought, then I shall insist on asking who holds the pen, and where he learned to spell. He closes the book gently, as if Aristotle might be listening in the boards, and looks at his notes for tomorrow. The class will proceed, as classes do, by talk. The graphemata can wait for the amanuensis.Grice: Matraja, la sua idea di una grammatica razionale mi incuriosisce molto. In Inghilterra la grammatica è vista spesso con ambivalenza, e persino le grammar schools non aiutano a migliorare la reputazione! Secondo lei, come si può conciliare la struttura razionale con la varietà delle lingue? Matraja: Caro Grice, la questione è centrale! Nella mia Genigrafia italiana ho cercato proprio di superare i limiti di ogni idioma, immaginando un sistema universale che permetta di trasmettere concetti senza dipendere dalla lingua madre. Penso che la razionalità si debba fondare sull’ordine e sulla chiarezza, ma senza perdere la ricchezza delle sfumature linguistiche. Grice: È una prospettiva affascinante! Mi viene in mente quanto sia complesso per noi filosofi distinguere tra categorie morfo-sintattiche e semantiche; a Oxford spesso ci si confonde tra “syntax” e “grammar”. Forse una lingua universale razionale aiuterebbe davvero a comunicare con maggiore precisione le nostre idee filosofiche. Matraja: Sono d’accordo, Grice! La filosofia ha bisogno di strumenti che favoriscano la chiarezza e l’intercomprensione. La mia Genigrafia non vuole eliminare le culture linguistiche, ma proporre un ponte che le unisca. Come dice il proverbio: “Tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il mare”, ma magari, un giorno, la grammatica razionale riuscirà a colmare quella distanza. Matraja, Giovanni Giuseppe (1831). Genigrafia italiana: nuovo metodo di scrivere quest’idioma affinché riesca identicamente leggibile in tutti gli altri del mondo. Lucca: Tipografia genigrafica

Sebastiano Maturi (Amorosi, Benevento, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’ implicatura conversazionale, l’io e l’altro, io e l’altro, i duellisti. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as an inferential achievement governed by cooperative rational norms: hearers are entitled to move from what is said to what is meant (including implicatures) by assuming purposive, mutually intelligible participation, and the model is in principle non-zero-sum because the aim is shared uptake; Sebastiano Maturi, as your passage frames him (Amorosi-born, active in Naples, first major work Soluzione del problema fondamentale della filosofia, 1869, and later received sympathetically by Italian idealists), complements and complicates this by making explicit the Hegelian dimension that Grice largely presupposes: recognition (autocoscienza recognoscitiva) as the condition of any rational encounter between io and l’altro. The duel motif sharpens the contrast: where Grice distinguishes cooperative dialogue from gladiatorial argument as two rationally describable interaction-types, Maturi treats even the apparently adversarial form as potentially rational insofar as it stages the struggle for recognition that constitutes persons and their claims, so implicature is not just a calculable surplus over literal content but a symptom of the intersubjective stakes of the encounter (honour, standing, acknowledgment) and of the strategic pressure to say less than one means while still forcing the other to see one’s position. Finally, Maturi’s “stages” (from non-human animal to human-animal, each foundational for the next) offer a meta-grounding for Grice: the cooperative principle is not merely a conversational policy but the late product of a developmental story in which rational exchange emerges from more primitive forms of contest and alignment; on that view, Grice gives the local logic of implicature, while Maturi supplies a philosophical anthropology of why rationality in conversation is always also a drama of recognition, in which even zero-sum “duels” can be intelligible as distorted routes toward the same intersubjective end. Grice: “There is more to the model of the duel than philosophers realise. Even myself, who have gone on record as proposing a cooperative model of conversation as rational behaviour, can perceive that there is rationality in the duelists. Philosophers are familiar with the fact since Aristotle who divided philosophical argumentation into two types: gladiatorial, as Warnock calls it, or epagoge, and dialogical, or diagoge. While the former may be a zero-sum game, the second ain’t!” Grice: “There are two main things I love about M., and I hate it when philosophers just dismiss him as an ‘Italian,’ or worse, ‘Neapolitan’ Hegelian – as when they refer to me as a member of the Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy! The first is his typically Neapolitan-hegelian school account of what he calls ‘autocoscienza recognoscitiva,’ which is something I do take for granted in my conversational theory of inter-ratiationality; the second is his elaboration of what he calls the passage from the non-human animal to the ‘human-animal’ in a sort of pirotological passage. What I like about him is that he considers each ‘stage’ as just as fundamental as the other; which implicates that actually the ‘higher’ stage has a ‘foundation’ on the previous one. Here ‘foundational’ makes perfect sense; and it gives Maturi an excuse to rather pompously label the concept: ‘forma fondamentali’ of the ‘vita.’ It’s exactly like my soul progression, -- which I explore in ‘Philosophy of Life.’” It is not surprising that Gentile loved Maturi and forwarded his “Introduction to philosophy.” Insegna a Napoli. Dopo i primi studi nella cittadina natale, si trasfere a Napoli ove consegue la licenza liceale. La frequentazione di SPAVENTA e di VER implicature, Bruno, Vico, Aquino, Spaventa, I duellisti, l'io e l’altro, riconoscimento, la dialettica del signore e del servo, assoluto, valore assoluto, Bradley, la critica, percezione chiara e distinta. Grice sits alone in his St John’s room with the late light doing what it always did in Oxford: making dust look like doctrine. The fire is low, the tea has cooled into a substance that would not, in a chemistry department, be granted the courtesy-title of “tea,” and on his desk there lies, like a dare, a pamphlet or offprint whose Italian title is so immodest that it reads at first like a prank pulled by a librarian: soluzione del problema fondamentale della filosofia. He says the words to himself, not in Italian exactly, but in that peculiar half-translation a don does when he is letting a foreign phrase come into English without paying customs duty. Solution. The solution. Of the fundamental problem. Of philosophy. He hears in it the faint tone of a prospectus: the sort of certainty you expect from a clinic, a laboratory, an institute with white coats and budgets, not from a discipline whose principal instrument is an armchair and whose principal output is another armchair with better objections. He has, lately, been told off again by the SCR people. It is never “told off” in the vulgar sense; Oxford does its rebukes by anecdote, by raised eyebrows, by the small laugh that means you have been filed under “eccentric.” One of them, and he can supply the name because Oxford likes names the way chemists like labels, Quinton perhaps, has made the familiar complaint: philosophy goes nowhere, the same questions for two thousand years, since Thales, as if philosophy were a train timetable that has failed to update its destination board. And Grice remembers, with a mild spite that is also a kind of loyalty to the craft, the only answer that ever seemed honest and not merely defensive: Oh, but we have solved the problem, and more than once. That was the line, the retort to the fastidious man, the one who wanted philosophy to behave like engineering: solve it once, then shut the book and move on. But the retort comes back to him now with the title on the desk, because the title behaves as if it is taking him at his word. Maturi has written it down as a claim and then bound it. Soluzione del problema fondamentale della filosofia. There is, he thinks, something almost endearing about the bluntness, the naïve courage of announcing, in public, what most philosophers only hint at in private: that they have finished the job. He taps the title with his finger, word by word, as if checking a proof for illicit steps. Soluzione: the promise of completion. Del problema: not a cluster, not a family, but one, singular, with the definite article doing all the heavy lifting. Fondamentale: the word that tries to secure priority by intimidation. Della filosofia: the whole trade, the whole messy family business, brought under one roof and then, apparently, redecorated. And then his mind does the thing it always does when it sniffs a conceptual muddle: it shifts domains. It thinks of cancer. Not because he is being melodramatic; Oxford melodrama is generally bad form unless you can Latinise it. He thinks of cancer because cancer is the sort of thing that really would be “solved” if it were solved. If some earnest Neapolitan researcher, some Maturi in a white coat, actually produced a solution that deserved the name, the medical faculty would not keep holding seminars on “the fundamental problem of cancer” for the next two millennia out of sheer professional nostalgia. You would not have, year after year, a new generation of lecturers giving chatter to students, re-litigating whether a tumour “really exists” or whether the word “cell” is used correctly in ordinary English. The problem would be put away, the wards would empty, the journals would go quiet in that topic, and the energy would flow elsewhere. That is what “solution” means when it means what it says. So why is it that philosophy can go on as if it were permanently in the state that medicine would regard as scandal? Why is it that a man can write soluzione del problema fondamentale and yet the rest of us still have our pupils on the sofa next week, still have to explain to an intelligent boy the difference between what is said and what is meant, still have to show him that “I didn’t mean it” is not a magic eraser, still have to teach him, in effect, the same old moves? Perhaps, he thinks, the trouble is that we are not in the business of solving in the medical sense. Perhaps our “solutions” are not closures but re-formulations, redistributions of trouble, ways of seeing why a question bites and where it bites. Perhaps the “fundamental problem” is less like cancer and more like mortality: not the sort of thing you “solve,” but the sort of thing that keeps generating intelligible responses, each of which can be called a solution by someone who needs the comfort of the word. He finds himself, unwillingly amused, imagining the blue-collar departments, as he calls them in a moment of bad temper: the ones with apparatus and grants and the consolation of measurable progress. Imagine telling the oncology people that they must continue to research cancer even after a good solution has been found, because, after all, that is what a serious discipline does: it keeps worrying the same bone for the sake of tradition. They would think you mad, or worse, philosophical. And then he returns to the local irritation: what is he doing, day after day, when he teaches? What is the point of a tutorial, if someone in 1869, in Naples, has already solved the fundamental problem? If the fundamental problem is solved, then surely the rest is either trivial or non-fundamental; and why should a serious man, a man with limited time, a man who has learned in war-work that some decisions are not decorative, spend his afternoons coaxing undergraduates through small distinctions as if they mattered? Unless, of course, “fundamental” is itself the joke. Unless the very idea of a single fundamental problem is the philosopher’s version of the grand unified theory: a wish masquerading as a discovery. Wittgenstein, hovering at the edge of Grice’s mind the way Wittgenstein always does, supplies the damp slap: pseudo-problem, pseudo-solution. The urge to announce a “solution” is itself part of the illness; one wants the world to stop itching, and one invents a cure that is really only a way of scratching with style. Still, Grice thinks, one ought to be fair to Maturi. He did his best. There is a certain dignity in a man who is willing to say, without embarrassment, that he has found the solution, rather than merely implying it in footnotes and letting his disciples do the trumpet-work. And if the man also did research in cancer, or at least took seriously the model of the sciences, then perhaps the title is not arrogance but longing: a philosopher reaching for the kind of closure the laboratory promises. Grice looks again at the words and feels the odd double pull that tutoring always produces: the pull toward seriousness and the pull toward comedy. The title is jocular because it is so straight-faced; it is serious because it reveals, in its overconfidence, the hunger that makes philosophy possible at all. And he realises, with a small resignation that is also a kind of professional pride, that his own work is not to deliver a final solution but to keep the conversation honest: to show, each time, what follows from what, what is being relied on, what is being smuggled, what is being left for the hearer to do. So perhaps the puzzle resolves itself in the only way these puzzles ever do. Medicine, if it solved cancer, would stop talking about it because the aim is to stop the suffering. Philosophy, even when it “solves” something, cannot stop talking because the talk is the medium in which the solution exists. A philosophical solution is not a pill. It is an arrangement of reasons that must be re-achieved by each new mind, and the re-achievement looks, to the impatient outsider, like repetition. He takes the pamphlet, closes it, and thinks: if Maturi has solved the fundamental problem, then good luck to him. Tomorrow at two o’clock a boy will come in with an essay full of cleverness and fog, and Grice will do what he always does: not cure philosophy, but keep it from lying about itself.Grice: Professore Maturi, devo dire che la sua approfondita analisi delle implicature tra i duellisti mi ha riportato alla mente i miei anni al Vadum Boum, la mia università. È proprio lì che ho iniziato a distinguere tra diagoge ed epagoge nella filosofia: il confronto dialettico, come lei lo descrive, mi ha sempre fatto sperare in un esito più eirenico, dove la rivalità tra filosofi sfocia in una maggiore comprensione e non solo in una lotta per la vittoria.  Maturi: Caro Grice, mi onora sapere che il mio studio possa suscitare tali ricordi e collegamenti. Condivido il suo auspicio: la dialettica del duello filosofico, pur essendo talvolta aspra, può diventare una strada verso il riconoscimento reciproco e la crescita dell’autocoscienza. Come nella scuola d’Amorosi, il dialogo è sempre una danza tra l’io e l’altro.  Grice: Ecco, proprio questa attenzione all’autocoscienza riconoscitiva è ciò che mi affascina del pensiero neapolitano-hegeliano. Nel mio lavoro, la cooperazione razionale non annulla mai il valore della precedente “forma fondamentale”: ogni nuovo stadio della vita trova le sue radici nella storia del pensiero, proprio come lei sottolinea.  Maturi: Senza dubbio, Grice. La filosofia, che sia epagogica o diagogica, deve sempre ricordare che tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il mare: il vero progresso nasce dalla capacità di ascoltare e riconoscere l’altro come parte essenziale della propria crescita. Solo così i duelli diventano ponti, e non barriere. Maturi, Sebastiano (1869). Soluzione del problema fondamentale della filosofia. Napoli.

Walter Maturi (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning is an intentionalist, micro-level account: what a speaker means (and what is implicated beyond what is said) is recoverable by a rational hearer who assumes cooperative purposes and uses that assumption to infer the speaker’s communicative intentions; Maturi, as a historian of the Risorgimento and of historiography (Walter Maturi, 1902–1968; trained in Naples with the Croce–Schipa milieu; author of works such as Il concordato del 1818 tra la Santa Sede e le Due Sicilie (1929) and Interpretazioni del Risorgimento), provides an illuminating macro-level analogue in which “meaning” is not the meaning of a single utterance but the meaning of events, texts, and political actions as reconstructed through competing interpretive frameworks. Where Grice asks how a hearer justifiably gets from an utterance to an intended implicature, Maturi asks how a reader of history justifiably gets from fragmentary evidence to an interpretation, and his emphasis on plural “interpretazioni” mirrors a Gricean point: inference is rational but underdetermined, so different audiences (London, “Woolwich,” patriotic or partisan constituencies, even gendered publics like “Speranza”) can draw different, yet intelligible, “implicatures” from the same record because they bring different background assumptions and interests to the interpretive situation. The contrast is that Grice builds normativity into conversational uptake via cooperation and shared rational expectations, whereas Maturi foregrounds how those expectations are themselves historical and ideological—historians must reconstruct intentions and contexts across distance, propaganda, and institutional pressures—so that “implicature” becomes something like the political or rhetorical upshot a movement leaves in its traces rather than a neatly cancellable conversational inference. Grice: “People sometimes asks me how my intentionalist approach can be applied to history. I always respond: Read M.! M.’s ‘interpretazioni,’ thus in plural, ‘del risorgimento’ is a classic. Even in London, the risorgimento had at least two interpretations! One in Woolwich, and another one elsewhere. And there is possibly a gender distinction too with “Speranza,” Wilde’s mother, being somewhat fanatic about it!” M. compe la sua formazione culturale a Napoli dove si laurea sotto SCHIPA, uno dei firmatari del manifesto dei filosofi anti-fascisti redatto da CROCE. Di SCHIPA, pella lezione di rigore che gl’impara, M. conserva un commosso ricordo ed ha modo d’esprimere la sua gratitudine in occasione della morte di Schipa. Segue con attenzione ed interesse, ma anche con spirito critico, le lezioni di CROCE, e studi sotto Gentile Maistre. Impostato sulla lezione di CROCE è La crisi della storiografia politica italiana, a cui segue un saggio dedicato sugli studi di storia, inserito in La vita intellettuale italiana. Il concordato tra la santa sede e le due sicilie e giudicato positivamente dalla critica di Omodeo che lo recense ne La Critica. Frequenta la scuola storica diretta da VOLPE ed e segretario e bibliotecario dell'istituto storico. Collaboratore dell'enciclopedia, pella quale scrive voci tra le quali quella dedicata al risorgimento ispirata alle sue idee liberali. A causa di questo episodio, nonostante il suo disinteresse pella vita politica attiva, e allontanato dall'istituto storico.  Nei suoi saggi di storia politica i suoi punti di riferimento sono CROCE, Meinecke, Salvemini, e VOLPE.  Dapprima come incaricato di storia del ri-sorgimento e poi come ordinario tenne le sue lezioni a Pisa dove ha modo di scrivere saggi come alcune importanti voci in un dizionario di politica a cura del partito fascista, il saggio Partiti politici e correnti di pensiero nel risorgimento, e l'accurata biografia Il principe di Canosa. Storia, storiografia, unita longitudinale della filosofia, Croce, Gentile, Schipa, Volpe. Grice’s room at St John’s had the particular quiet of a place that had hosted too many clever young men to be impressed by any new one. Coal scolded in the grate without committing itself to warmth. The kettle made the sort of private noise that passes for company in college rooms. On the table lay the notes for tomorrow’s seminar, a word he used with an inward wince, since it was in fact his university-lecturer stint, his public duty, the thing he would never prepare this hard for if it were only a tutorial with two boys and an essay. He had written one word at the top of the page and then, below it, written it again, as if the second instance might behave better. concordato concordato He spoke the word softly, to see whether it sounded foolish in English when no one was there to laugh at it. Grice: It is not even my language. The room answered, in the voice it always used when it wanted to be a conscience: his own, with a tone slightly more severe. Maturi: Then why are you petting it like a cat you swear you dislike. Grice did not look up. There was no one to look up at. The voice had arrived, as these voices do, by being convenient. Grice: I am not petting it. I am testing it. I want a word that will make them uncomfortable in the right way. Maturi: Your audience. The seminar. Grice: The class. The timetable calls it a class. I call it a seminar to lend myself dignity, and then I call it a class in my head to take the dignity back. Tomorrow I am to explain conversational helpfulness to people who think talk is either a pastime or a weapon. I require something that sounds like neither, something that sounds like an arrangement. Maturi: A pact. Grice: Exactly. Your word sits there in your title as if it were only history, only diplomacy, only the Santa Sede bargaining with the Due Sicilie. But it keeps whispering to me that conversation is precisely that sort of thing: a concordato. A pact between two parties who are not obliged to like each other, but are obliged, if they want meaning to happen, to pretend that they share a purpose. Maturi: You are about to drag Cicero into a treaty. Grice: I have already done it. Cor. Heart. Concordia. Cordial. And the prefix con, cum, with. Two hearts. Not one heart, not my heart bullying yours, not your heart sulking in silence, but two hearts, together, consenting to be jointly answerable for what gets understood. Maturi: And is that etymology or propaganda. Grice: Both, if I can manage it. I want them to hear that conversation is not free. It is not merely noises exchanged. It is a civil contract. Two hearts, yes, but also two interests. And the interests must be managed, not sentimentalised. That is the whole point of my maxims. They are not moral decorations; they are terms of an arrangement. Maturi: You keep saying heart. Are you sure the word is not a cord, a chord, rather than a heart. Grice hesitated, and the hesitation was the whole reason he had written the word twice. He turned it over as if it might show its underside. Grice: That is my fear, and also my opportunity. Cor is heart, yes. But English hears cord at once. Cordial and chord are close enough in the ear to make a pun feel like a proof. Two hearts, one cord. Same cord. Not the romantic nonsense of fusion, but the practical fact of binding. A pact binds. A cord binds. A chord binds tones into one hearing. If I am wrong about the philology, I can still be right about the mechanism. Maturi: You want to tell them that helpfulness is a kind of binding. Grice: A voluntary binding, and therefore all the more irritating to them. They will want to be clever without being constrained. They will want to win without admitting there is a game. So I will hand them a word that says, openly, there is a game, and that the game has a document. Maturi: And you will add the monster. Grice: I cannot resist the monster. The Due Sicilie. Two Sicilies is already enough to unsettle an English ear, because it insists that even an island can come doubled. A two-headed thing. And then the Santa Sede, which sounds, to my audience, either holy or absurd, and in either case useful for offence. He heard, then, another voice, not Maturi’s, older, domestic, contemptuous in a way that passed for piety. It came from Birmingham with a clarity Oxford could never quite imitate. Mother: There’s nothing holy about it. Grice: Mother says the only See that is holy is Heaven. Maturi: You are mixing concordats. Grice: I am mixing them on purpose. See means to sit. Sede. The Pope sits, and thinks the sitting makes him holy. My father would have enjoyed that as a mistake of office for essence. Henry VIII enjoyed it too, in his way, proposing himself as defender of the faith as if defence were a crown you could pin on your own chest. Englishmen do love a title. We imagine Jerusalem in our weather, we imagine sanctity in our stone, and then we talk as if our own little see were as holy as theirs. Maturi: You are far from your syllabus. Grice: No, I am at the centre of it. Because this is exactly what my students do when they hear a word. They bring their assumptions, their loyalties, their resentments, their private sermons. And they call the result understanding. My whole task tomorrow is to show them that understanding is an inference under a pact. It is not a miracle. It is not merely decoding. It is what happens when two sides agree, tacitly, to cooperate just enough. Maturi: And concordato will be your provocation. Grice: It will be my piece of gasoline, yes, but poured with manners. I will say: you think conversation is casual. It is not. It is two hearts consenting to one cord, under terms neither side has fully written down, but both sides will punish you for violating. If you want to speak, you must enter the concordato. If you want to be understood, you must act as if the other person has rights. Mother: Rights. Grice: Exactly. Even the Santa Sede and the two-headed monster understood that. They wrote it down. We do it invisibly. That is the whole trick of civility: it makes the contract look like nature. He underlined the word once, not to emphasise it, but to see whether it could bear a line without becoming melodrama. concordato Grice: Tomorrow I shall present a principle of conversational helpfulness, and I shall let them think it is merely niceness until I drop this word like a document on the table. Not holy. Not Italian. Not mine. And precisely for that reason, perfect.Grice: Caro Maturi, spesso mi chiedono come il mio approccio intenzionalista possa essere applicato alla storia. Trovo che le tue interpretazioni del Risorgimento siano particolarmente illuminanti, persino a Londra si discute ancora di queste diverse prospettive! Maturi: Grazie, Grice. Credo che la pluralità delle interpretazioni sia essenziale per comprendere la complessità della storia. La lezione di rigore di Schipa e l'approccio critico di Croce mi hanno insegnato proprio a non accontentarmi mai di una sola versione. Grice: Non posso che essere d’accordo. Anche nelle mie ricerche filosofiche, ho sempre ritenuto che la conversazione debba tenere conto delle diverse intenzioni, proprio come tu fai con le correnti di pensiero nel Risorgimento. Come dice il proverbio: “Ognuno tira l’acqua al suo mulino”, e la storia non fa eccezione. Maturi: Esattamente, Grice. La storia è un insieme di voci, di aspirazioni, di interpretazioni che si intrecciano. Solo con il dialogo e la riflessione critica possiamo avvicinarci alla verità storica, senza mai dimenticare che “chi non si pone domande resta fermo”, proprio come insegna la filosofia. Maturi, Walter (1929). Il concordato del 1818 tra la Santa Sede e le Due Sicilie. Firenze.

Gaio Mazio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale all’orto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rational, cooperative enterprise in which hearers infer what is meant beyond what is said (implicature) by assuming the speaker is being relevant, informative enough, and intelligible; the Gaio Mazio vignette relocates that Gricean machinery into the Epicurean garden as a practical style of life, where the point of speech is not primarily dialectical victory but the cultivation of tranquil, ordinary satisfactions, so “reason in conversation” looks less like maxim-following as an abstract norm and more like a therapeutic discipline of tone, volume, and topic. Historically, Gaius Matius is a late-Republican figure remembered as a loyal associate of Caesar and later connected with Cicero’s circle, and ancient notices associate him with Epicurean sympathies and with writing on domestic, agrarian, or culinary matters; that fits your “food and trees” emphasis and turns the garden into a setting where what is implicated is often ethical counsel rather than propositional information. In Gricean terms, Matius’ “Less shouting; more dining” is a deliberate flout of relevance that generates a corrective implicature: the best answer to over-heated philosophical disputation is not another premise but a change of conversational aim (from contest to conviviality), and even the contrast between “words cooked” in the school and cabbage that “tastes subtler” in the garden is an invitation to infer that meaning is better achieved when talk remains anchored in shared practices. So while Grice gives the inferential logic by which implicatures are calculated from cooperative expectations, Matius supplies a model of why those expectations exist and what they are for: conversation is governed by reason because it is one of the arts by which people keep peace of mind, and implicature becomes a civil, garden-trained way of redirecting ambition and excess without open confrontation. Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialectic as opposed to the Oxonian dialectic, I fous on the agora of Socrates, the accademia of Plato and the lizio of Aristotle – but of course there was also the Porch, and the Garden! It is not surprising that of all these Hellenistic sects, Walter Pater, at Oxford, found the Garden to be the most congenial to his ultimately Roman mind!” Filosofo italiano. Friend of GIULIO  Cesare and Cicerone . M. writes on food and trees and takes an interest in the philosophy of the Garden. L’orto. GRICEVS: O MATI, audio te in horto Romano philosophari: num brassicam cum dialectica misces? MATIVS: Immo vero, GRICE: in horto etiam brassica sapit subtilius; in schola saepe sola verba coquuntur. GRICEVS: At Oxonii verba sunt satis salsa—sed sine oleo. Quid Epicurus diceret de nostris disputationibus?  MATIVS: Diceret: “Minus clamate; plus cenate.” Et si quaestio manet, respondeat pomarium, non professorius. Mazio, Gaio (a. u. c. DCCX). De orto. Roma.

Filippo Mazzei (Poggio a Caiano, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats communication as a rational, cooperative practice in which hearers are entitled to infer what a speaker means beyond what is said by assuming purposive talk and then calculating implicatures from shared expectations; Mazzei (Filippo Mazzei, 1730–1816, Tuscan Enlightenment figure who moved between Old World and New World politics, commerce, and reform discourse, close to Jefferson and active in the American revolutionary milieu) makes a useful contrast because his primary “medium” is not the face-to-face tutorial exchange but the politically consequential letter, manifesto, and transatlantic act of persuasion, where audiences are dispersed and common ground must be constructed rather than presumed. In Gricean terms, Mazzei’s writing is designed to stabilize uptake at a distance: slogans, republican vocabulary, and appeals to liberty and toleration work by loading shared premises into the context so that readers draw the intended conclusions without the author being present to negotiate misunderstandings, and that turns implicature into a tool of mobilization and coalition-building rather than a local conversational byproduct. At the same time, Mazzei’s bicultural position (Tuscany/Virginia; “traitor” vs “illustre toscano”) highlights how implicature is audience-relative in a way Grice formalizes: the same utterance can carry different implied commitments depending on whether the hearer’s background is national, ideological, or personal, so “old world/new world” becomes not just a theme but a pragmatic fault-line determining what will be inferred as praise, betrayal, cosmopolitanism, or propaganda. In short, Grice provides the micro-mechanics of rational inference from utterances; Mazzei exemplifies the macro-politics of making those inferences predictable across cultures and distances, where conversational reason is asked to scale up into public reason. Grice: “When I deliver my proemium as the John Locke lecturer at Oxford, I played on the idea of the old world versus the new world – which was a topic of some interest for my former pupil, Strawson. Strawson argued, wrongly, that Carnap, who emigrated to the New World, had to start anew – whereas in the Old World, we respect TRADITION!” Filosofo italiano. Poggio, Toscana. Grice: “Not every philosopher has a city, ‘Colle,’ named after him!” -- Grice: “I like M.; he is hardly a philosopher, but the Italians consider among the ‘filosofi italiani,’ – there is a good wine, “M.,” since ., when travelling to the Americas, transplanted a grape from his paese – the descendants still grow it! In oltre, he was influential in the ‘risorgimento’!” -- essential Italian philosopher.Massone e cadetto di una nobile famiglia toscana di viticoltori, fu personaggio energico ed eclettico, illuminista, promulgatore delle libertà individuali, dei diritti civili e della tolleranza religiosa. Visse una vita avventurosa e movimentata, con alterne fortune economiche.  Sebbene sia sconosciuto al grande pubblico, partecipò attivamente alla guerra d'indipendenza americana come agente mediatore all'acquisto di armi per la Virginia, ed è ritenuto dagli storici uno dei padri della Dichiarazione d'Indipendenza americana, in quanto intimo amico dei primi cinque presidenti statunitensi: George Washington, John Adams, James Madison, James Monroe e soprattutto Thomas Jefferson, di cui fu ispiratore, vicino di casa, socio in affari e con cui rimase in contatto epistolare fino alla morte. Grice: “The more Italian historians of philosophy, in their pretentiously and fake patriotic prose, keep referring to this or that as ‘un illustre toscano’, the less I am leaned to see Mazzei as ITALIAN at all!” – Paeseism with a vengeance!” – Grice: “As a Brit, I find M. a traitor – to his country, and to mine!” implicature, mazzei wine, vino mazzei, la rivoluzione del nuovo mondo.  Grice lingers, with the peculiar fastidiousness of a man who pretends not to care about words while living off them, over Mazzei’s 1776 title and the single term that, to his ear, misbehaves: convenzione. He says the date is already a clue, because 1776 is precisely when English begins to behave as if it can legislate the world by printing, and when Italians abroad begin to borrow the new Anglo-American political lexicon with a freedom they would never have risked at home. Convenzione, he muses, has the unmistakable air of a word coaxed into Italian by American circumstance: not quite a calque, not quite a translation, but a pragmatic import, the sort of import one smuggles in by putting a Latin-looking coat on an English idea. And he adds, dryly, that if Mazzei believed he was being Ciceronian, Cicero would probably have declined to recognise the usage, or else would have recognised it and disapproved. Because, Grice says, conventio in the Roman mouth is not yet our philosophical convention. It is a coming-together, an agreement, a meeting, a compact, a procedure by which parties bind themselves; it has the flavour of law, bargain, embassy, assembly. One does not use it, in Cicero, as an all-purpose explanatory solvent. Yet the English philosophical word has acquired an extra kind of laziness: it is what one invokes when one does not want to explain why a practice holds, only that it holds because people do it. It threatens to replace analysis with sociology; and in Oxford, he remarks, sociology is what one does only after sherry, and even then with the curtains drawn. He then performs, as if it were civic duty, the ritual disclaimer: he is against trading in convention in his account of meaning. Not because he denies that conventions exist, but because he refuses to let convention do all the explanatory work. If meaning were merely convention, then philosophy would reduce to compiling correlations and calling the compilation a theory; and he has never been persuaded that lexicography, however honourable, is the same as philosophical explanation. What matters, for him, is intention, recognition, and rational uptake in a cooperative practice; convention may stabilise these, but it is not their source and certainly not their whole story. It is one ingredient among others, and a dangerous one if it is allowed to pretend to be the only ingredient. At this point, with a kind of honest irritation that he disguises as humour, he admits that he has nevertheless made room for something he calls conventional implicature, and that he has done so while not being altogether sure what he means by it. The phrase, he says, entered his system the way phrases enter colleges: because one needs a filing cabinet for recurring phenomena that do not look inferential in quite the right way. If you say but, there is a contrast; if you say therefore, there is a consequence; if you say even, there is a scale being climbed. One does not calculate these each time as one calculates a conversational implicature; one more or less inherits them. So he baptised them conventional and moved on, which he concedes is not his finest methodological moment, but it is a realistic one: philosophers, too, have to get through the day without footnoting every convenience. Still, he continues, the deeper point is that convention is only one correlation among many. There are natural correlations, where a sign points by causal regularity; iconic correlations, where a sign resembles what it signifies; indexical correlations, where a sign is tied to circumstance; and then the messy human correlations where what matters is not the sign at all but the mutual recognition that someone is trying to get someone else to think something. The American revolutionary setting tempts Mazzei to treat convenzione as the master word, because politics needs explicit agreement, the public coming-together, the procedure that binds strangers at distance. But that is a political necessity, Grice says, not a metaphysical foundation; it is what you need when you cannot rely on shared habits, shared rooms, shared tacit understandings. Mazzei interests him precisely because he is forced to do, in print and at distance, what Oxford prefers to do in rooms: to manufacture the conditions under which agreement can be presumed. In a tutorial you can rely on common habits and repair misunderstandings as they arise; in a new republic, in correspondence, across oceans, you need a convenzione because you need a public record that substitutes for the presence of interlocutors. And that, Grice concludes, is why the word continues to amuse him even as it irritates him: it is a little Americanism wearing an Italian suit, a procedural term dressed as a philosophical one; and it reminds him—uncomfortably, because he likes his theories clean—that sometimes you really do need a convention where a convention is needed, and no amount of analysis of meaning will make a delegate appear without one.

Grice: Caro Mazzei, lei toscano d’America o americano di Toscana? La sua storia sembra più intricata di un bicchiere di Chianti dopo una cena tra Locke e Jefferson! Mazzei: Grice, in Toscana si dice “chi ha due paesi ha doppia fortuna!” E io ho portato il vino e la filosofia oltreoceano: se non altro, i miei vitigni si sono adattati meglio di molti filosofi! Grice: Ma davvero, Mazzei, lei tra armi, vino e idee rivoluzionarie, non teme che qualcuno la prenda per massone più che per filosofo? Oppure è come il proverbio: “Meglio una bottiglia in mano che un trattato da leggere!”? Mazzei: Grice, la vita è troppo breve per bere vino cattivo e per non seguire il vento della libertà. Se i miei amici presidenti americani hanno brindato con il mio vino, credo di aver fatto qualcosa di buono—filosofia compresa! Mazzei, Filippo (1776). Istruzioni per i delegati alla Convenzione (Contea di Albemarle, Virginia).

Giuseppe Mazzini (Genova, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – la giovine italia. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rational reconstruction of what a speaker intends an audience to recognize, with implicatures arising when what is said is deliberately less (or other) than what is meant under shared cooperative expectations; Mazzini’s communicative practice, by contrast, is paradigmatically public, mobilizing, and programmatic—his slogans (like “Giovine Italia”), manifestos, letters, and exhortations are designed to generate collective agency and moral duty, so the “reason” governing meaning is not primarily the local logic of a single exchange but the long-range rhetoric of nation-building, where audiences are recruited, disciplined, and unified over time. In Gricean terms, Mazzini’s political language is rich in strategic implicature: terms like “Italy,” “youth,” “people,” and “duty” often carry presupposed moral claims (about sacrifice, legitimacy, and historical destiny) that are not fully stated in each utterance but are meant to be taken up as common ground by sympathizers, while opponents may treat those same implicatures as ideological overreach—showing how uptake depends on shared premises rather than just inferential competence. Where Grice emphasizes cancellability, calculability, and the hearer’s entitlement to infer under cooperative norms, Mazzini foregrounds a setting in which cancellation is often politically costly (to retract the implicatures is to weaken the movement) and in which the “cooperative principle” is re-engineered as solidarity: conversation becomes collective persuasion rather than neutral information exchange. The result is a useful contrast: Grice offers a general micro-theory of how meaning is inferred from intentions in ordinary talk, while Mazzini illustrates how, in mass political discourse, meaning is governed by a moral-rhetorical project that stabilizes implicatures through repeated public framing, turning what is merely implied in one moment into a standing assumption of an emerging community. Grice: “I never liked M.’s adage, ‘giovine italia’ but then my favourite Australian composer is Peter Allen, ‘everything old is new again.’ M. has been identified by Benedetti  with fascism, as he should!” Filosofo ligure. Filosofo italiano. Genova, Liguria. Grice: “Of course it is difficult for an Italian philosopher to approach the philosophy of M.cooly; it would be like me approaching the philosophy of Horatio Nelson!” – Grice: “I’ve found ‘Il pensiero filosofico di Giuseppe Mazzini’ quite helpful – the equivalent would be the pretentious sounding, “The philosophical thought of Sir Winston Churchill,’ say!” --  Grice: “ loves to cherish the fact that an old street in Woolwich, of all places, is named after him, in a way ‘Speranza,’ just because Garibaldi visited!” Grice: “ also cherishes the fact that Lady Wilde preferred ‘Speranza’ just to defend M.!” Esponente di punta del patriottismo risorgimentale, le sue idee e la sua azione politica contribusceno in maniera decisiva alla nascita dello STATO UNITARIO ITALIANO. Le condanne subite in diversi tribunali d'Italia lo costringeno però alla latitanza fino alla morte. Le teorie mazziniane sono di grande importanza nella definizione dei moderni movimenti europei per l'affermazione della democrazia attraverso la forma repubblicana dello stato. Nacque a Genova, allora capoluogo dell'omonimo dipartimento francese costituito da parte del regime di Bonaparte. Il padre, Giacomo, e medico e docente universitario d'anatomia originario di Chiavari, una cittadina del Tigullio all'epoca capoluogo del dipartimento francese degli Appennini, successivamente parte della provincia di Genova, figura politicamente attiva nella scena pubblica locale, sia durante l'epoca della precedente repubblica ligure, sia, in tempi successivi, dell'Impero napoleonico. la giovine italia, la tesi di laurea di Benedetti su M. nella ideologia fascista, ideologia fascista, gentile, bobbio, garibaldi, nazione italiana, stato nazionale, stato unitario. Grice: Caro Mazzini, mi colpisce sempre la forza delle tue idee su “Giovine Italia”, benché io preferisca il motto di Peter Allen, “tutto ciò che è vecchio torna nuovo”. Credi davvero che il rinnovamento debba sempre partire dai giovani? Mazzini: Grice, ritengo che il cambiamento non sia questione di età, bensì di spirito. “Giovine Italia” simboleggia l’energia e la speranza di chi vuole costruire un futuro diverso. L’importante è credere nella possibilità di una rinascita collettiva. Grice: È interessante come la tua visione abbia influenzato movimenti democratici in tutta Europa. Ma non temi che l’identità nazionale possa diventare una forma di esclusione piuttosto che di unione? Mazzini: La nazione, per me, è casa comune; deve essere inclusiva e aperta, non chiusura. Solo attraverso la partecipazione e il dialogo si può costruire uno stato unitario che sia veramente democratico e al servizio di tutti. Come dicono dalle mie parti: “Chi semina vento raccoglie tempesta”, ma chi semina concordia raccoglie libertà. Mazzini, Giuseppe (1837). Filosofia della musica. Paris: Baudry.

Jacopo Mazzoni (Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – la vita attiva dei romani. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how an audience can rationally get from what is said to what is meant by presuming cooperative purpose and inferring intentions, with implicature arising as a disciplined, accountable surplus over literal content; the Caio Mecenate Melisso vignette makes that same machinery visible in a sharply social register, where clothing, titles, and gifts do part of the communicative work and where the speaker can deliberately “murmur” so the audience completes the thought for him. Historically, the figure usually called C. Maecenas Melissus is an Augustan-era freedman and man of letters often associated in later sources with small literary forms (including collections of jokes) and with courtly culture; that background fits your “Dicta Trabeata” conceit, because the trabea (as a status-sign) functions like a pragmatic amplifier: it frames what is taken to be relevant, authoritative, or safely deniable before a word is parsed. Where Grice models implicature as something that can be calculated from conversational norms plus an assumed rational intention to be understood, Melissus highlights a setting where part of the intention-recognition is engineered by non-verbal convention (dress, patronage, genre, court etiquette), so that implicature becomes a technique for giving meaning while avoiding full commitment—letting the reader “think himself wise,” distributing responsibility for the intended message to the audience, and gaining praise for what was never explicitly stated. In short, Grice supplies the general inferential account of how implicature works; Melissus illustrates how, in an elite culture of rank and performance, implicature can be a cultivated art of insinuation and deniability in which social signals pre-load the context and make the audience do the interpretive labour. Grice: “It is sad that my favourite philosopher, Ariskant, succumbes to the intellect – or as M. would call it ‘la vita speculative.’ The Romans, never! We do have an adage at Oxford: a man of words, and not of deeds is like a garden full of weeds.” This dwells on the real antonym of ‘vita speculativa’. Aristotle would have ‘theoretical,’ since ‘theorein’ is like to ‘see’. But then you would think that opposite is the ‘vita prattica.’ M. prefers ‘vita attiva’ – which is a bit of a redundancy – but anything goes when it comes to over-qualify the Romans!” Grice: “Mazzoni is important on various fronts: he loves Dante, or Alighieri as Strawson calls him – his library in organised alphabetically; the other front I forget!” Compì i suoi studi di lettere a Bologna e quelli di filosofia a Padova. Membro dell'Accademia della Crusca, fu tra i preferiti del papa Gregorio XIII che lo avrebbe voluto prelato; M. preferì proseguire nella carriera universitaria. Dapprima fu all'Macerata, ed in seguito a Pisa, dove ebbe la cattedra di filosofia. Nella città della torre pendente, conobbe un giovane insegnante di matematica, Galilei, con il quale instaurò ottimi rapporti. Invitato ad insegnare all'Università La Sapienza di Roma. Benché avesse da poco preso questa cattedra, seguì il cardinale Pietro Aldobrandini nei suoi incarichi a Ferrara ed in seguito a Venezia. Ammalatosi sulla strada del ritorno, si recò nella sua Cesena, dove si spense. Opere: “Difesa della Commedia di ALIGHIERI Grazie alla sua preparazione letteraria, giunse alla notorietà per il suo tomo Difesa della Commedia di Dante, pubblicato a Bologna inizialmente, sotto pseudonym e poi l'anno successivo sotto il suo vero nome, in cui criticò aspramente Salviati. Nel testo egli risponde ad alcune contestazioni fatte alle sue elucubrazioni sul sommo poeta Alighieri. implicature, repubblica romana, the Latins on ‘vita activa’, I romani e la vita attiva. Jacopo Mazzoni.  Grice: Professore Mazzoni, mi incuriosisce la sua preferenza per la “vita attiva” dei Romani rispetto alla “vita speculativa” dei filosofi. Crede davvero che la pratica valga più della teoria? Da noi, a Oxford, si dice: “Uomo di parole e non di fatti è come un giardino pieno di erbacce!” Mazzoni: Caro Grice, la “vita attiva” è il cuore pulsante della civiltà romana! Senza azione, anche le idee più splendide rischiano di restare sterili. È vero che la teoria illumina, ma la pratica trasforma: come diciamo a Cesena, “chi fa, trova la strada; chi pensa troppo, rischia di perdersi nei meandri.” Grice: Mi colpisce che lei abbia difeso Dante con tanto vigore, pur essendo un amante della vita attiva. Forse la letteratura, per lei, è anch’essa forma d’azione? Mazzoni: Esattamente, Grice. Difendere Dante è stato un atto concreto, una battaglia intellettuale. La parola, se sostenuta da passione e impegno, diventa azione potente. Come si dice dalle mie parti: “La penna muove il mondo, ma la volontà lo trasforma.” Mazzoni, Jacopo (1583). Della difesa della commedia d’Alighieri. Florence: Giunti.

Cajo Clinio Mecenate (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a rationally disciplined inference: hearers assume cooperative purpose and use that assumption to move from what is said to what is meant (implicatures) in a way that is, in principle, accountable, cancellable, and keyed to shared norms of relevance and evidential sufficiency; the Maecenas case reframes that same rational machinery by foregrounding how the social ecology of patronage reshapes what “cooperation” and “autonomy” look like in practice, because when one speaker (or sponsor) controls resources the conversational background includes dependency-risk and deference-signalling, so that much of what gets communicated is communicated indirectly (gratitude, dissent, limits, and the conditions of continued support). Historically, Gaius Cilnius Maecenas (c. 70–8 BC) is famous less for surviving writings (only fragments and hostile testimony about an affected style) than for enabling a literary-philosophical circle (Virgil, Horace, Propertius) whose freedom was real but not costless; mapped onto Grice, this makes Maecenas a figure for the institutional preconditions of successful implicature: patrons create the stable common ground (time, leisure, audience) that lets subtle meanings be exchanged, while simultaneously introducing a pressure that can distort implicature (speakers may flout maxims strategically to remain “safe,” leaving dissent to be inferred rather than asserted). So where Grice builds a general account of how rational agents derive meaning beyond the literal, Maecenas highlights that the very rationality Grice models is socially situated: conversational benevolence may be amplified by material support, yet the same support can force a politics of indirection in which implicatures do the heavy ethical work—maintaining autonomy, saving face, and keeping philosophical inquiry possible without openly contesting the hand that funds the conversation. Grice: “In my ‘reflections on happiness,’ I dwell on autonomy, and give the example: do not rely on a grant by the government. In fact, most of my requests were systematically rejected, even if I thought I had provided good grounding for them – “The value of this should be self-evident.” “The significance should be obvious by its character.” In Ancient Rome, the government gave no grants, but M. did!” Keywords: Grice, Gardiner, Mecenate. Filosofo italiano. Gaio Cilnio Mecenate. Interessi filosofici prova lui, il potentissimo consigliere d'Ottaviano. Di origine etrusca, e probabilmente aretina, discende da stirpe regia, ma volle restare semplice cavaliere romano. Combattè a Filippi per i triumviri e e intimo di Ottaviano che egli cerca di conciliare con Marc'Antonio, siechè ha luogo l’incontro di Brindisi. Per conto di Ottaviano si reca presso Marc'Antonio affinchè partecipasse alla guerra contro Sesto Pompeo. Lui e il rappresentante di Ottaviano a Roma e in Italia con poteri illimitati. Ottaviano si serve di Mecenate in pace e in guerra e trova sia in lui che in Agrippa il sostegno più sicuro del suo principato. Ma egli deve la sua fama imperitura alla protezione che concesse ai maggiori filosofi del tempo suo. Restano pochi frammenti dei scritti del M. in versi e in prosa, nei quali, e specialmente nel Simposio o convito, opera che introduce in Roma un genere letterario molto coltivato in Grecia, mostra di subire l’influsso dei filosofi dell’Orto. Interessi filosofici e influssi epicurei si manifestano negli seritti dei maggiori filosofi del circolo del Mecenate. Maecenas wrote several works, none of which have come down to us. Their loss howerer is not much to be deplored, siuce, acoording to the testimony of many ancient writers, they were written in a very artificial and affected manner (Suet. ‘Octv.,’ ; Sen., ‘Epist.’; Tac. ‘Dial. de Orat.,’, who speaks of the ‘calamistros Maecenatis.  Gricevs: O Maecenas, dic mihi, quid est felix vita? Putasne, sine pecunia publicā, sapientem vivere posse? Gricevs: O Maecenas, dic mihi, quid est felix vita? Putasne, sine pecunia publicā, sapientem vivere posse? Mecenate: Felicitas, care Grice, non a donis rei publicae pendet, sed a libertate animi atque ab arte colendi necessitudines sinceras. Philosophos poetasque sustentavi, quod culturam veras divitias esse credo, omnibus muneribus materialibus diuturniorem. Gricevs: Maecenas, censesne igitur auxilium philosophis praestitum utilius esse quam ipsum argentum? Nonne times ne dependentia a Maecenate autonomiam cogitandi infirmet? Mecenate: Vera autonomia e responsabilitate et dialogo oritur. Maecenas ideas non imponit, sed facultatem praebet ut crescant. Ut antiqui dicebant: “Divitiae evanescere possunt; sapientia manet.” Mecenate, Gaio Clinio (a. u. c. DCCXIV). De felicitate. Roma.

Caio Mecenate Melisso (Roma, Lazio). Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what is meant beyond what is said by presuming a cooperative exchange and then inferring (often via implicature) the speaker’s intention from the utterance plus shared norms; the little Grice–Maecenas Melissus dialogue recasts that machinery in an Augustan social setting where meaning is managed not only by maxims but by status-signals and patronage conventions. Historically, C. Maecenas Melissus is usually identified as an Augustan freedman and literary figure (often linked with joke-collections and with the title “Maecenas” as a mark of association or honour), so the trabea in your exchange is a perfect pragmatic prop: it “speaks” socially even when the author “murmurs,” letting the reader supply flattering inferences (“the reader thinks himself wise”)—a deliberately engineered implicature. In Grice’s terms, Melissus exploits predictable interpretive habits to get uptake without bald assertion, and the shared background of elite Roman decorum makes that uptake almost automatic; but the punchline (“we’re praised for what we didn’t quite give”) also highlights a tension Grice acknowledges in practice: implicatures can be used to create deniability, to distribute responsibility for meaning to the audience, and to let institutional power (dress, rank, gifts) do part of the communicative work that, in Grice’s abstract model, is carried by cooperative rational inference alone. GRICEVS: Salvē, MAECENAS; audīvī tē “Dicta Trabeata” scribere, sed timeō nē trabea ipsa plus loquātur quam verba. MAECENAS: Salvē, GRICE; trabea quidem clāmat, sed ego tantum submurmurō, ut lector putet sē ipsum sapiēns esse. GRICEVS: Bene; apud mē hoc vocātur implicātūra, cum auctor tacet et tamen exigat ut alius intellegat. MAECENAS: Ita est; ego dō munera, tū dās sensum, et uterque laudāmur pro eō quod nēminī prorsus dēdimus. Mecenate Melisso, Caio (a. u. c. DCCLXIII). Dicta traeata. Roma.

Medio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale al portico romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how interlocutors can mean more than they say because hearers treat utterances as rational moves in a cooperative exchange and infer additional content (implicatures) by assuming shared norms of relevance, informativeness, candour, and perspicuity; the Medio vignette, by contrast, locates “conversational reason” less in an explicitly articulated inferential calculus and more in a Roman social technology of the portico, where philosophy is preserved as a practice of situated talk, memory, and custom even when the textual record is thin (Diogenes Laertius’ “he wrote a number of essays” shrug) and where the built environment itself (the porch) functions as an institution that stabilizes expectations about how one speaks, listens, and belongs. So while Grice’s model foregrounds the calculability and (in principle) cancellability of implicature from what is said plus rational assumptions about the speaker’s intentions, Medio foregrounds the durability of conversational norms when authorship and doctrine are under-documented: the “implicatures” that matter are carried by shared habits, local maxims, and the tacit authority of place—sermones and mores—so that meaning is conserved not only through texts but through repeated forms of exchange. In short, Grice gives you the abstract mechanism by which reason governs the transition from said to meant; Medio supplies an historical-social picture in which that governance is maintained by civic settings and communal continuity, making conversation itself (rather than treatises) the primary archive of rational life. Grice: “The Romans were a bit like the Oxonians: it all had to be Greek – witness Diogenes Laertius – he goes on in great detail to list all the lost essays by unknown Greek philosophers – but when it comes to Roman philosophers like Medio, he couldn’t care less – ‘he wrote a number of essays,’ he notes – VERY edifying!” Filosofo italiano. Medio. Porch. Portico. A contemporary of Plotino. M. writes a number of essays. Gricevs: Medive, dic mihi, cur Romani semper Graecos imitantur? An porticus vobis etiam philosophus erat? Medivs: Griceve, in porticu semper philosophamur, sed interdum etiam sub umbra ciceris requiescimus. Graeci libros perdunt, Romani porticus servant! Medio: la ragione conversazionale al portico romano -- Roma – filosofia italiana (Roma). Grice: “The Romans were a bit like the Oxonians: it all had to be Greek – witness Diogenes Laertius – he goes on in great detail to list all the lost essays by unknown Greek philosophers – but when it comes to Roman philosophers like Medio, he couldn’t care less – ‘he wrote a number of essays,’ he notes – VERY edifying!” Filosofo italiano. Medio. Porch. Portico. A contemporary of Plotino. M. writes a number of essays. Gricevs: Medive, dic mihi, cur Romani semper Graecos imitantur? An porticus vobis etiam philosophus erat? Medivs: Griceve, in porticu semper philosophamur, sed interdum etiam sub umbra ciceris requiescimus. Graeci libros perdunt, Romani porticus servant! Gricevs: At, Medive, quid prodest porticus servare, si philosophiam ipsam in libros non colligimus? Ne totum in umbra pereat quod in sole nascebatur! Medivs: O Griceve, porticus non solum lapides, sed etiam sermones et animos conservat. Ubi libri silent, memoria et mos vivunt—sic Romani semper invenient ubi philosophandum sit. Medio (a. u. c. MXXIII). De sermone et more. Roma.

Angelo Camillo De Meis (Bucchianico, Chieti, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – IL FU MATTIA PASCALE – lo spirito abruzzese. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats talk as a rational, cooperative practice in which what a speaker means is fixed by intentions that are in principle recoverable by a hearer, and conversational implicatures are the extra contents a competent audience is licensed to infer from what is said plus shared expectations about how reasonable interlocutors pursue purposes in dialogue; De Meis, by contrast (Angelo Camillo De Meis, 1817–1891, Abruzzese philosopher-physician and political figure, associated with a naturalistic philosophy of nature and cited by Pirandello in Il fu Mattia Pascal as a byword for sweeping synthesis), exemplifies a different location of “reason”: not primarily the micro-norms that govern utterance-interpretation, but the macro-ambition to unify domains under one systematic explanatory project (vegetal → animal → human, with a Hegel-tinged developmentalism and a more Kantian treatment of the human level). In Gricean terms, the Pirandellian joke “Who says it? De Meis!” works like a social implicature attached to a name: it signals, without stating, that the speaker is about to generalize across “all the problems” at once, so that De Meis becomes a cultural shorthand for a certain conversational posture (maximal generalization, explanatory overreach, or integrative breadth, depending on the hearer’s attitude). Where Grice insists that implicature is typically cancellable and locally calculated within an exchange, the De Meis figure highlights how implicatures can also sediment into reputational and stylistic conventions—what a name, a school, or a regional “Abruzzese spirit” comes to convey before any argument begins—so that conversational reason is partly governed by inherited expectations about what kinds of thinkers say what kinds of things. The upshot is that Grice offers the fine-grained inferential mechanics of meaning-in-interaction, while De Meis supplies a picture of philosophical rationality as large-scale synthesis whose very ambition becomes, in conversation, a standing implicature: to invoke De Meis is already to imply that one is treating philosophy as “one problem, namely all of them,” and that pragmatic framing effect can shape how any subsequent utterance is heard. Grice: “I am call a systematic philosopher – which, in Gilbert Harman’s paraphrase, means that when it comes to philosophy, I want to make it all my own! In Italy, the corresponding figure would be M. – and since Pirandello – it has become a drawing-room joke: “Who says it?” “M.!” – The implicature being that Camillo De Meis shared my motto that there is only ONE problem in philosophy, namely: all of them!” Filosofo italiano. Bucchianico, Chieti, Abruzzo.  Grice: “I agree with M.’s naturalism; he proposes a three-stage development: vegetal, animal, man – his naturalism has a Hegelian side to it, while man is more old fashioned, more Kantian!” Figlio di un medico aderente alla carboneria e di ideali mazziniani, nacque a Bucchianico, dove compì i primi studi: li prosegue presso il Regio collegio di Chieti e poi a Napoli, dove e allievo dei letterati PUOTI, SANCTIS, SPAVENTA e RAMAGLIA. Si laurea e divenne socio degl’Aspiranti naturalisti, di cui diventerà presidente; e poi medico aggiunto dell'Ospedale degli Incurabili e apre una scuola di grande successo, dove insegna filosofia naturale. E poi rettore del Collegio di Napoli. Dopo la promulgazione della costituzione nel Regno di Napoli, venne eletto deputato per la circoscrizione Abruzzo Citra: sostenne la protesta di Mancini contro la repressione operata dalle truppe borboniche contro i manifestanti e l'accusa di tradimento al re. E quindi costretto all'esilio. Dopo un soggiorno a Genova e a Torino, si stabilì a Parigi. Grice: “De Meis’s theory resembles my pirotological progression, heavily! I like his generalisations. I wish we had at Oxford such a freedom to generalise!” implicature, citato da Pirandello in “Il fu Mattia Pascal” “Chi lo dice? – gli domanda forte il giovane, fermo, con aria di sfida. Quegli allora si volta per gridargli: “Camillo De Meis!” Grice: Meis, ho sempre ammirato il modo in cui lei affronta la filosofia come un unico grande problema. Mi ricorda il mio tentativo di sistematizzare tutto, come dice Harman: “voglio farlo mio!” Lei, invece, nei suoi scritti, propone una visione naturalistica che parte dal vegetale, passa all’animale e culmina nell’uomo. Come è nata questa prospettiva? Meis: Caro Grice, è proprio la vita abruzzese—con la sua semplicità e il suo spirito di concretezza—a ispirare la mia filosofia. Ho sempre pensato che la realtà si sviluppi in forme progressive, e che l’umano debba essere letto in continuità con la natura, ma senza dimenticare le sue peculiarità razionali. Forse c’è un po’ di Hegel in questo, ma anche Kant non manca! Grice: Mi colpisce come Pirandello abbia citato il suo nome quasi come un proverbio: “Chi lo dice? Camillo De Meis!” In Inghilterra una tale generalizzazione sarebbe vista come audace; da noi, la conversazione tende alla specificità. Crede che questa libertà di generalizzare sia una forza della filosofia italiana? Meis: È vero, Grice. La filosofia italiana ama le grandi sintesi, ma non perde mai il legame con l’esperienza concreta, “terra terra”, diremmo in Abruzzo. La generalizzazione è una sfida, ma serve a capire l’unità del mondo. E poi, come dice il proverbio: “Chi non rischia, non rosica!”—anche in filosofia occorre osare, senza perdere il senso della realtà. Meis, Angelo Camillo De (1868). Della filosofia della natura. Napoli: Morano.

Enzo Melandri (Genova, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- le forme dell’analogia – analogia nel convito di Platone – Reale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what is meant (including implicatures) by assuming a cooperative exchange and then inferring, from what is said plus shared norms, what additional proposition(s) the speaker intends the audience to recognize; Melandri’s preoccupation with analogy, proportion, and symmetry (from Plato’s Symposium through Aristotle and Aquinas, and refracted through modern semiotics and Kant) shifts attention from the linear, maxim-guided inferential route Grice emphasizes to the way understanding often proceeds by structured pattern-matching across domains, where a speaker’s “meant” content is grasped by seeing a proportional fit rather than by calculating a single best implicature. Put in Gricean terms, Melandri makes salient that conversational reason is frequently analogical before it is deductive: interpreters draw a “this is like that” mapping that organizes what counts as relevant, what counts as an apt level of specificity, and even what counts as a satisfactory explanation, so that implicature can ride on perceived similarity-structures (focal terms, proportional relations, symmetric contrasts) rather than solely on the cooperative principle plus maxims. Where Grice treats analogy as one tool among others in philosophical unification, Melandri treats it as a deep form that can unify discourse and resist “the symbolic” when symbol-manipulation becomes detached from the real; the upshot is a complementary picture in which Grice supplies the normative logic of uptake (why an implicature is licensed), while Melandri foregrounds the morphologies by which uptake is actually achieved (how meaning becomes intelligible through analogical form), making conversational rationality look less like a rulebook and more like an art of proportioned seeing. Grice: “In an essay which was originally to be included in my ‘Way of Words’, ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’, I focus on M.’s obsession or fixation: analogia, or proporzione. ‘Analogical unification’ is just one mode of unification for Aristotle: the others being ‘focal unification’ and ‘recursive unification’. I basically elaborate on Aristotle’s analogy for ‘medical’, dropping my view that there may be more about Aristotle’s idea of this unity that may relate to my view on theory-theory. Grice: “One of the ten items he lists in his ‘Contro lo simbolico’ is ‘lo simbolico’ itself!” -- Grice: “Melandri takes analogy more seriously than I did – I do list ‘analogy’ as part of what I call ‘philosophical eschatology – the third branch of metaphysics, along with ontology and category study.” Grice: “Melandri focuses on the Graeco-Roman tradition of analogy, which he pairs with two other concepts: proportion, and symmetry – re-interpreting mainly Aquino’s reading of the Aristotelian tradition in a semiotic approach.” Grice: “Melandri also takes Kant seriously on this.” Grice: “If an Italian philosopher wrote ‘contro la comunicazione,’ another wrote ‘contro il simbolico’!” --  Grice: “He has studied Buehler; I like that!” Laureatosi a 'Bologna, è lettore a Kiel in Germania. Insegna poi a Lecce, Trieste e Bologna. Parallelamente all'attività universitaria, collabora con Mulino e alla rivista omonima, per le quali ha svolto attività di consulenza. Bühler, l’aggetivo ‘galileano’ -- le forme dell’analogia, Grice – analogia – problema della comunicazione, Buehler, teoria di Buehler, analogical unification, la comunicazione, implicatura problematica, aquino, kant, mill, jevons, maxwell, Perelman, abcd, haenssler, dorolle, lyttkens, Reichenbach, newton, cellucci, marramao, aristotele, platone, convito, reale, grice, analogical unification, owens, ross. Grice: Melandri, devo confessare che se ho inserito l’analogia nella mia “eschatologia filosofica”, lo devo proprio alla sua lettura del Simposio: il modo in cui esplora la proporzione, la simmetria e il concetto di analogia nella tradizione greco-romana è stato per me illuminante. La sua esegesi penetra davvero nelle pieghe profonde del pensiero platonico e aristotelico. Melandri: Caro Grice, le sue parole mi onorano. La mia ossessione per l’analogia nasce proprio dalla convinzione che, senza proporzione e simmetria, il pensiero filosofico rischia di perdersi nella confusione. Platone, nel Simposio, offre spunti ineguagliabili su come l’analogia sia il ponte essenziale tra l’umano e il divino. Grice: È interessante notare come lei, più di molti, abbia saputo vedere nell’analogia non solo una tecnica argomentativa, ma una vera e propria chiave per comprendere la comunicazione stessa. Mi ha colpito il suo “Contro lo simbolico”, dove l’analogia diventa quasi una resistenza all’eccessiva astrazione del linguaggio. Melandri: Esatto, Grice! L’analogia ci salva dall’aridità dei puri simboli: ci costringe a mantenere un legame vitale con l’esperienza e il mondo vissuto. In fondo, come diciamo a Genova, “chi va piano va sano e va lontano”: anche il pensiero deve procedere per passi proporzionati, senza salti nel buio. Melandri, Enzo (1960). La linea e il circolo. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Virgilio Melchiorre (Chieti, Abruzzo): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – il corpo – la filosofia dell’amore – amante ed amato – il convito di Turolla. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains understanding as a rational reconstruction of intentions under cooperative norms, so that implicature is the inferential surplus generated when what is said is treated as a purposeful move addressed to a recognizably shared end; Melchiorre (Chieti 1931–Milano 2026, long associated with the Università Cattolica di Milano, and in his work from Metacritica dell’eros to Corpo e persona and Essere e parola) reframes that same “reason in exchange” by grounding it in an anthropology of embodiment and reciprocity, where meaning is not only inferred but also enacted in the bodily and affective conditions of recognition between amante and amato. Where Grice tends to model cooperation as a normative constraint on utterance interpretation (helpfulness, benevolence, relevance), Melchiorre treats relation itself—exposure to the other through the lived body, the symbolic imagination, and love’s dialectic—as constitutive of personhood and thus of the very space in which language can function as revelation rather than mere code; this makes implicature look less like a technical add-on to what is said and more like the ordinary, often “indirect” way in which persons disclose themselves when the most important contents (desire, shame, care, fidelity) are not fully sayable without remainder. In short, Grice supplies the inferential mechanics of how hearers justify moving from saying to meaning, while Melchiorre supplies the metaphysical-phenomenological setting in which such justifications matter: cooperation is not just a conversational policy but a form of interpersonal acknowledgment rooted in corporeity, and implicature becomes a privileged index of that ethical exposure—what love and the body make communicable precisely by preventing it from being exhaustively stated. Grice: “It’s very rare to find an Italian philosopher who won’t give you a tirade on ‘That’s amore!’. On the other hand, on the colder shores of Oxford, as my pupil Strawson calls them, we TRY. The closest I came to the idea of love was through my reading of Butler. Butler founds his morality, as is well known, in two conflicting desiderata: that of self-love, and that of other-love, or benevolence. My pupils at Oxford were therefore treated to the conversational versions of these two desiderata: the desideratum of conversational self-love, and the desideratum of other-love, or benevolence. I later realised that ‘benevolentia’ is all that mattered. And this became ‘helpfulness’ and later ‘co-operation’!” -- Grice: “I like Melchiorre; while I refer to bodily identity in my “Mind” essay, M. has dedicated a whole treatise to ‘the body’ – he has also explored semiotic aspects and come up with nice oxymora: ‘nome indicibile,’ ‘immaginazione simbolica,’ ‘essere e parola.’”. Grice: “Melchiorre’s first explorations on the concept of body is Strawsonian – corpore e persona -. What led Melchiorre to this reflection is what he calls a meta-critique of love – Socrates did his critique of love in the Symposium, and Phaedrus. Grice: “Melchiorre, while quoting the necessary German sources for an Italian philosophers – Eros und Agape, tr. N. Gay – he dwells on Turolla’s beloved (by every Italian schoolboy) version of “Convito” – which Turolla published under the ostentatious title, “Dialogo dell’amore” – M. typically finds some mistakes, since Turolla was no philosopher – and no lover of Sophia, and no Sophos of love!” –il corpo corpi e persone, meta-critica dell’eros, il convito di Trolla, Turolla, il fedro di Turolla – amore – il riconoscimento come identita – la dialettica dell’atto amoroso – l’amante e l’amato – l’amore reciproco, amore e contramore, erote ed anterote. Virgilio Melchiorre.  Grice: Professore Melchiorre, mi colpisce quanto la filosofia italiana sappia intrecciare il discorso sull’amore col corpo e l’identità personale. A Oxford, da Butler in poi, ci siamo spesso fermati al dilemma tra amor proprio e benevolenza. Lei, invece, ha dedicato un intero trattato al corpo: cosa ne pensa del legame tra corporeità e esperienza amorosa? Melchiorre: Grazie, Professor Grice. Credo che il corpo sia la prima grammatica dell’amore: attraverso la presenza fisica riconosciamo l’altro, ci lasciamo interpellare e rispondiamo. Come dicevo nel mio “meta-critica dell’eros,” l’amore implica sempre un incontro concreto, non solo una dialettica astratta. È nel corpo che l’amante e l’amato si riconoscono. Grice: È affascinante! Da noi, la benevolenza si traduce spesso in cooperazione conversazionale: aiutare l’altro con le parole, costruire insieme il senso. Lei parla di “nome indicibile” e “immaginazione simbolica”: sono forse modi per oltrepassare i limiti del linguaggio, proprio come l’amore supera la mera parola? Melchiorre: Esattamente, il linguaggio è una soglia, non un muro. Nell’atto amoroso, si creano ossimori: parole che cercano di dire l’indicibile. Anche Turolla, pur non essendo filosofo, nel suo “Dialogo dell’amore”, ha intuito che l’essenza dell’amore sta nel reciproco riconoscimento: amante e amato si trasformano l’uno nell’altro. La filosofia, insomma, non può ignorare questa dialettica viva tra corpo, parola e amore. Melchiorre, Virgilio (1953). Dissertazione. Sotto Olgiati and Bontadini. Milano

Giuseppe Melli (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- AVRELIO – filosofia italiana – la filosofia a Roma nel tempo di Pomponio – pre-ambasciata --  Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how we routinely get from what is said to what is meant by treating talk as a rational, cooperative enterprise in which hearers are entitled to infer intentions and thereby derive implicatures (cancellable, calculable, audience-sensitive) from principled expectations about relevance, informativeness, and the like; Giuseppe Melli, as your passage frames him, shifts the emphasis from those micro-inferential mechanics to the historically thick conditions under which “reason in talk” becomes culturally legible at all—Rome’s suspicion of Greek philosophers, senatorial attempts to expel them, the later charisma of Carneades, and then the Roman appropriation and domestication of philosophy culminating in the emblem of Marcus Aurelius as a specifically Roman ethical voice. In that setting, implicature is less a tidy byproduct of cooperative maxims and more a political-cultural phenomenon: the very act of hosting, translating, or commemorating philosophy carries secondary meanings (about identity, authority, “foreignness,” and legitimacy) that are not always under any single speaker’s control, and the reception of a philosopher can hinge on what his presence “implies” for national mores. So where Grice offers a universalist rational reconstruction of how intention and shared norms generate conversational meaning, Melli’s Rome-centred lens highlights that the norms themselves are contested and historically managed—philosophy’s uptake in Rome is negotiated through suspicion, prestige, censorship, monuments, and patriotic feeling—making “conversational reason” appear as a civic achievement (and sometimes a fragile one) rather than a default background of every exchange. Grice: “It would be silly to suppose that Antonino represented Plato’s idea of the philosophus rex. In fact, Mussolini detested Antonino, and tried, without success, to replace his equestrian statue at the Campidoglio by one of Giulio Cesare!” Keywords. Filosofo. Grice: “I like M.; you see, Italians feel that Marc’aurelio is theirs, so M. puts his soul in his essay on Marc’aurelio, while his essay on Socrates is rather neutral! For us at Oxford, both Marc’Aurelio and ‘Socrate’ are just as furrin; Locke ain’t!”. Altri saggi: La filosofia di Schopenauer, Tocco, Firenze, Tocco, Firenze, Commemorazione di Villari, Firenze,  La filosofia greca da Epicuro ai Neoplatonici, Firenze, Socrate, Lanciano. I primi contatti tra i filosofi romani e i filosofi greci non sono amichevoli. Essendosi parlato in senato dei filosofi e dei retori il senato consulto da incarico al pretore Marco POMPONIO  di provvedere “uti Romae NE essent [FILOSOFI greci]”. Semi della filosofia greca sono sparsi dagl’esuli ACHEI, tra i quali era anche Polibio, venuti dopo la guerra macedonica. Pochi anni dopo, ci e l'ambasciata della quale fa parte Carneade. Anche questa volta vedemmo come CATONE  s’impensiera dell’efficacia rovinosa che quell’abile parlatore puo esercitare sull'educazione nazionale. Ma Carneade ha un grande successo e l’infiltrazione delle idee filosofiche grechi e già cominciata, specialmente dopo la conquista delle città della Magna Grecia come Crotone – sede della scuola di Pitagora --, Taranto – sede della scuola di Archita --, Velia – sede di Parmenide e Senone – e dopo l’isola della Sicilia – Girgenti, sede della scuola di Empedocle --, e Leontini, sede della scuola di Gorgia. AURELIO ANTONINO Grice: Caro Melli, dicono che a Roma i filosofi greci venivano accolti come la pioggia in agosto: a volte sospirati, più spesso cacciati via. Tu come te la cavi con i senatori sospettosi? Melli: Ah, Grice, ai miei tempi bastava entrare in senato con una toga un po’ fuori moda e ti scambiavano già per un retore greco! Per fortuna, Marc’Aurelio aveva più pazienza di Catone: lui almeno ascoltava prima di mandare via qualcuno. Grice: Divertente! E Musso che avrebbe fatto se avesse visto Socrate sotto il Campidoglio? Avrebbe ordinato una statua anche per lui o solo per Giulio Cesare? Melli: Probabilmente una statua di Socrate con la testa di Cesare, così nessuno si offendeva! Ma io resto fedele ad Aurelio: più filosofia nei suoi appunti che in tutte le statue di Roma messe insieme. Melli, Giuseppe (1932). Saggio di critica letteraria. Bologna: Zanichelli.

Gaio Memmio (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano. Grice explains reason-governed conversational meaning by treating talk as a cooperative, inference-driven practice: what a speaker means is not exhausted by sentence meaning but is fixed by publicly recognizable intentions, and implicatures are the rationally derivable “more” that competent hearers calculate from what is said plus shared conversational expectations; the Memmius episode relocates that Gricean mechanism into the Epicurean “garden” as a social and political technology of indirectness, where the crucial norm is not simply cooperative truth-seeking but the management of otium, safety, and philosophical therapy amid Roman ambition and cultural translation. With Memmius (historically, Gaius Memmius, tribune 66 BC; Lucretius’ dedicatee; and associated with the Athenian site of Epicurus’ Garden through Cicero’s correspondence about building plans), the “orto” becomes a scene in which what is left unsaid often matters more than what is said: Epicurean counsel like abstain, withdraw, seek quiet can function as conversationally encoded guidance about politics, status, and risk, and the villa/garden itself becomes a medium that frames uptake (Lucretius’ poetic address to Memmius aims to move him without sounding like senatorial harangue). So where Grice offers a general theory in which implicature is calculable and cancellable under a presumption of cooperative rational agency, Memmius highlights how those same inferential resources are cultivated for a distinct ethical end: minimizing disturbance, redirecting desire, and sustaining tranquility through tactful speech, poetic indirection, and strategic silence—implicature as a cultivated “horticultural” virtue rather than merely a theoretical byproduct of maxims. Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialectic to contrast – and indeed compare – it with the Oxonian dialectic, I focus mainly on the agora of Socrates, the accademia of Plato, and the lizio di Aristotele – the latter two are gyms – to which we may add the Portico, and a notable NON-gym, to wit: Epicurus’s garden. Cicero found the phrase ‘Epicurus’s garden’ too Hellenistic, and forced Memmio to go and buy the thing. It was henceforward referred to as “Memmio’s Villa,” that Lucrezio  visited to find inspiration for one of the greatest poetic gems in Italian metric and versified philosophy!” Filosofo italiano. A bit of an enigmatic character. LUCREZIO dedicates his great Garden poem to him – L’Orto. M. acquires the ruins of the house in Athens where Epicuro starts his Garden, or Orto. GRICEVS: Memmi, dic mihi, utrum Romae in horto plus philosophiam colas, an olera? MEMMIVS: Grice, si herbae loqui possent, fortasse me meliorem Epicureum esse dicerent—ego autem, dum carmina Lucretii lego, fabam sero. GRICEVS: Memmi, fateor, Roma tua et hortus tuus plus sapientiae olent quam totus Porticus Stoicorum. Dic, quid inter herbas et versus Lucretii requiris? MEMMIVS: Grice, dum inter ramos legor Lucretium et inter radices meditor, invenio in orto meo id quod nec Stoici nec Accademici dare possunt—quietem animi et sapientiam, quae crescit lente, sicut faba ipsa. Memmio, Gaio (a. u. c. DCLXXXVIII). De natura rerum. Roma.

Geronimo Mercuriale (Forli, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – il ginnasio. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats communication as an inferential, cooperative practice in which hearers use rational expectations (relevance, adequacy, sincerity, perspicuity) to recover speaker-intentions and thereby derive implicatures beyond literal sentence meaning; Mercuriale, by contrast, belongs to a Renaissance “gymnastic” rationality in which the regulative ideal is not primarily mutual understanding through inference but the disciplined governance of the human being through regimen—exercise, baths, and habit—so that what counts as “reason” is enacted as a norm for training and health rather than as a norm for interpreting utterances. In the passage’s Oxford-athletics motif this becomes a pointed contrast: where Grice analyzes how conversation itself is a rational game with rules that generate implicatures (e.g., what you responsibly leave unsaid), Mercuriale (author of De arte gymnastica, first published 1569; illustrated edition 1573) exemplifies a program in which the body is treated as an object of systematic classification and prescription (medical, military, athletic exercises) and the mind is improved indirectly by regulated practice; if Grice’s “procedure” is a public, intersubjective calculus of intentions and uptake, Mercuriale’s “procedure” is a physiological-ethical technology aimed at producing stable dispositions. The upshot is that Mercuriale complements Grice by supplying a model of normativity that is not semantic but practical: just as a good trainer infers from signs (symptoms, fatigue, posture) and adjusts a regimen, a Gricean interpreter infers from verbal “signs” and adjusts beliefs about what is meant; yet for Grice the rational work is done in the space between what is said and what is meant, while for Mercuriale the rational work is done in the space between what the body does and what it is being shaped to become. Grice: “At Oxford, you are – as a scholar – either an athlete or an aesthete. I surely fell in the first group, even though I was myself ‘musical’. Oddly, I continued being athletic even as a tutorial fellow. I soon realise that St. John’s lacked a proper cricket team, so I founded the demi-johns!” (At Corpus, I had played both cricket, football – captain of team for a term – and golf, just because my tutor was a Scot!).” Grice: “At Corpus, as it had been at Clifton, cricket featured as my priority, -- philosophy came second!” Celebre per avere per primo teorizzato l'uso della ginnastica nella filosofia. Suoi sono anche il primo saggio sulle malattie cutanee e un'importante saggio, forse la prima mai scritta, di pediatria.  Ritratto raffigurato in "De arte gymnastica.” Dopo aver studiato a Bologna ed aver conseguito la laurea a Padova, dove ha modo di conoscere TRINCAVELLA, segue a Roma Farnese. A causa della sua fama, infatti, i forlivesi lo inviarono come legato presso Pio IV. Pare aver composto il suo celeberrimo saggio sulla ginnastica.  E professore in entrambe le università dove studia. A Padova, in particolare trascorse un periodo molto fecondo, in cui scrive saggi, alcuni dei quali basati sugli appunti presi dagli studenti durante le lezioni. Si reca poi a Pisa, dove divenne tutore di Ferdinando I de' Medici e poté godere di una certa fama. Cura anche altre importanti personalità del suo tempo, tra cui Massimiliano II, che lo nomina cavaliere e conte palatino. Merita di essere citato un famoso episodio che lo vede convocato a Venezia insieme a molti altri filosofi illustri, consultati per decifrare una misteriosa epidemia che colpiva la città. Escluse fin dall'inizio un caso di peste, in quanto solo una minima percentuale della popolazione si era ammalata e il contagio resta comunque molto limitato. Grice: “Mussolini said that ‘ginnasta’ and indeed ‘ginnasio’ were effeminate – ‘ginnico’ is the word!” –il ginnasio, attivita ginnica, bagni romani, “Me and the demijohns,” , “Ginnasia.  Grice takes Mercuriale down from the shelf with the faintly guilty pleasure of a man discovering that the Renaissance could be read as a manual for his own habits. De arte gymnastica, he murmurs, and then pauses over the Latin as if it were already doing the work of a definition: ars, not hobby; gymnasia, not a mere room with ropes and mirrors but a whole discipline of training. He smiles at the modern English shrinkage of the word into gym, as if the language had performed an elision to spare people the embarrassment of admitting they are cultivating the body on purpose. In Oxford, he says, one pretends to be an aesthete until one is forced, by college life, to confess one is also an athlete; and the confession is always made under some respectable cover, a club, a fixture, a foundation ground, a timetable that turns play into duty without ever calling it duty. He starts, characteristically, by classifying Oxford people. There are the aesthetes, who can quote Pater and never perspire, and there are the athletes, who can perspire and still quote Pater if pressed. He says that the division is not moral but institutional: Oxford is built to keep both types in the same dining hall, and to make them think they are pursuing one life when they are really pursuing two. The oddity, he adds, is that he has always belonged to the athlete side of the ledger while refusing to surrender the other side. Music, yes, but also the bat; conversation, yes, but also the pitch. One forgets, he says, how much the University was designed as a machine for producing men who are tolerably happy: if you are good at books you are given a scholarship; if you are good at games you are given a field; and if you are good at both, Oxford quietly behaves as if it has justified itself. He remembers the sequence of foundations as if it were a career in institutional patronage. First, the boy as boarder at Clifton, learning early that games are not optional but part of the curriculum of being taken seriously. Then Corpus: the foundation system in its clean form, the scholar who is meant to learn because he is poor, and then, with a grin borrowed from home, the retort he attributes to Mother, that only the poor learn at Oxford but we all play. At Corpus he played cricket as naturally as he read Aristotle, and for a term he even captained the football side, which he describes as a brief experiment in leadership conducted at sprinting pace rather than at the leisurely pace cricket prefers. Later Rossall: not the collegiate idyll but employment, and still the same paradox, coaching boys in cricket and football while living the life of a master who must be both respectable and physically present, as if the mind could not be trusted unless it also had lungs. Then back again, Merton and the Harmsworth, another foundation in another register, and then the long St John’s phase, first as lecturer tied to the college, then as fellow and tutor, and with it the discovery that a large college can lack, absurdly, a proper cricket side until someone takes the trouble to found one. Hence the Demijohns, on St John’s land up in North Oxford, a club name that carries its own joke of diluted allegiance: still John’s, but not quite, as if adulthood were always only half-separated from undergraduate life. Mercuriale’s treatise, he says, makes this all look less like accident and more like regimen. Mercuriale catalogues exercises and baths as if the body were a philosophical instrument with maintenance requirements; Oxford, more slyly, does the same by embedding games into the moral architecture of the place. The aesthete can pretend he does not care for gymnastic discipline because he has books; the athlete can pretend he does not care for books because he has the pavilion; but the institution quietly makes each depend on the other for status. Even golf makes an appearance, because his Scots tutor Hardie, he remarks, managed to turn the most languid of games into a lesson in method: patience, stance, timing, and the ability to miss without melodrama. Mercuriale would have approved, he says, not because golf is heroic, but because it teaches controlled repetition, and controlled repetition is how both bodies and arguments get trained. Then he makes the dry turn to his own philosophy, as if it were the final stretch of the same track. Conversation, he says, is not fencing, but it is certainly a sport, with rules, tempo, feints, and a premium on not showing all one’s cards at once. If Mercuriale gives you a regimen for the body, he himself has supplied, for good measure, a regimen for talk: a way of seeing that what is left unsaid is often the decisive move, and that the best conversational play is like good opening batting, making runs without giving chances. Perhaps, he says, he was the sportiest of his philosophical generation in Oxford, not because he had more muscle than the others, but because he took games seriously enough to notice that they are not metaphors at all, merely another form of disciplined cooperation. And if he ended by creating conversational implicature, he adds, it was only because Oxford had trained him for decades to live by the same principle in every arena: do your duty in public, keep your method quiet, and let the point be inferred.Grice: Caro Mercuriale, devo confessare che il mio amore per il cricket ha spesso superato quello per la filosofia. Ma tu hai saputo unire ginnastica e pensiero, quasi come se il corpo e la mente giocassero a staffetta! Mercuriale: Grice, sei più filosofo o atleta? In fondo, anche a Oxford si dice che sia meglio sudare in campo che in biblioteca. Io, invece, ho teorizzato che una buona corsa spalanca la mente alle idee migliori, altro che “ginnasio effeminato” come diceva Mussolini! Grice: Allora dovrei fondare un nuovo club filosofico, ma solo per chi sa saltare gli ostacoli… del ragionamento! “Me and the Demijohns,” forse è la prova che il gioco di squadra aiuta anche nei dibattiti accademici. Mercuriale: E magari, Grice, potremmo organizzare una partita di cricket tra filosofi e ginnasti. Chi perde dovrà spiegare, senza sbagliare, la differenza tra ginnico e ginnasta. Scommetto che i forlivesi tiferebbero per me! Mercuriale, Geronimo (1573). De arte gymnastica. Venezia: Giunti.

Piero Meriggi (Como, Lombardia): il deutero-esperanto. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes communicative sense depend on rationally reconstructible intentions under a background presumption of cooperative talk, so that implicature arises when a hearer can work out what an utterer meant to get across (beyond what was said) by treating the utterance as a move in a rational, normatively constrained exchange; Meriggi, as your passage frames him, pushes on a different axis by treating meaning as partly grounded in the material shape of expression itself, via a priori language-planning and phono-symbolic “natural” values of sounds (a, i, u, etc.), so that what a sign means is tied less to conversationally negotiated intention-and-inference and more to a designed code whose semantic assignments are supposed to be intelligible in virtue of articulation, physiology, or iconic fit. In Gricean terms, Meriggi’s deutero-Esperanto/blaia zimondal is a stress-test for the social dimension of meaning: a language that nobody uses may have internal systematicity, but it lacks the population-level uptake and shared practical expectations that make implicatures calculable and make speaker-meaning succeed as a public action; conversely, Grice’s Brighton joke about inventing a language no one speaks highlights that private procedures and idiosyncratic codes do not yet amount to communicative meaning unless they project into a community of interpreters who can recognize intentions and coordinate on rules. So while Meriggi exemplifies a constructive, code-first rationality (build the semantics into the phonetic inventory; let meaning ride on designed symbolics), Grice exemplifies an interaction-first rationality (meaning is what agents do with expressions in cooperative practice; implicature is the rational surplus generated by that practice), and the contrast turns on where “reason” is located: for Meriggi, chiefly in the architect’s design of a semiotic system; for Grice, chiefly in the hearer’s and speaker’s shared capacity to infer, under public norms, what is meant beyond what is said. Grice: “When I was at Brighton – Anna McCormack responded, but few quote her! – I played with ‘Deutero-Esperanto.’ Earlier in my William James set on logic and conversation, I had played with myself, ‘lying in the tub’ and coming up with a new highway code – ‘that nobody uses’ – This is my more specific reflection on what I mean by a ‘procedure’ which springs from the idiosyncratic utterer and may project or not into an intended population. At Brighton, I was more direct, if more controversial, although McCormack never picked up the irony. I stated that I could invent a new language, call it ‘Deutero-Esperanto’ that nobody ever speaks! Of course, for Witters and his followers – at the time, some of my former colleagues, such as D. F. Pears – that would be nonsensical! Now, we don’t think Italian philosophers as being per se Gricieans – as Katz and Fodor spell my surname in adjectival dress – but there were possibly more inventors of new languages in Italy than in the rest of the world. Compared to Meriggi, Bishop Wilkins should have continued preaching!” Citato da VAILATI , “SCRITTI” – “un appasionato”. Progetto di lingua a priori, il blaia zimondal è elaborato da M., professore dell'istituto tecnico di Como. Il blaia zimondal parte da un principio fono-simbolico. Ciascun *suono* possede un significato naturale (Grice) o *senso* generale corrispondente al suo modo naturale di formazione fisiologico – fisi, NATURA -- luogo e modo di articolazione dei foni. Così ad esempio -- a, vocale aperta, esprime ciò che è grande, alto, forte, bianco, evidente. -- i, vocale ANTERIORE alta, per il fatto che è prodotta serrando quasi completamente la bocca, esprime ciò che è piccolo, basso, leggero, interiore -- u, vocale POSTERIORE alta, esprime ciò che è basso, scuro, pesante, lontano, futuro. deutero-esperanto. Grice has Meriggi’s title in front of him and, as if the word itself had invited the lecture, begins by treating declinatio as the proper name for a very definite kind of order: the ordered variation of a noun by case and number, governed by a paradigm and not by whim. He says that people use declension loosely, but that in a serious grammar it means the whole machine, not merely one ending, and that Meriggi, by choosing the Latinised title, is signalling that he intends to be read with a schoolmaster’s exactness. Licio, he adds, is not a flourish but a technical referent, and so the question becomes a comparative one, the only kind he trusts: what does a masculine, a feminine, and a neuter noun look like when you march it, case by case, through four languages that each pretend, in different ways, to make gender and case rational. He chooses a representative masculine noun, and he does what irritates people who prefer ideas to morphology: he starts with singular and he starts with the nominative, as if the nominative were a moral right. Latin first, because Latin is the pedagogical baseline. Nominative as the subject form, genitive as the possessive and the anchor for the rest, accusative as the direct object, dative as the indirect, ablative as the case of separation and instrument and far too many other things, and then, with a pedant’s pleasure, he pauses on the locative, remarking that Latin pretends not to have it while quietly keeping it alive in a few stubborn items and in place names, and that a man who says Romae is using a case the textbooks bury out of embarrassment. Greek next, where the same chain is recognisable but the article and the endings make the paradigm look more explicitly worked, and where, if one is being honest, the dative is doing the work that Latin spreads across dative and ablative. Anglo-Saxon then, because it preserves enough case to make the comparison nontrivial: nominative, accusative, genitive, dative, with the instrumental either shadowy or merged depending on how fussy you are, and with grammatical gender still alive in a way modern English has forgotten how to tolerate. And then Lycian, where the case system is neither Latin nor Greek nor Germanic, but still Indo-European enough to invite the same questions, with a nominative and an accusative that behave as you would expect, and with the oblique cases doing the real classificatory labour. He repeats the exercise with a feminine noun, insisting that the point is not to show off endings but to show what a language thinks it is doing when it marks roles. Latin’s first declension looks almost too neat, he says, until you remember that the neatness is a historical accident made into a schoolroom ideal. Greek’s feminine paradigms remind you that gender is not a semantic label but a grammatical commitment: the forms tell you what counts as a subject and what counts as an object before anyone has uttered a word of intention. Anglo-Saxon’s feminine forms, he remarks, are the closest thing English ever had to a public guarantee that syntactic role would not be left to mere word order. Lycian again, because this is where Meriggi’s title bites: it is one thing to know declension in the classical languages; it is another to follow declension in a language you do not speak, where the paradigm has to be inferred from inscriptions and distributional patterns rather than heard as a living habit. Then he does the neuter, and here he becomes positively pleased with himself, because the neuter lets him make the point that three genders are not three kinds of thing but three kinds of agreement, and that the notorious neuter rule in Greek and Latin, with nominative and accusative identical and the plural sometimes looking like a singular, is not a curiosity but a deep structural fact about how those languages trade off form against function. Anglo-Saxon, he says, preserves the neuter in a way that makes the old Indo-European pattern visible without the Greek article and without Latin’s later levelling. Lycian, again, is the test case: does it preserve the neuter patterns that a comparative philologist expects, and if it does, what has been preserved and what has been remodelled. Only then does he permit himself plural, and he does it in the same chain, nominative through the obliques, as if the plural were merely the singular repeated with discipline. Midway he stops to make his one joke about the dual, and he makes it with the air of a man correcting a lazy historical imagination: Greek has a dual and uses it in a way that can still be seen, fossil-like, in certain forms; and the dual, he says, never quite dies in English culture either, because it survives as a conceptual ghost in both, and in the old ambi- of Latin, and in the whole human impulse to treat two as a special number rather than merely the first plural. Anglo-Saxon, he adds, has its own dual pronouns, and that fact alone should cure anyone of thinking that modern English was always as indifferent to number as it now pretends to be. At the end he closes Meriggi’s paper with the satisfaction of having turned one bibliographic title into a small map of European grammatical conscience. Declinazione, he says, is not merely morphology; it is a picture of what a linguistic community chooses to make explicit, publicly, about role, relation, and reference. Meriggi, by forcing you to look at Lycian endings with the same seriousness you give to Latin and Greek, is quietly asking the Gricean question from the other side: before we ever infer what someone means, what have our languages already decided to mark, case by case, as the default machinery of intelligibility.Grice: Meriggi, devo ammettere che il tuo progetto di deutero-esperanto mi ha affascinato. Davvero credi sia possibile creare una lingua che nessuno parla, eppure abbia senso filosofico? Meriggi: Caro Grice, per me ogni lingua nasce sempre da un bisogno umano profondo, anche se resta "incompresa". Il blaia zimondal, con i suoi principi fono-simbolici, è un esperimento per dimostrare che ogni suono ha già in sé un significato naturale. Grice: Quindi, se ti capisco bene, una 'a' non è solo una lettera, ma racconta di grandezza o luminosità? Mi ricorda i miei giochi sul linguaggio che "nessuno usa", quasi come inventare un codice della strada solo per sé stessi! Meriggi: Esatto! E forse, Grice, come tu stesso sostieni, ogni atto linguistico nasce dall’idiosincrasia dell’emittente, ma può sempre diventare, con fortuna, patrimonio di molti. L’importante è ascoltare la musica nascosta dietro ogni suono. Meriggi, Piero (1929). La declinazione del licio. Rendiconti dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei

Nicolao Merker (Trento): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – l’etologia filosofica – o tempora o mores -- il filo d’Arianna – Arianna abbandonata a Nasso. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats understanding as a disciplined inference from what is said plus a rational presumption of cooperative purpose (so that implicature is, in principle, recoverable from shared expectations and can be cancelled, defended, or recalculated); Merker, by contrast, is best read in your passage as shifting the explanatory spotlight from the local mechanics of inference to the larger “ethological” and historical conditions that make those inferences socially available in the first place—ethos as the settled habits of a form of life, and even ethnos as the boundary-marking of group identity that sets who counts as an insider hearer with the right background. Where Grice abstracts toward a general, almost formal story about how intention and rationality govern conversational meaning across contexts, Merker’s preferred metaphors (the Ariadne thread, the labyrinth, abandonment at Naxos) suggest that “context” is not merely a set of parameters for computing implicature but a culturally and historically sedimented pathway through which interpreters are guided (or misled), and that breakdowns in communication often reflect conflicts of ethos—shared norms, moral-political temperaments, and identity narratives—rather than failures of logic alone. In that sense, Merker complements Grice: Grice gives the inferential engine of implicature; Merker supplies the genealogy and “mores” that explain why certain implicatures feel natural, why some audiences are excluded from uptake, and why what counts as reasonable conversational behavior is itself historically variable—an Ariadne-thread problem as much as a maxim-following problem. Grice: “I like to consider myself a philosophical ethologist. As Merker reminds us, ethos is possibly related to ‘ethnos,’ but possibly not!” Grice: “In fact, I while I sort of detest etymologies, which usually refute my theories – cf. ‘mean’ – I must say that ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethos’ are etymologically relate – both originating from the same proto-indo-european root s(w)we- a reflexive pronoun referring to one’s own, or a social group. While ‘ethnic’ focuses on shared origins and group identity, ‘ethos’ emphasizes the characteristic customs, values, and morality of a person, group, or culture. Therefore, while they have distinct meanings in modern English, they share a common etymological thread in ancient Greek, reflecting concepts of community and shared cultural identity!” Grice: “At Oxford, we wouldn’t consider M. an Italian philosopher, as we don’t consider Ayer an English philosopher – Anglo-Jewish at most. M. is different, though!” Filosofo italiano. Trento, Trentino. Grice: “My favourite of his books is ‘storia della filosofia ai fumetti.” Grice: “The fact that he found Italian words for all that Kant says in “Metafisica dei costume” is admirable! I love M., and for many reasons; he has philosophised on what makes me an Englishman: my blood, or the fact that I was born in Harrborne? I love M.: he uses metaphors aptly like ‘il filo d’Arianna’ to refer to what I pompously call ‘the general theory of context.’ --Si laurea a Messina. Trascorse un periodo di ricerche in Germania. Allievo di VOLPE, insegna a Messina e Roma. Cura edizioni italiane di classici dell'età della Riforma, dell'Illuminismo e dell'idealismo, nonché di Marx, Engels e del marxismo. Storia della filosofia, l’eta antica, il filo d’Arianna, Teseo e il minotauro, omo-sociale, Teseo, Arianna abandonata, giacobinismo, populismo etnico, etnico ennico etnicita ennicita, etnos, Greek ethnos, Latin ethnos. Grice does what he always does: he begins pedantically, by locating Trento the old way, as a comune and as the chief town of its provincia, with the regione named as he would have heard it before the later bureaucratic refinements had settled into everyone’s mouths. Then his ear catches on the surname. Merker, he says, is not the sort of name one expects to find filed among the Rossi and Bianchi; it has the look of a border-name, Germanic in shape, and therefore (he adds, cautiously, because he dislikes grand etymological confidence) not at all surprising in Trento, where the map itself invites the thought that names may travel as readily as people do. From that small onomastic point he makes the larger, characteristically Oxford analogy: Oxford too has its internal borders, less mountainous but no less real in accent and ancestry. A man may be “born in Oxford” and still be, in the social imagination, a Scot by migration or a Welshman by the sound of his consonants; and Grice mentions, with the air of a tutor producing an example rather than a memoir, the Scots presence in his own education, the Hardie line, the way a name or a voice can quietly carry a second geography into a room. So, he says, one should not be too quick to read “Italian philosopher” off either the place of birth or the language of publication. Trento can produce an Italian citizen with a Germanic surname, and Oxford can produce an English don with a Celtic tutorial ancestry; the moral is not genealogical purity but the conversational fact that background is always already doing classificatory work, often before anyone has stated a thesis. He then turns, as if the surname had been only the thread that got him into the labyrinth, to Merker’s own preferred thread: Ariadne, guidance, abandonment. Names, he says, are like that: a small filament that can either lead an audience safely through context or leave them stranded, depending on what they presume about who counts as “one of us.” And here he gives Merker his due: where Grice builds an inferential engine for implicature, Merker reminds him that the engine runs on a fuel that is not evenly distributed, the mores of a form of life, the local habits by which a hearer is licensed to take the next step. The Germanic-looking Merker in Italian Trento is therefore not merely a biographical curiosity but a miniature demonstration of Merker’s point: ethos and boundary can meet in a single proper name, and the resulting expectations can steer interpretation as surely as any maxim.Grice: Caro Merker, permettimi una curiosità: sono quasi sorpreso che i tuoi connazionali italiani non abbiano mai pensato di italianizzare il tuo cognome in “Merchero”! Sai com’è, da queste parti ogni nome straniero viene subito infilato nel tritacarne della tradizione... Merker: Ah, Grice, se sapessi! Al liceo classico i miei compagni ci hanno subito pensato: “Merchero”, “Mercurio”, e una volta addirittura “Marchese”! Mi divertivo molto: bastava sentire quell’accento trentino su un cognome così palesemente non italiano per far sorridere tutti. Grice: D’altronde, “Merker” suona proprio fuori dal coro in mezzo a tutti quei Rossi, Bianchi, e Verdi... Immagino anche i tuoi professori alle prese con la pronuncia: un piccolo labirinto, degno del filo d’Arianna che tanto ami evocare! Merker: Proprio così! E pensa che, tra uno scherzo e una battuta sull’etnia e sull’ethos, ho imparato che anche il nome può diventare una piccola lezione di filosofia: ci ricorda chi siamo, da dove veniamo e quanta ironia serve per restare sé stessi in mezzo ai minotauri della burocrazia italiana! Merker, Nicolao (1961). Le origini della logica hegeliana. Hegel a Jena. Feltrinelli.

Marco Valerio Messalla Corvino (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’orto romano. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning explains how hearers rationally recover what a speaker means beyond what is literally said by presuming a cooperative, purposive exchange and then calculating implicatures from that presumption plus shared expectations about relevance, informativeness, and manner; the Messalla passage, by contrast, relocates that Gricean rationality into a Roman-Epicurean “garden” politics of speech, where the point of indirectness is not just efficient information-transfer but cultivated social living under pressure (how to speak, and when to abstain, amid Caesar, the Senate’s noise, and the transition to Augustus). Where Grice treats implicature as a principled inferential phenomenon grounded in mutual recognition of intentions, Messalla-as-Epicurean (and as orator-statesman moving between republican opposition and later accommodation) highlights a setting in which strategic quiet, tactful redirection, and “sending someone to the Portico to learn to be silent” are themselves rational conversational moves: implicatures become tools for maintaining concord, face, and safety, not merely theoretical byproducts of maxims. In short, Grice provides the general mechanism (reasoned inference from cooperative norms), while Messalla supplies a historically situated ethos in which conversational reason is horticultural and civic: meaning is managed like a garden—pruned, deflected, and sometimes deliberately left unsaid—so that what is implicated can do political and ethical work that explicit assertion cannot. Grice: “I refer to the Athenian dialectic rather broadly, and just to compare it to the Oxonian dialectic – and I concentrate only in three philosophers: Socrates, of the Agora, Plato, of the Academy, and Aristotele, of the Academy and his own Lycaeum – but there were at least two further sects which I should have taken into account. One is referred to by the Italians as ‘Il Portico,’ since that is what ‘stoa’ means – The other is referred to by Italians as ‘L’Orto’ since its founder, Epicurus, had a thing for ‘gardening’! The topic quite overlaps with the Oxonian dialectic, seeing that for most of the late nineteenth-century, Oxonian dialetic was of the very gardening type – as a cursory glimpse of Pater’s Marcus the Epicurean will testify!” -- Filosofo italiano. Garden. Friend of Orazio. They study philosophy together. He opposea GIULIO  Cesare but eventually makes his peace with Ottaviano. He writes philosophical treatises. Allow me to address briefly the L’ORTO philosophy within the context of the difficult tines covering the years which witness the downfall of the republic and the birth of the principate. In  'L’ORTO in Revolt' (J.R.S.) Momigliano takes as a starting point the conversion to L’ORTO of CASSIO who rapidly comes to the conclusion that GIULIO Caesar has to be eliminated because of what appear to be his tyrannical tendencies. The author emphasises that during this crucial period the adherents of the L’ORTO philosophy did not maintain a passive political aloofness. While some followers of L’ORTO actively support GIULIO in a noderate way, a mumber oppose him, among whom are I. Manlio Torquato, Trebiano, L. Papirio Paeto, M. Fadio Gallo, and, as the evidence suggests, L. Saufeio and Statilio. Monigliano concludes with the statement that on the whole, the events prove that Cassio is not an exceptional case among the contemporary L’ORTO. Portico orto. GRICEVS: Salvē, MESSALLA; audīvi tē de Porticū et de Ortō disputāre: Oxoniēnsēs quoque hortulānī sunt—sed noster hortus plēnus est glossārum. MESSALLA: Salvē, GRICEVE; hortulānī? Ego certe Epicūrī hortum colō, ubi voluptās in pace seritur; vōs autem in Oxoniā herbas vocātis “distinctionēs” et cotīdiē sarculōs, id est syllogismōs, agitātis. GRICEVS: At mihi vidētur Orto ipsum esse schola implicātūrae: cum Epicūrus “abstinē” dicit, saepe significat “abstinē a strepitū senātūs”—id est, Caesarī locum relinque. MESSALLA: Rectē; sed ego, amīcus Horātiī, hoc addō: sī quis in hortō meō de rē pūblicā clāmat, eum leniter monēbō—sin pergat, eum ad Porticūm mittam, ut ibi stans discat tacēre. Messalla, Marco Valerio (a. u. c. DCCXXIII). De libertate et concordia. Roma.

Gregorio Messere (Torre Santa Sussana, Brindisi, Puglia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale  – l’implicatura di Sileno. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning makes what a speaker means depend on publicly intelligible rational patterns: hearers assume (ceteris paribus) cooperative, purposive talk and can therefore work out implicatures as disciplined inferences from what is said plus shared expectations about relevance, adequacy, sincerity, and manner; in your Messere vignette, by contrast, “our Socrates” is less a theorist of cooperative exchange than an emblem of elenchus under pressure, and the key contrast is that Messere’s life-story (seminary pedagogy, accusations, seven years’ imprisonment, self-training in Greek, later Neapolitan intellectual prominence) foregrounds how conversational reason can survive hostile contexts where cooperation is not guaranteed and where meaning must be managed through stance, reticence, and irony. The “Sileno” thread sharpens this: Alcibiades’ Silenus trope (Socrates as outwardly plain, inwardly rich) becomes a metapragmatic reminder that interlocutors routinely traffic in layered meaning—praise that carries a barb, honorifics that insinuate ridicule, public labels that impose an implicature one must live under—so Messere functions as a case in which implicature is not merely computed but socially weaponized (a community can “call you Socrates” while half-meaning “a Silenus,” i.e., a figure whose surface invites misreading). Where Grice’s program stresses the calculability and cancellability of implicatures under a rational cooperative presumption, Messere dramatizes the asymmetry of power in real exchanges: accusations, institutional gatekeeping, and reputational framing can force implicatures onto a speaker irrespective of his intentions, making “reason in conversation” not only an inferential norm but also a moral and civic practice of resisting imposed readings, using learned language (Greek), timing (silences), and wit to restore control over what is taken to be meant. Grice: “While I claim that most of what I refer to as the Athenian dialectic is due to Aristotle, it may well be thought to originate with Socrates. The Italians know this well – as when they call M. ‘our Socrates’!” -Ricevuti i primi rudimenti del sapere dai chierici locali, il suo padre, Pietro M., sebbene non agiato, decide di fargli frequentare il seminario d‘Oria, assecondando così il suo vivo desiderio di intraprendere la carriera ecclesiastica, qui dimostra sin da subito una profonda passione per lo studio. Ordinato sacerdote per poi ritornare al paese natìo, dove divenne un maestro di grande dottrina. S’applica allo studio della filosofia, della matematica, della storia ecclesiastica e civile, nonché anche alla musica e al canto. Incolpato dell'omicidio di un chierico,  è messo in prigione nelle carceri del vescovo d‘Oria, dove rimane rinchiuso per sette anni, tuttavia non si lascia mai abbattere dallo sconforto. Anzi, procuratosi alcuni libri, M. s’applica allo studio della lingua greca, per la quale già aveva dimostrato una forte predisposizione. Dopo un lungo e dibattuto processo, la sentenza finale lo dichiarò innocente e assolto da qualsiasi reato. Risentito con i suoi concittadini per averlo ingiustamente ritenuto reo, dichiarò che il suo paese mai più lo avrebbe rivisto. Fu così che M. partì per Napoli, dove rimase fino alla morte. Nella città partenopea ebbe modo di affinare e approfondire la sua cultura, divenendo un personaggio di rilievo nel mondo intellettuale napoletano del tempo. La grande conoscenza della lingua greca gli conferì grande notorietà nonché una cattedra di Lettura Greca, che mantenne fino all'anno della morte, presso l'Università degli studi di Napoli. Tale cattedra  era stata nuovamente istituita  a spese di Giuseppe Valletta, filosofo, letterato e giureconsulto dell'epoca ed amico di M.. Grice: “When they called M. ‘Socrate’ I hope they don’t mean Alcibiades’s implicature, ‘my dear Sileno!’” Implicature, Sileno, Socrates, Socrate Sileno, Socrate, Silenus. St John’s SCR, Michaelmas 1948. The room has that post-war polish which is really only a kind of tiredness dressed up: people have returned, committees have resumed, and Oxford is once again pretending that the world is made of minutes. Russell had arrived with the quiet confidence of someone who has been told, by a librarian or by fate, that he is “needed.” He was not yet, to me, a character, only a newly-elected fellow with the fresh paint still on his title. Irony, isn’t it, Grice, he said, dropping into the chair opposite as if the chair were a continuation of the conversation rather than its beginning. You philosophy, I classics. I hated the remark at once, not because it was false, but because it was the sort of truth that is always smuggled in under the name irony. It’s only irony if you mean something by it, Russell. I mean, he said, that they tell me you’re a Latinist. Who tells you that. The librarian. I could hear the whole scene in my head: the librarian, half joking and wholly earnest, announcing the new appointment by means of a category. Have you met our new Latinist. The phrase made my teeth itch. Oxford loves labels that are both too big and too small. Have you met our new Latinist, I said, repeating it with the contempt it deserved. Yes, Russell said, as if bracing. I suppose I’m to accept it. I nearly said yes, often, at the Flag and Lamb, and then I stopped. There are jokes you do not hand to a new colleague on his first week, because the new colleague is still deciding whether you are a colleague or a nuisance. A Latinist, I said, is a man with a known vice. A classicist is a man with two vices and no confession. Russell gave a small smile, the sort that admits the point without paying for it. And what are you reading, Grice. Oh, nothing important. A bit of Neapolitan gossip, really. An inaugural lezione in Greek. In Greek. Naples, 1681. Russell leaned forward. They had a Chair just for Greek. So it seems. A cattedra di Lettura Greca, at the University of Naples. And you’re reading this because… Because I am trying to decide whether it is a memory, a memoria, or merely an excuse to say the word Greek in a room full of men who prefer Latin. Russell had the decency to look wounded, which was exactly what I wanted. A man who does not defend himself is impossible to tease. I don’t prefer Latin, Russell said. You don’t. Not in your sense. In my sense I mean: you will, eventually, end up associated with Latin whether you like it or not, because Oxford distributes reputations by need, not by love. Russell gave me a look: not hostile, not yet; merely the look of someone marking you as a phenomenon. And Naples in 1681, he said, had a Greek chair. Yes. Funded by a certain Valletta, and given to a man named Messere. Messere. Gregorio Messere. Pugliese by birth, Napolitan by adoption. Forty-four at the time, by my arithmetic. Russell’s eyebrows went up, just slightly, as if arithmetic were a moral virtue. And you have the text of his inaugural lecture. I have no such thing. I have a notice, a report, a bibliographical smell. But I am an Oxford man, and therefore I cannot see a new Chair without imagining the speech that must have been made to justify it. Russell laughed. That is very Oxford. No, it’s very human. Oxford only does it with better Latin. Russell took the paper from me with the calm of someone trained to handle documents. He read the line aloud, slowly, as if Latin and Greek might be hiding inside it. Lettura Greca. Yes. So at Naples they institutionalised Greek reading as an office. They did. And at Oxford. At Oxford we institutionalise Greek reading as a title, I said, and pointed with my chin at the air, as if the Regius Professor were hovering somewhere above the port. There is a Regius Professor of Greek. Russell nodded. Dodds, at the moment. Yes. And yet you will still be called a Latinist. Because the librarian needs a noun. Because Oxford needs a simplification. Russell handed the paper back. But surely Bologna had it hundreds of years earlier, he said, because this is what classicists do when they feel the conversation drifting too far into England: they restore Italy to the centre by means of “surely”. Surely, Russell, I said, is not an argument. It is a polite form of pressure. But did Bologna have a Greek chair earlier. I expect Bologna had Greeks before it had chairs, I said. And Naples had a chair before it had enough Greeks to deserve it. That is the difference. Naples was declaring an intention. Russell looked pleased by that, and then immediately suspicious, because he had not yet decided whether my praise was praise. And why are you interested in Messere. Because Messere is a useful joke under a serious entry. Forty-four, Naples, 1681, teaching Greek under an endowed arrangement. It makes “our Socrates” sound less like a nickname and more like a professional hazard. Russell frowned. “Our Socrates.” That is what they call him, or so the Italians say. And you believe it. I don’t believe it. I hear it. And I ask: what is being implied when a man is called Socrates. Compliment. Threat. Warning. Perhaps all three at once. And then, more to the point, what does the man do to survive the label. Russell leaned back. You philosophers. You hear a compliment and start looking for the knife. Not the knife, Russell. The mechanism. Compliments are how institutions move people without admitting it. Russell glanced again at the paper. So: Naples has a Greek chair. Oxford has a Greek chair. Yet Oxford calls its new fellow a Latinist. Exactly. And you think that matters. It matters because it is the easiest case of the general rule: one word, one office, one man, many senses. Classics is a cover-name. Latinist is a misdescription. And Greek, in England, is always somebody’s second love even when it is their first competence. Russell looked at me, and I could see him doing what good classicists do: checking the text behind the phrase. I did Mods in Greek and Latin, he said, very calmly. And you survived. With difficulty. Good. Then you are already an Oxford Greek. Oxford Greek is not a language; it is a biography. Russell laughed again, more openly. And Messere. Messere is a reminder that “Greek” can be an institution rather than a hobby. Naples made it a chair in 1681. Oxford made it Regius centuries earlier, yes, but we behave as if Greek is still an elective refinement. Russell took a sip of port, as if considering whether to allow himself a confession. The truth is, he said, I like Greek because it misbehaves. Latin behaves. That is the first honest sentence you’ve said, Russell. That’s unfair. No, it’s a compliment. And I mean it without the knife. Russell’s smile tightened. Now who’s implying. I am, I said, and heard myself. I am, in other words, doing the one thing that ruins philosophy in public: making the implicature explicit. Russell looked delighted, which annoyed me, because I had handed him the advantage. So you see, he said. You do belong in philosophy. And you, I said, do belong in classics. Classics is where one learns how to enjoy misbehaviour while pretending it is grammar. He stood to go, the way new fellows do, with the modest urgency of people who still feel they must be seen doing something. And Grice. Yes. I shan’t tell the librarian you object to “Latinist.” Don’t. Let him keep his noun. But if he calls you a Latinist again, correct him in Greek. Russell laughed, and went out. And I thought, privately, that Oxford had once again done its favourite trick: it had taken a man whose heart would always be in Greek and placed him where the College needed Latin shored up. Classics, indeed: the art of being named for what the institution requires while you go on loving what you love.Grice: Messere, ti chiamano “il nostro Socrate”, ma vorrei essere certo che non intendano il Sileno di Alcibiade! Com’è vivere con questa implicatura sulle spalle? Messere: Grice, avessi avuto la saggezza di Sileno, forse avrei evitato sette anni tra le grinfie del vescovo d’Oria! Ma, come si dice a Torre Santa Susanna, “l’importante è non perdere la musica anche quando ti chiudono in cella”. Grice: Ah, la musica nascosta dietro ogni suono... e dietro ogni accusa ingiusta! Tu, tra filosofia, canto e greco, sembri un vero campione di resilienza: hai mai pensato di scrivere un trattato su “Sileno e la pazienza del filosofo pugliese”? Messere: Potrebbe essere una bella idea! D’altronde, in prigione ho avuto tutto il tempo per imparare il greco: se a Napoli ho brillato, lo devo anche ai silenzi di Oria. Del resto, come dice il proverbio, “chi non ha peccato, ha almeno un chierico che lo accusa!”. Messere, Gregorio (1681). Lezione inaugurale greco – Napoli.

Domenico Grimaldi di Messimeri (Seminara, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats communication as a rational, intention-guided cooperative enterprise in which hearers are entitled to infer more than is said (conversational implicature) by assuming broadly shared norms of relevance, informativeness, and sincerity; “Messimeri” (Domenico Grimaldi, Marchese di Messimeri, 1735–1805, a Calabrian-Naples/Genovesi-linked Enlightenment economist and agrarian reformer, author of works such as Saggio di economia campestre per la Calabria Ultra, 1770, and active in trans-European agrarian/economic societies) reframes that Gricean picture by relocating “reason” from the micro-logic of utterance interpretation to the macro-practice of exchange, where market transactions and policy proposals function like structured conversations with their own expectations, strategic silences, and socially enforced “maxims” (credit, trust, reciprocity, and informational signalling). So where Grice analyzes how implicatures are calculable from what is said plus rational assumptions about cooperative talk, a Messimeri-style “philosophical economy” stresses that the same inferential apparatus operates in price signals, contractual language, and reform discourse, but under institutional constraints (property regimes, incentives, public administration) that make “cooperation” less a polite default and more a negotiated equilibrium; implicature in this register becomes the practical art by which agents communicate commitments, quality, risk, and credibility without always stating them, and conversational reason becomes a discipline of coordination under scarcity rather than primarily a theory of speaker-meaning. Grice: “At Oxford, we rarely study philosophical aeconomics, but they do so at Cambridge – witness Keynes!” Filosofo italiano. Seminara, Reggio Calabria, Calabria. Grice: “He was of a noble family – he was into the free market – so his is a philosophical economy.”  Esponente dell'illuminismo napoletano.  Francesco Mario Pagano. Nato in una famiglia aristocratica che faceva risalire le proprie origini alla nota famiglia di Genova, ricevette la prima educazione dal padre, il marchese Pio Grimaldi, un uomo colto che aveva cominciato a introdurre criteri di conduzione innovativi nelle sue proprietà terriere, peraltro non molto estese, di Seminara. Non essendo molto ricco, il padre lo avviò agli studi giuridici, in previsione di una possibile professione forense, all'Napoli. Nella capitale napoletana M. fu raggiunto dal fratello minore Francescantonio, fece parte con il fratello dell'Accademia dell'Arboscello, frequenta le lezioni di economia di Genovesi. Si trasferì a Genova, dove ottenne la riammissione nel patriziato della Repubblica di Genova, ottenendo così il permesso di esercitare alcune magistrature. In Liguria, tuttavia, M. ha modo di approfondire gli aspetti tecnici, economici e sociali legati all'agricoltura il cui studio lo spinse a viaggi in Francia, specie in Provenza, in Piemonte e in Svizzera. Si interessò in particolare alla colture dell'ulivo e del gelso per l'allevamento dei bachi da seta. Venne accolto fra l'altro nell'Accademia dei Georgofili, che premiò una memoria, nella Società economica di Berna, un centro di cultura fisiocratica, e nella Société royale d'agriculture di Parigi.  Saggio di economia campestre per la Calabria Ultra  François Quesnay, maggior rappresentante della fisiocrazia. Vignette St John’s, 1938. A lecture-room that still thinks it is a chapel: wood, draughts, the faint moral threat of portraits. I had been lent to St John’s from Merton in the way one lends a book one hasn’t read: with optimism and a reminder to return me in good condition. The advertised topic was Personal Identity and Memory. I had meant to lecture. I had, in other words, meant to talk continuously while other people remained silent. This was already a misunderstanding of my own temperament. I began with a sentence I immediately regretted for being too much like a thesis. If you want a grip on personal identity, I said, you begin with memory. Harlowe, who had the air of a man determined to make the thing “practical”, raised a hand at once. Memory, Grice? I don’t follow. That’s exactly the difficulty, I said, and realised too late that I had answered him as if he were a tutee and not a member of an audience. A lecturer is meant to prevent questions from hatching. I, by instinct, warm them. You mean memory as in recollection, Harlowe. But memory is used in oh so many ways, Grice. I know, I said. That’s my whole point. He then did the one thing that guarantees an Oxford philosopher will stop lecturing and start conversing: he produced a book as evidence. As a matter of fact, he said, I’ve been reading a memory. A memory. A memoria, he corrected, and he said it with a faint Italian flourish, as if vowels were already an argument. I stopped. The word memoria sat on the air like a foreign coin. You’ve been reading an actual memoria. Yes. By Messimeri. Messimeri, I repeated, as if repetition would either clarify or summon the man. Grimaldi, really. Domenico Grimaldi. Marchese di Messimeri. That is not a memory, I said. That is a memorandum. Or a memoir. Or, at worst, a paper. But it is not a memory in the sense Locke means, or in the sense I mean. Harlowe looked pleased. He had succeeded, within three minutes, in dragging me from my own topic into his. It’s called a memoria, he said again, and began to read with the careful pomp of someone giving Latin verse in school. Memoria sopra di una certa specie di pianta pratense chiamata sulla. I couldn’t help it. Memoria sopra. Over. As in over the moon. As in the cow jumped. Harlowe blinked. It just means “on”, he said. Of course it does. That’s what “over” always means, until it means “finished”. Go on. Di una certa specie. A certain species, I said. Not certain in Descartes’s sense. Certain in Cicero’s sense: aliquis. Some chap. Some plant. Chiamata sulla, Harlowe continued. Called sulla, I said, and leaned into the cruelty because the room was listening now and I felt I had to reward them. Or miscalled Sulla. Who was an emperor, Harlowe? Or merely a dictator with delusions of permanence. Sulla, Harlowe said flatly, is a plant. Then we are safe from Roman politics for the moment. He looked down at the page again, like a man who has come with a train timetable and intends to use it. What plant. Now we were back to the word species, which is a dangerous word in a lecture because it can mean classification, kind, specimen, and sometimes merely “sort of thing”, which is what philosophers secretly mean by it when they think they’re being scientific. The plant called sulla is Hedysarum coronarium, Harlowe said, pleased with himself for producing the Latin as if it were the decisive move. Forage. Legume. Pea-family business. I approved in spite of myself. A Latin binomial is the best way to calm a philosophical room: it looks exact, which makes everybody behave as if they are exact. Hedysarum coronarium, I repeated. The crown sweetener. Coronarium. Good. A garland plant. A plant already designed to be worn as if it had opinions. And in modern botany it’s often filed under Sulla rather than Hedysarum, Harlowe added, as if he were doing me the kindness of an update. So the plant is now called Sulla, and it was already called sulla. Delightful. A case where ordinary language has beaten taxonomy by arriving first. And there you have it, Harlowe said, the real point. It’s a memoria. For the Georgofili. Could the Georgofili have a collective memory then. That, I said, is exactly the unphilosophical question I was hoping you would ask, because it allows me to look philosophical while merely being grammatical. The room laughed in the polite way it laughs when it is grateful to be given permission. No. The Georgofili do not have a collective memory in the Lockean sense. They have minutes. Records. Papers. Archives. What they call memorie are not memories. They are things to be remembered. Or things offered for remembrance. Or simply things filed under a rubric. So only Messimeri has the memory. Only Messimeri has the memory, if he has one at all. The rest is label. But why call it memoria, Harlowe insisted, as if he were prosecuting a charge. Because academies like to pretend that what they circulate is recollection rather than information. It sounds less pushy. Less commercial. More civilised. You call it a memoria and you imply: this is not mere novelty; it belongs to a tradition. It deserves to be kept. This was, I admit, not lecture but sermon. Still, it moved the room along. Harlowe would not let me stop there. And the plant itself, he said, why is it called sulla. Is it in memory of Sulla. In memory of Sulla, I repeated, as if tasting the absurdity. Now, Harlowe, I said, you are doing the thing philosophers do when they are tired: turning a coincidence into a theory. But it’s plausible. It’s only plausible because you want it to be witty. The plant-name “sulla” is just the common name; the Latin does not commemorate the dictator. Hedysarum coronarium is not an imperial monument. Harlowe looked faintly disappointed. So how many memories, then. How many what. How many memories in the whole business. There’s the memoria as paper. There’s Messimeri’s memory that the plant is called sulla. There’s the academy’s memory when they print it. There’s the reader’s memory when he reads it. At this point I realised Harlowe had, in his own dull way, stumbled into my actual topic. He had walked into it backwards, but he had walked into it. Exactly, I said. And now we can go back to personal identity. But I could not resist one more snap, because it was too neat. Only note this: the whole scene is held together by a word that tries to do too much. Memoria. It means memory in my mouth, and it means a submitted paper in Messimeri’s. And the audience is expected to sort it out without complaint. That, Harlowe, is what the world does all day: it relies on you to repair ambiguity without calling it ambiguity. And that is why I do not lecture. Lecturing is pretending there is only one sense at a time. So you want to converse. I want to make you do the work, Harlowe. Conversation is the only honest examination-system: it forces the hearer to supply what the speaker has left out, and then to discover whether he supplied it responsibly. Harlowe looked down again at his page, as if checking whether responsibility was listed in the table of contents. So the Georgofili. Leave the Georgofili alone, I said. They are innocent. They are merely Italian. And with that I returned, somewhat shamefacedly, to my intended beginning: memory and the self. But the lecture had already confessed its real nature. It had become a tutorial with seats. Grice: Messimeri, spesso a Oxford trascuriamo l’economia filosofica, mentre a Cambridge – vedi Keynes – la studiano con entusiasmo. Ma tu, da Seminara, come hai conciliato il pensiero filosofico col libero mercato? Messimeri: Grice, la mia formazione aristocratica mi ha portato a vedere l’economia non solo come scienza, ma come filosofia della libertà. La gestione innovativa delle mie terre mi ha fatto comprendere che il mercato è un laboratorio di ragione e implicatura, dove ogni scambio è un dialogo. Grice: Mi piace questa visione: il mercato come conversazione. Forse, ogni transazione cela delle implicature filosofiche, proprio come nei nostri scambi verbali, dove ciò che si intende va oltre ciò che si dice. Messimeri: È proprio così, Grice! Dall’Accademia dell’Arboscello agli studi sulle colture di ulivo e gelso, ho imparato che persino in agricoltura la ragione conversazionale illumina l’economia. Dopotutto, un vero filosofo non coltiva solo pensieri, ma anche terre e relazioni. Messimeri, Marchese Domenico Grimaldi di (1766). Memoria sopra di una certa specie di pinta pratense chiamata sulla, Accademia degli Goorgofili, Settembre 12, Napoli,

Quinto Cecilio Metello Numidico (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats talk as a cooperative, rational enterprise in which hearers are entitled to reconstruct a speaker’s communicative intentions, and where implicature is what a rational interpreter is licensed to infer (and can in principle calculate) given what was said plus shared norms of relevance, informativeness, and sincerity; “Metello,” by contrast, enters your passage as a Romanized test case for how such rational reconstruction is shaped by forensic and civic life, because the Metellan lens is juristic and political: justice as ius (a public, institutional, and adversarial concept) rather than primarily a moral property, and Carneades’ paired speeches (praise then demolition) exemplify not cooperative convergence on truth but the strategic, dialectical reversibility of reasons in the forum. So where Grice uses “reason” to explain how ordinary conversation can reliably transmit more than literal content through mutually recognized intentions and cooperative expectations, Metellus (as pupil and later antagonist of Carneades) highlights how the same inferential machinery can be recruited in settings where the point is not shared understanding but pressure-testing, undermining, or re-framing normative concepts—producing implicatures that function like legal insinuations, rhetorical traps, or political positioning. In short: Grice models implicature as a product of conversational rationality aimed at intelligibility and coordination, whereas the Metellan/Carneadean scene stresses that reason in discourse is also institutionally situated and often agonistic, so that what is “meant beyond what is said” can be governed not only by cooperative maxims but by the priorities of law, power, and the contestability of ius itself. Grice: “At Oxford, we follow Cicero’s statement that philosophy in western Europe started when the Greeks sent an embassy led by Carneade to Rome. Greece is not considered part of Western Europe – and that’s why we keep the frieses of the Parthenon! Now M. knew Carneade, so he may well be regarded as the first Roman, and thus Western European philosopher!” -- Filosofo italiano. A Roman general and politician. A pupil of Carneade. Grice: “Fortunately, we have enough material to be able to reconstruct what M. found appealing in Carneade. In the first speech, Carneade PRAISED Roman justice – dike --; in his second speech, the next day, he condemned it. This left an enduring mark in M. who dedicated the rest of his life to abuse Carneade!” – Grice: “I deal with M.’s and Carneade’s alternate concepts of ‘dike’ or the ‘ius’ in my ‘Philosophical eschatology and Plato’s Republic – Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus defend what I see as a politico-legal concept of the ius, not a moral one. It may be argued that the legal or politico-legal concept, is PRIOR to the moral – and it takes a special kind of metaphysical construction routine to prove otherwise!” Quinto Cecilio Metello Numidico. GRICEVS: Salvē, METELLVE; audīvi te Carneadēn audivisse: Oxoniēnsēs statim ex hoc efficiunt ut sis “primus philosophus Occidentālis”—geographiā semper comiter labōrante. METELLVS: Salvē, GRICEVE; sī hoc satis est, tum omnis quī prandium cum Carneadē superāvit cathedram meret: modo longē ab Athēnīs. GRICEVS: At quam pulchrē docuit: hesternō diē iustitiam Rōmānam laudāvit, posterō diē eandem evertit—methodus perfecta: laus, deinde correctiō. METELLVS: Correctiō? ego id “cervīcis torquendum” appellō. Duās ōrātiōnēs dedit; ego tertiam reliquā vītā composuī: “Quaēsō, desine.” Metello Numidico, Quinto Cecilio (a. u. c. DCXLV). Dicta de iustitia et iure. Roma.

Metronace (Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale nella scuola di Napoli. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats conversation as a normatively organized, cooperative activity in which what a speaker means is fixed not just by what is said but by rationally recoverable intentions and audience inferences, with conversational implicatures arising (and being calculable) against background expectations like relevance, informativeness, and sincerity; “Metronace,” by contrast (in the Neapolitan/“Porch” vignette), functions less as a rival theory than as a localized, stylized re-voicing of that same Gricean picture, shifting the emphasis from Grice’s quasi-formal rational reconstruction to the embodied social setting of argument—warmth, food, humor, conviviality, and civic style—so that “conversational reason” looks more like a cultural practice (dialectic as shared life, not merely rule-governed inference) and “implicature” looks less like a technical upshot of maxims than like the lived art of insinuation, wit, and tact in a Neapolitan scene; where Grice explains how rational agents can mean more than they say because hearers are entitled to assume cooperation and to compute what must have been intended, Metronace dramatizes how that entitlement is sustained by communal ethos and local forms of exchange (the bread-and-laughter civility of Napoli), making the same bridge from said to meant appear not as an abstract engine but as a practice whose rationality is inseparable from place, tone, and shared habits of talk. Grice: “When I refer to the Athenian dialectic and the Oxonian dialectic, Minnio-Paulello criticized me for obliterating the Roman dialectic. I said: ‘And what about the Neapolitan dialectic?’” Porch.A popular teacher of philosophy at Napoli, where Seneca attends some of his lectures. Gricevs: Salve, Metronax! Dic mihi, quid est haec dialectica Neapolitana? Nonne Oxoniensis aut Atheniensis sufficit? Metronax: O Gricevs, Neapolitana dialectica plus saporis habet! Hic philosophi argumentantur inter pizzam et espresso, non inter toga et librum. Gricevs: Mirum! Fortasse veritas accipit gustum mozzarellae, non tantum syllogismorum. Seneca certe laetus aderat! Metronax: Sic est, amice! In Napoli, philosophus non solum disputat—sed etiam risus et panem partitur. Dialectica hic semper calida est, sicut vulcano Vesuvio! Metronace (a. u. c. DCCC). De dialéctica neapolitana. Roma.

Giacomo Micalori (Urbino): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- Ganimede e l’implicatura sferica di Giove. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning treats what is “meant” as systematically recoverable from what is said plus rational expectations of cooperation (maxims), so that implicature is typically cancellable and calculated by reference to shared purposes in talk; read against that, “Micalori” (Giacomo Micalori of Urbino, professor of theology and philosophy, author of Della sfera mondiale, Urbino, Marco Antonio Mazzantini, 1626, and Antapocrisi, Rome, Francesco Cavalli, 1635) can be used as a deliberately anachronistic foil in which cosmological language (“sfera,” planispheres, longitude/latitude, and the Ganymede/Zeus star-myth complex) invites a quasi-Gricean distinction between what a term strictly commits one to (entailment) and what it merely invites an informed reader to supply (implicature): calling something “the sphere” in a scholastic-astronomical register can be played as if it “says” more than a local conversational hint—almost as though the conceptual apparatus forces a world-picture (hence the joke that “by calling it sfera, Micalori’s statement entails rather than implicates that the Romans were wrong”), whereas for Grice the interesting work is precisely in the gap where speakers exploit shared rational norms to mean more than they say without being logically committed; the mythological overlay (Zeus abducting Ganymede via the eagle constellation; Hyginus’ Astronomica 3.15 as a canonical crystallization of astral lore) then functions as a staged test-case for “reason in conversation,” because mythology, like polite conversational indirection, is a rule-governed practice of saying one thing while licensing another layer of uptake—yet Grice would insist that the extra layer is pragmatic, defeasible, and responsibility-sensitive, not a cosmological necessity, while the Micalori-side “spherical” rhetoric tempts the reader toward a thicker, more doctrinal “implicature” that behaves like background metaphysics; the upshot of the comparison is that Grice models conversational reason as a minimal, public, calculative discipline for moving from utterance to intended meaning, whereas the Micalori constellation-sphere frame (as you present it) dramatizes how a learned symbolic system (myth + astronomy + geometry) can make the unsaid feel structurally enforced—turning what would be a Gricean implicature into something closer to entailment by the weight of the worldview embedded in the vocabulary. Grice: “In Italy, like Oxford, we take mythology seriously! And so did Schelling!” Filosofo italiano.  Roma, Lazio. Grice: “I took my ideas on longitude and latitude from M.” -- Grice: “By calling it ‘sfera,’ M.’s statement ENTAILS rather than implicates that the Romans were wrong.” Professore a Urbino.  Opere: “Della sfera mondiale” In Urbino, Mazzantini, M., Antapocrisi, In Roma, Francesco Roma Cavalli.  Zeus features heavily in a lot of starlore, and the Eagle constellation is no exception.  The predominantly accepted mythos for this constellation is the abduction of Ganymede. Zeus had facilitated the kidnapping, fancying the beautiful mortal boy as his personal cup-bearer.  In the constellation, which is situated south of Cygnus on the equator, making it visible from both the Northern and Southern hemispheres, poor Ganymede can be seen hanging from the claws of the eagle as he is swiftly taken to the heavens.  The constellation appears alongside several other bird constellations. The Eagle’s wings are spread, giving it the appearance of gliding through the stars. As Hyginus states, the beak is separated from the body by a milky circle. It was also said to set “at the rising of the Lion and rises with Capricorn”. (Hyginus, Astronomy, 3.15)  Greek astronomy  Humans have a natural urge to identify familiar things amongst the twinkling stars of the mysterious abyss above us. These narratives came out of astronomical observations and ancient time tracking. The study of the sky began long before the earliest Greek sources that (sparsely) discuss them, Homer and Hesiod. They likely developed during the transition from oral to written transmission, but to what is extent is unknown.  Even though the Greeks were late to the constellation conversation, they received a lot of their knowledge from their Eastern neighbors. implicatura sferica, planifesferio, Casali, Micalori. Grice: Caro Micalori, devo confessare che quando guardo le stelle mi sento sempre un po’ come Ganimede: rapito, ma non dall’aquila, bensì dalla curiosità filosofica! Tu che hai studiato la “sfera mondiale”, dimmi: la filosofia può davvero abbracciare il cielo? Micalori: Grice, in Italia ci prendiamo la mitologia sul serio, come Schelling! La “sfera” non è solo una questione di geometria, ma un modo per smentire i Romani: qui ogni implicatura è planetaria! E poi, vuoi mettere il fascino del planifesferio? Basta un po’ di cielo e il tè va subito in orbita! Grice: Ah, il planifesferio! Ogni volta che parli di longitude e latitude, mi sento un esploratore, ma senza bussola. Forse dovrei chiedere a Giove una mappa stellare… o almeno una tazza di caffè, così non mi perdo tra implicature sferiche e costellazioni birichine. Micalori: Grice, non ti preoccupare: il segreto è leggere le stelle come si legge una conversazione, con ironia e un pizzico di leggerezza. Dopotutto, tra Ganimede, l’aquila e Zeus, anche i filosofi ogni tanto volano alto… e qualche implicatura cade, ma nessuno si fa male. E se proprio ci perdiamo, Urbino ci aspetta per una nuova “Antapocrisi”! Micalori, Giacomo (1618). Le nozze finte. Pesaro: Flaminio Concordia.

Gianfranco Miglio: la ragione conversazionale  e l’implicatura conversazionale -- implicatura ligure – la LIGVRIA e la PADANIA. Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning helps frame Gianfranco Miglio as someone working with the same inferential machinery, but at a different scale: where Grice studies how hearers reconstruct what a speaker means by presuming cooperative rationality and then calculating implicatures, Miglio focuses on how political language constructs consensus by getting publics to supply the intended conclusions “between the lines.” Miglio’s disarmingly blunt definition of ideology as what politicians propagate to obtain or purchase consent can be read as a macro-pragmatic thesis: political speech routinely maximizes implicature and minimizes explicit commitment, relying on audience design, shared regional identities, and strategic vagueness to make a program sound inevitable without stating its strongest premises. In that sense, your “implicatura ligure” and “Padania” motifs are Gricean: they suggest that the same utterance can generate different implicatures depending on the audience’s background assumptions and local loyalties, so that meaning becomes a function of what a community treats as relevant, plausible, and action-guiding. Miglio’s federalist/confederal emphasis then parallels Grice’s sensitivity to context: just as Grice insists that what is meant depends on the circumstances of utterance, Miglio treats political legitimacy and institutional design as dependent on territorial and historical context, not on one-size-fits-all abstractions. The contrast with Oxford’s tendency to treat political philosophy as “minor” can be folded back into Grice’s own lesson: politics is precisely the domain in which rational interpretation is most vulnerable to manipulation, because the hearer’s cooperative inferencing can be exploited—so Miglio’s analysis can be presented as showing how conversational reason, when scaled up to mass publics, becomes a technology of consensus formation, with implicature doing as much work as explicit argument. Grice: “At Oxford, dreaming spires as it is – philosophical politics – or political philosophy – is considered minor, or a minor specialty – since you are bound NOT to be deemed a philosopher. It’s highly different – slightly different – in Italy, where, with Mussolini, EVERYTHING is political!” Berlin, who thought was a philosopher, ended up lecturing on the history of ideas, i..e. ideology – M. defines ideology so simply that would put Berlin to shame: an ideology is what politicians propagate to reach or buy consensus!” --  essential Italian philosopher. Sostenitore della trasformazione dello Stato italiano in senso federale o, addirittura, confederale, fra gli anni ottanta e i novanta è considerato l'ideologo della Lega Lombarda, in rappresentanza della quale fu anche senatore, prima di "rompere" con Umberto Bossi dando vita alla breve stagione del Partito Federalista.   Polo scolastico "M." ad Adro. Costituzionalista e scienziato della politica, fu senatore della Repubblica Italiana nella XI, XII e XIII legislatura.  Ha insegnato presso l'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano, ove fu preside della Facoltà di Scienze politiche. È stato allievo d’Entrèves e Pallieri, sotto la cui docenza si è formato sui classici del pensiero giuridico e politologico.  Colpito da ictusnon si riprese e morì ottantatreenne nella sua stessa città natale, Como, circa un anno dopo. Il funerale si tenne a Domaso, sul Lago di Como, comune d'origine del padre e sede di una villa nella quale il professore si rifugiava spesso; in seguito M. è stato tumulato nel locale cimitero, a fianco dei membri della sua famiglia. Laureatosi a Milano con Origini e sviluppi delle dottrine giuridiche pubbliche, evita l'arruolamento per la Seconda guerra mondiale a causa di un difetto uditivo congenito, e poté divenire assistente volontario alla cattedra di Storia delle dottrine politiche, che ENTREVES tenne nella medesima università.  Implicatura ligure. Grice, Saturdays and Mondays. Grice: Caro Miglio, a Oxford abbiamo sempre visto la filosofia politica come una specializzazione minore. In Italia, invece, sembra che tutto diventi inevitabilmente politico! Mi incuriosisce come tu definisca l’ideologia in modo tanto diretto: “ciò che i politici propagano per ottenere consenso.” È una prospettiva brillante, quasi disarmante nella sua semplicità. Miglio: Grazie, Grice! In effetti, in Liguria come in Padania, la politica permea ogni aspetto del vivere civile. La mia esperienza mi ha portato a sostenere la trasformazione dello Stato in senso federale: credo che solo valorizzando le differenze territoriali si possa costruire un vero consenso, che non sia solo ideologico, ma condiviso. Grice: Interessante! Questa idea di “implicatura ligure” mi affascina. Pensi che la conversazione politica abbia delle sue implicature particolari, magari più sottili rispetto a quelle della quotidianità? Oppure, come dici tu, tutto alla fine si riduce alla ricerca del consenso? Miglio: Direi che la conversazione politica è piena di implicature, spesso più implicite che esplicite! La differenza la fa la trasparenza: quando la politica riesce a essere chiara nei suoi intenti, il dialogo si fa davvero costruttivo. Ma come in tutte le conversazioni, molto si gioca tra le righe… e il consenso, a volte, è solo una conseguenza. Miglio, Gianfranco (1958). Le trasformazioni della democrazia. Milano: Giuffrè.

Mario Mignucci (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale. Mignucci is an unusually close Italian analogue to Grice because his core scholarly terrain—ancient logic from Aristotle through the Stoics and Diodorus, including questions about implication, modality, and criteria of truth—sits exactly where Grice’s pragmatics needs a disciplined background story about valid inference and what counts as a permissible step from one commitment to another. Grice’s theory says that conversational meaning is reason-governed: hearers recover what is meant (often as implicature) by assuming cooperative rationality and then computing what must be intended given what is said; Mignucci’s reconstructions of ancient implication and modal reasoning show, at the level of logical form, what it is for an inference to be licensed, blocked, or strengthened, which is precisely what the Gricean hearer is doing informally when an utterance looks under-informative or oddly chosen. That is why your “only Mignucci understood my implicature” joke can be made serious: Mignucci is trained to see the difference between what follows strictly (logical consequence, Diodorean dominance, Theophrastean modality) and what follows only given background rational constraints, and that mirrors Grice’s difference between entailment and implicature. Even when Grice grumbles about deontic logic or about Aristotle’s clumsiness with necessity/possibility, the shared methodological point remains: both treat meaning as answerable to norms of inference—Mignucci by excavating ancient systems that make those norms explicit, Grice by explaining how everyday speakers rely on analogous norms implicitly, so that conversation becomes a practical, lived version of the logical enterprise Mignucci studies in its classical, “Portico” form. Grice: “M. is perhaps the only Italian philosopher – other than Speranza – who understood my implicature!” Keywords: implicatura.Per una nuova interpretazione della logica modale di Teofrasto. Vichiana – Grice: “the sorry story of deontic logic”. La teoria del Lizio aristotelica della scienza. Sansoni, Firenze, L'argomento dominatore e la teoria dell'implicazione in Diodoro Crono, Vichiana – Grice: “Of course, Diodorus fails to recognise the genius of Philo!” -- Il problema del criterio di verità presso gli stoici antichi. Posizione e criterio del discorso filosofico, cur. di Giacon. Patron, Bologna. Il significato della logica stoica del PORTICO. Patron, Bologna – Grice: “I’ve always found Stoic Logic boring – I mean Mates’s essay, not the logic herself!” -- L'unificazione del sapere in Aristotele – Grice: “What I call the Einheit von Wissenschaft -- Atti del congresso di filosofia, Perugia. Sansoni, Firenze. Le pseudo-scotiste Quaestiones super libros Priorum Analyticorum Aristotelis e la sillogistica dello Stagirita. De doctrina loannis Scoti: Acta congressus scotistici, Oxonii – Grice: “Being an Oxonian myself, I’ve always hated Scotus, perhaps because he came from the wrong side of Hadrian’s Wall!” Edizioni Antonianum, Roma. Aristotele, Gli Analitici Primi. Introduzione, traduzione e commento. – Grice: “I was fortunate that I never had to lecture on this dry tretise, sticking rather to the two first items in the Organon: Categoriae and De Interpretatione!” Loffredo, Napoli. Albert the Great's Approach to the aristotelian modal Syllogisite. In Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Age. Actes du congrès de philoso-phie médiévale, Montréal. Vrin, Paris. Aristotele, Gli Analitici Secondi. Azzoguidi, Bologna Grice: How clumsy could Aristotle be when he said that what is necessary is not also possible?” -- Aristotele e l'esistenza logica. In Filosofia e logica, a cur. Carrara and Giaretta. Mignucci. Grice: Mignucci, dimmi la verità: la logica modale di Teofrasto ti ha mai fatto ridere, o sei stato sempre serio come Aristotele davanti ai suoi Analitici? Mignucci: Grice, se fosse per me, Aristotele avrebbe inventato la logica per poter giustificare le sue pause pranzo! E poi, su Teofrasto, ti assicuro che capire la sua logica è come cercare il criterio di verità tra gli stoici: un vero gioco di prestigio. Grice: Ah, ma almeno tu hai colto la mia implicatura, cosa che nemmeno Diodoro Crono riusciva a fare, troppo preso a scoprire se il possibile fosse davvero necessario… Scommetto che Scotus non avrebbe superato nemmeno il portico del mio college! Mignucci: Scotus l’avrei spedito direttamente a Roma, senza passare dal via! In fondo, la logica è come il domino: chi vince è quello che riesce a far cadere tutte le premesse senza perdere la pazienza… o la voglia di scherzare! Mignucci, Mario (1965). La teoria aristotelica della scienza. Firenze: Sansoni.

Gaio Minicio Fundano (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Adriano nel diritto romano e Plinio minore. Grice and Gaius Minicius Fundanus meet most naturally around the Hadrianic rescript to Fundanus as a case study in how reasoned meaning is engineered in institutional speech: Hadrian’s letter is explicitly about legal procedure (no punishments on vague accusations; require a properly framed charge and proof), but it also carries a layered communicative design whose force depends on what a rational addressee is entitled to infer beyond the bare directive. In Gricean terms, the rescript presupposes a cooperative framework between emperor and governor: it sets shared conversational (and juridical) expectations about what counts as an adequate “move” in the forum—what must be stated, what evidence must be produced, what can be dismissed as calumny—and it thereby generates implicatures about imperial policy without ever announcing a general “philosophy” of toleration. Fundanus, as recipient, is positioned like Grice’s ideal hearer: he must recover the intended point by tracking relevance (this is really guidance on governance, not merely on one sect), Quantity (say enough to justify action, not more), and Quality (do not act on what cannot be responsibly supported). The later Greek transmission through Justin and Eusebius then adds a further Gricean layer: a document written as administrative instruction acquires a new audience and thus new implicatures, becoming for Christian historians a signal of how the empire “really” regarded Christianity; the shift illustrates Grice’s point that meaning is not exhausted by literal content, but is also shaped by audience design and by the assumptions readers bring when they treat an utterance as part of a larger rational enterprise. Finally, your Oxford framing (“Minicius, Hadrian, and Pliny mean a lot to the Oxonian philosopher”) can be cashed out in Grice’s own terms: these are exemplary materials for showing how norms of rational communication—proof burdens, permissible inferences, the policing of empty accusation—are not merely legal technicalities but instances of the same reason-governed practices that make everyday conversation possible, only here amplified into the stable, publicly accountable discourse of Roman law. Grice: “Minicio, Adriano, and Plinio minore may not sound philosophical, but they do at Oxford. There is no such thing as a Faculty of Philosophy; only a Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, based at Merton – within the real Faculty, the Faculty of Literae Humaniores. Therefore, Minicio, Adriano, and Plinio minore MEAN a lot to the Oxonian philosopher – to the Oxonian philosopher that counts, that is, the one with a double first in Greats, like me!” Filosofo italiano. Rescritto di Adriano a Gaio M. Fundano. L'imperatore Adriano, autore del rescritto a Gaio M. Fundano. Il rescritto di Adriano a Gaio Minucio Fundano è un rescritto imperiale inviato dall'imperatore romano Adriano a Gaio Minucio Fundano, proconsole d'Asia. Il documento giuridico, scritto originariamente in latino, fu tradotto e tràdito in greco ellenistico da Eusebio di Cesarea che si rifaceva a Giustino.  Il testo è noto agli storici e agli studiosi di Storia del Cristianesimo per essere uno dei più antichi scritti pagani sul cristianesimo. Il documento di Adriano, pur indirizzato a Minucio Fundano, rispondeva in realtà a un'istanza sollecitata da Quinto Licinio Silvano Graniano, predecessore del destinatario: Graniano aveva chiesto lumi sul comportamento da tenere nei confronti dei cristiani e delle accuse che venivano loro rivolte.  Adriano rispose al proconsole di procedere nei loro confronti solo in presenza di eventi circostanziati, emergenti da un procedimento giudiziario e non sulla base di accuse generiche, petizioni o calunnie: veniva stabilito così il principio dell'onere della prova a carico dei promotori delle accuse. Roman law, Adriano a M. Not to be confused with Minucio. GRICEVS: Oxonii Minicium, Hadrianum, Pliniumque auditum est quasi trium philosophorum collegium; sub-facultas enim pro facultate sufficit, modo quis geminum primum in Greats habeat, ut ego. MINICIVS: Ego vero proconsul Asiae fui, non professor Mertonensis; sed si rescriptum Hadriani in schedula mea philosophiae nomen meretur, faciam ut etiam tabellarius Stoicus videatur. GRICEVS: At hoc ipsum est lepidum: imperator respondet de probationis onere, populus autem audit de fide et christianis; tu accipis litteras iuris, nos accipimus implicaturas. MINICIVS: Ita fit ut in foro dicatur “probate,” in schola intellegatur “philosophate”; et si quis me cum Minucio confundit, respondeo: non error est, sed interpretatio—Eusebius vertit, vos ampliatis. Minicio Fundano, Gaio (a. u. c. DCCCLXXVIII). Dicta. Roma.

Minucio Natale (Roma, Lazio). Roman jurist.

Minucio Natalis (Roma, Lazio). De iure civili.

Gaio Minucio Fundano.

Marco Minucio Felice (Roma, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’eulogio ad Ottavio da Frontone. Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning lines up strikingly with Minucius Felix’s Octavius because Octavius is itself a staged act of rational uptake: a dialogue in which persuasion proceeds less by brute assertion than by managing what a reasonable interlocutor can be brought to concede, infer, and accept as the point of the exchange. Grice’s core claim is that hearers routinely reconstruct speaker-meaning by assuming cooperation and then deriving implicatures from what is said plus shared standards of relevance and rationality; Minucius, writing in a Ciceronian-legal Latin and in the persona of an advocate, dramatizes exactly that inferential economy—arguments are offered with an eye to what the “other side” will have to read between the lines, and the dialogue format makes the audience into a third-party hearer computing the intended upshot. The Frontonian “eulogy” frame in your passage usefully heightens the Gricean point: praise, attribution, and even name-slippage (Minucio/Minucia) are classic sites where what is understood outruns what is literally said, because polite form and rhetorical positioning invite the reader to supply the deeper social meaning (who counts as authoritative, who is being aligned with whom, what intellectual pedigree is being claimed). Read this way, Minucius becomes a natural “gate to philosophy” for a classicist like Grice: not because he offers system, but because he exhibits reason as a conversational practice—civil, adversarial, and yet governed by norms that make indirectness interpretable—so that the real philosophical action lies, as Grice would put it, in the disciplined passage from dictum to what is meant, and in the audience’s responsibility to keep its inferential haste (“the ear runs ahead”) answerable to shared rational standards. Grice: “At Oxford, you are introduced to philosophy via the classics – more specifically, you matriculate to the Faculty of Literae Humaniores – the only faculty to offer a course in philosophy --, organized since 1913 as the sub-faculty of philosophy. After Grief and Laughing for five terms, as Carroll has it, you get to know the Porch, and all the other philosophical sects. So Minucio does mean something to me. He was my gate to philosophy!” -- Filosofo italiano. He writes “Ottavio” – draws on a speech by Frontone. La gente: Minucia. Cirta, filosofo,  scrittore e avvocato romano. Non è noto con certezza quando vive. Il suo Octavius è simile all'Apologeticum di Tertulliano, e la datazione della vita di M. dipende dal rapporto tra la sua opera e quella dello scrittore africano. Nelle citazioni degli autori antichi (Seneca, VARRONE, CICERONE) è considerato più preciso di Tertulliano e questo concorderebbe col suo essere anteriore ad esso, come afferma anche Lattanzio; Girolamo lo vuole, invece, posteriore a Tertulliano, sebbene si contraddica dicendolo posteriore a Tascio Cecilio Cipriano in una lettera e anteriore in un'opera Per quanto riguarda gli estremi della sua esistenza, Felice menziona Marco Cornelio Frontone; il trattato Quod idola dii non sint è basato sull'Octavius; dunque se quello è di Cipriano, M. non fu attivo oltre il 260, altrimenti il termine ante quem è Lattanzio. Anche la zona d'origine di M. è sconosciuta. Lo si ritiene talvolta di origine africana, sia per la sua dipendenza da Tertulliano, sia per i riferimenti alla realtà africana: la prima ragione, però, non è indicativa, in quanto dovuta al fatto che all'epoca i principali autori di lingua latina erano africani, e dunque il loro era lo stile cui ispirarsi; la seconda, inoltre, potrebbe dipendere esclusivamente dal fatto che il personaggio pagano dell'Octavius. Roma. GRICEVS: Oxonii per Literae Humaniores ad philosophiam intravi; quinque terminos “luctum et risum” pertuli—et tamen dicunt me a te, MINVCI, per ianuam ingressum esse! MINVCIVS: Ianua, inquis? Cave ne ianua sim quae crepat: statim omnes clamabunt “implicatura!” cum tu tantum fores aperueris. GRICEVS: At tu mihi plus quam fores: tu es clavis. Nam “Ottavium” scribis ex Frontone, et populus audit “Minuciam”—quasi error sit, cum sit argumentum de eo quod dicitur et quod intellegitur. MINVCIVS: Ita vero: tu “cooperemur” dicis, illi “conuiuemur” subaudiunt; ego “Ottavium” dico, illi “Minuciam” subaudiunt. Sic ambo docemus: non semper verba peccant—saepe auris festinat. Minucio Felice, Marco (a. u. c. DCCCLIII). Octavius. Roma.

Luigi Miraglia (Reggio, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale di CICERONE. M. is a useful foil for Grice because he represents a tradition—Neapolitan philosophy of law with Hegelian ambitions and a strong Ciceronian-Roman lineage—in which reasoning is explicitly staged as public, institutional, and historically saturated, whereas Grice’s theory begins from the micro-logic of everyday talk and asks how hearers recover what a speaker means by assuming rational cooperation and then computing implicatures. Miraglia’s legal-philosophical method (moving between induction and deduction, historical-comparative method, development of language alongside development of law, and the interplay of moral, legal, and “rational” right) treats discourse as a civic instrument that stabilizes norms; Grice, by contrast, treats discourse as a rational practice whose stability is achieved through tacit conversational expectations (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Manner) that make meaning inferable even when it is not spelled out. The Ciceronian angle provides the bridge: Cicero’s dialogic, forensic culture shows how persuasion, credibility, and shared standards of reason make civic speech work, and Miraglia’s jurisprudential interest in “living law” can be reframed in Gricean terms as a community’s settled patterns of inference—what speakers can count on hearers to supply, cancel, or challenge in context. So while Miraglia systematizes the rationality of law by putting it into a philosophical architecture (Hegel, Vico, Roman doctrine, historical schools), Grice explains how rationality already operates in the smallest conversational moves that underpin any such architecture, including legal argument: the courtroom and the seminar alike depend on what is meant outrunning what is said, and on the audience’s entitlement to treat that gap as reason-governed rather than merely rhetorical. Grice: “At Oxford, you are introduced into philosophy after five terms into Grief and Laughing! Therefore, once you meet Cicero, you know what he is talking about! – or about which he is talking, as he’d have it!” Reggio, Emilia. Grice: “M. is the type of philosopher beloved by the Oxford hegelians; but then he is a Neapolitan Hegelian!” Grice: “I always found Kant easier, but there’s nothing like a ‘filosofia del diritto’ in Kant! And Hegel’s ethics itself, compared to Kant’s is mighty more complex – that’s why I taught Kant!” Si laurea a Napoli, dopodiché insegna nella stessa università.  Segue una corrente di filosofia eclettica, ad esso contemporanea, che mira all'integrazione di pratiche giuridiche ed ispirazioni filosofiche. Saggi: Condizioni storiche e scientifiche del diritto di preda; Un sistema etico-giuridico; Filosofia del diritto. I sistemi filosofici ed i principi del diritto. La speculazione greca e LA DOTTRINA ROMANA. Fichte. SPEDALIERI ROMAGNOSI I filosofi della reazione. La scuola storica e la scuola filosofica. Schelling e Scleiermacher. Hegel Rosmini SERBATI Herbart, Trendelenburg e Krause. Le varie fasi della filosofia di Schelling. Sthal e Schopenhauer Il materialismo, il positivismo ed il criticismo. L'idea della filosofia del diritto. La filosofia e le scienze. Il carattere della Filosofia.  Diritto ed i metodi logici. L'induzione e la deduzione. L'induzione, l'osservazione e l'esperimento. Diritto naturale e il buono civile di AMARI ricavate dall'induzione. L'importanza del metodo storico-comparativo secondo VICO Amari, Post e Sumner-Maine. Parallelo fra lo sviluppo della lingua e lo sviluppo del diritto. L'induzione statistica, il compito della deduzione, l'universale astratto e l'universale concreto come principi. Cicerone, diritto morale, diritto legale, diritto razionale, stato di natura. (early 1942; Newhaven; the shore base still called Forward II, later HMS Aggressive) Newhaven had the damp, practical smell of a place designed to be used rather than admired. The Navy, in its inimitable way, had turned a hotel and a quay into a ship without water: a stone frigate. Officially it was Forward II; later, with the sort of cheerful aggression the Service likes to apply retroactively, it would be renamed HMS Aggressive. At the time, nobody I knew felt aggressive. We felt busy. [en.wikipedia.org] In the little cabin allotted to “temporary” people—temporary rank, temporary certainty, temporary peace—I was doing what Oxford men do in every theatre of operations: reading something irrelevant with an air of moral necessity. Clifford came in without knocking, because knocking is for peacetime and for men who don’t share bulkheads. You’re reading again, Grice. Only a little. He leaned over my shoulder, reading the title upside down with a sailor’s confidence that print will meet you halfway. Condizioni storiche e scientifiche… something… preda. Diritto di preda. Right. Preda. Like predator. Like predatory. That about submarines, is it. Not exactly. It’s about prize. Captures. What becomes whose, when you seize it at sea. Oh. Loot. There is always a moment in wartime when somebody says “loot” and thinks he has done with jurisprudence. I turned the page with the mild irritation of a man who wishes to correct a noun and is not allowed to. Not loot. Prize. Loot is what you do when you have no court. Prize is what you do when you insist you’re still civilised. Clifford sat on the edge of the bunk with the expression of someone prepared to be educated provided it does not take longer than a cigarette. So this Italian chap is telling you how to steal politely. He’s telling you how states pretend not to steal. Same thing. Not quite. The difference is the paperwork. If you want the English, it’s prize law. And what does the Italian mean by preda. A prey. Something you catch. Yes. A thing taken. But the important thing is the right. Who is entitled, under what conditions, to take. Clifford frowned. Are you entitled. Me. Personally. Well, you’re in uniform. That’s entitlement, isn’t it. It’s the beginning of entitlement. Miraglia would want the rest: jurisdiction, procedure, condemnation. He would insist the capture doesn’t change ownership until a prize court says so. Clifford blinked, as if a court had appeared in the Channel and was now asking for witnesses. There are courts. During the war. Yes. Here. Not here here. But yes. Prize procedure doesn’t stop because the weather is bad. Clifford reached for the book as if it were evidence. And you’re relaxing with this. I’m relaxing from the thought that a torpedo doesn’t consult definitions. So I consult them on its behalf. That was not fair, and I knew it, which is why it pleased me. Clifford flipped a few pages. He hardly speaks English, this Miraglia. He speaks better English than you do Italian, which is his advantage. I don’t expect you read Alighieri’s tongue, he said, with a grin, because he knew perfectly well that I did. It isn’t Alighieri’s tongue. It’s Neapolitan law-philosophy pretending to be universal. Same thing, again. No. Dante is hard on purpose. Miraglia is hard because he’s a professor. Clifford handed the book back. So what’s the practical upshot. We take a ship. We call it a prize. We take the cargo. We feel moral. That is almost exactly right. Except the feeling moral is the whole mechanism. The law is the machine that produces that feeling. Clifford was silent for a moment, which in a war is the closest men come to philosophy. And if we take a ship without the machine. Then we call it something else. We call it piracy. Or we call it necessity. Or we call it a regrettable incident. He nodded at that. Sailors understand “regrettable incident” at once. So why are you reading an Italian from 1871. Why not something modern. Something that mentions Hitler. Because the concepts don’t mention Hitler. They mention Rome. Preda is Latin in a moustache. And Miraglia is obsessed with Cicero, which makes him tolerable. Clifford sat back, considering this as if Cicero were a kind of weapon-system. Cicero. That’s the talky Roman. The talky Roman. Yes. And your point. My point is that law is conversation with bayonets in the background. And prize law is a conversation where everyone pretends the bayonets are merely punctuation. Clifford laughed. That’s very Oxford, Grice. No. That’s very Naples. Oxford would rather not mention the bayonets. He took out his cigarette-case and offered it, as if to seal the argument. So what are you going to do with your preda. Try to understand why one word in English—prize—means both “captured property” and “a reward.” As if capture were merit. It’s an outrage in the dictionary. Clifford lit up. Maybe the Germans would say it’s efficient. The Germans would say lots of things. Miraglia would ask what they are entitled to say. Then why aren’t you in London doing that, instead of in this hotel-ship. Because someone decided I should be “useful” near the water. Clifford exhaled smoke in the direction of the ceiling, as if sending signals to somebody higher up. You belong in Room 39, Grice. Not in a bunk with a book. Room 39 is a room-number pretending to be an institution. Still. Still. Yes. Clifford stood to go, but paused at the door for the last jab, because the English cannot resist leaving a final line unexamined. So. If we bag something out there tonight, you’ll tell us whether it’s loot or prize. I’ll tell you it’s a conversational implicature. We’ll call it prize because we want to be heard as civilised. He laughed again, and went out. Editorial prophetic (as you asked for) He did: the Naval Intelligence Division at the Admiralty really was known as Room 39. [wikiwand.com], [archive.org]Grice: Miraglia, ho sempre pensato che Cicerone rappresenti l’incontro ideale fra filosofia e diritto. Lei che ne pensa del ruolo della conversazione ciceroniana come modello per la nostra riflessione filosofica? Miraglia: Grice, condivido! Cicerone ci insegna che il dialogo è il cuore pulsante del pensiero giuridico e morale. Anche nella mia esperienza, la conversazione permette di illuminare le sfumature del diritto, che non sono mai solo regole ma anche ragionamento condiviso. Grice: Proprio così! Da Oxford a Napoli, il confronto tra idee è sempre stato una chiave per superare i confini tra deduzione e induzione. Spesso dimentichiamo l’importanza del metodo dialogico nella costruzione del diritto, non trova? Miraglia: Assolutamente. La vera ricchezza del diritto sta nell’equilibrio tra ragione storica e universale. Come diceva Vico, “verum ipsum factum”: comprendere nasce dal dialogo e dall’esperienza comune, che danno vita alla legge viva. Miraglia, Luigi (1871). Condizioni storiche e scientifiche del diritto di preda. Napoli.

Bruno Misefari (Palizzi, Reggio Calabria, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale, l’implicatura anarchica. Misefari is a natural “stress test” for Grice because Grice’s account makes conversational meaning depend on shared rational norms (cooperation, sincerity constraints, intelligible relevance), whereas an avowed anarchist can be staged as someone who both relies on those norms to be understood and simultaneously contests their authority as social discipline. In Gricean terms, Misefari’s political rhetoric (anti-militarist agitation, prison, the insistence on being “Calabrese” before “Italian”) works largely through implicature: the point is often carried not by explicit doctrine but by what a hearer is invited to infer about legitimacy, coercion, and solidarity from slogans, refusals, and strategically chosen identities. The Humpty-Dumpty joke then becomes a neat contrast: semantic “anarchism” in Flew’s sense (words mean whatever I decree) is not merely rebellious but self-defeating for Grice, because it would destroy the public, reason-governed calculability that makes communication possible; Misefari can be portrayed as a “real anarchist” precisely because his anarchism is not a denial of meaning-rules but a critique of which rules should govern collective life. So the comparison can frame “anarchic implicature” as a way of speaking that exploits Grice’s maxims—especially Relation and Quantity—by saying less, hinting more, and letting the audience do the rational work, while also foregrounding that those very inferential habits are culturally trained and politically consequential: conversational reason is a shared resource, but it can be recruited for dissent as easily as for obedience. Grice: “My pupil A. G. N. Flew once referred to Humpty-Dumpty as defending what Flew called ‘semantic anarchism.’ Of course, Flew never read the Alice books! On the other hand, Misefari did, and he was a REAL anarchist!” Grice: “Etymologically, ‘anarchy’ is lack of principles – as in Austin!” – Grice: “Cicero could not translate or would not translate this dangerous Hellenic concept!”  ‘Io non sono italiano; io sono calabrese!” Frequenta la scuola elementare del piccolo paese di nascita in provincia di Reggio Calabria, per trasferirsi collo zio proprio a Reggio Calabria. Influenzato dalle frequentazioni di socialisti e anarchici in casa dello zio, partecipa attivamente alla fondazione e allo sviluppo d’un circolo socialista, intitolato a Babel, rivoluzionario. Inizia a collaborare ad Il Lavoratore. Collabora a Il Riscatto, periodico socialista-anarchico; e con Il Libertario. A causa della sua attività anti-militarista esercitata all'interno del circolo contro la guerra italo-turca, è arrestato e condannato a due mesi e mezzo di carcere per istigazione alla pubblica disobbedienza.  È nei anni successivi che M. si converte dal socialismo all’anarchia. Ciò avvenne soprattutto colla frequentazione da parte di  BERTI, suo professore.  Si trasfere a Napoli e si iscrive al politecnico, dopo avere studiato alle superiori, e anche per non dispiacere al padre, proseguì tali studi. Pesa inoltre su questa decisione il fatto che dopo la tragica distruzione della città di Reggio a causa del terremoto, il lavoro che garantiva le maggiori certezze è proprio quello dell’ingegnere. Nondimeno continua per proprio conto gli studi a lui prediletti: la filosofia, come aveva fatto fino ad allora. A Napoli si fa subito avanti nell’ambiente anarchico. implicatura, anarchismo, anarchismo semantico, Flew, Humpty-Dumpty. Bruno Misefari. Grice: Caro Misefari, devo confessarle che a Oxford il termine “anarchia” ci spaventa quasi quanto il tè senza zucchero. Lei invece ne fa una filosofia… Come si vive da vero anarchico in Calabria? Misefari: Eh, Grice, in Calabria l’anarchia è una questione di carattere! Qui, se dici “io non sono italiano, sono calabrese”, nessuno si scandalizza: al massimo ti offrono un caffè e ti chiedono cosa pensi della pizza. L’importante è saper discutere senza finire in rissa! Grice: Lei mi ricorda Humpty-Dumpty: “le parole significano ciò che voglio.” E se qualcuno le dicesse che il semantico anarchismo è solo una moda, lei come risponderebbe? Misefari: Caro Grice, direi che la moda cambia più in fretta delle implicature! L’anarchia semantica si addice a chi ama le sfide: qui a Palizzi, la vera rivoluzione è riuscire a farsi capire, senza perdere il sorriso e magari una fetta di torta. In fondo, come si dice dalle mie parti, “la libertà è come il vento: ti spettina, ma ti fa respirare!” Misefari, Bruno (1923). La guerra e l’anarchia. Milano: Edizioni Sociali.

Filippo Mocenigo (Venezia, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale. Grice’s reason-governed pragmatics and Mocenigo’s Venetian “Institutiones” converge on the same insight from opposite directions: Mocenigo tries to modernize the Lyceum by making the norms of discourse explicit and teachable (from term to proposition to syllogism, with rhetoric and ethos as civic disciplines), while Grice tries to explain how ordinary talk already works because participants tacitly conform to rational constraints that make speaker-meaning recoverable beyond the literal dictum. Where Mocenigo emphasizes the enthymeme as the bridge between strict inference and public persuasion, Grice’s conversational implicature is a kindred bridge: a licensed inference that is not formally stated but is nonetheless rationally calculable given shared assumptions about cooperation, relevance, and evidential responsibility. The contrast is equally instructive: Mocenigo’s “civile conversazione” is institutional and partly one-way, aimed at forming citizens through a stable logic of discourse for governance and law, whereas Grice’s model is interactional and reparative, showing how hearers infer what is meant precisely when utterances are incomplete, elliptical, or strategically indirect. Put together, they yield a unified picture in which communicatio is both moral and logical: credibility and character (ethos) are not mere ornaments but conditions for warranted uptake, and the rational structure of discourse is what lets a community treat talk as a civic bond rather than as mere noise or manipulation. In that sense Mocenigo supplies the Renaissance pedagogy of the very norms Grice later theorizes at the micro-level: the “rules” are not primarily rules of grammar or etiquette, but constraints on reasonable inference that allow discourse to be at once persuasive, truth-aimed, and publicly accountable. Grice: “In Italy, ‘philosopher’ does NOT mean ‘analysit of ordinary-language’!” -- The  Institutiones of M.  serve as a systematic exposition of the philosophy of the Lycaeum – that the Italians spell ‘lizio’ --, specifically designed to modernise and structure the ancient concepts of logic, rhetoric, and communication for a Renaissance audience. M.'s Institutiones is part of a broader Renaissance tradition of "institutional" writing — works intended to establish foundational principles of a discipline. The treatise typically follows the Organon, of the Lyceum, organizing knowledge from a simple term to a complex syllogism. It aims to provide a framework that bridges the gap between theoretical logic and the practical application of language – civile conversazione -- in civil life. While focusing on logic, it integrates elements of rhetoric and ethics, viewing communication not just as a technical skill but as a moral responsibility of the citizen.  M. develops the model of the ‘lizio’ by shifting it from a strictly "utterer-centric" oral tradition to a more comprehensive "logic of discourse" suitable for written and institutional communication.  M. emphasises the unity between Logic (Logos), Rhetoric (Pathos), and Grammar, refining Aristotle's view that communication is a tool for revealing truth rather than just persuading an addressee. The Enthymeme as a Link: He focuses on the enthymeme, a rhetorical syllogism, as the primary bridge between formal logic and public communication, allowing complex philosophical truths to be communicated effectively to a non-expert addressee. Civil Communication: He develops the concept of comunicatio as a civic bond. While communication in the ‘lizio’ is often one-way (utterer to passive addressee), M.’s treatise frames it as an essential component of social institutionalization, where shared logical structures allow for stable governance and legal order. M. expands on Ethos by linking the utterer’s s credibility. flosofia naturale, filosofia transnaturale, metaphysical philosophy. Grice: Mocenigo, mi ha sempre affascinato il modo in cui le Institutiones del Lizio abbiano modernizzato la logica e la comunicazione. Lei ritiene che il modello della "civile conversazione" possa ancora essere un ponte tra filosofia e vita quotidiana nella nostra epoca? Mocenigo: Caro Grice, assolutamente sì! La civile conversazione è, secondo me, il cuore pulsante del vivere sociale. La filosofia non deve rimanere confinata tra le mura accademiche; proprio come nelle Institutiones, il discorso razionale e il dialogo etico plasmano il cittadino e la società. È nella comunicazione che la logica diventa concretezza e responsabilità morale. Grice: Concordo pienamente! L’Enthymeme che lei valorizza, quel sillogismo retorico, secondo me rappresenta il punto d’incontro tra il pensiero preciso e la capacità di persuadere con eleganza. Non trova che oggi, più che mai, occorra educare alla logica del discorso, anche fuori dalla retorica classica? Mocenigo: Senza dubbio, Grice. Dalla logica alle emozioni, la comunicazione è il filo che tiene insieme la trama civile. L’Enthymeme permette di portare la verità filosofica al grande pubblico, senza perdere rigore, ma adattando il linguaggio. Credo che il compito del filosofo sia proprio quello di rendere la conversazione una pratica di giustizia e di coesione sociale, un ponte tra ragione e umanità. Mocenigo, Filippo (1780). Lettere familiari. Venezia: Pasquali.

Giovanni Battista Modio (Santa Severina, Crotone, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del disonore sessuale, la filosofia del Tevere. Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning helps recast Giovanni Battista Modio’s Roman-and-Calabrian world as a pragmatics laboratory: Modio’s dialogic writing (notably Il convito, and his Tevere treatise) trades on the fact that social talk about honor, marriage, and sexual reputation is rarely carried by the dictum alone, but by what an informed audience can be counted on to infer from hints, proverbs, and the management of what is sayable in polite company. In Gricean terms, Modio’s favourite materials—banter at a convivio, carnival looseness in Rome, and the circulation of proverbial wisdom—are precisely the contexts in which implicature becomes a civil technology: speakers protect face, signal complicity, and distribute blame or ridicule while staying just this side of explicit accusation. The “river philosophy” motif sharpens the comparison because a river can function like context itself: it carries deposits, rumours, and half-said things downstream, so that meaning becomes a public current rather than a private intention; Grice’s contribution is to explain how that current is nonetheless reason-governed, since hearers recover what is meant by presuming relevance, proportion, and strategic restraint. Modio’s proverbial punchlines (e.g., “anzi corna che croci”) illustrate the same mechanism as a compact, culturally preloaded move: it says little, but it triggers a large inferential package about norms, consolation, and the acceptable framing of misfortune. Read this way, Modio’s “philosophy of the Tiber” and Grice’s “logic of conversation” converge on one point: in morally charged domains, what counts as communicated is often what is left unsaid but made recoverable by shared rational expectations, so that wit and indirection are not decorative extras but the very medium through which a community keeps its meanings intelligible without making them dangerously explicit. Grice: “Only in Italy a philosopher writes a treatise on a river – although the Isis would not be out of place for some Magdalenite!” – Grice: “His convito is a jewel!” – Seguace di Neri. Originario di Santa Severina, borgo collinare della Calabria Ulteriore, è avviato agli studi di filosofia presso l'Archiginnasio di Napoli. In seguito passa a Roma, dove si avviò agli studi in medicina divenendo allievo di Fusconi. M. frequenta gl’ambienti accademici, dove entra in contatto con alcuni dei maggiori esponenti di spicco di quell'epoca come Molza e Tolomei.  Pubblica la sua prima opera letteraria più famosa dal titolo I”l convito; overo, del peso della moglie: un dialogo diegetico” (Roma, Bressani) -- ambientato a Roma durante il carnevale della città capitolina, in cui viene trattato il tema delle corna durante un convivio presieduto dall'allora vescovo di Piacenza Trivulzio e a cui parteciparono anche Gambara, Marmitta, Benci, Selvago, Raineri e Cesario. E altresì grande estimatore degli saggi di Piccolomini.  Durante la stesura in lingua volgare di un Operetta de’ Sogni, si ammala di febbre altissima. Si spense dopo qualche giorno a Roma, nella tenuta di palazzo Ricci in via Giulia.  Altri saggi: “Il Tevere, dove si ragiona in generale della natura di tutte le acque, et in particolare di quella del fiume di Roma” (Roma, Luchini) “Origine del proverbio che si suol dire "anzi corna che croci" (Roma, A. degli Antonii,” Jacopone da Todi, I Cantici del beato Iacopone da Todi, con diligenza ristampati, con la gionta di alcuni discorsi sopra di essi e con la vita sua nuovamente posta in luce” (Roma, Salviano). Prospetto autore, su edit16.iccu.. Modio, Il Tevere, cit., c. 45r  Anno di pubblicazione della medesima opera. G. Cassiani, Dizionario biografico degli italiani, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. amore, sesso. Grice: Modio, devo confessarle che mi ha sempre incuriosito il suo celebre convito romano. Ma secondo lei, tra il Tevere e il Tamigi, quale fiume porterebbe via più segreti amorosi? Modio: Caro Grice, il Tevere ha sentito talmente tanti sospiri e pettegolezzi che ormai scorre con leggerezza tra una confidenza e l’altra. Ma attenzione: tra le sue onde, un orecchio allenato può ancora sentire il tintinnio delle famose “corna” di Roma! Grice: Ah, la sua filosofia della conversazione è davvero unica! Da noi a Oxford, al massimo si discute del peso delle tazze da tè, mai di quello delle mogli. Forse dovremmo importare qualche proverbio calabrese sulla vita matrimoniale. Modio: Lo dica pure ai suoi colleghi: “meglio le corna che la croce!” In fondo, caro Grice, la conversazione civile serve proprio a questo: a ridere insieme, anche delle nostre piccole disavventure d’amore. Perché come si dice dalle mie parti, tra il serio e il faceto, scorre sempre il fiume della saggezza! Modio, Giovanni Battista (1586). Historia de’ Saraceni. Venezia: Ziletti.

Padre Battista Mondin, S. X. (Monte di Malo, Vicenza, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell ritorno dell’angelo, la semantica filosofica, la semantica pel sistema G, interpretazione e validità. M. (born at Monte di Malo, in the Vicenza area) can be read as a systematic counterpart to Grice’s anti-systematic but deeply rule-sensitive pragmatics: where Grice explains conversational meaning by appeal to defeasible maxims and the hearer’s rational reconstruction of what a speaker intends, Mondin treats interpretation and validity as topics that invite explicit architecture—definitions, taxonomies, and a mapped “system” in which semantic questions can be located and assessed. The contrast in your passage (Oxford’s suspicion of chairs, treatises, and “philosophy of language” as a field versus the Italian comfort with manuals and encyclopedic ordering) becomes Gricean in itself: Grice’s point is that conversational rationality works precisely because it is mostly implicit, carried by shared expectations rather than by announced rules, whereas Mondin’s Thomist-influenced temperament (Aquinas as model) tries to make those expectations explicit, stable, and teachable across domains, including theology. The “angelology” motif sharpens the comparison because angels are, in medieval and scholastic thought, paradigms of intellect and message-bearing: they are a literalization of the idea that meaning travels via intention and uptake, so Mondin’s seriousness about angels can be recast as seriousness about the metaphysics of communication, while Grice’s quip deflates the metaphysics back into pragmatic method—how we actually succeed, in real talk, at getting one another to see what we mean. Finally, the pizza/“semantics of the margherita” joke usefully dramatizes Grice’s central distinction between conventional meaning and occasion-meaning: even if a term or sign has a stable “value,” what it communicates shifts with context and audience, and Mondin’s preference for agreement between philosophy and theology echoes Grice’s cooperative core—meaning and understanding depend on a shared rational orientation, whether the interlocutors are dons in Oxford, Thomists in Rome, or (as the joke has it) angels crossing a bridge and still managing to be understood. Grice: “I thank God that we at Oxford don’t systematise philosophy as they do in Bologna, with things such as the chair in ‘Filosofia della lingua.’ It is true that some Oxonian philosophers HAVE written tracts on ‘the philosophy of language’ – such as Blackburn – but they were NEVER taken seriously. Myself, I did my part in my seminars, which myself being a university lecturer, were in theory ‘open to any member of the university’ – including most of my enemies!” Grice: “Trust an Aquino to provide a systematic philosophy! Mind, I’ve been called a systematic philosopher, too! At Oxford, we are very familiar with angels – but only M. takes angeologia seriously! Trust an Italian! Ponte Sant’Angelo comes to mind!” Dottore di Filosofia e Religione a Harvard. È stato decano della Facoltà di Filosofia presso la Pontificia Università Urbaniana di Roma. M. membro della Congregazione dei Missionari Saveriani. Nei suoi studi, le principali figure di riferimento sono state AQUINO e Tillich, da cui ha tratto l'ideale di un accordo e di un mutuo sostegno tra filosofia e teologia.  “Etica, Etica e politica, Filosofia, Antropologia filosofica, Manuale di filosofia sistematica, La Metafisica di Aquino e i suoi interpreti,” “Storia dell'antropologia filosofica” Antropologia filosofica e filosofia della cultura e dell'educazione; “Epistemologia e cosmologia; “Logica, semantica e gnoseologia; Ontologia e metafisica Storia della metafisica, Storia della metafisica, Storia della metafisica, “Ermeneutica, metafisica, analogia in Aquino; Storia della filosofia medievale Dizionario enciclopedico di filosofia, teologia e morale Il sistema filosofico di Aquino glossario filosofico, going through the dictionary, linguistic botanizing. Grice: Mondin, lei che ha dato dignità agli angeli nella filosofia, mi dica: sono davvero sistematici o ogni tanto fanno qualche deviazione spontanea? Mondin: Caro Grice, gli angeli sono più sistematici di quanto sembri, ma ogni tanto si concedono una passeggiata tra i ponti di Roma, giusto per ricordarci che anche la filosofia ha bisogno di un po’ di leggerezza! Grice: A Oxford, la leggerezza è rara: abbiamo più nemici che angeli! Però confesso che mi piacerebbe vedere un angelo filosofare sul senso della pizza. Secondo lei, esiste una semantica della margherita? Mondin: La semantica della margherita? Certo! Il suo valore è universale, ma la sua interpretazione cambia da Vicenza a Napoli. L’importante è che, tra filosofia e teologia, si trovi sempre un accordo... almeno sulla mozzarella! Mondin, Battista (1963). Ordinazione. Pavia. Piacenza

Giovanni da Casale Monferrato (Casale Monerrato, Alessandria, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s model of reason-governed conversational meaning (where what is meant is often an implicature rationally recoverable from what is said plus shared norms) fits Giovanni da Casale Monferrato remarkably well once you treat medieval “scientific-theological” exposition as a disciplined conversational practice rather than as mere treatise-writing. In the Quaestio de velocitate motus alterationis, Giovanni’s contrast between uniform and difform qualities (the rectangle versus the triangle as graphical encodings of change) is a way of making inferential commitments explicit: the diagram does not merely illustrate, it guides the reader toward licensed conclusions about rates of alteration, just as Grice’s maxims guide a hearer toward licensed conclusions about speaker-meaning. Your pizza-and-oven joke then becomes a Gricean diagnostic: we can move from a geometric model of “hotness” to a practical claim about cooking only if we assume cooperation and relevance, i.e., that the speaker is offering the right kind of information for the hearer’s purposes; otherwise the audience is left to compute implicatures (perhaps the point is methodological, not culinary). Giovanni’s medieval scholastic setting also parallels Grice’s emphasis on rational reconstruction: quaestiones are structured dialogues with an imagined opponent, so progress depends on anticipating what a reasonable interlocutor would infer, object, or demand as clarification—exactly the inferential sensitivity Grice theorizes under the Cooperative Principle. Finally, the passage’s contrast between “inanimate bodies” and “animate bodies” (not guided missiles) aligns with Grice’s central distinction between mere causal sequences and reason-responsive agency: for Giovanni, motion can be modelled; for Grice, conversation can be modelled; but in both cases the model matters because it captures a form of intelligibility—patterns that are not just observed, but are treated as answerable to reasons, and therefore as things we can interpret, correct, and coordinate with others. Autore di opere di teologia e scienza e legato pontificio. Entra nell'ordine francescano nella provincia genovese. Docente presso lo studio francescano di Assisi. Compone il saggio. “Quaestio de velocitate motus alterationis, Venezia. In esso presenta un'analisi grafica del movimento dei corpi uniformemente accelerati. La sua attività di insegnamento in fisica matematica influenza gli studiosi che operarono a Padova e Galilei che ri-propose idee simili. ‘Giovanni da Casale’, Treccani. Filosofia Filosofo del XIV secolo Teologi italiani Storia della scienza. Grice: “Casali dicusses the velocity of motion of alternation. He wisely remarks that if one takes the example of the quality of hotness, one may conceive of a UNI-FORM hotness throughout – ‘just as a rectangular parallelolgram is formed between two equidistant lines, such that any part you wish is equally wide with another. ‘Let there be throughout a UNIFORMLY DIFFORM hotness, such that it is a triangle!” corpi inanimati, corpi animati, inerzia, un corpo animato non e un missile guidato – Grice. La liberta dei corpi animati, uniform, uniformly difform, difformly difform.  Grice: Caro Monferrato, mi dica: se la velocità del caldo può essere rappresentata come un triangolo, allora la pizza in forno segue una parabola o diventa una retta? Ho bisogno di una risposta scientifica, ma non troppo calda! Monferrato: Paul, in Piemonte diciamo che la pizza, se troppo calda, va mangiata con calma e con filosofia. L’importante è non confondere il moto accelerato della mozzarella con quello dell’appetito; la scienza insegna, ma la fame decide! Grice: Ecco la saggezza piemontese! Se invece di pizza fosse una discussione, lei preferirebbe un moto uniforme o difforme? Glielo chiedo, perché a Oxford, spesso si finisce in curva anche quando si parte dritti! Monferrato: A Casale Monferrato si dice che una conversazione ben fatta è come un corpo animato: non è un missile guidato, ma sa sempre dove andare. Uniforme quando si ride, difforme quando si discute... purché non si finisca arrosto, come una pizza troppo scientifica! Monferrato, Giovanni da Casale (1478). Sermones. Venezia: Johannes de Colonia.

Giuseppe Ignazio Montanari (Bagnacavallo, Ravenna, Emilia-Romagna). Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning pairs surprisingly well with Giuseppe Ignazio Montanari because Montanari stands at the intersection of rhetoric, prudence, and public intelligibility: trained in seminarian and aristocratic eloquence, then active as a teacher and prolific writer, he works in precisely the space where meaning is not just what is asserted but what can be responsibly inferred by an audience under shared norms. On a Gricean reading, Montanari’s rhetorical formation supplies the “craft” side of cooperation: speakers design utterances for uptake, calibrating how much to say, when to be indirect, and how to let hearers supply the rest—i.e., implicature as a disciplined economy rather than as mere flourish. The biographical note about his politically cautious posture during the Romagnol unrest is especially Gricean: when explicit commitment is risky, communication migrates into what can be suggested without being stated, so deference, petitions, and professions of patriotism can function as strategically placed conversational moves whose point is carried by what they invite the competent hearer to conclude. Even his scientific title, Osservazioni astronomiche (Bologna, 1740), can be used as an analogy for Grice’s pragmatics: observation reports are thin on theory but rich in inferential potential—readers recover significance by assuming the observer is methodical and sincere, much as Grice’s hearer assumes cooperation and then computes what is meant beyond the literal. In short, Montanari provides a historically concrete picture of how conversational reason operates in educated Italian practice: rhetoric teaches how to make meaning public, prudence teaches when to let implication carry the communicative load, and the audience’s rational expectations supply the bridge from dictum to what is understood. Nasce da Lorenzo e Barbara Biancoli -- cfr. lettera a Vaccolini, Pesaro. Inizia a studiare nel seminario di Faenza, dove si sono formati letterati famosi come Monti e Strocchi. Tuttavia, problemi di salute indussero i genitori a trasferirlo a Ravenna, presso il collegio dei nobili, dove gli è maestro di eloquenza Farini ed ha per compagno Mordani, al quale resta legato d'amicizia per tutta la vita.  Dopo aver perso la madre -- il padre s’è intanto risposato --, completa gli studi tra Bologna e Roma, laureandosi in diritto. Subito dopo ottenne la cattedra di umanità e retorica al ginnasio di Solarolo, dove resta quattro anni e sposa Mainardi. A quest’epoca risalgono le sue prime prove letterarie -- Rime sacre, Faenza, che Betti preferiva agli Inni sacri del Manzoni --, d’ispirazione cristiana, come molta della sua non rimarchevole produzione successiva che pure in qualche caso ottenne giudizi favorevoli dai contemporanei.  Spinto dall’illustre letterato e amico di famiglia Borghesi, concorse per la cattedra a Savignano ottenendola. Già in questa fase M. si rivela scrittore dalla vena facile e prolifica, rivolgendo i propri interessi a quattro filoni fondamentali: opere di retorica, traduzioni dal latino, brevi biografie e opere di argomento religioso. I moti in Romagna non videro in prima fila M., che però, «sebbene un po’ copertamente, dev’essere stato del numero» -- Pierini. Portano a questa conclusione alcune professioni di patriottismo dello stesso M. e la domanda che indirizzò al vescovo di Rimini per essere riammesso all’insegnamento. Tuttavia l’atteggiamento assai prudente di M., preoccupato di conservare l’impiego e mantenere agli studi i cinque figli, non consente di conoscere le sue autentiche idee politiche. Se, d’una parte, sembra talora aderire ai moti liberali -- v. un carme a Mordani, cit. in Polenta -- , dall’altra mostra in pubblico un atteggiamento deferente verso le autorità ecclesiastiche, delle quali cerca spesso l'aiuto e la protezione. Grice: Caro Montanari, tu che da Bagnacavallo sei finito a fare osservazioni astronomiche a Bologna, dimmi: quando scrivi “ho visto una stella”, lo dici o lo impliciti per modestia da seminario? Montanari: Paul, in Romagna s’impara presto che tra dire e dire troppo c’è di mezzo la cattedra, quindi l’astronomo parla poco e lascia il cielo fare il resto. Grice: Ah, allora la tua Osservazioni astronomiche è un manuale di implicature: poche parole, molte costellazioni, e il lettore cooperativo si arrangi. Montanari: Esatto, e se qualcuno mi chiede prove, gli rispondo che anche le stelle hanno cinque figli da mantenere: non possono brillare a comando. Montanari, Giuseppe Ignazio (1740). Osservazioni astronomiche. Bologna: Lelio dalla Volpe.

Montanari: la ragione conversazionale -- filosofia italiana –  (Roma). Filosofo italiano.

Montanari, Bruno – teaches at Catania.

Montanari, Federico – teaches at Modena and Reggio Emilia

Montanari, Tomaso saggista

Mazzino Montinari: la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del sovrumano – torna a Surriento. Montinari is a natural counterpart to Grice because both make interpretation answerable to reasons rather than to aura: Grice explains how hearers rationally recover speaker-meaning by assuming cooperative norms and then calculating implicatures, while Montinari’s critical Nietzsche scholarship shows how readers recover authorial sense only by disciplined constraints on what can legitimately be inferred from notebooks, variants, and editorial interventions. The famous Montinari–Colli demolition of “The Will to Power” as Nietzsche’s putative authored book is, in Gricean terms, an exposure of a massive illegitimate implicature generated by paratext and institutional authority: an editorial compilation was made to look like a single intended communicative act, inviting readers to attribute to Nietzsche a global thesis and architectonic plan he did not in fact “mean” to put forward in that form. Montinari’s philological work functions like Grice’s maxim-governed pragmatics: it distinguishes what is explicitly in the evidence (dated fragments, contextual notes, manuscript layers) from what later readers are tempted to supply as “what he really meant,” and it insists that inferences must be licensed by reliable uptake conditions rather than by wishful system-building. Your passage’s political-cultural frame (culture as the remaining force against institutional assimilation and commodification of protest) also fits Grice’s core point that rationality is social and procedural: meaning is stabilized by shared practices, and when institutions manipulate the available context, they also steer what implicatures become “natural.” Finally, the Sorrento/Turin joke captures a serious methodological parallel: for Grice, the deepest work of meaning happens in what is left unsaid but responsibly recoverable; for Montinari, Nietzsche’s “overman” and other grand motifs survive not as slogans but as interpretive tasks that require resisting premature closure—treating the archive not as a monolithic message but as a field in which only some implications are warranted, and where the critic’s virtue is to keep inference tethered to reason. Grice: “We don’t study Nietzsche at Oxford, but they do, at Cambridge! If I were asked to identify the main difference between the Italian philosopher and the Oxonian philosopher is that the Italian philosopher takes Nietzsche seriously! But then he lived at Torino!” Nelle istituzioni esistenti, sostenute da immani forze di produzione e di distruzione, viene assimilata e mercificata ogni e qualsiasi protesta, persino quella dei Lumpen, ogni tentativo di lasciare la «nave dei folli». Se il metodo di Nietzsche può ancora aiutarci, allora l'unica forza che ci è rimasta è quella della cultura, della ragione.»  Considerato uno dei massimi editori e interpreti di Nietzsche. Ha definitivamente dimostrato che Nietzsche non ha mai scritto un'opera dal titolo “La volontà di Potenza” e che le cinque diverse compilazioni che la sorella del filosofo e altri editori dilettanti hanno pubblicato sotto questo titolo sono testi del tutto inaffidabili per comprendere il pensiero di Nietzsche. Si era formato a Pisa presso la quale si laureò con I movimenti ereticali a Lucca. Caduto il fascismo, divenne un attivista del Partito comunista, presso il quale si occupava della traduzione di scritti dal tedesco. Mentre visitava la Germani a Est per motivi di ricerca, fu testimone della rivolta. Successivamente, in seguito alla repressione della Rivoluzione ungherese del 1956, si allontanò dall'ortodossia marxista e dalla carriera nel partito. Mantenne tuttavia la sua iscrizione al PCI, e rimase fedele agli ideali del socialismo. Collabora con le Edizioni Rinascita, e per un anno fu direttore dell'omonima libreria in Roma. Dopo averne rivisto la raccolta di opere e manoscritti in Weimar, Colli e M. decisero di iniziarne una nuova edizione critica. Essa divenne lo standard per gli studiosi, e fu pubblicata in da Adelphi. Per questo lavoro fu preziosa la sia abilità nel decifrare la scrittura a mano (praticamente incomprensibile) di Nietzsche, fino a quel momento trascritta solo da "Gast“ (Köselitz).  L’implicatura di Nietzsche. (Michaelmas, late 1948; St John’s SCR; Grice and Colvin) Colvin was new enough to the place that one still had to decide whether to call him “Colvin” or “that new chap who knows what every chapel window cost”. I made a point of calling him Colvin, because it has the right clean consonants and because new fellows, like new buildings, should be greeted with the minimal ornament. He found me in the SCR with a thin Italian typescript balanced on the arm of a chair, as if I were trying to make foreign paper look like an Oxford habit. What’s that, Grice. You look as if you’re reading an index. More or less. It’s a title, really. A title in Italian. You’re getting continental. Only in the way the Bodley is continental: it remains where it is and accumulates. Colvin took the sheet with the quick, quiet confidence of a man who has spent his life taking other people’s documents away from them. La questione della Riforma protestante in Lucca, he read. Yes. That’s a thesis. So I’m told. And Lucca is a very deliberate choice. Deliberate how. Deliberate in the historian’s sense. Lucca is small enough to be local, and awkward enough to be revealing. Which decade. November 1949. Colvin looked faintly pleased, as if I’d just confirmed the date of a moulding. November. Exactly. And who wrote it. Mazzino Montinari. Colvin repeated the name once. Not admiration, not yet. Just filing. Where’s he writing it. Pisa. Scuola Normale. Normale, Colvin said. So, not abnormal. Normale Superiore. Colvin smiled. Superiore. Oxford would never dare print that. I’m glad you appreciate the politics of adjectives. Colvin sat down. He was not a philosopher, but he had that historian’s way of sitting as if he might, at any moment, produce a receipt. And why are you reading a Tuscan thesis-title in St John’s. Because the phrase that accompanies it is irresistible. Listen to this: after a year of philosophical studies, he “moved to history” under Cantimori. Moved. Yes. Moved. Passive. As if History came round with a van. Colvin gave a small laugh, and I felt I had done my welcoming duty. Tutors do that, he said. They rearrange people. But there’s the point that annoys me. He “moves from philosophy to history” and then he graduates in Filosofia della storia. Colvin blinked once, politely, the way historians do when a philosopher has made the category mistake that he thinks is a discovery. So he moved from philosophy to philosophy. Exactly. That’s your complaint. It is. “Philosophy of X” is not a proper transfer, in my view. It is philosophy wearing an X as a hat and calling it travel. Colvin handed the paper back. Historians would call it specialization. Philosophers call it evasion. Or, Colvin said, they call it a way of smuggling method into a subject that would otherwise be all wind. That’s better. Now we’re talking. But you’re still annoyed. Because the wording invites a silly inference. “Moved to history” sounds like exile. “Filosofia della storia” sounds like he never left the house. And what do you think actually happened. I think Cantimori taught him to treat texts as evidence, not incense. And a philosopher who learns that is dangerous to everybody’s grand theories. Colvin looked at me as if he were deciding whether I had just praised a historian or insulted him. So you’re reading it because you want to borrow Cantimori’s discipline. I’m reading it because I want to move Montinari back. Back to philosophy. Back to where he belongs, but with the historian’s conscience installed. If he’s clever, he’ll stop people making Nietzsche mean what later editors want him to mean. Colvin nodded, as if the words editor and evidence had been enough to make him feel at home. That, he said, is at least a respectable reason to read a title. It’s an Oxford reason, too. Colvin stood up, as if concluding a small inspection. Well, he said, if you’re going to welcome me by talking about archives and editorial mischief, you’ve chosen correctly. I was beginning to fear I’d have to pretend to enjoy metaphysics. You’ll still have to pretend. Yes, but now I know what sort of pretending we can do together. As he went out, I noticed the small victory: not that I’d made him laugh, but that I’d made a historian tolerate a philosopher’s pedantry about a phrase. And that is as close as Oxford ever comes to inter-faculty friendship: a shared irritation at someone else’s wording.Grice: Caro Montinari, lo confesso: a Oxford, Nietzsche è come il caffè decaffeinato, c’è ma nessuno lo prende davvero sul serio. A Cambridge invece pare che lo sorseggino a tutte le ore! Tu che lo conosci per davvero, dimmi: il “sovrumano” si trova prima o dopo la fermata di Sorrento? Montinari: Paul, a Sorrento si trova solo il limoncello. Per il sovrumano bisogna passare per Torino, magari sotto la pioggia, con una valigia piena di manoscritti indecifrabili. E comunque, ti avviso: “La volontà di potenza” te la serve solo la sorella di Nietzsche, ma il conto lo paghi tu! Grice: Ah, e pensare che noi inglesi ci accontentiamo del “common sense”! Quando provo a leggere Nietzsche, mi sembra di salire sulla famosa nave dei folli. Ma dimmi, è vero che per capire i suoi appunti bisogna decifrarli come le lettere di un medico in pensione? Montinari: Esattamente! Solo che nel caso di Nietzsche la calligrafia peggiora col pensiero, non con l’età. Se vuoi, la prossima volta ti porto una lente d’ingrandimento e un dizionario di implicature conversazionali: vedrai che insieme riusciremo almeno a trovare la dedica, se non il significato! Montinari, Mazzino  (1949). La questione della Riforma protestante in Lucca. Pisa.

Guidobaldo de’marchesi Del Monte (Pesaro, Marche): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – la prospettiva e la filosofia della percezione. Guidobaldo del Monte (1545–1607), the Marquis of Montebaroccio from the Pesaro–Urbino world, is a particularly good match for Grice because his most famous intellectual moves—on mechanics, balance, and perspective—are exercises in making implicit structure explicit, much as Grice treats conversation as a rational practice whose “hidden” rules become visible when a speaker’s move would otherwise look puzzling. Del Monte’s work in statics and in the equilibrium controversy is methodological: he forces the reader to see which assumptions are doing the work, which idealizations are permitted, and which inferences are licensed; Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims play an analogous role at the level of talk, explaining how hearers are entitled to move from what is said to what is meant by presuming a disciplined economy of reasons. The perspective theme strengthens the parallel: Del Monte treats seeing as standpoint-dependent but still rule-governed (a lawful transformation from viewpoint to appearance), and Grice treats understanding as context-dependent but still rule-governed (a lawful transformation from utterance to implicature). In both cases, the point is not that meaning or perception is subjective, but that it is systematically recoverable because agents share methods—geometrical in Del Monte’s case, conversational-rational in Grice’s—by which different “angles” can be coordinated into a stable objectivity. That is why an Oxford fascination with perception (Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia) can be recast, in your Pesaro frame, as a continuation of Del Monte’s insight: what matters is not merely what is given to the senses (or to the ears), but the publicly intelligible procedures by which we justify moving from appearances (or words) to the reality we take ourselves to be tracking. Grice: “For some resason – most likely due to the empiricist tradition prevalent in these islands, the philosophy of perception is quite popular at Oxford. Our moral professor of philosophy, Austin, spent most of his terms teaching it – “Sense and sensibilia”!” Grice: “I like to illustrate a ‘scientific revolution’ with Del Monte’s refutation on the equilibrium controversy, since it involves a lot of analyticity that only a philosopher can digest!” -- essential Italian philosopher. Il marchese Guidubaldo Bourbon Del Monte (Pesaro), filosoMecanicorum liber, Suo padre, Ranieri, originario da un famiglia benestante di Urbino, discendente dalla schiatta dei Bourbon del Monte Santa Maria, fu notato per il suo ruolo bellico e fu autore di due libri sull'architettura militare. Il duca di Urbino, Guidobaldo II della Rovere, gli attribuì, per meriti, il titolo di Marchese del Monte, dunque la famiglia divenne nobile solo un generazione prima di Guidobaldo. Alla morte del padre, ottenne il titolo di Marchese. Studia matematica a Padova. Mentre era lì, strinse una grande amicizia con Tasso. Combatté nel conflitto in Ungheria, tra l'impero degli Asburgo e l'Impero Ottomano. Al termine della guerra, torna nella sua tenuta a Mombaroccio, vicino Urbino, dove passava i giorni studiando matematica, meccanica, astronomia e ottica. Studia matematica con l'aiuto di Commandino. Divenne amico di Baldi, che fu anch'esso studente di Commandino. Ispettore delle fortificazioni del Granducato di Toscana. Grice: “There possibly is no equivalent to perspective for the other senses. Prospettiva, as the Italians call it. They are obsessed with it. Consider the human body. Consider Apollo del Belvedere – it is not just a body perceiving another body, there is a perspectival side to it!” Giambattista del Monte. Guido Ubaldo de’ marchesi Del Monte; Guidobaldo Del Monte. Monte. Keywords: implicature, perspective in statuary.  Grice: Caro Monte, sai, a Oxford la filosofia della percezione è sempre stata un terreno fertile di dibattito. Austin ci ha abituati a ragionare su “Sense and sensibilia”, ma mi colpisce come in Italia la prospettiva sia così centrale. Tu che hai riflettuto a lungo su questo tema, come pensi che la prospettiva arricchisca la nostra comprensione del vedere? Monte: Grazie, Paul! Per noi italiani, la prospettiva non è solo una tecnica pittorica, ma una vera e propria filosofia del percepire. Credo che la prospettiva ci insegni quanto ogni punto di vista sia unico e imprescindibile per cogliere l’armonia del mondo. La percezione, in fondo, è sempre un dialogo tra ciò che vediamo e il modo in cui ci poniamo di fronte alla realtà. Grice: Interessante, Monte! È come se la prospettiva diventasse una metafora della conversazione stessa: ognuno porta il suo sguardo, la sua posizione, e solo dal confronto nasce comprensione autentica. Non credi che anche nella statua, come nell’arte del dialogo, sia il mutare del punto di vista a generare nuovi significati? Monte: Assolutamente! Basta pensare all’Apollo del Belvedere: se lo osservi da una sola angolazione, rischi di perderne la bellezza. Così è anche nel pensiero: solo accogliendo la molteplicità dei punti di vista possiamo sperare di avvicinarci alla verità. Dopotutto, come dice il proverbio, “ogni testa è un piccolo mondo”. Monte, Guidobaldo Del (1577). Mechanica. Pesaro: Bartolomeo Oliverio.

Giovanni Morandi (Firenze, Toscana)

Luigi Morandi (Todi, Perugia, Umbria): la lingua di Firenze. Giovanni Morandi’s philological attention to “rules of Florentine” (in the tradition of early grammars, vocabularies, and the recovery of documents like the grammatichetta often associated with Lorenzo il Magnifico) pairs well with Grice because it highlights the difference between rules as codified norms of a language and rules as rational constraints on intelligible interaction. Grice’s “conversational rules” are not grammar-book prescriptions but defeasible principles that hearers use to make sense of what speakers are doing—principles whose force is shown precisely when a speaker appears to deviate and the audience repairs the deviation by deriving an implicature. Morandi’s historical-linguistic project supplies the background against which that repair becomes possible: a stabilized lexicon, a sense of correct formation, and a culturally legible normativity (Florence as an emblem of stylistic discipline) that makes departures noticeable and therefore interpretable. In the Oxford–Florence contrast of your passage, “rule” itself becomes a pragmatic test case: a term can shift from legal-regulative (regula, rule of law) to game-regulative (a move should follow a move) to conversationally regulative (maxims guiding uptake), and Grice’s point is that what matters is not which sense is “in the dictionary” but which rational expectations participants are entitled to mobilize in context. Morandi’s insistence that the life of a language lies in the dialectic of norm and exception then converges with Grice’s central claim: conversational meaning is reason-governed because exceptions are not mere breakdowns but data—signals that invite principled inference—so that the most revealing “rules” of talk are those that can be bent, flouted, or reinterpreted while still remaining mutually intelligible. Grice: “At Oxford, ‘rule’ has a meaning that was adopted by Austin, and therefore, disadopted by me! – Cicerone should know better – REGVLA – from ‘reign’ – the rule of law. In my “Logic and Conversation” I occasionally and informally refer to the ‘conversational rule’ of the ‘conversational game’, i. e. the rule that states which ‘conversational mve’ should follow which!” Trabalza cita. REGOLE DELLA LINGUA FIORENTINA C ["kabalza. A quanto dico del notevolissimo documento che qui esce pella prima volta alla luce, sono in grado, per speciale favore usatomi dal mio illustre maestro ed amico senatore Morandi, d’aggiungere alcune notizie di grande importanza storica, anticipando le conclusioni a cui egli è giunto, com'è suo costume, dopo largo e profondo studio, e che illustra col noto suo magistero di dottrina e di stile in un saporitissimo saggio. Nella Antologia M. segnala l'importanza della grammatichetta vaticana, narrando le vicende del manoscritto; e poiché egli stesso m'esorta a pubblicarlo per intero, annunzia fin d'allora ch'io la mette come appendice ad ogni grammatica razionale o ragionata. Continuando però le sue indagini con rigore di metodo intorno ai primi vocabolari e alle prime grammatiche della nostra lingua, M. puo ha tra le altre cose provare che la nostra grammatichetta e molto probabilmente opera di Lorenzo il Magnifico, non certamente d’ALBERTI , com'e stato supposto; e che anche Vinci abbozza una grammatica della lingua d’Italia, dimettendone forse il pensiero, quando ha notizia, come apparisce da due suoi ricordi, della grammatichetta del magnifico. Lo studio di M. s’occupa poi distesamente dei materiali raccolti da VINCI per fare il vocabolario italiano, il latino-italiano e una specie di dizionario illustrato dell’armi Prefazione antiche, pel quale sa attingere d’una fonte classica sfuggita ai lessicografi latini suoi contemporanei. Importante. lingua, linguaggio, Alberti, storia della grammatica razionale. Corpus, late morning. The Old Quad is doing its usual trick of looking ancient while undergraduates remain young. I find Shropshire installed on a bench with a paperback-sized Italian thing, as if the sun had come out solely to assist his private education. What are you reading, Shropshire. Preparing for my Latin. That is a curious-looking Latin. It declines nicely. It is Italian, Shropshire. Italian declines too, if you bully it hard enough. Let me see. He hands it over with the air of a man offering a harmless object and hoping it will not be treated as evidence. “Stornelli ed altre poesie.” You mean you are revising your Latin by reading “stornelli”. Exactly. Masculine nominative plural. You are attempting to make an Italian plural do the work of a Latin case. It’s the -i that does it. Very classical. The -i does it the way a cap and gown “does it”. Costume does not entail citizenship. He shrugs, because shrugs are a cheap form of scepticism and therefore popular in Oxford. Read the first line, then. I want to hear how your “Latin” begins. Shropshire clears his throat and recites, with the earnestness of a man who has discovered that confidence can substitute for pronunciation. Stornelli sopra l’albero m’hanno svegliato. There you are. Stornelli. Plural. Not the verse-form, then, but the birds. Little starlings. Little noises. Little nuisances. Very morning. Exactly. And in that moment I feel the Click: not the modern click of a camera, but the older click of a word dropping into place and suddenly refusing to stay there. Stornelli: birds, yes. But also, by the title, poems. One word, two errands. You know, Shropshire, you have done something for once that is educational by accident. That’s my best sort of educational. What, the accident? The accident is your method. The education is Morandi’s title. One word, two senses; and the reader must choose, or pretend to choose, before he has any right to. He looks pleased, though I doubt he knows why. Shropshire is at his most useful when he is pleased for reasons he cannot articulate. Who is Morandi, anyway. Luigi Morandi. Italian chap. Later on he founded a biblioteca circolante. A circulating library. Yes. To circulate the stornelli, I take it. No, to circulate books. You have no proof of that. It’s what it means. And here the second click arrives, because “what it means” is precisely the phrase that always smuggles in the wrong certainty. Biblioteca circolante: in Italian, a lending library; in English, a library that goes about on little feet. Oxford has a Bodleian that stays. Morandi has a library that moves. One cannot resist. Oxford, you see, has got this backwards. Our library stays; we circulate. We circulate to the Bodleian, you mean. No, we circulate among ourselves. We circulate opinions. We circulate essay-topics. We circulate the influenza. But the Bodleian stays, like a moral principle. Corpus doesn’t, Shropshire says. Corpus is next to my bedroom. A short-diameter circle, if you want circulation. He says it as if he is proud of being a commoner who lives on his own commons, which he is. There is a tone some men have when they say “I pay for my food” that resembles virtue even when it is merely arithmetic. So you don’t bother with the Bodley. Why bother, when my library is already implicating me every night. He does not know he has said something good, which is why it is good. But tell me, Shropshire, what do you think Morandi is doing with “stornelli”. Is he naming birds or poems. Both. Both is lazy. Or clever. Clever is just laziness with a tie on. Shropshire considers this as if it were a maxim worth testing. It isn’t really the same word, though, he says. The poem-one isn’t from the bird-one. So you are going to spoil it with etymology. It’s true, though. The verse-form comes from that Provençal thing. Estorn. Yes. A poetic contest. Whereas the bird is storno. And storno is from Latin sturnus, if you want to be properly dead about it. Exactly. So the two “stornelli” are not brothers at all. They are two strangers wearing the same coat. Yes. And yet, in conversation, you treat them as brothers the moment it amuses you. Yes. That is the whole business, you see. The dictionary says: two unrelated histories. The title says: one printed form. And the reader, being a cooperative animal, supplies the bridge at once, because bridges are what readers do when authors leave gaps. So Morandi is relying on the reader to make the wrong inference. Not wrong. Useful. There are inferences that are historically false and conversationally correct. That sounds like cheating. It is civilisation. Shropshire laughs, and I realise that what I am enjoying is not the joke but the mechanism: one word, two senses, and then a third layer, the author’s invitation to pretend they are linked. The invitation is not stated; it is implied by the mere placement of the word on the cover and the birds in the first line. That is the kind of thing I cannot stop thinking about. It is not grammar; it is social reason. Shropshire takes the book back, like a man reclaiming property that has been temporarily nationalised. So I shouldn’t call it Latin. You may call it Latin if you also call the Bodleian a circulating library. Meaning: never. Meaning: only as a joke. And even then, be sure the joke circulates better than the book. He tucks Morandi away and looks satisfied, as if he has revised Latin without having suffered Latin, which is the undergraduate ideal. Minimal notes you can append (if you want) In Italian usage, “stornello” can denote the starling (as a diminutive/alternate of “storno”), but “stornello” also denotes a folk verse-form; standard etymologies usually treat the verse-form sense as separate (often traced to Occitan/Provençal “estorn”, a poetic contest) rather than derived from the bird-word. The vignette exploits the resulting “one form, two senses” as a Gricean prompt: the history may diverge, but conversational uptake happily recombines. “Biblioteca circolante” is an ordinary Italian term for a lending library; the humour depends on taking it compositionally in English as “a library that circulates”, and contrasting it with Oxford’s famously non-lending Bodleian.Grice: Caro Morandi, mi permetto di dirti che la lingua di Vadum Boum — come affettuosamente chiamo la mia università — è davvero una bestia di tutt’altra razza rispetto alla lingua di Firenze! Lì, le parole sembrano indossare abiti diversi, e le regole che guidano il “conversational game” non sono affatto quelle che Cicerone avrebbe riconosciuto. Morandi: Ah, Paul, non posso che sorridere! La lingua fiorentina, si sa, ha il pregio di una sobria eleganza e di un rigore quasi musicale. Ma non credere che sia immune da stranezze: basta leggere la grammatichetta del Magnifico o sfogliare il vocabolario di Vinci per scoprire che anche da noi ogni “regola” ha i suoi trasgressori, e il gioco della conversazione si arricchisce proprio grazie a queste variazioni. Grice: È proprio questo il bello, caro Morandi! A Vadum Boum “rule” ha assunto un significato che Austin aveva adottato, e che io, per spirito di contraddizione, ho preferito rifiutare. Ma, se ci pensi bene, nella logica della conversazione ogni regola è fatta per essere reinterpretata: il vero gioco sta nel sapere quando e come infrangere la “regola”. Morandi: Non potrei essere più d'accordo! In fondo, il nostro lavoro di filosofi e studiosi della lingua consiste proprio nel capire le regole, ma anche nel riconoscere il valore delle eccezioni. Come dice il proverbio fiorentino, “il parlar chiaro non è sempre il parlar vero”: la lingua vive una dialettica continua tra norma e creatività, ed è questo che la rende così affascinante e infinita. Morandi, Luigi (1867). Stornelli. Sanseverino Marche.

Sergio Moravia (Bologna, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale – personologia -- l’implicature conversazionali dei ragazzi – la scuola di Bologna. M.’s work on “personology,” the wild child, and “hidden reason” can be read as a human-sciences counterpart to Grice’s project in conversational pragmatics: both treat mindedness as something that becomes visible in patterns of intelligible conduct rather than as an occult inner glow. Grice argues that conversational meaning is reason-governed because hearers can (and normally do) reconstruct what a speaker meant by presuming rational cooperation and then deriving implicatures from what is said plus context; Moravia’s “il pungolo dell’umano” and the figure of the ragazzo selvaggio similarly dramatize how the status of “person” is not given merely by belonging to Homo sapiens but is achieved (or withheld) through entry into shared practices of sense-making—language, education, norm-following, and reciprocal recognition. That is why your “metaphysical transubstantiation” joke lands: in Gricean terms, becoming a person is becoming an agent whose behaviour is interpretable under reasons, and conversational implicature is one of the clearest signatures of that agency (the ability to mean more than one says, to understand indirectness, to play by and sometimes exploit the maxims). Moravia’s “ragione nascosta” then parallels Grice’s insistence that the most important rational work in communication is often not explicit argument but the quiet inferential labour beneath the surface—what must be supplied by a competent participant in a “universe of sense.” Finally, Moravia’s Nietzsche, as you quote him (earthbound, humane, anti-narcissistic, seeking sense beyond nihilism), fits Grice’s temperament: both resist grand metaphysical inflation in favour of the disciplined, finite achievements of understanding in ordinary life—conversation as the civil technology by which the human animal becomes, and stays, a person. Grice: “Perhaps I should have followed Moravia and called my construction routine of metaphysical transubstantiation, by which a specimen of Homo sapiens sapiens becomes a person – personologia!” Filosofo italiano. Bologna, Emilia-Romagna. Grice: “I like Moravia: he has philosophised on what makes us ‘human,’ (“il pungolo dell’umano”) – his analysis of ‘il ragazzo selvaggio’ is sublime – and he has played with ‘reason,’ hidden and strutturata – and the universi di senso with which I cannot but agree! – provided we don’t multiply them ad infinitum!” -- Grice: “I like Moravia’s idea of ‘la ragione nascosta’ – you have indeed to seek and thou shalt find!” -- “Il Nietzsche che prediligo è il Nietzsche terreno, umano, presente nel tempo. È il Nietzsche intrepido esploratore del sottosuolo dell'uomo e dei disagi della civiltà. È il Nietzsche che fertilmente e sofferentemente (non narcisisticamente) vive e pensa il nichilismo: ma per andare oltre il nichilismo. È soprattutto il Nietzsche cheneo-illuminista forse malgrado luivuole conoscere, capire, dare un (nuovo) senso alle cose.” Professore a Firenze. Allievo diGarin, si è formato in ambiente fiorentino conseguendovi la laurea in filosofia nel 1962 con tesi su Gian Domenico Romagnosi. Professore incaricato, è poi diventato ordinario di Storia della Filosofia all'Firenze. Nel corso della sua carriera, si è interessato particolarmente dell'illuminismo francese e del pensiero del Novecento, della storia e dell'epistemologia delle scienze umane, con particolare attenzione all'antropologia, la filosofia della mente e l'esistenzialismo. I suoi studi e le sue ricerche hanno aperto nuove prospettive interdisciplinari fra pensiero filosofico e scienze umane. ragazzi, personologia. Grice: Caro Moravia, se avessi seguito Bologna fino in fondo avrei chiamato la mia teoria una personologia conversazionale, dove i ragazzi diventano persone a colpi di implicature ben educate. Moravia: Paul, a Bologna i ragazzi imparano presto che la ragione è nascosta e un po’ birichina, ma se la provochi con gentilezza viene fuori a fare due chiacchiere. Grice: È proprio questo che mi diverte della tua scuola, perché la conversazione civilizza l’Homo sapiens senza bisogno di moltiplicare universi di senso come conigli metafisici. Moravia: Allora siamo d’accordo, perché anche il mio Nietzsche preferisce parlare tra umani, magari in cortile, piuttosto che fare il nichilista solitario in cattedra. Moravia, Sergio (1962). Il mito dell’uomo naturale. Firenze: La Nuova Italia.

Fabrizio Mordente (Salerno) : la ragione conversazionale – I know that there are infintely many stars. Grice’s reason-governed pragmatics can be made to meet Mordente’s infinitesimals by treating “infinite” talk as a case where what is said is systematically underdetermined and must be stabilized by conversational norms of evidence, precision, and disciplinary purpose. When Grice wonders “There are infinitely many stars—do I know that?”, he is pressing the gap between merely asserting a grand claim and being entitled to it; on a Gricean view, the hearer will normally infer (by Quantity and Quality) that a speaker who flatly says “infinitely many” is committed to having the right kind of grounds, and if those grounds are unavailable the utterance invites either retreat (“I mean very many”) or reinterpretation as rhetorical exaggeration. Mordente’s proportional compass and the Bruno–Mordente controversy over minima and commensurability illustrate the same dynamic in early modern mathematics: terms like “minimum,” “indivisible,” and “infinitesimal” are not self-interpreting; their usable content depends on what competent practitioners can reasonably infer about permitted operations (measuring, comparing, treating as commensurable) and on what counts as an acceptable justification against an Aristotelian background that allows only potential infinity. In that sense, Mordente’s “measuring a bit of infinity” becomes a pragmatic analogue of Grice’s implicature: the instrument does not merely add data, it constrains interpretation, licensing certain inferences and blocking others, so that claims about the infinitely small can function cooperatively rather than as mere metaphysical flourishes. The upshot is that both projects—Grice on conversational meaning and Mordente on mathematical minima—turn on the same rational discipline: making sure that an audience can, in principle, recover what is meant from what is offered, whether the audience is a conversational partner computing implicatures or a community of geometers deciding what “infinite” is allowed to mean within the rules of their practice. Grice: There are infinitely many stars. Do I KNOW that? There are infinitely many infinitely infinitisemials. Keywords: infinitesimal, commensurability of infinitesimals – or other. Scholars and historians of science have considered Giordano Bruno and Fabrizio Mordente's ideas on infinitesimals and commensurability in the context of the historical development of the concept, which  eventually led to Leibniz's infinitesimal calculus. The link is generally explored in the context of the historical evolution of mathematical and philosophical thought on infinity, atomism, and the continuum, rather than a direct personal or philosophical connection between the individuals themselves across different centuries.    Key points regarding the connections made by scholars: Aristotelian problem: Aristotle denied the existence of an actual infinite (both large and small) and maintained the infinite divisibility of the continuum in potentia, a standard view that Bruno explicitly challenged. The issue of commensurability was central to Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian philosophy, where quantities were generally considered commensurable or incommensurable in a specific mathematical sense. Bruno and Mordente: Bruno initially disregarded the Aristotelian distinction between mathematical and physical quantities. Influenced by his controversy with Mordente regarding the latter's proportional compass, Bruno began to argue for the existence of a physical and a mathematical minimum (atomism), making geometric objects (and thus infinitesimals) potentially determinable and commensurable, contrary to the standard Aristotelian view of continuous magnitudes. This represented a significant shift in his mathematical thinking, attempting a reform of mathematics to accommodate the infinitely small. Fabrizio Mordente. Grice: Caro Mordente, ogni volta che penso alle stelle infinite, mi viene il dubbio: le conosci tutte o ti affidi all’implicatura conversazionale? Mordente: Ah, Paul, ti dirò: tra infiniti infinitesimi e stelle, a Salerno ci si perde più facilmente che sulla Via Lattea! Ma almeno con il mio compasso proporzionale, posso cercare di misurare un po’ d’infinito… senza smarrirmi troppo! Grice: E meno male! Aristotele avrebbe detto che tutto si può dividere, ma tu e Bruno avete deciso di moltiplicare i minimi come se fossero pizzette – e ogni tanto pure commensurabili! Mordente: Paul, la filosofia italiana è così: tra una stella e un infinitesimo, la conversazione non finisce mai! Anzi, quando pensi di aver detto tutto, arriva un nuovo infinito da discutere… e magari una pizza da condividere! Mordente, Fabrizio (1584). Apud Johannem Baptistam. Venezia: Bertoni.

Emilio Morselli (Vigevano, Pavia, Lombardia): la sistematicita della filosofia –la filosofia della lingua – parola, ragione, segno, comunicazione.  Grice’s account of conversational meaning as reason-governed inference can be paired with Emilio Morselli’s “systematic” Lombard ambition (a dictionary mind: parola, segno, comunicazione) by treating Morselli’s lexicographic and historiographic impulse as an attempt to stabilize, in public form, the background rationalities that make talk intelligible in the first place. On Grice’s view, hearers recover what is meant by assuming cooperative rational agency and then computing implicatures from what is said plus context; in your passage, Morselli’s entries on silence (as the sceptic’s suspension of judgment) and aphasia (as loss of linguistic function) mark two limiting cases that help isolate Grice’s middle ground, where meaning is neither mere appearance nor mere noise but the product of interpretable intention under shared norms. Skeptical silence resembles Gricean conversational “withholding” at its extreme: the speaker declines commitment, yet that very refusal can still be meaningful because interlocutors rationally search for a point (the implicature of caution, parity of reasons, or methodological restraint). Aphasia, by contrast, models breakdown: when the capacity to produce usable signs collapses, the Gricean machinery cannot get traction because there is no reliable vehicle for intention-recognition, so the cooperative calculus fails. Morselli’s systematicity thus complements Grice by foregrounding the infrastructure of intelligibility—definitions, distinctions, taxonomies—while Grice explains how, even with that infrastructure, actual communication lives in the dynamic gap between dictionary-meaning and occasion-meaning: the same word (or the choice of silence) can carry different rationally recoverable implications depending on the conversational setting, the epistemic posture, and the shared expectations that make “saying less” a way of meaning more. Grice: “The Italians distinguish between Morselli and Morselli. The second wrote a ‘manuale di semejotic’ – the first did not!” Grice: “What I like about Morselli is that his is mainstream (Lombardia) and that he approached philosophy systematically. Only Morselli could conceive of a ‘dictionary’ – and he also wrote a ‘storia della filosofia’!” – Per li scettici antichi, l’afasia, Osn!:d P*%r OdMi WHMJOTECA CAPWvj|a£. dico) = Il silenzio, fllos., il tacere, è il risultato della sospensione di qualsiasi giudizio o affermazione circa la vera natura dello cose. L’uomo conosce soltanto ciò che appare, và 9aiv6jj.Eva, la pura apparenza: se si vuolo oltrepassarla, ci si trova di fronte a ragioni contrarlo e d'uguale forza; perciò il saggio, se vuol conservare l’impassibilità e l’equilibrio dell’anima (derapala), non afferma nuLa, neppure l’impossibilità della scienza. (psicol.): l’afasia ò la perdita totale o parziale dello funzioni del linguaggio. Affettivo (lat. a/Hccrc. p. 0. dolore, laeiiiìa addolorare, rallegrare) (psicol.): si dico delle modificazioni e dei modi di essere dei soggetto, dei processi essenzialmente soggettivi, come il niacore, il dolore, le emozioni, 1 sentimenti, lo passioni, io inclinazioni, che formano una dello tre grandi attività in cui si distribuisce solitamente, per comodità d’analisi, la vita psicologica, cioè l’intelligenza, il sentimento, la volontà. Affezione (affectio) (psicol.): in generale designa una disposizione, uno 0 stato, un mutamento dovuti a causo esterne o Interne, sempre con un carattere di passività. In senso più particolare esprime il piacere, il doloro e lo emozioni elementari. implicatura. Emilio Morselli.  Grice: Caro Morselli, da Vigevano alla filosofia sistematica, dimmi: il silenzio è davvero la risposta migliore quando le parole non bastano? Oppure rischiamo di diventare afasici e perderci la conversazione? Morselli: Paul, il silenzio tra gli antichi scettici era un’arte! Ma se dovessi scrivere un dizionario, forse la voce “afasia” sarebbe la più lunga: nella filosofia, tacere è più rumoroso che parlare! Grice: Allora, Morselli, se la parola è segno e la ragione è comunicazione, qual è il destino di chi si affida solo all’apparenza? Gli scettici sarebbero perfetti per una chat muta! Morselli: Paul, tra afasia e sentimenti, l’importante è mantenere l’equilibrio dell’anima. Se qualcuno ti affetta troppo, magari è solo un’affezione temporanea: in Lombardia, anche l’implicatura passa col tempo e con un buon risotto! Morselli, Emilio (1898). Elementi di sociologia generale. Milano: U. Hoepli.

Enrico Agostino Morselli (Modena)– metafisica e psicologia filosofica – semeiotica.  Morselli is a good foil for Grice because semiotics/“semeiotics” treats symptoms as signs whose significance is recovered by disciplined inference, whereas Grice’s program treats utterances as actions whose significance is recovered by disciplined inference under assumptions of rational cooperation. In your passage, the Stevenson quip (“spots only mean measles—strictly, a spot does not mean”) marks the difference between natural meaning and speaker-meaning; Morselli’s psychiatric semeiotica sits right on that boundary, since it is precisely the practice of moving from observed “spots” (symptoms, behaviors, expressive disturbances) to what they indicate, while being careful not to slide from indication to intention. Grice supplies the conceptual control: where a symptom is read as evidence (natural meaning, defeasible and diagnostically constrained), a communicative act is read as meant (non-natural meaning, intention-involving, audience-directed). The Italy/Oxford contrast then becomes methodological: early Oxford “armchair psychology” often tried to read minds from introspection and ordinary-language cues, whereas Morselli’s clinical posture treats the mind as something approached through a rule-governed interpretive practice (a semiotics of the mental) that already anticipates Grice’s key idea that interpretation is rational and norm-sensitive, not merely associative. Finally, the mediumship episodes sharpen the Gricean warning: once you start treating every sign as if it were a message, you risk over-ascribing intention and importing “implicature” where there is only evidence; Grice’s maxims (especially Quantity and Relation) explain why that temptation is powerful—humans are built to infer purpose—while Morselli’s semeiotic discipline exemplifies the counter-pressure to constrain inference by method, background knowledge, and differential diagnosis. Grice: “Stevenson, an American, states that spots only ‘mean’ measles – strictly, a spot does not mean. Italians don’t have this problem – witness Morselli and his semejotica, as he spells it!” Grice: “When I arrived at Oxford, psychology was philosophy, and philosophy was psychology – or rather, philosophers were armchair psychologists, and vice versa! I never recovered. Abstract: Grice’s intention. Occupation(s) Physician, psychical researcher Enrico Agostino Morselli is an Italian physician and psychical researcher. M. is a professor atTurin. He is best known for the publication of his influential book Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics claiming that suicide is primarily the result of the struggle for life and nature's evolutionary process. According to Shorter "M. is known outside of Italy for having coined the term dysmorphophobia. In Italy, he is known for the psychiatry textbook A Guide to the Semiotics of Mental Illness." M. is a eugenicist and some of his writings have been linked to scientific racialism. M. is also interested in mediumship and psychical research. He studies the medium Eusapia Palladino and concludes that some of her phenomena is genuine, being evidence for an unknown bio-psychic force present in all humans.  Selected works Science Suicide: An Essay on Comparative Moral Statistics; A Guide to the Semiotics of Mental Illness (Manuale di SEMEIOTICA [SEMEJOTICA] delle malattie mentali Psychical research  M., E. . Eusapia Paladino and the Genuineness of Her Phenomena. Annals of Psychical Science. M., Psicologia e “Spiritismo”: Impressioni e Note Critiche sui Fenomeni Medianici di Eusapia Palladino. Turin: Fratelli Bocca. References  Stark, Rodney; Bainbridge, William Sims. Religion, Deviance and Social Control. Routledge. Maj, Mario; Ferro, Anthology of Italian Psychiatric Texts. World Psychiatric Association. G: Morselli begins before most philosophers had learned to blush at the word brain. S: Or cervello, rather. G: Yes, and that is already the first nuisance. S: Because you dislike nuisance in vocabulary more than in people. G: I dislike nuisance when it masquerades as precision. S: Yet Morselli’s title is beautifully plain: Spirito e materia. Conferenza sui rapporti fra il cervello e il pensiero. G: Beautifully plain, and therefore dangerous. S: Dangerous because cervello is vernacular? G: Dangerous because plainness tempts one to think one has settled something. S: We are in 1946, not Bologna 1276. G: Oxford never knows what century it is, and Bologna never stops reminding one. S: So: cervello. Is he simply saying “brain”? G: More or less. But with a history attached. S: Cerebrum? Cerebellum? Cerebro? Cervello? Cervelletto? G: Exactly. A physician learns one set in Latin and speaks another in Italian. S: And Morselli chose the Italian. G: Because he was lecturing not to anatomists only, but to intelligent civilians and incipient spiritists. S: You are unfair to spiritists. G: I am exact about spiritists. S: Let us begin with Broca. G: Broca, yes. French, not Italian. S: And not Brocca with two c’s. G: Quite. French enough to avoid doubling consonants and to keep Paris in order. S: He localised speech in the frontal lobe. G: In the left frontal region, yes. S: So pensiero, if tied to speech, is not in the cerebellum. G: Certainly not in the cerebellum in the sense of “the little brain at the back.” S: Yet the Italian ordinary word cervello comes from cerebellum, the diminutive. G: Which delights me no end. S: Because the larger organ gets named by the little one? G: Or because language, being language, refuses to honour anatomy’s dignity. S: French does the same. G: Cerveau, yes. S: Spanish keeps cerebro for the big thing, cerebelo for the little thing. G: Which is almost too rational for a Romance language. S: So Morselli, by saying cervello, is not saying cerebellum. G: No. He is saying the ordinary Italian word for “brain.” S: Even though a physician trained in Latin at Bologna would know perfectly well the distinction. G: He would know it, and then ignore it when speaking to the public. S: So the physician says cerebrum in the lecture hall of anatomy and cervello in the conference to cultured laymen. G: Precisely. S: Then what is your complaint? G: My complaint is not with Morselli’s word. My complaint is with the hearer who thinks the word has done the theory. S: “Cervello” explains nothing. G: No more than “mind” explains anything. S: Yet Morselli connects cervello and pensiero. G: As every nineteenth-century medico-philosopher was obliged to do if he wanted to be modern. S: Is that why you call him a philosopher? G: I do. S: Many would call him merely a physician. G: Many would call Broad merely a professor, which would also be stupid. S: Broad does use “brain.” G: Broad uses brain, nervous system, traces, dispositions, feelings, yes. He inhabits the mind-body landscape without taking residence in the cortex. S: And you are influenced by Broad. G: Broad taught us all how to speak carefully about things one cannot yet prove. S: Then your “brain-trace” in Personal Identity belongs to Broad’s atmosphere. G: Entirely. S: You write: “Since this trace is usually supposed to be in the brain, I shall refer to it as a ‘brain-trace’.” G: Yes. S: Why not “cerebral trace”? G: Because I was not trying to sound learned. S: So “brain-trace” is plain English, as Morselli’s cervello is plain Italian. G: Exactly. S: Then what if I say a brain-trace is just a cerebral trace? G: You would be stupidly right and therefore philosophically unhelpful. S: Which is a kind of Oxford sin. G: It is the commonest one. S: But surely “cerebral trace” sounds more medical. G: Yes, and therefore more falsely explanatory. S: Because “cerebral” flatters the listener into thinking science has been consulted. G: Quite. S: Yet in the Causal Theory of Perception you say the philosopher may consult the neurologist for the specific causal chain. G: Yes, because I am not a neurologist. S: Retina, optic nerve, cortex, all that. G: Quite. S: And the philosopher’s business is the general conceptual role of causal connection, not the exact wiring. G: Precisely. S: So when Place and Smart later say “brain processes,” they are doing something stronger. G: Much stronger. S: And choosing “brain” on purpose. G: Yes. S: Why not “cerebral processes”? G: Because “brain” is the public noun. S: The ordinary English organ-word. G: Exactly. S: Like Morselli’s cervello. G: Very much like it, but with a different polemical use. S: Explain. G: Morselli says cervello because he is modern and medical and wants the organ in sight. S: While still speaking intelligibly to non-medics. G: Yes. S: Place and Smart say brain because they want to force philosophy to confront physicalism without hiding behind technical Latin. G: Exactly. S: So “sensations are brain processes” is stronger than “seeing causally depends on some brain event.” G: Much stronger. S: Ryle would hate the flavour of it. G: Ryle dislikes flavours that smell of laboratories. S: He prefers the machine to the brain. G: He prefers the ghost in the machine because the machine is a logical metaphor, not a neurological organ. S: And you? G: I prefer to know which question I am asking. S: Which today is brain-trace. G: Today, yes. S: Let me be absurd for a moment. Is a brain-trace in the cerebrum or in the cerebellum? G: If you are asking me anatomically, I refuse. S: If philosophically? G: Then the question is worse. S: Why? G: Because “brain-trace” in my argument is a placeholder for whatever persistent physical condition someone imagines mediates memory. S: Not a claim about lobe, gyrus, or nucleus. G: Precisely. S: So when you say “usually supposed to be in the brain,” you are being broad in both senses. G: Delightful. Yes. S: Then Morselli’s cervello e pensiero is similarly broad? G: Broad and broad-brush. S: Is that a criticism? G: It is a diagnosis. S: You do sound Morsellian when you put it that way. G: Heaven forbid. S: Still, by 1870 Broca is already known. G: Yes. S: So one could object to Morselli: if you mean thought in the articulate, expressive sense, say frontal cerebrum, not cervello simpliciter. G: One could object, but one would be pedantic if one took his title for a dissection report. S: So the title is public philosophy by a physician. G: Precisely. S: And perhaps that is why “pensiero” appears instead of something more technical. G: Of course. Pensiero is as public as cervello. S: Which would irritate an anatomist. G: And delight a positivist lecturer. S: Where does Wundt sit in all this? G: Wundt sits in the laboratory, timing reaction and dignifying introspection with apparatus. S: Stout? G: Stout sits in the armchair, but with far more discipline than most armchairs deserve. S: And Morselli? G: Half clinic, half philosophy, with occasional visits to mediumship. S: That sounds indecorous. G: It is indecorous and historically true. S: So why not classify him as psychiatrist and be done with it? G: Because classifications are where thinking goes to die. S: Very broad of you. G: I learned something from Broad. S: Let me try another stupidity. If a brain-trace is called a brain-trace, why not call it a thought-trace? G: Because then you would have already decided the matter in favour of idealism. S: Ah. G: Which is exactly where Geymonat, if he were here, would rap your knuckles. S: So brain-trace keeps the physical side in view. G: Yes, while still refusing to specify more than the philosopher has any right to specify. S: And “mental trace” is rejected because it is too obscure. G: In the argument, yes. S: You say it is “a very difficult one.” G: Quite. S: And then you proceed by “lack of an alternative.” G: Which is how half of philosophy gets written. S: Then suppose a clever surgeon produces the trace. G: As I say. S: You introduce the surgeon like a melodramatic villain. G: Not villain. Technician. Villainy belongs to the misuse of possibility. S: Logical versus causal possibility. G: Exactly. S: So the whole argument is really about not confusing these. G: Yes. S: And the brain is, in a sense, incidental. G: Incidental but useful. A concrete noun helps one expose an abstract confusion. S: Much as Morselli’s cervello helps stage the issue, even if it does not settle it. G: Exactly. S: Then tell me where in the brain your trace lives. G: I decline. S: Cortical? G: No answer. S: Frontal? G: No answer. S: Temporal, perhaps, since memory? G: You are turning me into a fraudulent neurologist. S: Which you are not. G: Quite. S: And yet the specialist is welcomed. G: Welcomed, consulted, and then politely left to his own evidence. S: Price would approve? G: Price approves too many things in Perception, but on this general point, yes. S: Broad, Price, you, all letting physiology in only so far. G: Because the philosopher’s danger is not ignorance of anatomy but confusion of levels. S: And Place and Smart later erase that distinction. G: Or rather reduce it. S: Would Dr Brain of Brain approve? G: Dr Brain would probably prefer a paper and a lesion to our chatter. S: Still, there was a Dr Brain who edited Brain. G: Yes, which proves that nouns sometimes appoint their own custodians. S: And Brain was a neurological journal, not a philosophical one. G: Precisely. S: So philosophy’s “brain” lagged behind medicine’s Brain. G: Nicely put. S: Then what did Morselli know that Oxford did not? G: He knew sooner that one could put brain and thought in the same title without apologising. S: Oxford apologised until the late fifties. G: More or less. S: Yet you already had your brain-trace in 1941. G: As a divertimento, yes. S: A dangerous little one. G: All divertimenti are dangerous if people take them for symphonies. S: So if I were to say to you now: “A brain-trace is like a cerebral trace,” you would answer? G: “Certainly, and a shoe is like footwear.” S: Unhelpful. G: Precisely my point. S: Then let us end with the Italians. G: Always dangerous. S: Cervello, from cerebellum. G: Yes. S: Yet not meaning cerebellum. G: Correct. S: Pensiero, broad enough to cover thought, speech, mind, intention, perhaps too much. G: Exactly. S: So Morselli’s title is anatomically loose but intellectually timely. G: That will do. S: And your own brain-trace is physiologically noncommittal but logically useful. G: Better. S: And Broca would insist that if we are talking language, we are in the frontal cerebrum, not the little brain at the back. G: Quite. S: While Ryle would say we have already been seduced by the machine. G: Yes. S: And some future Australian will tell us sensations are brain processes. G: Let him try. S: You sound resigned. G: No, merely English. S: And Morselli? philosopher or physician? G: Both, and that is why he matters. S: Who cares? G: I do.Grice: Caro Morselli, quando sono arrivato a Oxford, la psicologia era filosofia e viceversa. Ma dimmi, in Italia, le macchie significano sempre il morbillo o ogni segno ha il suo destino? Morselli: Ah Grice, da noi ogni segno si merita una sua interpretazione! La mia semeiotica delle malattie mentali ha più indizi di un romanzo giallo. Stevenson dice che le macchie “indicano” il morbillo, ma io preferisco pensare che ogni sintomo abbia una sua personalità. Grice: Allora, se un medium si presenta con una macchia, è malato o sta solo trasmettendo un messaggio dallo spirito di Palladino? Morselli: In quel caso, caro Paul, potresti ritrovarti con una diagnosi doppia: una da medico e una da spiritista! E se la macchia scompare, magari è solo l’implicatura che ha deciso di prendersi una pausa. Del resto, in Italia anche i segni si divertono a confondere i filosofi! Morselli, Enrico Agostino (1870). Spirito e materia. Conferenza sui rapporti fra il cervello e il pensiero. L’Eco delle Università.

Emiliano Avogadro Collobiano di Vigiliano e Della Motta (Vercelli, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. Grice’s account of conversational meaning as reason-governed inference fits Emiliano Avogadro della Motta especially well because Motta’s intellectual life, as sketched in your passage, is built around salon-like “little academies” in Vercelli where jurists, theologians, bishops, and philosophers coordinate inquiry across disciplines and status lines—exactly the sort of mixed-audience setting in which what is meant routinely outruns what is said, and is recoverable only through shared norms of relevance, tact, and argumentative charity. On a Gricean reading, Motta’s public roles (school reformer, civic administrator, cultural founder, adviser on public instruction) make him a manager of conversational rationality in the literal sense: he engineers the conditions under which talk can function as a cooperative enterprise (who gets educated, which voices are authorized, which topics are discussable), and so he indirectly shapes which implicatures a community can reasonably draw from policy, pedagogy, and even ecclesiastical debate. The Rosmini/Serbati motif sharpens the comparison: to “examine” a thinker is not merely to refute propositions but to negotiate how a name, a school, and a doctrinal posture will be taken in the conversational economy of the time; the better surname joke itself is Gricean, because it highlights how social tone and lexical choice guide uptake beyond literal content. Even the Avogadro “fluid” pun works as a miniature model of implicature: it treats the movement of ideas through rooms and registers as a rational, inference-driven circulation, where participants track what is being suggested, conceded, bracketed, or politely left unsaid as the conversation shifts from dogma to education to civic history. In short, where Grice theorizes the norms that make meaning calculable in conversation, Motta exemplifies a historical practice of those norms in action—an elite but outward-looking conversational culture that relies on shared rational expectations to turn sparse remarks, institutional gestures, and cross-domain discussion into stable, publicly intelligible meaning. Grice: “If Mill’s claim to fame is to some his examination of Mill, Motta’s claim to fame is his examination of Rosmini – or Serbati, as I prefer to call him – better surname! --!” -- Il conte Emiliano Avogadro della M,. Nacsce dal conte Ignazio della M. e da Ifigenia Avogadro di Casanova, entrambi appartenenti a nobili famiglie di vassalli e visconti, i cui antenati risalgono a poco oltre il mille. Tra gli Avogadro vi fu anche Amedeo, inventore della legge sui fluidi. Frequenta con profitto gli studi e si laureò in utroque iure, ma proseguì lo studio in diverse aree della teologia e della filosofia, trasformando le dimore familiari in piccole accademie dove giuristi, filosofi, studiosi di diritto canonico e vescovi si riunivano, per discutere vari argomenti ed approfondire la filosofia moderna e i diversi aspetti del nascente socialismo.  Ricevette l'incarico, che già fu del padre, di riformatore degli studi del Vercellese e in un'epoca in cui si guardava ancora con diffidenza all'istruzione delle classi popolari, egli visitava ciclicamente le scuole d'ogni ordine, scegliendone accuratamente gli insegnanti, convinto che l'istruzione e l'educazione fossero un diritto di tutti e dovessero procedere simultaneamente. Assunse la carica di Consigliere di Formigliana e continuò a dedicarsi allo sviluppo culturale della natia Vercelli, ove fondò la Società di Storia Patria, per incrementare gli studi sul glorioso passato della città. Divenne membro del Consiglio Generale del Debito Pubblico e più tardi sindaco di Collobiano e “Consigliere di Sua Maestà per il pubblico insegnamento” La sua notorietà varcò i confini del Piemonte, allorché ricevette l'eccezionale invito di partecipazione alla fase preparatoria della definizione del dogma dell'Immacolata e le sue riflessioni ebbero un seguito fra alcuni importanti gesuiti, implicatura. Grice: Motta, mi dica: tra la ragione conversazionale di Vercelli e la filosofia piemontese, avete mai discusso se la legge dei fluidi di Avogadro funziona anche tra nobili e vassalli, o si rischia che i visconti evaporino? Motta: Ah, Grice, se i visconti evaporassero, resterebbe solo la implicatura! In famiglia si dice che la vera fluidità è quella delle idee: nei nostri salotti si discuteva talmente tanto che i filosofi si spostavano da una stanza all’altra senza soluzione di continuità, come molecole impazienti. Grice: E mi dica, Motta, tra una discussione sul dogma e una sull’educazione, quanti filosofi servono per cambiare una candela nella Società di Storia Patria? O si lascia tutto all’implicatura e si spera che la luce arrivi da sola? Motta: Grice, in Piemonte si preferisce la luce naturale, ma se proprio serve una candela, basta coinvolgere il conte, il vescovo, il giurista e magari anche un fluido: così si accende tutto, e si ride, perché la filosofia è un diritto di tutti—anche del buio! Motta, Emiliano Avogradro Collobiano di Vigliano e Della (1848). Rivista retrospettiva di un fatto seguito in Vercelli con osservazioni al diritto legale di libera censura. Vercelli.

Tito Gaio Musonio Rufo (Bolsena, Viterbo, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale del Musonio di Gentile -- lingua lazia -- Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning finds an unusually apt foil in Musonius Rufus, whose authority, as your passage notes, was exerted largely through oral teaching and whose surviving “texts” are in effect the afterlife of uptake: apophthegms and lecture-fragments preserved by hearers (via Stobaeus, Aulus Gellius, Plutarch, and through Epictetus/Arrian). Where Grice theorizes how hearers rationally recover speaker-meaning by assuming a cooperative orientation and then calculating implicatures from what is said, Musonius exemplifies a pedagogy that forces precisely that calculative work: by refusing the security of a written treatise, he makes doctrine travel as an inferential practice, not as a fixed inscription, so that “what he meant” is inseparable from what competent auditors could responsibly reconstruct. The exile motif (Rome/Gyaros and back) sharpens the parallel: both at Nero’s court and in post-war Oxford’s “no-no” climate for Roman philosophy, institutions manage what counts as sayable; yet the Gricean point is that meaning survives censorship and fashion because it is not exhausted by the official dictum—an audience can still retrieve a standpoint from sparse prompts, silences, and pointed brevity. Your dialogue’s line “if I keep silent, you are compelled to understand” is Gricean to the core: silence and under-specification become communicative moves only against a background of shared norms, shared purposes, and the expectation that a rational agent is not wasting the interlocutor’s time. Finally, Musonius’ “lingua lazia” and Stoic plainness function like an ethics of maxim-following: speak with measured quantity and relevance, let the hearer do the rest, and treat the residue—what is not stated but becomes jointly recoverable—as the real vehicle of philosophical transmission, i.e., implicature as moral practice rather than mere semantic decoration. Grice: “I don’t know if it was Ryle, but for years, Roman philosophy was a no-no at Oxford. Gone were the days of Walter Pater and his Marius The Epicurean!” Esercita un forte influsso sui contemporanei. Di famiglia equestre dell’etrusca Volsini suscita per la sua fama di filosofo l’invidia di Nerone. Segue Rubellio Plauto nell'Asia Minore e lo incoraggia a togliersi la vita quando Nerone lo condanna a morte. Ritorna a Roma, dove e bandito insieme con Cornuto in occasione della congiura di Pisone e confinato nell’isola di Gyaros nelle Cicladi, ove per la sua rinomanza attira uditori da ogni parte.Verosimilmente richiamato a Roma da GALBA, negli ultimi giorni di Vitellio si une ad una ambasceria del Senato presso Antonio Primo per perorare la causa della pace fra i suoi soldati, ma senza successo.Quando Vespasiano assunse il potere, M. accusa davanti al Senato P. Egnazio Celere, quale delatore e falso testimonio nel processo di Borea Sorano. Vespasiano lo escluse dalla prima espulsione dei filosofi da Roma, ma poi lo esiliò per la seconda volta ; però Tito, che già lo aveva conosciuto, lo richiamò dopo la sua assunzione al trono. In seguito mancano notizie su di lui, ma da una lettera di Plinio il Giovane sembra che non fosse più in vita. Non risulta che abbia composto e pubblicato scritti, anzi sembra che si sia servito soltanto dell’insegnamento orale, del quale, però, rimangono frammenti abbastanza numerosi. Essi comprendono 19 brevi apoftegmi conservati da Plutarco, da Aulo Gellio e dallo Stobeo ; altri apoftegmi e trattazioni filosofiche relativamente ampie raccolti da Epitteto nel suo insegnamento-È e trasmessi i primi da Arriano, le seconde dallo Stobeo ; esposizioni o lezioni che si trovano nello Stobeo o costituiscono la parte più estesa dei frammenti. Etruria. Tito Gaio Musonio Rufo. GRICEVS: Nescio an Ryle fuerit; sed per annos philosophia Romana Oxonii quasi “nefas” habebatur—abiērunt dies Walteri Pater et Marii Epicurei! MVSONIVS: Miror vos: Oxonii “nefas” dicitis quod Nero “invidia” vocabat. Ille me Gyarum misit; vos tantum ad bibliothecam—quae, fateor, etiam carcer esse potest. GRICEVS: At tu—philosophus Bolsenae—tam multos auditores traxisti, et tamen nihil scripsisti. Id est implicatura maxima: “si taceo, vos cogimini intellegere.” MVSONIVS: Ita est: scripta saepe sunt longiora quam res; ego breviter doceo et diu exulō. Si ex XIX apophthegmatibus totam doctrinam colligitis, cooperative agite—et parcite mihi chartis, quas Vespasianus iterum exulare iuberet. Musonio Ruo, Tito Gaio (a. u. c. DCCLXXVIII). Dicta. Roma.

Arnaldo Mussolini (Dovia di Predapio, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): Ryle e la ragione conversazionale ad Oxford. Grice’s picture of reason-governed conversational meaning helps read your Oxford vignette not as a biographical aside about an Italian public figure’s brother, but as a case study in how institutional climates reshape what can be said and, crucially, what must be left to implicature. On a Gricean view, hearers routinely assume cooperative rationality and so infer speaker-meaning from not only what is asserted but from choices of topic, tone, and omission; in the passage, the “Ryle knew” motif and the post-war hardening of attitudes toward continental philosophy can be described as a systematic management of conversational presuppositions (what counts as “live,” “serious,” or “respectable” philosophy) and of salience (what gets framed as relevant or treated with derision). The move from pre-war respectful engagement to post-war dismissal functions pragmatically like a standing implicature: that certain traditions are not merely false but not worth pursuing, so that a philosopher can communicate exclusion without having to argue for it in the open. The label “unwanted course” is likewise Gricean: it is an overtly thin description that invites the audience to supply the deeper institutional message (this material is being taught under constraint, as an obligation rather than as a shared project), and it does so by relying on shared background norms about what Oxford expects to be worth teaching. In that way, your scene ties Ryle-style gatekeeping to Grice’s central insight: conversational meaning is rationally recoverable only against a backdrop of common assumptions, and when those assumptions become politically and culturally charged, the same inferential machinery that ordinarily supports cooperation can also support exclusion—by making silence, ridicule, and curricular sidelining do the work that explicit argument used to do. Grice: “As a scholarship boy from Clifton arriving at Oxford in 1934, little did I know that Mussolini’s brother was dead – but RYLE knew! Evidence from Rowe's biography of Austin and related academic reviews suggests that when Ryle eventually did become the dominant figure of philosophy at Oxford after World War II, he deliberately suppresses praise for German philosophy and continental european thought generally, often using derision in place of his pre-war respect for it. Evidence of Suppression Shift from Respect to Hostility: Before the war, Ryle is sympathetic to continental philosophy, reviewing Heidegger's “Sein und Zeit” with respect and delivering a measured account of Husserl's work. However, after the war, this dissent "hardens into hostility," and he replaces his former respect with derision. "Unwanted Course": Ryle himself refers to a course of lectures he gives at Oxford – when Grice was a scholar at Corpus, and then a Harmsworth Schoalr at Merton, to eventually become a Fellow, and Tutorial Fellow in Philosophy at St. John’s, and eventually University Lecturer -- on the work of Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, and Meinong [from whose ‘jungle’ – ontological jungle – Grice wants to get away as late as ‘Vacuous names’ -- as an "unwanted course," reflecting the prevailing shift in the Oxford philosophical climate away from such philosophers. Cultural Atmosphere: Rowe's biography and related analyses tie this shift to the general "political and cultural climate" in post-war Oxford, which influences dons and graduates. This atmosphere contributed to the rise of the insular Oxford "ordinary-language philosophy" led by Ryle and Austin, which largely ignores or dismisses non-anglophone traditions. Focus on British Pragmatist empiricism: Grice: Ah, Mussolini! Sa, anche io ho un fratello—‘ne ho solo uno, proprio come lei’—ma sembra che sia il suo ad essere la vera celebrità a Vadum Boum. Eppure, mentre molti preferiscono Mussolini, Mussolini è il mio uomo. La filosofia, mi creda, finisce spesso per essere dettata dalla dittatura della storia!" Mussolini: Caro Grice, la sua osservazione è davvero spassosa. L’ombra della storia pesa su tutti, persino sui pensieri—ma forse la filosofia, come il linguaggio, può liberarci dal suo fardello. La fama di mio fratello è un macigno, ma spero che anche la mia voce filosofica possa trovare spazio." Grice: "Ha centrato il punto, Arnaldo. La tirannia della storia è una realtà, ma c’è sempre spazio per un dialogo nuovo. Il filosofo, insomma, deve conversare—con eleganza, ovvio—anche col passato e proporre nuove implicature per il presente." Mussolini: "Esattamente, Professor Grice. Continuiamo allora a costruire la nostra filosofia con ragionamento e conversazione—senza mai dimenticare la storia, ma senza farci chiudere in gabbia. Grazie per la sua franchezza e questo scambio così ricco. Mussolini, Arnaldo (1902). La riforma sociale in Italia. Milano: Tipografia Editrice Sociale.

Benito Amilcare Andrea Mussolini (Dovia di Predapio, Forli-Cesena, Emilia-Romagna): la ragione conversazionale e la storia della filosofia di Lamanna. Grice’s reason-governed account of conversational meaning can be used, in your passage, to diagnose how political rhetoric works precisely by recruiting an audience’s practical rationality to supply what is not said: the speaker banks on the hearer’s assumption that utterances are produced with some cooperative point, so hearers infer additional content (implicatures) from selective emphasis, strategic vagueness, and the staging of “acts” as if they were arguments. Read that way, “the Duce” becomes less a partner in philosophical exchange than a case study in how public speech can exploit the very norms Grice theorizes: slogans and set-pieces invite maximal uptake with minimal propositional commitment; appeals to authority and destiny trade on the maxim of Relation by making personal action “relevant” evidence for historical necessity; and the claim that a “philosophy” is to be “desumed from acts” shifts evaluation from truth-conditions to performative display, encouraging the audience to treat power as a reason. The institutional framing you cite (culture journals, curated editions, “discorsi di circostanza”) also fits Grice’s emphasis on audience design: by controlling context, genre, and what counts as admissible background, the propagandistic speaker narrows the range of reasonable inferences until the preferred implicature feels like the only rational one. In short, your comparison can present Grice as explaining not only how cooperative conversation succeeds, but also how the appearance of rational cooperation can be engineered so that hearers do the inferential work—filling in conclusions, excusing gaps, and treating spectacle as meaning—thereby turning reason-governed interpretation into a tool that can be manipulated rather than a neutral route to understanding. Grice: “We do not study history as philosophers at Oxford – we FOUGHT it!” -- Grice: “I was thinking of Hitler, when I was callled to the arms. It was only later that I added M. to my thoughts!”—Grice: “I heard one Italian say, ‘Some like Mussolini, but Mussolin’s MY man’ – by the first, he referred to the Duce, by the second, to the Duce’s broher, the philosopher!” QUADERNI DELL'ISTITUTO NAZIONALE FASCISTA DI CULTURA. CARLINI, LA FILOSOFIA DI M. ISTITUTO NAZIONALE FASCISTA DI CULTURA, ROMA, tipografia del Senato di Bardi Ci proponiamo di mettere in rilievo, in rapidi cenni, un aspetto non ancora studiato della personalità del nostro duce: il sua ‘filosofia,’ quale si può desumere da’ suoi atti. In verità, i biografi di lui, indagando il periodo della formazione della sua personalità, non hanno trascurato questo lato. Discepolo di Nietzsche è definito anche recentemente. Egli stesso riconosce in Pareto un altro suo maestro; e tutti [Il presente studio vuol essere soltanto un saggio, anzi una semplice indicazione di un aspetto della personalità del duce: aspetto implicante svariati e importanti problemi del pensiero fascista. Per uno studio più ampio giover moltissimo la nuova, accurata, edizione de’ suoi scritti a cui s’è accinto l’editore Hoepli. M. ricorda il periodo della sua vita e della storia italiana da lui vissuta vertiginosamente, e aggiunge. Molti discorsi e scritti sono legati al movente che li provocò : sono di circostanza ». L’editore, anch’egli, dice che l’edizione « conterrà tutto ciò ch’è destinato a lassare alla storia, nella forma originaria più ampia: eliminati, quindi, i discorsi dei quali esiste solamente il riassunto ». tea with Mussolini. The Oxford University Fascist Association held its first annual dinner at the Clarendon Hotel, Cornmarket, Oxford, on Tuesday, 20 November 1934. Surviving descriptions of the printed menu record that Oswald Mosley was present and that the menu bears signatures including Mosley’s and William Joyce’s. The association is usually abbreviated OUFA. The Clarendon was a central Oxford hotel on Cornmarket Street, on the site of the old Clarendon Hotel later demolished in the 1950s. So the event was not in a college or university hall but in a commercial hotel in the middle of Oxford. The Joyce in question was William Joyce, not James Joyce. In 1934 he was a leading British fascist propagandist closely associated with Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. He later became notorious in wartime Germany as the broadcaster known as “Lord Haw-Haw,” and after the war he was tried and executed for treason. So his signature on the surviving Clarendon menu gives the dinner a significance beyond student politics: it places the occasion squarely within the wider fascist political network of the 1930s. The menu itself survives as an artefact, and the date, venue, and named attendees can be verified from sale and reproduction records, though those public traces do not by themselves yield a full transcription of the courses served.Grice: Ah, Mussolini, si dice che la filosofia non sia mai stata la sola guida dei destini d’Italia, ma mi incuriosisce il modo in cui la storia, da Dovia di Predappio, si intreccia con la ragione conversazionale. Lei ha mai pensato che il filosofo, più che studiare la storia, debba combatterla, come suggeriamo spesso ad Oxford?"  Mussolini: "Caro Grice, le sue parole colpiscono nel segno. In Italia, la storia è sempre stata una maestra severa. Io stesso, da giovane, l’ho vissuta vertiginosamente, imparando che la filosofia deve essere implicita negli atti, non solo nei libri. È così che la mia 'filosofia' si è forgiata, a volte tra Nietzsche e Pareto, a volte tra circostanze che richiedono risposte immediate."  Grice: Interessante, Mussolini. Da noi ad Oxford si ride spesso della filosofia messa sullo sfondo della storia, ma il suo modo di intendere il pensiero, come qualcosa che si desume dagli atti, mi ricorda la forza del pragmatismo. Forse il filosofo italiano è più vicino a quell’idea che la parola deve sempre farsi azione?"  Mussolini: "Direi proprio di sì, Grice. La filosofia italiana, soprattutto quella emiliana, non si accontenta di stare sulle pagine: vuole incidere nella realtà, lasciare traccia nella storia. E anche se i discorsi talvolta sono 'di circostanza', come diceva il mio editore, penso che la vera implicatura sia sempre quella di costruire—anche conversando—un destino più grande. Grazie per il suo sguardo acuto e per questa conversazione, che illumina il cuore della nostra tradizione. Mussolini, Benito Amilcare Andrea (1909). La filosofia della forza. Milano: Società Editrice Avanti.

Girolamo Muzio (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale nella vernacola.  Grice’s reason-governed picture of conversational meaning fits Muzio almost too well: Muzio’s “battle” for the vernacular is not merely a patriotic preference for Italian over Latin, but a thesis about what makes speech intelligible and socially efficacious in the first place—namely, that speakers and hearers share practical norms of inference that let them move from what is said to what is meant without needing an elite code. In Gricean terms, Latin at Oxford functions as a gatekeeping register that can disguise a failure of communicative cooperation (one can sound learned while flouting relevance, perspicuity, or audience-design), whereas Muzio’s vernacularism implicitly backs the Cooperative Principle by insisting that philosophical teaching remain calculable by ordinary reasoners within a living linguistic community. The Padua-to-Oxford contrast in your dialogue sharpens this: Muzio treats dialect, proverb, and “osteria” wit as sites where implicature is most naturally at home, because shared form-of-life knowledge makes indirectness interpretable; Grice, though formed by the Latin-heavy Literae Humaniores regime, ultimately gives a theory that vindicates Muzio’s point by explaining how meaning routinely outruns literal sentence-meaning through rational expectations. Even the comic opposition between “toga latina” and “lingua del popolo” can be cast as a pragmatics claim: when the language is socially marked as elite, the hearer must spend effort distinguishing genuine informative intent from mere status display, while vernacular talk—precisely because it is accountable to common uptake—makes conversational rationality visible in the open, where a well-timed proverb or joke does the philosophical work by implicature rather than by scholastic formality. Grice: “It can be said, to echo M., that there is an even less natural – than in his native Italy, long, largely figurative "battle" at Oxford over the use of Latin versus the vernacular in the teaching of philosophy. This is not a single, sudden conflict but a gradual cultural and institutional shift that occurs over centuries, as the role of the Latin language as the universal language of philosophy diminished. This transition is driven by social and intellectual changes. The Latin language, unlike the vernacular, is a marker of ELITE status. Proficiency in the Latin language is a hall-mark of a gentleman's education and an upper-class trait, zealously guarded to maintain social distinctions. The vernacular is a "commoner's tongue". The vernacular is long considered too unrefined for serious philosophical discourse by many philosophers. Rise of the vernacular: A wider movement across Europe in the late Middle Ages and early modern period legitimised the nationa language, though this is slower in English at Oxford. Practicality vs. Tradition: While the Latin language allows philosophers across Europe to communicate, it becomes a barrier to wider education and the integration of ideas, not so much in philosophy, but especially in science and modern subjects.  Key Dates and Periods Period/Date Event/Significance Pre-17th Century. Every scholarship and examination at Oxford is conducted in the Latin language. Late 17th - Mid-18th Century. A gradual shift begins. While the Latin language remains the formal language of tutorials, seminars, lectures, official documents, and to this day, degrees: Grice, B. A. Lit. Hum. Oxon -- the use of the vernacular in INFORMAL discussion and SOME written work starts to increase. 1750s Prominent intellectuals and philosophers, like Johnson, regard the Latin language as superior for formal philosophical discourse, highlighting ongoing cultural resistance to the vernacular in academia. E. Muzio.  Grice: Caro Muzio, dicono che a Oxford la battaglia tra latino e vernacolo sia stata lunga e figurativa. Ma lei, da Padova, si trova più a suo agio a filosofeggiare nella lingua del popolo o preferisce indossare la toga latina? Muzio: Grice, le confesso che il vernacolo ha una musicalità che il latino non riesce a imitare. Certo, il latino fa sentire tutti un po’ aristocratici, ma provi a dire “filosofia” tra amici in dialetto veneto: è più facile trovare un buon vino che un confine tra pensiero e risata! Grice: Ah, allora forse dovremmo istituire un simposio filosofico in osteria! Chissà che, tra un proverbio e una battuta, la ragione conversazionale non si riveli più profonda che tra i marmi di Oxford. Muzio: Ottima idea, Grice! A Padova si dice che la filosofia nasce dove si brinda. E se qualcuno osa correggere la nostra lingua, lo mandiamo a declinare “buon senso” in latino, così impara che la saggezza va servita sempre col sorriso! Muzio, Girolamo (1518). Isagogicon ad Libellum (introduzione a un libretto in lode di Biagio Elcelio). Augusta.

Bruno Nardi (Spianate, Altopascio, Lucca, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Alighieri -- dantesco – Alighieri – n contrasting Bruno Nardi’s approach to Dante with Grice’s theory of reason‑governed meaning, what emerges is a difference less of subject matter than of philosophical posture toward meaning itself. Grice conceives meaning as fundamentally conversational and normative, grounded in rational cooperation and inferences that speakers can be held accountable for, even when those meanings are implicit rather than explicitly stated; reason, for Grice, governs meaning by structuring the expectations that make implicature possible. Nardi, by contrast, approaches Dante not by extracting a theory of meaning in the modern analytic sense, but by situating philosophical significance within poetic, historical, and doctrinal strata where reason operates indirectly, through allegory, tradition, and literary form. Where Grice asks whether an utterance counts as meaningful by virtue of the rational intentions it manifests in a conversational exchange, Nardi asks whether a poetic text can count as philosophical by virtue of the rational architecture it embodies, even when it does not present arguments in discursive prose. In this sense, Dante functions for Nardi as a test case that stretches the boundaries of philosophy beyond institutional genres, whereas for Grice Dante becomes an ironic interlocutor who problematizes the very criteria by which philosophy is recognized. The comparison thus reveals a shared concern with reason as the condition of intelligibility, but a divergence in emphasis: Grice locates reason in the micro‑norms of conversational practice, while Nardi locates it in the macro‑continuities of intellectual history, where meaning is governed not only by what is said, but by how a culture learns to read, infer, and philosophize—even in verse. Grice: “I like N.– for one, he doesn’t know where to place Alighieri within the history of philosophy – which is mutatis mutandis the same doubt I have with Shakespeare!” Oxford, Bologna, Bologna, Oxford. Filosofo toscano. Filosofo italiano. Grice: “The Italians are fortunate: with Alighieri they can philosophise about him!” Primogenito di una famiglia benestante, composta di nove figli, viene avviato sin dalla tenera età alla carriera ecclesiastica. Entra nel collegio dei frati francescani a Buggiano e diventa chierico, assumendo il nome di frate Angelo. Usce dal convento di Buggiano perché non aveva intenzione di continuare nella vita religiosa, avendone perduta la vocazione. Proseguì gli studi di filosofia e teologia frequentando il convento di Sant'Agostino di Nicosia in provincia di Pisa. Volendo proseguire gli studi, i genitori gli indicarono un'unica strada, quella di entrare in seminario e diventare prete. Venne ammesso al seminario di Pescia e diventò sacerdote. Qui si avvicinò fugacemente al movimento Modernista, condannato da papa Pio X con l'Enciclica Pascendi. N. sostenne l'esame di concorso per una borsa di studio triennale conferita dall'opera Pia Galeotti di Pescia al fine di frequentare un corso di perfezionamento filosofico presso l'Università Cattolica di Lovanio (Belgio). N. aveva da poco iniziato a frequentare l'Università Cattolica di Lovanio che già decise l'argomento della sua tesi di laurea Sigieri di Brabante nella Divina Commedia e le fonti della filosofia di Dante, che venne discussa con Wulf. La lettura dell'opera di Pierre Mandonnet, nella parte dedicata a Sigieri, non persuadeva N. sulla soluzione. dantesco, Alighieri, animo, Pomponazzi, Virgilio, Enea, inferno, il concetto d’animo, la filosofia romana nel secolo d’augusto – il secolo d’oro della filosofia romana – il secolo augusteo, pico, abano. Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch’entrate. il paradiso filosofico. Grice: Caro Nardi, mi dica: Dante è filosofo per davvero, o lo consideriamo tale solo perché in Italia la filosofia si fa anche in versi? Nardi: Ah, Grice, Dante è filosofo se lo leggi a Oxford, poeta se lo leggi a Bologna, e a Spianate si dice che sia entrambe le cose... basta non chiederglielo direttamente, sennò ti manda dritto nel cerchio degli indecisi! Grice: Mi piace! Allora, la ragione conversazionale dantesca è: "Lasciate ogni speranza voi che entrate", o piuttosto, "Entrate pure, ma portate una domanda filosofica e un paio di scarpe comode"? Nardi: Senz’altro la seconda, caro Grice! Perché il paradiso filosofico si raggiunge solo con un po’ di ironia, un po’ di latino, e molta pazienza... Virgilio docet, ma a volte anche Pomponazzi ci prova. E se non basta, si può sempre filosofeggiare su una granita, come suggerisce Natoli! Nardi, Bruno (1911). Saggio sul pensiero filosofico d’Alighieri. Firenze: G. Barbèra.

Antimo Negri (Mercato, Napoli, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Antimo Negri with respect to reason‑governed conversational meaning highlights a contrast between an analytic reconstruction of communicative rationality and an idealist-historicist understanding of reason as a living act. Grice’s theory treats conversational meaning as regulated by publicly shareable norms of rational cooperation, where implicature arises from calculable departures from what is said, guided by maxims that articulate how reason structures mutual understanding in ordinary discourse. Negri, formed within the Italian idealist tradition of Gentile and deeply engaged with Hegelian mediation, would be less inclined to isolate conversational reason as a quasi‑technical system of rules, and more disposed to view it as an expression of the self‑actualizing activity of thought within concrete historical and cultural life. From this perspective, implicature is not merely an inferential add‑on to semantic content, but a manifestation of the dialectical tension between explicit utterance and the spiritual horizon in which it is produced and received. Where Grice insists on clarity about intentions, responsibility, and inferability as the rational backbone of communication, Negri would likely emphasize the formative role of tradition, intellectual style, and irony in sustaining meaningful conversation, especially within philosophical exchange. The point of contact between them lies in their shared resistance to scepticism about meaning: both reject the idea that conversation is arbitrary or opaque, yet they differ in where they locate its rational ground—Grice in the regulative logic of cooperative interaction, Negri in the broader, historically mediated life of reason that animates dialogue beyond the level of explicit inference. Grice: “At Oxford, idealists – like Bradley – are called bigheads – which is better than the monicker metaphysical sceptics receive: ‘beheads’!” Filosofo italiano. Allievo di ALIOTTA , con il quale si laurea a Napoli, sempre considera come suo maestro GENTILE , di cui tuttavia non è stato direttamente un discepolo. L'intensità con cui N. approfondiscd la filosofia di Gentile si concretizzato dapprima nello studio dell'allontanamento di SCIACCA  dall'attualismo poi in sagi quali: “Gentile,” “L'estetica di Gentile,” e “Gentile educatore.” Molti sono i saggi dedicati all'IDEALISMO, tra cui i saggi “La presenza di Hegel,” “Ricerche e meditazioni hegeliane,” e “Hegel” e le traduzioni di saggi hegeliane come “La vita di Gesù” e “Le orbite dei pianeti.” A queste traduzioni si aggiungono anche quelle di grandi classici del pensiero filosofico, economico e sociologico. Riceve il premio San Gerolamo.  A N. si deve anche la valorizzazione di alcune grandi personalità della cultura italiana, come quelle di EMO-CAPODILISTA , MICHELSTAEDTER , ed EVOLA . La sua carriera lo ha visto professore di storia della filosofia in alcune delle più importanti università italiane: Bari, Perugia e Roma, dove lavora presso l'Università degli studi di Roma Tor Vergata fino alla fine del suo incarico universitario. Nel corso della sua esperienza intellettuale è stato impegnato in un'intensa attività saggistica e pubblicistica, scrivendo sulle più importanti riviste culturali italiane e straniere, tra le quali: il Giornale critico della filosofia italiana», il Giornale di metafisica», «I Problemi della Pedagogia», «Rinascita della Scuola», «Dix-Huitième Siècle», «L'Enseignement Philosophique», «Studia Estetyczne», «Idealistic Studies». Collabora con molti dei maggiori quotidiani nazionali: «Il giornale d'Italia», l'«Avanti», «Il Messaggero», «Il Sole 24 Ore», «Il Tempo» e «il Giornale». implicatura.   Grice: Carissimo Negri, Oxford è famosa per i suoi idealisti “bigheads”—ma a Napoli, ci sono anche i filosofi “testa calda”? Oppure il clima campano raffredda i pensieri metafisici? Negri: Caro Grice, tra Vesuvio e filosofia, qui le teste si scaldano eccome! Ma almeno nessuno perde la testa come i “beheads” dello scetticismo inglese. Da noi si preferisce un espresso e una meditazione su Gentile… con molta ironia! Grice: Mi piace! Un caffè metafisico non guasta mai. Dimmi, tra Hegel, Gentile e la presenza di Emo-Capodilista, capita mai che la conversazione diventi una partita di ping-pong dialettico? O si rischia che la “implicatura” si perda tra i biscotti? Negri: Grice, la filosofia italiana è come una tavola imbandita: tra biscotti, caffè e saggi, ogni implicatura trova il suo posto. E se la dialettica si fa troppo serrata, basta un sorriso partenopeo: d’altronde, filosofare è meglio che prendersi troppo sul serio! La conversazione continua, con un brindisi ideale. Negri, Antimo (1944). Dissertazione. Facolta di Filosofia e Lettere. Napoli

Antonio Negri (Padova, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale. A comparison between Grice and Antonio Negri on reason‑governed conversational meaning brings into relief two radically different but curiously intersecting conceptions of rationality. For Grice, conversational meaning is governed by reason insofar as speakers implicitly commit themselves to norms of cooperation, inferability, and communicative responsibility; implicature arises because interlocutors trust that utterances are produced within a shared rational framework, even when what is meant exceeds what is said. Negri, by contrast, relocates conversational reason from the analytic space of individual intentions to the collective, productive dimension of political and social life. In his work on political grammar, power and potency, conversation is not merely an exchange governed by maxims but a form of assembly, where meaning emerges through conflict, plurality, metaphor, and historical struggle. From this perspective, implicature is no longer just a calculable inference but a site of political possibility, where what is unsaid carries the force of latent collective action. While Grice seeks to stabilize meaning against scepticism by articulating its rational rules, Negri accepts fragility as constitutive, seeing the openness of conversation as the very condition of its creative power. The convergence between them lies in their shared rejection of arbitrariness: both insist that meaning is governed, not accidental; yet they diverge sharply on what governs it—Grice locating reason in cooperative intentionality, Negri in the immanent, plural productivity of social and political life, where conversation is less a norm‑regulated exchange than a fragile, resistant “grammar” continually remade in practice. Grice” “In my Philosophical Eschatology and Plato’s republic,’ I venture into political philosophy. Negri ventured into it his whole life – and beyond!” Filosofo Padovano. Filosofo veneto. Filosofo italiano. Padova, Veneto. Grice: “Only in Italy a philosopher philosophises on Pinocchio!” -- Grice: “I like his idea of a new ‘grammar of politics,’ even if he uses the extravagant metaphor, delightful though, ‘fabbrica di porcellana’. He has a gift for metaphor, sure!” – Grice: “’la lenta ginestra’ to qualify Leopardi’s ontology is genial!” -- Grice: “Negri reminds me of ‘pinko Oxford’!” Tra gli anni sessanta e gli anni settanta, fu uno dei maggiori teorici del marxismo operaista. Dagli anni ottanta in poi, si dedicò invece allo studio del pensiero politico di Baruch Spinoza, contribuendo, insieme a Louis Althusser e Gilles Deleuze, alla sua riscoperta teorica. In collaborazione poi con Michael Hardt, ha scritto libri molto influenti nella Teoria politica contemporanea.  Accanto alla sua attività teorica, ha svolto una intensa attività di militanza politica, come co-fondatore e teorico militante delle organizzazioni della sinistra extraparlamentare Potere Operaio e Autonomia Operaia. A causa della sua attività politica è stato incarcerato e processato, all'interno del processo 7 aprile, con l'accusa di aver partecipato ad atti terroristici e d'insurrezione armata. Venne, tuttavia, assolto da queste imputazioni, per poi venire condannato a XII anni di carcere per associazione sovversiva e concorso morale nella rapina di Argelato. Saggi: “Stato e diritto -- la genesi illuministica della filosofia giuridica e politica” (Padova, Milani); “Lo storicismo” (Milano, Feltrinelli); “Forma giuridica” (Padova, Milani); “Flosofia del diritto” (Bari, Laterza); “Il concetto di partito politico” (Padova, Moderna); “Lo stato piano e il comune” (Milano, Feltrinelli); “Il concetto d’integrazione nella storia di Italia” (Milano, Giuffrè). implicature, potere-potenza, l’incubo, la differenza italiana, grammatica politica, assemblea. Antonio Negri.  Grice: Negri, ho letto con grande interesse i suoi lavori sulla "grammatica politica" e mi ha colpito la metafora della "fabbrica di porcellana". Mi chiedo: in un contesto dove la conversazione filosofica è spesso fragile, come si può evitare che la discussione politica si rompa sotto il peso delle passioni? Negri: Caro Grice, la fragilità della conversazione è, a mio avviso, il suo valore più grande. Bisogna accettare che il dibattito non sia mai definitivo: è un processo, una "ginestra" leopardiana che resiste lentamente. Per evitare le rotture, occorre coltivare un ascolto attivo e ricercare, anche tra divergenze, una potenza comune capace di generare nuove forme di dialogo e di politica. Grice: Mi piace il riferimento alla "lenta ginestra": la pazienza ontologica, potremmo dire, è essenziale. Ma non teme che, nella ricerca della potenza comune, si rischi di cadere nell’omologazione o, peggio, nel silenziamento delle differenze individuali? Negri: La differenza italiana, come la chiamavo nei miei saggi, è proprio ciò che ci salva dall’omologazione. La conversazione, per me, è un’assemblea aperta: ogni voce conta, ogni implicatura porta con sé nuove possibilità. Solo accogliendo l’incubo dell’uniformità e trasformandolo in potere plurale, possiamo davvero filosofare su Pinocchio senza tradire la nostra porcellana fragile. Negri, Antonio (1955). Lo storicismo. Facolta di Giurisprudenza, Padova.

Guido Davide Neri (Milano, Lombardia): l’implicatura conversazionale dell’aporia della realizazione – In Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversation, meaning arises from the rational cooperation of speakers who rely on shared maxims to generate implicatures beyond what is explicitly said, so that philosophical problems often turn on how ordinary linguistic practices enable or mislead our inferences. Neri’s position, as it emerges from his aporia della realizzazione, engages this Gricean framework obliquely by shifting attention from conversational rationality to the historical–phenomenological tensions embedded in concepts like “realization” and “res,” where meaning is not simply inferred but remains structurally aporetic because it is pulled between praxis, ideology, and ontology. While Grice treats philosophical puzzlement as something that can often be dissolved by clarifying how language is used and what is pragmatically implied, Neri is more skeptical of such resolution: for him, the very attempt to “realize” concepts—whether Socratic substance, Kantian Ding an sich, or modern objectivism—produces a kind of philosophical paralysis akin to Buridan’s ass, in which rational governance does not close the gap between word and world but exposes it. The contrast thus lies in Grice’s confidence that reason-governed conversational principles can illuminate and stabilize meaning, versus Neri’s insistence that meaning, even when rationally articulated, remains marked by aporia rooted in historical experience and the failures of realization itself. Grice: “Philosophers, not the ordinary chap, use ‘realise’ a lot – and not in the sense, ‘I hadn’t realise’ – but as a verb from the Latin root ‘res’ – In fact, I have myself engaged in such talk when I introduced my ontological marxism and my explorations on ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’ which was once planned to appear in my ‘Way of Words.’ The keyword here is ‘entia realissima’ – or ‘ens realissium’ in the singular. The Roman language allows for the superlative in ways that the English language doesn’t – since ‘most real’ can have vulgar usages that do not quite correspond with ‘realissimum.’ In ‘Aristotle on the multiplicity of being’ I propose a chain of being towards that ens realissimum. The primary substance thus – Socrates – qualifies as ens realissium. His wisdom is less real, and his love of wisdom is three-stages removed from reality. When Kant introduced the ‘ding an sich’ he really did not know what he was talking about. And some English philosophers – including myself – have used ‘obble’ (or object) as more or less equivalent to ‘ding’ if not ‘in sich.’ But Cicero would say that ‘thing’is a barbarism, when we have ‘res’ to replace it with!” “Any first in greats knows that!” Filosofo italiano. Milano, Lombardia. Grice: “Neri is an interesting philosopher – he speaks of the aporia of the realization, which is intriguing, and considers that ‘objectivism’ started with Galileo, which is realistic!” Professore a Verona. Allievo di Banfi e Paci, rappresenta una delle ultime sintesi della Scuola di Milano, di cui riprende alcuni dei temi portanti: ricerca fenomenologica, analisi storico-politica, studi estetici. Rispetto ai suoi maestri, del cui pensiero è stato uno dei maggiori interpreti, sviluppa un percorso di ricerca originale, caratterizzato da una critica delle ideologie del Novecento e dei loro fallimenti. aporia della realizzazione, il mordo dell’asino. Guido Davide Neri.  Grice: Carissimo Neri, mi incuriosisce davvero la tua “aporia della realizzazione”—ma dimmi, tu quando realizzi, ti senti più vicino a Socrate o a Kant? Io, personalmente, mi perdo sempre tra “res” e “ding an sich”!  Neri: Ah Grice, se mi lasci scegliere, preferisco l’asino di Buridano: almeno lui sa cosa non realizzare! Ma tra Socrate e Kant, forse mi sento come Galileo: realista, sì, ma con i piedi ben piantati sulla Luna… e la testa sulle nuvole milanesi.  Grice: In effetti, la Scuola di Milano avrebbe molto da ridire sulle nuvole! Però, mi affascina il tuo pensiero: quando parli di “entia realissima”, mi viene voglia di proporre un brindisi ontologico—solo che nessuno sa se il bicchiere è mezzo pieno, mezzo vuoto, o semplicemente… realissimum!  Neri: Grice, se il bicchiere è “aporetico” allora forse è il modo migliore per discutere: con Banfi e Paci avremmo scritto cento pagine solo per realizzare se fosse di vetro o di ideologia! E comunque, meglio un brindisi filosofico che un “mordo dell’asino” troppo serio—che la filosofia, si sa, è più felice con un sorriso! Neri, Guido Davide (1956).  Contributo. Ragionamenti. Milano.

Lucio Domizio Enobardo Nerone (Anzio, Lazio): il melodramma di Boito -- A comparison between Grice and Nero, framed through Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, turns on the distinction between what is explicitly performed and what is implicitly conveyed. In Gricean terms, meaning is not exhausted by observable behavior or literal expression but is fixed by what a rational agent can be taken to intend, given shared assumptions about cooperation and relevance. Nero’s celebrated performance while Rome burned becomes, under this lens, a paradigmatic case of non‑verbal implicature: the physical act of producing music is the explicit content, neutral in itself, while the implicature arises from the deliberate flouting of expectations tied to circumstances of catastrophe, thereby conveying indifference or contempt. Grice would insist that this implicit meaning is not an accidental by‑product but something Nero meant, insofar as he could foresee how a reasonable audience would interpret his conduct. Where Nero, especially as stylized in later philosophical and operatic traditions, embodies an aestheticized sovereignty that treats action as spectacle, Grice’s theory reins that spectacle back into the domain of rational accountability, showing how even melodramatic excess is interpretable through principles governing inference, intention, and mutual recognition. The contrast, then, is not between reason and irrationality, but between a performer who exploits the space of implicature for self‑dramatization and a philosopher who analyzes that same space to explain how meaning persists—even morally damning meaning—beyond what is merely done or said.

Grice: “Nerone’s performance as Roma burnt is possibly apt for meta-analysis: he performed a pavane – this is what he explicitly conveyed by his action, if not ‘meant’ – what he implicitly conveyed, and thereby *meant* is that he could not care less!” -- Filosofo italiano. Anzio, Roma, Lazio. Filosofo epicureo e imperatore romano. Demetrio Lacon dedicated a philosophical essay to Nerone, making it extremely like that Nerone was himself a follower of the doctrines of The Garden. ao ss TN Bo ZA SI gia SE er ES 7 VIS \ Rai COSI Sega pr e da ansa Mi, pe sud o, e RICORDI MILANO 1( @ISERI (mpradigeile) POS \ DI Li ‘A DG DI 8 li 7 LALA Ss INI (EL fn ra SI ; CS ‘ pi” x "n ': lr” t DS Ù Ì N ? Ò FINE Nine {UMBERTO PIZZI BULOGNA Via Zamboni Imprimé en Italie BOITO TRAGEDIA IN IV ATTI AUMENTO COMPRESO LE PERSONE DELLA TRAGEDIA: NERONE SIMON MAGO FANUÈL ASTERIA RUBRIA TIGELLINO GOBRIAS DOSITÈO PERSIDE CERINTO IL TEMPIERE TERPNOS PRIMO VIANDANTE SECONDO VIANDANTE LO SCHIAVO AMMONITORE I VARII AGGRUPPAMENTI DEL CORO: Ambubaje - Fanciulle Gaditane - Acclamatori - Cavalieri Augustani - Liberti - Fautori di parte frasina - Fautori di parte azzurra Popolo Schiavi Plebe Senatori Una compagnia di Artisti Dionisiaci, Tre decurie di Guardie Germane Eneatori Sacerdoti del Tempio di Simon Mago - Matrone - Classarii - Pretoriani - Cristiani Aurighi della fazione verde - Aurighi della fazione azzurra. PANTOMIMI, DANZATRICI, APPARITORI: Una puella Gaditana L’ Arcigallo Un venditore d’idoli Un venditore di tavole votive - Un mercante orientale Un flamine - L’auriga vincitore L’ auriga vinto Un lanista Due Mercurii Due Caronti Alcuni Etiopi Viandanti - Lettigarii - Clienti Servi Danzatrici Gaditane Corrieri Mauritani I due Consoli - Littori Preconi Due Tribuni della plebe Legionarii - Galli - Consider Nero's activities when Rome burned. One of the things which he could certainly be said to have done was to produce a sequence of bodily movements which, given that he was wielding a bow and fiddle, resulted in the passing of the bow across the strings of the fiddle and in a consequent flow of sounds. But there were at least two further things which Nero could be said to have done on this occasion: one is to have given a performance of the formidably difficult Seneca Chaconne, and the other is to have displayed his contempt for the people of Rome. Now it may be that we are free to regard the passage of the bow across the strings and the sounds thereby generated, or even perhaps Nero's production of these phenomena, as a sequence of events, but it does not look as if we are free to identify these events either with Nero's performance or with Nero's display of con-tempt, or to identify one of these last things with the other. Nero's playing of the Chaconne was (for all we know) masterly and profoundly sensitive, while his behavior vis-à-vis the people of Rome was callous, squalid, and hideous in the extreme; these items are therefore distinct from cach other, and also distinct from the physical events involving Nero's body, bow and fiddle, which can hardly be said to have been either masterly and sensitive or callous, squalid, and hideous.  I fear the question at issue is not quite so easily settled, as the following response perhaps demonstrates. First, the epithets (masterly', "sensitive,  'callous", "hideous", ctc.) which are, in the example given, applied to what Nero did (however that may be variously described) are all resultant or supervenient, and the features upon which they depend are the specific characteristics of what Nero did, viewed as a fragment of conduct or as a performance. Second, description of what Nero did may simultancously fulfill two roles, a referential role and a descriptive role. Such combinations are commonplace in ordinary discourse. To say, for example, "Robert's mother would not denounce him to the police" both refers to a particular lady, and at the same time gives a description of her which explains or is otherwise relevant to the presence or absence of the phenomenon mentioned in the predicate. Similarly, specifications of Nero's activity as a fiddler or as a moral agent may serve both to pick out that activity and to do so in a way which is relevant to what is being said about it. Third, where we find occurrences in a single sentence of more than one description fulfilling such a duality of roles, there is in general nothing to prevent the plurality of descriptions from being co-referential; "The composer of the San Francisco Sonata would hardly have forgotten how it goes, and the winner of the Pacific Piano Prize would hardly be unable to play the work" may involve a reference to a single person, Joe Doakes. Finally, the evaluative epithets which are applied to Nero's productions are not inconsistent with one another, and so might truly attach to a single item; sensitivity (and so aesthetic beauty) may be combined with moral hideousness. Nothing then prevents a single item, namely a certain sequence of bodily movements, from being also a certain sort of performance and a certain sort of conduct; nor from being, in each of these capacities (quâ each of these things) differently describable. Such an item may be, quâ performance sensitive and, quâ conduct, hideous; quâ bodily movement, however, it is neither of these. It is in such a fashion that the example should be interpreted.Lucio Domizio Enobarbo. Nerone.  GRICEVS:Salve, NERONE! Dic mihi: cum Roma ardebat, utrum musicam elegisti ut urbem consolaretur an ut populum irriteret? NERONE:O Gricevs, ego artem semper praefero! Fieri potest ut cives me minus amaverint, sed certe Seneca Chaconne magis quam aquam in Tiberim fluxit. GRICEVS:Audax es, Nero! Sed, confiteor, tuae chordae magis sonaverunt quam plebis clamores. Quid sentis de implicatūra tuae melodramatis, utrum benevolam an malevolam? NERONE:Gricevs, philosophia Epicurea me docuit: dum musicam facio, ignis fortasse ardet, sed mens mea placida manet—Roma ardet, ego cantare possum! Haec est vera ars: nihil nimis, nihil minus! Nerone, Lucio Domizio Enobarbo (a. u. c. DCCCVII). Dicta. Roma.

Giovanni Nesi (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – adulescentuli oratiuncula – In a comparative perspective, Nesi and Grice converge on the intuition that meaning in conversation is rationally constrained, yet they diverge sharply in how that rationality is grounded and articulated. Nesi’s Adulescentuli oratiuncula treats conversational reason as inseparable from moral and affective forces such as grazia and carità, understood in a broadly humanistic and pre-systematic way: communication succeeds because it is animated by benevolent intention and an ethos of harmony inherited from classical and Christian sources, even when these are blurred by etymological and mythological confusions between grace, charity, and the Charites. Grice, by contrast, strips conversational rationality of its theological and rhetorical clothing and recasts it as a formally articulable, reason-governed practice: conversational meaning arises from speakers’ recognition of intentions constrained by shared norms of cooperation, candour, and benevolence, without requiring moral edification or salvific purpose. Where Nesi treats carità as an animating virtue of discourse, closely aligned with grace and human flourishing, Grice reinterprets benevolence in minimal, analytical terms, as the presupposition that interlocutors are not malevolent and are aiming at mutual understanding. Thus, while Nesi anticipates aspects of the principle of charity by foregrounding charitable interpretation as a condition of meaningful exchange, Grice transforms this insight into a rigorously secular account of implicature, in which conversational meaning is governed not by moral exhortation but by rational expectations about how reasonable agents use language. Sono dalle celeste sphere Venere: perche  amore inspiro: dagl’elementi fuoco: perché  d’amore accendo da uoi con vocabul greco CHARITÀ chiamata: perché col mio ardore della GRAZIA della salute viso degni –Grice: “It all reminds me of my principle of conversational candour!” -- Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Grice: “I once had a fight with Nowell-Smith; he was saying that a philosopher should not be a moralist; I told him that by that token Nesi wasn’t one!” – “De moribus” Figlio di Francesco di Giovanni e di Nera di Giovanni Spinelli, si dedica interamente agli studi filosofici. Strinsge stretti rapporti con i principali umanisti fiorentini dell'epoca, tra cui ACCIAIUOLI e FICINO . Influenzato dall'operato di Savonarola, ricopre anche diverse cariche politiche. Altri saggi: “Adulescentuli oratiuncula”; “Orazione del corpo di Cristo”; “Orazione de Eucharestia” “ Orazione sull'umiltà” “Sulla carità”; “De moribus”; “De charitate”; “Oraculum de novo saeculo, Canzoniere, Poema. Treccan Dizionario biografico degli italiani,  Roma, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Obviously, Nesi is not having Davidson in mind. But Nesi is wrong in identifying GRAZIA with CHARITA, ‘greco vocabull” – this is an etymological blunder. The charities were indeed three – Eglea, Eufrosina, e Talia – and they danced mainly to eroticse Mars, or more frequently Giove and Mars together --. adulescentuli oratiuncula, principle of charity, Davidson on charity on Grice. Who was the first Englishman to use ‘charity’ as a hermeneutic principle? Butler. Grice speaks of self-love and benevolence. Benevolence – and charity? Grice is not so much concerned with Beneficenza or Malificenza, but with Benevolenza, and Malevolenza – where does charity fit? What was Ciceronian for charity. What is pre-Christian about charity? Charisma, charitas, folk etymological confusion here – caritativo – carita – caro, “le tre carità in armónico conubio” “tre carità”. Grice: Caro Nesi, leggendo la tua “Adulescentuli oratiuncula” mi è venuto in mente il mio principio di candore conversazionale! Dirò di più: la tua capacità di intrecciare filosofia e pathos umanistico è davvero ammirevole. Ma dimmi, come nasce in te questa attenzione così viva per la grazia e la carità? Nesi: Gentilissimo Grice, ti ringrazio di cuore! Sai, la mia formazione a Firenze, a stretto contatto con Acciaiuoli e Ficino, mi ha insegnato che la grazia e la carità non sono solo concetti teologici, ma forze motrici dell’anima e della buona conversazione. Senza carità – intesa come benevolenza – anche la filosofia rischia di diventare sterile esercizio retorico. Grice: Sono d’accordo, Nesi! Proprio come la tua interpretazione della carità va oltre la semplice beneficenza, anche il mio principio di charity invita a interpretare le parole dell’altro nella loro luce migliore. Talvolta però mi domando: non rischiamo, così facendo, di confondere carità e grazia, o addirittura di cadere in qualche equivoco etimologico? Nesi: Grice, tocchi un punto delicato! In effetti, la lingua può trarci in inganno: le tre carità – Eglea, Eufrosina e Talia – nascono da miti antichi, ben diversi dalla carità cristiana. Tuttavia, credo che tra la tua benevolenza conversazionale e la mia ricerca di armonia interiore ci sia un filo rosso: quello che, se ben seguito, trasforma la parola in strumento di grazia, e la conversazione in esercizio di autentica umanità. Nesi, Giovanni (1472). Adulescentuli oratiuncula: orazione pronunciata davanti alla Compagnia di San Niccolò. Firenze.

Paolo Nicoletti (Udine, Friuli, Veneto): la ragione conversazionale -- quadratura ed implicatura conversazionale – A comparison between Grice and Paolo Nicoletti (Paulus Venetus) shows a deep structural affinity in their respective approaches to meaning as governed by reason, even though they operate in radically different historical and methodological frameworks. Nicoletti’s late‑medieval logic, especially in the Logica parva and related Oxford‑influenced tracts, treats meaningful discourse as something that emerges from formally constrained relations of consequence, signification, and resolution of paradoxes such as the insolubilia; propositions mean what they do because they stand in rule‑governed inferential networks that determine what follows from what, what is asserted, and what is merely emitted as a consequence of saying something. Grice’s theory of conversational meaning relocates this insight from formal logic to ordinary language, arguing that what speakers mean is not exhausted by what they explicitly say, but is rationally recoverable through shared principles governing cooperative conversation, especially via implicature. Where Nicoletti distinguishes dictum, significatum, emissum, and consecutum to keep logical responsibility clear, Grice draws an analogous distinction between what is said and what is implicated, both insisting that interpretive charity and rational order are essential to understanding communicative acts. Nicoletti’s squaring of the square of opposition and his careful classification of terms in the arbor porphyriana anticipate Grice’s insistence that conversational meaning is not arbitrary or psychological, but structured by publicly accessible norms of reason. Thus, Nicoletti offers a rigorously logical, scholastic ancestor to Grice’s modern, pragmatic account: both dissolve confusion by showing that meaning—whether in medieval disputation or ordinary conversation—is governed by rational constraints that regulate how sense can be generated, extended, and responsibly inferred. Grice: “At Oxford, Wykeham is slightly below both White (slightly below) and Waynflete (that reigns supreme). Filosofo friulano – filosofo italiano. Udine, Friuli-Venezia Giulia. – Grice: “His diagramme for ‘arbor porphyriana’ is also brilliant – ending with “Plato,” “Socrates.”” -- Grice: “I especially like his squaring the square of opposition!” -- Grice: “A veritable genius, this Nicoletti.” -- Not under ‘Venezia’! -- paolo di venezia: philosopher, the son of Andrea Nicola, of Venice He was born in Fliuli Venezia Giulia, a hermit of Saint Augustine O.E.S.A., he spent three years as a student at St. John’s, where the order of St. Augustine had a ‘studium generale,’ at Oxford and taught at Padova, where he became a doctor of arts. Paolo also held appointments at the universities of Parma, Siena, and Bologna. Paolo is active in the administration of his order, holding various high offices. He composed ommentaries on several logical, ethical, and physical works of Aristotle. His name is connected especially with his best-selling “Logica parva.” Over 150 manuscripts survive, and more than forty printed editions of it were made, His huge sequel, “Logica magna,” is a flop. These Oxford-influenced tracts contributed to the favourable climate enjoyed by Oxonian semantics in northern Italian universities. Grice: “My favourite of Paul’s tracts is his “Sophismata aurea”how peaceful for a philosopher to die while commentingon Aristotle’s “De anima.”!” His nom de plum is “Paulus Venetus.”— Nicoletti and Grice: Dissolving the Insolubilia ̶ The Dictum, the Implicatum, and the Significatum vis-à-vis the Emissum and the Consecutum By S. R. Read and J. L. Speranza Abstract In ‘Consequence, Signification, and Insolubles in Fourtheenth-Century Logic,’ in Logica Universalis, Paolo da Harborne, and Paolo da Venezia,” Paolo da Harborne, and Paolo da Venezia Anglo-Italiano, Bordighera. quadratura ed implicatura.  Grice: Mi creda, Nicoletti, provo un autentico piacere nel poterla chiamare, semplicemente, Nicoletti! Sa, non sempre ho questa fortuna: basti pensare a Gugliemo d’Occam, dove il nome sembra sfuggire, come direbbe lei, a ogni “quadratura.” Invece qui posso proprio chiamare una zappa, zappa—call a spade a spade, come diremmo in inglese, ma lasci che lo dica in italiano: chiamare le cose con il loro nome! Nicoletti: Caro Grice, le sue parole mi onorano! Nel mio Friuli si dice che “il pane va chiamato pane e il vino, vino.” Anche nella logica, come lei ben sa, preferisco la chiarezza: una proposizione dev’essere distinta e precisa, proprio come un nome ben dato. E la sua franchezza è rara come la quadratura perfetta della “quadratura del quadrato di opposizione”! Grice: Ah, Nicoletti, la sua “arbor porphyriana” è per me fonte di continua ammirazione—mi sembra quasi di vedere Platone e Socrate spuntare tra i rami! E a proposito di precisione, la sua “Logica parva” ha illuminato più di una mia notte insonne a Oxford. Se solo avessimo avuto più spesso questa “conversazione genuina” nelle aule inglesi! Nicoletti: Lei è troppo generoso, caro Grice! Ma vede, anche le sue riflessioni sull’implicatura conversazionale hanno fatto scuola sulle nostre rive… Forse, tra Friuli e Oxford, ci unisce proprio questa ricerca: quella di dire il vero, in modo semplice, senza “insolubilia”. Alla fine, che gioia potersi chiamare, finalmente, col proprio nome! Nicoletti, Paolo (1405). Tractatus summularum logice (Logica parva). Padova.

Agostino Nifo (Sessa, Caserta, Campania): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale ludicra – A comparison between Nifo and H. P. Grice on reason-governed conversational meaning reveals an unexpected historical depth to Grice’s modern theory of implicature: both thinkers treat rationality as immanent in discourse rather than externally imposed. Nifo’s Dialectica and Rhetorica ludicra conceive philosophical exchange as governed by an animus intelligendi that operates playfully yet purposively, where intellectual activity, even when couched in wit or apparent frivolity, remains answerable to rational norms tied to the intellectus agens and the shared pursuit of understanding; the “ludic” element is not irrationality but a mode of activating reason through irony, exaggeration, and dialectical tension, especially in disputes over the soul and intellect. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature similarly grounds meaning in reason, but relocates it from metaphysics to pragmatics: what is meant beyond what is said arises from participants’ recognition of a cooperative, rational order governing conversation, articulated through the Cooperative Principle and its maxims. Where Nifo embeds rational governance in the ontology of intellect and soul, Grice reconstructs it in terms of speaker intentions and mutual expectations, yet both reject the idea that meaning is exhausted by literal form and both allow that apparent deviations, jokes, or indirections are intelligible precisely because reason silently regulates them. In this sense, Grice’s modern account of conversational implicature can be read as a secularized, analytic descendant of Nifo’s ludic dialectic, preserving the insight that rational order in conversation often reveals itself most clearly when language appears to be doing something less than strictly serious, or less than strictly literal. When Grice decided to import ‘soul’ into the philosophical vocabulary, he was following Nifo!. animus, anima, soul. Grice: “I like N.; first, because he wrote a treatise he called ‘ludicrous rhetoric;’ second, because he tried to refute Pomponazzi against the mortality of the soul – surely the soul is ‘mortal’ is a category mistake --.” Alla corte di Carlo V (L. Toro, Sessa Aurunca). Studia Padova sotto Vernia. Insegna a Padova, Napoli, Roma e Pisa, guadagnando una fama tale da essere incaricato e pagato da Leone X di difendere l’immortalità dell’animo di Leone X contro gl’attacchi di Pomponazzi e degli alessandristi. Ricompensato con la nomina a conte palatino con il diritto di assumere il cognome del Papa, Medici. La sua prima filosofia si ispira ad Averroè, modifica poi la propria visione giungendo a posizioni più vicine al domma romano. Pubblica un'edizione delle opere di Averroè corredate di un commento compatibile con la sua nuova posizione. Nella grande controversia con gli alessandristi si oppose alla tesi di Pomponazzi per il quale l'animo razionale non e separabile dal corpo materiale e, dunque, la morte di questo porta con sé anche la scomparsa dell'anima. Sostenne, invece, che l'animo di Leone X, quale parte dell'intelletto assoluto, non e distruttibile e alla morte del corpo di Leone X si fonde in un'unità eterna. Tra i suoi allievi, presso Salerno, tra gli altri, ricordiamo, Rosselli, filosofo calabrese autore di un testo molto controverso, Apologeticus adversos cucullatos (Parma), in cui cerca di affermare le sue dottrine che tendono a discostarsi da quello del suo maestro. Lo si ritiene protagonista di un curioso episodio. Pubblica il trattato “De regnandi peritia” ludica, ludicra, intellectus, animo intelligere, nous, intellectus passivus, intellectus activus, intellectus agens, intellectus possibilis, intellectus passibilis, what is so ludicrious about dialectis?– la dialettica ludrica”, Dreaming” – Malcolm, “Dreaming. Grice: Carissimo Nifo, confesso che la tua “retorica ludicra” mi ha sempre divertito! Ma dimmi: davvero pensi che l’anima possa essere oggetto di scherzo filosofico, o rischiamo che qualcuno ci accusi di prenderla… troppo alla leggera? Nifo: Ah, Grice, la filosofia senza un po’ di gioco è come l’anima senza corpo: non si regge! E poi, se anche Leone X rideva delle mie dispute, vuol dire che perfino i papi apprezzano il lato burlesco della metafisica! Grice: Vedi, caro Nifo, anch’io ho sempre pensato che l’ironia sia il sale delle conversazioni profonde—un po’ come l’intelletto agente che illumina le nostre notti insonni a Oxford. E poi, chi potrebbe resistere a una buona battuta sull’anima immortale? Nifo: Grice, dicono a Sessa che una risata prolunga la vita… magari, se Pomponazzi avesse sorriso un po’ di più, avrebbe creduto anche lui nell’immortalità dell’anima! Ma ora dimmi: tu, tra un gioco di parole e una disputa, da che parte stai? Nifo, Agostino (1514). De intellectu. Napoli.

Publio Nigidio Figulo (Roma): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale -- A comparison between H. P. Grice and Publius Nigidius Figulus with respect to reason‑governed conversational meaning highlights a shared conviction that intelligible communication is regulated by rational norms that transcend mere verbal form. Nigidius, especially in his reflections on gesture, grammar, and fate, treats communicative acts as embedded in a broader rational and cosmic order shaped by Pythagorean harmony: gestures, silences, and grammatical deviations signify only insofar as they are integrated into a rationally interpretable practice shared by interlocutors. Meaning, for him, is not exhausted by words but emerges from the coordinated use of signs governed by ratio, where failure of understanding calls for rational repair through explication. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature relocates a structurally similar insight into a modern, secular framework: conversational meaning is generated by the hearer’s rational reconstruction of speaker intentions under the assumption that discourse is cooperative and normatively constrained. While Nigidius grounds conversational rationality in metaphysical, religious, and cosmological principles, and Grice articulates it in terms of practical reason, intentions, and maxims, both converge on the idea that communication is intelligible only because participants implicitly recognize and respond to a rational order that governs not just what is said, but how deviations, gestures, and apparent irregularities count as meaningful within conversation.

Grice: “N. is my kind of philosopher. He wrote a little essay on ‘gestures’ which surely inspired me to refute Peirce about gestures NOT being vehicles by which an utterer can ‘signify’. Like my joint seminars with Staal, N. elaborated on ‘grammatical’ questions – and I must say N. had a better ear for grammatical improperties than Staal himself!” -- Filosofo italiano. Friend of Cicerone. N. enjoys a great reputation for learning. However, N. is on the wrong side of the civil war between Pompeo and GIULIO  Cesare, and Cesare sends him into exile – ‘which is worse than death for not a few Roman’ (Grice). N. is particularly interested in Pythagoreanism and is a leading figure in its revival at Rome. ‘Like Witters’ (Grice), N. specialises in the mystical side of Pythagoreanism and is credited with occult powers. N. è una personalità assai notevole. Senatore, pretore e ascoltatissimo consigliere di CICERONE  nel momento critico della congiura di CATILINA . Nella guerra civile, si schiera col partito di POMPEO  e dopo la sconfitta di questo vive in esilio. Nella vita politica occupa sempre posizioni secondarie. Ha fama notevole per l'ampiezza del suo sapere che lo fa ritenere il più dotto dei romani al pari di VARRONE , che però lo supera per ampiezza di cultura. CICERONE  afferma che fa risorgere le credenze della setta di Crotona come dottrina filosofica. Ma effettivamente è riapparso come pitagorismo in Alessandria, tanto è vero che ad esso appartenne Bolos di Mendes, o Bolos Democrito. Quindi l’affermazione di CICERONE  su lui si limita al mondo romano. Raccogge intorno à sè un circolo di 'crotonesi' che permite ai suol nemici personali di parlare di una factio. Il suo sforzo di fondere l'insegnamento della setta di Crotona – nella quale vede la verità su filosofia, astronomia e scienze occulte -- con credenze, oltrechè romane, etrusche. Suscita l'accusa di infedeltà alla 'religione' o culto ufficiale dello stato romano. Publio Nigidio Figulo. GRICEVS: Nigidivs, audivi te de gestibus disserere—an vera est sententia tua, gestus esse signa, quae verba superant? NIGIDIVS: O Gricevs, certissime! Saepe gestus magis valent quam mille verba—Ciceroni ego saepe oculis tantum loquebar, sed Pompeo manibus. Nimis enim arguta lingua Romana est! GRICEVS: Quid, si gestus non intelleguntur? Ego in Oxonia saepe manum levavi, sed discipuli putabant me numerum dare, non sententiam! NIGIDIVS: Gricevs, tunc ratio conversationalis adest: explicandum, non solum gestu, sed etiam verbo! Melius est, si Romae, gestus cum vino misceamus—sic omnes intellegunt, etiam qui verba amittunt. Nigidio, Publio N. Figulo (a. u. c. DCCIX). De fato. Roma: s.n.

Nisio (Samnium, Bojano, Campobasso, Molise): la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano -- Roma – In Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, conversation is structured by rational expectations shared by interlocutors, formalized in the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, which allow hearers to infer intended meaning beyond what is explicitly said through calculable implicatures grounded in mutual recognition of communicative purpose and practical reason; the Oxonian emphasis on tutelage and intellectual lineage mirrors this model’s focus on individual agents who generate and interpret meaning by assuming rational cooperation. By contrast, the figure of Nisio, presented as a pupil of Panaetius operating within the Roman portico tradition, embodies a more socially embedded and reciprocal conception of conversational rationality: dialogue is not primarily a matter of individual inferential calculation governed by abstract maxims, but a shared ethical practice in which speaking and listening are equally formative, authority is porous, and meaning emerges through lived interaction within a community. Where Grice analyzes conversation as a rule-governed activity explainable by rational reconstruction, Nisio’s Stoic-inflected perspective treats reason as immanent in the conversational setting itself, cultivated through mutual illumination rather than derived from theoretical principles, so that rationality is not imposed on conversation from without but grows organically through dialogic participation, making conversational meaning less a product of strategic inference than of shared moral and social orientation. Grice: “At Oxford, it’s all about ‘the pupil of’ as any reader of the Who’s Who will agree. I was myself Hardie’s tutor – Hardie being a Scots who at times I felt like he should have been tutoring pupils at St. Andrews, rather – and I was the tutor to Strawson. On the other hand, Nisio was the pupil of Panezio --, but Cicero is silent about who TUTORED Panezio, or whether Nisio did tutor any other than his son!” -- A pupil of Panezio. GRICEVS: Nisivs, dic mihi: in Oxonia omnes curiosi sunt de discipulis et magistris, quasi lex omnium philosophorum sit: “quis cuius discipulus?” Sed tu, discipulus Panezii, porticum Romanum elegisti, non atrium Oxoniense! Nisio: Gricevs, ad porticum Romanum venimus ut rationem conversandi discamus: hic, discipulus Panezii, magister non solum docet, sed etiam audit. In Samnio, dialogus est via sapientiae—magister et discipulus saepe sedent in eodem banco, ut pane et vino communi fruuntur. Gricevs: Quam pulchrum, Nisivs! In Oxonia, saepe disputamus utrum magister debet semper dux esse, an discipulus etiam possit invenire viam suam. Sed fortasse, Roma docet nos: philosophia vera fit ubi omnes partes audiri possunt, et porticus fit locus in quo veritas crescere potest. Nisio: Haec est vera sapientia, Gricevs: magistri et discipuli mutuo se illuminant, sicut lumen porticus Romanorum. Ego Panezii discipulus, sed filius et pater simul, et in dialogo nos omnes crescimus. Conversatione genuina, nomen nostrum fit clarum, et ratio fit communis. Nisio (a. u. c. CCXL). Dicta. Roma

Mario Alberto Nizolio (Brescello, Emilia): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale – In Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning, communication is explained through the rational coordination of speakers and hearers who rely on shared expectations of cooperation, articulated in the Cooperative Principle and its maxims, to derive conversational implicatures that go beyond literal sentence meaning; meaning is thus not located in inherited vocabularies but in the reasoned recognition of intentions within ordinary linguistic practice. Mario Alberto Nizolio, by contrast, anticipates a complementary but historically deeper stance: for him, conversational reason and implicature are not grounded primarily in the vernacular as spontaneous usage, but in the disciplined recovery of Cicero’s linguistic rationality, where philosophical meaning emerges from the grammar, lexical choices, and coinages of a paradigmatic language already shaped by communal reasoning. Where Grice reconstructs implicature as a calculable product of rational inference in dialogue, Nizolio treats it as something already sedimented in language itself, especially in Ciceronian Latin, whose terms such as quantity or intention crystallize patterns of thought prior to any explicit theory of pragmatics; thus Grice offers an abstract, analytic account of how interlocutors generate meaning by reasoning about one another, while Nizolio offers a humanist and anti-scholastic account in which reason-governed conversation is sustained by historically exemplified linguistic practices that keep philosophy concrete, dialogical, and resistant to empty abstraction. Grice: “I am surprised that Austin, a double first in literae humaniores, like me, would complain of philosophical jargon like ‘volition’ or ‘intention.’ Cicero had to COIN those terms, and not even Marcus Anthony opposed!” N. considers that the start fo philosophical inquiry is not so much the vernacular, as Grice calls it, but Cicerone’s vnacular. His ‘thesaurus ciceronianus’ is meant to provide context for some of Cicerone’s most brilliant coinages – some of them used by Kant, etc. – like ‘quantity’ and such! Filosofo italiano. Brescello, Reggio Emilia, Emilia Romagna. Grice: “I read Nizolio and it’s like reading myself!” – Insegna a Brescia e Parma. Pubblica il lessico Observationes in M. Tullium CICERONE, Brescia, il Thesaurus CICERONE, Venezia, Facciolati, e il lexicon CICERONE, Venezia, Facciolati. Ha una lunga polemica con MAIORAGIO per una critica portata da quest'ultimo a CICERONE che, iniziata con la Epistola ad M. A. Majoragium, prosegue con l'antapologia e si conclude con i De veris principiis et vera ratione philosophandi contra pseudo-philosophos, Parma, scritto contro gli scholastici, che interessarono Leibniz al punto che questi li fa ristampare premettendogli il titolo Anti-barbarus Philosophicus, sive philosophia scholasticorum impugnata, con una prefazione ed una lettera a Thomasius sulla dottrina del LIZIO, Francofurti, Roma, Bocca. E chiamato da Gonzaga a Sabbioneta. Contemporaneamente alle critiche di Ramo alla logica dei lizii, anche per lui occorre sostituire all'astrattezza di quella logica un pensiero che sia concretamente legato al reale, e a questo scopo la strada maestra sta nel ritrovare i processi del pensiero direttamente nella struttura grammaticale dell’italiano. Individua cinque principi per fare della buona filosofia. Cicerone, lexicon ciceronianus, Antonino, Leibniz’s ‘anti-barbaro’. il thesaurus ciceronianus. Grice: Caro Nizolio, ogni volta che leggo il tuo "Thesaurus Ciceronianus" mi sembra di riscoprire il cuore pulsante della filosofia: la chiarezza della lingua, la ricchezza delle idee. In Inghilterra spesso ci lamentiamo dei termini filosofici, ma tu ci insegni che la vera filosofia nasce proprio dal linguaggio di Cicerone! Nizolio: Grice, mi lusinga sentirlo da uno studioso raffinato come te! La mia battaglia contro i "pseudo-philosophos" è proprio questa: restituire alla filosofia la sua concretezza, togliendole l'astrattezza dei barbari e riportandola all'autenticità del pensiero ciceroniano. Grice: E la tua polemica con Maioragio è un esempio magistrale di come la conversazione filosofica debba essere vivace e fondata sulla grammatica e sul reale. Da noi, a Oxford, si dice che "il pane va chiamato pane"—proprio come tu insegni! Nizolio: Grice, la filosofia è dialogo, e la verità si trova nell’incontro tra pensiero e parola. Se riuscissimo sempre a "chiamare le cose col loro nome", forse avremmo meno "insolubilia" e più chiarezza. Grazie per questo scambio genuino: come direbbe Cicerone, "parlare è pensare insieme"! Nizolio, Mario Alberto (1535). Observationes in Ciceronem. Ex Prato Albuini

Augusto Del Noce (Pistoia, Toscana): l’implicatura conversazionale – la polemica contro il fascismo di Gentile -- In Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning, implicature arises from the rational expectations that speakers and hearers bring to dialogue: meaning is generated through cooperative inference, largely abstracted from historical contingencies, so that linguistic philosophy becomes a way of healing intellectual life after collective trauma by focusing on ordinary language and shared rational norms. N. approaches conversational implication from an almost opposite horizon: for him, conversation, philosophy, and meaning are inseparable from history, politics, and metaphysics, so that what is implied in discourse cannot be detached from the crisis of modernity, the legacy of Gentile’s fascism, or the unresolved tension between immanence and transcendence. Where Grice treats conversational reason as a universal mechanism that allows interlocutors to escape ideological φορτίο by appealing to tacit rules of cooperation, Del Noce reads implicature historically, as the unspoken residue carried by concepts forged within rationalism, Marxism, or fascism, and therefore as something that must be critically uncovered rather than neutrally reconstructed. Grice’s Oxford project aims to suspend historical weight to clarify meaning, whereas Del Noce insists that meaning is always already burdened by history and theology, so that true dialogue requires confronting the implicit philosophical commitments of modern discourse itself; implicature, for Grice, secures mutual understanding, while for Del Noce it exposes the hidden metaphysical wagers that make modern conversation politically and morally fraught. Grice: “Only in Italy, philosophy and history are so connected; it would be as if we at Oxford after the war would be only concerned with understanding Churchill!” Grice: “For us, to do linguistic philosophy was to get away from post-tramautic stress disorder acquired during what Winthrop stupidly called the ‘phoney’ war!” – Grice: “It’s not difficult to understand why Noce’s notes on Gentile were only published posthumously!” -- essential Italian philosopher. «Certo i cattolici hanno un vizio maledetto: pensare alla forza della modernità e ignorare come questa modernità, nei limiti in cui pensa di voler negare la trascendenza religiosa, attraversi oggi la sua massima crisi, riconosciuta anche da certi scrittori laici.»  (Risposte alla scristianità, da Il Sabato). Ttitolare della cattedra di "Storia delle dottrine politiche" all'Università La Sapienza di Roma.  Studioso del razionalismo cartesiano e del pensiero moderno (Hegel, Marx), analizzò le radici filosofiche e teologiche della crisi della modernità, ricostruendo con cura le contraddizioni interne dell'immanentismo.  Argomentò l'incompatibilità tra marxismo, umanesimo, ed altri sistemi di pensiero che propugnavano la liberazione secolare dell'uomo e la dottrina cristiana (affermò: "solo il Redentore può emancipare"). Sostenne tenacemente, per tali motivi, l'impossibilità del dialogo tra cattolici e comunisti e previde il "suicidio della rivoluzione". Studioso del fascismo, sostenne che tale ideologia fosse peraltro in continuità con il comunismo e fosse anch'esso un momento della secolarizzazione della modernità. Sostenne, inoltre, l'esistenza di molti punti di contatto tra il fascismo e il pensiero dei sessantottini. Filosofo della politica, preconizzò la crisi del socialismo reale, mentre esso viveva la sua massima espansione a livello mondiale. saggio su Gentile e il fascismo, Faggi, Serbati, Spir, Vidari, Rensi, Martinetti, Juvalta, Massantini, Catelli, Capograssi. Grice: Caro Noce, devo confessare che parlare di filosofia in Italia è come prendere un caffè a Pistoia: sempre un po’ di storia, un pizzico di polemica e quel retrogusto di modernità in crisi! Noce: Eh, caro Grice, qui da noi la filosofia non si beve mai da sola! Gentile, fascismo, marxismo… tutto finisce nel bicchiere, ma ti avverto: la modernità ha lasciato il fondo amaro, e i cattolici cercano ancora la zuccheriera! Grice: Da noi a Oxford, dopo la guerra, la filosofia serviva per dimenticare il ‘phoney war’ e Churchill… Ma a quanto pare, voi italiani preferite filosofare sul perché la rivoluzione si suicida piuttosto che godervi una pausa! Noce: Grice, la filosofia politica qui è come la pasta: se la scuoti troppo, rischi di far saltare anche il ragù! Meglio discutere con ironia, perché tra secolarizzazione e trascendenza, il vero dialogo sta tutto nel condimento! Noce, Augusto Del (1934). L’anti-cartesianismo di Malebranche. Rivista di Filosofia Neo‑Scolastica

Palla di Noferi Strozzi (Firenze, Toscana): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale della setta di Firenze – A comparison between Grice and Palla di Noferi Strozzi helps frame Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning in a historical-social key rather than a narrowly academic one: where Grice systematizes implicature as arising from shared rational expectations governing cooperative conversation, Palla Strozzi exemplifies a lived, pre‑theoretical practice of such reasoned conversational exchange embedded in Florentine civic and cultural life. Grice’s own preference for what he called “Athenian dialectic” implicitly downgrades other philosophical environments as “sects,” yet Palla’s Florence fits remarkably well with Grice’s core insight that meaning flourishes where rational interlocutors share norms, backgrounds, and communal purposes. Palla was not a system‑builder and never held a university post, but his role as patron, mentor, and convener of learned conversation—centered on his library and his cultivated social spaces—shows conversational reason operating through example, taste, and shared cultural competence rather than formal doctrine. In this sense, Florence functions as a “sect” only in Grice’s ironic taxonomy: it is precisely the kind of environment where implicature thrives, because much is meant without being said, relying on common training in classical texts, art, and civic values. Palla’s own Diario, attested as a fifteenth‑century manuscript source, confirms a world in which reflection, political judgment, and cultural meaning are negotiated conversationally rather than scholastically, aligning him with Grice in spirit if not in method: both treat conversation not as ornament, but as the medium in which rational meaning, social norms, and philosophical significance are generated and sustained. Grice would often speak of the ‘Athenian dialectic’ – by which he meant just Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – and none of the ‘minor’ schools other than the Agora –where Socrates preached barefoot, the Academy, or the Lycaeum --. Grice’s implicature seems to be that he would deem those ‘minor’ – pre-socratic and post-socratic or Hellenistic schools – as ‘minor – ‘sects.’ Italians more or less behave similarly. Other than Bologna, everything is more or less a ‘sect’, including whatever happens at Florence! Filosofo fiorentino. Filosofo toscano. Filosofo italiano. Firenze, Toscana. Important Italian philosopher, especially influential at what Grice called Italy’s Oxford, i. e. Firenze“Palla Strozzi was more a mentor than a philosopher, but I would consider him both a Grecian and Griceian in spirit.” alla Strozzi   Palla e Lorenzo Strozzi. Dettaglio dell'Adorazione dei Magi di Gentile da Fabriano. Grazie alla ricchezza accumulata nelle ultime generazioni dalla sua famiglia, il padre puo far istruire il figlio da filosofi, e grazie all'interesse e all'intelligenza, divenne di fatto uno dei più fini uomini di cultura fiorentini. Ricco e colto, commissiona numerose opere d'arte, tra le quali la Cappella N. nella Basilica di Santa Trinita, opera di Brunelleschi e Ghiberti. La cappella, progetto irrealizzato da N., venne fatta erigere in la sua memoria e ne ospita la sepoltura monumentale. Per questo ambiente commissiona l'Adorazione dei Magi. Grice: “His main claim to philosophical fame is in his character- unlike Alibizi’s and indeed Medici. He loved freedom, and chose to settle in Padova, although his roots were well in Firenze. He built hiw palace in Padova in Prato del Vallo to gather philosophers, since what’s the good of knowing the classics if you cannot converse? He never touched a university! His ‘bibliotheca’ is legendary! “Beautiful painting (by Gentile da Fabriano) of Noferi. Very Italian in an exotic sort of way!” – Grice. Refs.:, " Grice: Caro Noferi, a Oxford diciamo che senza università non c’è filosofia, ma tu sembri aver costruito una biblioteca più famosa dell’Accademia stessa… Firenze sarà anche una “setta”, ma che spirito di gruppo! Noferi: Ebbene, Grice, meglio una setta con belle cappelle e buoni pittori che un’Accademia dove si discute solo a stomaco vuoto! A Firenze preferiamo una conversazione con vino, arte e qualche implicatura nascosta tra le righe. Grice: Ammetto che il tuo spirito fiorentino mi affascina: la biblioteca, le chiacchiere, e persino Brunelleschi che progetta per te! Forse la vera filosofia nasce più facilmente in una loggia che in un’aula. Noferi: Esatto, Grice! Qui a Firenze si dice: “Senza conversazione, anche il pensiero più alto resta chiuso in soffitta… Meglio scendere in salotto, tra amici, capolavori e un buon bicchiere!” Noferi, Palla di N. Strozzi. (1415). Diario. Firenze.

Giovanni Andrea de Nola (Crotone, Calabria): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale dell’urina. A comparison between Grice and Giovanni Andrea de Nola situates Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning within a broader Aristotelian and medical tradition, where meaning emerges through regulated, practice‑bound interpretation rather than abstract stipulation. Grice’s interest in the multiplicity of predication, especially in his discussions of “medical” as an analogically unified term, mirrors de Nola’s medical‑philosophical concern with how signs are interpreted across contexts, most strikingly in his analysis of urine and bodily sediment. For Grice, conversational implicature arises from shared rational expectations that allow interlocutors to move from what is said to what is meant; for de Nola, medical signs function similarly, requiring the physician to infer meaning from observable phenomena by appealing to proportionality, analogy, and practical reason rather than fixed definition. Grice’s critique of reducing unity of meaning to a single “focal” structure, and his insistence on multiple modes of unification in signification, finds a historical counterpart in de Nola’s insistence that sanitas is not a single homogeneous property but instantiated diversely across healthy and diseased bodies. In this sense, de Nola’s medical reasoning exemplifies a pre‑modern anticipation of Gricean insight: meanings, whether conversational or diagnostic, are governed by rational norms shared within a practice, sustained by communal expertise, and made intelligible through inference rather than explicit rule, so that medicine itself appears as a specialized form of reason‑guided conversation between nature, practitioner, and community. Grice: “At Oxford, we are proud of our philosophy, at Bologna, and in Italy in general, they are proud of their physicians, as they call them – students of nature!”. In “Aristotle on the multiplicity of being” and in his unpublications, Grice considers – in the seminar on Categories with his former pupil Srawson – possible predications for ‘medical’ --. In his earlier reflections, Grice is concerned, like Aristotle, with the variety of such predications – ‘medical practice,’ ‘medical herb,’ ‘medical science,’ ‘medical person’. In ‘Multiplicity,’ he goes further. He is interested in refuting Owen, an Anglo-Welsh philosopher, former pupil of Ryle, who had made ‘focal unification’ a bit of the favourite jargon of the day. For Grice, ‘focal’ unification is just ONE type of such ‘unification’ in ‘signification.’ There is, of course, analogical unification, and recursive unification. Grice goes on to propose an exploration in what Aristotle might have had in mind when choosing ‘medical’ as his choice for ‘analogical’ or proportional unification – and comes out with something resembling his excursions into ‘theory-theory’. ‘Medical’ may thus be a bit of the vocabulary of the ‘lay’ or the ‘vulgar,’ for which the ‘learned’ is trying to provide his ‘rational’ or ‘logical’ ‘re-construction’ – Grice restricts the use of ‘construction’ to such routines for which there is no counterpart in the vernacular. Di origini napoletane e zio di Molisi, insegna per lungo tempo a Napoli. Discepolo di Altomare, divenne noto per suo saggio, “Quod sedimentum sanorum, aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei adversus Ferdinandum Cassanum et alios contrarium sentientes.” Cf. Marruncelli, Elementi dell'arte di ragionare in medicina” Crotone, Plato, Nola-Molise, corpus sanum, focal unification, Owen, Pantzig, brennpunktbedeutung, Aristotle, Metafisica, ‘unificazione focale’ – universale: ‘sanitas’ instantiazione: corpus sanum, corpi sani. Grice: Caro Nola, in Inghilterra siamo fieri della nostra filosofia, ma non posso non ammirare la tradizione medica italiana, soprattutto quella calabrese! Dimmi, come riesci a legare la pratica medica alla filosofia della ragione conversazionale? Nola: Grice, la tua domanda è tanto profonda quanto semplice! In Calabria, consideriamo ogni parola e ogni diagnosi come frutto di una conversazione genuina. Anche nell’urina, ci vediamo tracce del dialogo tra corpo e mente: la medicina è sempre una questione di proporzione, analogia e significatione. Grice: Che raffinata prospettiva, de Nola! A Oxford discutiamo spesso di “focal unification” nei predicati medici, ma sono sempre stato affascinato da come tu sappia integrare la logica aristotelica con la pratica quotidiana, persino nell’interpretazione dei segni corporei. Nola: Grice, la tua eleganza dialettica è fonte di ispirazione. Tra Napoli e Crotone abbiamo imparato che “sanitas” si manifesta in molte forme, e ogni corpus sanum è un’istanza unica, proprio come ogni conversazione. La logica e la medicina camminano insieme, perché svelano la verità attraverso la pluralità dei segni! Nola, Giovanni Andrea de (1562). Quod sedimentum sanorum, aegrorumque corporum non sit eiusdem speciei adversus Ferdinandum Cassanum & alios contrarium sentientes. Venezia: Bevilacqua

Giovanni Campano da Novara (Novara, Piemonte): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale d’Euclide. A comparison between Grice and N. brings into focus two very different but unexpectedly convergent ways of thinking about meaning, reason, and inference, one grounded in twentieth‑century analytic philosophy of language and the other embedded in medieval mathematical, astronomical, and exegetical practice. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning treats communication as inseparable from rational inference: what a speaker means is not exhausted by what is explicitly said but depends on what a rational, cooperative hearer is licensed to infer, given shared norms and purposes. For Campano, working in the thirteenth century with Euclid, astronomy, and astrology, meaning is likewise not exhausted by formal demonstration: the geometrical proof, the astronomical model, or even the mathematical calculation acquires its full sense only within a web of explanatory expectations, interpretive traditions, and worldly applications, ranging from pedagogy to cosmology. Where Grice articulates implicature as a systematic feature of ordinary conversation, Campano practices an implicit theory of implicature in commentary and calculation, treating diagrams, ratios, and demonstrations as communicative acts whose significance depends on what a trained reader can reasonably draw out beyond the written text. Grice’s famous impatience with Euclid as “not philosophical enough” at Oxford paradoxically highlights the shared concern: Euclidean proof presupposes a reader who already grasps what counts as obvious, relevant, or explanatory, just as Gricean conversation presupposes interlocutors sensitive to rational norms. Campano’s blending of geometry with astronomy and astrology pushes this further, suggesting that reasoned meaning may extend across domains, so that inference operates not only within formal proof but also in interpretive judgment about the world. In this sense, Grice theorizes explicitly what Campano enacts implicitly: meaning as something governed by reason, but never fully contained in explicit form, whether the medium is everyday language or mathematical demonstration.  “At Oxford,’ Grice says, “we don’t do Euclid – nor does he do us!” – Euclid is not considered philosophical enough. There is a special faculty for that, an a special chair – the Regius professor of Mathematics --. Grice would often admire a mathematician – ‘provided he is from the other place’. He meant Hardy – and was fascinated by an episode ‘that could never have taken place at Oxford – within the Debating Union --. Hardy is challenged to the ‘alleged obviousness’ of one of Euclide’s theorems, leaves the lecture room, for 24 minutes – returns, and responds to the challenger: “It IS obvious!” – Keywords: astronomy, astrology – what science? Filosofo italiano. Novara, Piemonte. m. Viterbo.  matematico, astronomo e astrologo italiano. Tra i più importanti scienziati e matematic (anche Bacone lo cita come uno dei più grandi matematici a lui contemporanei), Campano è conosciuto anche come Johannes Campanus (che è tuttavia anche il nome di un Johannes Campanus anabattista belga). Elementa geometriae, Campano da N. Tetragonismus idest circuli quadratura. Pubblicato un'edizione degl’Elementa geometriae d’Euclide ed un importante commento all'opera, introducendo un sistema di calcolo degli angoli del pentagono. Il testo e utilizzato per circa due secoli e sarà stampato a Venezia (Preclarissimus liber elementorum Euclidis). L'opera si basa su una traduzione in lingua araba dell'originale testo greco. N. ha inoltre probabilmente presente la traduzione latina eseguita da Bath. Cappellano di papa Urbano IV (in un documento delle Curia pontificia se ne attesta la presenza e se ne parla come di uno dei quattro migliori matematici viventi) e medico personale di papa Bonifacio VIII e viaggia in Arabia e in Spagna. Grice: Caro Novara, a Oxford diciamo spesso che Euclide non è mai stato abbastanza filosofico per noi. Ma dimmi, in Piemonte, si trova la geometria nei teoremi o tra le stelle? Novara: Ah Grice, qui la geometria si intreccia perfino con l’astrologia! Se vuoi sapere dove sta la verità, osserva i pentagoni: sono più misteriosi di una notte piemontese! Grice: Quindi, se ti chiedessi il segreto del calcolo degli angoli, mi risponderesti con una formula o con una profezia? Novara: Dipende, Grice! Qui tra Novara e Viterbo, la matematica si fa anche nelle chiacchiere: ogni angolo ha la sua implicatura, e ogni teorema ha il suo destino. Se non ci credi, chiedi a Bacone! Novara, Giovanni Campano da (1255). Euclidis Elementa. Roma.

Mario Novaro (Diano Maria, Liguria): la ragione conversazionale e implicatura conversazionale ligure -- l’infinito del ponente. A comparison between Grice and N. brings out two parallel but differently situated engagements with reason, inference, and the infinite as governing structures of meaning. Grice’s theory of reason‑governed conversational meaning insists that what is meant in conversation depends not on literal content alone but on rational expectations, shared norms, and the hearer’s capacity to infer beyond what is said, even when this invites encounters with the infinite, whether as an unbounded set of stars in ordinary speech or as a potential regress in semantic analysis. Novaro, by contrast, approaches the infinite not as a threat to rational explanation but as an object of disciplined philosophical inquiry, most clearly in his Italian treatise on the concept of infinity and the cosmological problem, where mathematical, metaphysical, and experiential dimensions are held together. Where Grice seeks to tame infinite regress through rational constraints such as anti‑sneak clauses, Novaro treats the infinite as something already partially known, manageable through philosophical training and reflection, a stance shaped by his formation in late nineteenth‑century philosophy and by the Ligurian intellectual milieu in which landscape, echo, and gradual extension matter as much as formal abstraction. In this light, Grice’s implicature emerges as a dynamic, context‑sensitive echoing of reason within conversation, while Novaro’s “Ligurian implicature” can be read as a culturally inflected sensitivity to how meaning accrues through accumulation, resonance, and indirectness. Both see reason as indispensable, but where Grice emphasizes the regulation of meaning in everyday communicative practice, Novaro exemplifies a broader philosophical confidence that even the infinite, whether conceptual or experiential, can be integrated into rational understanding rather than merely curtailed. Grice dwelt with the infinite early on in his career. ‘I kow that there are infinitely many stars,’ Grice claimed, was a piece of nonsense which, contra Austin, was bound to appear in ‘the vernacular’ or ‘the vulgar’. Grice’s tirade is against those defensors of ‘ordinary language’ that couldn’t recognise ‘ordinary’ from their elbow! At a later stage of his development, Grice re-encountered the infinite in terms of the ‘regressus ad infinitum.’ True, he proposes an ‘anti-sneak’ clause to cut that regress short. But, in response to some possible objection to this as ‘ad hoc’ he would comment: ‘And if the ‘analysans’ of ‘… significat …’ DOES appeal to the infinite – what?!” – Things were different for N., who knew that he knew the infinite – at least for the purposes of his ‘laurea’ – recall that ‘laurea’ occurs in Grice’s degree earned at Oxford, that of BACCA-LAUREVS in artibus --.  Grice: “N.  comes from my favourite area in Italy, “La riviera ligure”!” Grice: “Novaro wrote a nice little treatise on the nature of the infinite – a concept which fascinates me!” --Fratello di Novaro, nacque da famiglia economicamente agiata e dopo aver condotto brillantemente gli studi liceali, ottenendo la laurea a Torino. Si stabilì a Oneglia dove fu assessore comunale per il partito socialista. Dopo avere per breve tempo insegnato nel locale liceo, con i fratelli si occupò dell'industria olearia intestata alla madre Paolina Sasso.  Pur dedito all'attività imprenditoriale fece parte attiva della vita letteraria dei primo anni del Novecento e fondò la rivista “La Riviera Ligure,” da lui diretta fino alla sua cessazione. implicatura ligure, ‘la riviera ligure’, Grice echoing Kant, echo, implicature ecoica, Strawson’s ditto-theory of truth, Strawson’s echoic theory of truth, Skinner on echo – ecoico, eco, implicature ecoica, infinito, Lucrezio –Riviera Ligure. Grice: Caro Novaro, dimmi la verità: in Liguria l’infinito si trova più facilmente in una formula matematica o in una distesa di ulivi? Novaro: Ah Grice, qui l’infinito lo misuriamo a gocce d’olio! E se ti sembra poco, prova a contare quanti echi rimandano le nostre colline: è una regressione ad infinitum che anche Kant avrebbe apprezzato. Grice: Quindi, se ti chiedessi che cos’è l’implicatura ligure, mi risponderesti con una poesia o con una bottiglia? Novaro: In Liguria, Grice, la risposta migliore è sempre: “dipende dall’annata!” Ma una cosa è certa: tra filosofia e olio, l’infinito non manca mai! Novaro, Mario (1895). Il concetto di infinito e il problema cosmologico. Rome. Balbi.

Lucio Anneo Novato (Roma): la ragione conversazionale e il portico romano. In your Novato passage, Grice’s theory of reason-governed conversational meaning aligns neatly with the Roman “portico” setting and with Novatus/Gallio’s biographical position as a man of mediation: a provincial-born figure (Corduba by the usual ancient testimonies) rhetorically relocated into “Roma” by adoption and by senatorial office, just as an utterance can be relocated from its bare dictum into a socially intelligible act by the hearer’s rational uptake. Grice’s core thought is that what a speaker means is recoverable because participants presume a cooperative, norm-sensitive rationality (maxims, shared purposes, expectations of relevance and evidence), and the portico functions as an emblem of that public rational space: talk there is not private effusion but civic performance, where what is left unsaid must nonetheless be inferable if the exchange is to count as serious. Novatus, as Seneca’s addressee in De ira (to “Novatus”) and De vita beata (to “Gallio”), exemplifies the practical audience Grice needs: someone for whom philosophical counsel is not merely stated but designed to be taken up as guidance, reassurance, correction, or exhortation, i.e., as implicature-laden communicative action. The Campidoglio bells joke dramatizes Grice’s point about conversational “noise”: interference (literal or social) matters only because hearers are actively calculating speaker-meaning against a background of rational expectations, and so the very possibility of joking about tintinnabula presupposes a shared method for distinguishing signal from distraction. Finally, the punchline “if a philosopher sleeps, the implicature is…” turns Stoic sympathy into Gricean diagnostics: even silence, fatigue, or withdrawal becomes interpretable as meaning something, provided the participants are entitled—by the norms of the portico, the genre of philosophical conversation, and the assumed rational aims of the interlocutors—to treat it as evidence for a further intended point rather than as mere physical happenstance. Grice, as a ‘Midlands scholarship boy’ at Corpus, knew it well: the Romans would distinguish between one born within the sound of the bells of the Campidoglio, and one from the almost un-Roman provincial whence Novato hailed! Keywords. Filosofo italiano. Seneca’s brother. Adopted by Lucio Giunio Gallio. Seneca dedicates two of his philosophical dialogues to him. Seneca’s exhortations suggest that if Novato was not a follower of the Porch, he was a the very least a sympathiser.   GRICEVS: Salve, Novate! Dic mihi: in porticu Romano philosophari facilius est an in Campidoglio campanas audire? NOVATVS: O Grice, in porticu philosophari semper iucundum—sed campanae Campidoglio interdum plus sonant quam argumenta Senecae! GRICEVS: Quid? Tunc Seneca tibi epistulas mittere debet cum tintinnabulis annexis—ita nullus Romanus dormiet dum disputatio fit! NOVATVS: Hahaha! Grice, si philosophus dormiat, implicatura est: aut porticus nimis pacata aut Campidoglio nimis strepitans! Novato, Lucio Anneo (a. u. c. DCCXLIX). Dicta. Roma.

Camillo Novelli (Padova, Veneto). Filosofo. Fisico. Grice’s reason-governed account of meaning treats communication as a rational enterprise in which hearers recover what is meant by assuming the speaker is, by default, cooperating under shared norms; what is “meant” is therefore often larger than what is “said,” because it includes implicatures computed from context, expectations, and practical reasoning. In your Novelli vignette, the Padua voice of the “philosopher–physicist” pushes the same idea through the contrast between equations and their uptake: an equation is maximally explicit, but its role in inquiry still depends on what competent participants take it to be doing (explaining, idealizing, warning against category mistakes such as “relativity” versus “relativism,” or signaling methodological restraint). The Veneto proverb (“between saying and doing there is thinking”) fits Grice neatly: the missing middle term is the inferential work that turns a bare locution into communicative force, just as a formalism becomes meaningful only within a practice that licenses certain inferences and discourages others. The comic “periodic table with implicature next to sodium and potassium” is a good Gricean trope: it suggests that beyond the fixed inventory of elements (or fixed semantics) there is a systematic space of pragmatic consequences—non-written but rule-governed—without which talk (and even scientific talk) would be informationally inert. Finally, the bibliographic anchor to Novelli’s 1888 report on Venetian ceramics is useful as a realism-check: it lets “Novelli” function less as a verified physicist-philosopher and more as a Padua emblem for applied rational craft, where the same Gricean moral holds—precision is not opposed to wit or social inference; rather, precision is one of the norms that makes implicature calculable in the first place. Grice: Caro Novelli, a Oxford ci dicono che la fisica è per chi ama i numeri, ma tu da Padova, come fai a conciliare la filosofia con le equazioni? Novelli: Eh, Grice, in Veneto si dice “tra il dire e il fare c’è di mezzo il pensare!” Una buona formula filosofica può essere più esplosiva di una reazione chimica!  Grice: Allora mi sa che la tua tavola periodica ha anche la voce “implicatura” accanto a Sodio e Potassio… Novelli: Esatto! E guai a chi confonde la relatività col relativismo: qui a Padova ci tieniamo sia alla precisione sia alla battuta pronta, mica solo ai telescopi! Novelli, Camillo (1888). L’arte ceramica all’esposizione di Venezia. Roma: Botta.

Numa Pompilio (Cures Sabini, Fara in Sabina, Rieti, Lazio): la ragione conversazionale e l’implicatura conversazionale e la logica del regno – In the passage’s conceit, Numa Pompilio (Cures Sabini, today within Fara in Sabina, province of Rieti, Lazio) becomes a kind of archaic test-case for Grice’s idea that meaning in conversation is reason-governed: what matters is not only what is said (dictum) but what is made intelligible by a shared practical rationality that lets hearers compute an implicature. Grice’s Oxford joke—“one would hardly at Oxford call a ‘king’ a philosopher”—marks the institutional bias of the academy toward explicit theorizing, yet the Numa-myth reverses it: Rome “only saw wisdom through Numa,” precisely because Numa’s kingship is narrated as government by discourse, ritual, and negotiated normativity rather than by Romulus’ warrior literalism. On this reading, Numa’s “logic of the reign” looks like a political analogue of the Cooperative Principle: stability depends on public expectations, tacit coordination, and the managed gap between overt ordinance and culturally legible suggestion; even piety and ritual function like maxims whose authority lies in their uptake. The burned “book of Numa” sharpens the parallel: once the explicit text is destroyed, what survives is not the locution but the social residue—the teachable, recitable remainder that behaves like implicature (what a community can still recover, transmit, and treat as binding without an officially endorsed statement). Cicero’s polemic, denying a non-Roman (Crotone/Etruscan/Sabine) starting-point for philosophy, can then be cast as a struggle over who controls the conditions of recoverability—who gets to license which inferences as “Roman” rather than foreign. Finally, the biographical Grice details (Literae Humaniores, Corpus, Greek and Roman before anything else) underscore the ironic distance: he is trained to hear classical voices and their rational patterns, yet “he did not read Etrurian,” so the text jokes that he “missed most of Numa’s implicatures”—a neat way to say that implicature is not universal in the abstract, but keyed to shared encyclopedic knowledge, local precedent, and the historically situated competencies of a conversational community. Grice: “One would hardly at Oxford call a ‘king’ a philosopher – even if he was the second one!” – They say Romolo could not quite count as Plato’s ‘re filosofo’ – for one, he was an uncultivated, or wolf-cultivated – warrior, rather. ‘Rome only saw wisdom through Numa.’ Grice entered philosophy, as he should, though the sub-faculty, i. e. through the Faculty of Literae Humaniores, ad his was a classical scholarship to Corpus – His family having no ‘intention’ to matriculate in the city of dreaming spires. At Clifton, Grice read Greek and Roman (in that order) profusely. He did not read Etrurian, though, and thus missed most of Numa’s implicatures!” Keywords: Crotone, Roma. Filosofo italiano. Cures, Fara in Sabina, Rieti, Lazio. The second king of Rome. A book was discovered. It wasn’t written by Numa, but the Romans said it was. It was very philosophical. The Roman senate ordered that it should be burned. It was! But most Italians can recite by heart all the indiscriminate teachings it contained. The big polemic came from Cicero. He didn’t want Roman philosophy to have a start other than in Rome, so he denied the school of Crotone and much more any Etrurian influence via N. Still…  N.dal Promptuarii Iconum Insigniorum di Guillaume Rouillé 2º Re di Roma Predecessore Romolo Successore Tullo Ostilio Nascita Cures Dinastia Re latino-sabini ConiugeTazia Figli Pompilia N., Cures Sabini, -- è stato il secondo re di Roma, e il suo regno durò 42 anni. Numa Pompilio, di origine sabina, per la tradizione e la mitologia romana, tramandataci grazie soprattutto a Tito Livio e a Plutarco, che ne scrive anche una biografia, era noto per la sua pietà religiosa  e regna succedendo, come re di Roma, a Romolo. N. e un re pio, e in tutto il suo regno non combatté nemmeno una guerra. L'incoronazione di N. non avvenne immediatamente dopo la scomparsa di Romolo. Numa Pompilio. Numa.  Grice: Numa, dic mihi: philosophi apud Oxford reges vix existimant sapientes—sed tu, secundus rex Romae, quid de rationibus conversationalibus regni sentis? Numa: O Grice, Roma non semper ad bella, sed interdum ad dialogos spectat! Regnare, ut bene philosophari, est artem implicaturarum intellegere—et, si lupum inveneris, semper audi quam dicat! Grice: Sane, Numa! Sed, si librum tuum philosophicum senatus comburit, quid de implicaturis eius manet? Romae videntur omnia igni probata! Numa: Grice, implicaturae mea, sicut regnum, vivunt etiam post flammam! Et, si verba mea ardent, Italici tamen memoriam servare possunt—vel saltem in convivio recitare! Numa Pompilio (a. u. c. XXXIX). Dicta. Roma.